


Halle Studies in the Anthropology of Eurasia

Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology

Churches In-between

Greek Catholic Churches in Postsocialist Europe

Edited by Stéphanie Mahieu and Vlad Naumescu



LIT



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Cover Photo: Icon of Josaphat Kuntsevych (d. 1623), the first martyr saint of the Greek Catholics (Lutowiska, Southeast Poland, early twentieth century).

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Contents

	Preface	vii
	Acknowledgements	xiii
1	Introduction: Churches In-between *Stéphanie Mahieu and Vlad Naumescu*	1
PART ONE: Historical and Contemporary Overviews		**33**
2	Greek Catholics: Historical Background *Paul Robert Magocsi*	35
3	Developments since 1989	65
3.1	Hungary *Bertalan Pusztai*	67
3.2	Poland *Stanisław Stępień*	85
3.3	Romania *Lucian Turcescu and Lavinia Stan*	99
3.4	Slovakia *Stanislav Konečný*	111
3.5	Ukraine *Mariya Horiacha and Svitlana Hurkina*	125
3.6	North America *Peter Galadza*	143
PART TWO: In Search of Tradition: Internal Processes of Institutionalization		**155**
4	Continuities and Ruptures of a Religious Tradition: Making 'Orthodoxy' in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church *Vlad Naumescu*	157
5	Syncretism among the Greek Catholic Ukrainians in Southeast Poland *Juraj Buzalka*	183

6 (Re-)Orientalizing the Church: Reformism and Traditionalism within the Hungarian Greek Catholic Church 207
Stéphanie Mahieu

PART THREE: External Reordering: Property, Memory and Religious Competition 231

7 'Real Men' in Postsocialist Transition: The Greek Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Neoliberalism in a Transylvanian Village 233
Filippo M. Zerilli

8 Collective Memory and Religious Transmission: A Greek Catholic Example in Western Ukraine 255
Jacek Nowak

9 'Religion in Motion': Routes of Identification among Hungarian Greek Catholics in Subcarpathia 273
Bertalan Pusztai and Erzsébet Pilipkó

PART FOUR: Exceptional Moments: Pilgrimages and Apparitions 297

10 Greek Catholics of Zemplin: Dilemmas of Contemporary Identity Politics 299
Agnieszka Halemba

11 The Land of the Virgin Mary: A Greek Catholic Ukrainian Pilgrimage to Lourdes 319
Valérie Kozlowski

Contributors 333

Index 335

Preface

The Greek Catholic churches are a well-kept secret, at any rate for the great majority of sociocultural anthropologists. They have been significant actors in the modern history of Central Europe for more than four centuries, yet their very existence is something of a mystery, not only to scholars (outside small circles of regional specialists) but also to many citizens of the countries in which they are found. At the same time, these churches have always been controversial, politically as well as theologically. While some observers have seen in them a prototype for the reconciliation of Eastern and Western Christians, others perceive only an instrument of Western imperialism in the past and a continuing stumbling block to ecumenical dialogue today.

The diversity of the Greek Catholics' local adaptations is partly attributable to differences in structural position. They are a minority in all of the five states into which their homeland is currently divided. But the position of Greek Catholics in Ukraine, where they are outnumbered by Orthodox Christians (themselves fragmented into several churches) who share the same national identity, is very different from their position in Poland and Slovakia, where Greek Catholics are a small group in relation to Western Christian majorities professing a different national identity. In Hungary and Romania, the Greek Catholics identify overwhelmingly with the dominant nationality. However, as the only significant Eastern Church in a country marked by a plurality of Western Christian traditions the Hungarian Greek Catholics form a sharp contrast to their co-religionists in Romania, who are overshadowed by a dominant Romanian Orthodox Church. The picture is further complicated in all of these countries by a Ruthenian (Carpatho-Rusyn) identification that transcends the present political boundaries in this section of the Carpathians; for at least some Greek Catholics *Rusyn* or *Lemko* appears to be more meaningful than a mere regional designation.

Anthropologists can strive to make sense of this complexity by providing ethnographic accounts of how it is lived out in practice in particular communities. This volume is the first to provide a range of such studies for the Greek Catholics. However, the anthropological interest does not end there. The fascination of the Greek Catholics derives from their unique position 'between East and West' and the challenges they pose to general anthropological theories of religion, cultural change and *longue durée* history. Were they simply yet another element of diversity in a zone in which Protestantism was already complicating the long-established coexistence of Orthodox and Roman Catholic confessions? Or can we say that the creation of these churches brought together two 'cultures' or even distinct 'civilizations'? How adequate are terms such as 'syncretic' or 'hybrid' to describe the results of this religious interpenetration? What does the resurgence of

Greek Catholicism in countries where it was harshly repressed in the socialist decades tell us about the transmission of religious ideas more generally? Or has this revival less to do with religion per se and more to do with new forms of secular, national identity, which the Greek Catholic churches helped to incubate in earlier periods?

These are some of the larger questions raised by the contributors to this volume. Behind all the diversity, I would urge the reader to bear in mind some common factors. Contemporary anthropological investigations of religion sometimes neglect questions of economic development, inequality, and power (probably as a reaction to earlier approaches that viewed religious phenomena too mechanically as responses to changing material conditions). Today anthropologists tend to pay more attention than their predecessors to subjective experiences of religion, to embodiment and performance, the creation of meaning, the role of religion in healing and other important topics not addressed adequately hitherto. Yet it is clear that economic dislocation and material as well as spiritual insecurity have been major factors shaping the postsocialist religious landscape. In the case of the Greek Catholics there are strong reasons to insist that close attention to political economy is a precondition for understanding their predicament from the very beginning. Three dimensions of power seem especially crucial.

The first dimension I have in mind is the peculiar variant of imperialism which arose from long-term imbalances between East and West. In the sense in which we use these terms today, Christianity originated as an Eastern religion. It later became strongly associated with the rise of 'the West'. The very establishment of the Greek Catholic churches, beginning in the era of the Counter-Reformation, was an expression of Western domination. The states of Latin Christendom were economically and militarily stronger than their eastern neighbours, and the centralized Roman Catholic Church was able to dictate the theological conditions for Church Union to the decentralized, 'conciliar' churches of the East. The educational and general living standards of both clergy and congregations were higher in the West. This fundamental inequality can be compared with that which later shaped colonial relationships between the most powerful Western European states and their extra-European possessions and client states. In recent decades the social and cultural consequences of these processes have been extensively addressed by anthropologists and others, using concepts such as Orientalism. However, those working within paradigms such as 'postcolonialism' have paid relatively little attention to the distinctive forms of colonization that began in Central and Eastern Europe in the same era of overseas expansion. The Roman Catholic Church played a key role at both ends of Europe, but the story of how the Iberian powers pioneered modern imperialism in the

New World is much better known than the encounter that unfolded on the old continent with fellow Christians.

The second dimension of power is that located within the churches themselves. Anthropologists have drawn distinctions between the 'great' and 'little' traditions of world religions. Dichotomies such as 'orthodox versus folk' or 'doctrinal versus popular' have been used in much the same way. It was assumed that the former was somehow prior and 'official', and that the church would seek to impose this correct form whenever it noticed any serious deviation in the 'little tradition'. But how effective is the power of the church as an institution? The Unions that brought Greek Catholic churches into existence were not supposed to threaten the practical, ritual life of Eastern Christians. The peasants who formed the great majority of church members would have no occasion to notice references to theological issues (notably that of the *filioque*) in the small print of the Union documents. However, some Western actors, notably the Jesuits, were determined to promote far-reaching changes in virtually every area of religious life, and the Eastern churches were powerless to prevent this.

These power relations are often more subtle than appears at first sight. Even the highly centralized Roman Catholic Church has often experienced difficulties in managing the 'little' tradition. For example, most peasant apparitions of the Virgin Mary have no consequences beyond the lifetime of the visionary, but some give rise to local cults, and a select few are eventually granted official recognition, to become sites of mass pilgrimage such as Lourdes, Fatima, or Licheń. The dialogue between populace and elites is a complex one. Marian cults have long been instrumentalized by both ecclesiastical and secular authorities. The Virgin Mary was crowned as 'Queen of Poland' by the king of that state when his armies were facing disaster in the war against Sweden in the mid-seventeenth century. Simultaneously, at another level, her image was being transformed in Greek Catholic churches in line with the Latinization processes of the time, which affected not only icons but also church architecture, music, singing, and bodily practices of worship. It is too simple to attribute all this simply to unequal power relations between East and West in the general sense noted above. No doubt these played a part. The new icons were produced in workshops exposed to Western influences. New buildings were sometimes sponsored by elites aiming to raise their own social status by emulating the Western style. At the same time, however, one needs to recognize the tastes, actions and appropriations of ordinary Eastern Christian parishioners, who both preserved a great deal of their non-Latin heritage and modified the ideas coming from the West to accord with their own religious aesthetics and practices of popular piety. Moreover, although it seems clear that the general flow was from

West to East, we know that Latin Christians also borrowed from their Greek Catholic neighbours. In multi-religious districts, people observed each other's holidays, and popular practices (such as carol singing) could even merge at the local level. In short, some elements of popular religion were trans-denominational and they spread through processes of appropriation and emulation that were never fully controlled by ecclesiastical or secular hierarchies. Nowadays the Vatican organizes its churches to correspond with political boundaries, and the Virgin is harnessed to convey political messages that vary from state to state; but the forms of devotion to her remain transnationally syncretic throughout the Greek Catholic homeland.

Transnational forces must also be investigated in wider contexts, far outside the homeland, and this is the third context of power to which I wish to draw attention. I first met Greek Catholics in the course of rural fieldwork in southeast Poland in the late 1970s. There was no unanimity among those villagers concerning either secular identities or ecclesiastical politics, but everyone seemed to agree that they had in the past been unified by a pristine version of Byzantine Christianity. Only later did I realise that several of my early interlocutors had formed their opinions during extended sojourns in the United States and Canada. Even for those who had never lived outside Poland, the options available to them in contemporary debates had been significantly shaped through complex interactions in the diaspora, above all in North America in the early decades of the twentieth century. A wide-angled view of history is essential for understanding how ruptures and innovations can in the course of time be brought into line with a strong sense of tradition. Comparisons are facilitated in this volume by historical overviews for each separate country, as we draw the political boundaries today. These provide indispensable background for understanding the contemporary situation. But, as Paul Robert Magocsi reminds us in his introductory survey, the Greek Catholic Churches were shaped by international migration and unequal diaspora encounters long before modern borders crystallized and before terms such as globalization and transnationalism were taken up by social scientists.

These distinct contexts of power interact with each other. Thus the age of nationalism brought the first effective assertions of 'antisyncretism', that is, policies to restore a sharper boundary between the religious practices of Roman and Greek Catholics by bringing the latter back to their roots in the East. In recent years, antisyncretism has again been emphatically espoused by the Vatican, which insists that the Eastern Rite has equal status and – at least in its official, public pronouncements – deplores its 'corruption' through accumulated Latin accretions. Still, many Greek Catholics themselves resist these new pressures from above. They have become deeply

attached to the very accretions (the cult of the Sacred Heart seems to be the most prominent example) that are such an embarrassment to their elites. Nor can they easily abandon the habit of kneeling at the most sacred parts of the mass. Yet, when Greek Catholics in Poland under socialism had to choose between attending a Roman Catholic mass and the divine liturgy according to the Byzantine rite in an Orthodox church, most opted for the latter. The Eastern rite provided them with a sensuous appreciation of the sacred that touched them far more deeply than anything in the western repertoire.

The Greek Catholics have always been interstitial. Their churches were called into existence as the outcome of power politics played out without regard to the mass of the faithful. It seems to me that they could never develop a genuine synthesis of East and West; this was structurally precluded. Rather, they created a space for syncretism to flourish in many domains, but the strong tendency to Latinization has been countered in recent centuries by efforts to restore Eastern traditions. These efforts seldom impress Orthodox critics of the Greek Catholic churches, who view their very existence as a legacy of Western aggression. Given the undeniable element of truth in this diagnosis, outsiders might suppose that at some point, in the rarefied diplomacy of ecumenical rapprochement, a time will come when it will seem to seem politic to eliminate this anomaly. In other words, the Greek Catholic churches could be abolished by a decision taken far above the heads of their members, in just the same way that they were created in the first place. The trouble with this speculation is that it overlooks the very strong loyalties that have developed over four centuries. Some of those who, at one level of their consciousness, are fully aware of the contingencies and cultural borrowings which mark their church's history, retain a sense of adhering to a continuous ancient faith. Popular syncretism is not incompatible with a strong sense of identity: it seems safe to assume that the Greek Catholic churches have always been *authentic* to the great majority of their members. In several cases they seem to have profited from modern fusions of religious and national or regional identity. After four decades during which these churches as institutions ceased to exist (with the exception of Hungary and the former Yugoslavia), those who now in the new era of freedom proclaim the necessity to iron out all the impurities of the Greek Catholic 'little' tradition run up against a very strong sense of belonging. However, one lesson of anthropological research is that, precisely in an era of intensifying globalization, such rooted attachments continue to matter.

Chris Hann

Halle/Saale, October 2007

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Finally we would like to thank all the contributors for their patience throughout a lengthy process; this book is the result of their collective efforts.

Stéphanie Mahieu
Vlad Naumescu

Chapter 1
Introduction: Churches In-between

Stéphanie Mahieu and Vlad Naumescu

The Greek Catholic Churches (also called Eastern Rite Catholic Churches or *Uniat* Churches, although many Greek Catholics consider this latter term derogatory) are a fascinating topic for those interested not only in postsocialist religious phenomena, but also in the anthropology of religious mixture. In the past twenty years, they have aroused the interest of several anthropologists who, through Chris Hann's initiative, became involved with the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle. This book reflects the intellectual discussions that have taken place in Halle over the last few years on the recent development of the Greek Catholic Churches.

The Greek Catholic Churches are in communion with Rome but follow the Byzantine Rite, in common with the European Orthodox Churches.[1] They emerged between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries in the context of the Counter-Reformation, in the areas located across the Carpathian Mountains. In an effort to hinder the Reformation, it was proposed that, under certain conditions, these Orthodox dioceses unite with Rome, centuries after the Great Schism of 1054 between Western and Eastern Christianity.[2] Recognition of the Pope's authority was the main condition for acceptance into communion. In exchange for this union with the Vatican, the Greek Catholics obtained certain political rights from which they had previously been excluded. What were initially political creations, extending social and political rights, became transformed into lively churches that not only gained loyalty from their communities, but also developed an original synthesis with a distinctive religious identity, between Latin and Byzantine Christianity. Four centuries later, the Greek Catholic Churches straddle the

[1] The Orthodox Churches are autocephalous; each has its own rite and jurisdiction. Unlike the Catholic Church, they have no centralized authority.

[2] In 1054, the symbolic rupture between Rome and Constantinople occurred, but the mutual excommunication of Pope Leo IX and Patriarch Michael Cerularius had no immediate effect on church practices. From the eastern viewpoint, the rupture became irreversible in 1204 during the Fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople by the west. See Ducellier (1998), Roberson (1995).

border between Western and Eastern Christianity, often presented as a fault line of 'civilizations'. In his famous, and strongly criticized, book on the 'clash of civilizations', Samuel Huntington argued that the regions where Greek Catholics were once found in significant numbers (e.g. Galicia and Transylvania) belonged to the Western world (Huntington 1996). But the Greek Catholic Churches cannot be so easily put on one side or the other of the border between Western and Eastern Christianity. Rather, they should be considered a bridge between two cultural spheres, whose relations throughout the centuries have moved between conquest (the West of the East), compromise, and concord (Pelikan 1989: 4).

It is in their recent developments, however, that the European Greek Catholic Churches are absolutely fascinating. During the socialist era, the majority of these churches were proscribed (by forced unions with the Orthodox Churches).[3] In some cases, the former Greek Catholics, while attending other churches, were able to practice underground, outside legal institutional structures.[4] This 'practical adaptability' (Shlikhta 2004) contributed to the continued existence of the Greek Catholic Churches during the socialist period. In the years following the fall of the Berlin wall, these churches experienced a successful revival. This revival has not been easy; there has been harsh competition with the Orthodox, and sometimes the Roman Catholic Churches over properties taken by the communist regimes, but most of all over people's souls. At an internal level, the entire hierarchy, the schools and the seminaries, had to be reorganized almost from nothing. This was done on the basis of the existing clandestine structures, sometimes with the help of diaspora churches.[5] The switch from a small-scale, clandestine, intense religious life to a process of institutionalization and redefinition of the religious norm proved to be difficult and created internal tensions.

This book provides detailed ethnographic accounts of the revitalization of the Greek Catholic churches during the past fifteen years. Each chapter illustrates the challenges and doubts faced by these revived religious institutions. How can a church be recreated almost from nothing? How can a

[3] The 'reunification' synods took place in 1946 in Ukraine and in 1948 in Romania and Czechoslovakia (where the Greek Catholic Church was partially re-established in 1968). In Poland, even though the Greek Catholic church was not formally prohibited, its hierarchy was abolished. Hungary is the only exception: the Greek Catholic Church there did not suffer any particular repression.

[4] Dragadze (1993) uses the phrase 'domestication of religion' to describe the phenomenon of religious practice 'at home' during the Soviet period, mostly in relation to Muslims.

[5] Even though the Greek Catholic Churches were prohibited, unofficial structures existed during the socialist period and this helped re-establish them in the early 1990s. For example, priests were ordained to the priesthood clandestinely and bishops appointed. The diaspora also played a crucial role in the revival process, especially in Ukraine.

specific Greek Catholic 'identity' be defined or recreated? What are the priorities: to repossess the former places of worship, or to provide a special religious 'offer' in the new 'religious marketplace' by defining a unique religious norm, distinct from both the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches? How can former Greek Catholics be convinced to come back to 'their' church? These are among the most important questions addressed by this book's contributors. The volume covers five countries with significant numbers of Greek Catholics[6]: Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine. There is also discussion of the diaspora churches in Europe and North America.

The authors describe many situations related to recent debates in the anthropology of religion (in particular the anthropology of Christianity) and the anthropology of postsocialism (Hann 2002). The re-emergence into the public sphere of the Greek Catholic Churches involves six issues that are the subject of major debates in anthropology: religious mixture, popular religion, religious pluralism, property restitution, the 'religious marketplace', and religious transmission. This introduction explores the relationship between the Greek Catholic Churches and these six topics.

Religious Mixture: Syncretism, Bricolage, Hybridity

The Greek Catholic Churches, all located on the border between Eastern and Western Christianity, present an original synthesis of Catholic canon and Byzantine ritual, a mixture of Latin and Eastern religious elements. This may at first sight appear antithetical, not only because the two present different bodies of doctrine, but also because they excommunicated each other in the eleventh century. However, anthropology has long focused on just such religious and cultural mixtures, often labeled as syncretism, hybridity, bricolage, creolization, and *métissage*. The initial design of the union with Rome was based on the provisions of the papal bull *Laetentur Coeli* (1439), which was written during the Council of Florence (1438–45), the last, unsuccessful, attempt to reunite Western and Eastern Christianity before the fall of Constantinople (Pelikan 1989: 5). This, however, did not affect ritual: it was mostly related to the political recognition of the Pope's authority and to theological debates on Trinitarianism (i.e. does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father *through* the Son – the Orthodox position – or from the Father *and* the Son – *Filioque*, the Latin position), eschatological beliefs (the existence

[6] In addition to these five countries, Greek Catholics can be found in smaller numbers in Albania, in Bulgaria, and in the former Yugoslavia (Eparchy of Križevci; see Magocsi in this volume), as well as in southern Italy (Calabria and Sicily), home of the Italo-Albanian Catholic Church.

of Purgatory[7]), and the form of the Eucharist (unleavened bread for the Latin and leavened for the Orthodox[8]).

The synthesis is much more visible in terms of everyday practices. Over the centuries, many elements from the Latin ritual were brought into the Byzantine ritual: Latin pictures, statues and church architecture, Latin hymns and the use of organs, Latin prayers such as the rosary or the cult of the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ (Pospishil 1989; Hann 2003; Mahieu 2009). The Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom, the usual Eastern order for the celebration of the Eucharist, remains structurally the same but tends to be much shorter in Greek Catholic Churches than in the Orthodox Churches – less than an hour instead of two or even more in Greece. Unlike the Reformation, against which it was considered a remedy, Greek Catholicism in its inception was not aiming at religious 'purity'. If the search for the religious unity of Rome and Byzantium was not the main reason for the union, it nevertheless was one important argument for it: the Greek Catholic Churches were seen as a bridge between Rome and Byzantium. Yet, throughout the centuries, 'Uniatism' has been considered, mostly by the Orthodox Churches, less as a bridge than as an unacceptable mixture (Korolevskij 1927), concealing propaganda for total Latinization. More recently, 'Uniatism' has sometimes been presented as an obstacle to ecumenical dialogue between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches (Roberti 1992).[9]

Throughout the centuries, the pendulum has swung between 'Latinization' (or 'Occidentalization') and 'Byzantinization' (or 'Orientalization').[10] On the one hand, the argument for Occidentalization was that it was a way to escape the social backwardness of many Greek Catholics, often considered 'second class Catholics' (Hann 2005: 217), and to fight 'superstitions'. On the other, the 'Byzantine' trend stressed the need to keep the specificity of Eastern Christianity and restore the 'purity' of the Byzantine Rite when it had been lost (Pospishil 1989). Yet, the two positions do not symmetrically oppose each other: the 'Latinizers' never promoted a total Latinization of the

[7] See Le Goff (1984).

[8] See Erny (2000).

[9] A very important date for the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue is the Balamand Statement (1993). Even though 'Uniatism' was considered the major obstacle to this dialogue, the statement was nevertheless an important step on the rapprochement between Western and Eastern Christianity.

[10] Latinization and 'Byzantinization' refer to the ritual changes, while Occidentalization and Orientalization refer more generally to the exposure to western or eastern influence (see Hann 2005: 217).

rite, but rather the incorporation of certain Latin elements[11] into an original, typically Greek Catholic, body of practices (Hann 2005: 215). The 'Orientalizers', on the contrary, considered that the ritual should not be affected by Catholicism, and advocated a purification process to eradicate Latin elements (Pospishil 1989).

Is there a genuine Greek Catholic rite? It is hard to give a clear answer. There is more probably a Greek Catholic tradition influenced by both Byzantine and Latin elements, but not a real mix of these two traditions (also see Hann 2005: 215). In all of the countries covered in this book, however, a distinct Greek Catholic religious and social identity definitely exists, and this is connected with the geographical in-betweenness of the areas where Greek Catholics live. Indeed, in these regions, located across the varying borders of the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires, the swing of the pendulum between 'Latinization' and 'Byzantinization' can be connected with more general trends such as intellectual movements promoting 'Occidentalization' and 'Orientalization' (Hann 2005).

The turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century was a decisive moment, because it was both the time when the Latinization process proved to be the strongest and the time of the first attempts to bring it to a halt and to promote instead the specificity of 'Eastern roots'. In 1894, Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Orientalium Dignitas* threatened the deposition and exclusion of any Latin missionary who persuaded Eastern Rite followers to transfer to the Latin Rite. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi of L'viv-Halych (1865–1944), who played a crucial role in the institutional strengthening of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia (Magocsi 1989), had a strong policy in favour of easternization and subscribed to *Orientalium Dignitas*, stressing the eastern character of the Greek Catholic Church (Pospishil 1989). But the plea to purify the Eastern Rite of its Latin elements became more obvious after the Second Vatican Council's decree *Orientalium Ecclesiarum* in 1964 that the eastern churches 'should take steps to return to their ancestral traditions', by eliminating from the ritual 'what has altered them'.[12] Yet this decree was applied, partially, only in Hungary, because the other Greek Catholic Churches had no legal existence at the time (see Mahieu in this volume). In 1990, with the promulgation of the *Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches*, the Vatican's instructions in favour of a 're-orientalization' process became

[11] As at the Synod of L'viv in 1891, when a hybrid 'Ruthenian rite' that maintained Latin elements in the ritual was approved. However, the synod's resolution was not really applied; see Pospishil (1989).

[12] Decree *Orientalium Ecclesiarum*, see http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19641121_orientalium-ecclesiarum_en.html (accessed 5 August 2007).

much more explicit. It may appear paradoxical that *Rome* issued the appeal for liturgical purification by eradicating the Latin elements. Yet, this appeal may actually reflect the Vatican's new positioning as a 'global actor' in a pluralistic world, putting a stronger emphasis on civil societies (Casanova 1997). Pope John Paul II illustrated this by playing an active role in supporting both civil societies and the Greek Catholic Churches in Central and Eastern Europe. All of the chapters in this book deal with the 'in-betweenness' of the Greek Catholic Churches; but Buzalka, Naumescu, and Mahieu address in particular the ongoing debate between 'Latinizers' and 'Orientalizers' within the Greek Catholic Churches in Poland, Ukraine, and Hungary, respectively, in light of this recent trend, encouraged by the Vatican, to 'rediscover' their 'authentic traditions'.

The very existence of the Greek Catholic Churches, as well as the discussion about how profound and how rapid this 're-orientalization' process must be, illustrates their syncretic nature, one of borrowing and interpenetration of distinct religious traditions. In addition, the churches experience tension between the 'politics of syncretism', the mixture of elements of different religious 'traditions', and the 'politics of anti-syncretism', the attempt to protect religious boundaries (Stewart and Shaw 1994). The anthropological literature most commonly uses the concept of 'syncretism' to describe a religious as well as a cultural mixture (on the genealogy of the term, see Stewart 1999). The term has often been criticized, either for having pejorative overtones, or for having as a premise the purity of the traditions that mingle (Stewart 1999). However, Stewart and Shaw (1994) and Stewart (1999) rehabilitated the concept of syncretism by providing a relational and dynamic definition. For them, religious mixture is seen as an ongoing process, and the way it is negotiated at the local level has to be studied ethnographically. Buzalka's contribution lies within this relational definition, which seems to fit the Greek Catholic case particularly well.

Another key concept is 'bricolage', used originally by Lévi-Strauss in *The Savage Mind,* to describe the characteristic patterns of mythological thought (Lévi-Strauss 1974). For Werbner (1994), bricolage differs from syncretism in the sense that it is 'the formation of fresh, cultural forms from the ready-to-hand debris of old ones' (Werbner 1994: 215). Francophone literature frequently uses bricolage in reference to do-it-yourself religions (Christians 2006), the practice of 'tinkering or cobbling things up out of bits and parts' (Laurent 2005). Bricolage has been applied as an analytical tool in two religious contexts. First, in the context of new West African religious movements, bricolage emphasizes the relation between metaphors and concepts and processes of permanent reinterpretation (Mary 2001, 2005; Laurent 2005). Second, bricolage has been used in the European context to

describe the 'bouquet of beliefs' in which individuals build their own set of beliefs outside any institutional affiliation, in a situation of atomization of belief (Hervieu-Léger 1999, 2005). This second application has been criticized as underestimating the existence of constraints, but Hervieu-Léger has shown that individuals build their 'bouquet of beliefs' by using symbolic resources available only within certain limits (Hervieu-Léger 2005). The concept of bricolage, with its material dimension, may help reflect the mixture of religious elements, such as icons and statues, within the Greek Catholic Churches.

Other concepts frequently associated with syncretism have emerged in studies of religious and cultural mixture, often in the context of postcolonial, postmodern, and transnational studies. 'Hybridity' (or its variant 'hybridism') was used to qualify (with a pejorative overtone) the Greek Catholic Churches. For Cyrille Korolevskij,[13] 'Uniatism is a spurious compromise', and the Uniates 'bask in hybridism'. He adds that 'hybridisms should best be eliminated' (Korolevskij 1927: 58). The notion of hybridity has met with considerable success in recent anthropological literature, and is often associated with postmodernism (Clifford 1988, 1997; Bhabha 1994; Benhabib 2002).[14] The emphasis put on the 'fluidity, permeability and renegotiability of culture', often correlated with an anti-essentialist position in anthropology, has sometimes led hybridity to be 'a view on culture' whose normative dimension has been criticized (Kompridis 2005: 319). It also received the same criticisms as syncretism, namely that it assumed the pre-existence of bounded cultures (Webner 2001; Zehner 2005). In addition, its biological overtones and its racist connotations when it was part of scientific racism in the nineteenth century were considered problematic.[15] Yet, it usually now refers to a 'mixture, crossed between two things' (Stewart 1999), and probably has, together with the more recent concept of creolization (Hannerz 1987; Stewart 2007), the status of 'favored concept' (Shaw and Stewart 1994) in contemporary anthropology. Syncretism and its synonyms are sometimes understood as the mixture between two established religious traditions (the case of the Greek Catholic Churches), but also between an official and an unofficial, 'popular' religion.

[13] Cyrille Korolevskij, whose real name was Jean François Joseph Charon (1878–1959), was a French-born Greek Catholic priest who fervently advocated liturgical purification.

[14] *Hybrids* is also a core concept of other anthropological currents, such as Bruno Latour's 'symmetrical anthropology', together with networks and messengers (Latour 1993).

[15] In French anthropological literature, the term *métissage,* also originating from genetics, has become important. See Laplantine and Nouss (2001).

Popular Religion, Local Traditions, and 'Syncretism from Below'

The Greek Catholic Churches were initially established 'from above', by political elites, for reasons that initially had little to do with religious matters and even less with the everyday practice of the faithful (see, e.g. for Romania, Hitchins 1999). However, as Hann notes, over the centuries, the faithful have constantly reshaped these churches and created a 'syncretism from below' (Hann 2005). Not only did the Greek Catholic flocks combine elements from both Western and Eastern Christianity, such as Byzantine icons and Latin statues (Mahieu 2007), but also official and less official practices, the latter characteristic of a 'popular religion'. Many authors have emphasized that the eastern churches, because they have no single, centralized canon law, have been much more flexible than the Roman Catholic Church in applying dogma (Andreesco and Bacou 1986; Badone 1990; Stewart 1991; Kokosalakis 1995). Therefore, the boundary between official and popular religion was much more porous than in the Catholic world, creating what Mircea Eliade has described in the case of Romania as 'Cosmic Christianity' (Eliade 1972).

The notion of popular religion and the 'two-tiered model', contrasting the religion of the elite and the religion of the masses, has been criticized because it presents popular religion as 'a diminution, a misconception' (Brown 1981). In addition, in the context of European anthropology, the generalized description in folklore studies of popular religion as the religion of a rural, traditional, unchanging world, has given an out-of-date tone to the study of popular religion (Rivière 1997). However, the same argument used to defend the concept of syncretism can also defend the use of the notion of popular religion – that it is not about opposing bounded and immutable entities, but rather about focusing on the 'dialectical character of their interrelationship' (Badone 1990: 6; Stewart 1991), as in Carlo Ginzburg's work on religion in sixteenth-century Italy (Ginzburg 1997). The classical distinction between 'orthopraxy' and 'orthodoxy', that is, the 'religion as practised' rather than the 'religion as prescribed' (Christian 1981: 178), seems to apply in the case of the Greek Catholic Churches.

Because the Orthodox Churches have always been more flexible towards 'popular practices', the first arguments in favor of Latinization among Greek Catholics noted that it would help combat popular customs and 'superstitions'. During the eighteenth century, members of the 'Transylvanian School',[16] influenced by the Enlightenment, considered that the line that

[16] The 'Transylvanian School' (Şcoala Ardeleană), also called 'Latinist School of Blaj', was a Greek Catholic intellectual movement that brought Enlightenment ideas to the Transylvanian Valach. Its historical and philological arguments supported the thesis that the Transylvanian

needed to be drawn was not between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, but between 'true Christian beliefs' and 'superstitions' (Hitchins 1999: 82). In 1927, a Romanian Greek Catholic priest described the Greek Catholic funerary practices of the peasants as 'non-Christian, wild, pagan' (Pop 1927). Funerary practices are particularly rich and performed only with the formal support of the church in Romania (Andreesco and Bacou 1986), even in the Greek Catholic Church. At this level, one could argue that the prohibition of the Greek Catholic Churches and their forced union with the Orthodox Churches in the 1940s did not have significant consequences for popular religious practices. This still holds with the return to legality: as a Romanian Greek Catholic priest once said when he was appointed to his new parish, his parishioners made it very clear that he had to adapt to the local funerary practices, and not the other way round (Mahieu 2003).

More recently, the processes of 'purification' of the Byzantine Rite by eliminating its Latin elements have less to do with 'little Christian' practices than with the attempt to weaken the appeal of practices hugely popular among elderly women, such as the rosary or the cult of the Sacred Heart. The chapter by Juraj Buzalka particularly studies this process and shows that many Greek Catholics consider these practices 'their' tradition. Agniezska Halemba's chapter shows the ambiguous position of the Slovak Greek Catholic Church regarding popular practices such as pilgrimages to new Marian apparition sites. On the one hand, the hierarchy never welcomes new apparitions, but, on the other, would rather exercise some control over the phenomenon.

The Greek Catholic Churches present an original mixture of official and popular religion, as well a mixture of two major religious traditions. They have co-existed for centuries in multiethnic and multiconfessional societies but this situation changed dramatically in the second part of the twentieth century.

Religious Pluralism, Ethnicity, and Nationalism

The Greek Catholic Churches are located in areas that during the centuries have experienced not only shifting boundaries among the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires, but also religious plurality: for centuries, Greek Catholics have lived alongside Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, the Orthodox, and Jews. Until the late 1940s, they usually existed as a minority group, except in Western Ukraine and Northern Transylvania, in states that

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Romanians were directly descended from the Roman colonists present in Dacia in the early second century until the Roman retreat in 271. Its most famous members were Ion Budai-Deleanu, Petru Maior, Samuil Micu, and Gheorghe Şincai.

over the centuries developed contrasting religious politics (see Hann et al. 2006). This religious plurality ended in two phases. First, during the Second World War, the Jewish population was destroyed. Second, during the socialist era, regimes advocating strict atheism tightly controlled religious activities and almost totally repressed the Greek Catholic Churches.

In the postsocialist context, the former religious plurality turned into religious pluralism. This concept has become widely used to describe contemporary religious situations across the globe (Fabian 1985; Hamnett 1990). Champion distinguishes between two sorts of religious pluralism: an identity-based pluralism, demanding equal rights for all religious groups, and a pluralism based on the right to religious freedom (Champion 1999: 46). In the postsocialist context, the concept of religious pluralism relates to introducing liberal religious policies following the end of a secular state. Even though all five countries covered in this book respect religious freedom, the religious environments in which the Greek Catholic Churches evolved present very distinct features. The two most extreme cases are Romania, with its dominant Orthodox Church (86% of the population), and Poland, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic (94%). In these two countries, the dominant (or titular) state nationality and religion broadly overlap. Hungary and Slovakia offer a contrasting religious landscape: a Roman-Catholic majority (55% for Hungary and 68% for Slovakia) with significant Protestant (both Lutheran and Calvinist) minorities (18% in Hungary, 10% in Slovakia), and a low level of church attendance. Ukraine presents another distinct religious landscape: a predominantly Orthodox population (over 75%) strongly divided since 1992 between two Orthodox Churches, one depending on the Kyiv Patriarchate (50% of the total population), the other one on the Moscow Patriarchate (26%). The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, with an estimated 3,000,000 followers, is the largest Greek Catholic Church in the region. In the five countries, Greek Catholics live generally in specific regions that used to belong to the Habsburg Empire: northeastern Hungary (the Nyíregyháza area), southeastern Poland (around Przemyśl), Transylvania in Romania, Eastern Slovakia, and Western Ukraine. The number of Greek Catholics outside these regions is much smaller. At the national level, they are a small religious minority (especially in Poland and Romania), but in specific areas they sometimes represent a majority (Western Ukraine).

The other important distinction concerns the overlap of religious and ethnic belonging. Greek Catholicism has a strong historical link to the Rusyns (or Ruthenians[17]), whose existence in the region has been exten-

[17] Also called Carpatho-Rusyns, Carpatho-Ukrainians, or Lemkos, (see Magocsi 2005). Their existence as a nationality distinct from Ukrainians has been the subject of lively debate (Magocsi 1999). According to Himka (2005), the contemporary Ukrainians were called Rus'

sively studied by Paul Robert Magocsi (Magocsi 1978, 1989, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2005). The overlap between religious and ethnic identity is also obvious in Poland, where being Greek Catholic equates with being Ukrainian (Buzalka in this volume; see also Hann 1998a). In Romania and Ukraine, apart from the Rusyns, being a Greek Catholic does not relate to any ethnic distinctiveness. On the contrary, in both countries, the Greek Catholic Churches played an important role in the nation-building process. In the eighteenth century, Bishop Inochentie Klein regarded the union with Rome as a means to attain the status of *natio* for the *Vlachs* (Romanians), which would guarantee them equal rights with the Hungarians and the Saxons (Hitchins 1999; Verdery 1999). His followers, a group of Greek Catholic intellectuals called the 'Transylvanian School', were the first to stress the Latin origins of the Romanian language. They transformed this linguistic argument into a political one by connecting the Roman origins of the *Vlachs* to the union with Rome. In Ukraine, Greek Catholicism also played an important role in the promotion of a specific Ukrainian national identity, different from Russian, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century (Himka 1999; see also Nowak in this volume). Because most Greek Catholics are located in western Ukraine, where the Ukrainian language is used much more than in the east, nationalism certainly played a role. Generally, however, except for a few cases in the early 1990s when the Romanian Greek Catholics were accused of a pro-Hungarian stance, ethnicity did not play any significant role in the revitalization process of the Greek Catholic Churches in Romania and Ukraine. In Hungary, Greek Catholics are of Rusyn and Romanian origin, but lost these languages as they became assimilated into Hungarian society in the late nineteenth century (Hann 2005: 218). They could, however, maintain a degree of ethnic specificity through adherence to Greek Catholicism. Bertalan Pusztai has shown how, precisely at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a group of intellectual Greek Catholic leaders promoted the 'Hungarianness' of their church by trying to introduce Hungarian as a liturgical language and to separate their church from its Romanian and Rusyn background through the invention of a glorious past dating back to St Stephen's conversion (Pusztai 2005; see also Mahieu in this volume). In Slovakia, Greek Catholic history was also originally connected with the Rusyns, but linguistic assimilation into Slovak society, even though not as strong as that in Hungary, was nevertheless significant (Magocsi 1994; Roberson 1995; see also Halemba in this volume).

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in the Middle Ages, Ruthenians for the early modern and Austrian periods, and Ukrainians in the twentieth century.

Inside the Greek Catholic Churches there are further ethnic divisions. After the border changes following the Treaty of Trianon of 1920, many Hungarian-speaking Greek Catholics lived in territories belonging to Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Pilipkó and Pusztai's chapter deals with such minorities within the minority: the Hungarian-speaking Greek Catholic parishes of Ukraine's Transcarpathian region. The Greek Catholic Church in Hungary has strong links to these parishes in Ukraine. For example, many students from Ukraine attend the seminary in Nyíregyháza, and Hungarian parishes organize charitable activities in Ukraine. The second ethnic minority among Greek Catholics is the Rusyns, often assimilated, but sometimes with distinct hierarchical structures. The Carpatho-Rusyn (Ruthenian) Greek Catholic diaspora communities in North America have been crucial in preserving a specific Carpatho-Ruthenian identity (Pekar 1989). At a more general level, the Greek Catholic diasporas (in Europe, but most of all in North America) have played a very important role as 'guardians and saviours of their religion' (Kozlowski in this volume) both during the years of prohibition of the Greek Catholic Churches in socialist Europe and in their revitalization process (Galadza, Naumescu in this volume).

The re-emergence of the Greek Catholic Churches on a pluralistic religious scene appeared as a threat to the once-dominant churches that, as in Romania, sometimes had benefited directly from the suppression of the Greek Catholics (Gillet 1997; Stan and Turcescu 2005). This became obvious when the Greek Catholics reclaimed their property confiscated in the 1940s by communist regimes.

Property Claims and the Quest for Historical Justice

One of the most debated and contentious topics involving the Greek Catholic Churches in recent years concerns demands for the return of property. Property restitution claims were a crucial element in the 'decommunization process' (Borneman 1997) in postsocialist countries (Hann 1998; Zerilli 2002; Verdery 2003; Stan 2006). The property question (with an emphasis on decollectivization) is part of a reordering characteristic of postsocialist transformations. What is at stake is the break between the socialist and the postsocialist states and the quest for 'historical justice' (Hann 2005), not only to repair 'socialism's breach of property rights' (Verdery 1999: 72), but also to recognize, through retributive justice, the accountability of wrongdoers and to restore dignity to the victims (Borneman 1997).

The claims of the Greek Catholics over church property present features distinctive from other kinds of property restitution, however. General church restitution or compensation processes have taken place in many postsocialist countries, but, the case of the Greek Catholic churches has

created additional problems. Their claims involve not only social relations between individuals (Hann 1998), but also institutions competing at the national level (Iordachi 1999; Verdery 1999; Zerilli 2005). Following their prohibition in the late 1940s, the Greek Catholic Churches were deprived of all their property and moveable goods. In the early 1990s, the churches first demands included *Restitutio in Integrum*, that is, an unconditional restitution of the buildings appropriated by the communist regimes. This claim had two aspects: the first was to repair the injustice visited on the Greek Catholic Churches by the communist regimes. More importantly, restitution was crucial for their future existence, because any revitalization would be almost inconceivable without places of worship (Verdery 1999; Mahieu 2004b). An additional problem stems from the Catholic canon law, which provides that the property of Catholic parish is controlled by the bishop, while in the Orthodox Church the buildings belong to the local Orthodox community (Metz 1997; Verdery 1999: 70). Claims for restitution met with a harsh reaction; for nearly half a century, either the Orthodox or the Roman Catholic Churches had used the Greek Catholic buildings as places for their own worship. Another difficulty involved the *Simultaneum*, the shared use of a single church. Generally, Greek Catholic claims over property were obstructed and sometimes led to bitter conflicts. The competing actors put forward different arguments (Stan and Turcescu in this volume). In Romania, while the Greek Catholic Church used a legal argument based on an owner's rights, the Orthodox adopted a demographic argument, based on the number of believers attending each church (Mahieu 2004b). In his study of restitution claims made by the Greek Catholics over the Sfântul Vasile Polona Church in Bucharest, Zerilli emphasizes that while the building was an actual place of worship for the Orthodox, it was more an imagined space (in Anderson's terms) for the Greek Catholics (Zerilli 2005). Indeed, the Orthodox community did not see any reason to return the buildings to a church that according to the census represented less than 1 per cent of the population. The Greek Catholics in contrast, argued that people would not return to their former church if there were no proper places of worship (Iordachi 1999; Mahieu 2004a; Stan and Turcescu in this volume). Zerilli's chapter in this volume deals with property issues in Romania. He shows how the local Greek Catholics transformed a property conflict into a civil project of local development.

In many cases, conflicts over property belonged to the 'politics of the past' (Hann 1998a). Before becoming Greek Catholic, sometimes in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, many of the contested churches were Orthodox or Roman Catholic. Therefore, the current occupiers provided anteriority arguments. This is most obvious in the affair of the Greek Catho-

lic Cathedral in Przemyśl, studied in depth by Christopher Hann (Hann 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2005). He analyzed the conflict that arose over the building, which was transferred to the Roman Catholic Carmelite order by the communist regime in 1946 and claimed by the Greek Catholics in the early 1990s. Built in 1630, the building was originally a Roman Catholic foundation and only allocated to the Greek Catholics in 1784. Therefore, Roman Catholic activists claimed that the 1946 transfer was nothing other than restitution to its original and rightful owners. The Greek Catholics retorted that the building actually incorporated elements from an even older Orthodox church. In 1991 Roman Catholic activists occupied the Cathedral, and it was eventually left in the hands of the Carmelites, while the Greek Catholics received the nearby former Jesuit church that they had been using unofficially for years. Hann describes how both churches were architecturally 'purified'. The Carmelite church's cupola, added by the Greek Catholics in the nineteenth century and modeled on Saint Peter's Basilica in Rome, was nevertheless considered an 'eastern' symbol and eventually destroyed. At the same time, the Jesuit church's interior was redesigned to look more 'Ukrainian' (Hann 2005). Similar changes took place in Romania, where many Latin elements were added to the churches returned to the Greek Catholic Church in an effort to erase the Orthodox past (Mahieu 2007).[18]

The battles over property represented a crucial issue for the recently legalized Greek Catholic Churches, in both their local and national competition with the dominant churches. In her book on the reburial of Greek Catholic Bishop Inochentie Micu Klein, Katherine Verdery argues that the metaphor of the 'religious marketplace' helps to describe the competition between the Orthodox and the Greek Catholic Churches in Romania not only over properties, but also over souls (Verdery 1999: 80).

Liberalization of Faith and the 'Religious Marketplace'

In all the socialist countries, the dominant Marxist-Leninist ideology considered religion to be 'the opiate of the people' and churches, therefore, suffered more or less active repression. With the exception of Hungary, the Greek Catholic Churches were confronted with yet another type of repression: forcible reintegration into the Orthodox Churches. Therefore, the changes in the early 1990s had a double significance: general liberalization

[18] Still, one should not forget that in the majority of cases, the switch from Orthodoxy to Greek Catholicism did not take such extreme forms because, especially in rural areas, people continued to perform their local, 'popular' traditions during the socialist period, even if they had become Orthodox.

towards religion; and a return to legality of the Greek Catholic Churches, which escaped from the 'catacombs'.

Because of this return to legality, the Greek Catholic Churches became new actors in the liberalized 'religious marketplace'. They now competed with both other traditional religious groups and with the new religious groups such as the Evangelical or Pentecostal churches (Wanner 2003). The new religious market now confronted the Greek Catholic Churches both with a supply problem (to provide a distinct religious offering) and a demand problem (to convince its former believers to return). For example, the Hungarian and the Slovak Greek Catholic Churches, even though they have a stable institutional structure, face novel 'demand' challenges, that is, the risk of the 'deinstitutionalization of religion'. Both of these churches deal with this problem by encouraging highly emotional religious events such as pilgrimages to Marian apparition sites (Halemba in this volume) and youth retreats inspired by Eastern monasticism (Mahieu in this volume).

The term 'religious marketplace' appeared in social science literature in the 1980s. The U.S. economist Gary Becker's assumption that the basic propositions of economics could apply, with few modifications, to non-economic spheres of social life influenced the development of the religious marketplace concept (Becker 1986; Bruce 1999). Becker argued that people engage in maximizing behavior. Applied to religion, this approach initially described the North American religious scene, where the problem was a marked decline in church attendance. Advocates of this approach, such as Finke, Stark, and Iannaccone (1988), argued that as churches become less institutionalized they become more efficient, and that this increases church attendance (see also Young 1997). They used concepts from neoclassical economic theory, such as competition, monopoly, and market (Iannaccone 1992: 128) to explain this phenomena.

Outside the United States, the metaphor of the religious marketplace was widely used in the context of postsocialism to describe the new religious situation emerging in former 'people's democracies'. It was often connected with the general switch from centrally planned to market economies and from Marxism to neoliberalism (Zerilli in this volume). In a recent article, Mathijs Pelkmans (2006) distinguishes three approaches to the religious marketplace. The first uses it as a metaphor to help to highlight the differences between the socialist period and the situation in the 1990s and 2000s. In the postsocialist era, the recognition of religious freedom led to the end of monopolies of 'traditional' religions and the diversification of religious groups. The second approach, influenced by rational choice theory, uses the concept as an analytical tool, establishing a parallel between pastors and entrepreneurs, and churches and firms. The third approach advocates the use

of the religious marketplace as a prescriptive model in political agendas. Religious activists frequently use this concept in the context of claims for greater religious freedom (Pelkmans 2006: 31). In this volume, the concept of the religious marketplace is used more in the first, metaphorical, way. In Zerilli's contribution to this volume, he describes a young Greek Catholic priest who could represent a good example of a religious entrepreneur. Zerilli uses the market metaphor to help us understand how local political and legal actions are connected to property claims.

Nevertheless, the metaphor of the religious marketplace has been criticized both theoretically and empirically (Bruce 1999, 2006). One crucial critique lies in its explanatory limits that underrate the existing constraints on religious choice. Most of all, the metaphor misses the diachronic dimension of religious belonging; that is, in most societies, religious belonging is not a matter of individual choice but is related to strong inherited cultural constraints (Bruce 2006: 45) or 'customary group practices' (Verdery 1999: 80). Another crucial factor in understanding the postsocialist religious scene is religious transmission, or 'religion as a chain of memory' (Hervieu-Léger 2000). The Greek Catholic Churches are peculiar in this domain. Because they were banned during the socialist era, this chain was partially interrupted. After their return to legality, choosing to join these churches demonstrated a strong connection with collective memory and religious identity.

The 'Catacomb' Church: Memory, Continuity, and Transmission

Because the Greek Catholic Churches were proscribed for more than forty years, the 'chain of belief' (Hervieu-Léger 2000) was institutionally interrupted in all but the diaspora communities (Kozlowski in this volume). Nevertheless the experience of 'underground churches', when small groups of lay people organized secret religious meetings outside any institutional affiliation, had important consequences when the Greek Catholic Churches regained their legal status (Mahieu 2004a; Naumescu in this volume). The memory of the communist past, and in particular the memory of the 'underground church', plays a crucial role in the contemporary transformations of Greek Catholic Churches.

The study of memory has boomed in anthropological studies, so much so that authors have warned against the danger of 'abuses of memory' (Todorov 1995; Berliner 2005) and of 'overextension of the concept [that] may become almost indistinguishable from either identity or culture' (Fabian 1999: 51). Most anthropologists and historians who study collective memory refer to the work of Maurice Halbwachs (1992) as their main inspiration (see Nowak in this volume). More recently, Pierre Nora (1989) and Jan Assman (1995) have become known as the 'fathers of the memory craze' (Berliner

2005). In postsocialist countries, the huge gap between the official positions of the political regimes and the actual experiences of the people made such a craze particularly visible. Studies on the oral history of the communist period are so numerous it would be difficult to account for them all.

The Greek Catholic Churches had no official existence during socialism, and they therefore particularly needed oral history to recover their memories. The anthropological literature on Greek Catholics in the socialist era is limited. The official atheistic position of the regimes and the nature of ethnographical methodology, which implies long-term participant observation, resulted in little research that dealt primarily with religion (Rogers 2005: 5). The proscription of the majority of the Greek Catholic Churches made things even more difficult. Two authors, however, have provided anthropological accounts of Greek Catholicism (or its remnants) during the socialist era. Chris Hann published his first study about the Greek Catholics of southeastern Poland in 1988, describing their semi-official situation in the late 1980s (Hann 1988). Gail Kligman's monograph, *The Wedding of the Dead* (1988), focused on a particular mortuary ritual and on popular poetry in Ieud, a village located in Maramureş, a region where over 90 per cent of the population was Greek Catholic before 1948. Kligman noted that even though people said they were Orthodox, it was mostly a formal answer, and that at home they would still call themselves Greek Catholics. They also kept using the greeting *Laude-se pe Isus*, considered a typically Greek Catholic formulation that bitterly recalled the way people resisted the forced introduction of Orthodoxy in 1948. She underlines that it would be an exaggeration to describe this as a symbolic protest (1988: 231). Kligman's observation helps in understanding the diverse forms taken by what is now called the 'underground church' and its effects on the institutionalization processes of the Greek Catholic Churches.

In many cases, people remembered having once been Greek Catholics (Mahieu 2004a). However, actual underground practice was relatively infrequent.[19] A case like Ieud[20] illustrates how memory stayed alive without small underground communities. The collective memory of Greek Catholicism also involves an idealized pre-soviet past of strong social bonds (Nowak in this volume). After socialism, intense and sometimes systematic efforts

[19] According to historian Nicolae Gudea (personal communication), a maximum of 20% of the former Romanian Greek Catholics participated in the underground church.

[20] Ieud's inhabitants rejected all the Orthodox priests sent to the village after the forced union with the Orthodox church until 1954 when a former Greek Catholic priest 'turned' to orthodoxy and was eventually accepted. During the liturgies, he maintained some seconds of silence in the moments when the priest was supposed to refer to the Pope, so that the faithful would understand that he had kept his faith in Greek Catholicism (see Mahieu 2004b).

began to collect the oral history of the underground church (Rance 1992, 1994; Vasile 2003).[21] Naumescu has shown how Greek Catholics changed their use of remembrance: from 'oppositional' memory during the socialist period to 'memory recovery' in the postsocialist era, during public manifestations such as the reburial of the eighteenth-century Bishop Inochentie Micu Klein and the burial of Alexandru Todea, the 'bishop of the underground' (Naumescu 2004).

The attempts to re-establish Greek Catholic Churches in the 1990s directly connected with the memory recovery process. People who 'returned' to the Greek Catholic Churches often mentioned a return to the faith of their ancestors (Mahieu 2006). They gave up the churches they had attended for decades: usually Orthodox, but sometimes Roman Catholic. Should this 'return' to Greek Catholicism after decades of Orthodox (or sometimes Roman Catholic) attendance be considered a conversion? Conversion is a radical change, from one religion to another or, within Christianity, usually from an established church to a Pentecostal church. As argued elsewhere (Mahieu 2006), even though the narratives of some of the faithful, especially among young people, treat 'return' to the Romanian Greek Catholic Church as an important change, this process can scarcely be called a conversion. 'Returning' to Greek Catholicism does not require any formal conversion ritual. Most of all, many people stressed the similarities between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches and, as in Romania, they continued to attend their former churches even after they 'came back' to Greek Catholicism. Less than a process of conversion, what we observe seems closer to a process of 'adhesion' (Snow and Michalek 1984: 169). This does not presuppose a radical new way of life, and is even closer to a process of 'alternation' in the sense defined by Travisano, that is, 'a transition in which a new identity develops naturally out of the old one' (Travisano 1970; see also Barker and Currie 1985; Kirsch 2004).

In a recent article, Joel Robbins has argued that because social anthropology has developed as a science of continuity the anthropology of Christianity (in particular Protestantism) has not been able to incorporate the ruptures and radical changes that characterize Christianity. Therefore, the development of an anthropology of Christianity has languished (Robbins 2007). Only recently has this begun to be recognized as a distinct area of research (Cannell 2005; Scott 2005). Robbins underlines that the kind of Christianity of interest to him, evangelical Protestantism, influences his

[21] Also see for Ukraine http://www.ichistory.org/churchex/church0.html (accessed 6 August 2007), which seeks to create an archive of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the underground.

emphasis on discontinuity, and adds that other Christian traditions have put a greater accent on continuity.

Greek Catholics provide an interesting example of the debate over ruptures and continuity in the anthropology of Christianity. As members of an eastern church, they illustrate par excellence the continuity of Christianity and present themselves as bearers of a tradition uninterrupted since early Christianity (Pelikan 1999; Pott 2000). Yet, because they were banned for more than four decades, they show how a religious tradition can be, at least formally, interrupted. The mission of ensuring continuity by faithfully transmitting the Christian message has been a major challenge for all the churches since their inception. Pospishil (1989) in a discussion of the debate over liturgical reform within the Greek Catholic Churches, shows what is at stake in this reform. The rite represents a system of symbols and pictures that become the mediators and the presence of the holy in specific forms. When those forms are said to be reformed, as in the 'Byzantinization' process, the symbols – the existing 'syncretic' Greek Catholic rite – risk losing their meanings. The opposite risk is Latinization and the disappearance of Greek Catholicism itself (Pospishil 1989: 203).

Bruno Latour (1991) has developed theories about this tension and suggests that all Christian churches have been confronted since early times with a double and contradictory obligation: on the one hand, faithfulness to the Christian message and, on the other, renewal in the transmission of this message. By focusing on the 'messengers' of the Christian message, Latour shows that, in the Christian world, the 'messengers' cannot be distinguished from the message they 're-present'. Therefore, two traps can endanger religious transmission: tedious repetition and loss of meaning (in the case of too much faithfulness), and heresy (in the case of too much renewal). More recently, religious transmission has received increasing attention in the field of cognitive studies (Bloch 1998; Boyer 2001). Through focusing on the cognitive mechanisms behind the process of transmission, Whitehouse (2001) has suggested the need to investigate the evolution of religious tradition through the 'modes of religiosity' theory, based on the forms of memory retention: imagistic (highly emotional, innovative, and small-scale communities) and assuring innovation, and doctrinal (textual doctrine, routinized ritual, hierarchical communities) assuring the reproduction of the tradition. Naumescu's recent work (2007) as well as his chapter in this volume are inspired by Whitehouse's theory: the different competing trends he studies illustrate the tension between renewal and transmission. His more general argument however, is that Eastern Christianity has acquired a certain balance between the two modes acting as mechanisms of reproduction and change in this particular tradition.

The memory of the underground church, as well as the focus on religious transmission, are absolutely crucial in understanding recent developments in the European Greek Catholic Churches. However, of the six topics we have discussed here, all equally important for an understanding of their revitalization processes, some may prove to be less crucial in the coming years. To be sure, the Greek Catholic Churches have reached a turning point. The first postsocialist years were dedicated to property claim campaigns, to the re-establishment of the hierarchy and the ecclesiastical structure and, most of all, to the search for believers. Some churches were more successful in their revitalization processes (as in Ukraine), and others less so (as in Romania). The Greek Catholic Churches have now entered into the course of normal religious life. Four of the five countries covered in this book have recently joined the European Union (Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in 2004, Romania in 2007). Property claims, even though they remain problematic in Romania, have usually resulted in agreement. The number of believers is unlikely to increase or to drop significantly. The institutions now have clear structures. But the Greek Catholic Churches will soon be confronted with novel challenges: as the Europeanization processes go deeper, they will have to react, as do the other churches in Western European countries, to processes of religious individualization (Pollack 2003). Their future vitality depends upon how they respond to such a process.

The Book

This book reflects the fruitful scholarly discussions that took place at the Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology of Halle/Saale between 2003 and 2005. Chris Hann, the institute's director, has had a long-standing interest in the Greek Catholics. Under his impetus, a group of young scholars working on Greek Catholicism gathered in Halle. Juraj Buzalka and Vlad Naumescu conducted fieldwork and defended their doctoral dissertations on the Greek Catholic Churches in Poland and Western Ukraine. Stéphanie Mahieu shared results of her research in Hungary as a post-doctoral fellow in 2004 and 2005. Jacek Nowak, Bertalan Pusztai, and Filippo Zerilli spent shorter periods in Halle, when they presented their work on the Greek Catholics in Ukraine (the Subcarpathian and western areas) and Romania respectively. Agniezska Halemba, a post-doctoral fellow in Halle until 2005, recently carried out research on the Slovak Greek Catholics. Paul Robert Magocsi, with his tremendous knowledge of the history of the Rusyns and of Greek Catholicism, has been of great help, both during his residencies in Halle and in the development of this book. Two workshops on the Greek Catholic Churches were organized in Halle, one in May 2003 and another in September 2005.

The original idea for the book was to publish recent ethnographies of the Greek Catholics. However, since little systematic transnational literature on the Greek Catholics is available, it was considered important to include a historical introduction, and to give a general and systematic overview of the legal and political changes that have affected the Greek Catholic Churches after their revitalization in the early 1990s. Therefore, the book consists of four parts: the first part presents the historical and recent developments of the Greek Catholic Churches in the countries covered in this book, and the three other parts consist of ethnographical contributions.

Part 1. Historical and Contemporary Overview

The book begins with a comprehensive historical introduction by Paul Robert Magocsi. It then turns towards a general overview of the recent changes that have affected the Greek Catholic Churches in the five countries covered in this book: Hungary (Bertalan Pusztai), Poland (Stanisław Stępień), Romania (Lucian Turcescu and Lavinia Stan), Slovakia (Stanislav Konečný), and Ukraine (Mariya Horiacha and Svitlana Hurkina). For each country, the authors present the changes that brought the Greek Catholic Churches back to legality, the problems connected with property claims, and the hierarchical stabilization processes. In addition, Peter Galadza presents the current situation and challenges of the Greek Catholic Churches in North America.

Part 2. In Search of Tradition: Internal Processes of Institutionalization

Part 2 deals with the internal transformations that have affected the Greek Catholic Churches, more specifically, the ongoing debate between 'Orientalizers' and 'Westernizers'. This debate has existed since the inception of the Greek Catholic Churches (Pospishil 1989; Hann 1998), but it took new forms in the 1990s, after the Vatican's promulgation of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches. All three chapters in this part examine groups who claim that they represent the 'true' tradition (be it based on the 'memory of the underground' for Naumescu, on the attractiveness of 'popular', Latin practices for Buzalka, or on the Greek model in my chapter on Hungary) and compete with the official hierarchy.

Vlad Naumescu's contribution is based on his research in western Ukraine and deals with the processes of institutionalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). He is particularly interested in 'tradition in the making', in Barth's meaning of the phrase, and is inspired by White-

house's 'modes of religiosity' theory: the imagistic and the doctrinal. Naumescu focuses on the interaction between the two modes in the re-established UGCC, and shows how a traditionalist splinter group, following the Lefebvrist movement, claims to be the true guardian of the underground church's memory, thus competing with the Greek Catholic hierarchy on a crucial process within the UGCC: the 'recovery of memory'. Eventually, the splinter group's leader was excommunicated in 2004. Naumescu presents the challenges faced in the past fifteen years by the UGCC, which remains hierarchically highly heterogeneous. The church includes the 'underground priests', whose suffering as 'martyrs of the faith' gave them prestige but whose training was sometimes poor; the former Orthodox priests, whose motivation to 'return' to the Greek Catholic Church appeared suspect; and the diaspora priests and the priests ordained after the mid-1990s, better trained in the spirit of a return to eastern roots advocated by the Vatican. Naumescu shows that in the early 1990s the people who actively set up the revival process of the UGCC were pro-Catholic and wanted to differentiate themselves from any eastern, Orthodox associations. In the mid-1990s, the diaspora elite, closer to the Vatican pro-eastern spirit, accomplished a make-over. At stake is the definition of the 'tradition' that both the official hierarchy and the splinter group claim to possess, based on the memory of the 'underground'.

Juraj Buzalka has conducted ethnographic research in southeast Poland, among the Greek Catholic Ukrainians in Przemyśl. He shares the same interest as Naumescu in studying the 'true tradition'. His chapter focuses on the recent attempts by the Greek Catholic Church to define its tradition. Buzalka investigates the politics of 'syncretism/anti-syncretism' (Stewart and Shaw 1994), and shows how the faithful accommodate an 'elite-driven' anti-syncretism, an attempt to purify the church of its Latin elements. Buzalka describes a peculiar situation in the context of Przemyśl where Eastern Christianity overlaps with 'Ukrainianness'. He argues that both the young intellectuals who promote 'Byzantinization' and the devout women who cherish Latin prayers and images claim that 'the true tradition' is their source of inspiration. Buzalka argues that this confirms the validity of the 'religious synthesis' concept, in the sense that the conflicts he describes are not about purity versus mixture, but about competing discourses over the meaning of religious synthesis.

Stéphanie Mahieu's contribution deals with a similar trend of liturgical purification in the Hungarian Greek Catholic Church, probably the most Latinized of the Greek Catholic Churches. It does, however, have extremely active advocates of a 'Byzantinization', perhaps stemming from the initial efforts of the 1970s. She focuses on a group sometimes called the *Vad*

Bizánciak, the 'wild Byzantines', who promote radical liturgical purification. She discusses the best way to define the trend they represent and argue that the label 'charismatics' seems to apply more than 'fundamentalists' or 'traditionalists'. She shows that this trend is not an anti-modern, traditionalist movement, but on the contrary, that it has perfectly integrated the new religious characteristics of contemporary Europe, emphasizing occasional meetings characterized by their emotional intensity rather than week-by-week church attendance. This trend can also challenge the secularized Hungarian Roman Catholic Church: going 'east' is no longer equated with backwardness, as it was until the early twentieth century, but with the depth and the mysticism of the eastern religious experience, based on the Greek monastic tradition.

Part 3. External Reordering: Property, Memory and Religious Competition

Part 3 deals with the general reconfiguration of the religious landscape created after the Greek Catholic Churches returned to legality. The Greek Catholic Churches competed with other religious groups, at both the local and national levels. The three authors show the implications of this return, the comings and goings between religious groups, and the conflicts it created: religious mobility connected with a conflict over property in Romania (Zerilli), a massive switch from Orthodoxy to Greek Catholicism in Western Ukraine (Nowak), and a very diverse religious landscape among Hungarians in Subcarpathian Ukraine (Pilipkó and Pusztai).

Filippo Zerilli's contribution comes from research carried out in Mihalț, a village in Transylvania in Romania. He investigates the relationship between an emerging Greek Catholic religious ethic and the globalizing culture of neoliberalism. He seeks to explain the reasons for the successes and failures of Greek Catholicism in Transylvania. Zerilli shows how property conflicts over a particular church building and the current construction of a new Greek Catholic church reflect, at the local level, the current inclusion of Romanian society into a globalizing world. Mihalț presents a very distinctive feature: many people who declared themselves Greek Catholics in the 1992 census actually never stopped attending the 'old church', used by the Orthodox Church. After the appointment of a young Greek Catholic priest, a harsh conflict erupted over the church building, and this dispute took on a national dimension. Eventually, the government assured funding to build a new Greek Catholic church. Zerilli argues that the Greek Catholics, with the help of their energetic young priest, transformed their struggle to get back their former church into a civil project of local development. Therefore,

at the local level, Greek Catholics identify themselves as modern and dynamic, in contrast to Orthodox conservatism.

Jacek Nowak conducted research in Ukraine in the early 1990s, and went back recently to the site of his field studies. He argues that the revitalization of the Greek Catholic Church has successfully redefined national identity, but could not create local ties. In his chapter, about a rural community in Western Ukraine, Nowak shows how collective memory of a past when the Greek Catholic Church served as a strong social bond became a reference for rebuilding weakened social ties. There were high expectations in the early 1990s, when a massive switch from Orthodoxy to Greek Catholicism took place. The hope that the Greek Catholic Church would help to establish a break with the Soviet period (which was associated with Orthodoxy), by recreating trust and local identity turned out to be over-optimistic. The new church built in 1992, the first collective project in the village for a long time, is now barely used. Nowak describes a community that now suffers an extreme social crisis, with very low levels of trust and social cohesion. The hope that the Greek Catholic Church could play its former social role has fallen through.

Erzsébet Pilipkó and Bertalan Pusztai worked, in Subcarpathian Ukraine, with Hungarian-speaking, former Greek Catholic communities that exist as both a religious and an ethnic minority. They focus in particular on the processes of 'return' (as well as 'no-return') to the Greek Catholic Church after 1990: after the first months of euphoria, it became obvious that return would not be clear cut. There were conflicts over property, and this relatively small community is now divided into three religious groups: Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Orthodox. Pilipkó and Pusztai show that this return had very distinctive features, the result of divergent regional attitudes during the Soviet period. In the Uzhhorod region after 1949, the majority of Greek Catholics joined the Roman Catholic Church, and chose not to leave it after 1990. In the regions of Berehovo and Vynohradiv, most residents joined the Orthodox Church during the Soviet period, and, after many conflicts, the majority of the former Greek Catholics stayed in the Orthodox Church, even though many still consider themselves Greek Catholics. An additional complexity stems from the fact that the Rusyns living in the region came back in large numbers to the Greek Catholic Church. For many, Greek Catholicism equates with being Rusyn. The authors argue that, in the Hungarian-speaking communities, the attempt to obstruct the revival of the Greek Catholic Church equated religion and ethnicity in order to prevent local Hungarians from being 'pulled apart'.

Part 4. Exceptional Moments: Pilgrimages and Apparitions

The final chapters of the book deal with exceptional religious events in the life of Greek Catholic believers: pilgrimages to Marian apparition sites. The intensity of the religious experience creates a stronger sense of belonging, whether to a small diaspora group of newcomers to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in France (Kozlowski), or for the pilgrims who gather in new apparition sites in Slovakia (Halemba).

Valérie Kozlowski's chapter is the only one that deals with a diaspora Greek Catholic Community, that of the St Volodymyr Cathedral in Paris. She presents a detailed ethnography of the pilgrimage of members of this community to Lourdes, and describes how they created their own space through the building of a Greek Catholic church. Her interest focuses on the relationship between collective remembrance of the motherland and pilgrimage. She shows that only newcomers from Ukraine are allowed to join the group and argues that it is a 'rite of passage' that will help them create new identities and join the diaspora. She pays particular attention to the narratives and dreams of the pilgrims during their stay in Lourdes, and demonstrates that time spent in Lourdes establishes the link between Ukraine and their new home.

Agnieszka Halemba conducted field research on the Slovak Greek Catholic Church; her interest is in the sites of Marian apparitions. She presents the two major challenges currently confronting the Slovak Greek Catholic Church: on the one hand, the tendency among laymen to abandon church-bound religious practices, and, on the other hand, the church's attempt to redefine its position on the Slovak religious scene. Halemba describes different sites, both the established ones and the new ones. She argues that, unlike the top-down, massive Catholic pilgrimages analyzed by Grace Davie and Danièle Hervieu-Léger, the pilgrimages she describes create modes of identification outside the direct control of the church's hierarchy.

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PART ONE

HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEWS

Chapter 2
Greek Catholics: Historical Background

Paul Robert Magocsi

Writing about Greek Catholics for an English-speaking audience is not the easiest of tasks. First of the many difficulties is the very term *Greek Catholic*.[1] As will become clear, this is a generic term applied to a wide variety of related but distinct churches that minister to about 7.6 million Christian faithful living mostly in Central and Eastern Europe but also in North America and the Middle East. Adding to the terminological confusion is the fact that many of the churches belonging to the Greek Catholic category are not formally designated by that name. It is, therefore, not surprising that most of the major encyclopedias and reference works in English (also in French, German, Italian, and Spanish) do not contain an entry called 'Greek Catholics'.[2]

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[1] A variant of this term, in the form *Greco-Catholic,* was introduced by Peter Galadza, the editor of *Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies,* published by the Metropolitan Sheptytsky Institute at St Paul's University in Ottawa, Canada. The prefix *Greco-* is used in an attempt to avoid identification with Greek ethnicity, although – and perhaps unfortunately – the formulation *Greco-Catholic* has not yet replaced *Greek Catholic.* It should also be mentioned that this chapter has benefitted enormously from a critical reading of an earlier version by Professor Galadza and by Professor John-Paul Himka, to both of whom I am very grateful.

[2] There is no entry, 'Greek Catholic Church/Greek Catholics', in either of the two standard editions of the *Encyclopedia Britannica,* 11th ed., 29 vols. (1910), 14th ed., 29 vols. (1972), nor is there an entry in the index of either. The current 15th edition, 32 vols. (1998), has no entry in either the macropaedia or micropaedia parts of the work; there is an index entry, although it incorrectly states that the Greek Catholic Church is a 'Ukrainian religion' and directs the user to the entry: 'Ukrainian Catholic Church'.

There are no entries called 'Greek Catholic' either in the body of the text or in the index of the *Encyclopedia Americana: International Edition,* 65th version, 30 vols (Danbury, Conn., 2000) or *Collier's Encyclopedia,* 24 vols. (New York, 1990). Nor are the standard French, Spanish, or Italian encyclopedias any better, with nothing under 'l'église gréco-catholique' in *La grande encyclopédie,* 31 vols (Paris, 1908); *La grande encyclopédie Larousse,* 21 vols (Paris, 1971–78); under 'iglesia griego católica' in *Enciclopedia universal ilustrada Evropeo-Americana,* 70 vols. (Madrid and Barcelona, 1925–30) and *Apéndice,* 10 vols. (Bilbao, Madrid, and Barcelona, 1930–40); or under 'chiesa greco-cattolica' in the *Enciclopedia*

Numbers and Names

The world's largest religious groups are the Christians, with 1.9 billion adherents, and the Muslims at 1.8 billion. By comparison, there are only about 15 million Jews (Smart 1999: 13). Among Christians worldwide, 234 million are adherents of Eastern Christianity, including the Oriental Orthodox Churches (Armenian, Coptic, Ethiopian, etc.), the Eastern Orthodox Churches (Russian, Serbian, Romanian, etc.), and the Catholic Eastern Churches. The latter category includes the Greek Catholics, who number a mere 7.6 million[3] – less than one-half of one per cent of all Christians. Despite this, Greek Catholics do make up a substantial portion of the population in specific regions of the countries where they live. Moreover, their historic importance and impact on social and cultural developments in many parts of Central and Eastern Europe should not be underestimated.

Although this volume uses the term *Greek Catholic*, it would be useful to note how adherents of that faith are categorized within the larger framework of the Christian or, more particularly, the Eastern Christian world. In the past, the more reliable literature on the subject referred to the Uniate Eastern Churches, Churches in Communion with Rome, Catholic Eastern Churches of the Byzantine Rite, or simply Catholic Eastern Churches.[4] The

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italiana di scienze, lettere ed arti, 36 vols. (Milan and Rome, 1929–39) and in the *Grande dizionario enciclopedico utet,* 20 vols. (Turin, 1966–75), although this last work does at least have some information (23 lines) under the entry 'Orientali, Chiese', more precisely its subheading: Orientali uniti – Rito byzantino o Greco.

The standard German-language encyclopedias, *Der grosse Brockhaus,* 21 vols. (Leipzig, 1928–35) and *Der grosse Brockhaus,* 15 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1977–82), both have a cross reference, 'griechisch-katholische Kirche', directing the user to 'Kath. Kirche: die Orientalische Kirche'; the newest *Brockhaus Enzyklopädie,* 21st ed., 30 vols (Leipzig and Mannheim, 2006–07) does have a 21-line entry 'griechisch-katholische Kirche', in Vol. IX; but *Meyers enzyklopädisches Lexikon,* 32 vols. (Mannheim, Vienna, and Zurich, 1971–81) has nothing.

Even specialist reference works are problematic. The one-volume *Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity* (Oxford, 1999) has only a cross-reference 'Greek Catholic', directing the reader to 'Eastern Catholic'. The newer *Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) has an extensive chapter (pp. 291–318), entitled 'Eastern Catholic Christianity', not Greek Catholicism. The original edition of *The Catholic Encyclopedia,* 16 vols. (New York, 1907–14) does have in Vol. VI extensive entries on 'Greek Catholics in America' and the 'Greek Church', in which there appears the subheading 'Greek Uniat Churches'. However, the latest edition of this work, *The New Catholic Encyclopedia,* 2nd ed., 15 vols. (Washington, D.C., 2002), only has an entry 'Greek Catholic Church in Greece'; otherwise, there is nothing even in the index on Greek Catholics, and it is necessary to look at the entry 'Eastern Catholic Churches', or individual entries on the Romanian, Ruthenian, and Ukrainian Catholic Churches, among others.

[3] The membership statistics are drawn from Roberson 1999.

[4] See, for instance Fortescue 1923 and Attwater 1948, the second volume of which carries the subtitle: *Churches in Communion with Rome.*

category Catholic Eastern Churches is subdivided into three groups of churches according to their derivation from: (1) the Assyrian Church of the East; (2) the Oriental Orthodox Churches; or (3) the Orthodox Churches of the Byzantine Rite. It is this third subdivision of Catholic Eastern Churches that is historically referred to as Greek Catholic.

The accompanying table lists all Catholic Eastern Churches derived from churches of the Orthodox Byzantine Rite. With the exception of the Melkites (based in the Middle East), all the others were established in Central and Eastern Europe and have their jurisdictions today in that part of the world, as well as in North America, South America, Western Europe, and Australia, where Greek Catholic immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe settled in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The adjectival designations that appear in the table – Ukrainian, Ruthenian, Romanian, and so on – should not be understood exclusively as ethnic or nationality categories. In some cases, those designations refer to present-day countries, whose Greek Catholic adherents may be of various ethnicities/nationalities. In other cases, they may indeed refer to an ethnic category, especially among immigrants living outside their homelands. In yet other cases (Ruthenian, Melkite, and those from the former Yugoslavia), they refer to neither a country nor a specific ethnic group.

Catholic Eastern Churches of the Byzantine Rite[5]

Present-day Nomenclature of Church	Acceptance of the Union* or First Jurisdiction Founded**	Adherents ca. 2005
Ukrainian	1596*	4,269,000
Ruthenian	1646*	597,000
Romanian	1700*	742,000
Melkite	1724*	1,342,000
Former Yugoslavia	1777*	50,000
Slovak	1818**	225,000
Bulgarian	1861*	10,000
Greek	1911**	2,300
Hungarian	1912**	269,000
Russian	1917*	3,500
Belarusan	1931**	105,000
Albanian	1939*	3,200
Total		7,618,000

[5] The figures in this table (rounded to the nearest 100) are drawn from the *Annuario Pontificio per l'anno 2005.*

The Idea of Church Union

The Greek Catholic phenomenon could be said to have begun in 1596, when some of the Orthodox hierarchs and clergy living in the eastern regions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (modern-day Belarus and Ukraine) accepted the idea of church union – *unia* – with the Catholic Church in Rome. To be sure, even earlier there had been some interest and attempts to implement church union in the wake of the schism that after the thirteenth century separated the Christian world of Catholic Rome from that of Orthodox Constantinople. A short-lived union was proclaimed at Lyons in 1274 and another at Florence in 1439.[6] As was to be the case in subsequent efforts to implement or undo church unions, secular politics as much as theological concerns were among the motivating factors behind Catholic-Orthodox reconciliation or separation. The Union of Florence came about in 1439, a time when the Byzantine Empire was about to be overtaken by the Ottoman Turks. Byzantium's Orthodox emperor was anxious to obtain military assistance from Western European powers arrayed against the Islamic Ottomans, while for his part Pope Eugene IV (r. 1431–47), by achieving union, hoped to appease those forces within the Roman Catholic Church who were opposed to his rule.

Secular politics aside, Catholics and Orthodox churchmen had their own agendas. Four points of dogma were agreed on at the Council of Florence: the doctrine of the *filioque*[7]; the existence of purgatory; unleavened bread as a legitimate matter of the Holy Eucharist; and the primacy of the pope in Rome. (From today's perspective it seems incredible that Roman primacy did not figure more prominently.) At the same time, however, the council accepted the principle of theological diversity, so that both the Western and Eastern traditions, law, and liturgies could continue to be practised, if specific conditions warranted and agreement was reached.

Among the participants at the Union of Florence was Isidore, the Orthodox metropolitan of Kiev resident in Moscow, who was appointed apostolic legate responsible for promoting the union among the churches in the East. Isidore's mission was ultimately a failure. In Muscovy, both the Ortho-

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[6] For details on the early efforts at Church Union, see Halecki 1958: 15-82.

[7] The *filioque* issue, which later was exaggerated to become a seemingly irreconcilable theological difference between Catholics and Orthodox, had to do with a clause in the fourth-century Nicene Creed concerning the Holy Spirit and whether it proceeds only 'from the Father' (as in the original creed used by the Orthodox), or 'from the Father and the Son' – *filioque* in Latin (from a later modification of the creed used by Catholics). This issue remains high on the agenda of church leaders, as witnessed by a recent meeting of theologians: 'The *Filioque:* A Church Dividing Issue?: An Agreed Statement of the North American Orthodox–Catholic Theological Consultation, St Paul's College, Washington, D.C., October 25, 2003.

dox Church and the country's secular ruler rejected the union. In Constantinople, however, the very fount of the Orthodox world, the Florentine Union was proclaimed in late 1452. The next year, however, what remained of the Byzantine Empire fell to the Ottoman Turks. While the Ottoman Empire permitted the existence of Orthodoxy on its territory, it did so on the condition that the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople repudiates the Union of Florence. (The Vatican was at the time considered by the Ottomans to be their greatest enemy in Europe.)

Some aspects of the Florentine Union did survive in the eastern lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (present-day Belarus and much of Ukraine). There the Orthodox inhabitants were designated Ruthenians (from *Ruteni,* the Latin word for the ethnically Rus' population). The hierarchy of the Ruthenian Church – metropolitans and bishops – was according to Orthodox tradition still chosen by church councils and, intermittently, was recognized by both the pope in Rome and the ecumenical patriarch in Constantinople. For a few decades (1472–1501) unionist sentiment prevailed within the Ruthenian Church,[8] but that situation changed in the course of the sixteenth century. That was a time when Orthodox hierarchs in Poland-Lithuania could not be approved for consecration without the prior approval of the Polish king, thus effectively subordinating the Orthodox hierarchy to the secular ruler of a Roman Catholic state.

Church Union in Poland-Lithuania

Considering the persistence of the Florentine unionist tradition within the Ruthenian Church, it is not surprising that the next effort at church union took place in the eastern lands of Poland-Lithuania. In 1590, several Orthodox bishops met in the town of Brest in southwestern Lithuania (today Brest-Litovsk in Belarus), where they accepted the idea of church union with Rome.[9] The Orthodox prelates agreed to acknowledge the supremacy of the pope in Rome, and in return they expected the king of Poland to guarantee to the Ruthenian Church the same privileges, prerogatives, and immunities enjoyed by the Roman Catholic Church. The Ruthenians also expected to preserve the liturgy, structure, and traditions of their church[10] and did not

[8] For further details on the survival of the Florentine Union, see Halecki 1958: 123–140; and Macha 1974.

[9] There is an extensive literature on the Union of Brest. Aside from the earlier work by Halecki 1958: 199–419, the best modern analysis, which includes a comprehensive updated bibliography, is Gudziak 1998. For a critical assessment that is not in keeping with most standard interpretations, see Senyk 1998.

[10] The specific conditions of great concern to the Orthodox included: use of the liturgy according to the Byzantine ('Greek') rite and celebrated in the Church Slavonic language;

challenge the theological belief of Roman Catholics regarding use of the *filioque* in their version of the Nicene Creed.

Of course, no church union could occur in the absence of secular political interests. Poland-Lithuania's Orthodox hierarchs, in particular Bishop Gedeon Balaban of L'viv (r. 1569–1607), were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople (to whom the Ruthenian Church was jurisdictionally subordinate), who they felt was interfering in the internal affairs of their church. To assure the success of their unionist efforts, the Ruthenian church hierarchy needed the support of the most influential Orthodox political figure in Poland-Lithuania, the palatine of Kiev, Prince Konstantyn Ostroz'kyi (1526–1608). Initially, the prince was himself a strong supporter of church union, although his understanding of union assumed the participation of the 'whole Ecumenical Church', that is, the entire Roman Catholic *and* Orthodox world, including the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople and other eastern patriarchs (at the time under Ottoman rule), as well as the church in neighboring Muscovy and Moldavia.

When Ostroz'kyi's grandiose scheme proved untenable, the pro-unionist Ruthenian bishops continued their efforts to achieve church union, even if it were only to apply to Poland-Lithuania. Both groups met, but separately, in the town of Brest in October 1596. The pro-union forces, soon to be known as Uniates, proclaimed the Union of Brest, which subordinated the Ruthenian Church to the pope in Rome. The opposition forces led by Prince Ostroz'kyi rejected the church union and instead proclaimed their intention to protect the Orthodox faith against interference from Poland's secular authorities led by that country's king, its Roman Catholic Church, and its Uniate allies. Hence, a process that began in 1590, when most of the Orthodox in Poland-Lithuania had initially favored the idea of church union, ended in 1596 with the division of the Ruthenian Church into two mutually antagonistic forces: Uniate and Orthodox.

Initially, the Polish secular authorities recognized only the Uniates and outlawed the Orthodox. For their part, the Orthodox in Poland-Lithuania and neighboring Muscovy dismissed what they derogatorily called the *Uniaty,* whom they refused to recognize as a canonical church body. The Orthodox view of the Uniates, formulated as it was in the charged political environment surrounding the Union of Brest, was in the future to have dire consequences whenever the secular authorities of a given state decided for its own

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communion under two species – leavened bread and wine; the possibility for married men to be priests; election of bishops by church councils; in music the use of the human voice only (no instruments) in worship; the absence of statuary in churches and the presence of an iconostasis (a screen that separates the altar from the sanctuary); and observance of the Julian calendar.

purposes to defend the cause of Orthodoxy. Eventually, the Orthodox Church in Poland-Lithuania was able to regain its legal status. As a result, from 1632 until 1795, two parallel church jurisdictions, Uniate and Orthodox, each with its own metropolitan and bishops, functioned in Poland-Lithuania.

The fate of the Uniates was to change radically following the three partitions that between 1772 and 1795 removed Poland-Lithuania from the map of Europe. In the lands annexed by the Russian Empire (present-day Lithuania, Belarus, and central Ukraine), the Uniates faced the wrath of the tsarist regime (Lencyk 1966; Wolff 2002–03). Already in 1796, the Uniate metropolitanate of Kiev and all of the church's eparchies were abolished. Some Uniate eparchies and the metropolitanate were restored during the next decade, but then systematically abolished again between 1839 and 1875. All Uniates in the Russian Empire were forced to become Orthodox or Roman Catholic after these jurisdictional closures.

In contrast to the Russian Empire, where the tsarist government outlawed the Uniate Church, in former Polish lands annexed by the Habsburg-ruled Austrian Empire the church not only survived but also flourished.[11] As early as 1772, the Habsburgs acquired the region of Galicia, whose eastern half was inhabited largely by Uniates (mostly ethnic Ruthenians/Ukrainians). In 1774, Habsburg Austria officially renamed the church *Greek Catholic* and provided for it a seminary to train priests. This was followed by a series of reforms that guaranteed Greek Catholics full equality with Roman Catholics (1781) and the establishment of a jurisdictionally distinct metropolitan province of Galicia and Rus' with its seat in the provincial capital of L'viv (1808). The Greek Catholic Metropolitanate of Galicia and Rus' was divided into the eparchies of L'viv, Przemyśl, and later Stanislaviv, which together by 1900 encompassed a broad network of 1,894 parishes serving nearly three million Greek Catholic faithful throughout eastern Galicia and a small part of western Galicia (the Lemko Region west of the San River along the Carpathian foothills).

During the 'long' nineteenth century (i.e. until 1914), the Greek Catholic Church in Austrian Galicia did not function only as a religious institution providing spiritual comfort to its adherents; it also engaged in civic and cultural activity intended to preserve the national identity of its faithful (Himka 1999; Turii 2003). For most of the century, the Greek Catholic Metropolitanate of Galicia was associated with a somewhat vague East Slavic oriented national identity known as Old Ruthenian (*starorusyny),* but after the ascent to office in 1900 of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi (r.

[11] The classic work on the Uniate/Greek Catholics in the Habsburg Empire, especially during the early period, remains Pelesz 1878–81. See also Maday 1969: 114–128 and 147–199.

1900–44) the church quickly became an instrument of the Ukrainian national cause.

Church Union in Hungary and Romania

Following the Union of Brest in 1596, which applied to Eastern-rite Christians in Poland-Lithuania, the next church union was carried out in the Kingdom of Hungary. The northeastern region of the Hungarian Kingdom (the present-day Transcarpathian oblast in Ukraine and the Prešov Region of northeastern Slovakia) was inhabited by Orthodox believers of primarily Carpatho-Rusyn (Ruthenian) and, to a lesser degree, Slovak ethnicity.

In the seventeenth-century the political situation in Hungary was very complex. Most of the kingdom was ruled by the Ottoman Empire, while the far northern and eastern regions were under the authority of either the Austrian Habsburgs or Transylvanian princes. The Catholic Habsburgs and Protestant Transylvanians were engaged in a civil war over the right to rule the Kingdom of Hungary. Caught in the middle were the Rusyn-inhabited Orthodox lands in the Subcarpathian region, which in turn were divided between the warring Habsburgs and Transylvanians.

Beginning in 1614 two attempts were made to initiate a church union, a move favored by the pro-Habsburg Catholic forces but opposed by Protestant Transylvania.[12] Finally, in April 1646, in the Habsburg-controlled city of Uzhhorod, 63 Orthodox priests accepted what came to be known as the Union of Uzhhorod. As with the earlier Union of Brest in Poland-Lithuania, the new Uniate Church in the Hungarian Kingdom would retain its Byzantine rite and married clergy, its bishops would continue to be elected by a council (*sobor*) of monks and clergy, and its priests would be guaranteed the same privileges accorded to the Roman Catholic clergy. Because at the time most of the Uniates were ethnically Rusyn, the new body, as in neighboring Poland-Lithuania, was referred to as the Ruthenian Church.

The Union of Uzhhorod initially applied only to those lands in the Hungarian Kingdom that were under Habsburg authority (present-day eastern Slovakia and the region around Uzhhorod in far western Ukraine). Somewhat later, in 1664, the union spread farther eastward to the central part of Subcarpathian Rus'/Transcarpathia (thanks to the pro-Catholic sympathies of the widow of the local Transylvanian prince) and finally to the eastern Maramorosh region in 1721.

The jurisdictional status of Hungary's Ruthenian Uniates was precarious, since its bishops were technically only 'ritual vicars', that is, auxiliaries

[12] For further details on the church union in the Hungarian Kingdom, see Hodinka 1909; and Lacko 1955/1966.

to the Latin-rite Catholic bishop of Eger.[13] The subordinate status of the Uniates did not change until 1771, when, at the request of Austrian Empress Maria Theresa (r. 1740–80), the pope established a jurisdictionally independent Eparchy of Mukachevo. At the same time, the term *Uniate* was changed to *Greek Catholic* and the episcopal seat of the Ruthenian Eparchy of Mukachevo was transferred to Uzhhorod, where a seminary to train priests was set up in 1778.

Under Habsburg rule the Ruthenian Eparchy of Mukachevo functioned as a state-supported church throughout the long nineteenth century. Its hierarchs, however, especially during the last decades of the nineteenth century, felt increasingly obliged to express their loyalty to the Hungarian state. The church generally supported the state's policy of magyarization, which worked to assimilate the kingdom's non-Magyar inhabitants, including Rusyns. In fact, the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church was internally divided between clergy who supported magyarization and clergy (including the national awakener Aleksander Dukhnovych) who strove to preserve the cultural and national identity of the Rusyn people.[14]

The third church union to affect a significantly large number of people occurred in Hungary's eastern region of Transylvania. In 1699, Habsburg Austria succeeded in driving the Ottoman Turks out of the Kingdom of Hungary, although it had not yet been able to eliminate rule by Protestant princes in Transylvania. Earlier the Transylvanians had issued an Edict of Toleration (1572) that provided for equal rights for the four 'privileged' religions in the region: Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed Calvinist, and Unitarian. The Romanians living in Transylvania, almost all of whom were Orthodox, were not among the chosen religions, although in 1698 the Habsburg ruler Leopold I (r. 1655–1705) did issue a decree promising the privileges of the four recognized religions to persons who joined one of them. That incentive, together with ideological work carried out by Jesuit activists, convinced the Orthodox metropolitan of Alba Iulia and his successor to convoke synods in 1697, 1698, and 1700 that agreed to church union with Rome. A year later the Union of Alba Iulia was confirmed by the Habsburg authorities, who within a decade finally succeeded in removing from Transylvania the last of its Protestant rulers opposed to church union. The Union of Alba Iulia accepted the dogmatic points of the earlier Florentine Union. The Romanian Uniates were permitted, however, to elect their own bishops and metropolitans (as did the Romanian Orthodox) and to use Romanian instead of Church

[13] On the 'struggle' against the Latin-Rite diocese of Eger and the subsequent developments in the Ruthenian Church of Hungary, see Žatkovič 1933; and Pekar 1992: 36–61.

[14] On the nationalist struggle within the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Mukachevo, see Pekar 1992: 84–100.

Slavonic in the liturgy, one of the earliest examples of the use of a vernacular language in the Catholic Church.

Initially, most of Transylvania's Orthodox clergy accepted church union, hoping to enjoy the promised improved educational opportunities and socioeconomic status enjoyed by Catholics and members of the other privileged religions. In fact, however, social equality was never realized among Transylvania's Romanians, and educational improvement was slow in coming. This led in the 1740s to a widespread movement for a return to Orthodoxy, followed by an anti-Habsburg Orthodox uprising between 1758 and 1762. By the 1760s only one-sixth of Transylvania's Eastern-rite adherents were Uniate, while the remaining five-sixths were Orthodox.

Nevertheless, Transylvania's Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church did survive, thanks to the dynamic leadership of bishops Ion Inochentie Micu-Klein (r. 1728–51) and Petru Pavel Aron (r. 1752–64). With the assistance of the Habsburg government they transformed the Eparchy of Făgăraş, in particular its seat at Blaj, into a cultural and educational centre for prospective clerics as well as lay students. The schools that came into being in Blaj were the first to teach in the Romanian language, and their graduates helped spread education in that language throughout the rest of Transylvania (Korolevsky 1957: 15–18; Hitchins 1986). In effect, by the nineteenth century, the Greek Catholic Church in Transylvania had become an instrument to promote the Romanian national awakening (Florescu 1967; Niessen 1993). In 1855, the jurisdictionally independent Greek Catholic Metropolitanate of Alba Iulia–Făgăraş was created, with its seat in Blaj and eparchies in Blaj, Gherla, Oradea, and Lugoj.

Other Church Unions

A few other Greek Catholic jurisdictions came into being in the Habsburg-ruled Hungarian Kingdom. As early as 1611, in Hungarian-ruled Croatia-Slavonia, the local Orthodox bishop accepted the union and functioned from the monastery at Marča as an auxiliary to the Latin bishop of Zagreb, responsible mostly for Serbian and Croat refugees who fled from the Ottoman invasions. In 1777 the pope in Rome established an eparchy with a seat in Križevci for all Greek Catholics living in Hungarian-ruled Croatia-Slavonia (mostly ethnic Croats and Serbs) and the Vojvodina (mostly Bačka Rusyns) (Magocsi 2005b). The Eparchy of Križevci was at first subordinate to the Latin archbishop of Esztergom, but after 1853 to the Latin archbishop of Zagreb.

In the northern part of the Hungarian Kingdom, Rome approved in 1818 the establishment of the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Prešov, which was created by detaching 194 parishes from the western part of the Eparchy of

Mukachevo; that is, territory in what is today eastern Slovakia and northeastern Hungary.[15] The ethnic composition of the Eparchy of Prešov was complex. When, after 1850, the Hungarian authorities conducted the first censuses and individuals were asked to indicate their national identity or their native language, the Greek Catholics who until then described themselves as Ruthenians (*rusnakŷ/rusnatsi*) in the sense of belonging to the Byzantine rite or faith (*rus'ka vira*), were now being officially recorded as belonging to either the Rusyn, Slovak, or Magyar nationality. At least until the First World War, the eparchial seat and its administration in Prešov either associated itself with the Rusyn nationality or, increasingly, favoured the magyarizing national assimilationist policies of the Hungarian government.

It was the struggle over national identity, which was couched in terms of a debate about language, that led to the establishment in 1912 of yet another Greek Catholic jurisdiction in Hungary, the Eparchy of Hajdúdorog.[16] Ever since the creation of the first Uniate/Greek Catholic churches following the Union of Brest in 1596, one of the hallmarks of the Eastern rite had been the use of Church Slavonic as a liturgical language. Although not the vernacular language of any one ethnic group, Church Slavonic was nonetheless understandable to many East Slavic speakers. It was, however, not easy for native speakers of Hungarian to learn. Therefore, in 1860s, Magyar nationalists and pro-Hungarian Rusyn Greek Catholics (the so-called magyarones) began a movement to convince the Vatican to allow them to use Hungarian instead of Church Slavonic in their liturgy. When, in 1896, the Vatican refused to allow the use of vernacular Hungarian, the movement switched tactics and demanded the creation of a distinct eparchy. Finally, in 1912, the pope approved the creation of the Eparchy of Hajdúdorog by detaching 162 parishes (70 from Mukachevo, 8 from Prešov, 44 from Oradea, and 4 from Gherla). The new eparchy, with its seat in Nyíregyháza, covered territory in what is today northeastern Hungary and far northwestern Romania (Niessen 1994).

To get around the Vatican's proscriptions against the use of the Hungarian vernacular, yet at the same time not wanting to use Church Slavonic, it was agreed that the official language of the Hajdúdorog Eparchy would be Greek. Although an approved liturgical language, Greek was at least as alien as Church Slavonic for Hungarian speakers. In the end, the eparchy continued to use Hungarian in direct violation of the Vatican's ban on 'living languages' (Korolevsky 1957: 23–45). As important for the supporters of

[15] On the establishment of the eparchy and its development down to the First World War, see Dukhnovich 1877/1971; and Kubinyi 1970: 27–130.

[16] For background information, see Pirigyi 1990: 83–120 (Vol. II); and Magocsi 2005c.

Hungarian state policy during the last decades before the First World War was that the Eparchy of Hajdúdorog (and before it the Vicariate of Hajdúdorog created in 1873) became an instrument of magyarization that successfully helped transform the non-Magyar faithful (primarily Rusyns) into both Hungarian speakers and staunch Magyar patriots.[17]

Beyond the territorial heartland of Greek Catholicism within Habsburg Austria-Hungary there were a few other communities that came into being during the long nineteenth century. In Bulgaria, the Orthodox were engaged in a struggle to gain ecclesiastical independence from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. Independence was finally achieved in 1870, but until that happened some Bulgarian Orthodox thought that union with Rome would be the solution to their jurisdictional problems. In response, the Vatican consecrated a bishop and an estimated 60,000 Orthodox became Bulgarian Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. Those numbers were reduced substantially after 1870, but a few communities managed to survive, mostly in Macedonia and Thrace (which remained under direct Ottoman rule until 1912), and for whom the Holy See created an ecclesiastical structure in the form of Bulgarian Byzantine Catholic apostolic vicariates based in Thessalonica and Adrianople. After the First World War, these vicariates were replaced by a single apostolic vicariate based in Sofia (Attwater 1948: 120–123).

Greek Catholics among Belarusans date back to the 1596 Union of Brest, when Belarusan lands were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Belarusan Uniates were forcibly converted to Orthodoxy by the Russian imperial government after 1839, but a community of about 30,000 (part of the so-called Neo-Unia) arose after the First World War in the part of Belarus that at the time was incorporated into Poland. In 1945, when the Soviet Union annexed eastern Poland, Belarusan Greek Catholics were suppressed once again, only to re-emerge following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since that time, some estimate that the number of Greek Catholics in independent Belarus has grown to 100,000; nevertheless, they do not have their own hierarchical structure (Flynn 1993).

Greek Catholicism after the First World War

The First World War and its aftermath profoundly changed the political map of Central and Eastern Europe. The Russian, German, and Ottoman Empires

[17] Local Rusyns, especially members of the intellectual elite working in Hungary's capital, Budapest, were among the staunchest supporters of national assimilation and of introducing the Hungarian language into the liturgy. For details, see Mayer 1977: 136–168 (English edition 1997: 153–189).

collapsed, and the states that succeeded them – the Soviet Union, Weimar Germany, and Turkey – were territorially much smaller than their imperial predecessors. As for Habsburg-ruled Austria-Hungary, it simply ceased to exist on the last day of October 1918. The Habsburg territories that formed the heartland of Greek Catholicism were now apportioned to several new or expanded postwar successor states. Austrian Galicia went to Poland, while Hungarian-ruled Transcarpathia/Subcarpathian Rus' went to Czechoslovakia, Transylvania to Romania, and Croatia-Slavonia and the Vojvodina to Yugoslavia. Not surprisingly, the new Polish, Czechoslovak, Romanian, and Yugoslav regimes were to have an important impact on the Greek Catholic Churches in each of those countries.

The situation was particularly problematic in Poland, where from November 1918 to June 1919 Poles and Ukrainians fought a bitter war for control of eastern Galicia, the former Habsburg territory east of the San River. Although Ukrainian armies were driven out of the region in July 1919, for the next two decades Ukrainian militants carried out a kind of underground war against Polish rule. The struggle was to continue with varying degrees of intensity at the same time that the Polish government placed restrictions on Ukrainian civic, cultural, and educational life, which compared unfavourably with what had existed during prewar Habsburg rule.

The state's relations with the Greek Catholic Church were finally regularized in 1925, following the signing of a concordat between the Holy See and Poland. The Greek Catholic Metropolitanate of Galicia was restricted to its three eparchies (L'viv, Przemyśl, and Stanislaviv), that is, to lands that for the most part comprised the former Habsburg-ruled eastern Galicia. Within that territory the Greek Catholic Church after 1925 was allowed relative freedom of action and, as a result, it took on the role of defender of Ukrainian cultural and educational as well as spiritual interests. This transformation of the church into a Ukrainian 'national' institution was in large part due to three factors: the leadership of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, who reigned as Metropolitan of L'viv from 1900 until his death in 1944; the grassroots work of several male and female monastic orders, such as the Basilians, Studites, and Redemptorists; and the fact that a sizeable number of nationalist activists were children of married Greek Catholic priests.[18]

There were theological seminaries in the eparchial seats of Przemyśl and Stanislaviv, and the seminary in L'viv was in 1928 transformed into a theological academy. Set up on the pattern of Catholic universities in the West, with theological and philosophical faculties, the Greek Catholic L'viv Theological Academy functioned as the only university-level Ukrainian-

[18] For a solid introduction to the church in interwar Poland, see Budurowycz 2002–03. On the multifarious career of Galicia's metropolitan, see Magocsi 1989.

language institution in Poland. The various monastic orders were particularly active in publishing Ukrainian-language books and journals and in staffing as teachers the private Ukrainian-language secondary schools and teacher's colleges that functioned parallel to Poland's state-run educational system (Kaszczak 2005: 92–115).

The interwar years also witnessed a sharpening of the internal debate between those Greek Catholics who favored the adoption of a more western religious model, including enforced celibacy for the clergy (Bishop Hryhorii Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv, Bishop Josaphat Kotsylovskyi of Przemyśl, and the Basilian Order), and those who preferred the preservation of the Eastern rite and spirituality (Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, Bishop Mykola Charnetskyi, and the Studite Order). As a result, religious practice among Greek Catholics differed among the three eparchies of the Galician metropolitanate. During the ongoing debates, the 'Easternizers' presented themselves as patriots defending Ukrainian 'national' interests in opposition to the 'Westernizers' (critics would say pro-Polish Latinizers) who favoured practices more in keeping with Roman Catholicism.[19]

To the south of Poland was the new state of Czechoslovakia, which received territory that in the prewar Hungarian Kingdom encompassed the Greek Catholic eparchies of Mukachevo and Prešov. Most of the Mukachevo Eparchy, with its seat in Uzhhorod, found itself within Subcarpathian Rus', a territory that according to the postwar international treaties was to be granted special autonomous status within Czechoslovakia. Most of the Prešov Eparchy was located within the Slovak administered part of the new country.

In general, Czechoslovakia's political leaders were imbued with a spirit of democratic secularism that favored a reduction of religious influence in society. This inevitably led to friction and discontent with all churches, including the Greek Catholics in the eastern part of the country. As early as 1920 the government abolished the labour and transport dues (*rokovyna*) and tax in kind (*koblyna*) traditionally paid by peasants to the Greek Catholic Church. This caused severe economic hardship for priests and their families, who were cut off from a significant portion of their income. Clerical discontent with the new state was complemented by suspicion (not unfounded) that many Greek Catholic priests and especially hierarchs were magyarones, that is, persons who did not expect Czechoslovak rule to last long and who were marking time until Subcarpathian Rus' would be returned to Hungary.[20]

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[19] The flashpoint over which the Easternizers and Westernizers clashed is discussed by Pospishil 1989; Stępień 2003; and Galadza 2004.

[20] For further details, see Kubinyi 1970: 144–157; Pekar 1992: 115–140; and Palinchak 1996.

State-church relations improved somewhat after a series of Czechoslovak laws regulating parishioners' church dues and priests' salaries were passed in 1926. Although perhaps not with the same intensity as in neighbouring Polish-ruled eastern Galicia, the Greek Catholic Church in both the Mukachevo and Prešov eparchies played an active role in civic, cultural, and educational affairs. As a result, the church gradually came to be seen as a defender of a distinct Carpatho-Rusyn nationality.[21] Finally, towards the end of the interwar decades, in 1937 the Holy See separated the eparchies of Mukachevo and Prešov from the Hungarian Metropolitanate of Esztergom and placed them 'temporarily' under the jurisdiction of the Eastern Congregation in Rome until such time as the planned establishment of a distinct Metropolitanate of Mukachevo would be realized.

The Greek Catholic Church in both Poland and Czechoslovakia faced an analogous problem during the interwar years – a movement known as 'the return to Orthodoxy'. This phenomenon had actually begun in Austrian-ruled Galicia as early as the 1880s, and not long after appeared in northeastern Hungary. The Habsburg authorities reacted firmly, so that any large-scale spread of Orthodoxy among Austria-Hungary's East Slavs was held in check during the decades before the First World War (Himka 2001). Also, beginning in the 1880s a massive wave of emigration had brought hundreds of Greek Catholics from Austrian Galicia and Hungarian Subcarpathian Rus' to work in the industries and mines of the northeastern United States. By the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, their numbers had reached about 400,000. With their married clergy, 'incomprehensible' liturgical language (Church Slavonic instead of Latin), and seemingly 'foreign' rituals (communion with leavened bread *and* wine, organless chanting, and fixed holidays celebrated two weeks later than 'normal' Catholics), Greek Catholic priests and their poor working-class parishioners found themselves not especially welcome in established American Roman Catholic circles. In 1891, the priest Alexis Toth and his parishioners in Minneapolis, Minnesota became the first Greek Catholics to leave the Catholic Church and 'return to Orthodoxy'. This began a process whereby over 50,000 Greek Catholic immigrants from Austria-Hungary had by 1914 joined the Russian Orthodox Church of North America.[22]

In the decades before First World War many immigrants returned home, and some brought 'the return to Orthodoxy' spirit with them. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first Orthodox parishes in the Carpathian region of Austria-Hungary (Becherov, Velyki Luchky, and Iza) were con-

[21] See Magocsi 1978: 178–185; Lets [Letz] 2003.
[22] See Dyrud 1992; Magocsi 2005a: 9–33.

nected with returning 'American Orthodox' immigrants.[23] The Austro-Hungarian authorities, who at the very same time were concerned with the Russian Empire's designs in the Balkans and its interest in the 'people of Rus' outside Russia' (*zagranichnaia Rus'*), reacted by arresting Greek Catholics-turned-Orthodox and putting them on trial for alleged 'treason against the state'. Trials and later persecution (including hangings, assassinations, and internment in concentration camps) continued against suspected and real Orthodox adherents in Austro-Hungary from 1904 until virtually the end of the First World War. As a result of such persecution, the number of 'converts' to Orthodoxy was kept to a minimum.[24]

With the end of the war and the disappearance of Austria-Hungary, however, the Orthodox movement among Greek Catholic peasants now living in Czechoslovakia and Poland returned with a vengeance.[25] It should also be noted that both among immigrants in the United States as well as among Greek Catholics in Europe, returning to Orthodoxy was equated with preservation of a Rus' (sometimes confused with Russian) cultural identity and the definite rejection of any association with Ukrainians.

During the 1920s, about one third of the Greek Catholics in the eastern part of Czechoslovakia (an estimated 189,000) became Orthodox. The motivations behind the 'return' were varied and included: acceptance of promises by Orthodox priests not to extract traditional dues (the *koblyna* and *rokovyna*) from parishioners, discontent with pro-Hungarian 'aristocratic' attitudes among the magyarone Greek Catholic clergy, or simply displeasure with the local parish priest. For most of the interwar years, life in Czechoslovakia's Greek Catholic eparchies of Prešov and, most especially, Mukachevo, was characterized by a struggle to control church property, which in turn resulted in frequent violence and numerous court cases between rival Greek Catholic and Orthodox parishioners.[26]

In Poland's southeastern lands, the Orthodox movement proved to be less intense than in Czechoslovakia. It was also more geographically restricted and was actually concentrated in a small area of Galicia west of the San River along the northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains. This area was known as the Lemko Region (after the name *Lemko* used from the early

[23] See Mayer 1977: 124–152 and 190–232.

[24] The trials all took place in Sighet (Sighetu Marmației), the seat of Maramorosh county, in 1901 against converts from a Romanian-inhabited village, and in 1904 and 1913–14 against converts from Rusyn-inhabited villages. According to Hungarian census data from 1910, there were among Rusyns only 577 Orthodox adherents.

[25] For a comparative study of the Orthodox revival among Rusyns in both countries, see Bruski 1997.

[26] See Horkaj and Pružinský 1998: 94–147; Krizina 1999: 50–78.

twentieth century as an ethnonym by the local East Slavic Rusyn inhabitants). Between 1926 and 1932, an estimated 20,000 Greek Catholic Lemkos joined the Orthodox Church in Poland (Moklak 2000; Stachowiak 2000). The reasons for their 'return' were several: discontent with the Latinization influences and Ukrainian national ideology promoted by the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Przemyśl, pro-Orthodox propaganda disseminated by returning immigrants, and the high cost of pastoral and sacramental services (baptisms, weddings, funerals, etc.) demanded by some Greek Catholic priests.

The Orthodox threat to the Greek Catholic establishment in Poland and Czechoslovakia certainly came to the attention of the Vatican. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the Eparchy of Mukachevo was able to contain the situation, and during 1930s it managed to return to Greek Catholicism certain parishes lost in the previous decade to the Orthodox. In Poland the Holy See decided to intervene directly by adopting measures (elaborated on below) it had used earlier among immigrants in North America.

The first decade of the twentieth century in the United States was marked by ongoing friction among Greek Catholic immigrants, in large part because of identity issues. Many immigrants from Austrian-ruled Galicia were adopting a Ukrainian national identity, while those from Hungarian-ruled Subcarpathian Rus' (the Eparchy of Mukachevo) and Prešov (the Eparchy of Prešov) rejected this option in favor of maintaining their traditional Rus' identity.[27] The nationality question also had an impact on religious preference, since some Greek Catholics became convinced that by joining the Russian Orthodox Church of North America they would be better able to preserve their Rus' faith (*rus'ka vira*) and Rus' national identity. In this regard it should be noted that most immigrants made no distinction between their religion and their ethnonational identity. Hence, any proposed changes or restrictions on Greek Catholic religious practices could, and often would, be construed as a threat to one's Rus' identity.[28]

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[27] It should be noted that national differences were not absolutely coincidental with regional boundaries. For instance, aside from Ukrainian-oriented immigrants from Galicia, there were still many from that region who retained a Rus' identity, which they came to understand as being of Russian nationality. The Rus' and Russophile orientations were especially prevalent among Galician immigrants from the so-called Lemko Region west of the San River. The Ukrainian-Rusyn identity complexities at the parish level are revealed in a recent study by Richard Custer (2006). See also the chapter, 'The Making of the Ukrainian American: From Ruthenians to Ukrainians', in Kuropas 1991: 73–105.

[28] A good example of this problem was the papal bull, *Ea Semper,* issued in 1907 to regulate relations between Latin- and Greek (Byzantine)-Rite Catholics in North America. Among other things, the document forbid ordination of married men to the priesthood and subordinated the Greek Catholic bishops to Roman Catholic bishops on United States and Canadian territory. These restrictions were viewed by many immigrants as an attack on their Rus'

Aware of the relationship between regional and national differences among America's Greek Catholics, and wanting to avoid further defections to Orthodoxy, the Vatican responded to the crisis by creating separate jurisdictions for immigrants from Austrian Galicia and the Hungarian Kingdom in the form first of administrations (1916), then exarchates (1924), and eventually metropolitan sees (1969). These are today what comprise the distinct Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (based in former Austrian Galicia) and the Byzantine Catholic Church (based in the former Hungarian Kingdom).

Realizing that such a move seemed to stabilize internal Greek Catholic relations in the United States, the Vatican decided to follow the same policy in the European homeland. In 1934, it detached from the Eparchy of Przemyśl 111 Greek Catholic parishes west of the San River (with 127,000 faithful) and created the Lemko Apostolic Administration under the direct authority of the Holy See. The implied goal was to reduce the Ukrainian influence over Greek Catholics and, therefore, remove one of the reasons for 'returning to Orthodoxy'.[29] In the Lemko Region, as in the United States, the Vatican's policy seemed to work and further losses from Greek Catholicism were contained (Prach 1992).

Developments in Romania took a different turn. In contrast to the Greek Catholic hierarchs in Galicia and Subcarpathian Rus', who greeted with caution or hostility the establishment of Polish or Czechoslovak rule over their eparchial territory, the bishops of Transylvania welcomed the popular assembly in Alba Iulia that in December 1918 proclaimed the unification of that land with Romania. To emphasize their identity and relationship to the new state, Transylvania's Greek Catholics were henceforth known officially as the Romanian Church United with Rome. Despite the fact that the Greek Catholics cooperated with the government in the cultural reclamation of Transylvania from Hungary, the new Romanian constitution of 1923 defined the Orthodox Church as the 'first religion of the state (Niessen 1993: 57)'.[30] And whereas the state did provide subsidies and other privileges to enhance the material status of its Greek Catholics, the rise of nationalist and fascist forces during the 1930s created friction with Romanian society and with the Orthodox, where little or none had existed before.

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national identity. For the full text of the *Ea Semper* decree and its impact, see Magocsi 2005a: 28.

[29] The new jurisdiction's official directory made it clear that the Lemko Apostolic Administration came into being as a response to the Orthodox movement; for that reason the first administrator (Vasylii Mastsiukh) and chancellor (Ioann Polianskii) adopted the Lemko Rusyn national orientation and avoided appointments of Ukrainian-oriented priests. See *Shematyzm hreko-katolyts'koï Apostol'skoï Administratsiï Lemkivshchyny* 1936: xiv.

[30] For further details on the church during the interwar years, see Maner 2003.

The Greek Catholic Churches in Central Europe faced new challenges following the outbreak of the Second World War and the numerous changes of political borders. Poland ceased to exist in September 1939 and the Greek Catholic Metropolitanate of Galicia found itself under Soviet rule. The Soviets implemented restrictive measures against Greek Catholics, especially regarding church property and education, but it did allow the institution to exist. In June 1941, German armies invaded the Soviet Union and annexed eastern Galicia to Greater Germany, which it ruled until September 1944. The German authorities basically left the Greek Catholic Church to its own devices, although they did not appreciate Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's criticism of the excesses of Nazi rule, including its treatment of Jews.[31]

In Czechoslovakia, the territory of the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Mukachevo was returned to Hungary as early as March 1939. The church was given a privileged position by the Hungarian administration, in which some priests were given important leadership roles.[32] Meanwhile, the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Prešov found itself under the rule of an independent Slovak state whose officials were frequently critical of the local Greek Catholic bishop (Pavel Goidych) because of his willingness to defend the cultural and educational needs of his Rusyn faithful in the face of threats posed by slovakization (national assimilation).

Farther south in Romania, northern Transylvania was reannexed to Hungary in 1940 and the region's Greek Catholic bishops were expected to interact with the rest of Hungary's Catholic world. Despite their defense of the Romanian character of their eparchies, Greek Catholic hierarchs were later to be accused by their Orthodox religious revivals for exhibiting a lack of Romanian patriotism.

The Soviet Era

The precarious situation of the Greek Catholic Church in Central and Eastern Europe during the Second World War only worsened after the end of the conflict. The Soviet Union was now the undisputed dominant power throughout the region. In 1945, Subcarpathian Rus', which included the Eparchy of Mukachevo, was annexed to the Soviet Union as the Transcarpathian oblast of Soviet Ukraine. Within a year, Communist regimes were installed in Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (1948), all of which were closely allied to, if not virtually dependent on, the Soviet Union.

Although officially an atheistic state, the Soviet Union did tolerate certain religious bodies, in particular the Russian Orthodox Church. The

[31] See Magocsi 1989: 101–162; and Bociurkiw 1996: 32–61.
[32] See Pekar 1996; Botlik 1997: 256–247.

Soviets did, however, continue the policy of their tsarist Russian predecessors regarding the Greek Catholics, who for the Russian Orthodox world remained the despised *Uniaty.*[33] Between 1946 and 1950 the Greek Catholic Church in the Soviet Union and in most of its neighbouring Communist satellite countries was abolished.[34] The manner used to eliminate Greek Catholicism differed slightly from country to country, but the results were the same. Church councils (*sobors*) that were uncanonical in nature were convened in Soviet Ukraine (at L'viv, March 1946), Romania (at Alba Iulia, October 1948), and Czechoslovakia (at Prešov, April 1950). At these councils a certain number of Greek Catholic priests (but no bishops) agreed to repudiate the unions that several centuries before had brought their churches into existence.

The most elaborate procedure for elimination took place in Ukraine (historic eastern Galicia).[35] The first step began in 1945 with a propaganda campaign by Soviet Ukrainian writers, whose newspaper articles and pamphlets denigrated the idea of Vatican-inspired Uniatism throughout the centuries and more recently accused the Greek Catholic hierarchy and priesthood of collaboration with the Nazi German invader during the Second World War.[36] The propaganda campaign was followed by the arrest of the entire hierarchy (bishops, auxiliary bishops, and chancellors) and, often after

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[33] The Soviet regime sponsored a wide variety of publications designed to reveal the nefarious activity of the Greek Catholic Church ever since it come into being at the Union of Brest. A good example that depicts the 'Uniate Church as an agent of Fascism and the Vatican' which operated 'Under the Banner of the Fascist Swastika' is two editions of a work in Ukrainian issued by the publishing house of the Soviet Ukrainian Academy of Sciences under the title, *On the Road to Shame and Treachery,* by Serhii T. Danylenko *Dorohoiu han'by i zrady: istorychna khronika* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1970) – 15,000 copies; 2nd revised and expanded edition (1972) – 34,000 copies. This work was issued for foreign consumption in a revised Russian language edition: Sergei T. Danylenko, *Uniaty [The Uniates]* (Moscow: Izdvo politicheskoi literatury, 1972) – 60,000 copies; as was another collection of essays by various authors and translated into English: *Uniate Church: Forcible Establishment, Natural Failure* (Kiev: Politvydav Ukraïny Publishers, 1983).

[34] There is an extensive literature on the destruction of the Greek Catholic Church; for a general overview of developments throughout the region, see Dunn 1977; and Stępień 1994: 195–262.

[35] The following discussion is based on Bociurkiw 1996: 102–207. The Soviet Marxist view was presented in several tendentious historical tracts published during 1960s and 1970s; the official Orthodox viewpoint was elaborated in *The Lvov Church Council: Documents and Materials, 1946–1981* (Moscow: Moscow Patriarchate, 1983).

[36] Among the most prolific authors of polemical tracts directed against the Greek Catholic Church was the Soviet Ukrainian writer Iaroslav Halan, whose works were brought out in seventy different editions for a total of over 2.5 million copies. Among his best known collections was the Russian-language *S khrestom ili s nozhem: pamflety [With a Cross or a Knife: Pamflets]* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962) – 100,000 copies.

torture, sentencing them to long prison terms. Eventually most died in prison. Among the important exceptions was Galicia's Metropolitan-Archbishop Iosyf Slipyi.[37]

The next step was to create an 'Initiative Group' comprised of Greek Catholic priests who could be convinced to repudiate the union. The group's work culminated with the convocation of the L'viv Sobor (council), which on March 8, 1946 formally outlawed the 1596 Union of Brest and 'returned' to the fold of the Russian Orthodox Church. Further efforts were made to convince parish priests to accept the decisions of the L'viv Sobor, with the result that 37 per cent (1,111) of the 2,950 priests in Galicia's three Greek Catholic eparchies accepted the return to Orthodoxy.

In the Greek Catholic territories that remained within post-1945 Poland (primarily Galicia west of the San River), the situation was made somewhat easier, since in 1945–46 the Greek Catholic Ukrainians and most Lemko Rusyns were expelled from their age-old homeland and resettled eastward in Soviet Ukraine. Poland's Communist authorities then nationalized Greek Catholic property, arguing that it belonged to 'juridical persons' who no longer existed. In this manner the Greek Catholic Church jurisdictions technically still located in Poland (with a total of 363 parishes in the Lemko Apostolic Administration and the western third of the Eparchy of Przemyśl) were 'delegalized' and Byzantine-rite Catholicism officially 'non-recognized'.[38]

Developments in Soviet Transcarpathia took yet a different turn (Lacko 1961; Bociurkiw 1996: 213–228). In 1946, Soviet officials tried to persuade the Bishop Teodor Romzha of Mukachevo to place himself under the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate. He refused, and the following year he was killed by Soviet secret police in what was made to seem like a car accident. Efforts continued to convince parish priests, and of the 315 in the Mukachevo Eparchy, 140 (44%) 'reunited' with the Orthodox. Most of the 'recalcitrants' (those who refused reunion) were sent to prisons where they died or remained in exile in the Soviet Far East. Almost as an afterthought, an Act of Reunion was read out in the course of a service held in the Uzhhorod cathedral on 28 August 1949.

The practice of convoking a church council (*sobor*) was once again used in two Soviet satellite countries with significant Greek Catholic popula-

[37] As a result of international pressure, Metropolitan Slipyi was subsequently amnestied and allowed to leave the Soviet Union. He arrived in Rome in 1963, and for the next two decades – during which he was raised to the rank of Cardinal and major-archbishop (some used the term Patriarch) – he led the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in exile.

[38] Bociurkiw 1996: 207–212; Ryńca 2001; and the chapters by Stanisław Stępień and Mariusz Ryńca in Paul J. Best and Jaroslaw Moklak (eds.), 2002: 183–206.

tions. In Romania, 430 Greek Catholic priests out of 1,800 were convinced to endorse 'reunification' with the Romanian Orthodox Church, and with that in mind a synod was convoked at Alba Iulia. On 1 October 1948, the synod formally abolished the Romanian Church in Union with Rome. All five of Romania's Greek Catholic bishops were arrested (only one of whom survived prison) together with over 600 priests who also refused to abjure Catholicism (Ivanko 1949–50; Brown 1990). In Czechoslovakia, Communist officials invited 80 Greek Catholic priests to a 'peace rally' being held in the eastern Slovak town of Prešov in April 1950. The rally was transformed into a sobor, which proclaimed the abolition of the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Prešov and the reunion of its priests with the Orthodox Church. When Prešov's Greek Catholic hierarchs (Pavel Goidych and Vasyl' Hopko) refused to accept Orthodoxy, they were promptly arrested, placed on a show trial, and sentenced to life imprisonment. About one third of the 301 Greek Catholic priests in the Prešov Eparchy became Orthodox.[39]

Several factors prompted a certain number of Greek Catholic priests to accept the reunion with Orthodoxy. These included: the fear of violence carried out by the authorities against not only the priest but his family; a desire to continue pastoral work regardless of jurisdiction; the conviction that entering the Orthodox fold would guarantee the survival of the Byzantine rite and tradition against Latinization; or, simple opportunism and concern for their material welfare. In fact, a few Greek Catholic priest-'converts' were given influential posts in the new Orthodox hierarchies.[40] As for Greek Catholic Church and monastic property, it was confiscated by the state and given either to the respective Russian, Czechoslovak, and Romanian Orthodox churches (in the case of Poland to the Roman Catholic Church) for their use, or to local town and village authorities for non-religious purposes, such as warehouses, cultural centres, or educational facilities. Many Greek Catholic church buildings were simply destroyed, a phenomenon that was especially prevalent in southeastern Poland.[41]

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[39] See Lacko 1961: 158–173; Fedor 1993; and Šturák 1999: 38–96.

[40] Of the three main leaders of the Initiative Committee for Reunion of the Galician Metropolia, the chairman, Havriïl Kostel'nyk, was assassinated in 1948, while the priests Antonii Pel'vets'kyi and Mykhaïl Mel'nyk were immediately before the 1946 Sobor raised to the rank of Orthodox bishops of Stanislaviv and Drohobych, respectively. In Slovakia, among former Greek Catholic activists working on behalf of reunion, the assistant chancellor of the Eparchy of Prešov, Viktor Michalič, became Orthodox Bishop Aleksander of Michalovce, and the priest Michael Millý became Orthodox Bishop Methodius of Trebišov.

[41] Of the 689 churches in the Lemko Apostolic Administration and Eparchy of Przemyśl located west of the San River that were still in use at the close of the Second World War, over half (346) were destroyed or left to decay, while 245 were acquired by the Roman Catholic Church (Marek et al. 1997).

In effect, by 1950 the Greek Catholic Church had ceased to exist in most countries of Communist-ruled Central and Eastern Europe. There were only two exceptions. The Greek Catholic Eparchy of Hajdúdorog, with its seat in Nyíregyháza, continued to function within the guidelines and restrictions that applied to all religious groups in Communist Hungary. Similarly, in Communist Yugoslavia, which after 1948 had separated itself from the Soviet bloc, the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Križevci continued to survive, serving a small community of fewer than 50,000 faithful mostly in Croatia and the Vojvodina.[42]

The only change in the Communist era took place in Czechoslovakia during the so-called Prague Spring of 1968. During the first eight months of that year, when efforts were undertaken to liberalize Communist rule, the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Prešov was allowed to re-establish itself.[43] The eparchy managed to regain use (but not ownership) of its former cathedral church in Prešov, and within the next year plebiscites were held in over 210 Orthodox parishes. All but five of those parishes opted to return to the Greek Catholic Church. The church was able to survive the reinstitution of hard-line Communist rule in Czechoslovakia that followed the Soviet-led military intervention of the country in August 1968. The Greek Catholic Eparchy of Prešov did undergo a change in its character, however. For the first time in its history, the eparchy was headed by an ethnic Slovak, under whose direction the church took on an increasingly Slovak character.[44]

Despite its formal abolition in Ukraine, Poland, and Romania, Greek Catholicism continued to survive and initially flourish in the diaspora. There, during the post-Second World War decades, communities of Greek Catholic immigrants and their descendants maintained a wide network of churches, community centres, schools, and fraternal organizations sponsored by or associated with the various eparchies of the Byzantine Ruthenian Catholic Church in the United States and with the eparchies of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada, the United States, South America, Australia, and Western

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[42] In Poland there was no Greek Catholic Church structure, although a few discrete communities of believers were, after the mid-1950s, allowed to function, usually using side chapels in Roman Catholic churches.

[43] For details, see Lacko 1976.

[44] The last reigning bishop, Vasyl' Hopko (of Rusyn nationality), survived prison and was released in 1963, but on instructions from the Vatican (allegedly inspired by the Slovak Cardinal Tomko) he was not given episcopal authority in 1968, which instead went to a Slovak priest, Ján Hirka (later consecrated bishop in 1990).
On slovakization after 1968 as inspired by Slovak religious and secular émigré circles in Rome and Toronto, see Magocsi 1999: 77–85. The Ukrainian view of these events (which is critical of slovakization) is found in Carpathian Alliance 1971, and in Pekar 1973. The Slovak view appears in Šturák 1999: 138–158.

Europe. The Ukrainian church hierarchy and monastic communities were particularly well established in Rome, where they maintained their own theological institutions, publishing houses, and other training centres.

Even in the homeland Greek Catholicism managed to survive under Communist rule as an 'underground church' with its own hierarchy and priests, who administered the sacraments and conducted liturgies in secret, often at the risk of arrest and persecution.[45] A change in the status of the Greek Catholic Church was, as so often in the past, directly dependent on secular politics. Beginning in 1985, the Soviet Union was headed by a new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who was determined to reform Communist rule. As a result of liberal policies instituted by Gorbachev and renewed interest on the part of the Catholic Church during the pontificate of John Paul II, Greek Catholics slowly came out of the underground.[46] How they finally emerged, and how they re-established their churches throughout the region is a story connected with the Revolutions of 1989, the disintegration of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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[45] On the 'underground church' in various countries, see Markus 1975; Brown 1990: 216–218; Keleher 1993: 61–98; Šturák 1999: 159–183.

[46] On the emergence of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics from the underground see Hvat 1983; and Keleher 1993: 99–182.

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CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1989

Chapter 3.1
Hungary

Bertalan Pusztai

After a fifty-year interval, in 2001, the Hungarian census asked again about the religious affiliation of citizens. According to the strictly voluntary answers of respondents, 268,935 persons in Hungary considered themselves Greek Catholics. Over 7.5 million Hungarians are affiliated with a religion or church, and 5.25 million of them are Roman Catholics. In contemporary Hungary, the Greek Catholics rank as the fourth largest religious community after the Roman Catholics, the Reformed, and the Lutherans; however, this is not always so obvious because Byzantine- and Latin-Rite Catholics are often grouped together. Greek Catholics make up 2.6 per cent of the entire population and 3.5 per cent of those identifying themselves as religious.[1]

The overall proportion of Greek Catholics in Hungary is small, but in their region of origin, their share of the population becomes more significant. As a characteristic East-Central European phenomenon, Greek Catholicism has traditionally been widespread in the northeastern regions of post-Trianon Hungary.[2] A century ago, Greek Catholics lived in inferior economic, geographic, and cultural conditions as compared to the national average. This and their original range outside post-Trianon Hungary have had their consequences. Nationally, Hungarians hardly know of Greek Catholicism, while in these northeastern areas it is an obvious, well-known social and religious phenomenon to be taken seriously. Among the total population of 580,000 in the northeastern County of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, 102,484 people identify with Greek Catholicism. In the southeastern part of this county, near the towns Nagykálló and Nyírbátor, every third inhabitant is Greek Catholic.[3]

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[1] For the 2001 census data on religious affiliation see the Central Statistical Office homepage: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/volumes/26/tables/load1_1.html (accessed 4 April 2006).

[2] The Treaty of Trianon (1920) assigned territories with Hungarian and non-Hungarian Greek Catholic communities from Hungary to Slovakia (the Northernmost parts), to Romania (the Székely areas and Partium), and to Ukraine (Subcarpathia).

[3] Total population: 582,256, (141,000 Roman Catholic and 241,000 Reformed); detailed information in Hungarian: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/05/ tables/load3_17.html,

Even the smallest village in this county has three churches (Roman Catholic, Reformed, and Greek Catholic). In the other northeastern county, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, the census recorded 54,699 Greek Catholics out of a total population somewhat over 744,000.[4] In Hajdú-Bihar County, with over 550,000 inhabitants, 47,259 people identified themselves as Greek Catholics. Most live in and around Debrecen and Hajdúböszörmény; other minor regions of the county recorded communities of a few hundred persons.[5] Apart from the northeastern regions of the country, 28,901 Greek Catholics lived in Budapest,[6] with another 13,232 in the surrounding Pest County.[7] The Hungarian Greek Catholic history reflects this distribution: various liturgical or ecclesiastic reform movements started from the northeastern areas of the country, and then were developed further by an elite that had managed to move to Budapest.[8] As a result of this odd regional distribution, a particular duality characterizes even today's pastoral efforts: apart from the northeastern areas, where a particular Greek Catholic identity pioneered both liturgical and cultural innovation after centuries-long acculturation processes, throughout the greater part of Hungary, pastoral care focuses on a 'diaspora'.

The political changes that began in 1989 provided the opportunity of a new beginning in Greek Catholic Church life in Hungary. An omnipotent ideology that had attempted to extirpate religion root and branch fell, and the state ceased direct control and supervision of church activities.[9] Hungarians

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short summary in English: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/volumes/26/tables/loadgkat3_1.html (accessed 4 April 2006).

[4] Total population: 744,404 (351,000 Roman Catholic and 194,000 Reformed); detailed information in Hungarian: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/05/tables/load3_6.html, short summary in English: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/volumes/26/tables/loadgkat3_1.html (accessed 4 April 2006).

[5] Total population: 552,998 (73,000 Roman Catholic and 236,000 Reformed); detailed information in Hungarian: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/05/tables/load3_10.html, short summary in English: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/volumes/26/tables/loadgkat3_1.html (accessed 4 April 2006).

[6] Detailed information in Hungarian: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/05/tables/load3_2.html, short summary in English: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/volumes/26/tables/loadgkat3_1.html (accessed 4 April 2006).

[7] Detailed information in Hungarian: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/05/tables/load3_15.html, short summary in English: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/volumes/26/tables/loadgkat3_1.html (accessed 4 April 2006).

[8] For a general discussion of the history of Hungarian Greek Catholicism, see Pirigyi 1990.

[9] For an overview of the situation of the churches before the changes, see Török 2003. According to current researches the state control was severe. Simultaneously with the retirement of the Hungarian Greek Catholic bishop, Szilárd Keresztes, an unconfirmed, but archive-based scholarly study appeared on his cooperation with Hungarian Secret Services dating back to the late 1960s. The paper reveals the similar involvement of the previous bishop, Imre Timkó, cf. Szabó 2007.

debate whether religion is a private or a public affair, but churches are now free to involve themselves in activities that go beyond simply organizing religious life. Thus, Hungarian citizens can freely choose to send their children to denominational educational institutions from kindergarten to university. In addition, churches have an increasing role in providing social and health care (see Mahieu 2006).

The changes of 1989–90 affected Greek Catholics too, the majority of whom lived on the eastern, economically undeveloped periphery of the country, largely in rural areas. The church itself had but one institution: the seminary in Nyíregyháza, which, surprisingly, had been founded in 1950 shortly after the Communist takeover of the country. In general the Greek Catholic Church shared the plight of the other churches. However, compared to the Roman Catholic Church it has had more success in recruiting priests and church workers, a problem that has forced the Latin church to introduce momentous changes.

The 1991 papal visit to Hungary inaugurated a renewal of Roman Catholic religious life. Pope John Paul II also celebrated a Byzantine-Rite mass in Hungarian at Máriapócs, the most important Greek Catholic shrine in Hungary (Ruthenian, Slovakian, and Romanian believers participated too) – thereby stressing the legitimation of the Hungarian language in liturgy.[10] The order of St Basil the Great, which had maintained the shrine, was re-established,[11] and a new guesthouse built to serve the needs of pilgrims. To commemorate the most recent tear shedding of the Madonna icon, the church organized a centennial jubilee in 2005, with a rich devotional, artistic, and scholarly program (Ivancsó 2005). Hungarian Greek Catholicism has established connections with Greek Catholic communities in the neighbouring countries, which often have to cope with a multiple minority fate.[12] The Hungarian community has primarily supported the renewal of religious life in their sister communities of Subcarpathia in Ukraine which were persecuted when they belonged to the Soviet Union.[13] Annually, about twenty

[10] It must be noted that the liturgy held in Hungarian language on 19 November 1965 in Rome during the Second Vatican Council is considered to be the first official acceptance of the Hungarian language for the Byzantine-Rite liturgy.

[11] Some of their publications include Keresztes 1996; Lakatos 1997.

[12] By multiple minority fate, we mean that living, for example, as a Greek Catholic community in Orthodox Romania is a form of minority existence. Being Hungarian in a Greek Catholic community in Romania with a Romanian majority is a further level of minority existence. During the re-annexation of northern Transylvania during the Second World War, some particularly interesting sources were established in this respect as a result of the offices of a Hungarian civil servant surveying the area (Balog 1992).

[13] For a discussion of the Subcarpathian Greek Catholicism, see Bendász 1991; Botlik 1997; Pirigyi 2001.

Hungarian Greek Catholic youths from the neighbouring countries study at the Nyíregyháza seminary. Greek Catholic diaspora communities have become better organized and more 'visible': new communities have established themselves, or older diaspora communities have had the chance of openly participating in the church life of the 'recipient' towns. The increase of social and geographical mobility will probably dissolve the Greek Catholic 'block area', and Greek Catholics will increasingly exist in diaspora communities in cities.[14] Defying diaspora conditions, Hungarian Greek Catholicism has a strong Internet presence.[15]

With regard to worship, a marked turn to the East can be observed. Works expounding Eastern Rites have an important role in Hungarian Greek Catholic book publishing (Ivancsó 1996a, 1999),[16] as Eastern spirituality becomes generally popular in Hungary. This can be readily observed in the historical study of church architecture and in the building and decoration of churches, thoroughly studied by Bernadett Puskás and Géza Nagymihályi (B. Puskás 1991, 1996, 2008; L. Puskás 1991; Nagymihályi 1995, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006; Sasvári 2001). All this has contributed an ever more independent profile to Hungarian Greek Catholicism, as it steps out from under the shadow of the vast Roman Catholic Church. Some studies of Greek Catholic authors discussing the relation to Roman Catholicism from a theological point of view exemplify the struggle for a distinct identity (e.g. Baán 1997a; L. Puskás 1998a).

Recent years have witnessed an unprecedented growth in the religious, educational, and social institutions of the Greek Catholic Church, very much in accordance with the desires of the early twentieth-century Greek Catholic elite. István Gróh, a member of this elite and a founding editor of *Görögkatolikus Szemle* (Greek Catholic Review), wrote in the magazine's first issue in 1929: 'We need authority, social weight and acknowledgement, Greek Catholic institutions; recollection will not do, we must act and create' (Gróh 1929: 1). The Hungarian Greek Catholic Church evaded the fate of similar churches in the neighboring countries: it was not forced to merge with others, and could maintain its full-fledged independent existence. Its only institution was the Nyíregyháza Theological College, which trained students exclusively for the ministry (c.f. Hollós 2001; Oláh 2001). Since 1990, the laity could also enrol and study theology. Since 1991, teachers of religion

[14] Consideration of diaspora communities had already begun in the interwar period (Magyar 1987).

[15] The most important links are: http://www.atanaz.hu/, http://parochia.hu/ and http://gorogkatolikus.lap.hu/ (accessed 4 April 2006).

[16] Attention should be given to a parallel, but reverse process, the dissemination of Western cult forms (e.g. the cult of the Sacred Heart of Jesus) in the interwar period.

have also been trained at the college. In 1995, the theological college and the seminary separated, and the college affiliated with the Pontificio Istituto Orientale of the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome and became a university faculty. In 2000, it took the name Saint Athanasius Greek Catholic Theological College. Its graduates thus receive the bachelor's degree of a pontifical university. In 2003, the college moved into its new, modern building – a dominant piece of architecture in the city center of Nyíregyháza (Ivancsó 2000).

The foundations of a Greek Catholic educational system were also revitalized. In one of the significant centres, Hajdúdorog, the Greek Catholic Church had operated a gymnasium (secondary school) for centuries; however, in 1947–48 it was nationalized – along with the vast majority of church schools. This school was one of the first to be re-established after the changes. Seeing its successes, the church started a kindergarten and a secondary boarding school in the town. The diocese runs kindergartens and primary schools in Nyíregyháza, Miskolc, and Rakacaszend.

Nyíregyháza has become a major centre of Greek Catholic scholarship. The college and seminary staffs pursue research on Greek Catholic church history and also participate in scholarly life at both regional and national levels. Constant invitations to join non-theological scientific committees attest to their scholarly reputation, as does the 2003 election of a Greek Catholic priest and professor, György Fodor, as Rector of Pázmány Péter Catholic University (Budapest – Esztergom – Piliscsaba). Along with the college and the seminary, scholars and students have access to the church art collection in Nyíregyháza, the diocesan archives, and the best library on Greek Catholicism in Hungary.

Freed from socialist repression, the Greek Catholic press has also revived. In 1990, the new series of the monthly *Görögkatolikus Szemle* (Greek Catholic Review) published by the Hajdúdorog Bishop's Office began to provide information on matters of worship and practice. The review also publishes its annual almanac. Local papers were also started.[17] The theological college's scholarly activities are regularly published in conference publications and monographs as well as in the scholarly magazine, *Athanasiana*, launched in 1995, when the college affiliated with the pontifical institution. Further publication opportunities for researchers at the college include the *Studia Biblica Athanasiana*, a magazine of scriptural research; the *Folia Canonica – Review of Eastern and Western Canon Law*, a joint enterprise with Péter Pázmány Catholic University; the foreign-language *Folia Athana-*

[17] E.g. *A szegedi görögkatolikusok tudósítója* [The Szeged Greek Catholic Correspondent], a bimonthly since 1993, edited by Miklós Szaplonczay.

siana Review of Byzantine Theology; and *Munkálatok* (Work in Progress), a series devoted to disseminating the work of the college students.

Naturally, the press and scholarly publications are not merely a means of conveying information; they are also a symbol of self-assertion. Since 1990, Hungarian Greek Catholic scholarship has undergone significant renewal, partly fueled by the commemoration of important anniversaries in an array of successful conferences. Thus a conference in Nyíregyháza commemorated the centenary of the papal encyclical *Orientalium dignitas* (Orosz 1995). In 1996, a conference on ecclesiastical history celebrated the three-hundredth anniversary of the first tear shedding of the holy icon at Máriapócs.[18] In 2000 the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the Nyíregyháza Theological College was duly commemorated (Janka 2001).

Individual authors have also produced outstanding works, notably in the field of church history. István Pirigyi dedicated decades to the elaboration of a Greek Catholic history and his prolific work has made him a key figure in Hungarian Greek Catholic historiography.[19] István Ivancsó, beside being an editor of *Athanasia,* published several works on liturgical and church historical questions. He wrote a monographic study on Moses the Hungarian, a tenth-century, pre-schism Kiev monk of Hungarian origin (Ivancsó 1997).[20] Hungarian Greek Catholic tradition always gave particular significance to the pre-schism period, and earlier studies anachronistically regarded the emergence of the Eastern Rite in the Carpathian Basin in the tenth century as an early example of Greek Catholicism. Although this discourse is disappearing, attempts to create a very closed, independent tradition, neither Eastern nor Western, have not disappeared entirely.[21] István Pirigyi published a study of an exclusively Greek Catholic 'example', Péter Parthén, the seventeenth-century bishop of Mukachevo who took great pains to uphold the union (Pirigyi 1996). Numerous publications have been devoted to the postwar martyr of the Ukrainian Orthodox reunion, Theodore

[18] *Máriapócs 1696 – Nyíregyháza 1996. Történelmi konferencia a máriapócsi Istenszülő-ikon első könnyezésének 300. évfordulójára* [History Conference on the 300th Anniversary of the First Tear Shedding of the Theotokos Icon at Máriapócs].

[19] His most important monographs include Pirigyi 1982, 1990, 1991, 1998, 1999, 2001; on his life and activity cf. Janka 2002; Kiss 2002.

[20] István Ivancsó also translated and annotated a work of particular significance for general church history, the fourth-century travel journals of Eteria, regarded as one of the earliest pilgrimage diaries (Ivancsó 1996b).

[21] Apart from establishing – or more precisely, retrospectively inventing – a thousand years long, continuous Hungarian Greek Catholic tradition (a characteristic activity of the late 19th and 20th centuries), the post-1990 church changed its orientation towards the East as its spiritual centre. This is in contrast to the highly Latinized, Western-oriented, Hungarian Greek Catholic tradition of the past century.

Romzha (see Puskás 1998b). These examples indicate that Hungarian Greek Catholic historiography has a predilection for themes deemed acceptable, specific, neither Eastern nor Western. The discourse of the interwar years characterized the Greek Catholic struggles for independence as a type of national struggle, and such vocabulary is still used.[22] Today, however, when Greek Catholics no longer suffer national prejudice, it is indicative of a self-confident Greek Catholicism capable of withstanding the appeal of Roman Catholicism. Reprints also have a conspicuous role in promoting Hungarian Greek Catholic identity. Among them, the republication of the Memorandum on the 1900 pilgrimage to Rome[23] and the 1793 manuscript translation of the liturgy of St John Chrysostom[24] have to be mentioned here. To understand the ethnic processes, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history, especially on a local level, is considered an important topic. István Baán contributed to Greek Catholic church history in numerous studies focusing especially on the times around the first millennium and the eighteenth century (1988, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d, 2005, 2007). Individual Greek Catholic parishes have also been subjected to scrutiny by historians (e.g. Pirigyi and Ivancsó 1993; Pirigyi, Farkas and Papp 1998).

Hungarian Greek Catholicism has become a preferred object of scholarly attention outside of the church as well. Besides historical questions related to the Rusyn language, the late István Udvardi made a large contribution to the investigation of Greek Catholic church history and the connection of Hungarian and Ruthenian social and cultural history (Udvari 1990, 1992). American historian James Niessen published studies on questions related to the history of the Hungarian Greek Catholics (Niessen 1991, 1993, 1994). Greek Catholics as a particular phenomenon on the border of Western and Eastern Europe are continuously attracting scholarly interest (Bottlik 1997; Maner-Spannenberger 2007). The folklorist Elek Bartha has studied Greek Catholic popular religion for decades and published his findings in numerous studies (1980; 1990; 1999, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b). Other studies focused on particular religious customs and the cult of saints (Magyari 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2002; Sasvári 1998). In a series of studies Irén Szabó thoroughly analysed gestures and space usage featuring Greek

[22] For one of the best examples of such literature see Papp 1996.

[23] *Emlékkönyv a görög szertartású katholikus magyarok római zarándoklatáról* [Memorandum on the Pilgrimage to Rome by Greek Rite Hungarian Catholics]. Budapest, 1901, (reprint Hajdúdorog: Mészáros Károly Városi Könyvtár, 2000), Internet edition: http://www.atanaz.hu/mgke/emlekko/index.htm (accessed 4 April 2006); for an analysis see Pusztai 2005.

[24] The work of Mihály Krucsay: *Lithurgia: Az az isteni Szt. szolgálat vagy mise, mely Aranyszájú Szt. János munkáiból magyar nyelvre átültetetett* [Liturgy: That Is, the Divine Sacred Service or Mass translated into Hungarian from the Works of St John Chrysostom]. Edited and postscript written by István Ivancsó (2003).

Catholic liturgy and everyday life (Szabó 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005). Greek Catholicism has also become the subject of religious geography (Keményfi 2000). Several ethnographic studies focusing on contemporary social processes and especially on relations between ethnic identity and religion among Hungarians in Transylvania (Ilyés 1998, 1999, 2001), Transcarpathia (Pilipkó 1997, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2007; Pusztai 1997, 2001; Geszti 2001; Domokos 2004), and Hungary (Szabó 1999; Pusztai 2002; Teleko 2002) have been published recently. Other works have focused on the cultural historical (Cserbák 1986) and discursive political (Pusztai 2003, 2005, 2007) dimensions of Greek Catholic identity creation have also found their place in fresh research projects.

In summary, we can state that Hungarian Greek Catholics, in spite of the threats of migration and melting into Roman Catholicism, have proven to be a viable and vigorous, cohesive, and agile community that actively seeks its identity, and on the whole seems to have found it.[25]

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[25] For a Greek Catholic self-assessment of the past decade see Soltész 2002.

the Millennium Year], pp. 146–155. Miskolc: Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Megyei Levéltár.

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Chapter 3.2
Poland

Stanisław Stępień

After the Second World War, Poland found itself under Soviet supervision. From an ideological standpoint, the atheistic regime regarded the Catholic Church as the chief enemy of the new political system. However, during the first months after the 'liberation', communist authorities did not openly attack the Catholic Church, although from the start they tried to weaken it by infiltration and by making difficult its contacts with the Vatican.[1] As time passed, and the regime was becoming stronger, the Catholic Church in Poland felt increasingly under siege and uncertain of its future. The background of the immediate postwar years shaped the reception of the Greek Catholic Church and the abolition of its administration in Poland in 1946.

The Situation of the Greek-Catholic Church in Poland during 1944–1956

After the establishment of a new Polish-Soviet frontier in 1945, Poland contained only a small part of the former Greek Catholic diocese with the capital in Przemyśl and the entire Lemko apostolic administration with the seat in Sanok. Out of 640 parishes, which had functioned in the Przemyśl Diocese before the Second World War, 223 Greek Catholic parishes and 129 Lemko Apostolic Administration parishes[2] were converted into administrative units within the new borders of Poland.

In the beginning, the state thought the entire Greek Catholic population in Poland could be displaced by moving it to the territory of the USSR in the deportation action carried out from 1944 to 1946. Thus, they did not

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[1] See for example Micewski 1982; Cywiński 1990: 13–68; Wyszyński 1991: 243–265; Kumor 1995; Stępień 1998.

[2] Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie (hereafter AAN), Ministerstwo Administracji Publicznej, sign. 1040, k. 17–35; Archiwum Państwowe w Przemyślu (hereafter APP), Administracja Apostolska Łemkowszczyzny (hereafter AAŁ), sign. 11, k. 337. See also Stępień 1996a.

demand unification of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church as was done in Soviet Ukraine. The state did, however, decide to abolish the church's hierarchy. At the end of 1946, the Ordinary, Bishop Josaphat Kotsylovskyi, his Assistant Bishop Hryhoryi Lakota, and the most active members of the church were arrested (Misilo 1991). They were later transported to the USSR and sentenced to long prison terms under the absurd accusations of treason, betraying the Ukrainian nation, collaboration with the Nazis, and, as well, spying for the Vatican (Stępień 1998).

Alarmed by this situation, the Polish Primate, Cardinal August Hlond asked the Vatican to allow him to at least temporarily structure the legal status of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland. On 25 October 1946, Pope Pius XII endowed the Primate with special authorization for the Greek Catholic clergy (Harasym 1990: 23; Stępień 1995: 77), giving him the power of authorizing the Uniate priests to hold the Liturgy and other religious services in the Latin Rite, which would help them to support themselves. Those powers were soon to be extended. During Primate Hlond's visit to Vatican on 10 December 1946, the Pope nominated him the Special Envoy of the Holy See to all of the Eastern Rite Catholics in Poland (Dziubyna 1996: 106). On 9 January 1947, during the meeting of the Polish Bishops' Conference, a special commission was established to deal with the Eastern Rite. By the commission's decision of 31 March 1947, the Primate of Poland was named General Vicar of the Lemko Apostolic Administration (Hoc'kyi 1992; Dziubyna 1996: 83).

By that time the deportation action had already ended. In all, 480,305 persons (including approximately 300 clergymen) were expelled, and the process lasted from 15 October 1944 until 15 October 1946 (Misiło 1996). After it was over, however, in spite of the earlier hopes of the communist authorities, approximately 150,000–200,000 Ukrainians still lived in Poland. The Ukrainian partisans, although considerably weakened, were still active. Then, the authorities decided to forcibly relocate the entire Ukrainian population from the southeastern provinces to the northern and western regions annexed to Poland after the Second World War. From 28 April to 28 July 1947, the 'Wisła (Vistula) Action' relocated 140,575 Ukrainians and members of mixed families (Misiło 1993: 32). This group included about 100,000 Greek Catholics and sixty-two priests. An additional seven priests were arrested and sent to the USSR, along with twenty-two who were put in the Polish central labour camp in Jaworzno (Wojewoda 1994: 32; Dziubyna 1996: 89-102).

After the death of Cardinal A. Hlond on 22 October 1948, Stefan Wyszyński, 48 years old and at that time the youngest of the Polish bishops, became in December 1948 the Primate of Poland and assumed the authority

given to his predecessor by the Holy See over the Catholics of the Eastern Rite. From the start, he began close cooperation with the General Vicar, Wasyl Hrynek, whom he appointed the Secretary of Greek Catholic affairs.

At that time, Greek Catholic clergymen were often employed to perform services in Latin, partially because of the shortages in the Roman Catholic clergy in the previously mentioned western and northern territories. The only condition was that they learn liturgical texts in Latin. The candidates for positions as rectors needed in addition to take an examination in canon law. Married clergy (in the Greek Catholic Church in Poland, celibacy was introduced only in the interwar period) presented more complications. The bishops were well aware that the Roman Catholic communities would not accept a married priest, so the priests who had decided to work in the Roman Catholic parishes could not live with their spouses in the place of their service. Greek Catholic priests willing to work in the Latin Rite would generally become vicars to the local Latin rectors, or they would take posts of convent chaplains or work in hospitals, jails, or schools, since in the first postwar years religion was still taught in schools.

All of the Roman Catholic Church actions that sought to enable functioning of the Eastern Rite greatly troubled the communist authorities in Poland. The state tried to prevent the Roman Catholic Church from acquiring the Greek Catholic Church's property. For that reason, a decree on 5 September 1947 nationalized all of the Greek Catholic property.[3] In order to liquidate the Greek Catholic Rite, the authorities would also try to use the Russian Orthodox Church in Poland, which since 1951 was led by former Archbishop of L'viv Makarij Oksijuk from the USSR, who was known for his attempts to destroy the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine.

Greek Catholic priests, both those who temporarily shifted to the Latin Rite and those who remained beyond the structure of the church, tried continually to reach larger populations of parishioners by giving them sacraments in their own rite and celebrating, behind the closed doors, the so-called quiet masses. During 1953–56, the authorities repressed those activities, particularly after the arrest of Primate Wyszyński. Soon, Father W. Hrynyk was also arrested for celebrating masses in the Eastern liturgy (Majkowicz 1990: 253) and spent almost two years in prison. This was the most oppressive time in the history of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland.

[3] 'Dziennik Ustaw RP' 1947, nr 46, poz. 339, ibidem, 1949, nr 52, poz. 404; AAN, Ministerstwo Administracji Publicznej, sign. 1040, k. 76.

Pastoral Services in the Greek Catholic Rite after 1956

Changes in Polish political life after October 1956 raised Greek Catholic hopes for reviving their church structures. After Primate Wyszyński's release from prison, he met with Father Hrynyk, who had also been released. However, it soon became obvious that the authorities were not interested in giving any legal status to the Greek Catholic Church. After negotiations with the Roman Catholic Church, the state only agreed to tolerate Greek Catholic pastoral services under the condition that the Roman Catholic hierarchy would outwardly represent them.

After consulting with the Holy See, the Primate of Poland decided to establish Greek Catholic pastoral services in the Roman Catholic parishes, but this required a permit issued by appropriate state agencies. Initially, nine Greek Catholic pastoral service units were established, but by the end of 1957 there were already seventeen, and in the following year an additional fifteen were set up. These pastoral services first reappeared in Przemyśl, Warsaw, and Krakow. Internal state security, however, did everything in their power to make the opening of new units difficult. They intimidated local Roman Catholic priests in whose parishes they suspected such Greek Catholic pastoral service would take place. Despite the hardships, the number of Greek Catholic pastoral units systematically grew: in 1958 there were thirty-eight of them, in 1959 forty-three, in 1960 forty-five, in 1961 forty-six, in 1965 fifty-three, and by 1967 fifty-six. In addition, thirty Greek Catholic priests worked in Latin Rite services (Harasym 1999: 67). Five years later, the number of the Greek Catholic priests grew to thirty-nine and included eight monastic priests (ibid.: 68).

The revival of the pastoral service in Greek Catholic rite resulted in a need to educate Greek Catholic priests as bi-ritualists, so they could serve both the Greek and the Roman Catholics. Officially, they had to be registered as Roman Catholic priests. The first such priests were appointed in 1956, and by the second half of 1960s there were seventeen. All came from Greek Catholic or mixed families (Majkowicz 1990: 252).

In 1964 Primate Wyszyński was appointed the Special Envoy of the Holy See for the affairs of the Eastern Rite and received all the powers of the ordinary (after his death that office was transferred to his successor, Cardinal Jozef Glemp). In 1967, he appointed a vicar responsible for the affairs of the Greek Catholics and gave the post to the current secretary of that rite – Father W. Hrynyk.

When Cardinal Wyszynski died in 1981, Archbishop Jozef Glemp established two Greek Catholic vicarages – northern and southern. The former included Greek Catholic pastoral units, which existed in Roman Catholic metropolitanates – Warsaw, Gniezno, Poznań, the Bialystok Archdiocese,

and two dioceses, Łomża and Drohiczyn. The latter included Greek Catholic units belonging to eparchies: Wrocław, Krakow, the Archdiocese of Lubaczów and the Diocese of Przemyśl. On 22 December 1981, the primate appointed two general vicars – in the northern vicarage, the Provincial of the Basilian Order, Father Josafat Romanyk (died in 2007), and in the southern vicarage, Joan (Jan) Martyniak. Gradually the number of Greek Catholic units grew, along with an increasing number of Greek Catholic priests. At the beginning of the 1980s, seventy pastoral units were served by thirty-two diocesan priests and fourteen monks. This expanded in 1988 to eighty-four units in which pastoral services were carried out by sixty priests and monks (Stępień 1991: 69).

Greek Catholic monastic life also developed, with the orders of Basilian monks and nuns, the Servants of the Holy Mary Mother of God, and the Convent of St Joseph Sisters. Nuns, depending on their order, taught religion to children and youth in the Greek Catholic Rite, made liturgical clothes, did charity work, or looked after the sick or disabled.

The election of a new pope from Poland in 1978, the Cardinal of Krakow, Karol Wojtyła, greatly improved the situation of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland. Pope John Paul II demonstrated his concern for the Greek Catholic Church; in the fall of 1987, Polish and Ukrainian clerical officials met in Rome. The Polish Cardinal Józef Glemp and the Major Archbishop of L'viv, Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky, presided over the meetings. Hierarchs of both churches, just like Polish and German Bishops addressing wrongs done in the past, pronounced in the name of the Catholics of both rites the famous words: 'we forgive and ask for forgiveness'.[4]

Very important for the Greek Catholic Church in Poland was the anniversary celebration of the millennium of Christianity in Rus-Ukraine in 1988, with a magnificent religious event celebrated at the Marian shrine in Jasna Góra, Częstochowa.

Development of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland after 1989

Political and social transformations in Poland after 4 June 1989 directly influenced the legalization of the structures and development of pastoral activity of the Greek Catholic Church. On 16 July 1989 the Holy Father appointed, for the first time since the Second World War, a Greek Catholic bishop to serve the Greek Catholics in Poland. The new bishop, Father Joan Martyniak had been one of the general vicars. At first, the new hierarch acted as a Bishop Assistant to the Primate of Poland, who by then still held

[4] Transcripts of the speeches of the two hierarchs delivered at the meetings of 8 and 17 October, 1987. See 'Pismo Okólne. Biuro Prasowe Episkopatu Polski' 1987 (44): 1–9.

the power of the Ordinary of the Eastern Rite Catholics in Poland, but on 16 January 1991 the Holy See revived the Greek Catholic Diocese in Przemyśl and Archbishop Martyniak became its ordinary. The official transfer of authority over the diocese took place in Przemyśl on 13 April 1991. Unfortunately, a self-appointed, so-called Social Committee of the Defenders of the Polish Carmelites' Church, made up of Polish nationalistic groups that after the Second World War came from Western Ukraine, blocked the ceremony from taking place at the former Greek Catholic Cathedral, occupied since 1946 by the Roman Catholic Order of Discalced Carmelites. In that situation, Bishop Joan Martyniak had his installation ceremony in the Roman Catholic Cathedral. In the following months, the activities of the Social Committee of the Defenders of Polish Carmelites' Church increased the national and religious tensions in the town and the region. These tensions stemmed from historical conflicts (Hann 2005). Marcin Krasicki founded the disputed church in 1631 and gave it to the Carmelites. Because of the 'Josephine reforms', the Carmelites were banned, exiled from Przemyśl, and lost the St Theresa Church. In 1784, Austrian authorities gave the church to the Greek Catholics under the condition that they would stop building their own cathedral. They continuously used the church until 1946. In a concordat signed in 1925, the Second Polish Republic guaranteed the Greek Catholic Church property rights. With the abolition of Greek Catholic legal status in 1946, the church and the adjoining buildings were returned to the Carmelites. Representatives of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and the Carmelite Order signed an agreement with the Greek Catholic Ordinary on 15 February 1991, which provided that the newly appointed Greek Catholic Bishop of Przemyśl was to take over the church for five years, until his own cathedral would be built (Stępień 1996b: 305–6). However, protests lasted for several, months and the ensuing occupation of St Theresa's Church led to breaking the agreement and prevented the pope's planned meeting with the Greek Catholic community in their former cathedral during his visit in Przemyśl on 2 June 1991. In those circumstances, Pope John Paul II, who wanted the Greek Catholic Diocese in Przemyśl to commence normal functioning as soon as possible, gave them the military church (the former Jesuit chapel), which had been shared between the Roman Catholics and the Greek Catholics, and raised it to the rank of the Greek Catholic Cathedral (ibid.: 314-5).

Conflicts were also caused by the Greek Catholic Church's claims for restitution of property confiscated illegally after the Second World War. The claims primarily concerned churches and buildings necessary for the diocese to function in the pastoral as well as material sense. Because most of those properties now housed civic programs (e.g. schools, archives, a museum, and an orphanage) any claims to them could create social tension and apprehen-

sion in local communities. The Greek Catholic Church authorities demanded their return based on the law, *On the Relations of the State with the Catholic Church,* enacted by the Polish parliament on 17 May 1989.[5] A government and church bilateral commission was to resolve issues concerning restitution of church property. Despite the policy procedure taking very long and provoking impatience among the Greek Catholics, they were able to regain some of their property, such as the former seminary, the monasteries of the Servants of the Holy Mary and the Basilian Order, the Greek Catholic Bishop's palace, the church, and two apartment buildings in the market square. They also received 700 hectares of land and forest as a compensation for property lost after the Second World War (Giza 2003).

The reactivation of the Diocese of Przemyśl started a process of creating Greek Catholic parishes to replace existing pastoral services. A new network of parishes, offices, and diocesan institutions spread throughout the country.[6] After receiving legal status, the Cathedral Chapter began its official activity (Stępień 1996b: 301).

The Organization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Poland, 1989–1996

Year	Number of parishes	Number of diocesan priests*	Male Orders			Female Orders		
			Number	Houses	Monks	Number	Houses	Nuns
1989	85	57	1	5	16	3	19	–
1990	94	55	2	6	13	3	19	–
1991	95	59	2	6	14	3	19	–
1992	95	63	2	6	16	3	20	–
1993	108	66	2	5	16	3	22	139
1994	108	66	2	5	16	3	23	–
1995	108	66	2	5	16	3	23	–
1996	108	67	2	5	18	3	25	144

* Including monks working in parishes and retired priests working abroad.

Sources: Greek Catholic Calendars 'Blahovista' 1989–2006 and Report on the State of the Greek Catholic Przemyśl Diocese made by General Vicar, Father Teodor Majkowicz (as of November 1995) – Metropolitan Curia Archives in Przemyśl, unsigned document.

[5] 'Dziennik Ustaw' 1989, nr. 29, poz. 154.

[6] The territory of the new metropolitanate did not match the former Greek Caholic Diocese of Przemyśl, part of which became part of Ukraine after 1944. Today it is a part of the Sambor – Drohobycz Eparchy.

Different sources show different numbers of Greek Catholics in Poland. According to estimates from the first half of the 1990s, between 110,000 and 160,000 people belonged to the Greek Catholic Church.[7] Unfortunately, neither the church nor the state has precise statistics, and the Greek Catholic population is scattered throughout Poland. In many regions, the communities are too small to establish a parish or even include it in a pastoral service. Thus, these people usually attend Roman Catholic or Russian Orthodox church services. On the other hand, people are considered Greek Catholic even when they regularly attend services in the Roman Catholic or other Christian churches. Some do not even identify themselves as ethnic Ukrainians, and nothing would indicate that they would return to their ethnic or religious identity.

The Greek Catholics who joined the Russian Orthodox Church in the past decades have a different position. They usually consider themselves Ukrainians, and in very few cases of regional separatism they assume 'Lemko nationality'. They have not, however, become Polish. Some return to Greek Catholicism after years of adhering to Russian Orthodoxy, even though Russian Orthodox parishes created after the Second World War still exist in the territory of the prewar Greek Catholic Diocese of Przemyśl, although in such cases the Ukrainian nationalism seems to overwhelm the religious spirit. For the same reason, these people, depending on the circumstances or the environment, often feel the same about attending services in either liturgy. Part of this phenomenon results from calls, frequently from laypeople, for bringing both churches into a closer relationship, particularly for patriotic and religious celebrations. The followers usually receive badly any criticism of the other rite, which sometimes comes from the clergy of either of the churches. Possibly some priests who criticize the other rite want to strengthen a particular religious identity among their followers, but usually this has the opposite effect.

The sensitivity of defending national and cultural identity was revealed by a campaign of the intelligentsia when new territorial divisions of the Polish Catholic Church were established on 25 March 1992, following the Pope's Order *Totus tuus Poloniae Populus* that incorporated the Greek Catholic Diocese in Przemyśl into the Roman Catholic Metropolitanate of Warsaw. This caused mass protests by the Greek Catholics, both laypeople and clergy, that did not stop even after the Apostolic Nuncio in Poland had explained that it was only a temporary arrangement until, in the near future,

[7] Mirosław Kmita (1996/1997: 208), shows that 110,000 Greek Catholics lived in Poland in 1994. They mostly lived on the territories of the following Roman Catholic dioceses: Legnica (20,000), Warmia (20,000), Wroclaw (15,000), Zielona Góra–Gorzów (15,000), Koszalin-Kolobrzeg (over 13,000).

the Greek Catholic Church structures would be organized and the metropolitanate of that rite would be created.[8] The pressure was so high (10,000 signatures were collected in a relatively short time) that on 19 June of the following year the diocese was excluded from the Roman Catholic province and subjected directly to the Holy See.

The final act of the organization of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland took place on 1 June 1996 when the Holy See established the Greek Catholic Church Province – Przemyśl-Warsaw Metropoly. It included two administrative units – the Przemyśl-Warsaw Archdiocese and Wrocław-Gdańsk Diocese (Stępień 1996b: 324-5). They covered the entire territory of Poland; their border runs southeast along the Wisła River. Warsaw was entirely within the Przemyśl-Warsaw Archdiocese. Archbishop Joan Martyniak, up until then the diocesan bishop, was designated the metropolitan; Teodor Majkowicz became the ordinary of the new Wrocław-Gdańsk Diocese (Stępień 2000).

Newly appointed ordinaries set up diocesan offices and in order to enhance pastoral services they divided their dioceses into decanates. The Przemyśl-Warsaw Archdiocese was divided into four decanates: Przemyśl (thirty-two parishes), Krakow-Krynica (twenty-two parishes), Olsztyn (nineteen parishes), Koszalin (twelve parishes) and Elbląg (fourteen parishes). In 1998, thirty-five priests and two deacons served in the Przemyśl-Warsaw Archdiocese. The Wrocław-Gdansk Diocese had twenty-two priests and one deacon in four deaconates: Wrocław (seventeen parishes), Zielona Góra (fourteen parishes), Koszalin (twelve parishes) and Słupsk (thirteen parishes).[9] After Bishop Teodor Majkowicz died in 1988, the Provincial of the Basilian Order, Bishop Włodzimierz Juszczak became the new diocesan bishop of the Wrocław-Gdańsk Diocese (Waplak 2006).

In the following years, the number of parishes systematically grew and the number of Greek Catholic clergy increased. The ordinaries wanted to reach all of the largest Greek Catholic communities in Poland. In 2006, the Przemyśl-Warsaw Archdiocese had seventy-six parishes served by forty-eight priests and the Wroclaw-Gdansk Diocese had fifty-eight parishes and thirty-two priests.[10] After 1989, Greek Catholic pastoral service in the Polish Army began; as chaplains the army employs priests designated by the bishop.

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[8] Materials about the protests have been published; see *O tożsamość grekokatolików. Zbiór dokumentów z historii Cerkwi Greckokatolickiej w Polsce*, Warsaw, 1992.

[9] 'Schematism', 'Kalendar Blahovista', Gurovo Ilavec'ke 1999: 207–221.

[10] Official data of the Przemyśl-Warsaw Archiocesan Curia in Przemyśl. See also 'Litopys Wroclaws'ko-Gdans'kiej', pp. 151–161.

Greek Catholic male and female religious orders play a complementary role in developing the pastoral service of the church and provide charity work within the church. Basilian monks, active throughout Poland, have monasteries in Warsaw, Przemyśl, Węgorzewo, and Kętrzyn. In recent years, a mission of Studite Order in Wysowa-Zdrój was established. Three still-active female orders include: the Basilian Order (Gorlice, Kętrzyn, Warsaw, Pasłęk, Pieniężno, and Przemyśl), Convent of Sisters of the Holy Mary (Warsaw, Bartoszyce, Goleniów, Koszalin, Kruklanki, Olsztyn, two convent houses and novitiate in Przemyśl, Świdwin, Janów Lubelski), and the St Joseph Sisters Congregation (Kraków, Banie Mazurskie, Wrocław, Komańcza, Międzylesie, and Przemyśl).[11]

The first Greek Catholic synod in over 100 years was held 14–16 March 2002. This meeting played an important role in improving the efficiency of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland by focusing on the liturgy, the church calendar (leaving the traditional Julian calendar used in the Eastern Church), lay involvement in managing church institutions, relations with the Roman Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church, and the issues of property and renovation of the sacral historical sites.[12]

The Greek Catholic Church in Poland has started a close cooperation with the Greek Catholic hierarchy in Ukraine; this consists in appointing new priests from Ukraine who mostly study at the Catholic University in Lublin. Ukrainians are accepted into Basilian monasteries in Poland where they undertake their novitiate and study at the Roman Catholic theological institutions, mainly at the Higher Institute of Theology in Przemyśl and the Papal Department of Theology in Warsaw.

The political transformations in Poland, renaissance and reorganization of the Greek Catholic religious life opened new opportunities for the church. Today it can freely work on its development with full support of Polish constitutional guarantees and the Concordat signed between the Republic of Poland and the Holy See on 28 July 1993.[13] The Greek Catholic Church has gained a legal status; it is developing its local structures, monastic life, and educating new priests. Although Greek Catholic hierarchs together with the Roman Catholic bishops are part of the Polish Bishops' Conference, they also keep canonical ties with the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine and regard the Major Archbishop of L'viv (traditionally called the Patriarch of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church) as their spiritual supe-

[11] 'Schematism', 'Kalendar Blahovista', Gurovo Ilavec'ke 1999: 222–225.

[12] Detailed information about the Synod can be found in 'Kalendar Blahovista', Gurovo Ilavec'ke 2003: 37–150.

[13] See 'Dziennik Ustaw RP' nr 51, poz. 318.

rior.[14] This trend of emphasizing unity with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has also found its expression in the name it has adopted in recent years. The church now calls itself the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (Ukrains'ka Hreko-Katolyc'ka Cerkva) just like the church in Ukraine.

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[14] For decades, Ukrainian Greek Catholics have tried to bring the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church to the rank of Kiev-L'viv Patriarch, the title Cardinal Josyf Slipyj undertook after his release from the Gulag in 1963. On the issue of Patriarchate see also Horiacha and Hurkina, and Naumescu this volume.

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Chapter 3.3
Romania

Lucian Turcescu and Lavinia Stan

The Greek Catholic Church in Transylvania[1] was constituted between 1698 and 1700 when the Habsburg regime, through the skilful mediation of the Jesuits, persuaded the local Orthodox clergy, under the leadership of Metropolitan Atanasie of Transylvania, that their acceptance of Catholic dogma and the authority of the Pope would earn them equal status with the Catholic and Protestant clergy.[2] The reasons for the conversion remain disputed, with the Orthodox viewing Greek Catholicism as the result of political pressure and the Greek Catholics arguing that the Orthodox Romanians of Transylvania accepted Catholic dogma more or less freely in their desire to become part of Western Europe. In any case, within a century of the Greek Catholic Church's inception, Transylvanian Romanians 'were transformed from a mute society of serfs and shepherds subservient to the will of Western European regional masters into a vocal class expressing "national" aspirations' (Hupchick 1995: 74). Not only did the Greek Catholics play a major part in the national emancipation of Transylvanian Romanians, but also as prominent politicians they continued to dominate the political scene in interwar Greater Romania from 1918 until 1940. Many leaders of the National Peasant Party, which ruled Romania alternatively with the Liberal Party during the interwar period, were Greek Catholics and proud of their heritage.

As part of general Soviet bloc opposition to the Vatican – referred to in Romanian archival documents of the communist secret police as the 'world's reactionary centre' (Vasile 2003: 21) – the Romanian communists suppressed the Greek Catholic Church in late 1948. Its assets were confiscated or transferred to the Romanian Orthodox Church, after the head of that

[1] Transylvania, the western part of Romania, was an autonomous principality under Ottoman rule from 1541 and became part of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1686. It became part of Romania in 1918.

[2] The Greek Catholic Church is known officially as the Romanian Church United with Rome. Some authors refer to it as the Uniate Church, but this term is considered derogatory by some Greek Catholics. For historical details, see Georgescu 1991.

church, Patriarch Justinian, denounced the Vatican as 'the centre of the oldest imperialist tradition', (Durandin 1995: 375) and the communists announced that they would no longer abide by the Concordat signed between the Vatican and the Romanian state in the interwar period. These events resembled the disbanding of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine (1946) and were repeated in Czechoslovakia (1950). Until 1989, many Orthodox clergy and theologians naively believed that the 1948 suppression of the Greek Catholic Church had put an end to Greek Catholicism in Romania, but the unrecognized church survived clandestinely until 1989, when it resurfaced and received official recognition. The Greek Catholics denounced the 1948 confiscations and merger as unlawful acts perpetrated by a communist state willing to disregard basic human rights, and harshly condemned the Orthodox Church for its role in suppressing another Romanian Christian denomination. At the same time, the Greek Catholics refused to acknowledge that the Orthodox Romanians of Transylvania might also be entitled to an apology for their loss of followers as a result of the conversion in 1700 or to compensation for the property they lost to the Greek Catholics at the time.

Postcommunist Issues and Actors

The collapse of the communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu brought new hope to the Greek Catholics. The church quickly reorganized itself, and its clergy and followers launched a sustained campaign for having their rights recognized. However, forty-five years of communist rule and underground activity had taken a great toll on the Greek Catholic membership. As late as 1995, Greek Catholic Church officials insisted that the vast majority of its pre-1948 believers (estimated at 1.5 to 2 million) had remained loyal; however, they discovered that only a fraction still considered themselves Greek Catholics, while the rest had converted, willingly or not, to Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, or other faiths. The 2002 Romanian national census counted only 200,000 Greek Catholics, about 1 per cent of the country's total population.

Among the many pieces of legislation that the first postcommunist National Salvation Front government adopted was Decree Law No. 9 of 31 December 1989, which annulled many communist laws and decrees, the very last one being the 1948 decree that had dismantled the Greek Catholic Church.[3] Four months later, Decree Law No. 126 of 20 April 1990 officially recognized the resurrected church (in Article 1), and set the general framework for restitution of Greek Catholic property. Article 2 provided for the return of Greek Catholic Church assets controlled by the state. A committee

[3] The Decree-Law was published in *Monitorul Oficial* (31 December 1989).

of state and Greek Catholic Church representatives started to identify such assets. According to Article 3, another committee, composed of Greek Catholic and Orthodox representatives, would discuss the possible return of former Greek Catholic churches, places of worship, and parish houses used or owned by the Orthodox Church by taking into account 'the wishes of the faithful in the communities with such churches'.[4] Article 4 further stipulated, 'For the localities with an insufficient number of places of worship, the state will support the building of new churches and give the denominations the needed land'.

Setting the tone for property restitution, the decree's omissions and commissions had a major impact on subsequent efforts to find a solution acceptable to both churches. The decree divided restitution of Greek Catholic property into two distinct components by separating the return of places of worship from the return of all other assets, a process echoing the 1948 decision to transfer Greek Catholic property to other organizations according to its use. Postcommunist authorities believed that the two distinct restitution processes had two distinct solutions, and that the state's agreement with the Greek Catholic Church was not binding on the Orthodox Church. At the same time, the state refused to legislate the restitution of Greek Catholic churches and places of worship used by the Orthodox Church, thus signaling that the state viewed restitution as a strictly religious problem: It could not or would not interfere, either as a mediator or as an active participant. Instead of admitting that an injustice perpetrated by the state must be settled by the state, the postcommunist authorities refused to involve themselves in a divisive issue and, by doing so, they allowed the tensions to escalate into a full conflict. While the two churches should have settled their differences through dialogue and negotiation, state non-interference gave the Orthodox Church the upper hand – since they had access to, and in many cases the property rights over, the churches – and left the Greek Catholics unprotected and without any means of appeal. Whenever the Greek Catholics insisted on the urgency of permission to celebrate mass inside their former churches rather than on the street, in public parks, or in ad-hoc places of worship, the state representatives prescribed more dialogue, although procrastination benefited only the Orthodox. Rather surprisingly, Article 4 implicitly suggested a possible solution to the conflict: the construction of new churches, which could represent a concession to the Orthodox, who were thus no longer required to return the old Greek Catholic churches in the localities where new state-sponsored churches would be built.

[4] Priests and their families use parish houses.

Although they were reluctant to search for a solution to the restitution of churches, the postcommunist Romanian authorities rather quickly returned other Greek Catholic property that had been in state hands. By contrast, the Orthodox Church has mounted formidable resistance and used wide-ranging methods and arguments to delay the loss of Greek Catholic property that had been transferred to it after 1948. By 1997, Parliamentary representatives had met four times with the Transylvanian Orthodox leader, Antonie Plămădeală, and the Greek Catholic leader, Lucian Mureşan, and identified and returned 80 state-owned buildings. During the same period, some 100 churches were returned to the Greek Catholic Church, and the two churches made arrangements for organizing alternate masses in 30 other churches.[5] Most of these churches were located in Romania's southwestern region of Banat, where an agreement between the Orthodox Metropolitan Nicolae Corneanu of Banat and the Greek Catholic Bishop Ioan Ploscaru of Lugoj allowed the Greek Catholics to regain their churches as early as 1990.[6]

In 1992, a legislative proposal sought the restitution of Greek Catholic property, but it took almost a decade for the Parliament to formulate and adopt a bill. The reasons for the delay are many. Perhaps the most important factor hampering the search for a political solution to the inter-confessional dispute was that both the Social Democrats and the Democratic Convention lacked political will. The great disparity in numbers between the two churches intimidated even atheistic politicians, who proved unwilling to risk losing political capital and to alienate the predominantly Orthodox electorate. The sharpening claims on both sides made serious and sober dialogue impossible. Several times the Greek Catholics insisted on nothing short of *restitutio in integrum*, that is, an immediate and unconditional restitution of all their buildings confiscated in 1948, regardless of whether or not any believers were left to use them; subsequently, the Orthodox rejected even the most reasonable proposals. Over the years, pragmatic dialogue aimed at finding an imperfect but jointly acceptable solution changed into exhortations on each church's historical precedence and the cruelty of communist injustices. For example, it was suggested that the legitimacy of Greek Catholic claims hinged on that church's contribution to the state and nation-building processes more than on its legal right to its former properties. Greek Catholic history-based demands for restitution allowed the Orthodox Church to advance its own claims for the restitution of property lost in 1700 to the

[5] According to Stefan Ionita of the State Secretariat for Religious Denominations; see *Monitorul Oficial al Romaniei* (4 November 1997). By 2002, the number of returned churches had reached 136, according to a Greek Catholic lay group's memorandum addressed to the Romanian authorities. This memorandum will be considered in detail later in this chapter.

[6] *Monitorul Oficial al Romaniei* (25 November 1994).

then-nascent Greek Catholic Church. As frequently happens, instead of uniting the two Romanian churches, history became one more factor dividing them.

On 5 April 2002, Orthodox and Greek Catholic leaders were called to a meeting with Romanian Minister of Religious Affairs and Culture Răzvan Theodorescu and State Secretary for Religious Denominations Laurenţiu Tănase. During the discussions, Greek Catholic representatives complained that since 1998 the mixed Orthodox-Greek Catholic committee had met six times without making real progress. On 19 April 2002, over 100 Greek Catholics participated in a mass organized in front of the Alba Iulia Orthodox cathedral. Priests from twenty-nine parishes appealed to Prime Minister Adrian Năstase to put an end to the 'discrimination against the Greek Catholic Church'.[7]

On 1 June 2002, a new Romanian ambassador was accredited to the Vatican. The Pope asked that the situation regarding restitution of the Greek Catholic property be clarified. Prime Minister Năstase suggested the government could initiate legislation to solve the conflict, because such restitution 'is a promise we made to ourselves and the European Committee', but Romania's President Ion Iliescu said that the state should not interfere in a purely religious conflict. In response to the Pope's letter, Orthodox leaders pointed out that the Romanian Orthodox Church also wanted back some of its assets (buildings and land) that the communist state had confiscated. In a June 2002 open letter, Greek Catholic Archbishop Lucian Mureşan asked President Iliescu to convince the government not to limit restitution of Greek Catholic property confiscated by the communists. Lucian asked for the return of all Greek Catholic assets, regardless of which institution currently owned or used them. President Iliescu repeated that the state could not and should not interfere in a conflict that must be settled by the two churches alone. He also said that doing justice must not result in other injustices.[8] Prime Minister Nastase promised that the government would propose a law on restitution of church property by the end of the year. Orthodox Bishop Vincenţiu Ploieşteanu, who participated in the drafting of the law, said the bill referred only to property in state hands, and thus excluded Greek Catholic churches in the hands of local communities.

In June 2002, the Senate adopted the ordinance on the return of church assets confiscated by the communists from 1945 to 1989 (law 501/2002). This law governs all buildings but churches. Restitution claims are to be filed within six months with a committee formed of representatives of five ministries and the State Secretariat. For buildings used as schools, museums,

[7] *Ziua* (20 April 2002).
[8] *Monitorul* (17 June 2002).

care homes, and hospitals, the initial owner can opt for either financial compensation or restitution. In this latter case, the owner cannot change the building tenants for five years and will receive rent from the state for this period. The ordinance was adopted in response to the Pope's appeal for a solution to the situation of Greek Catholic property. The same day the law was adopted, the government analyzed a report on Greek Catholic churches and concluded that because most former Greek Catholics had remained Orthodox and 160 churches had already been returned most of the problem had already been solved. 'The restitution of all of the remaining Greek Catholic churches would block many faithful from exercising their freedom of religion', the report said.

On 1 October 2002, the Orthodox and Greek Catholic leaders met for the seventh time in Arad to settle their differences. The Greek Catholics again asked for the return of the Baia Mare and Oradea cathedrals and the St Basil Church in Bucharest. They asked to be given back the unused churches kept locked by the Orthodox and the right to celebrate alternate masses in localities that had only a formerly Greek Catholic church now used by the Orthodox (sometimes referring to this using the Latin word *simultaneum*). The Orthodox rejected the idea of alternate masses and insisted that the wishes of the majority must be respected when settling restitution disputes. The last meeting occurred in Baia Mare on 23 September 2003.[9] After the Baia Mare meeting, some Romanian newspapers reported that after eight meetings organized by the State Secretariat, the dialogue between the two churches remained sterile.[10] Even if in mid-October 2002, the government adopted norms for implementing law 501/2002 on religious restitution and constituted a Special Commission on Restitution, government officials expressed already the logic according to which restitution should function in the Greek Catholic case. After the decision, Minister of Administration and Internal Affairs, Octav Cosmâncă said that the Greek Catholic Church would not get restitution of all its churches in localities where few or no Greek Catholic followers remained or where mass was celebrated alternatively by the two churches sharing the same building. 'You cannot take a church from 500 people and give it to 20 because it would stay closed all the time', Cosmâncă said. At the local level, however, many Greek Catholics have argued that people do not return to the Greek Catholic Church precisely because the churches have not been given back (Mahieu 2006). In places where there is conflict, the government's solution is to build new church buildings and allow local parishes to decide whether they want the old or the new church. Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania Deputy Zsolt

[9] *Evenimentul Zilei* (5 October 2003).
[10] *Evenimentul Zilei* (4 October 2003).

Szilagyi said that 'conflict situations are generated by those who use the buildings and refuse to give them up, not by anybody else'.[11] The government decided that buildings where Orthodox mass was celebrated would not be returned to the Greek Catholics.

The Greek Catholics, for their part, noted that 350 of their parishes were obliged to celebrate mass either in improvised chapels or the open air. The Greek Catholics have had 135 churches returned to them. They did not, however, claim restitution of all of the churches they possessed in 1948. According to the daily *Cotidianul*, the Greek Catholic Church asked for the return of 160 churches and the right to organize alternate masses in 227 other churches.[12] The Special Commission on Restitution announced that by the 2 March 2003 deadline, it had received 7,400 claims for the restitution of church assets confiscated by the communists. The Greek Catholic Church and the Jewish community had sent in the largest number of claims, around 2,000 each. Verdicts were supposed to be handed down within 60 days, but actual progress has been extremely slow.[13]

On 12 March 2003, Minister of Culture and Religious Affairs, Răzvan Theodorescu announced that the Romanian Orthodox Church had returned 160 churches to the Greek Catholic Church, including the Blaj, Cluj, and Lugoj cathedrals. The Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs allotted to the Greek Catholic Church funds three times larger than would be warranted by its percentage in the population.[14] During 1990–2001, the State Secretariat for Religious Denominations financially supported the construction of 220 new Greek Catholic churches.[15] 'The fate of the worship places was left to be decided by the local communities, according to their number, although it was known that this system was bound to create grave conflicts'. (Corneanu 2000: 20). On 20 November 2005, the Greek Catholic cathedral in Oradea, completed by a Greek Catholic bishop in 1810, was returned to its lawful owners. As a sign of friendship, among those attending the ceremony were the Orthodox Bishop of Oradea, Ioan Mihălțan; Lubomyr, Cardinal Husar, head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church; and Secretary of State for Religious Denominations Adrian Lemeni.[16]

The United States government's annual reports on human rights around the world continue to single out Romania for discriminating against

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[11] *Curentul* (19 October 2002).
[12] *Cotidianul* (19 October 2002).
[13] *Telegraful de Constanta* (7 March 2003).
[14] *Ziua* (12 March 2003).
[15] *Ziua* (21 March 2002).
[16] *SEIA Newsletter on Eastern Churches and Ecumenism*, ed. Ronald Roberson, no. 123 (31 December 2005). Newsletter distributed by e-mail by the editor.

the Greek Catholic Church. In its 2004 and 2005 reports, issues such as property restitution, church registration, harassment by Orthodox clergy, and access to cemeteries figured prominently.[17] In January 2005, the local village council of Pesceana (Vâlcea county) illegally forbade the registration of a Greek Catholic parish and Greek Catholic Church activity in the locality. The police did not react to the Greek Catholics' complaints of verbal and physical abuse by the Orthodox villagers and their priest. Eventually, the local police chief was fired. Following a complaint by a group of NGOs, the National Council for Combating Discrimination decided that the local council's decisions were discriminatory and reprimanded it at the end of August 2005.[18]

Arguments for and against Restitution

The two sides in the conflict, Orthodox and Greek Catholics, have put forward arguments for and against property restitution.[19] An initial argument that led to postponing Parliamentary discussion of numerous bills proposing a solution to the Orthodox-Greek Catholic conflict was the absence from Parliament of church representatives from either side. According to the Parliament's regulations, however, such a presence is not permitted, especially when such a bill is debated. Another argument for postponing discussion of proposed legislation asked the government to solve the issue of church restitution.

The Orthodox Church has argued that in Orthodox canon law church buildings belong neither to the state nor to the national church structures, but to the local communities; therefore, only the latter could decide who was entitled to use them. A recurring argument has been that today there are few Greek Catholics compared to their enormous restitution claims. As a corollary to this population argument, a call came from various Orthodox circles that the Greek Catholics abandon all claims for restitution and rely on the state or local communities to build new churches for them.

Before the 1997 vote in the Senate that passed the bill on church sharing, the Senate invited Gheorghe Anghelescu, the State Secretary of Religious Denominations and a graduate of the Orthodox Theology Faculty in the Transylvanian city of Sibiu, to voice the government's position regarding

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[17] The reports can be found on the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest's website. Available: http://bucharest.usembassy.gov/US_Policy/Reports.html (accessed August 2007).

[18] Details on this and other incidents can be found in a letter sent by the General Association of United Romanians' President Laurentiu Horia Moisin to the Minister of Administration and Interior Vasile Blaga on 15 February 2006. Available: http://www.catholica.ro/stiri/dosare.asp?ids=32 (accessed August 2007).

[19] These arguments are illustrated with many examples in Stan and Turcescu 2007.

the bill. In his address Anghelescu put forth another argument against Parliamentary interference, namely, that passing a law on restitution would represent state interference in church affairs and therefore be unconstitutional. This implied that the conflict over restitution between the two churches was religious in nature. Anghelescu openly sided with the Orthodox Church and urged legislators not to interfere in a religious matter. 'Following Article 29.5 of the Constitution, which provides for the separation of church and state', he said, 'we [the State Secretariat] believe that the adoption of a law on the use of churches can be construed as state interference in church affairs'. A final argument invoked at times by both Orthodox and Greek Catholics simply has dismissed the existence of the other side and favoured either the conversion of one to the other or a return to the state of affairs as it had been under the communists.

The Memorandum

In September 2002, after more than a decade of disappointment with the postcommunist process of property restitution, a number of Romanian Greek Catholic laypersons from both Romania and abroad formed an 'action committee' and published a memorandum addressed to the Romanian President and several ministers (including the Prime Minister at the time, Adrian Năstase), the presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, as well as the president of the Supreme Court of Justice. They denounced the continued discrimination against their church and requested that it come to an end.[20] They identified several areas of discrimination, for example: limitations on their church's right to justice; the state's reluctance to return assets nationalized and confiscated from the Greek Catholic Church; legislative acts meant to continue the criminal acts of the 1948 nationalization and confiscation of property; acts of religious hatred against Greek Catholics; the Romanian state's reluctance to enforce the law and continuing to allow bureaucrats and pressure groups to violate the laws; the illegal destruction or dismantling of places of worship and other buildings belonging to the Greek Catholic Church; the sale and destruction of property belonging to their church even though they formed part of the national patrimony; and marginalization of the leaders of the Greek Catholic Church on the occasion of various national and local feasts. The memorandum listed various demands, including: respect of the religious freedom that all legal denominations were supposed to enjoy in Romania; an end to illegal demolition and dismantling of Greek Catholic churches, as well as legal protection (under Law No. 422 of 18 July 2001) for churches that are historical monuments from the eighteenth and

[20] Available: http://www.greco-catolica.org/memorandum.aspx (accessed August 2007).

nineteenth centuries; unconditional restitution of all Greek Catholic assets nationalized or confiscated by the communist state; creation of a legislative framework regarding restitutions in accord with the Romanian constitution and all international treaties Romania signed; an end to using mediators (partners or users) in the process of property restitution, because the dialogue with the Orthodox had proved inefficient in solving the issue of restitution; the annulment of the Decree Law No. 126 of 1990 as unconstitutional – because the transfer of juridical powers from the state to a mixed ecclesiastical commission charged to effect the restitution was illegal and abusive, and limited the Greek Catholic Church's right to justice, as well as leading to the state's renouncing its constitutional obligations; applying the consequences of the Decree Law No. 9 of 31 December 1989, which abrogated Decree No. 358 of 1948, which led to the confiscation of Greek Catholic property by the communist state; restitution of land and forests; and financial reparations for the Greek Catholic Church.

The memorandum represents an important document in the relationship between the Greek Catholic Church, on the one hand, and the Orthodox Church and the state, on the other, because it recommends shifting the responsibility for property restitution from the Orthodox Church to the Romanian state. The Decree Law No. 126 of 1990 encouraged the two churches to form a mixed commission in order to return Greek Catholic property found in Orthodox possession to its rightful owners. The memorandum, however, stated that this was an artifice meant to actually postpone the restitution of property. The memorandum refers to the Orthodox Church as 'our sister church' – and as the beneficiary of the confiscations – although not as the one who confiscated and nationalized Greek Catholic property. The memorandum also favours good relations with the Orthodox Church. Unfortunately, the memorandum has had no major impact on the relations between the Greek Catholic Church, the Romanian state, and the Orthodox Church.

On 16 December 2005, in recognition of its vitality, Pope Benedict XVI raised the status of the Greek Catholic Church in Romania to that of a major archbishopric and promoted its head Archbishop Lucian Mureşan of Făgăraş and Alba Iulia to the rank of major archbishop.[21] According to observers, the papal decision made the Romanian Greek Catholic Church the fourth major archbishopric in the Catholic Church, after the Ukrainian Catholic Church and India's Syro-Malabar Catholic Church and Syro-Malankara Catholic Church. A major archbishop has authority similar to that of the Eastern Catholic patriarchs, and the key decisions of their churches,

[21] *SEIA Newsletter* no. 123 (31 December, 2005). See also *Romania libera* (6 May 2006).

including the election of bishops in their home territories, are made by their synods of bishops, not by the Vatican.

Conclusion

Today, the restitution of the Greek Catholic churches abusively confiscated by the communist regime remains as divisive and as far from an amicable settlement as it was in 1990, when the issue first emerged. Both sides made small concessions over the years. Some Orthodox leaders have surrendered Greek Catholic places of worship in their dioceses, as reparation for the communist injustices inflicted on the Greek Catholic Church. The Greek Catholics have progressively scaled down their requests, abandoning *restitutio in integrum* in favour of requesting only that churches would allow congregations to celebrate mass indoors, rather than outdoors. In the end, neither side was fully committed to solving the conflict. The Orthodox turned down the reasonable request for alternate use of churches, while the Greek Catholics recently returned to the demand for *restitutio in integrum*.

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Chapter 3.4
Slovakia

Stanislav Konečný

Historical Developments

Byzantine influence in Slovakia dates back to the ninth century, when Cyril and Methodius evangelized the territory of Great Moravia. Later, however, the Latin Rite became prevalent. Both forms coexisted in the following centuries, but the Eastern Rite remained prevalent only in the southern part of the Carpathian Mountains and in parts of eastern Slovakia. When the Kingdom of Hungary placed itself under the church jurisdiction of Rome in year 1000, the Ruthenians, inhabiting the northeast of today's Slovakia, remained in the Eastern Rite and belonged to the Diocese of Mukachevo (some Slovaks and Romanians also belonged to the Orthodox Church). In comparison to members of the Roman Catholic Church, the Orthodox priests and believers occupied a lower social status. This was the main cause of the struggle for church unification with the Vatican, which is traceable from the fourteenth century. The ruling classes and some European royal dynasties also supported uniatism.

In 1646, the proclamation of the Union of Uzhhorod established the Greek Catholic Church in Subcarpathia. In spite of the problems it faced in the following years, the union contributed to the economic security of parishes in the Mukachevo diocese and to the development and cultural elevation of Ruthenians in the Hungarian Kingdom. In 1771 the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Mukachevo received equal status with other Catholic administrative units. The Mukachevo Eparchy consisted at that time of 711 parishes in thirteen districts, which today lie in four different states: Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Prešov became a diocese under the Papal Bull *Relata Semper,* issued on 22 September 1818 by Pope Pius VII. At that time Bishop G. Tarkovič administered 193 parishes with 150,000 members (Šturak 2003: 32). Under Bishop J. Gaganec (1843–75) the Prešov Eparchy developed considerably. During the second half of the nineteenth century, priests such as A.V. Duchnovič, V.I. Dobrjanskij, A.I. Pavlovič, and J. Stavrovskij–Popradov helped Prešov become a centre for the national revival

of the Hungarian Kingdom's Ruthenians, who were ideologically and socially connected to the Greek Catholic Church.

After the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic (CSR) at the end of the First World War, this trend continued, especially when Bishop Peter Pavol Gojdič, OSBM took over the Prešov Eparchy. The 1930 census registered 213,725 Greek Catholics in Slovakia (Letz 1996: 262). The eparchy, besides its pastoral activities, administered church schools, supported charities, and published actively. Under church patronage, the Association of A. Duchnovič facilitated the development of culture and enlightenment. During the Nazi-backed Slovak Republic (1939–45), the state viewed the Greek Catholic Church with disfavour, partly because of suspected pro-Hungarian and Russophile stances, but primarily because of the Ruthenian leadership's critical attitude towards the ruling regime and tension with the pro-Slovak priests and church members.

After the Second World War, the Greek Catholic Church, uncompromised by cooperation with fascism, was spared criticism and reprisals. However, help given by the church to Galician refugees led to the suspicion that it supported Ukrainian nationalism, and this invited reprisals. The new state supported the Orthodox Church and criticized the Holy See. Inspired by the L'viv Synod of March 1946, which annulled the Union of Brest, the state forced the Greek Catholic Church to join with the Orthodox Church, and prepared the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church. The Greek Catholic Church became more endangered after February 1948, when the non-communist members of the government were forced to resign, and the CSR was thrown entirely into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union (see Fedor 1993). According to the Greek Catholic Church statistics, 237,000 Greek Catholics lived in Slovakia in 1948. At that time, the church had 239 parishes and 1,055 branches, which belonged to the Prešov district, to the Mukachevo administrative unit, and to the district of Hajduroz (Hajdúdorog in today's Hungary).[1]

The pressure against the church increased with time. First, the Greek Catholic monasteries were liquidated. In rural areas, Communist Party members organized committees supporting a 'return to Orthodoxy' and targeting both the faithful and the priests. This campaign, however, met with only slight success. Nevertheless, a church council (*sobor*) in Prešov on 28 April 1950 proclaimed the Union of Uzhhorod invalid. The participants approved the inclusion of priests and church members in the Orthodox Church. Despite the fact that 238 priests (86.3 per cent of the clergy) refused to comply with the decrees of the sobor, the Greek Catholic Church ceased

[1] *Schematism Frag*. and Prešov 1948: 148, 206.

to have a legal existence and went underground (see Gajdoš and Konečný 1993). Liturgical services were performed in private houses, priests could only secretly visit their parishes, and the church was led clandestinely. The Greek Catholic laity had two forms of resisting the 'union' with the Orthodox Church: attending Roman Catholic churches or formally accepting Orthodoxy while still practising the Greek Catholic faith in secret. The hierarchy, seminary members of the Greek Catholic Orders, professors, and many priests who refused the union with Orthodoxy suffered internment in labour camps or deportation to the Czech part of the republic. One person however, Professor M. Lacka, SJ, who had been active in Rome, managed to maintain contact with the Curia. In 1969, the Bishop of Prešov District, P.P. Gojdič, died in prison. The auxiliary bishop, Vasyl Hopko, was conditionally released in 1964 from prison because of poor health.[2]

With the liberalization of the regime in 1968, some activists could make use of legal means to re-establish the Greek Catholic Church. Vatican's petitions and diplomatic pressures led to a relegalization of church activities in the CSSR through the government Decree Number 70 of June 1968 entitled, 'In Regard to the Economic Security of the Greek Catholic Church [provided] by the State'. However, the Orthodox Church still possessed the former Greek Catholic Church property. After an agreement with the Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Catholic mass was celebrated in Roman Catholic churches. However, the seminary was not re-established, and after the death of Vasyl Hopko in 1976 no replacement bishop was installed. Instead the Vatican named a temporary administrator, Ján Hirka, and endowed him with bishop's rights including the function of ordaining priests. The state continued to monitor rigorously the activity of the Greek Catholic Church (Šturak 2003b).

Post-1989 Developments

The real renewal of the Greek Catholic Church started in November 1989 and became actual in December of the same year, when Pope John Paul II appointed Ján Hirka as Bishop of Prešov. Cardinal J. Tomko consecrated him on 17 February 1990 in Prešov. An extraordinarily large number of priests and church members attended the ceremony (Hric and Šturak 1998: 100). However, there was an extreme shortage of priests. Many buildings that in the past had belonged to the Greek Catholic Church were in inadequate condition. Not only administration and pastoral activities needed to be improved, but also education, charitable activities, and publishing.

[2] Životopis prešovského svätiaceho biskupa ThDr. Vasi1a Hopku. In *Slovo*, r. 35, September 2003, p. 21.

Greek Catholic believers passionately demanded instant compensation of historical injustices and return of church property. In 1950 the state had assigned 434 church buildings, 72 chapels, and 238 parish buildings to the Orthodox Church. During the spring of 1990 a vivid tension gripped Eastern Slovakia, but state authorities eventually managed to calm the situation. The government's deputy chair, A. Varga, the deputy chair of the Slovak National Assembly, J. Širotňák, the chair of the Košice District Committee, M. Hvozdík, and chair of the Prešov County Committee V. Sopko, met with the representatives of Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches and agreed on a tolerant approach to legally resolving mutual tensions. On Sunday 25 March a Pastoral Proclamation was read in churches, exhorting tolerance and patience.[3]

In this sense, positive results came from *The Proclamation of the Government of the Slovak Republic on the Fortieth Anniversary of the Prešov Sobor*, in which the government declared as lawless and unconstitutional all acts committed in the forced transfers to Orthodoxy. The government also apologized for the injustices and repressions suffered by bishops, priests, and members of the Greek Catholic Church after 'the Sobor of Prešov' in 1950. The government proclaimed that new measures would rectify all of the negative impacts of the forced integration with Orthodoxy (Slovak Government 1990). During the repressions of the socialist era Greek Catholic Church membership in Slovakia could not be measured; however, the 1991 census registered 178,733 Greek Catholics (3.8 per cent of the population, and 4.6 per cent of the whole religious population). Among the Greek Catholics, 87.7 per cent were Slovak, 4 per cent Ruthenian, 3.8 per cent Hungarian, 2.3 per cent Ukrainian, and 1.5 per cent Roma.[4] During the first three years after the regime change, the new conditions allowed the Greek Catholic Church to operate *sui iuris* in the CSR.

The large territory of the Prešov Eparchy, which included all of Czechoslovakia, led to Pope John Paul II's appointment in January 1992 of a deputy bishop, Milan Chautur, CSsR. Until 2002 the general vicar was Monsignor J. Gajdoš. After Czechoslovakia divided in 1993, a bishopric vicariate was established in the Czech Republic, which was led by Monsignor I. Ljavinec. At that time, the eparchy contained twelve deaconates: Bardejov, Humenné, Košice, Michalovce, Poprad – Banská Bystrica, Prešov, Spišská Nová Ves, Stará Ľubovňa, Svidník, Trebišov – Dobrá a Vranov, and Topľou. A bishopric vicariate in the Czech Republic encompassed the parishes of Prague and Brno and three deaconates: Plzeň, Ostrava, and Liberec.

[3] Gréckokatolíci a pravoslávni: Pohľad do histórie a súčasnosti veľkého problému nášho kraja. *Východ* 1 (38) [74]: 3.
[4] *Slovak Bureau of Statistics. Census* 1992: 36.

After 16 March 1996, the vicariate became an Apostolic Exarchate, seated in Prague. Monsignor I. Ljavinec became exarch, and after 2003 Dr L. Hučko became the titular bishop (Babjak 1998).

Statistical data from 1993 and 1994 reveal the extent of Greek Catholic activity. During 1993 the church registered 207,625 members. Greek Catholic priests baptized 3,505 children, married 1,253 couples, and buried 2,481 persons. On 1 October 1994 the church consisted of 259 parishes (with 97 unoccupied), and administered 461 churches and 88 chapels.[5] The papal visit on 2 July 1995 to Prešov greatly encouraged pastoral activities. While there, Pope John Paul II expressed his gratitude for the loyalty of the Greek Catholics to Rome.

The establishment of the Greek Catholic Apostolic Exarchate in Košice on 21 February 1997 came as a surprise to most believers. The deputy bishop of Prešov, M. Chautur, became head of the new institution (Vasil' 2000: 142), which covers the same territory as the Košice district. The Mukachevo Eparchy (Hajduroz Eparchy) was transferred to Slovak administration (Gajdoš 1997: 91). The beatification of Bishop Peter Pavol Gojdič, OSBM and of Metod Dominic Trčka, CSsR on 4 November 2000 in Rome considerably reinforced the status of the Prešov Eparchy and the Košice Exarchate. They were the first Slovak priests beatified in the modern age (Gábor 2002).

The present territorial arrangement of the Greek Catholic Church is not definitive. The Forty-fourth Plenary Session of the Conference of Slovak Bishops, which took place on 17–18 March 2003 in Spišská Kapitula, discussed the project of establishing, in addition to the Eparchy of Prešov and that of Košice, a third one – the Bratislava Eparchy, for the rest of Slovakia. If the Bratislava – Trnava district is divided into two parts, eleven districts would exist in Slovakia: seven Roman Catholic, three Greek Catholic, and the Military Ordinariate for Slovak armed forces (Gavenda 2003: 9).

The 2001 census indicated an increase in religious belonging. The Greek Catholic Church had 219,831 adherents, 4.1 per cent of the whole population and 4.8 per cent of the population reporting any form of religious belonging. Over 93 per cent of the Greek Catholics (205,190) lived in Eastern Slovakia. In the Prešov District, they represent 15.3 per cent of the local population and in the Košice District 11 per cent.[6] The highest share of Greek Catholics lives in the counties of Medzilaborce (40.8 per cent of the population), Stropkov (40.8 per cent), Svidník (34 per cent), and Stará Ľubovňa (31 per cent). Of the cities, the most Greek Catholics live in Košice

[5] *Schematism* Prešov 1994: 108–109.

[6] *Slovak Bureau of Statistics. Census* 2001: 22, 25.

(17,831), Prešov (8,279), Humenné (8,086), and Michalovce (7,850) (Gradoš 2002).

New changes in the hierarchy occurred with the naming of a new bishop of Prešov, Dr J. Babjak, SJ In 2003. After Ján Hirka's retirement, Pope John Paul II appointed Bishop Babjak in Rome on 6 January 2003 and officially installed him in the office in Prešov on 18 January 2003 (Gradoš 2003a). Monsignor V. Skyba became the new proto-vicar for the Ruthenians. Since 1996, the Ruthenian representatives had requested a Ruthenian bishop; on 24 April 2004 Bishop J. Babjak appointed P.P. Haľko, OSBM as the vicar for Ruthenians (Krajňák 2003). An important act for the Greek Catholic Church was the beatification of Sister Zdenka Schellingová and Bishop Dr Vasyl Hopko by Pope John Paul II during his visit in Bratislava on 14 September 2003 (Gradoš 2003b).

In October 2004, the Prešov Eparchy contained 166 parishes and 181 branches, which had at their disposal 342 churches; it was divided into 16 proto-presbyteries: Banská Bystrica, Bardejov, Bratislava, Humenné, Medzilaborce, Nitra, Poprad, Prešov, Sabinov, Snina, Stará Ľubovňa, Stropkov, Svidník, Vranov nad Topľou - Čemerné, Vranov and Topľou – mesto a Žilina. Of the 265 priests, 220 were active in parishes. The twenty-six Greek Catholic monks and ninety-two Greek Catholic nuns constituted a considerable help for the eparchy, especially in activities related to charity and publishing.[7]

Religious Orders

Slovakia has two active Greek Catholic monastic orders for men: the Basilians and the Redemptorists of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite. The Order of St Basil the Great has been active in Slovakia since the fifteenth century; an independent Province of the Order named after Sts Cyril and Methodius was established in 1948. After 1989, these orders provided multifaceted support for apostolic activities in Prešov, Trebišov, Krásny Brod, Kamienka, and Litmanová. Both orders have monasteries in Prešov and Krásny Brod. They publish a periodical, *Blahovistnyk,* in the Slovak and Ruthenian languages.

The Redemptorists of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite came to Slovakia in 1921 from what is now the Czech Republic. An independent vice-province was established in 1946 in Michalovce. They are active as missionaries and publish a periodical, *Misionár,* in Slovak. The Redemptionists also have monasteries in Stropkov and in Stará Ľubovňa.

[7] *Schematism* Prešov 2004: 328.

In 1922, the oldest Greek Catholic order for women, the Order of St Basil the Great (Basilians), established a convent in Slovakia. The Basilians came from Stanislavov in Galicia (today Ivano-Frankivsk in Ukraine); they focus on girls' education and on charity, especially among the Roma. In Slovakia, an independent division, 'Bolestná matka Božia' (Suffering Mother of God), is located in Prešov. This order has monasteries in Prešov, Bardejov, and Svidník and a missionary house in the village of Volosjanka in Ukraine. A former 'Delegatúra sv. Cyrila a Metoda' (Mission of Sts Cyril and Methodius) of the Basilian Sisters located in Sečovce became a vice-province. The nuns are located in monasteries in Levoča, Vranov nad Topľou, and in the Decanal Office in Bratislava.

The Kongregácia Sestier Služobníc Nepoškvrnenej Panny Márie (Congregation of the Serving Sisters of the Virgin Mary) came to Slovakia in 1928. The nuns educate children, help the elderly, and take care of churches. At present, the order in Slovakia functions as an independent province (the Province of the Holy Spirit) based in Prešov. Besides its headquarters and novitiate in Prešov, the congregation is active in Humenné, Ľutina, Poprad, Snina, and Stará Ľubovňa. Another order, Rehoľa Najsvätejšieho Vykupiteľa (the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer) has only five nuns in Slovakia; under the leadership of H. Dudová, they are active in Sečovce, Medzilaborce County.

Legal Status

The decisive factor in the post-1989 development of the Greek Catholic Church has been the change of its social and legal status. Because of Law No. 308/1991, on freedom of religious belief and the status of churches and religious societies, and Law No. 192/1992 Zb., which determined church registration conditions, the church has relative independence from state authorities and improved economic and financial security. From the beginning of these changes, the Catholic Church of both rites has enjoyed an important social authority connected with its role during the socialist era.

After 1989, the church expressed its support for the democratic changes. Even though political discussions articulated the idea of separation of church and state, these opinions had little chance of acceptance at the beginning of the 1990s. The churches supported the idea of Slovak independence, however, and resisted authoritarian tendencies after 1994. Tensions between the government and churches culminated in 1998, when the 'transitory' legal period ended, all property restitutions were to be effective, and the churches' status in relation to the state had to be defined legally. The restitutions, however, were not done satisfactorily. In January 1999, the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic established an expert group to

prepare a law on church–state relations. In 1999, discussions began on a Basic Agreement with the Vatican. The acceptance by the Slovak Parliament of the Basic Agreement reinforced the position of the Greek Catholic Church and avoided the liberal criticisms of several elements of the agreement (Kollár 2001: 47).

The status of the Greek Catholic Church was stabilized by the Law No. 394/2000 Z.Z. of 31 October 2000, 'Concerning freedom of religious belief and the status of churches and religious societies'. This law defined churches, confirmed their legal identity, and provided registered churches with a right to conclude agreements with the state. On 24 November 2000 the 'Basic Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Holy See' was signed. The Vatican's responsibility for harmonizing the Slovak eparchies and exarchates in conformity with the boundaries of the state directly affected the status of the Greek Catholic Church (Mulík 2004).[8] Financial relations between the churches and the state are regulated by the Law No. 218/1949 Zb, 'In regard to the economic security of churches and religious societies by the state'. The Law No. 16/1990 abolished the monitoring of the churches by the state, which had been used by the socialist regime as a tool for direct intervention in the church affairs. The Ministry of Culture (under Law No. 522/1992) provides financial support to registered churches in Slovakia (Kollár 1997: 267). Law No. 298/1990 Zb., 'In regard to return of the property to religious orders and congregations', sought to rectify injustices done to the Greek Catholic religious orders. The Law no. 282/1993 Z. z., 'In regard to alleviation of some property injustices caused to churches and religious societies', (the so-called Restitution Law) had significant importance for the Greek Catholic Church (Moravčiková and Cipár 2001: 231-234).

In the current system, the state allocates funds to churches and religious societies according to their membership numbers. From 1999 to 2004, the state spent an annual average of 600 million Slovak Koruna (SKK; approximately 17 million Euro) to support churches. The Greek Catholic Church received approximately 9 per cent of this amount, even though it claimed only 5 per cent of total church members. The Roman Catholic Church obtained roughly 55 per cent of the funds, despite having approximately 75 per cent of the religious population (Gajdoš 2005: 11).

The most complicated financial issue was the property settlement with the Orthodox Church, done according to Law No. 211/1990 Zb, 'In regard to settlement of property relations between the Greek Catholic Church and the

[8] The agreement between Slovak Republic and registered churches and religious societies, which regulate the status of eleven registered non-Catholic churches was signed on 11 April 2002 (Čikeš 2001).

Orthodox Church', passed on 29 May 1990.[9] The contested property consisted of 122 churches and 30 parish buildings in 122 villages of Eastern Slovakia. Court decisions resulted in the eviction of several Orthodox parishes, which caused an uproar among Orthodox believers. On the other side, Greek Catholic claims to parishes were not always satisfied. Until 1996, the ownership of thirty-six places of worship had not been resolved, but both churches then agreed to a framework on solving contested claims. Either the courts or direct negotiations resolved the remaining cases. On the basis of the government Measure No. 507/1995, the state allotted 17.3 million Slovak Koruna (SKK) for reimbursement of the Greek Catholics and 13.2 million SKK to the Orthodox Church and covered 11.3 million SKK of court expenses (Kollár 1996: 267, 273). After several negotiations between churches on settling property claims, Slovak Deputy Prime Minister P. Csáky and Bishop J. Hirka signed an agreement that concluded the church property issue (see Mesežnikov 2000: 57).

In December 2000 the Slovak government and representatives of both churches signed an agreement in which they agreed to abstain from additional property claims against each other and against the state. The Slovak government pledged to disburse 54 million SKK to rectify all additional property claims. Archbishop Nikolaj of the Orthodox Church commented that with the agreement Slovak government had decided to prevent the resolution of old injustices by the creation of new injustices (Maroszová 2000: 3). The final step was an agreement signed between the representatives of both churches in Michalovce on 26 January 2001 (Kollár 2001: 50).

Education and Charity

The religious freedom brought by 'the Velvet Revolution' revealed an acute lack of Greek Catholic priests and a high average age of practising priests. Catholic theology was not taught in Prešov, despite an unsuccessful attempt to change this in 1968. One of the eparchy's first acts was opening a seminary in September 1990 and establishing the Greek Catholic Faculty at P.J. Šafárik University in Prešov. However, the beginnings were not easy. During the first four years, despite makeshift conditions and reconstructions, the faculty was stabilized through help from the Czech Republic. In 1994, a general reconstruction of the seminary began, which ended in 1996. On 1 January 1997 the faculty became a part of the Prešov University, and since 1 September 2005 it has been called the Greek Catholic Theology Faculty. Its goal is the theological formation of students and preparation for priesthood and various church or civil services. The curriculum contains philosophical

[9] In *Slovo* 22, August 1990: 2.

and theological disciplines as well as the study of history, ethics, law, and languages, with the accent on the pedagogical and psychological preparedness of the students. Since 1999, the faculty has published its own periodical, the theological review *Theologos*.

In 1990, the bishop emphasized for the first time the need to establish and operate church schools. Since September of that year, under the care of the Basilian Order, a middle-level health-care school with the name of Stredná zdravotnícka škola sv. Bazsila Veľkého v Prešove (*The Secondary Nursing School of St Basil the Great in Prešov)* operates in Prešov. The school has its own vision of education serving social needs. On average 200 pupils attend. The second school established by the eparchy is an elementary school in Svidník, named Základná škola sv. Juraja vo Svidníku (St George Elementary School in Svidník); on average 180 pupils attend the school. The Gymnázium sv. Jána Zlatoústeho (St John Chrysostom Secondary School) in Humenné is also supported by the government. In May 2002 this school graduated sixty-four students. At the same time, an elementary school in Tichý Potok was opened. A nursery, Cirkevná materská škola sestry Jozafáty (the Church Nursery of Sister Josaphata), was opened in Ľutina. On average, twenty children receive care there; the emphasis is on moral behaviour (Ichniovská 2002). Other schools followed – an elementary school in Roškovce and a gymnasium (secondary school) in Prešov.

The Greek Catholic Charity in Prešov, established in September 1991, has been very active. Bishop J. Hirka, by founding this institution, built on the work of his predecessor, Bishop P.P. Gojdič, who in 1947 had established an institution under the same name as a branch of the Central Charity in Slovakia. The new director, M. Šatný, started a first project in February 1992 that focused upon the deprived inhabitants of Prešov. In September 1993 the charity opened a temporary shelter for homeless persons. Since 1 July 1998 the charity has operated the Cesta k domovu (Road Home*)* project, which serves as a night shelter facility, opened under the framework of the project Archa. The temporary shelter was changed to a facility for drug addicts. Another facility, Dom nádeje (House of Hope), offers a shelter to persons seeking relief from drug dependency. The charitable activities gradually spread to the whole region and have a three-pronged character. Seven centres provide a service to families and focus on helping elderly, sick, and lonely persons. The charity and social centres serve as points of first help that offer assistance to the socially excluded. Other charitable and pastoral projects are oriented to provide spiritual assistance to selected groups in Ukraine (Hurtuk 2002: 9).

Art and Culture

Although the Greek Catholic Church's cultural and educational activities are not as central to mainstream Slovak culture as they were in the past, their significance is not negligible. Architecture and pictorial and performing art were always connected with Eastern spirituality and formed a part of religious life and the work of the church. The wooden churches from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries located in northeastern Slovakia have an important historical value, and twenty-seven are national memorials. One task of the church is maintaining them as sacred and cultural memorials. The Greek Catholic Church, even though it has no funds for preserving and reconstructing historical memorials, supports activities leading to this goal. The church, dependent on its resources, preserves and promotes icons and various sacral objects that have a great artistic and historic value.

Conclusion

The Greek Catholic Church still has a significant historical and social importance today in Slovakia. This church is one of the very few institutions and organizations that in spite of political and ideological pressures was not defeated by totalitarian practices and maintained its spiritual and also organizational identity in an indirect way even during the years of persecution. Therefore, the recent establishment of the Greek Catholic archiepiscopate *sui iuris* in Prešov with its head bishop Monsignor J. Babjak, ThD, PhD, SJ is perceived as a confirmation of the church's internal maturity and a certain organizational consolidation and as a particular honour (Petrík 2008). Moreover, on 30 January 2008 Pope Benedict XVI promoted the apostolic exarchate in Kosice to be the Eparchy of Kosice, and detached four deaneries from the Eparchy of Prešov, which became part of the newly established Eparchy of Bratislava. The Eparchy of Prešov was transformed into an archeparchy. The new eparch of Kosice was the former exarch, Monsignor M. Chautur, CSsR, and Monsignor P. Rusnak was appointed eparch of Bratislava (Vasil' 2008). In Slovakia, the new metropolitan Greek Catholic Church thus consists of 250,000 church members situated in 265 parishes and 274 subsidiaries. These are divided into 22 deaneries (protopresbyteries) with a total of 514 temples. The church has 425 clergymen and 162 members of religious orders at its disposal (Šturák 2008).

The metropolitan organization of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia became a reality just in the year of the 190th anniversary of the establishment of the Eparchy of Prešov and the fortieth anniversary of its legal renewal after the communist interruption. The church's prestige was promoted by a very high Israeli state decoration 'Righteous among the Nations'

awarded to Bishop Pavel Gojdic in memory of his saving the lives of Jews during the Holocaust. Perhaps the most crucial step, however, was the post-1989 re-establishment of important institutions such as the faculty of theology, the seminary, elementary and middle schools, and charity organizations. Although it cannot avoid the more general process of secularization, this enthusiastic renewal opened a new perspective in the life of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia.

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Chapter 3.5
Ukraine

Mariya Horiacha and Svitlana Hurkina

Officially, the Soviet authorities had completely liquidated the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) in western Ukraine by 1950 (Galicia in 1946 and Transcarpathia in 1949).[1] Nevertheless, the UGCC continued to exist 'in the catacombs' through faithful and persistent resistance by bishops, many believers, and those clergy who did not convert to Orthodoxy. The Soviet regime heavily persecuted the UGCC from 1946 to 1989. From the second half of the 1950s, the clandestine Greek Catholics repeatedly requested the official registration of their communities and state recognition of the UGCC. In particular, many petitions were submitted in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1987–89, during 'perestroika', the movement for the democratization of society in the Soviet Union, one of the main appeals from western Ukraine demanded 'legalization of the UGCC'. The *Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church* (1982–84) and its successor, the *Committee for the Defense of the UGCC* (1987–89), promoted this goal.

Exit from the Underground

The movement for the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine 'officially' started in August 1987 with an 'Open Letter' about the exit from its underground existence, signed by a small group of Ukrainian Greek Catholics under the leadership of Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk.[2] In 1988, numerous celebrations of the Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine[3] took

[1] Doc. 27. Dopovidna holovy Rady v spravakh Rosiiskoi pravoslavnoi Cerkvy pry Radi Ministriv SRSR G. Karpova chlenam Politbiuro CK VKP(b) z pryvodu likvidatsii unii v URSR, adresovana v kopii sekretarevi CK KP(b)U M. Khrushchovu. 8 zhovtnia 1949 roku (in Serhiychuk 2001: 226-228).

[2] *Blahovisnyk*, Rome, 1987: 86. In 1987 Ukrainian Greek Catholics had nine secret bishops.

[3] The Millennium of Christianity celebration marked one thousand years since the 'baptism of Kievan Rus' in 988, the moment when Volodymyr the Great instituted Christianity as the state religion.

place in underground communities. The largest celebration took place in a forest near the shrine of Zarvanytsia, where approximately 15,000 Ukrainian Greek Catholics participated in the Divine Liturgy, presided at by Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk. Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk, the *locum tenens* of the Major Archbishop's See,[4] gave Western journalists many interviews about the UGCC. During 1989, many important events took place: the journeys of bishops to Moscow and several meetings with Soviet authorities; the return of several Orthodox priests, with their parishes, to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church; the rotating hunger strike of Greek Catholics on Arbat Street in Moscow from May to November; outdoor open liturgies at the court of the Discalced Carmelite Monastery Church in L'viv; and numerous demonstrations of the clergy and faithful in cities and towns of Galicia, among them two demonstrations at St George's Cathedral in L'viv with thousands of participants, on 17 September and 26 November (Forest 1990: 110-113; Solchanyk and Hvat 1990: 88-89). All these activities led to the emergence from the underground of many Greek Catholic communities and the start of a new period in the life of the UGCC.

The Ukrainian Greek Catholics' struggle for legalization received such international attention that the central authorities could no longer ignore the 'problem of the Uniates'.[5] Trying to resolve the religious problems in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev visited Rome on 10 December 1989 and had a meeting with Pope John Paul II. At this meeting, the USSR and the Vatican reached an agreement and opened the path to legalizing the UGCC. Then the Greek Catholic communities could, according to the Soviet law on religious organizations, start their registration by the Ukrainian government's Council for Religious Affairs.

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[4] At that time the head of the UGCC resided in Rome, with a *locum tenens* of his see in L'viv. In 1963, after eighteen years of imprisonment and exile in the Soviet camps, the head of the UGCC, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, was freed by the Soviet authorities at the request of Pope John XXIII, on the condition that he would go directly to Rome and never return to Ukraine or any territory of the USSR. From 1963 until 1991, Rome became the temporary residence of the head of the UGCC. After the death of Cardinal Slipyj in 1984, Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky became his successor. However, in 1963 after his release from the Soviet camps, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj secretly consecrated Redemptorist Vasyl Velychkovskyi as bishop, in a Moscow hotel room, and appointed him as the *locum tenens* of his see in L'viv. In 1964, Bishop Velychkovskyi consecrated another Redemptorist, Volodymyr Sterniuk, as bishop and his coadjutor.

[5] The term 'Uniates' was generally used during the Soviet period in documentation, popular publications, and public expressions to indicate the Greek Catholics, but always with a negative connotation. Thus, with the process of legalization, the UGCC had to strive for moral rehabilitation in the eyes of society and had to reject the term Uniates as unacceptable for their identification.

Having returned to Moscow, Gorbachev passed the cause of legalization into the hands of ecclesiastical authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church. During 12–17 January 1990, delegations of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Vatican held negotiations established four-sided commissions for normalization of relations between the various churches. The commission included representatives of four churches in Ukraine: the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church,[6] the Roman Catholic Church, and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The commission had to resolve the tensions between these churches, but soon was paralyzed because no side wanted to compromise. The representative of the UGCC, Metropolitan Volodymyr Sterniuk, demanded the full rehabilitation of the UGCC. He required the acknowledgment not only of separate Greek Catholic communities but also of the UGCC as an institution with its former status and with restitution of all property possessed before its formal liquidation in 1946. The Russian Orthodox Church was not ready to satisfy these requirements and to recognize that the 'L'viv Council' of 1946 had decided illegally to liquidate the UGCC and force reunification with the Russian Orthodox Church. In protest, the UGCC delegation left the commission and negotiations deadlocked. On 23 January 1990, the Council of the UGCC in Ukraine gathered in the Church of the Transfiguration, at which the decisions of the 'L'viv Council' of 1946 were declared illegal and invalid.

In spring 1990, it became obvious that the Soviet government could not resolve the conflict between the churches. In spite of the central authorities' negative treatment of the UGGC, the legalization of the UGCC continued with the support of local authorities of the western Ukrainian regions. On 18 August 1990, the St George's Cathedral complex (the historic cathedral and residence of the Metropolitan of Halych) was transferred back to the UGCC from the Russian Orthodox Church. In September 1990, the renewed Ukrainian Youth for Christ organization held a large religious festival in L'viv. This was the period of organizing church life in the UGCC under the conditions of the revival of the Ukrainian state.

The head of the UGCC, Cardinal Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky, moved from Rome to L'viv on 30 March 1991 and remained there permanently. Although the UGCC had preserved its ecclesiastical structure with its own hierarchy, priests, religious workers, and communities from the underground, there was an urgent need for its renewal and development. The head of the UGCC had difficult tasks in organizing normal church life, diminishing tensions with the Russian Orthodox Church, satisfying the spiritual needs

[6] During the Soviet period, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was named the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1990, it was renamed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

of the laity, and achieving the official recognition of the UGCC by the Ukrainian government. The first Synod of Bishops under his leadership in Ukraine took place on 16–31 May 1992 at St George's Cathedral in L'viv. The twenty-eight bishops from Ukraine and abroad who participated in the synod created new eparchies and acknowledged that the 'L'viv Council' of 1946 had been uncanonical (Lencyk and Markus 1993: 361-362). In 1992, the remains of Patriarch Josyf Slipyj were transferred from Rome to L'viv in accord with his testament and were buried in the crypt of St George's Cathedral. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's participation in this ceremony testified to the partial rehabilitation of the UGCC. However, in order to return to their previous status, the Ukrainian Greek Catholics had to undergo a long struggle. After 1991 some priests and laypeople from the Ukrainian Diaspora (in Poland, Italy, Canada, the United States, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom), educated in different seminaries and Western theological schools, came to Ukraine to stay and to assist their mother church in rebuilding ecclesiastical and institutional structures.

From 1989 to 1994, the state registered many new Greek Catholic communities. Also, in the regions of L'viv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Transcarpathia, many faithful of the former UGCC parishes, which the Russian Orthodox Church had possessed during Soviet times, returned to the UGCC. Often Orthodox priests who served at parishes in these regions also registered with the UGCC. The Greek Catholic communities registered by the State Committee on Religious Affairs rapidly grew from zero in 1989 to 298 in 1990 and to 2,932 in 1994. From 1995 to 2005, this number showed smaller but stable growth, from 3,032 to 3,386 communities see Annex 1).[7]

Meanwhile the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), formerly known as the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, received autonomy in 1990. It remained officially the largest church in Ukraine, but in the break of the 1980 and 1990s, on the wave of the achievement of Ukraine's independence, it suffered two splits, which resulted in establishment of two other Ukrainian Orthodox Churches viewed by the UOC-MP as 'schismatic organizations', whose claims of Orthodoxy are seriously questioned as canonically invalid. One of these offshoots is the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). It

[7] Statistics for 1988–1990 from 'Relihiini hromady v Ukrains'kij RSR', *Liudyna i svit*, (1990) 12: 25; Statistics for 1994 from *Liudyna i svit*, (1994) 5: 10-11; Statistics for 1996 from 'Relihiyna aktyvnist' v Ukraini u 2000 r. zrosla'; *Relihiyna Panorama* (2001) 3: 56-66; Statistics for 1998-2005 from 'U Derzhavnomu komiteti u spravach relihii'; *Liudyna i svit* (1998) 1: 24-27; (1999) 1: 24-27; (2000) 1: 26-29; (2001) 1: 35-38; (2003) 1. Statistics for 2004 from 'Relihiini organizatsiji v Ukraini', *Liudyna i svit* (2004) 1: 31-34. Statistics for 2005 from 'Relihiini organizatsiji v Ukraini' on http://www.risu.org.ua/ukr/resourses/ statistics/ukr2005/ (accessed August 2007).

started in 1921 but during the Soviet period was suppressed twice. In modern times, the UAOC was renewed in August 1989, when the parish of the Church of Sts Peter and Paul in L'viv announced its break with the Moscow Patriarchate. Having regained the recognition of the state, the UAOC was initially ruled from abroad by Mstyslav Skrypnyk (1990–93) and then, following his death in 1993, after a brief union with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate (1992–95), it re-established itself as an independent church. Geographically the UAOC operates almost exclusively in the western Galician provinces, with only small support elsewhere. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate represents another attempt of some Ukrainian Orthodox bishops to gain independence from the Moscow Patriarchate under the leadership of former Ukrainian Exarch Filaret in 1992. It was established at the unifying council where Filaret and his supporters joined hands with the UAOC. Since 1995 the UOC-KP has been headed by Patriarch Filaret (Mykhailo Denysenko), who was defrocked by the Moscow Patriarchate in 1992 and excommunicated in 1997 'for schismatic activities'. This church enjoys its main support in the Volhyn region (where it holds from 30 per cent to 40 per cent of parishes) and the capital Kyiv, has moderate support in the central and Galician provinces (from 15 per cent to 30 per cent), and has several international parishes in the West and in Russia. Each of the three Ukrainian Orthodox Churches claims to be the descendant of the former Kyivan Metropolitanate.[8]

From 1994 to 1997, the four-hundredth anniversary of the Union of Brest (1596) was celebrated in Ukraine and the Diaspora. On this occasion, academics examined this historical event. International, interdisciplinary, and interreligious 'Brest Lectures' took place in L'viv, Kyiv, and other Ukrainian cities.[9] In March 1996 a symposium was held in L'viv on the liquidation of the various Greek Catholic Churches in Eastern Europe, and ten years later, in March 2006, an international conference gathered in Kyiv that discussed the state's repressive policies toward Christian churches and believers from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. These conferences

[8] The name 'Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate' (UOC-MP) is not official but often used in contemporary public and scholarly works to distinguish it from other Ukrainian Orthodox Churches by identifying its jurisdiction. For detailed information on the Ukrainian Orthodoxy see the official websites of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches: http://www.pravoslavye.org.ua; http://www.kievpatr.org.ua; and http://cerkva.info (accessed August 2007). For more historical information see also Bociurkiw 1995; Markus 1995; Horiacha and Suchasna 1999.

[9] The 'Brest Lectures' were organized by Borys Gudziak, director of the Institute of Church History, as a series of eighteen symposia divided into six traveling sessions, where different aspects of the topic of the Union of Brest and its consequences for the Ukrainian Church were discussed (see Gudziak 2000; also Gudziak and Turii 1994; 1996; 1997a; 1997b).

were held on the fiftieth and sixtieth anniversaries of the 'L'viv Council' of 1946 through which the UGCC was officially banned. From 1996 to 2006, the UGCC's Patriarchal Council held three sessions. The first session (1996) focused on problems of the new evangelization; the second (1998) on the role of the laity in the life of the Church in the modern world; and the third (2002) on the social problems of Ukrainian society.[10]

For a long time the issues of a Ukrainian Embassy at the Vatican and a visit of the Pope to Ukraine were unresolved. From 1996 to 1998 some diplomatic steps towards resolving these issues were taken: an exchange of delegations between Kyiv and Rome in May 1996[11]; meetings of President Leonid Kuchma with the apostolic nuncios in Kyiv[12] and with Pope John Paul II in Gniezno in 1997; the visit to Kyiv of the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Angelo Sodano, in May and June 1998; and the visit of Ukrainian Minister of External Affairs H. Pustovoytenko to Rome in January 1999 with an official invitation for the Pope to visit Ukraine. As a result of all these steps, Ukraine opened an embassy at the Vatican, and on 25 May 1999 the Pope received credentials from Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Nina Kovalska.[13] In response, the Vatican appointed a new nuncio for Ukraine, Nikola Eterovic, who replaced former nuncio Antonio Franco.[14] Finally, from 23 to 27 June 2001 the Pope made a pastoral visit to Ukraine. Despite the debates surrounding this event, the papal visit was successful and strengthened Ukraine's international prestige. On 27 June, at a Byzantine-rite Liturgy in L'viv in which approximately one million faithful participated, Pope John Paul II beatified twenty-seven Greek Catholic martyrs of the twentieth century.[15]

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[10] The fourth session of the UGCC's Patriarchal Council, dedicated to youth, 'Youth in the Church of the Third Millennium', was to be held in Kyiv on 19–24 August 2007. 'Next session of the Patriarchal Sobor to be held in Kyiv', 29.09., www.ugcc.org.ua/eng/press-releases/ (accessed August 2007).

[11] 'President of Ukraine met Cardinal from Rome'. RISU, Agency of Religious Information. 24 May 1996.

[12] 'Presydent Ukrainy pryiniav Apostol'skoho Nuncia v Ukraini Antonio Franko (na ioho prokhannia)' [The President of Ukraine received the Apostolic Nuntio to Ukraine, Antonio Franko (at his request)]. RISU, Agency of Religious Information, 24. Jan. 1997.

[13] 'Ie posol u Vatykani' [There is an Ambassador to the Vatican], *Parafialna gazeta,* 13 June 1999.

[14] 'Sviatishyi Otec pryznachyv novoho Apostol'skoho Nuncia v Ukraini' [Holy Father named the new Apostolic Nuntio to Ukraine], *Parafialna gazeta,* 13 June 1999.

[15] For more detailed information see the brochure *Church of the Martyrs. The New Saints of Ukraine* (L'viv, 2004).

Structure and Administration

After its legalization in 1990 and until 1992, the UGCC consisted of three eparchies: L'viv, Ivano-Frankivsk (the new name of Stanislaviv), and Mukachiv. This structure partly preserved the old structure of the prewar Halych (Galicia) Metropolitanate, which had been divided into three parts: the L'viv Archeparchy and the Peremyshl (Przemyśl), and Stanislaviv eparchies. Between 1992 and 2005, the UGCC broadly expanded its administrative structure by establishing new eparchies and exarchates. The Synod of Bishops held in L'viv from 1 to 31 May 1992 decided to create four new eparchies: Kolomyia-Chernivtsi, Sambir-Drohobych, Ternopil, and Zboriv (established on 20 April 1993). In 1996 the Exarchate of Kyiv-Vyshhorod was established for central and eastern Ukraine.

In August 2000 the Synod of Bishops held in Buchach changed the ecclesiastical territorial-administrative divisions by creating two new eparchies, Stryi and Sokal, and reorganizing the eparchies of Ternopil and Zboriv into the eparchies of Ternopil-Zboriv and Buchach-Chortkiv. The Kyiv-Vyshhorod Exarchate, which covered the territory beyond Galicia, Transcarpathia, and Bukovyna, received a separate status. Also at this synod, the Particular Law of the UGCC was accepted *ad experimentum*. In one year, 146 canons of the Particular Law of the UGCC were approved and activated. As of November 2000, all of Ukraine fell under the jurisdiction of the Major Archbishop and the Synod of Bishops of the Kyiv-Halych Metropolitanate of the UGCC. However, the autonomous status of the Greek Catholic Church's Mukachiv Eparchy has been preserved as a *sui juris* church not subordinated to the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The Mukachiv Eparchy, with its centre in Uzhhorod, has since November 2002 been led by Bishop Milan Šašik.

On 14 December 2000 Cardinal Lubachivsky died, and in January 2001 Auxiliary Bishop Lubomyr Husar was elected head of the UGCC. Under his leadership, the territorial structure of the Kyiv-Halych Metropolitanate was further elaborated. In 2001, the exarchate of Kyiv-Vyshhorod was divided, and during the following years two new exarchates in eastern Ukraine were created: in February 2002 the exarchate of Donetsk-Kharkiv, and in July 2003 the exarchate of Odessa-Crimea. The Synod of Bishops held in L'viv-Rudno from 24 to 31 October 2003 pronounced the *de jure* creation of the exarchate of Lutsk on the territory of the Volyn and Rivne regions, but this had not been accomplished in fact by 2007. As a final step of the reconstruction of the UGCC, the UGCC major archbishop's see was transferred from L'viv to Kyiv. The head of the UGCC, Lubomyr Husar, decided to transfer the see on the basis of Canon 57 of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches. The decision was approved and blessed by the

Synod of Bishops held in Kyiv from 5 to 12 October 2004, and blessed by Pope John Paul II. From 21 August 2005 the seat of the head of the UGCC would be in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, and his title would be changed from 'Major Archbishop of L'viv' to 'Major Archbishop of Kyiv-Halych'. Despite some negative reactions from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Moscow Patriarchate, the act of transferring the see was accepted by Ukrainian society. At present the Major Archbishopric in Ukraine is divided into: two archeparchies (Kyiv and L'viv), seven eparchies (Ivano-Frankivsk, Kolomyia-Chernivtsi, Sambir-Drohobych, Ternopil-Zboriv, Buchach, Stryi, and Sokal), and two exarchates (Donetsk-Kharkiv and Odessa-Crimea). Because of the UGCC's growing needs, fourteen new bishops were ordained in Ukraine from 1994 to 2006. The UGCC has also developed its structure beyond Ukraine among the Ukrainian Diaspora in Europe, North and South America, Australia, and Asia.

Different departments of the UGCC possess legislative and executive authority. The head of the UGCC and the Synod of Bishops represent the legislative authority. Commissions of different levels and offices represent the executive authority. Four acting commissions work at the patriarchal level[16] and four commissions at the metropolitanate level.[17] Other commissions are still under construction.[18] All of these commissions form the Patriarchal Curia.

Patriarchal Status

The recognition of the status of the UGCC as a patriarchate is a very acute, ongoing issue. Josyf Slipyj, the head of the UGCC, first raised the question in October 1963 at the Second Vatican Council. Metropolitan Slipyj proposed the creation of a Kyiv-Halych Patriarchate for Ukrainian Catholics. The council did not resolve the matter, but in December 1963 the Vatican recognized the Archbishop of L'viv as the major archbishop of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.[19] In 1975 Josyf Slipyj began using the title 'Patriarch of Kyiv and Halych and All Rus'. Although the Vatican did not recognize the

[16] These are the Catechetical Commission, the Commission of Youth Affairs, the Commission of Monastic Affairs, and the Liturgical Commission.

[17] These are the Commission of Family Affairs, the 'Justice and Peace' Commission, the Commission of School Affairs, and the Commission of Health Care Ministry.

[18] Among them are the Ecumenical Commission, the Commission of Priestly Formation, the Commission of Canon Law, the Commission of Social Communications, the Commission on the Laity, and the Commission on Evangelization.

[19] According to the official Vatican title, in the 1960s the UGCC was named the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In the papal statistical annual (*Annuario Pontificio*) the name Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite is used.

patriarchal status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Slipyj secured official recognition of the synodal structure of the UCC/UGCC under the authority of the major archbishop, who had the right to convoke the Synod of Bishops and council of the UCC/UGCC (Lentsyk and Markus 1993: 360). The cause of the patriarchal status of the UGCC was renewed in the 1990s. At the beginning of the decade, after the Synod of Bishops of the UGCC in Rome, the bishops had an audience with Pope John Paul II. At this meeting, Metropolitan Volodymyr Sterniuk asked the Pope when the Patriarchate of the UGCC would be recognized. The Pope then answered that he did not see any more obstacles (Haliv 2003: 18).

In 1999, the Synod of Bishops proposed changing the name of the UGCC to the Kyivan Catholic Church, to emphasize the identity of this church. The issue of the Patriarchate of the UGCC was discussed at the third section of the Patriarchal Council, where 184 delegates from Ukraine, Europe, North and South America, and Australia voted unanimously for the patriarchate and requested the head of the UGCC and the Synod of Bishops to declare the Patriarchate of the UGCC. In July 2002 the Synod of Bishops of the UGCC, which followed the Patriarchal Council and was for the first time held in Kyiv, approved the decision to fulfil the patriarchal status of the UGCC and handed it to the Pope. On 27 October 2002, in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, the cornerstone was blessed and the construction of the new Patriarchal Cathedral of the Resurrection began.

At the end of 2003 the issue of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Patriarchate went beyond the discussion within the UGCC itself and became a matter of interest for both supporters and opponents. On 6 February 2003 the College of Cardinals, convened by John Paul II, discussed this issue, and three cardinals voted against the Patriarchate of the UGCC.[20] The Orthodox churches reacted sharply on the issue.[21] In 2003 Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople wrote three letters to the Patriarch of Moscow, to the heads of various Orthodox Churches, and to the Pope, expressing his negative opinion concerning the pronouncement of the Patriarchate of the UGCC. Other Orthodox Churches also expressed a similar attitude and sent their letters of protest to Rome.[22]

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[20] Among these were two German cardinals, Walter Kasper and Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), and the prefect of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, Ignace Moussa I Daoud.

[21] This happened after the official announcement by Cardinal W. Kasper to the Moscow Patriarchate in February 2003 about the intention of the Pope to declare the Patriarchate of the UGCC.

[22] From November to December, 15 heads of the Orthodox churches reacted against the creation of the Patriarchate of the UGCC.

The Patriarchate of the UGGC was the main issue on 3 June 2004 at the meeting between Pope John Paul II and the Permanent Synod of Bishops of the UGCC. The late Pope expressed his position:

> I share your desire, which is rooted in canonical and conciliar regulations, to have a completed juridical-ecclesiastical structure. I share it in both prayer and sufferings, waiting for the day predestined by the Lord in which I, as successor of the Apostle Peter, can confirm the mature fruit of your ecclesiastical development (in *Blahovisnyk*, L'viv 2004, p. 48).

The project of creating the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Patriarchate provoked a storm of protests. The arguments that were raised by different actors against the Patriarchate of the UGCC can be summarized as follows:

> •It would weaken communion with the Pope and the Catholic Church in general.
>
> •It would create a nationalistic church and preserve 'uniatism', which is condemned as an improper way of unity.
>
> •It would be an obstacle in the ecumenical dialogue among the Christians in Ukraine.
>
> •The creation of the Patriarchate on the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate would ignore the rights of the Moscow Patriarch.

The head of the UGCC, Lubomyr Husar, answered these arguments in his Pastoral Letter of 6 September 2004.[23] In spite of the lack of recognition on the part of Rome, the Patriarchate of the UGCC remains on the agenda of this church and is considered to be a matter of time. The Synod of Bishops of the Kyiv-Halych Metropolitanate told their faithful, the patriarchal status of the church is not only a Decree of the Synod of Bishops but must be also approved by the Holy Father:

> This status is first of all the transfigured life of the People of God who realize their new obligations and responsibilities. In the opinion of some, the present discussion around the Patriarchate of the UGCC is a sign of the Holy Spirit that we must confirm this patriarchate in the life of the whole Church. However, at the same time the life of the Church is God's matter. That is why, despite our reflections and strivings, we have to put our hope in God.[24]

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[23] In *Blahovisnyk*, L'viv 2004: 48-57.

[24] Zvernennia Synodu epyskopiv Kyievo-Halyckoi mytropolii do dukhovenstva, monashestva i virnykh UGKC z pryvodu vizytu do Moskvy kardynala Valtera Caspera. [Address of the Synod of Bishops of the Kyiv-Halych Metropolitanate to the clergy, consecrated persons and laity of UGCC on the occasion of the visit of Cardinal Walter Kasper to Moscow]. In *Blahovisnyk*, L'viv 2004: 101.

Educational and Charitable Institutions of the UGCC

From 1989 to 1992, while many Greek Catholic communities were being registered, priests were lacking. In order to resolve the problem, the hierarchy accepted two solutions. On the one hand, in the early period, candidates for the priesthood studied only briefly, with an emphasis on self-education and liturgical practice, and less emphasis on spiritual formation. On the other hand, many priests of the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church who served in Galicia had a Greek Catholic background and joined the Greek Catholic Church. Because of this complicated situation, members of the clergy in the UGCC have had radically different levels of spiritual formation.[25] Several candidates were also sent to study in seminaries in Rome,[26] but this did not solve the problem. However, with the reopening of the L'viv seminary in Rudno in 1990 and later of the eparchial seminary in Ivano-Frankivsk and the Mukachiv Eparchy's Theodore Romzha Theological Academy in Uzhhorod, as well as the creation of two new eparchial seminaries in Drohobych and Ternopil (Velyka Berezovytsia, Ternopil region), the situation regarding the formation of candidates for the priesthood changed. Two religious orders, the Redemptorists and the Basilians, also founded their own philosophical-theological institutes.

Within the UGCC, many newly created educational institutions offered different degrees of theological education to the laity. When the L'viv Theological Academy (LTA) reopened in 1994[27]; it provided Ukraine's first Catholic theological education for laypeople and religious workers, including women. In 1998 the LTA's bachelor's program in theology received accreditation from the Congregation for Catholic Education. The Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) was based on the LTA and was inaugurated on 29 June 2002. The structure of the UCU includes two faculties (philosophi-

[25] www.ugcc.org.ua/eng/church_in_action/education/ (accessed in August 2007).

[26] In Rome, the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the second half of the twentieth century had three educational institutions, where mostly Ukrainians of the Diaspora studied. The Ukrainian Pontifical Minor Seminary of St Josaphat, founded in 1951 in France, was transferred to Rome in 1958 and functioned until 1996. Several students from independent Ukraine were educated there, also. Now this institution has been renamed the Ukrainian Institute of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Together with the Ukrainian Pontifical College of St Josaphat, it is now in use mostly by graduate students of theology from Ukraine during their studies in different universities in Rome. The Ukrainian Catholic University of Pope St Clement was founded by Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj in 1963, and in 2004 it became a branch of the newly inaugurated Ukrainian Catholic University in L'viv.

[27] The L'viv Theological Academy was founded by Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky (1901–44) in 1928 on the basis of the L'viv seminary. Rev Josyf Slipyj was the first rector of the academy, closed down twice by the Soviet authorities, in 1939 and in April 1945 (see Senycia 1973).

cal-theological and humanities), a graduate program in theology (2001), a Catechetical-Pedagogical Institute (granting master's of theological studies degrees and incorporating an evening theology school), and seven other research institutes.[28] In March 2006 the state accreditation commission accredited the theological faculty. Other religious educational institutions for the laity include the Ivano-Frankivsk Institute of Religious Culture, the Holy Trinity Eparchial Catechetical Institute (Drohobych, L'viv region), the Institute of Spiritual and Religious Education (Zboriv, Ternopil region), the Higher Institute of Religious Culture (a branch of the Catholic University of Lublin), the L'viv Musical-Theological School, the Cantors' School (Chortkiv, Ternopil region), and the Blessed Clement Sheptytsky Lyceum (L'viv). Moreover, Greek Catholics also continue their theological studies at different universities in Poland, Greece, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Austria, the United States, and Canada. The Ukrainian Academic Theological Society (UATS), which has united Ukrainian theologians since 1923, was transferred from Rome to Ukraine in 1998.[29] In August 2005 the first conference of the new generation of young UGCC theologians attracted 300 participants to L'viv,[30] and on 2–4 January 2007 the UATS gathered about 240 participants from Ukraine, Poland, and Germany to the congress 'Eucharistic Communion: The Challenge of Tradition and Modernity'.

Among the other institutions established in Ukraine we will mention Caritas-Ukraine, which was established in 1991 as the official charitable organization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The Centre for the Maltese Cross was registered in L'viv in 1993. The international movement of Faith and Light communities has been in Ukraine since 1992; in 2005, there were fourteen communities in Ukraine: in Kyiv, L'viv, Ternopil, Tiachev, Khust, Kamianets-Podilskiy, and Zhovkva.

Monastic Orders and Congregations

The UGCC has various monastic orders and religious congregations, with nine male and eighteen female monastic orders and congregations. Male religious orders like the Order of Saint Basil the Great (Basilians, OSBM), the Studite Monks, and the eastern branch of the Order of the Most Holy Redeemer (Redemptorists, CSsR) were founded in Ukraine, operated through the underground period, and continued their work after the legaliza-

[28] Among these are the following institutes: Church History, Religion and Society, Marriage and Family Life, Liturgical Studies, Canon Law, Theological Terminology and Translation, and Nonprofit Management. www.ucu.edu.ua/eng/about/history/ (accessed in August 2007).
[29] *Statut Ukrains'koho Bohoslovskoho Naukovoho Tovarystva*. L'viv 1998 // *Archive UBNT*.
[30] http://www.ucu.edu.ua/ukr/current/chronicles/article;1618/ (accessed in August 2007).

tion of the UGCC. After the independence of Ukraine in 1990, newer male religious institutions established communities in Ukraine, such as, the Congregation of the Salesian Fathers of St John Bosco (Salesians), the Monastery of St Theodore Studite (Studion), Miles Jesu ('Soldiers of Jesus'), the Congregation of the Incarnate Word, the Missionary Society of St Andrew the Apostle, and the Order of Friars Minor.

To the traditional female religious communities of the UGCC belong the Sisters of the Order of Saint Basil the Great (OSBM); the Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate (SSMI); the Sisters of St Joseph, the Spouse of the Virgin Mary (Josephites); the Myrrh-bearing Sisters under the Protection of St Mary Magdalene; the Sisters of the Holy Family; the Sisters of the Priest and Martyr St Josaphat Kuntsevych (Josaphat Sisters); and the Studite Sisters. Two female congregations that continue their work today were founded in the underground church: the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary of Fatima (1945) and the Sisters of the Most Holy Eucharist (1957). The Eastern branch of the Congregation of the Sisters of Mercy of St Vincent de Paul (Vincentians) has worked in Ukraine since 1926. New female congregations that started to work in the UGCC since 1991 include the Sisters Catechists of Saint Anne (founded in Brazil among the Ukrainian diaspora); Daughters of Mary, Help of Christians (Salesian Sisters); Missionary Sisters of the Most Holy Redeemer; and the quite small communities of Miles Jesu ('Soldiers of Jesus'); Sisters of the Order of the Virgin Mary, Missionary of Love; a society of common religious life, the Daughters of the Mother of God of Perpetual Help, Monastery of the Entrance to the Temple; Missionaries of the Mercy of Jesus and Mary; and Sisters of the Incarnate Word.[31]

In September 2004, representatives of all religious orders and congregations of the UGCC for the first time gathered for their Conference, 'The Transfiguration in the Lord'. This sobor should last for six years and discuss in three sessions the themes, 'Monastic Identity in Vocation and Ministry in the UGCC', 'Vocation and Formation', and 'Ministry and Mission'. Two sessions of the sobor took place in September 2004 and 2006, respectively; the last one is planned for September 2008 (Kozhukh 2004; *Patriyarchkhat* 2006).

As of 2006, the Greek Catholics in Ukraine (including the Mukachiv Eparchy) have 19 hierarchs (including three emeriti), 2,136 priests, 94

[31] www.ugcc.org.ua/ukr/church_in_action/ugcc_chyny/ (accessed August 2007).

monasteries with 1,216 religious, 15 missions, 3,438 communities in 24 regions and the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol[32] and about 5 million faithful.[33]

Conclusion

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine went through a wide range of changes from 1989 to 2006. It started with the process of legalization of the UGCC and continued with the quite successful rebuilding of its institutional ecclesiastical and monastic structures, the partial return of church property nationalized by the Soviet state, the renewal and foundation of theological schools and seminaries, charitable and other Christian organizations, newspapers, journals, and so on. Also, much has been done during this period in rethinking its ecclesiastical identity. The hierarchy proposed a new direction for the church to return to the roots of the Kyivan tradition; also, the movement for the recognition of the patriarchal status of the UGCC received new strength and support among its hierarchy and the faithful in Ukraine. The numerous vocations to the priesthood and consecrated life, the formation of the new generation of theologians and active laypeople, extension of the ministry to the Greek Catholic faithful on the whole territory of Ukraine and beyond, and the beatification of the twentieth-century martyrs opened new perspectives for the future of the UGCC.

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[32] 'Relihiini organizacii v Ukraini stanom na 1.01.2006 roku. Statystychni dani Derzhavnoho Departamentu u spravakh religii', in: http://www.risu.org.ua/text/ukr_2006 (accessed August 2007).

[33] The official site of the UGCC gives a number of faithful over 5.5 million. See: www.ugcc.org.ua/ukr/church_in_action/structure/ (accessed August 2007).

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Annex 1. Official statistical data regarding the UGCC in Ukraine (including the Mukachiv Eparchy)

Year	Bishops	Priests	Parishes and communities	Monasteries, convents, and religious houses (Missions)	Monastics and consecrated persons	Faithful
1938*	9	2,495	2,387	152	1,500	circa 3.5–4 million
1950	***UGCC***	***officially***	***liquidated***	***in the***	***Soviet***	***Union***
1988	9 (not registered)	circa 260[a]	NA	NA	NA	NA
1990	9	NA	298˜	NA	NA	NA
1998*	13	2,052	3151	61	1,292	NA
2006[n]	18	2,136	3,438	94 (15)	1,216	circa 4–5 million

* Bociurkiw 1996: 28–30. The statistical data for the UGCC for 1944–46 are available mostly from Soviet state archival sources and are not very reliable. Thus, we are omitting these years from the table.

[a] Stockyi 1999: 88 (Table 15).

° NA = not available, because of a lack of official sources.

˜ *Liudyna i svit* 12 (Kyiv 1990): 25.

* *Liudyna i svit* 1 (Kyiv 1998): 24–27.

[n] *Relihiini organizacii v Ukraini (stanom na 1 sichnia 2006 r.)* http://www.risu.org.ua/ukr/resourses/statistics/ukr2006/ (accessed August 2007).

Chapter 3.6
North America

Peter Galadza

'In-between' characterizes the Greek Catholic Churches of North America[1] in far more ways than it does those of Eastern Europe.[2] A host of distinctive cultural, demographic, religious, and social factors – as would be expected – dramatically encroach on church life in North America.[3] After describing and analyzing the situation of the Ukrainian, Byzantine-Ruthenian,[4] Slovak, Hungarian, and Romanian Greek Catholic communities in the United States and Canada, we shall turn to a discussion of their relations with their counterparts in Eastern Europe.

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[1] In North America, there are, of course, other Greek Catholic Churches besides those that trace their roots to Eastern Europe, e.g. the Melkites. The focus of this volume precludes our treating them, however.

[2] In this chapter, as throughout the present volume, 'Eastern Europe' includes Ukraine, notwithstanding the contrary tendency, still widespread, to distinguish between 'Eastern Europe' and 'the former USSR'.

[3] An in-depth, scholarly study of all of the Greek Catholic Churches in North America has yet to be written. The following articles and chapters of books provide introductions to some of the individual communities, although in the case of the first two books, by Warzeski (1971) and Procko (1982), a certain tendentiousness and filiopiety are noticeable: Markus 1979; Marunchak 1982: 585–89; Magocsi 1999. More popular, although very serviceable, introductions are Pekar 1974 and Petras 1987. See also the articles dealing with the Greek Catholics in the *Acta* of the Encounter of the Eastern Catholic Churches of the Americas and Oceania, Boston. November, 1999.

[4] Technically, the church described here as the 'Byzantine-Ruthenian' is officially the Byzantine Catholic Church of the Pittsburgh Metropolitan Province. This reflects the fact that it includes Hungarian and Croatian Greek Catholic parishes. Nonetheless, because 'Byzantine Catholic' is a designation that is frequently used for *all* Greek Catholic Churches, I will use the technically less correct, although generally less confusing 'Byzantine-Ruthenian' or simply 'Ruthenian', especially as the Hungarian and Croatian parishes make up only about one-tenth of the total of this jurisdiction's communities.

Churches in Decline

Without exception, the Greek Catholic Churches of North America are in decline – in some instances, dramatic decline. The statistics provided in Table 1 indicate this only partially; were we to include numbers for the immediate post-Second World War period (when recorded membership peaked) one would see that these churches have lost at least three-quarters of their faithful in less than sixty years. Among the reasons are the following, although not all of them apply to all of the individual churches:

1. The general decline of 'main line' religion in North America. All churches, whether Protestant, Anglican (Episcopalian), or Catholic[5] that have 'made their peace' with modern secularism (understood theologico-spiritually, not institutionally[6]) are waning. Many analysts believe this is because they have come to be viewed as redundant.[7] The promotion of values and convictions barely distinguishable from those dominant in society at large not infrequently generates indifference towards the 'duplicate' body. Now, while the attitudes and beliefs of Greek Catholics in North America often differ from their Western Christian or non-religious neighbors, those Greek Catholics who have embraced secularity through the acceptance of an ethnocentric, or ethnoexclusivist, approach to religion (a very comprehensive form of secularization) often see their descendants leave the Greek Catholic community. These will usually either join another church perceived as primarily *religious/spiritual* in orientation (which thus takes their pastoral needs seriously) or leave the Greek Catholic Church while retaining their ties with ethnic organizations. Actually, since the 1980s a third option has emerged: occasionally ethnically conscious 'cradle Greek Catholics' maintain an affiliation with ethnic organizations while nonetheless switching to Roman Catholic (or other) parishes. Before the 1970s, this would have been almost unimaginable. A strong attachment to Ukrainianism, for example, tended to require a nominal connection to an Eastern Church (although Canada, in particular Western Canada, did have its Ukrainian communist labor temples). All of this raises the question of the sense of community that

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[5] Roman Catholicism in North America has managed to maintain its numbers only because of Hispanic immigration. Otherwise, this church would also be in statistical decline.

[6] The former is a matter of accepting the priorities, values, behaviors, etc. of a non-religious environment as the church's own, or at least allowing these to inordinately influence the church, while the latter is simply the acceptance of a church's disestablishment, a phenomenon that has usually strengthened churches. These tend to flourish when required to engage people through their own efforts rather than relying on a secular government's support or pressure.

[7] For a discussion of this, see Johnson, Hoge and Luidens (eds.) 1993. For a discussion of the 'antidote' to this phenomenon see Nichols 1999.

prevails among North American Greek Catholics. Communitarian bonding is sometimes stronger at the ethnic level than at the religious level. Thus, many Greek Catholics with strong ethno-national bonds feel challenged by efforts to universalize their church for the simple reason that a broader *religious* grounding for their sense of community has yet to be forged.

2. Absence of critical mass. Although the preceding factor does not apply to all Greek Catholic communities in North America, the geographic dispersal of membership does. The ethnoreligious enclaves of the past are rare. Thus, if Greek Catholics are required to drive past thirty or forty other houses of worship on their way to a Greek Catholic church, there will frequently come a point – especially if the latter is located in a crime-ridden 'old immigrant' neighborhood – when the Greek Catholics either stop making the trek, or simply join a parish (usually Roman Catholic) closer to where they live. The example of youth groups is similar; if parish youth must travel thirty to one hundred miles to come together for joint activities, the chances of maintaining ties to such groups decline significantly with each passing year.

3. Lack of leadership. The 'brain drain' that characterized some Greek Catholic communities in their ancestral homelands[8] has left its mark on their counterparts in the 'new world'. Nevertheless, in North America there remains an additional factor influencing the absence of strong leadership: the continued prominence of the apostolic nuncios (Vatican ambassadors) in vetting candidates for the episcopacy.[9] Events of the past century suggest that Vatican authorities have felt little compulsion to choose visionary leaders for the Greek Catholic eparchies in the Western world, for a number of reasons. First, Greek Catholics themselves have rarely agitated for such leadership; second, their relatively insignificant numbers[10] do not warrant a greater interest on the part of Roman authorities. Third, the Greek Catholic tradition of optional celibacy makes Eastern Catholicism extremely inconvenient for Rome, especially as the latter attempts to stave off calls for an end to compulsory celibacy for the clergy of the Roman Rite. Finally, 'global ecumenism', or more specifically, the desire for rapprochement with

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[8] Granted, Habsburg Enlightenment policies markedly raised the standards of education for 'Uniate' clergy, but otherwise Greek Catholics can hardly lay claim to significant intellectual traditions.

[9] As a result of changes mandated by post-Vatican II ecclesiology in Ukraine and Romania, where Major Archeparchies have been established, the Eastern Catholic Synods there have a prominent role in the selection of bishops for the 'home territories' (although the Eparch of Uzhhorod is not part of Ukraine's Synod, reporting instead directly to Rome). In North America, however, the nuncios' opinion is almost decisive.

[10] Many Roman Catholic *parishes* are larger than some North American Greek Catholic *eparchies.*

the Orthodox Churches of Greece, Russia, Serbia, and so on, who have viewed the very existence of Greek Catholic Churches as one of the main stumbling blocks to rapprochement, makes the enfeeblement of the Greek Catholics a 'permissible' goal. A significant exception to this is in territories where the Greek Catholics represent the face of Catholicism to society at large. Thus, in Eastern Europe, and Ukraine in particular, it is in the Vatican's interest to have leaders who will not embarrass Rome[11] and who in any case are able to lead large bodies of faithful, especially as Rome may at times want to lead them in a very particular direction.

4. Neglect of education. The lack of strong leadership has affected theological education. The Greek Catholic hierarchies of North America have been unable to cooperate to create a strong, united theologate at a respected university in order to facilitate theological reflection that would combine the best in contemporary cultural analysis with the best in modern Eastern Christian thought. Consequently, the handful of seminarians enrolled in degree programs generally do not receive training that would equip them to translate the genius of Eastern spirituality and practice into North American life. Of course, this is a daunting task: in North America the Eastern tradition is countercultural. Special creativity and talent are required to communicate it in a milieu that had no part in generating its genius. However, two initiatives have been undertaken that partially respond to this challenge – although they remain uncoordinated with other Greek Catholic jurisdictions:

a) In Canada, the Sheptytsky Institute of Eastern Christian Studies, an academic unit of the Faculty of Theology at Saint Paul University in Ottawa, offers degrees from the bachelor's to the doctoral level. Thoroughly ecumenical (with several Orthodox as regular instructors), it benefits from the resources of the largest religious library in all of Canada. At the undergraduate level, the core of students is Ukrainian Catholic seminarians, but the PhD program has attracted students from other churches.

b) In the United States, the Byzantine Catholic Seminary of Sts Cyril and Methodius in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania has opened its doors to non-seminarians, and has affiliated itself with Duquesne University.

In contrast, St Josaphat's Seminary in Washington, D.C. and St Basil's College in Stamford, Connecticut, both Ukrainian Catholic institutions, have

[11] In Ukraine, for example, after a period of malaise under the leadership of Cardinal Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky (in Ukraine 1991–2000), Rome intervened directly in 2001 to ensure that a more competent primate, Lubomyr Husar, be elected by the Synod. Also, for the See of Uzhhorod, Rome recently went outside the Greek Catholic community to find the most suitable candidate for the episcopate, Milan Sasik, a Roman-Rite Jesuit from Slovakia.

retained older, closed models of education and do not admit lay students. Moreover, seminarians in both schools receive an essentially Roman Catholic education, although with an Eastern patina.[12] Incidentally, Romanian, Slovak, and Hungarian Greek Catholics have no academic institutions of their own, and, in fact, rarely have seminarians at all. Here it should also be noted that the Center for Eastern Christian Studies at the University of Scranton recently closed due to a lack of students. The center, which had a particularly close relationship with the Byzantine-Ruthenians, was the continuation of the John XXIII Center, located on the campus of Fordham University from the 1960s to the early 1980s. It had inherited the John XXIII Center's excellent library (now transferred to Košice, Slovakia) as well as the journal *Diakonia,* now no longer published. The University of Scranton's Center for Eastern Christian Studies had also constructed a beautiful wooden church, which still stands.

5. Relative indifference towards immigrants. The general decline of the Greek Catholic Churches in North America has prevented them from consistently engaging even their most natural prospective members, recent Eastern European immigrants. With the exception of a few noteworthy communities, until approximately the year 2000 these newcomers were significantly underrepresented. They were generally not sought out by the clergy and in some cases were even resented as parvenus, 'unwilling to contribute financially to parish upkeep'.[13] However, as noted previously, since 2000 this has begun to change, although only at those Greek Catholic parishes where the ancestral language is still used for worship. Sociology – rather than pastoral outreach by the clergy – helps explain the shift: with the immigrants becoming financially more secure, and thus not having to work on Sundays, the natural dynamics of nostalgia draws them to reminders of home. Unlike many of their post-Second World War counterparts, however, these postsocialist émigrés are rarely nationalists. Consequently, once they have acclimated, they are far more likely to welcome the use of English in the liturgy, not to mention other adaptations needed to keep their religious communities vibrant.

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[12] Such minimalism is contrary to the prescriptions of Vatican II, which mandate that Eastern Catholics be distinct not only in their liturgical rites, but also in their theology, spirituality, and canonical traditions. The pertinent decrees are *Lumen gentium,* par. 23, *Unitatis redintegratio,* par. 17, and *Orientalium ecclesiarum,* par. 5.

[13] Immigrants from socialist countries naturally were unaccustomed to supporting such institutions financially. In addition, undocumented immigrants within this group would tend to fear direct contact, especially documentable contact, with North American organizations.

A Brief Analysis of the Statistics

Before proceeding to a discussion of relations between North American Greek Catholics and their counterparts in Eastern Europe, a brief analysis of the statistical table below is called for. This should help amplify some of the interpretations proffered above.

To begin with, the dramatic decline in numbers evident in certain eparchies (Stamford, Passaic, Toronto, and Sts Cyril and Methodius, Toronto) is deceptive: the decline has been occurring far more gradually. How, then, is one to explain the statistics? Until recently, eparchies were not 'penalized' for inflating their numbers. However, national Episcopal Conferences have begun assessing contributions to their agencies on a per capita basis. Thus, bishops now have a financial incentive not to present inflated numbers.

The dramatic decline in other eparchies, however, is consistent with the points made previously about the challenges of demographic dispersion. Parishes in the Chicago and Van Nuys eparchies, for example, are frequently hundreds, if not thousands, of miles apart.

As for the Eparchy of Saskatoon, the dramatic decline there is reflective of the 'flight from the farms' taking place in parts of the Canadian prairies. British Columbia, among other provinces, has benefited from the migration, which explains the stability in numbers for the New Westminster Eparchy.

If we compare the statistics for two 'sister eparchies', the Byzantine-Ruthenian and Ukrainian of Parma, Ohio, we note that the ethnic orientation of the Ukrainian eparchy has apparently enabled it to draw immigrants and thereby maintain its numbers, while the Byzantine-Ruthenian eparchy has lost almost half of its faithful since 1990. This means that the latter's consistent efforts to attract 'non-ethnic' Americans by comprehensively using English, has not produced the expected results. This raises the question of other handicaps (besides language) to the universalization of Eastern Catholicism. As noted above, promoting a countercultural tradition requires extra effort. Of course, the spate of clergy scandals in the Parma Ruthenian eparchy may also have influenced the decline,[14] although Rome has acted to improve the situation by appointing John Kudrick, one of the few visionary Greek Catholic hierarchs in North America, as bishop for the eparchy.

Here we should also note that Greek Catholic monastic communities for men exist in Mundare, Alberta and Glen Cove, New York; and for women, in Uniontown and Fox Chase, Pennsylvania and Sloatsburg, New York. None of these, however, has managed to avoid the effects of the decline described previously. In addition, several small monastic communi-

[14] Other eparchies, however, have not been entirely free of such scandals.

ties have formed in the past several decades. These have attempted a return to authentic Eastern monasticism, but have had erratic histories. In any case, their influence on their respective churches has been negligible.

Relations with Eastern Europe

Our analysis of relations between North American and Eastern European Greek Catholics begins with the question of the clergy. The ethnic, indeed sometimes ethnocentric, orientation of Ukrainian Greek Catholic eparchies in North America means that they have turned to Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia to recruit priests during the present clergy shortage. The following is a list of the Ukrainian eparchies and their approximate proportion of recent-immigrant clergy (that is, post-1990 immigrants):

> Philadelphia – one-third; Stamford – two-thirds; Chicago – one-third; Parma – one-fifth; Winnipeg – one-sixth; Toronto – one-third; Edmonton – one-fourth; Saskatoon – one- third; and New Westminster – one-half.

These are dramatically higher proportions than in the Byzantine-Ruthenian eparchies, which have only a few such immigrant priests throughout all of North America. The ethnic factor mentioned above explains part of this difference: At the present time, almost all Ukrainian Catholic parishes in North America where more than one service is conducted on Sundays retain at least one Divine Liturgy in Ukrainian or Church Slavonic. Where only one service is held, at least some parts are almost always sung or read in Ukrainian or Church Slavonic. In addition, between one-quarter and one-third of all Ukrainian Catholic parishes in North America still follow the Julian calendar. Also, most of the clergy in Eastern Europe are married, and the Byzantine-Ruthenians have been very reluctant to import married priests owing to the way in which the celibacy crisis of the 1930s traumatized their jurisdiction.[15] As hinted above, the acculturation to American life (or conversely 'de-ethnicization') of the Byzantine-Ruthenian Church in the United States manifests itself most conspicuously in the ubiquitous use of English – and even some Spanish – in worship.[16] The Byzantine-Ruthenians were, in fact, pioneers in the use of English and have already published their second

[15] The Vatican decree, *Cum data fuerit* of 1929, which banned both the ordination of married men to the priesthood and the acceptance of married priests from overseas in the Eastern Rite in North America, led to a decade of volatile litigation ending in the creation of a separate Orthodox jurisdiction, the Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Diocese of Johnstown, Pennsylvania. For an engaging history of this period from an Orthodox perspective see Barriger 1985.

[16] The use of some Spanish is particularly evident in several of the Byzantine-Ruthenian parishes of Southern California and adjacent states.

official, revised translation of the Divine Liturgy in forty years. (They also pioneered the publication in English of a full set of catechetical materials for youth and adults, the 'God with Us' series.) Facility with Rusyn, Hungarian, Slovak, or Croatian is not a requirement for ministry in the Byzantine-Ruthenian Metropolia. Estimates are that only about 10 per cent of the clergy, usually older priests, are able to speak one of these languages. Sts Cyril and Methodius Seminary no longer celebrates any services in Church Slavonic or Hungarian,[17] nor does it provide instruction in any of the 'ancestral languages', although seminarians are free to enroll in optional language courses at the University of Pittsburgh. This openness to English means that the Byzantine Catholic Metropolia has been able to turn to a large pool of biritual Roman Catholic priests to help service its parishes. Benedictines, Franciscans, Jesuits, and some Roman-Rite diocesan clergy learn the rudiments of the Byzantine Rite and alleviate the clergy shortage among the Byzantine Ruthenians in the same way that married priests from Eastern Europe do so in Ukrainian Catholic eparchies. Both solutions have their shortcomings; neither of the two groups of clergy has an organic relationship to their respective communities. This, of course, raises the question of the ordination of native-born North American married men to the priesthood. Roman Catholic pressure to restrict the practice continues, especially in the United States. Only a small handful of married candidates has been ordained, and this only after Rome vetted each one of them. Canadian Roman Catholic authorities, on the other hand, have been far more tolerant of a married clergy. Nevertheless, as of 2006, the Ukrainian Catholic seminary in Ottawa has yet to develop a comprehensive program to prepare married men – and their wives – for such ministry.

Up to this point, only scant attention has been devoted to the Slovak and Hungarian, Greek Catholic Churches of North America. This is emblematic of their even greater decline. The Romanians, in spite of their small numbers, have managed to hold their own.

In the United States, Greek Catholics who claim Slovak heritage are part of the Byzantine-Ruthenian Church. In Canada, uranium-mining magnate Steven Roman was able to convince the Vatican in 1980 to create a separate eparchy for Slovak Greek Catholics, who until then had belonged to the Eparchy of Toronto. The eparchy consists of six parishes located between Windsor, Ontario and Montreal, Quebec. In 1984, John Paul II blessed the foundation of what would eventually become one of the more impressive Greek Catholic edifices in the world, Holy Transfiguration Slovak Cathedral. However, ownership of the property and building remained in the hands of

[17] Ukrainian Catholic seminaries generally follow the practice of alternating weekly between English and Ukrainian.

the Roman family, and when Mr Roman died in 1988 his family was willing neither to see the completion of the cathedral's interior nor to transfer ownership of the building to the Slovak Eparchy. Consequently, in October 2006 the bishop revoked the status of the building as a cathedral, and the cathedral parish moved back to its old site in downtown Toronto, although the bishop left open the possibility of further negotiations. The former cathedral parish, located in Markham, outside Toronto, was the only noteworthy community in the Slovak eparchy, although it never drew substantial numbers owing to its location in an area (one of Steven Roman's estates) where few parishioners lived.

Hungarian Greek Catholic parishes in the United States today are essentially indistinguishable from other communities within the Byzantine Catholic Metropolia, while in Canada, the five or six parishes that still use some Hungarian for worship and preaching are all part of the Ukrainian Catholic Eparchy of Toronto.

As regards the Romanian Greek Catholics, the Eparchy of Canton numbers fourteen parishes dispersed in nine states. Of the twelve priests associated with the eparchy, almost half are from Romania.

Before concluding, a note on financial support for Greek Catholics in Eastern Europe is necessary. Here one notes a fascinating difference between Ukrainians and Ruthenians. Whereas the new Greek Catholic seminary in Uzhhorod was built primarily with contributions from the Byzantine Ruthenians of the United States, the new Ukrainian Catholic seminary and university in L'viv have come into existence because of funding from German, Belgian, American, and other Western Roman Catholic agencies. Two important Catholic aid organizations, Renovabis, and Church in Need, and national Catholic Episcopal Conferences have been prominent in this regard. In part, this can be explained by the fact that North American Ukrainians, being more nationalistic, have channeled most of their contributions into secular pan-Ukrainian causes, leaving Greek Catholic authorities in Galicia to seek other sources of funding for specifically religious projects.

Of course, hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals in North America have contributed to the construction or renovation of churches throughout the Greek Catholic territories of Eastern Europe, but no statistics are available on the amounts and exact sites where such funding has been distributed. Considering that postsocialist societies remain inhospitable to financial transparency, such statistics are unlikely to be compiled.

In conclusion, one should note that, in theory, a religious tradition possessing aesthetic worship and a holistic and mystical spirituality should be thriving in a milieu where 'New Age' trends have proven how attractive such characteristics can be. And the ability – at least in principle – to ordain

married candidates to the priesthood should also help Greek Catholics to flourish, or at least maintain a larger pool of candidates to choose from. However, based on observations from the first part of this chapter, little of this potential will be realized – except in discrete communities where bold, intelligent, and holy leaders have managed to emerge or retain their positions at the helm.

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Table 1: Membership Statistics

Ukrainian Catholic Church in the United States

Jurisdiction and Membership	1990	2000	2006
Archeparchy of Philadelphia, PA	77,571	69,088	65,000
Eparchy of Saint Josaphat, Parma, OH	11,964	11,522	11,032
Eparchy of Saint Nicholas, Chicago, IL	28,000	9,500	10,000
Eparchy of Stamford, CT	40,998	16,684	16,600

Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada

Jurisdiction and Membership	1990	2000	2006
Archeparchy of Winnipeg, MAN	49,350	45,000	29,740
Eparchy of Edmonton, AL	40,907	26,250	28,750
Eparchy of New Westminster, BC	7,700	4,000	7,835
Eparchy of Saskatoon, SK	24,000	12, 200	8,607
Eparchy of Toronto, ON	80,000	83,200	10,866

The Ruthenian Byzantine Catholic Church

Jurisdiction and Membership	1990	2000	2006
Archeparchy of Pittsburgh, PA	143,784	75,261	59,946
Eparchy of Parma, OH	22,202	12,680	12,402
Eparchy of Passaic, NJ	85,050	51,771	23,914
Eparchy of Van Nuys, CA	17,125	3,108	3,026

The Romanian Greek Catholic Church in the United States

Jurisdiction and Membership	1990	2000	2006
Eparchy of Saint George's, Canton, OH	5,000	5,300	5,000

The Slovak Byzantine Catholic Church in Canada

Jurisdiction and Membership	1990	2000	2006
Eparchy of Sts Cyril and Methodius, Toronto	30,000	20,000	2,500

Source: *Annuario Pontificio,* compiled by Ronald G. Roberson, CSP, available at http://www.cnewa.org.

PART TWO

IN SEARCH OF TRADITION: INTERNAL PROCESSES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Chapter 4

Continuities and Ruptures of a Religious Tradition: Making 'Orthodoxy' in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church

Vlad Naumescu

In this chapter I engage with the institutionalization of the post-1989 Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), in connection with the postsocialist transformations that shaped the 'making of churches' in (western) Ukraine. I focus on a particular 'community of practice', the traditionalist movement in the UGCC, which retains a nostalgia for the church's underground times. Marginalized by the church, this group has looked for alternative spaces in which religious practice might preserve the mode of religiosity specific to the underground period. Their story illustrates the attempt of a religious institution emerging in the postsocialist religious sphere to consolidate its structure by redefining the orthodoxy of the local religious tradition.

Historically, two great religious traditions, Eastern and Western Christianity, intersected in western Ukraine and equally shaped the local tradition. To describe the specific Ukrainian religious tradition, some authors portrayed it as a 'religion of the margins' (*une religion des confins*), a space of ambiguity in between the Latin Catholic and the Slavic Orthodox worlds (Wilson 2000; Boyko 2004). Within this tradition, Greek Catholics stand apart as a perfect illustration of the in-betweenness characteristic to this local variant of Eastern Christianity. During its existence, the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church was subject to incessant fluctuations and internal transformations between two poles of attraction: the Latin and Byzantine worlds. Several authors consider that the contradictory attraction to both East and West, the 'orientation problem' of the UGCC, is the permanent dilemma that has pervaded the church's history (Hann 2003; Boyko and Rousselet 2004; Yurash 2005). By maintaining a slight distance from the Roman Catholic Church in order to preserve their distinctiveness, and by retaining their unique identity vis-à-vis Orthodoxy, Greek Catholics have always stressed the differences between the two great traditions while equally highlighting their unifying characteristics. Throughout the UGCC's history, one or the

other of these influences has predominated in the church, but at least since Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi[1] in the early twentieth century, the Uniate Church has come to see itself as a 'a bridge to unity', a bridge between East and West.

An enormously important factor in shaping present-day Greek Catholicism is the socialist experience of most Greek Catholic Churches in Eastern Europe. Following the banning and repression of the Greek Catholic Church by Soviet authorities, an 'underground' or 'catacomb church' formed in Ukraine after 1945.[2] Throughout the Soviet period, the domestication of religion (Dragadze 1993) led to the modification of lifecycle and sacramental rituals undertaken by lay people. Believers and the lower clergy took over the 'relationship with the divine' from traditional institutions (churches) and tailored it to local circumstances and their spiritual needs. The survival of a Ukrainian religious tradition relied on lay people who, freed (and obliged) to improvise in order to survive, opted for 'practical adaptability' (Shlikhta 2004) rather than remaining faithful to 'the orthodoxy' of their church.

With the revival of religious activism in the 1980s, the UGCC emerged from a provisional hierarchy that had developed in the underground, helped by a strong church in the Ukrainian Diaspora, which had grown to be large and extremely influential.[3] Greek Catholic communities grew fast in western Ukraine, owing to the favourable attitude of local authorities and leaders of the nationalist movement (*Rukh*) towards its underground leaders. Beyond the level of religious politics, new churches appeared through the reorganization of parishes and local communities and with very little top-down control by religious authorities. Individual and collective choices about which church to attend, which Orthodox congregation to join, or whether or not to become Greek Catholic depended from case to case and on various reasons.[4] The grassroots dynamics insured the forma-

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[1] Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, the most celebrated figure of twentieth-century UGCC, led the church from 1901 to 1944. He regarded his own church as a model for the attainment of this church unity, even if later in life he came to see that a different approach, an ecumenical movement, would have a greater chance of success (Husar 1989).

[2] Historical works on religion under socialism mention the experience of the Greek Catholic community during Soviet times (Fletcher 1981; Ramet 1987; Markus 1989). Since then, other works concerning the clandestine survival of Greek Catholic communities and the case of the 'underground Church' have become available (Bociurkiw 1993, 1996; Keleher 1993; Shlikhta 2003/4).

[3] The revival of UGCC is discussed in details by Horiacha and Hurkina (this volume) but also Bociurkiw 1995; Plokhy 1995.

[4] There is indeed no visible pattern, though some general tendencies at the level of decanates [*blahocenia*] could be determined (Yurash 2005). This process led to the fragmentation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy: the formation of three Orthodox Churches claiming national recognition alongside the UGCC (Markus 1995; Plokhy 2002; Krindatch 2003).

tion of an extremely heterogeneous UGCC, which made great efforts to find an 'identity' shared by all its members. In this chapter, when addressing the question of church institutionalization, I refer mostly to the search for a 'common identity' expressed in the redefinition of 'tradition' rather than to the structural processes that recreated the church as a religious institution. However, as we shall see here, the two processes are strongly interconnected.

Anthropologists exploring the dynamics of a religious tradition have moved away from two-tiered models such as Robert Redfield's 'great and little traditions' (in Badone 1990). Yet they have maintained the differentiation between what are seen as two separate but interacting spheres of religious life: 'religion as practiced', expressed in the variety of contextualized, local or 'little' traditions, and 'religion as prescribed', or the doctrinal religion created and reproduced by elites through theological discourses (Christian 1989; Badone 1990; Stewart 1991). The religious dynamics found in such models follow a top-down diffusionist pattern as the 'great tradition' induces change, while 'religion as practiced' or the 'little tradition' is usually the 'great tradition' rooted in a particular place and time and remaining in spite of the 'great' tradition's own changes (Stewart 1991: 11).

Such an approach might not be relevant in the case of Eastern Christianity (in spite of Stewart's attempt to use it for Greek Orthodoxy) which stands out among other major Christian traditions because of its variety of local traditions and decentralized authority.[5] Religious authority based on revelation rather than on authoritative interpretation permitted the development of various indigenous traditions with individually authentic expressions of the same belief, as was the case in western Ukraine. The blurred distinction between practical and doctrinal religion allowed for rather facile exchanges between popular practice and beliefs and church doctrine. The naturalness of religious evolution seems to be based on the ways in which popular exegesis and practice shape theological knowledge. Hence, the body of practices and beliefs that forms the local religious tradition developed in a process of local elaboration by creatively synthesizing multiple influences and historical strata.

My own approach follows the anthropological literature that engages with processes of religious transmission in order to account for cultural transformation. I intend to show how the local variant of Eastern Christianity represents a 'tradition in the making' in the sense of Fredrik Barth's 'cos-

[5] 'In the Orthodox tradition, popular and official religion are barely separable. There is in fact an emphasis on popular faith, as authority in the Church largely depends on it. Sainthood, for instance, emerges popularly first and is institutionally confirmed by the Church afterwards' (Kokosalakis 1995: 443).

mologies in the making' (Barth 1987). I turn towards its mechanisms of transmission, reproduction, and change rather than institutions and collective representations. In order to do so I engage with a theoretical approach that considers the cognitive mechanisms behind social processes: the modes of religiosity theory (Whitehouse 2000). Based on a differentiation in memory retention between semantic and episodic memory, the theory proposes two 'modes of religiosity' that ideally can account for the evolution of any religious tradition. Whitehouse's working hypothesis is that the form in which religious experiences are stored in individual memory correlated to 'ritual frequency' determines two different sets of psychological and sociopolitical features structured around the two modes: imagistic and doctrinal (Whitehouse 2000). The doctrinal mode is based on verbalized, textual doctrine; frequent ritual performance; and routinized, standardized ritual forms performed by large-scale, centralized, hierarchical communities with diffuse membership. In contrast, the 'imagistic' involves non-verbal, highly emotional rituals that are rarely performed within small-scale, innovative, difficult to spread, and intensively cohesive communities.

The modes of religiosity theory proposes that the evolution of any religious tradition can be understood through the interaction of the two modes; the most common case is a mainstream doctrinal religion (such as Catholicism), which because of routine and boredom triggers an interest in imagistic practices from some of its members (such as Catholic charismatic movements).[6] Elsewhere (Naumescu 2007), I argue that Eastern Christianity illustrates the 'equilibrium' state between the two modes of religiosity – the religious tradition, which although doctrinal in essence, manages to draw on imagistic practices to renew its message and keep people engaged. The basis of religious knowledge is kept in written standardized form and a certain degree of uniformity in practice and beliefs bond together the imagined community of Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the varieties of religious expressions within Eastern Christianity are the result of the interaction of different modalities of religious transmission.[7] Imagistic and doctrinal rituals are acting within the religious tradition in both directions: to preserve certain continuity of practice and belief and to accommodate change and adjust the religious message accordingly. In simpler words, 'doctrinal' assures the reproduction of the tradition while 'imagistic' channels innovation and change. Yet, in certain moments, one can distinguish a particular trend that

[6] Several scenarios of the modes interaction are possible and Whitehouse discuses some in his work (Whitehouse 2004: 157–163) while Ted Vial offers others (in Whitehouse and Martin 2004: 155).

[7] Iconography is one example of the particularities that set apart the modalities of religious transmission in Orthodoxy.

seems to favour one mode of religiosity over the other. The proliferation of imagistic practices seems to characterize the underground whereas a strong tendency towards doctrinal accompanies the postsocialist institutionalization of churches. Since the early 1990s, conflicts over what constituted the distinctiveness of the local religious tradition emerged frequently among the Ukrainian churches, particularly in western Ukraine. One of this struggle's high points was the case of 'traditionalists', a small group of Greek Catholics nostalgic for the underground years. Their case is particularly interesting because it illustrates the shift from the imagistic towards the doctrinal in the UGCC and the role of the underground church in shaping the present tradition.

The Life of a Splinter Group: 'Tradition as a Stumbling Block'[8]

In February 2003, a student at Ukrainian Catholic University published an article in *Patriyarkhat*, the official journal of the UGCC, reporting on the traditionalist movement within the church. The lengthy article describes a group of Greek Catholics who call themselves 'traditionalist' (*tradytionalisty*), and the author names the parishes and priests belonging to this group from every eparchy in western Ukraine. He presents the traditionalists as a well-organized movement, with a charismatic leader, and as having successfully established a parallel structure to that of the official church. Moreover, throughout the text, the author makes several connections between Ukrainian traditionalists and the Lefebvrist movement in the Roman Catholic Church.[9] The existence of two influences in the church tradition: 'pro-West and pro-East' (*prozakhidnyi i proskhidyi*) is singled out as being the primary cause of the emergence of traditionalists followed by the general trend of still practicing underground Greek Catholics. Underground Greek Catholics believed that suffering was a unique marker of faith under the old regime and that an appreciation of this suffering is indispensable to the proper understanding of the local tradition. Amongst the various names and places of importance

[8] 'Traditsiia yak kamin' spotykannia' (Tradition as a stumbling block) by Vlodko Hitsiak, Patriyarkhat no.1, January-February 2003: 14–16.

[9] The Lefebvrist movement took its name from Marcel Lefebvre, a French bishop who refused to accept some of the decisions of the Second Vatican Council and the revision of the Catholic mass. This anti-modernist movement belongs to the larger trend of 'traditional or traditionalist Catholicism' within the Catholic Church. The group is represented worldwide by the Society of St Pius X (founded in 1970), led today by Bishop Bernard Fellay, considered uncanonical by the Vatican because he was not consecrated with Papal approval.

mentioned in the article, one particular priest, Vasyl Kovpak, was regarded as the undisputed leader of the traditionalist movement.[10]

The article in *Patriyarkhat* was the first to bring traditionalists into the public eye, portraying them as an 'organized group' associated with a foreign movement, implying that they posed a threat to the church. It was not by chance that the article was written by a student of the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU). Since its inception, the Catholic University, successor to the L'viv Theological Academy founded in 1994 was a major player in the reconstruction of the UGCC in western Ukraine and the strongest progressive voice within the church.

At that time, Vasyl Kovpak served as parish priest of the Peter and Paul Church in Riasne, one of the newer suburbs of L'viv, a Soviet 'dormitory district' built in the 1980s. The priest came to the parish in L'viv-Riasne only in 1991, after the political changes. People in Riasne remembered the period preceding the 'changes' as a quiet time for religious practice, irrespective of confessional identity. During Soviet times, Fr Muravskyi, an underground Greek Catholic priest and a returnee from Siberia, conducted liturgies in the houses of local inhabitants who knew him. Other underground priests sometimes came to Riasne for religious services, but these visits were rare. People either attended the Roman Catholic cathedral in the city centre or went to the nearby Orthodox church, with its Orthodox priest, Fr Babych.

Vasyl Kovpak became a priest in 1990, when the UGCC was first emerging into public life, registering hundreds of new parishes and in need of new priests. During the underground period, he studied theology in a clandestine seminary belonging to Basilian monks[11], and he headed up the third Basilian order, an uncompromising radical group of Greek Catholics, which did not accept any relation to Orthodoxy, 'reunited' priests, or the Soviet state. Kovpak left the Basilian order soon after being ordained, having observed that the community was altering the tradition it had fought so hard to preserve during the underground era, now adapting to the general tendency of church renewal. In his parish in Riasne, Kovpak practiced what he

[10] Apparently the movement spread in the early 1990s when Western Lefebvrist priests started to come to Ukraine. They contacted a group of Greek Catholic priests and lay members that favoured religious practices derived from the Latin Rite (an important component of their underground practices) and helped them organize into an active society.

[11] The order of St Basil the Great was the first centralized monastic order in the Kyivan Church. The present version of the order was created by Metropolitan Veniamin Rutskyi (1614–1637) by joining five autonomous monasteries with the centre at the Holy Trinity monastery in Vilno in 1617. Basilians were reformed by Jesuits in the nineteenth century and became a missionary order spreading around the world. They constitute one of the main monastic orders in Greek Catholic Churches today.

considered the 'true' (*pravdyvyi*) rite while further developing contacts with Ukrainian and foreign priests that shared his ideas. In the early 1990s, he started preparing young Ukrainians for the entrance exam to the newly opened official seminary of the UGCC, the Holy Spirit seminary in Rudno (L'viv). In the beginning, Kovpak's students successfully gained entry to the seminary, but eventually, by 1998–99, they were no longer accepted, being regarded as *kovpakyvtsyi* – Kovpak's students.

While running the Riasne parish, Kovpak had surrounded himself with a small group of priests and supporters who cherished the religious experience of the underground. The parish became Kovpak's base of activity, as his parishioners became full supporters of the traditionalist movement. Greek Catholics in Riasne who did not agree with the priest's hard-line change switched to other parishes in the city. Three priests who served as assistants in the parish were sent away because they would not follow the traditionalist line. At first, his base of support was elderly people who remembered the 'way things were done before' and who refused any recent changes introduced by the church. As it has developed, the traditionalist community has become much broader and its discourse focused on the idea of maintaining 'the old traditions of the Greek Catholic Church and staying away from Orthodoxy'.[12]

Although some of Kovpak's supporters were indeed older people who remember the period before 1946, he found most supporters among those Greek Catholics who participated in the underground church. These were entire families spanning several generations, and people who kept close contact with each other with their common involvement in illegal religious services, domestic devotions, and clandestine, informal networks. For former participants in such surreptitious activities, memories of those times evoke a strong sense of nostalgia whenever they were recounted.[13]

Daria, a woman in her middle age living in Shchirets, a nearby village, had met Vasyl Kovpak in the underground church in L'viv.[14] After 1990, she asked him to prepare her son for theological studies. Even though her son did not become one of the *kovpakyvtsyi* in the end and she did not meet the priest in recent years, Daria approved of Kovpak's move to reclaim the spirit the UGCC once had under socialism. She portrayed the image of the 'true

[12] From an interview with the head of Riasne parish council Volodia Havalko in *Hreko-katolyts'kyi neporozumynnia* (Greek Catholics' Misunderstandings) by Maria Sholomytska, Postup no. 37 (1346) Monday, 16 February 2004: 3.

[13] The same feelings for the underground church can be witnessed in the Romanian Greek Catholic Church, which went through a similar experience from 1948 to 1989 (Mahieu 2004).

[14] Apart from the names of main actors who became public following an entire media campaign, all other names are either changed or omitted for privacy reasons.

church', which she as well as others said was experienced and could be understood only by those who actively participated in the underground: The church is strong when it is persecuted. It was in those times that the Church was strong, when we went to liturgies in houses, covering windows … the true church was that one!'

Like Daria, more people in L'viv, agreed with and supported Kovpak to a certain extent in the spirit of solidarity generated by their common feeling of being part of the underground community. Religious life in a traditionalist parish followed the model of the 'underground church'. Devotion was more intense, with each parish priest promoting his parish as a 'place of pilgrimage' for the neighboring areas, thus drawing larger crowds on Sundays than his local community could provide. On Sundays and feast days, religious services took place three times a day (in Riasne), and the Sunday liturgy lasted for two and a half to three hours. The main religious celebrations took place outside the church in the middle of the neighborhood, and on every occasion traditionalists organized long processions through the entire locality. The community was strongly united by its common opponent, re-enacting the model of the 'defender of faith' common to the times of repression. This model, which presupposes clear-cut attitudes and a firm moral stance, mobilized the community and reproduced the former determination of the 'underground' believers.

In recent years the traditionalist group had also attracted new converts and Greek Catholics disappointed by the daily routine of church practice. Among them, one family of former Communists, now Catholic converts, who owned a large factory in L'viv offered full support to the group. The owners opened a floor of the factory to serve as a chapel and conference hall for the traditionalist community. This family, under the guidance of Kovpak, integrated religious practice into the factory's daily routine, each morning conducting a religious service for the eight hundred employees of the enterprise in addition to spiritual readings during common meals.

Every eparchy in western Ukraine had 'traditionalist' parishes similar to Riasne. Kovpak's activism and his claim to represent traditionalism in UGCC attracted many priests, nuns, and candidates for the priesthood who had somehow been forced towards the periphery of the church since 1989 because of their wish 'to keep the tradition'. Some of these people were already 'problematic' for the church hierarchy. In the Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil-Zboriv eparchies, local bishops quickly responded when a parish priest displayed his inclination towards 'traditionalist' practices, immedi-

ately suspending him from the parish.[15] The parishes in Riasne, L'viv (Riasne-1 and Riasne-2) became the core of the 'traditionalist' movement, with other priests joining Kovpak without being removed from their own parishes. Additionally, a small group of nuns who were forced to leave the Basilian order in 1995 because of their 'traditionalist' ideas joined Kovpak's movement and subsequently opened a 'traditionalist' monastery.[16]

In 1999, Vasyl Kovpak and two other Ukrainian priests asked Lefebvrist bishop Bernard Fellay to become their spiritual leader. With this initiative, Kovpak hoped to receive approval and support for organizing the incipient structures of the traditionalist movement. Those candidates refused by the Greek Catholic seminary were to become part of a private seminary led by Kovpak. In September 2000, Kovpak, together with six other priests and the nuns, formed the Society of St Josaphat, headed by him. Upon the Lefebvrist bishop's visit to Ukraine in November 2000, this almost 'splinter' group from the UGCC was ready to receive the episcopal blessing, and thus to re-enter world Catholicism through the back door, opened by another splinter group, the traditionalist Catholics of Marcel Lefebvre. At a retreat organized for followers of the traditionalist movement, the bishop inaugurated the Immaculate Heart of Mary Seminary, gathering eight students, the congregation of Basilian Sisters of the Divine Mercy, and a community of ten nuns.

Some accusations against Ukrainian traditionalists held that their priests maintained contact with Lefebvrists only for material reasons. Indeed, the connection with the Lefebvrite society brought significant advantages and assistance to the community, which would not have survived and developed to such an extent left to its own devices. Three Lefebvrite priests from the Society of St Pius X in Poland regularly visited to instruct seminarians. Since 2001, the Society of St Josaphat had published a bimonthly journal, *Dzvin z Fatimy* (Bells from Fatima), and the group's printing house also published, among other items, a collection of 'traditionalist' Christmas carols, a book about the apparition at Fatima, and Kovpak's 2003 book, *Persecuted Tradition* (*Peresliduvana tradytsia*).

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[15] Such was the case of Fr Lubomyr Haievsky from Bohorodchan, Ivano-Frankivsk, suspended from his parish in September 1999 and excommunicated in 2002 by Bishop Sofron Mudryi for continuing his priestly activity in the village.

[16] The Basilian nuns led by the head of the female Basilian order, Liuba Ilnytska (1992–1994), were forced to leave the order because of strong disagreements over ritual practice. Some of the nuns adhered to the pre-war Basilian Rite, while others had adopted the post-Vatican II influences under the guidance of Redemptorist fathers. Initially, the traditionalist nuns formed an independent monastery, but they were later excommunicated and their monastery was closed. Afterwards they reunited with the newly established movement around Kovpak.

The book appeared in response to the investigation ordered by Cardinal Husar, head of the UGCC, in September 2003. In it Kovpak reflects on how the church developed since 1989, finding a continuous thread of 'traditionalist ideas and practices'. He offers a detailed explanation of the formation of the 'traditionalist movement', an account of his attempts to discuss these ideas with the hierarchy of the UGCC, and a critical evaluation of the contemporary situation of the church. The book includes an autobiography, which explains how by experiencing the 'underground', Kovpak arrived at the idea of becoming a 'defender of the Greek Catholic tradition' because of his 'disappointment' with the official church and 'the immorality of church representatives'.[17]

Following the results of the investigation, which were not made public, in a press conference on 10 February 2004, Lubomyr Husar announced the decision of the church to recall Vasyl Kovpak as parish priest and to suspend his status as a Greek Catholic priest. The official statement states that Kovpak 'of his own free will has ceased to belong to the UGCC and the Catholic Church in general' because of his recognition of the Lefebvrist bishop Bernard Fellay.[18] Husar stressed that 'the road to return to UGCC is always open to Kovpak and his followers on the condition that they denounce their affiliation to the *foreign* bishop'. The announcement of the suspension was published in religious and secular media and was posted at several churches in the city.

On 15 February, the first Sunday after the announcement, two priests were sent from St George's Cathedral (the chancellery of the UGCC) to replace Kovpak in his function as parish priest. Upon hearing of this, Kovpak's parishioners gathered in front of the church and threatened the two priests, turning them away and telling them never to return. The following Sunday, the priests returned with Orest Fredina, an extremely popular priest among Greek Catholics in L'viv and chancellor of the Archeparchy. Orest Fredina attempted to reason with Kovpak's parishioners, hoping to convince them to accept the two new priests. The two sides remained intransigent and the parishioners became irritated, stating that 'the parish already has its own priest!' The case became notorious in L'viv, attracting media coverage and the attention of Greek Catholic believers, for whom it became a matter of

[17] The book ended with eleven open letters written by theology students belonging to Kovpak's seminary and addressed to Cardinal Husar. In the letters, the students explained how they were discriminated against as followers of Fr Kovpak (*kovpakyvtsyi*), claiming that this fact accounts for why they were barred from entering the Greek Catholic seminary (Kovpak 2003).

[18] 'Tribunal Excommunicates Lefebvrite Priest from Greek Catholic Church', RISU News, 14.06.2004, source: www.risu.org.ua (last accessed on 21 September 2005).

debate. At the time of these fights in Riasne, I was accompanying a group of pilgrims to Lishnia, a recent apparition site frequented by Greek Catholics from all over western Ukraine. Most of my traveling companions, coming from various parishes in L'viv, were regular visitors to 'alternative' devotional sites; they were 'churched' people in the sense of being knowledgeable believers rather than passive churchgoers. They belonged to the group of Greek Catholics that had been involved in underground activities during the socialist years, participating in 'illegal' religious services and visiting such sites of popular devotion. After the liturgy at Lishnia, celebrated by two priests who were also followers of the underground tradition, the pilgrims started an animated discussion of the Kovpak case. The main issue of debate was whether the priest was 'on the right track'. The pilgrims sympathized with the priest's plight, identifying with his struggle for 'our tradition', although they also expressed concern about the possible split with church authority implicit in Kovpak's position. They discussed whether the Pope's authority had been defied, given the known relation between the schismatic priest and the Lefebvrist bishop. The pilgrims were less concerned with Kovpak's alleged insubordination to the Greek Catholic hierarchy.

The conflict regarding Vasyl Kovpak went on until 1 June 2004, when the Church Tribunal of the UGCC, subsequent to an additional investigation started two months earlier, excommunicated the priest. The decision was announced by a decree signed by Cardinal Husar. Kovpak was prohibited from performing religious services in the UGCC, and all Greek Catholic priests were forbidden to associate with Kovpak in any religious activity. Aside from the condemnation of Kovpak's connection to Bishop Fellay, the priest was also accused of 'popularizing the movement among other priests and establishing illegal institutions on the territory of the major archbishop of the UGCC'.[19] From the church's viewpoint, this act was the culmination of a case that had begun as an instance of minor ritual differences, like 'kneeling during communion', and boiled over into open defiance of the authority of the church.

The mission of the 'underground church' was to preserve the tradition of the Greek Catholic Church, and traditionalists consider that 'being traditionalist means knowing and protecting the traditional knowledge of the Church' (Kovpak 2003: 134). The mission they undertook now continued that of the underground church and they saw themselves as its successors. They opposed anything that did not belong to the Catholic tradition and that could pervert the only 'true church'. The response of the church hierarchy to the traditionalist movement made use of the same idea of 'true tradition',

[19] RISU news 14.06.2004 *Tribunal Excommunicates Lefebvrite Priest from Greek Catholic Church*. Source: www.risu.org.ua (last accessed on 21 September 2005).

which it regarded as completely different from the 'Catholic tradition'. The claim of new leaders repositioned the entire debate over 'tradition' by reinterpreting the entire church history from an 'Orthodox' viewpoint. In the words of a Greek Catholic church leader, representative of this new orientation:

> [The] UGCC started from the baptism of Volodymyr the Great, We [the Churches] are all one Kyivan Church which simply split under different jurisdictions – Moscow, Rome, Constantinople…We want to return to our ancient traditions. This is why the Greek Catholic rite has to unite us with the Orthodox…. Now we continue to look for a name – Greek Orthodox, Orthodox-Catholic, Kyivan Catholic. This is going on. When we fulfill Christ's instruction 'to be one', then there will be no sense in the existence of a separate group of 'Greek Catholics'. We want to be one Kyivan Orthodox-Catholic Church.[20]

Continuities and Ruptures of a Church Tradition

In the conflict over authority that emerged in the Kovpak case, the 'true tradition' became the object of contestation and competition between different religious actors. The Greek Catholic tradition fiercely protected by traditionalists has changed significantly since 1989. During the underground period, the Greek Catholic rite was modified to a large extent, and the 'practical adaptability' that most of the clergy and the lay members chose in order to preserve the Greek Catholic rite implied that significant transformations were made in both lifecycle and liturgical rituals (Shlikhta 2003/4: 192). Forced to adapt to their church's disappearance, Greek Catholics had to choose whether to switch to Orthodoxy together with their parish priest; to begin frequenting a Roman Catholic church, few of which remained open; or to refuse these options and continue on with private, individual religious practice, infrequently interspersed with clandestine religious services.

In reality, the choice was not so clear-cut, and people could and often did move between these options, praying at home and attending Sunday mass in a Catholic church, but also attending underground liturgies when the occasion presented itself. Sometimes rituals were performed multiple times, just to be sure that the 'right thing' was being done for the occasion: an Orthodox priest performed a funeral, and later at night an underground Greek Catholic priest blessed soil from the grave. The laity developed a preoccupation with performing rituals as they had once been performed –

[20] *Vony vzhe poza Tserkvoiu* [They are already against the Church], Mykhailo Dymyd in *Gazeta Argument*. 14 January 2004: 4-5.

indeed, to follow the 'tradition'. The tradition they sought to preserve was a synthesis of Latin and Byzantine influences, which made their mission easier. Western Ukrainians could adjust to either Roman Catholic or Orthodox Churches by following one or the other set of characteristics already present in their own practice.[21] Underground Greek Catholic priests sometimes attended the two Roman Catholic churches still open in L'viv, and listened to confession in both Polish and Ukrainian. 'When a Ukrainian came to confession I spoke to him in Ukrainian, when a Pole [came], I used Polish. And I encouraged people to find Catholics and listen to their liturgy' recalled Father Vasyl Voronovsky, a former underground priest.[22]

Greek Catholics from L'viv, knowing that their priests could be found at one of the Catholic Churches, would go there in order to confess to 'their own' priest, afterwards partaking of the Latin mass. This situation created problems for the Roman Catholic Church, whose own position was insecure, and sometimes priests were afraid to accept 'illegal' Greek Catholic priests into their churches.

The majority of Greek Catholics, however, ended up in the Orthodox Church, although this switch had little effect on their religious practice. Most priests serving new Orthodox parishes were 'reunited' Greek Catholic priests, those who had signed the agreement to join the Orthodox Church (*pidpysaty pravoslavia*).[23] They and their parish communities retained the rite as it had been, making use of the same Greek Catholic prayer books (though they were forbidden in 1949), and maintaining the specifics of the local religious tradition.[24] Other acts and objects were preserved in the liturgy, processions, and devotions such as the Latin prayers of the rosary and the 'way of the cross'. Galician popular religiosity was actually better preserved in the 'reunited' church than in the 'underground church'.

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[21] The accommodation was not straightforward because of the language differences and other barriers across rites. However, most of these difficulties could be overcome with the help of a sensitive priest.

[22] Institute for Church History (1994), interview with Vasyl Voronovski, L'viv, 03.01.1994, fund no. 1469/ P-1-1- 903.

[23] Already by the late 1950s, with the return of exiled Greek Catholic bishops and priests, many of the 'reunited' priests resumed their contacts with the clandestine church. According to various testimonies, hundreds of priests returned then to the underground church, and while these priests formally maintained their Orthodox affiliation, they also reactivated their connection to the UGCC.

[24] This included the kissing of the veil on the Friday before Easter (*plashchenytsia*), the blessing of Easter food (*pasky*) on Saturday afternoon, commemorating the dead on Easter Monday, singing carols (*koliadky*) at Christmas, and performing a popular religious play dedicated to Christmas (*Vertep*). May and June remained special months with devotions dedicated to the Mother of God (*maivky*) and Sacred Heart of Jesus (*haivky*).

Later attempts by the Orthodox hierarchy to 'Orthodoxize' the Ukrainian exarchate came to nothing. Western Ukrainian Orthodox priests, now trained in Russia, tended upon their return to Ukraine to adapt their teaching and practice to the local tradition. State authorities in charge of religious issues regularly reported that 'reunited parishes continue to observe the Uniate rituals rather than the Orthodox', and from the 1960s on they continued to report that church rituals in Orthodox churches were performed in accordance with an 'established local tradition' (quoted in Shlikhta 2003/4: 349–350). Despite absorbing some influences from Orthodoxy, the local religious tradition maintained its particular character during the entire Soviet period.

Although the literature depicts the underground period as 'the time of the laity', because people to some extent controlled religious practice and adapted it to their own needs, priests continued to play an important role. The sacrament of confession became a highly important event because it offered the laity the possibility of legitimating their religious actions. Confession confirmed to the priest the worshippers' status as practicing Christians, which was particularly important in such risky, illegal services, and symbolized their belonging to a larger community of faith represented by the priest. During confession, a believer could obtain the blessing to attend Catholic mass, and the interdiction to attend Orthodox liturgies, or the approval to perform certain rituals at home with a suggested private devotional routine. Priests provided believers with the means to carry out rituals such as the blessing of holy water in the priests' absence. In fact, individual confessions,[25] even if sporadic, were spaces of negotiation of the orthodoxy of ritual practice, and provided a mechanism for adjustment of the church tradition to the particular situations.

Historians researching the 'catacomb church' tend to disagree on the effects of this 'practical adaptability' on official church doctrine. William Fletcher (1981) maintains that theological conservatism and practical adaptability were distinct features of the underground experience, and those changes brought on by the pressures of Soviet times did not undermine official church dogma. Natalia Shlikhta's argument (2004), derived from oral history materials, is that practical adaptability brought significant changes to rites, thus challenging and forcing a rethinking of various theological concepts. Bearing in mind the peculiarities of Eastern Christendom, clearly the church tradition absorbed those transformations that affected both the practice and teachings of the church. Underground priests were walking

[25] Particularly during Lent, when the number of people requesting confession was larger than usual, priests would accept public confessions, a clear break from official church doctrine (see Shlikhta 2003/4).

a fine line between preserving the Greek Catholic tradition, through which people could differentiate Greek Catholicism from Orthodoxy, and implementing smaller scale changes that would revivify religious practice in difficult times.

Furthermore, the UGCC, in its provisional underground form, could not communicate a uniform message regarding its religious tradition. Differences between 'Latinization' and 'Easternization' tendencies within the church were perpetuated during this period, each being promoted by different monastic groups. In a simplified view, the Basilians championed the Latinization drive, which in this case meant the preservation of the pre-1946 tradition,[26] in contrast with the Studites as representatives of the Eastern orientation.[27] During Soviet times in Ukraine and elsewhere, the church persisted mainly because of the spirit of monasticism.[28] Underground monastic orders organized themselves in order to solidify their communities and provide religious services for larger audiences. Although in the 1950s, monks and nuns were sent away either into exile or back to their families, in the 1960s they started to gather and reorganize in small groups. Up to six people lived together in a house or flat that functioned as a sort of 'domestic monastery' where their schedule and duties mirrored those of a normal monastery. Monks found employment in low-profile jobs that gave them the time to pursue their spiritual paths (Keleher 1993: 71). Overall, monasticism was better able to adapt to the difficult conditions of the time and retain certain aspects of Greek Catholic tradition. Other elements of the local religious tradition were retained in the 'reunited Orthodox' churches.

Those Greek Catholic orders active in the underground included lay associations centred on various devotions and third-order monastic communities (also known as tertiary orders). The lay forms of religious association survived the repression in a better condition than the religious institutions themselves, and constituted a basis for religious practice under the Soviet

[26] Because of the strong Jesuit influence in the nineteenth century the Basilians became and have remained until today the Latinizing factor in Uniate Churches. They introduced most of the ritual practices today considered to represent Latin influences on the Greek Catholic rite. The Basilians are also perceived as 'a church within the church' because they have retained an independent streak over the course of their existence. They continue to have various conflicts with the hierarchy because they promote their particular view of tradition and ritual in the UGCC.

[27] This was the reason for their creation by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, who founded the order to renew Eastern monasticism in the Greek Catholic Church. The first renewed monastery of the Studite Order was established in 1904 in Sknyliv, near L'viv.

[28] Jennifer Wynot discusses the role of secret monasticism in preserving the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union prior to the Second World War. The features she describes for that case were also present in the Greek Catholic underground church: 'urban monastics', 'monasteries in the world', 'wandering monks', and 'personified monasticism' (Wynot 2002).

regime. Tertiary orders – Franciscan, Basilian, and Redemptorist – consisted of consecrated laypersons who continued their secular lives with work and their families, remaining 'in the world', while simultaneously pursuing spiritual lives similar to those of monks. The Basilian tertiaries were the most determined defenders of the rite. This community was perfectly adapted for the underground life: its members, all laity, maintained a secular existence, but made vows and adopted a monastic regime that gave them monk-like obligations. Under the guidance of underground Basilian priests, Basilian tertiaries, of whom Vasyl Kovpak also was one, adopted a survival strategy that allowed for no compromise. They unequivocally opposed the idea of Greek Catholics attending Orthodox churches, and they refused to open their doors to recently 'reunited' priests. Change of confessional identity, even if only as a façade, was regarded as betrayal, and all accommodations with Orthodoxy were condemned.

When the underground was first emerging in the light of day in the glasnost years, Greek Catholic priests emphasized their differences from the Orthodox Church in order to create a necessary distance. This campaign went beyond the labeling of the Orthodox as 'Russians' and the use of nationalist discourses; it actively promoted Latin-Rite devotions in local practice. In the 1980s the phenomenon of Marian apparitions was a particular means of civic and religious mobilization in western Ukraine. Large pilgrimages to sites like Hrushiv, where an apparition of the Virgin Mary was made public in 1987, were occasions for Greek Catholic leaders and religious activists to inculcate practices and ideas about the right Greek Catholic tradition, and to reinforce the orthodoxy of the rite. In Hrushiv visionaries communicated divine messages encouraging committed practice of Latin devotions: to Christ the King, for the souls in Purgatory, to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and the daily practice of the rosary. These visionaries asked people to pray for the Pope and follow the church hierarchy in order to convert their country (Terelya and Brown 1991). These sites of popular devotion were also spaces where believers and clergy simultaneously confronted various devotional practices from the underground and found common religious expressions with which to represent the emerging Greek Catholic community.

By the time of the Greek Catholic revival, the Catholic Church had undergone one of its most important transformations, as a result of the Second Vatican Council. This added more problems to the UGCC. Vatican II reforms reached UGCC during its underground period and were inconsistently applied. In the early 1990s, these inconsistencies were among the first causes of conflict. In the eyes of the Roman Catholic leaders, the underground experience represented a liminal period for UGCC, and the resulting

ambiguities had to be cleared up quickly. More than issues of doctrine or liturgy, the most visible, pressing questions involved confirming or refuting the status of priests and bishops consecrated in the underground. Ordination ceremonies for bishops, priests, and deacons had often been shortened, left incomplete, or performed without witnesses due to the constraints on the underground church. The inclusion of clergy ordained in the underground was not a smooth process and generated many surprises and conflicts.[29]

In the 1980s there were fewer than 500 active underground priests and members of monastic orders; at the end of 1989 more than 600 Greek Catholic parishes had applied for official registration. Some 300 churches were already functioning, and 200 Orthodox priests were prepared to become Greek Catholic. By mid-January 1990 the numbers had risen: the Greek Catholics had 600 churches, 350 converted priests, and 700 parishes that had applied for registration. The church was starting to look like an institution again, with religious structures developing all over western Ukraine, led by an established church hierarchy.[30] The UGCC's extremely heterogeneous supporters added to the growing list of problems besetting the institutionalization process. The older priests, ordained before 1946 and faithful Greek Catholics during the underground times, played a pivotal role in the first years of church revival. They had remarkable biographies of suffering and resistance and constituted moral examples for Greek Catholics in their devotion to the rite and the church. Together with the example of those who had died in the underground and become martyrs for the church, these people inspired the first generation of self-discovered Greek Catholics. As objects of much admiration, their legacy was soon transformed into an 'official memory' of the church, which created the martyr aura of the present-day Greek Catholic Church. The old priests preserved the pre-war Greek Catholic tradition of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, held to be 'the authentic tradition' from the times of 'the right Church' (*pravdyva tserkva*) as Father Vasyl Kovpak maintained. Kovpak himself was inspired by such priests and legitimized the 'traditionalist' movement by referring to their model of faith.

The 'underground church' had also ordained younger priests during the Soviet times. These men studied in Roman Catholic seminaries in Riga

[29] For example, Fr Vasyl (Iosaphat) Kavatsiv, the parish priest of the Annunciation Church in Stryi and a 'self-declared' bishop, claimed he had been ordained as a bishop in the underground but was able to provide neither proof nor witnesses. Although he was not recognized as a bishop by either Rome or the UGCC, he received great popular support due to his celebrated underground past.

[30] There were ten bishops recognized by the Pope in 1991 when the acting head of the underground church between 1972–1991, Volodymyr Sterniuk, resigned to be replaced by the official leader from diaspora, Ivan Lubachivsky.

or Kaunas and returned afterwards to western Ukraine to become priests. Their orientation was Latin, which was an advantage in the early 1990s, but would become a problem later, when the UGCC changed course towards Orthodoxy. From the underground seminaries in Ukraine emerged more priests, clandestinely educated and ordained by the underground bishops. Their theological knowledge and style of worship depended on the monastic order in which they were educated: the Studites were more inclined towards the Eastern Byzantine influence, whereas the Basilians embraced the Latin tradition. The Redemptorists had incorporated the changes brought by the Second Vatican Council, while the Basilians maintained the pre-Council rite. In many cases, it was unclear whether members of an underground monastic community, and particularly those from the third orders (like Kovpak), should be considered laymen or monks, and whether their status would remain unchanged with the re-institutionalization of the church. Well adapted to the underground, some monks and nuns found it hard to emerge after 1990. Some individuals could not change their patterns of life or did not want to. Either too old or still devoted to a mode of religiosity that secured their personal survival and that of their beliefs, these people looked for possibilities to continue. Throughout the underground period, monastic communities had maintained their particular identities, and upon the legalization of the church, the differences between the values and practices of these orders and the revived institutions of the church became even bolder. Some of the priests, nuns, and laity who gathered around Kovpak and formed the 'traditionalist' movement represent just one facet of this inability to adjust and refusal to give up their values.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the few underground priests were insufficient for the rapidly developing Greek Catholic Church, and this resulted in a series of hasty ordinations. The new priests came from various backgrounds, some having a real interest, others having joined the church for status and material benefit. Among these new recruits, many, motivated by an enthusiasm for the religious revival, were eager to try a new option. Their studies were brief – two to six months before their ordination – because the church needed priests quickly in order to register parishes and regain church property throughout western Ukraine. This was a widespread phenomenon not only in the Greek Catholic Church, but also in the Orthodox Churches (Mitrokhin 2001). Between 1988 and 1998, the increasing number of religious communities required qualified personnel, who did not exist at the time.[31]

[31] It would have been extremely difficult to prepare priests in such a short time, considering that an institutionalized theological education system was not in place. Before 1989, there was one official Orthodox seminary in Odessa, but most priests from western Ukraine studied in

Four hundred priests – nearly equal in number to the underground priests – left the Orthodox tradition to become Greek Catholic. These former Orthodox priests were not the 'reunited' priests from 1946. They came from western Ukraine, had been trained in theological seminaries in St Petersburg and Moscow, and had had their own parishes before 1989. Many other priests of this generation did not even consider becoming Greek Catholic, but switched to the Orthodox Autocephalous Church, or later to one of the three Orthodox Churches. Reasons for changing confession varied from priest to priest, with each priest's decision contingent upon whether he could convince his parishioners to support the change, even if it was against the general trend or whether he was forced by his parishioners to leave the church. In many cases, priests from the same village studied in the same seminary and practice a similar rite, but now belong to different churches (Orthodox and Greek Catholic) and have become competitors. Some made a strategic switch that opened better career opportunities and gained support of the Roman Catholic Church; others returned because of the family tradition. Disregarding the reasons for their 'conversion', the newly reunited priests had their own unique understanding of the rite and church, and were regarded with suspicion not only by the 'true' Greek Catholic priests who survived the repression but also by the returnee priests from abroad. In fact, however, the reunited priests best represented the local religious tradition as it had developed throughout the Soviet period.

On the whole, the mode promoted for the emerging church was that of the underground martyrs, but those advocating it were diaspora priests. Few diaspora priests returned to Ukraine in the early years of revival (about 40 by 1993) but they occupied all the leading positions, from the head of the church to the founders of its new educational system. These people were better educated in the spirit of the post-Vatican II Catholic Church, had better ties with the Vatican and the Ukrainian Church abroad and thus could provide more for the emerging church. Representatives of the underground church were slowly marginalized, together with the trend they represented in the UGCC. Priests ordained after 1994–95, who had completed a full program of theological studies, were better prepared, but also more Eastern oriented, given the new direction of the UGCC.

In spite of the hierarchy's attempts to establish guidelines for the 'recreated' church, the UGCC remains a heterogeneous institution of clergy and

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St Petersburg or Moscow. The Greek Catholic Church had to build its pedagogical system from nothing. The first two institutions appeared in 1990: the Basilian Theological Institute in Krekhiv, and the Holy Spirit Seminary in L'viv, Rudno. The L'viv Theological Academy was closed in 1946 and reopened in the fall of 1994, while its first institution, the Institute for Church History, opened earlier in 1992.

monastic communities. Rather than identifying with the particular direction promoted by church hierarchy, the mass of believers followed the local religious tradition, common to all the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches.[32] As understood by the Greek Catholic elite, this constitutes an advantage today. When the UGCC re-established itself in western Ukraine, its regional influence was extremely important for the development of local structures. Those who supported the foundation of the new church were pro-Catholic and nationalist, rejecting any connection to Orthodoxy and therefore with the Eastern roots of the UGCC. This orientation changed radically with the takeover by the diaspora elite, who redirected the church towards the goal of becoming a 'national church' by becoming part of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The journey from local to national meant switching emphasis from Catholicism to Orthodoxy, understood in this context as the Eastern Christian tradition of the Kyivan Rus. This is visible not only in the move of the patriarchial seat from L'viv to Kyiv, in the establishment of new exarchates in Eastern Ukraine, and in the official UGCC discourses regarding the recognition of its Patriarchate status. It was also apparent in the recurrent attempts to purify the Greek Catholic liturgy and redefine church tradition that started in the mid-1990s. This unexpected rethinking of Greek Catholicism surprised many people, and the first casualties of the purification of the rite (Mahieu 2003: 206; also this volume) were the underground 'heroes', once fixed in the 'representation' of the 'martyr church', who became marginalized by the mainstream discourse and practice. The representatives of the underground, either real survivors or self-created protagonists, found themselves, as well as the tradition they stood for, in direct opposition to the church.

By putting the memory of the underground church in the service of their ideas regarding the 'true church', traditionalists began to compete with the church hierarchy over the memories of the martyr bishops and priests. Thus, they became actors in one of the most important processes taking place in the UGCC – the 'recovery of memory'. The intense activity of discovering and describing the underground preoccupied both church elite and monastic orders, and both equally used the underground's symbolic importance. However, traditionalists appeared in this process as those who would preserve the character of the underground in opposition to the others,

[32] In western Ukraine, believers created a broader, all-inclusive sphere of practices and beliefs, which could accommodate the frequency of institutional changes. Thus, they could transcend recently built confessional borders between four competing Eastern Christian churches by transporting their practice and expectations to different churches as different places of prayer. This leads to increased social acceptance and possible coexistence among those religious groups seen as Orthodox or very close to a shared 'Orthodox imaginary'. The basis of this unexpected cohesion is the local religious tradition from which these churches took form (see Naumescu 2006).

who would only preserve its memory. Each group claimed itself as legitimate heir to the 'catacomb church'. The official history of the church has been revised since the 1990s through the standardization of the collective memory of the underground experience and creation of 'exemplary biographies' (Naumescu 2004). Some events and heroes were retained and promoted in the official narrative of the past, while others were marginalized, and yet others disappeared altogether. The creation of the 'martyrs of the church', which culminated in the canonization of twenty-seven underground figures by Pope John Paul II in 2001, was a strenuous process of selection and recovery of memory.

Conclusion

The institutionalization processes I have presented go beyond the simple restoration of religious structures for the Greek Catholic community. The reconstruction of the church hierarchy accompanied processes of purification of the Greek Catholic rite, and redefinitions of church tradition. Following the spectacular 'revival' of the church, it began to distance itself from its underground past, while recovering memories of the underground. Various groups within the church competed to valorize this memory in a particular manner. The underground heroes became revered symbols and their tragic stories became constituent of the social memory of the Greek Catholic Church. At the same time, the survivors' understanding of the rite was revoked and underground practices abandoned.

Recollections of religious events from the 'underground church'– emotionally charged and extremely detailed – remind one of the differentiation between episodic and semantic memory in Whitehouse's model. In this sense, the modes of religiosity model may explain how the type of ritual transmission favours a particular social structure, a specific community of practice. With the traditional parish community destroyed by Soviet policies, a new type of relation developed between clergy and believers, out of which new forms of collective practice emerged. Restrictions placed on religious activity triggered a proliferation of imagistic practices, which increased believers' motivation and fortified the community of practice.

The Ukrainian experience of the underground favoured individualized, highly sensitive rituals making use of Catholic imagery and powerful symbolic rhetoric. These rituals, often improvised and tailored to specific needs, were practiced occasionally by small, cohesive communities of family and trusted companions. When the institutional church resurfaced, it strove to replace this form of practice with the routinized, standardized church rite, controlled by a centralized religious authority promoting 'orthodox' doctrine and tradition. The imagistic mode of religiosity was better suited to serve as

a successful engine of religious transmission under the Soviet regime, but the situation has changed completely since the 1990s when the doctrinal mode was reinforced by the UGCC hierarchy.

Yet people did not have difficulty mixing the two modes, either in the underground or afterwards. They tended to participate in all kinds of rituals, some more imagistic and others more doctrinal, both private and church-related. Keeping the two modes separate by promoting a unified practice and doctrine was a concern of the religious elites that emerged in the early 1990s. More than a conflict between modernists and traditionalists, the case of Vasyl Kovpak's 'traditionalists' was about trying to keep the modes of religiosity separate. In such cases, conflicts result from the subjection of one of the two modes to the other through political maneuvering. Thus, power and authority are variables neglected by the modes theory, which fails to read the historical and political context of such a case.

The dilemma of East and West remains an essential challenge to the UGCC. 'Easternizers' and 'Westernizers', 'Latinizers and Orientalizers', 'modernists and traditionalists' are all labels that have changed over time, being applied at different moments to different groups within the church. Depending on historical context, such markers were used in different associations, and their political meaning changed frequently. The actual dynamic behind these trends corresponds to two distinct models of religious authority available in Greek Catholicism[33] and the question of who defines the 'orthodoxy' of the religious tradition.

As we have seen here, religious authority in the UGCC is disputed in the centre as well as at the margins of the church. The Greek Catholic hierarchy and monastic orders are competing actors, and the case of 'traditionalists' is part of this structural dynamic. The Catholic Lefebvrist movement offered Kovpak the legitimating doctrine and the basis to start a structure parallel to the one from which he had splintered. The 'rebellious' priest's intention to delocalize the conflict by connecting it to a transnational Catholic movement was successful and repositioned the struggle in a wider context. Through this move, Kovpak made use of the model of authority specific

[33] Greek Catholic Churches draw implicitly on two models of authority: the Catholic hierarchical authority and the Orthodox diffuse authority originating in the Orthodox tradition. This paradoxical position is reflected in the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, which establishes the frames for the functioning of the Uniate Churches within the Roman Catholic Church, but encourages them to preserve and follow the 'particular heritage of the Eastern Churches' (Congregation for the Eastern Churches 1996) that represents a completely different model of tradition than the Catholic one. The entire idea is questioned today by those UGCC hierarchs seeking to reinterpret 'uniatism' and their relationship with the Roman Catholic Church. By questioning the status of their own church, Ukrainian hierarchs aim to challenge the actual separation between East and West.

to the Latin tradition, changing his status by switching from the authority of one (Greek) Catholic bishop (Husar), to a different (Lefebvrite) Catholic bishop (Fellay). He thus challenged the established Greek Catholic hierarchy, making use of the larger Catholic framework to which Lefebvrists belong.

This chapter shows that the underground experience was essential in the realization of Kovpak's project to form a traditionalist movement. Church hierarchs understated Kovpak's influence in their public addresses, but their extreme reaction towards him – excommunication – showed the determination of the church to undermine his popularity and move away from alternative re-actualizations of the past. The community supporting Kovpak was bound by its common need for the preservation and re-enactment of a particular mode of religiosity specific to the underground. The traditionalists' main task was to preserve 'the feeling' of the underground church, and Kovpak's supporters were linked together by an emotional relation stemming from their common experience of the underground. For traditionalists, the high moral and spiritual standards set by the underground priests, from among whom the new martyrs appeared, constituted the criteria for having 'a true church' – similar to that in which Greek Catholics had fought and suffered for their faith. Traditionalists remained committed to preserving this model of Christian life, which differentiated Greek Catholics from others, Orthodox or Catholic. They moved from nostalgic re-enactment of the underground experience towards organized political activity attracted the attention of the church authority that had sanctioned their initiative. For Kovpak's supporters, traditionalism was a way to relive the underground they missed and a reaction to changes that sent them from the centre of Greek Catholic revival to the peripheries of the Greek Catholic Church.

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Chapter 5
Syncretism among the Greek Catholic Ukrainians in Southeast Poland[1]

Juraj Buzalka

> For sure, the Greek Catholic Church is tied with Ukrainian culture. This religion [and] the feeling of history and nationality are not possible to separate from each other. As a Galician Greek Catholic, I can only be a Ukrainian and vice versa. Also, the true tserkva is true tserkva! It is not large, but intimate. The iconostasis has an unrepeatable aura which no other Christian religion has. Tserkvy are usually small.
>
> A Przemyśl Greek Catholic Ukrainian

This chapter attempts to illuminate what it is to be a Greek Catholic in Przemyśl in southeast Poland. Despite Ukrainians' religious identification as 'Eastern Christian', both in Orthodox and Greek Catholic forms, and in opposition to Polish Roman Catholicism; people's religious practices, beliefs and identity narratives sometimes appear ambiguous in this East-West differentiation. This indicates the need for a closer look at the 'syncretism', 'mixture', or 'plurality' that comes out of the parallel existence of two neighbouring traditions along 'Christianity's internal frontier' (Hann 1988). After proposing a theoretical approach to syncretism, this chapter offers a historical perspective on the 'making' of the Greek Catholic Church in southeast Poland. The ethnographic material describes the religious-national identification among the Greek Catholics. As a result of the changes on the religious and societal landscape, Greek Catholicism is becoming more bounded in what is considered its tradition, and this tradition is becoming increasingly centrally defined. The main question is: how do the believers of various generations practicing Eastern Christianity, but nonetheless ac-

[1] This paper was prepared while I was a doctoral fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale. I would like to express sincere gratitude to Professor Chris Hann for help and valuable comments on this paper and the Max Planck Society for generous support of my fieldwork in southeast Poland in 2003–04.

knowledging the Pope as their head, respond to this strengthening of religious boundaries 'from above'?[2]

Nation and Religion

As the motto *Polonia semper fidelis* (Poland always faithful) reveals, the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish nation have been closely interrelated. Located between Protestant German lands and Orthodox Russia, this national-religious linkage emerged powerfully during the religious wars of the seventeenth century, when Poland came to be perceived as 'the Antemurales of Christianity-Catholicism in the war against Muslims, against schism and heresy' (Litak 1994: 28). Because of post-reformation politics, around the same time the Orthodox bishops of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth accepted the Union of Brest (1596), formally acknowledging the Pope as their head but keeping their Eastern religious practices. The union was finally accepted by the Orthodox Eparchy of Przemyśl in 1692 and – as in the Hungarian Kingdom – the resulting church was named Greek Catholic or the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite. Southeast Poland became part of the Austrian province of Galicia in 1772; unlike in Prussian and Russian parts of partitioned Poland, the Catholic Churches under Austrian rule enjoyed substantial independence. As in most of Eastern Europe, the nation-building process in what is now southeast Poland started in agrarian conditions, and the clergy strongly supervised the development of the national idea. The Habsburg rulers attempted to counterbalance the strong position of Roman Catholic Church, the stronghold of Polish nationalism, by supporting the Greek Catholic Church, the cradle of Ukrainian national revival (Himka 1990). After 1918, the independent Polish state provided what Rogers Brubaker calls state-based, nation-promoting, post-independence nationalisms (Brubaker 1996) and often used Roman Catholicism as a Polonizing force. Although the war between the new Polish state and Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918–1919 did not have as strong 'ethnic' consequences as the one that followed; the national-religious camps, in which the Greek Catholic clergymen and village teachers remained the strongest 'Ukrainizers' of peasant masses (Himka 1988), were already clearly defined.

During the Second World War, the Jews – since the Middle Ages, the third largest religious community in the region – vanished in concentration camps. The paramilitary Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) activities against

[2] I undertook fieldwork in Przemyśl and southeast Poland between the summers of 2003 and 2004 and made two other visits in May and July 2005. I had many informants among Roman Catholic Poles but spent most of my time with Greek Catholic Ukrainians. Except when referring to public figures, this chapter uses pseudonyms.

the Polish, as well as the actions of Polish troops against Ukrainian civilians climaxed in the so-called repatriation of inhabitants.[3] Following the postwar European practice and based on a 1944 international agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians from Poland and Poles from Soviet Ukraine were 'repatriated' to 'their' respective nation-states. However, there still remained around one hundred and fifty thousand Greek Catholic Ukrainians, mostly in the villages of what after 1945 became southeast Poland. During 'Operation Vistula' (*Akcja Wisła*) in 1947, they were forced to move to northwestern Poland an area acquired from Germany (*Ziemie Odzyskane*) after the Yalta and Potsdam conferences approved this border shift to compensate for Polish territorial losses in the east. The new Polish-Soviet border was located a few kilometers east of Przemyśl. Although it was not made illegal, after 1947 the Greek Catholic Church, which was perceived as the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism, de facto ceased to exist. During the socialist years, it worked as a more or less tolerated clandestine organization of the Roman Catholic Church among the believers dispersed across the entire country. This was possible because of the Roman Catholic Church's exceptionally strong position in Poland. The two thousand very conscious Greek Catholic Ukrainians currently living in Przemyśl, a city with a total population of seventy thousand, are actually the returnees and descendants of this last wave of population dispersal. Migrating back to their native region since the late 1950s, they see Przemyśl as the cradle of their national community and ancient seat of their bishops. Because of the reappearance of the Greek Catholic Church in the public sphere at the beginning of 1990s, the city of Przemyśl, located in Poland's statistically most religious region, became known for the nationalist tensions over church property and by the religious-national conflicts over the Carmelite Church, which before 1947 had been the Greek Catholic Cathedral.

Greek Catholic Syncretism

This chapter deals with syncretism and anti-syncretism, the opposite direction towards what is considered as 'pure' tradition. Stewart and Shaw (1994) suggest investigating syncretism and anti-syncretism together. Syncretism is understood as 'the temporary ambiguous coexistence of elements from diverse religious and other contexts within a coherent religious pattern' (Pye 1971: 93) or the domain 'of religious or ritual phenomena, where elements of two different historical "traditions" interact or combine' (Stewart and

[3] The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrainska povstanska armiia* – UPA) was a military formation, which fought from 1942 to 1949, mostly in contemporary western Ukraine and southeast Poland.

Shaw 1994: 10). These definitions, however, do not presuppose that syncretism has something like a beginning and an end – that a 'pure' tradition exists from which syncretism departed and to which it will possibly return or reemerge as a new 'purity' (Stewart 1999: 41). As noted by Stewart (ibid.), syncretism is not a transient stage that will disappear when assimilation occurs. Since all the religious traditions, even the most traditional ones, 'suffer' from syncretism, a more precise focus is needed. Stewart and Shaw (1994) see the politics of religious synthesis as a form of competition between discourses about syncretism/anti-syncretism and argue that religion is not only about purifying (anti-syncretism) but also about ongoing syncretism. The anthropology of syncretism, then, must comprehend how zones of purity and hybridity emerge; it is not concerned with pronouncing a particular religion to be syncretic or not, but with studying the various arguments made for or against the notion of religious mixing – it is concerned with competing discourses about mixture (Stewart 1999: 55).

Looking at southeast Poland, I shall extend this discursive model of syncretism/anti-syncretism to include certain 'structural' parameters. As I have argued elsewhere (Buzalka 2007), the power relations in post-peasant southeast Poland are determined by more traditional social structures, memories, and narratives – as enacted within family networks, among the intelligentsia, and through institutional churches. In this sense, attempts to regulate syncretism/anti-syncretism in this traditional Catholic and overwhelmingly rural context indicates the necessity to focus not only on what Stewart and Shaw see as the discourses about religious purity and mixture (Stewart and Shaw 1994: 7), but also on the broader institutional bases influencing power relations, which themselves are, as I noted, influenced by memory. In this chapter, I will first focus on the institutional churches that have been considered to have maintained purity and suppressed mixing.

Hann notices (Hann 2003: 228) that despite substantial borrowing and synthesis with the West, the Greek Catholics remained closer to the Orthodox in liturgy and music and that a significant, observable boundary has existed in everyday life between Roman Catholic (Latin) tradition, on the one hand, and Orthodox or Greek Catholic (Byzantine) traditions, on the other. As he explains, despite 'practiced' religion remaining an important East-West boundary marker, ever since the Greek Catholic Church first appeared in the region towards the end of the sixteenth century it has proved to be a case of syncretism that has complicated the East-West dichotomy. Especially at the times of increasing national identification, writes Hann (ibid.) and others (Pospishil 1989; Stępień 2000), an enduring East-West dichotomy in religious practice contributed to the differentiation of the populations into Poles and Ukrainians. Religion served as a primary differ-

entiation factor in establishing and nurturing nations in southeast Poland, and religion, like nation, has undergone changes with modernization. Hence, to understand nation as either exclusivist or inclusive, tolerant, and pluralist; one must understand the role of syncretism/anti-syncretism in religion. The following section, therefore, attempts to go beyond national constructions and illuminate what Hann saw as 'complex social and political processes rather than a "civilizational" divide between East and West' (Hann 2003: 223). To shed more light on these processes, I will focus on the Greek Catholic politics of religious synthesis. Historically, the conditions favoring a specific Greek Catholic 'tradition' or its weakening (syncretism/anti-syncretism) have varied throughout more than four centuries, but – as I intend to point out in this chapter – the stress on a separate 'tradition' (purity, anti-syncretism) has reached particular peaks at particular times. The most recent politics of Greek Catholic synthesis is related to the Second Vatican Council, the consolidation of the religious landscape in postsocialist Poland, and the appearance of the recognition of minorities.[4]

(Re)making of Greek Catholicism

As already indicated, the Union of Brest (1596) opened the way for more frequent borrowings between the Eastern and Western Rite Churches. This included the Uniate Church's acceptance of dogmas, religious practices, and analogical structures from the Roman Catholic Church. Theologian Victor Pospishil stresses that the Latinizations introduced in the Greek Catholic Church resulted from the initiative of bishops and clergy (Pospishil 1989: 204). Certainly, the more rigid Roman Catholic hierarchical structure caused the Greek Catholic clergy to pay more attention to the prescribed forms of cult than under the much less strict Orthodox rules before the union.[5] In this way, the Greek Catholic clergy introduced many Latin elements into the liturgy in order to distance Greek Catholic worship from Orthodoxy. However, the union also touched upon the everyday religious practices and possibilities of mutual influence and 'borrowings' of religious practice among the people united in one church. These processes were strengthened after the provincial Synod of Zamość (1720) institutionalized some of the

[4] Historian Stanisław Stępień (personal communication) agrees with my threefold division in the 'making' of the Greek Catholic tradition – the 'Austrian' representing the decades after Habsburgs took over Galicia, the 'national' tied to national awakening, and the present one that followed the Second Vatican Council. In Stępień's opinion, however, the current period should be divided into two – before and after 1989.

[5] For example, at the time of the Union of Brest, the vast majority of clergy celebrated the Eucharist using manuscripts that contained numerous local and regional variations (Pospishil 1989: 205).

Greek Catholic 'identity' issues (Stępień 2000: 91). Dominated by Basilians, this synod approved many Latinizations (Himka 2005: 27). Stępień (2000) and others (Himka 1990, 2005; Hann 2003) note that the Ukrainian national identification particularly shaped the discussion about the Greek Catholic identity. Ukrainian nationalism favoured expurgation of Latin elements from the Greek Catholic Church; on the other side, the defenders of 'Catholicism' or the clergy feared a move towards Orthodoxy or an irreligious socialism apparently followed by some Ukrainian nationalists (Pospishil 1989: 212). After the First World War, both tendencies were present among the Greek Catholic Ukrainian patriots; they differed only in their attitude towards the reform of the rite (Stępień 2000: 89).

Pelikan (1989: 4) mentions that the encyclical *Orientalium dignitas ecclesiarum* of Leo XIII of 1894 rejected Latinization and 'conquest' of the East and supported the preservation of the Eastern Rite churches united with Rome. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi (1865–1944) of L'viv-Halych subscribed to this program, and the encyclical became a 'Magna Carta' of a program for the intellectual reunification of East and West (Pelikan 1989: 4). One of Sheptyts'kyi's reforms was the organization of the Studite monks (1904), the first monastic community in the entire Eastern branch of the Catholic Church that sought a return to the contemplative character of the ancient form of monasticism as preserved in the liturgical forms of the books of the Orthodox Church (Pospishil 1989: 214). When Sheptyts'kyi became bishop he confronted three problems in the liturgy (Pospishil 1989: 202). The first, that of standardizing worship, especially the Eucharist or Divine Liturgy, was solved finally, in the 1940s, by producing various editions of liturgical books in Rome. The second problem, eliminating Latin or Roman liturgical influences, was resolved by the publication of *Ordo Celebrationis* in 1944.[6] The third challenge related to the need to provide the faithful with forms of worship that would reflect modernization in the religious sphere (ibid.). For the first time, the Ukrainian Catholic Church possessed indis-

[6] This book describes for the clergy how to exercise the functions; how to make the signs of the cross; how and when to bow; how to use incense; and so on. It also describes the essential features of the interior of a church (Pospishil 1989: 220). Pospishil wrote in 1989 that 'its implementation has progressed substantially, although much remains to be done' (ibid.: 202). Among the liturgical codifications were: the Liturgy of St John Chrysostom (*Liturhiia sv Ioanna Zlatoustaho*), which is used daily; the Liturgy of St Basil (*Liturhiia sv Vasiliia Velykaho*) celebrated ten times a year; the *Liturgikon siiest' Sluzhebnyk* containing all three Eucharistic liturgies, the office of the hours, liturgical calendar, etc.; two Gospel books (*Sviatoie Evanheliie* and *Evanhelia na nedily, praznyky i razlychnyia potreby*); an Epistle book (*Chteniia apostols'kiia na nedily, praznyky i razlychnyia potreby*) for both Sunday and holy day celebrations that was for the use of travelling priests; a *Malyi Trebnyk*; and a prayer book for priests (*Chasoslov*) and other books. Sixteen liturgical books were printed in Church Slavonic (Pospishil 1989: 219).

putably obligatory liturgical texts: they were official (approved by the Pope); they were typical (a prototype from which deviation was not permitted); and they were uniform for all parts of the Ukrainian Church (Pospishil 1989: 220). In sum, Sheptyts'kyi's reforms were important for appropriating 'tradition' on which the later modifications of Greek Catholic worship were built.

Obviously, the implementation of the reform took a long time. The biggest obstacle was the prohibition of the Greek Catholic Church in Soviet Ukraine and its semi-official status in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Already at the time the books were published, many bishops and clergymen especially opposed the tendencies to Byzantinization. Nevertheless, the new generations of the priests in emigration subscribed to the reforms (Pospishil 1989: 221). Reform also found fertile soil at the Second Vatican Council when the successor to Sheptyts'kyi, Cardinal Iosyf Slipyi (1944–84), further relied on *Orientalium dignitas*, thus continuing the establishment of an 'Eastern' Catholic identity (ibid.). The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was in the underground in Ukraine, but better conditions existed for spreading these changes in Poland, where the Greek Catholic Church continued functioning under the umbrella of the independent Roman Catholic Church.[7] This might explain not only why the Greek Catholic Church in Poland is so Ukrainian – the Second Vatican Council favoured the spread of national languages – but also why this church seems to be more 'Byzantine' (i.e. anti-syncretic) than the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in nearby L'viv, which shows many more signs of East-West mixing. Although nationalism played an important role – the religious identification with the 'East' strengthens Ukrainian minority identity in opposition to the Roman Catholicism of Poles in Przemyśl – one should not forget about the Catholic Church's independent position in communist Poland and the consequent proliferation of the 'West's' (Rome's) 'Byzantinization' of the 'East' among the Greek Catholics in Poland.

The Eastern Catholic Churches also have a separate code of canon law. The first attempt to codify Eastern law as the *Codex Iuris Canonici Orientalis* (Code of Eastern Canon Law) was partially completed when Pope Pius XII promulgated portions of the canons in 1948. The *Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium* (Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches) was promulgated in November 1990. The majority of the canons correspond closely to the Roman code, but the code incorporates certain differences regarding the hierarchy, administration, and other areas.

[7] The Polish Primate also had the rights of a Greek Catholic bishop and received direct instructions from the Congregation for Eastern Churches in the Vatican.

These historical sketches of the Greek Catholic Church and its liturgical reforms show the continual (re)making of Greek Catholicism 'from above' that has accelerated at certain periods. From a historical perspective, changes in top-level church politics have gradually become more defining of Greek Catholic identity on the ground. The remaining parts of this chapter will illustrate how this elite-driven, anti-syncretism is being accommodated among the people and clergymen in southeast Poland.

Greek Catholic Anti-Syncretism

Historian Stanisław Stępień (2000) differentiates several processes on the East-West continuum that have taken place under the institutional umbrella of the Greek Catholic Church. He defines Occidentalization as the intellectual movement of theologians, church artists, church law, and education; Latinization is defined as the process linked to the practiced religion as opposed to the orthodoxy of the official church. Here, he means the forms of preaching, liturgy, and popular devotion 'borrowed' by the Eastern Rite from the Latin Rite (Stępień 2000: 92). In the context of the Greek Catholic Church, Orientalization represents the opposite trend linked to the 'civilization' of Eastern Christianity; while Byzantinization relates to the rite itself – the forms of Greek Catholic religiosity as practiced (ibid.). In what follows I refer to various features in popular Greek Catholicism, such as a particular form of Marian cult, the rosary and pilgrimage practices, and the cults of holy places, water sources, and holy pictures, as results of the 'Latinization' processes. From the opposite perspective, the Roman Catholics adopted the Eastern practices of blessing of food, visits to graves at Easter, the blessing of water, and, as well, an 'Eastern' icon in Roman Catholic worship. Because of a wide and long-lasting 'syncretism' on the ground that cannot easily be attributed to any particular church or rite, I refer to the latter process as 'Byzantinization' of the Greek Catholic tradition. Insights regarding Greek Catholicism – its practices and the identity narratives underpinning it – rather complicate the East-West dichotomy. As will be shown in the forthcoming sections, although Greek Catholics tend to feel 'in their hearts' that Orthodoxy is the closest religion to theirs; at the same time, they also identify with Roman Catholic institutions, symbols, and practices.

One young Greek Catholic priest once explained to me that, obviously, his church belonging to Rome is most important. But then the phenomenon of Ukrainian nationality intervenes, and many people tend to agree on the closer unity with Orthodoxy. Occasions like the Jordan ceremony are

also considered as Ukrainian patriotic demonstrations.[8] Because the Greek Catholic Church in southeast Poland follows the Julian calendar, the Jordan ceremony usually takes place during a workday in Poland, which makes the procession to the river very visible in the city. Another Greek Catholic priest stressed that all the discussions concerning the position between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism are wrong, and one must understand the Union as the return to the unity and to the roots and not the establishment of a new church. Once I asked a Ukrainian entrepreneur, an engineer in his mid-forties: 'What is it to be Ukrainian in Przemyśl'? He replied: 'I go to our Cathedral, I have a strong national consciousness, and at home we speak Ukrainian, and practice our religious feasts'. While criticizing his young Greek Catholic priest for being more 'Uniate' than 'Ukrainian', a journalist friend explained to me that Greek Catholicism is close to Orthodoxy; it is a mystic religion in which one can see the direct sense of God's energies. He also pointed out the absence of compulsory celibacy and the less hierarchical organization of the Greek Catholic Church: 'We Greek Catholics are different, less dogmatic than Roman Catholics'. In a similar way, a student at Jagiellonian University (age 23) from Przemyśl expressed his dissatisfaction with the restoration of the Greek Catholic Cathedral in Przemyśl, which he saw as:

> … an unsuccessful rebuilding of a church into a *tserkva*.[9] It lacks the mystery, the spirit of the true *tserkva*. When you enter the true *tserkva* it is something completely different from when you enter the church. There are icons, the whole building, and an iconostasis. This cathedral has an iconostasis but that does not make it a *tserkva* … In stressful moments you can find a peace in true old *tserkvy* ... Orthodoxy is tied with culture and nationality. I am Ukrainian and Orthodoxy is the major religion in Ukraine. It is the closest religion to Greek Catholicism, much closer than Roman Catholicism. It is not closer through the clergy but closer by spirit!

In the discussion about the same cathedral, the Ukrainian intellectual (age 62) who had been gathering and reprinting the old Greek Catholic documents and scientific articles especially linked to Przemyśl from the Habsburg period, pointed out:

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[8] The Jordan ceremony is a feast of Eastern Rite Churches (Orthodox and Greek Catholic). This fixed ceremony takes place annually on the feast of Epiphany on 19 January. Commemorating the baptism of Jesus in the river Jordan, the annual procession is organized and the water – usually the local creek or river – is blessed.

[9] A *tserkva* (or *tserkov* in Ukrainian, *tserkvy* in plural; *cerkiéw* in Polish,) is a church building for Eastern-Rite worship.

> For sure, the Greek Catholic Church is tied with Ukrainian culture. This religion, and the feeling of history and nationality are not possible to separate from each other. As a Galician Greek Catholic I can only be Ukrainian and vice versa. Also the true *tserkva* is a true *tserkva*! It is not large, but intimate. The iconostasis has an unrepeatable aura that no other Christian religion has. *Tserkvy* are usually small. Our current Greek Catholic cathedral is too large; the little iconostasis is dominated by other artifacts. In the little wooden *tserkvy* it is the iconostasis that dominates. Because of this, Przemyśl Greek Catholics are more likely go to the Basilian *tserkva,* which is smaller and the intimacy is kept there. At the Jesuits [in the current Greek Catholic Cathedral] there are three aisles; the Carmelite church [the former Greek Catholic Cathedral] has just one aisle. It was chosen at the end of the eighteenth century because it was more intimate; the interior was more suitable for Greek Catholic worship.

My neighbor – a pensioner and engineer by profession – used to say that Eastern Christianity practiced in Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches is a more truthful tradition of Christianity than Roman Catholicism. A musicologist from Przemyśl (age 44), herself a devout Greek Catholic, loves the Church Slavonic liturgy because of its higher mysticism and religious vitality, for what she sees as 'living archaism'. Nevertheless, she understands that some people would not understand it and, thus, she agrees with the current use of Ukrainian as the liturgical language.[10]

Andryi (age 39), an art renovator by profession, is responsible for supervising all the restoration activities made on the sacral objects in the Przemyśl Greek Catholic archdiocese. He studied art history and restoration and became one of the best-known experts in the field of Eastern Christian art. As he says, he wants to revive in the Greek Catholic Church the glory it once enjoyed:

> Greek Catholicism is very much bound to tradition; it does not like hypocrisy. On the one hand, it is very traditionalistic; on the other, open to all new trends. The Greek Catholic Church is an Orthodox

[10] Still used in Orthodox Churches, Church Slavonic had also been a language of Greek Catholic liturgy before the introduction of national languages. After the Second Vatican Council, Ukrainian began to be used in the Greek Catholic Church liturgy, but believers did not accept it for many years. In Przemyśl this started in the 1980s; but in the early 1990s Church Slavonic was still used occasionally, depending on the preferences of priest and cantor. Under claims of following the Second Vatican Council rules, the Greek Catholic liturgy was finally 'Ukrainized' in 1990s. On the other hand, sermons and some songs (carols, Easter songs and so on) have been preached and sung in Ukrainian since the mid-nineteenth century and the religious classes in the schools have been taught in Ukrainian (personal communication with historian Stanisław Stępień).

> Church, it has only been reformed … and the *tserkva* is its traditional sanctuary. Other religions made concert halls and gathering chambers out of their sanctuaries … My sanctuary preserved what had been by the creation of the world ... My religion emphasizes my identity, the state of dignity – it is a state of mind … Look, Christian countries were against God in the EU constitution. I saw in Germany that religion is just a matter of conformity ... In the West it is different than to us. They are leaving religion and, therefore, they do not have anything to rely on! Today, open atheism is over and there has come an age of searching for traditional religiosity. As I saw in France, the holiest sacrum had only a little Orthodox chapel, not any other sanctuary. It was a place of silence where the man can be alone with God. There were symbols of Eastern Rite; the West does not have it any longer. For a man it is natural that he wants to enter such a sacrum. … In the West there is no mystery; in the Western Church everything is artificial.

Andryi does not like to see Latin elements in his church. Together with his colleagues, he led, in the 1990s, the rebuilding of the former Jesuit Church into a Greek Catholic cathedral fitting 'Byzantine' standards. He characterizes Greek Catholicism as taking the best from Eastern and Western traditions of Christianity; nevertheless, he thinks it remains much more eastern than western. He confirms this with examples from the Holy Communion: he says that in the West the practice is very feudal, people kneel and remain subordinated to the priest. On the contrary, in the East, people usually stand and the equality is closer to the one established by Christ. Consequently, he thinks, the Eastern Christians take Holy Communion in the form of bread and wine, while Roman Catholics are deprived of taking wine. Unlike Roman Catholic art, Greek Catholic art is not inspired by the secular art. Artists in the Byzantine tradition think about the eternal issues; the particularities are determined by the biblical and overall religious rules in Eastern Christianity, notes Andryi. The Eastern Christian artist 'has in mind the view on the "whole" of theological logics and symbolism of the East'. On the contrary – he continues – in the West, art dominates over theological logics. Currently, in the Greek Catholic Church, a new Byzantinization is under way. A painter making a living from decorations and restorations of *tserkvy* in Poland mentioned that the requests she currently has for paintings are for 'pure Moscow Byzantine' art. As she said, although the Greek Catholic priests today ask her to paint a proper 'traditional' *tserkva*, this type of 'Byzantinism' does not have anything in common with the regional tradition – in the decorations before the Second World War many more 'Latin' elements prevailed. Andryi is also aware of this fashionable Byzantinization (anti-

syncretic) trend and confesses: 'We are opening the world after several decades. We will put there what is necessary'.

Once Andryi took me to the museum of icons in the town Łańcut – eighty kilometers north of Przemyśl – where much of the Eastern Christian art from the Greek Catholic sanctuaries was stored after the Greek Catholics were expelled.[11] I was introduced to his colleague, Paweł – a restorer of icons. While working as a tourist guide, he became an enthusiast of Eastern Christian architecture in the Carpathians. Born in the north of Poland, he later moved to southeast Poland and learned Ukrainian. He also worked with Andryi on the renovation of the Greek Catholic Cathedral in Przemyśl. As he said, since the Greek Catholic Cathedral had been a Jesuit church, they had to keep the elements of historical value. At the same time, however, they were asked to create the Eastern Rite cathedral. Paweł and Andryi think that they succeeded in attracting the church hierarchy to their project.

During Easter 2004, I had the occasion to speak to a Greek Catholic former student (age 25) of the Przemyśl Roman Catholic seminary. Currently working in Warsaw, he comes from Ivano-Frankivsk, in contemporary Ukraine, and does not want to enter the priesthood anymore. For him, there are several differences between the Eastern and Western Catholic rites. He states that 'western liturgy is military' (*wojskowa*) and the Eastern one is 'mysterious' (*tajemnicza*). Although he accepted that there are many elements of Latin inspiration in the Greek Catholic Church, he stressed its special appropriation in Eastern Rite Catholicism; these Latin features have been introduced and appropriated by the Greek Catholic Church itself. The adoration of the Heart of Jesus is different in Greek and Roman Catholicism, as is the prayer to the Mother of God, he says.[12] The saints are shared with Orthodoxy, and the Greek Catholic calendar is independent from the Roman Catholic, he says. He also said there will be always difficulty to study 'proper' Greek Catholic practice in Przemyśl because the atmosphere is too nationalist. He himself underwent 'brainwashing' and became a conscious Ukrainian patriot only after his Przemyśl studies, especially after experiencing the Roman Catholic superiority of his Polish colleagues, who looked

[11] One third of *tserkvy* disappeared entirely, the Roman Catholic Church took another third, and only a third remain Eastern Christian – Orthodox or Greek Catholic (for more details see Iwanushiw 1998).

[12] With no equivalent in Eastern Christianity and combining Latin pious practices and Byzantine liturgical forms, two *molebens* (prayer services to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and to the Blessed Mary), the *Supplikatsiia*, the Rosary, and the Devotion of the Stations of the Holy Cross were incorporated into Greek Catholic ritual towards the end of the nineteenth century. They became very popular among believers, and also new religious songs dedicated to them were provided (Pospishil 1989: 210).

down on them as if the Eastern Rite were in second place after the only true Roman Catholic one.

Several themes emerged from the interviews with university educated and younger rather than older Greek Catholics in Przemyśl. Greek Catholicism is not only considered to be an overwhelmingly Eastern Christian tradition, but also a part of the universal Catholic Church – something that might be considered as a specific Greek Catholic tradition. In this Catholic framework, people like Andryi, the musicologist, the journalist, and others can imagine an even more straightforward 'purification' (anti-syncretism) than is happening now. For many ordinary people, this anti-syncretism actually might mean the move towards Orthodoxy. These intellectuals, however, would reject as many 'Latin' elements in their Greek Catholic practice as possible, but would also hardly sign up for any formal merging with Orthodoxy. For them – it seems – the Greek Catholic identity quite clearly is: 'Byzantinization' as returning to the 'roots' of the true Eastern Christianity within the Catholic Church.

A local intellectual said the Greek Catholic clergymen now have less acute fear of the 'stealing of souls' by the Roman Catholic Church than they did during the socialist years. Because of the unavailability of Greek Catholic services, many Greek Catholics used to attend Roman Catholic services during socialism, and many did not return to Greek Catholicism after 1990. However, my source also noted that Greek Catholic priests feel a growing danger from Orthodoxy – the church with which the Greek Catholic Church shares believers of the same Ukrainian nationality in southeast Poland. I was told several times in Przemyśl, and observed myself in the behaviour of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox priests towards each other, that a mutual, historically rooted tension exists today between the clergymen of both churches and a hidden competition over believers continues. This might have been obviously supported by the violent history during the socialist years in which the Orthodox Church took over many *tserkvy* and followers of the Greek Catholic Church, which de facto had ceased to exist. Several villages in southeast Poland opted for Orthodoxy not only to keep their 'Eastern' faith, but also to try to escape repatriation (Kalników, Szczawne, partly also Komańcza and others). In this sense, a local observer claimed, it might be counterproductive for the Greek Catholic clergy to support a complete return to the 'pure' Eastern Christian practice. It is much more convenient for them to keep the most popular 'Latin' elements and – as has been happening since the times of Sheptyts'kyi's reforms – if possible, to give them a new Eastern Rite with Catholic meaning. Even though among the younger and better educated Ukrainians, this process is progressing remarkably, for the older

generations of Greek Catholics, the keeping of 'unreformed' Latin (i.e. more syncretic) practices and interpretations remains essential.

Everyday Syncretism

While waiting in the corridor of the Greek Catholic cathedral office, I noticed pictures from first communions on the walls. The children were already eight or nine years old; the girls wore white dresses. In the Orthodox Churches, the children are allowed to take Holy Communion together with adults while they are still very small. After the Union of Brest, children in the Uniate Church gradually started to follow the Roman Catholic practice and took part in a ceremonial First Holy Communion. Apart from the Greek Catholic bishops, the Jesuit order also helped to introduce this new practice. The Synod of Zamość (1720) established the rule that only after reaching the appropriate age and undergoing instruction could children take part in Holy Communion. This practice – age, dress, and instruction – and many others I indicated as 'Latinization' are far from reaching the vanishing stage in contemporary Greek Catholicism. This need for a special Greek Catholic practice does not come just from the clergymen, but also because people like these 'Latin' elements regardless of their 'political' location on the East-West scale.

Mr Wowk (age 68) lives in a socialist city block near the river San. As a devout Greek Catholic, he moved to Przemyśl in the 1970s because of its functioning Greek Catholic parish. Before he retired, he was a clerk in a state firm. For him, 'all the Christian religions are the same, only the liturgy is different' and Greek Catholicism is, first of all, an Eastern Rite Catholicism of Ukrainian provenance. Although he thinks the building of the Greek Catholic Cathedral does not fit fully to the Canon of Eastern Churches, the interior decoration is already Eastern enough. As he says, 'the former Jesuit history of the Cathedral does not matter. I am concerned on God's things inside'. One retired woman who moved to the city in the late 1960s claimed: 'Our service (*nabozenstvo*) is richer and longer than the Roman Catholic; the funeral service also takes more than one hour. It is a deep and extraordinary ritual, but it is still first of all a Catholic religion'. My friend Maryjka (age 24) once mentioned her mother who often jokingly commented that an organ is needed in Greek Catholic *tserkva* in order to make proper and strengthen the singing of old ladies and a cantor.

One of the most visible Latin elements accommodated in the Greek Catholic Churches is the cult of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. It came to be widely accepted and practiced among Galician Greek Catholics towards the end of the nineteenth century (Pospishil 1989: 210; Stępień 2000: 95). This Roman Catholic feast gained a 'Byzantine' content by becoming the day of

'Christ the Lover of People' (*Chrystos Cholovikolyubec*) and was propagated especially by Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi. The practice of *Acathist* (praying) to the Sacred Heart of Jesus on the third Sunday after Pentecost was introduced. In the eyes of Sheptyts'kyi, since it was an unknown practice in Orthodoxy, by giving it a Byzantine content, it could serve not only to strengthen Greek Catholic identity but also as a basis for further 'ecumenical' activities with Orthodoxy and its possible union with Rome (Stępień 2000: 97). Especially during the interwar period, 'Latin' pictures of the Jesus with the 'burning' heart became common in the Greek Catholic *tserkvy* and private houses (ibid.). Because there are not many apparent differences between Orthodox and Greek Catholic iconography, these paintings of 'burning' hearts of Jesus and of Mother of God remain the easiest recognizable sign of a Greek Catholic *tserkva* or a private house when compared to the Orthodox. One old gentleman, an active choir leader for many decades, explained the role of the cult of Sacred Heart of Jesus in a Greek Catholic practice in the following way:

> It is a Latin element. The Holy Father sacrificed the whole of the East to the Heart of Jesus and to the Holiest Virgin Mary; why not accept it? There was a Bishop Kotsylovsky who officially introduced the Cult of the Heart of Jesus for us. This is valid up to the present day. There are services and prayers to the Heart of Jesus. It has been like this in the past and it should stay the same also today. I told our priests that they do not recite the parts of liturgy to the Heart of Jesus as long as they used to. They just mention Christ, the Lover of Man (*cholovikolyubec*) as if it would be the same as it used to be ... The liturgical form to the Heart of Jesus is there, I can recognise it, but the cult of the Heart as such is not propagated as much as it used to be. They [the Greek Catholic priests] cannot fully eliminate it, thank God, because people would make a revolution.

Ms Kateryna, an older Greek Catholic woman considered very devout, would certainly take part in a revolution if the Latin practices were to disappear from the Greek Catholic liturgy. Before Easter 2004, which exceptionally took place at the same time in Roman and Greek Catholic Churches (the Julian and Gregorian calendars coincided), I attempted to check on certain Greek Catholic procedures – such as the blessing of food (*pascha*) – which I was not sure about, and I decided to visit Ms Kateryna. She is an active member of the Greek Catholic Caritas and also leads a Marian circle (*Maryiska druzhina*), a Greek Catholic equivalent of rosary circles in the Roman Catholic Churches, which some Greek Catholic intellectuals see as Latin

element that should be best eliminated.[13] Surprisingly, she was not fully able to help me, even though she looked into the Greek Catholic prayer book she had brought from her stay in Canada, the current home of her children and grandchildren. She apologized by noting the underground history of the Greek Catholic Church and her frequent attendance in the Roman Catholic Church while she lived in the north of Poland. As a frequent listener to Radio Maryja – considered by most of my Ukrainian friends as unbearable to listen to because of its Polish nationalism – she is fully aware of the current political issues, but mostly listens to Radio Maryja because of its religious content. She listens to the sermons and prays when prayers are transmitted through the radio – she kneels at home and contemplates even in the middle of the day. Although she currently comes to *tserkva*, she remains very open and conscious about the universality of Christian devotion regardless of confession. She also has pictures of Jesus with the Sacred Heart as well as pictures of the 'Latin' Virgin Mary on the wall in her house. I was also given one of these Virgins, namely the miraculous picture of the Columbian Virgin Mary Rosa Mystica. Before leaving her house, I asked about these pictures. I pointed out that the Christ looks completely different in the icons in the Greek Catholic cathedral than he does in the holy pictures she gave to me. Ms Kateryna replied that Christ showed himself to a painter and the painter painted him according to what he had seen. Therefore, Christ on these pictures looks like the most handsome man on earth with blue eyes and nice legs. The visions of a pious painter – she thinks – were simply materialized and copied onto the thousands of pictures and some of those she gave to me. The same happened also to Mother of God, continued Ms Kateryna, and this makes her look like the fragile virgin, a girl with blue eyes dressed in white and perhaps some blue habit (my Rosa Mystica actually wears a white dress only).

Some weeks later, on Sunday, when we were on our way to see the house where she was born and where her brother – a poor peasant who often likes to see the bottom of a bottle – still lives with his Polish wife and several children (all of them Roman Catholic), we stopped in Chotyniec, a mixed Roman and Greek Catholic village located forty kilometers north of Przemyśl. After visiting the apparition site where the Mother of God appeared to a visionary and the Chapel of Reconciliation that was built in order to commemorate his visions – because of the 'Latin' pious behaviour of Ms Kateryna, the visionary recognized us as Roman Catholic pilgrims – Ms Kateryna asked to me photograph for her the Mother of God (*Matka Boska*)

[13] The Marian circles, as well as Catholic Action, were organized to attract laity into church life and were introduced in both branches of the Catholic Church at the beginning of the twentieth century (Stępień 2000: 98).

from the iconostasis in the ancient Chotyniec *tserkva*. She said she collects photos and stories about the miraculous Greek Catholic icons in the Przemyśl eparchy and she planned to publish a pilgrim guide book about them. The book would include stories and prayers, something my younger Greek Catholic friends would not like.[14] Ms Kateryna demonstrated enormous piety to this icon. She stood in front of it, crossed herself, and, after the service (*nabozenstwo*), she meditated while kneeling under it, thus doing something my Przemyśl friends would not do. Certainly, kneeling is too strong a sign of Latinization for them currently.

Ms Kateryna is also one of those older Greek Catholic women who like the Stations of the Cross tradition. She and her devout female friends take part in the rituals dedicated to the Stations of the Cross in the city. In Przemyśl, the Roman Catholic parishes organize an impressive public event containing processions and Stations of the Cross in the park as well as the theatrical dramatization of the Via Dolorosa to Calvary in nearby Kalwaria Pacławska. In addition, the Greek Catholic Cathedral has the Stations of the Cross installed around the walls and holds a liturgy during a fasting period near them. Mostly older women attend this liturgy, but also nuns bring their pupils from religious classes in the Ukrainian school. The believers and the priests demanded the installation of the Stations of the Cross in the cathedral, despite my friends' – the restorers of the cathedral – opinion of them as a 'Latin' disturbance of Eastern theological logic.

A discussion among the Greek Catholic believers took place also when some Greek Catholics, including Ms Kateryna, wanted to follow the practice held in Przemyśl Roman Catholic houses of carrying and showing (*peregrynacja*) a copy of the icon of the Mother of God of Częstochowa from house to house. Some followers of 'Latin' practices – such as Ms Kateryna – asked their priest to make the Roman Catholics stop also in their Greek Catholic Cathedral and then to continue the *peregrynacja* in their houses. After being refused, they continued to ask at least to bring their 'own' Greek Catholic Mother of God from Ukraine, make a pilgrimage through the city, and also display it in private houses.[15] A *peregrynacja* of the Mother of God from the Greek Catholic monastery in the village of Zarvanytsia, near Ternopil, Ukraine took place in Poland in 2002.[16] This

[14] In the Eastern Christian tradition – Greek Catholic and Orthodox – miracles have never been as strongly regulated by the church authorities as they have been in the Roman Catholic Church. In this sense, virtually every Greek Catholic village in southeast Poland had its own miraculous icon. One of these is on the iconostasis in the Chotyniec *tserkva*.

[15] I was told that before 1989 some Greek Catholics in Przemyśl privately welcomed the copy of Mother of God from Częstochowa, as did the Roman Catholics.

[16] According to a local tradition, when the Tatars attacked Kyiv in the thirteenth century, one of the monks from the Pecherska Lavra – a well-known Eastern Christian monastic center –

Mater Boza worship started in 1991 in Ukraine, but the inspiration, nevertheless, comes from the *peregrynacja* of *Matka Boska Częstochowska* – the Polish Roman Catholic Mother. In western Ukraine, the icons of the Polish Mother of God of Częstochowa are also popular, not least because, as frequently stressed by Greek Catholics, this icon is considered to be of Eastern origin.

In Przemyśl, I found another 'Latin' practice, the use of the bell during the Greek Catholic liturgy. The previously mentioned, elderly choir leader cannot tolerate a liturgy without it, but I heard the complaints of some friends – such as Andryi – who regard it as a 'Latin' relic. This old cantor especially keeps bell ringing alive. In other *tserkvy* of southeast Poland it is not common, partly because the bells have not survived the re-emergence of the church after socialism. The bell ringing will probably die out after the old cantor dies, but as one local said: 'Who knows if another "granddad" (*dziadek*) from among his colleagues will not continue the tradition'.

The same critique might be applied to the monstrance once used in processions and displays of the Most Holy Sacrament – another strongly Latin practice in Greek Catholic Churches. Today, Greek Catholic *tserkvy* do not widely use monstrances. Since monstrances should be made from gold and silver, they are expensive; they are not considered necessary in Greek Catholic worship any more and, therefore, people would rather collect money for the renovation of *tserkvy*. Similarly unsettled was the practice of kneeling and standing in Przemyśl. In the villages such as Hrebenne, everybody kneels; that is, they follow the prewar tradition seen as 'Latin' by many young Greek Catholics today. In Przemyśl, however, the situation was rather confusing. Some people – especially the older ones – kneeled and some remained standing during parts of liturgy. Even more common 'Latinization' comes with the rosaries, the spread of 'Latin' holy pictures and so on. The clerical and lay leaders tolerate all these elements, but younger and better-educated Greek Catholics are also recognizing them as unsuitable for 'pure' Byzantine practice.

The devotion of people like Ms Kateryna and her fellow Greek Catholics of the older generations represents the vanishing old type of syncretism. Her devotion – the kneeling, an attempt to make a pilgrimage guide, and the activities in the Marian circle and elsewhere – show that although she does not deny the sanctity and genuineness of icons, nothing in her case revealed

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escaped from Tatar captivity and took the icon with him. After a long walk to the west, he fell asleep in a forest. In his dream, the Mother of God came to him. Extremely frightened, he woke up and saw a water source in front of him and next to it the icon of Mother of God with little Jesus. As he understood it, this was the sign that he should have stayed and built a *tserkva* and monastery. I am thankful to the historian Stanisław Stępień for this information.

the exclusive devotional strength of 'Orthodox' images either. These believers express a desire for *peregrynacja* devotion, ringing of the bell in the *tserkva,* and a search for forgotten Greek Catholic icons from the interwar era to which they want to organize pilgrimages now, revealing a rather Latin practice. They also seek to revive former Greek Catholic water sources, now usually fully controlled by the Roman Catholic Church, such as the one in Siedliska, near Hrebenne. They like to attend Roman Catholic pilgrimages and visit the apparition sites supervised by the Roman Catholic clergy. Some Roman Catholic devout women (*dewotky*) do not miss any opportunity to come closer to the 'divine', regardless of which rite transmits it. Certainly some Greek Catholics accommodated these 'Latin' practices during the communist years, when Greek Catholic services were not available, but one should also keep in mind the remains of a prewar syncretism that some people might have remembered or might have been socialized into their families. It seems that many practices mentioned above – such as *peregrynacja* – were equally welcomed by Roman and Greek Catholics not only before the Second World War, but also during the socialist years. Apparently, during the socialist years a much less controlled image of 'pure' Greek Catholic worship was present in the parishes. Today, instead of following the old 'common' practice, a 'pure' Greek Catholic icon is brought from Ukraine for *peregrynacja*. As I indicated in the historical introduction, this is not only related to the effects of nationalist tensions that re-emerged in the early 1990s, but it is also a result of the new generations of Greek Catholics educated in the light of the Second Vatican Council and the practices following the Code of Eastern Canon Law. The Catholic Church simply recognizes and currently defines more clearly than ever before what Eastern Rite Catholicism should be – a view also evident in the contemporary anti-syncretic trends in Greek Catholic art.

Nevertheless, Latin rituals among the older Greek Catholics are still widely tolerated. At the same time, Greek Catholics – both older devout women and young intellectuals – claim they look to the true tradition as their source of inspiration. This confirms the plausibility of the concept of the politics of religious synthesis. 'Purity' and 'mixture' are not definite phenomena with a beginning and an end, but there is an ongoing discourse competition over the meaning of syncretism/anti-syncretism that forms the current religious synthesis. Nevertheless, institutionally determined power relations continue to play a crucial role.

At the L'viv Synod (1891) the obligatory daily recitation of the breviary by priests, the emphasis on a celibate secular clergy, and the preservation of the Western Eucharistic cult were introduced (Pospishil 1989: 212). A visible symbol of this hybrid rite is the *kolpak* or headgear of the clergy, also

appointed by the L'viv Synod – it is not a piece of Eastern attire, but neither is it the Latin *biretta*; it rather incorporates features of both traditions (ibid.: 223).[17] As stressed by Stępień (2000: 98), believers perceived this to be an element of Latinization, even though it should have been seen as the reform of the Greek Catholic Church. Celibacy was introduced *de iure*, but spread in practice only gradually depending on the local bishop. In the Przemyśl eparchy, Bishop Josaphat Kotsylovskyi (1867–1947, bishop 1917-1947) introduced it as compulsory in 1925; while in L'viv, Sheptyts'kyi sought to persuade the clerics to subscribe to celibacy 'voluntarily' – that is, via 'education' (Stępień 2000: 99). In the L'viv archdiocese, only 5 per cent of priests were celibate in 1918 and only 23 per cent in 1938 (ibid.). Celibacy was mostly held to during the socialist years in Poland's Greek Catholic Church, but some young priests married towards the end of socialism and others after 1989. My friends were concerned especially by recent pressure from the Vatican and Roman Catholic Church in Poland for stronger adherence to the pledge of celibacy among Greek Catholic priests. I have already mentioned how some young Greek Catholic priests avoid adhering to celibacy – they travel to Ukraine, where the rules are more relaxed in practice, and after some time come back as married priests. This causes controversy, especially in Roman–Greek Catholic relations. Some years before I started my fieldwork, a scandal occurred in which one of the Greek Catholic priests in the Przemyśl archdiocese had an illegitimate child with a local woman and consequently was sent to Ukraine, where the affair could be swept away, especially because the pressure from the Roman Catholic Church was absent. Another well-known example was the head of the Basilian order in Warsaw, who fell in love, left the order, and got married. As my friend said, this created a large stigma on the order and the entire Greek Catholic Church. He also gossiped about one high-ranking Przemyśl clergyman – a celibate priest – who is very intolerant of his colleague's wives and of the marriage of priests in general. According to my friend's personal experience, he sends the wives to the kitchen when visiting his subordinate priests. Nevertheless, currently, married priests are tolerated by the archbishop and are much appreciated by the majority of Greek Catholic believers, who see their married priests as different when comparing them to the Latin clergy. I heard my Greek Catholic friends several times refer to celibacy as being sick and marriage of priests as 'normal', which implied that normal is the Greek Catholic Church. Even though the majority of Greek Catholics would more likely see a compulsory celibacy as a 'Roman Catholic' dictate, I found

[17] Because the L'viv Synod did not receive full papal approval, as was the case with the Synod of Zamość (1720), there were subsequent reforms and debates going on in the Greek Catholic Church about its results (Pospishil 1989: 212).

some Greek Catholic believers – especially women – who did not seem to deny it in their rite either. Subscribing to the common 'Latin' interpretation, they argue that the priest should be married just to his church, and thus he cannot be made vulnerable by having a family and can fully serve Christ instead.

Celibacy will most probably remain a controversial issue. Nevertheless, if one takes into account the trend towards the specific Greek Catholic anti-syncretism and the pressure from the Roman Catholic Church, perhaps celibacy will slowly vanish from Greek Catholic practice in Poland, thus making Greek Catholicism more specifically in between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy, where married secular priests form the overwhelming majority of the clergy. This brief discussion about celibacy identifies some larger institutionally determined features, which cannot be changed with the 'local' practices of syncretism/anti-syncretism. If one considers the perspective of working locally but under the influence of forces coming mostly from above the local context – that of nation – the picture becomes even more complex.

Conclusion: Nation and Religion

Ukrainian national mythology and Eastern Christianity are linked by the founders of the faith of old Kyivan Rus', Olga and Volodymyr. Their statues are now installed next to the new Greek Catholic Cathedral. Especially in relation to Orthodoxy, this linkage shows more strength than the union with Rome and indicates a complex set of relationships and ideas between Ukrainian nationality and Greek Catholicism. As I already mentioned, some Greek Catholic clergymen nevertheless feel the increasing need to avoid identifying their practice with Orthodoxy. Since Eastern Christianity is congruent with Ukrainianness, their position is always to balance between Greek Catholic and Ukrainian. As one Przemyśl intellectual says, 'the Ukrainian fate is to straddle between East and West'.

As with a modern nation, so too institutional religion operates within the similar framework of structural and narrative changes of the society (Van der Veer 1994). In this sense, religion, like nation, operates within the same bounded view of culture. Syncretism and everyday tolerance possibly can overcome national and religious exclusivity but also possibly cause a strengthening of purity at the expense of plurality – syncretism can be valued positively as a sign of tolerance, but valued negatively as the corruption of purity (ibid.: 209). Consequently, if there were more 'syncretism' in religion, there would be more tolerance/plurality in the notion of a nation. This does not mean, however, that this possibly tolerant syncretism would be free of essentialism (see also Stewart and Shaw 1994: 22). Structurally defined power relations after socialism – such as the role of the institutional church

in the state, national intelligentsia, and the discourses and policies regarding minority rights – cause the essentialist view of religious and national cultures and their combination to continue as a decisive factor in politics.

The long-term Catholic response to modernity that particularly started at the end of the nineteenth century is currently reaching one of its peaks through what I identified as the politics of religious synthesis. These politics helped to clarify what it is to be Greek Catholic in Przemyśl. I have pointed out that syncretism is an expression and practice of tolerance and that anti-syncretism is a predominantly institutional attempt at 'purification'. Despite this purification, many features of syncretism live among Greek Catholics in Przemyśl. Although the younger and better educated Ukrainians tend to see more sharply what Greek Catholicism is and should be about, currently, this does not threaten the existence of 'mixture' on the ground. Some people – especially women – actually do stress their Christian faith first and only then their rite. Although syncretism will survive, I have shown that previously there was more syncretism at the grassroots; now a novel synthesis – a kind of Byzantinization from Rome – is appearing. Therefore, the differences between Roman and Greek Catholic practice and tradition are currently perhaps the sharpest ever. A Ukrainian Greek Catholic 'culture' appears in Przemyśl, one nurtured by much wider forces than high church politics or a particular nationalism, namely minority rights discourses and policies based on the logics of cultures locked within religious nations.

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Chapter 6
(Re-)Orientalizing the Church: Reformism and Traditionalism within the Hungarian Greek Catholic Church

Stéphanie Mahieu

Introduction

Hungary is an interesting case for the study of Greek Catholicism, because it is the only country in the region where the Greek Catholic Church was not subjected to specific and systematic political repression during the socialist period.[1] There has, therefore, been institutional continuity in the religious transmission of Hungarian Greek Catholicism.[2] This distinctive history significantly shaped recent developments of the Hungarian Greek Catholic Church (HGCC); unlike those in neighbouring countries, it has a stable number of believers and did not have to fight for property restitution. One of the most noteworthy postsocialist developments is the growing importance of a religious trend represented by members of the Greek Catholic hierarchy and believers who, following recent decrees by the Vatican, seek to 'restore' the Eastern specificity of the Greek Catholic liturgy by eliminating its Latin elements. This movement exists in other countries, but is particularly visible in Hungary. How can this be implemented in churches that, as all authors who have studied Greek Catholicism underline, and as the title of this book suggests, are characterized by their fundamental in-between, hybrid, and syncretic nature (Hann 2003)? The debate about the level of hybridity to be accepted within the Greek Catholic Churches is not new (Korolevskij 1927; Pospishil 1989), and the tension between the 'pro-East' and the 'pro-West' factions seems to be a classical illustration of syncretic versus anti-syncretic

[1] See the general overviews in this volume. In Poland, even though the Greek Catholic Church was not officially made illegal, it nevertheless ceased to exist during the socialist period. In Czechoslovakia, it was prohibited until 1968, when it gained semi-legality.

[2] This does not mean that there has been no continuity in the religious practice in Romania and Ukraine. But the difference is that in Hungary, by being legal, the Greek Catholic Church had to conform to state policies related to religion, and to the Catholic Church as such. Therefore, we can speak of an institutional continuity for Hungary, and of an 'improvised' continuity in the neighbouring countries.

positions (Stewart and Shaw 1994). Yet, it has taken new forms in the last decade, and can be analyzed in the frame of 'Globalizing Catholicism' (Casanova 1997; see also Csordas 2007) and the recent development of ecumenical dialogue, especially with Eastern Orthodox Churches.[3]

In this chapter, I focus on this purification process and on the movement that advocates it most strongly. I argue that this is not an anti-modern, traditionalist movement; on the contrary, it has integrated perfectly the new religious characteristics of contemporary Europe: an emphasis on occasional, emotionally intense meetings rather than weekly church attendance (Hervieu-Léger 1997, 2000; Davie 2000). Therefore, advocates of a re-orientalization of the Greek Catholic liturgy, by stressing its Greek Byzantine roots, can make the Greek Catholic Church more attractive in the contemporary Hungarian context of a relatively stable political situation within the European Union (EU) and a predominantly Roman-Catholic and Protestant religious environment without a dominant Orthodox Church from which it has to differentiate itself. This can also challenge the secularized Hungarian Roman Catholic Church: in contrast to the prejudices that until the early twentieth century equated going 'east' with backwardness, in present-day Hungary the Eastern Rite can be seen to expand the depth and mysticism of the religious experience.

I investigate the consequences of the Vatican's instruction on the reform of a liturgical norm that, by definition, claims to have been unchanged since early Christian times: the very term *orthodoxy* indicates that the true teachings of the divine revelation have been faithfully transmitted. I examine how the Vatican's instructions are implemented within the HGCC. I then focus on the group that most strongly depends on this 'return' and explore the anthropological literature on possible ways to classify groups that promote religious purification; I argue that the most appropriate term is *charismatics*. I then present ethnographical examples of Greek Catholic parishes in the Nyíregyháza area of northeast Hungary, where I conducted fieldwork in 2004 and 2005, to show how a liturgical reform designed in Rome is implemented in practice.

[3] A very important date for the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue is the Balamand Statement (1993). 'Uniatism' was considered to be the major obstacle to this dialogue, but the statement was nevertheless an important step for the rapprochement between Western and Eastern Christianity, separated since the 1054 schism (see Roberson 1995: 177).

The Vatican's Instruction to the Greek Catholic Churches

Orientalium Ecclesiarum

The Vatican's request to the Greek Catholic Churches to return to their 'authentic' traditions became explicit after the Second Vatican Council.[4] Such an appeal may seem a paradox if one remembers that the council's main achievement was a modernization of the Western liturgy, not a quest for origins. But the debate between *aggiornamento* and *ressourcement* (Peifer 2000; Tabard 2007) led to different conclusions for the Roman Catholic and the Greek Catholic Churches. Indeed, besides the general council's constitution on the liturgy, *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, which pleads for the renovation of the liturgy (the *aggiornamento*), the council enacted in 1964 the decree *Orientalium Ecclesiarum,* explicitly encouraging the Eastern Catholic Churches to preserve and/or rediscover their traditions, advocating *ressourcement* as a source of revitalization (D'Ambrosio 1991). According to the 1964 decree:

> All members of the Eastern rite should know and be convinced that they can and should always preserve their legitimate liturgical rite and their established way of life, and that these may not be altered except to obtain for themselves an organic improvement. Besides, they should attain to an ever greater knowledge and a more exact use of them, and, if in their regard they have fallen short owing to contingencies of times and persons, they should take steps to return to their ancestral traditions.[5]

The tension mentioned in this passage between tradition and renewal is almost as old as the history of Christianity. For Latour (1991), all Christian Churches have been confronted since early times with a double and contradictory obligation: on the one hand *faithfulness* to the Christian message, and on the other hand *renewal* in the transmission of this message. Two traps can endanger this transmission: tedious repetition and loss of meaning (in case of too much faithfulness) and heresy (in case of too much renewal). It seems that the obligation of faithfulness (the 'return to their ancestral traditions') was the main message addressed to the Greek Catholic Churches during

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[4] In previous decrees and encyclical letters, the Vatican had already addressed the question of the Latinization of the Eastern Rite Catholic Churches. In 1894, in the encyclical letter *Orientalium Dignitas,* signed by Pope Leo XIII, the following threat was made to Latin missionaries who tried to persuade Eastern Rite Catholics to turn to the Latin rite: 'Any Latin rite missionary, whether of the secular or religious clergy, who induces with his advice or assistance any Eastern rite faithful to transfer to the Latin rite, will be deposed and excluded from his benefice in addition to the ipso facto suspension *a divinis* and other punishments that he will incur as imposed in the aforesaid *Constitution Demandatam*'.

[5] http://www.cin.org/v2east.html accessed in August 2007.

Vatican II. This can be connected with the peculiarity of the Eastern Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom: the term Orthodoxy itself indicates that, from an Eastern point of view, the true teachings of the divine revelation have been kept unchanged by Eastern Churches, which faithfully transmitted them, through the Holy Scripture and the Holy Tradition, authorizing only minor changes (Popian 1994: 52).

The general messages sent by the Vatican in its *Orientalium Ecclesiarum* decree, however, seemed to be that the Eastern spirit had been lost and that the Greek Catholic Churches had borrowed too many Latin elements that should be eliminated from the liturgy. But because the other Greek Catholic Churches in Eastern Europe no longer existed officially, the HGGC was the only one in a position to implement this instruction. Despite the Hungarian authorities' official atheism, the Second Vatican Council's appeal for religious change affected the Catholic faithful in Hungary (Morel and Andras 1968; Timkó 1987). Greek Catholic Bishop Timkó (1975–88) tried to implement the appeal made in *Orientalium Ecclesiarum*. Many of my informants stressed his action in favour of a return to the Eastern traditions. This movement gained strength after the fall of the socialist regimes, when all of the Greek Catholic Churches could operate legally again.

The *Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches*

In 1990, the Vatican promulgated the *Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches,* which gave clear instructions to the recently re-established Greek Catholic Churches. Under the strong encouragement of Pope John Paul II, with Apostolic Letters like *Orientale Lumen* (1995), all Greek Catholic Churches were asked to re-discover their Eastern roots. This was presented as the only path leading to religious revival in a situation of these churches trying to re-organize themselves. This appeal can also be understood in light of the Vatican's desire to deepen the ecumenical dialogue began in 1993 in Balamand and improve relations with the Orthodox Churches. By adopting a pluralistic view and insisting on the specific traditions of the Greek Catholic Churches, one may argue following José Casanova, the Catholic Church behaved like an actor on the global stage (Casanova 1997). During his long papacy, Pope John Paul II became a global actor, successfully using the mass media, playing the role of 'first citizen of a catholic, that is, global and universal, human society' (Casanova 1997: 134). Yet, despite the global dimension of his papacy, he was particularly popular in Eastern Europe. His Polish, anti-communist background provided him an extraordinary credibility among both Roman and Greek Catholics. After the fall of socialism, the Greek Catholics, traditionally linked to specific territories and nation-making processes (in this sense very close to the Orthodox world) became part of the

Catholic missionary activity and of transnational networks. Many Greek Catholic priests and students coming from Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary began studying not only in Rome, but also in other Western European countries such as Belgium, Germany, and France.

The regular transnational meetings between members of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches[6] and the Greek Catholic hierarchy of the different countries included, as an important agenda item, the (re-) orientalization of the liturgy. The *Instruction for Applying the Liturgical Prescriptions of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches*, issued in 1996 by the *Congregation for the Eastern Churches*, stresses that the Greek Catholic Churches are (or should be) much more in continuity with Early Christianity than the Latin Church, and that they should keep this richness:

> For historical and cultural reasons, they [the Catholic Eastern Churches] have maintained a more direct continuity with the spiritual atmosphere of Christian origins, a prerogative that is ever more frequently considered even by the West not as a sign of stagnancy and backwardness but of precious fidelity to the sources of salvation (Congregazione per le Chiese Orientali 1996).

The text underlines that the Greek Catholic Churches have kept the chain of tradition relatively unaltered and that Western influences that obstruct such continuity should best be eliminated from the liturgy:

> The Eastern Catholic Churches, although having been influenced by the weight of Western tradition, have maintained in the field of liturgy a more faithful conformity to their true traditions. It is precisely their liturgies, restored to greater authenticity and vitality by eliminating that which has altered them, that could be the best starting point for a growth of their specific identity, from which could be drawn words and gestures capable of touching the hearts and illuminating the minds of their faithful in the present time (Congregazione per le Chiese Orientali 1996).

The terminology is clear: 'Latinisms' should be 'eliminated', liturgies 'restored' to 'authenticity'. The goal is to reach the hearts and minds of the faithful. The notion of tradition expressed in this extract is unclear, however. Anthropological literature abounds in examples of invented traditions (e.g. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), and in the religious field, many authors have

[6] 'As an institution this Dicastery received from the Supreme Pontiff the mandate to be in contact with the Oriental Catholic Churches for the sake of assisting their development, protecting their rights and also maintaining whole and entire in the one Catholic Church, alongside the liturgical, disciplinary and spiritual patrimony of the Latin Rite, the heritage of the various Oriental Christian traditions'. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/orientchurch/index.htm (accessed in August 2007).

shown that tradition is constantly re-interpreted and re-adjusted, even by groups that can be classified as 'traditionalists' (Hervieu-Léger 2000). Speaking about the reference made to the return to 'tradition' in both *Orientalium Ecclesiarum* and in *Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches,* theologian Thomas Pott notes that the idea of tradition used by the Vatican should best be defined as:

> Liturgy, an organism living in a living tradition, is subjected to modifications and changes aspect and form throughout the ages. Therefore, to which tradition has one to come back: the one from the early twentieth century, the one from the seventeenth century, the one from before or after Iconoclasm or the 'primitive' form? And what to do with the 'legitimate progress' of the organic development'[7] that the liturgy have presumably experienced (Pott 2000: 40)?

This question is of major importance in the Hungarian case because, as we will see, Hungary has no strong Byzantine tradition. The text gives some guidance on how to manage this renewal process. Most of all, the text specifies that this process should not be imposed by the hierarchy, but that important pastoral work should be done in order to involve the faithful:

> The preservation of the liturgical richness will be more fruitful the more they are determined not only by normative intervention by the Hierarchy, but also by the spontaneous and faithful adhesion of the Christian people, so educated by their pastors. It is important to recall that in these times pastors should be, also in this field, true models of the flock, so that its traditional fidelity may be maintained (Congregazione per le Chiese Orientali 1996).

This quotation illustrates a crucial characteristic of all Greek Catholic Churches since their inception: as Hann (2005) has argued, the unions with Rome in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were mostly movements carried out by the elites, for reasons more to do with politics than religious reunification (see also Hitchins 1999 for Romania). Yet, Greek Catholicism has been constantly reshaped 'from below' by the faithful. This explains how the originally intended temporary step towards total Latinization eventually led to the creation of an original synthesis between the East and the West. But the Vatican seems to consider hybridity an obstacle to a successful revitalization of Greek Catholic Churches. Paradoxically, the instruction to the Greek Catholic Churches to eradicate Latin elements from their liturgies comes from the heart of Roman Catholicism. Yet, the very idea of establishing a unified, common norm for all the Greek Catholic Churches is very Latin. As József, a Greek Catholic priest who studied in Rome explains:

[7] Pott refers here to the terminology used in the CCEC.

> For me, it is a complete mistake to think in a western way about eastern things. For them [in the Vatican], being 'Oriental' means having a certain tradition, and then they say: 'you should come back to the true eastern tradition', but it is constrained! It is a Latin way of thinking that aims to make things uniform according to a certain canon, which I don't know anything about!

What is indeed peculiar for the Greek Catholic Churches is that they are *sui iuris*, that is, they have autonomy in liturgical matters. However, as theologian Robert Taft suggests, liturgical reform is possible within the Greek Catholic Churches on the condition that they affect not the liturgy in general, but a *particular* liturgy (Taft 1999: 42). The Vatican's instructions are clear from this point of view, and all the Greek Catholic Churches have started to implement this purification process. Surprisingly, even though Hungary started the purification process much earlier than other countries, the current Bishop (since 1988), Szilárd Keresztes, is less in favour of radical change than his predecessor. This creates tension with the representatives of the strong movement in favour of a quick and deep re-orientalization of the Byzantine liturgy. Péter,[8] one of the most passionate advocates of this return, explains:

> [The] former Bishop [Imre Timkó] wanted a real Byzantine renewal; he pushed towards a rediscovery of the eastern tradition. The present-day Bishop guided this movement, but he has modified it since John Paul II came to Hungary[9] [in 1991], and asked us to be less East-oriented, to shave our beards and to eliminate everything which belongs to the Greek Byzantine rite. This is because all the other Greek Catholic Churches in the countries bordering on Hungary are in a defensive position towards the Orthodox, and we cannot be the exception, and say that we are more advanced than the others, because we are a minority and they are a majority, and we need a strong group to come forward.

The reason invoked by the bishop, which Péter criticizes, is the need for a 'concession' towards the Latin to please the emerging neighbouring Greek Catholic Churches that had been subjected to forced assimilation with the Orthodox and therefore are less keen to give up the Latin elements of the liturgy that had helped distinguish themselves from the Orthodox Churches. The HGCC is indeed in the novel situation of being one of the most recently created Greek Catholic Churches. It attracted a small number of believers compared to the once very large Ukrainian and Romanian Greek Catholic Churches, and these believers were not historically a cultural elite playing a

[8] The names of my informants have been changed.

[9] When he visited, among other places, the Greek Catholic shrine of Mariapócs.

role in the Hungarian political sphere.[10] Yet, because of its fate during the socialist era, it has now become one of the most dynamic and successful Greek Catholic Churches in the region.

Looking for Byzantine Roots: The Greek Model

The Hungarian Greek Catholic Church resulted from the tumultuous history of the Carpathian basin and more specifically from the Magyarization of Rusyn and Romanian populations (Mayer 1997; Molnár 1997). The Rusyn Greek Catholic Church in Subcarpathia was established at the Union of Uzhhorod (1646). In 1912, Pope Pius X created the Eparchy of Hajdúdorog for 162 Hungarian-speaking Greek Catholic parishes. In 1924, an Apostolic Exarchate was established at Miskolc for 21 Rusyn parishes that remained in Hungarian territory after the creation of Czechoslovakia. Like other Greek Catholic Churches, the HGCC is a *sui iuris* (self-governing) church. However, unlike sister churches in Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia, it does not have the status of a metropolitan church and it lacks a body of canon law. In consequence, the HGCC remains officially under the authority of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Esztergom. This particular status explains why the Latin influence is much more visible in Hungary: the Baroque style has had a great influence in the Carpathian basin (Puskas 1991), and at the turn of the twentieth century, Latinization was considered a way to escape backwardness in a region (northeast Hungary) that had long been the poorest and least developed in the country (see Pusztai this volume). There had been a regional convergence during socialism, and the economic development continued after the end of socialism. Even though northeast Hungary remains relatively poorer than western Hungary, it is now an economically dynamic region. This new status has consequences in all domains, including the religious. Today, the HGCC is distinctive in terms of its internal dynamism, especially when compared with the Greek Catholic Churches in the neighbouring countries. It boasts a new seminary in Nyíregyháza, several schools, three reviews, many vocations, and full churches. The miraculous weeping icon in Máriapócs cemented its position as the main pilgrimage centre for Greek Catholics of the entire Carpathian region (see the overview of Hungary by Pusztai, this volume). On a more general level, the HGCC has a much higher level of church attendance than the Hungarian Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, and there have been no property conflicts as in Romania and Ukraine. This very favourable situation had social and institutional consequences: the search for a 'rediscovery' of the church's

[10] Even though at the turn of the twentieth century, a Greek Catholic emerging elite attempted to give more national visibility to their church (Pusztai 2005).

eastern roots, strongly encouraged by the Vatican, has a much more important place on the HGCC's agenda than in the other Greek Catholic Churches.

Although Hungarian Greek Catholics are, in the large majority, of Rusyn and Romanian origin (but almost totally Magyarized), in contemporary Hungary there is no connection between Greek Catholicism and ethnic minority status. Unlike in Poland, where being Greek Catholic equates with being Ukrainian (see Buzalka, this volume.); in Hungary (as in Romania), being Greek Catholic does not mean being a member of an ethnic minority. In contemporary Hungary, Greek Catholicism is often connected with a regional origin (northeast Hungary), and, until recently, has been associated with a rural social background, but not with ethnic identity. This lack of an ethnic reference in Hungary is quite distinct from the situation in Romania, however, where the Orthodox Church, with its doctrinal and liturgically established norms, dominates the religious environment.

Indeed, in the current quest for a return to 'authentic' Eastern roots, what has to be 'rediscovered' is problematic. Hungary has no 'national' Orthodox Church,[11] and when seeking a 'purified' liturgy, the model is neither the Subcarpathian Rusyn form, nor the Romanian one, but the Greek model. This is especially obvious in the recent iconography and in the building of new churches, as I have argued elsewhere (Mahieu 2009), but also in narratives concerning a significant Byzantine church in Hungary in the Middle Ages, and the search by Hungarian Greek Catholic scholars to discover in contemporary religious life the 'survival of Byzantine spirituality' (Cselényi 1994: 103). This reference to Greece is not new: when Pope Pius X established the Eparchy of Hajdúdorog in 1912, the Hungarian language was limited to non-liturgical functions. According to a papal decree, the liturgy was to be celebrated in Greek and the clergy were required to learn it within three years. The First World War intervened, however, and the requirement to use Greek was never enforced. Eventually, in 1965, Hungarian was allowed as a liturgical language (see also Ivancsó 1995; Pusztai 2005). This was seen as a victory and in the current debate about how to reorientalize the liturgy, no one actually pleads for a return to ancient liturgical languages (Church Slavonic, Greek) or recognized vernacular languages (Romanian). This illustrates how different this trend is from the Catholic traditionalist movements, which recently obtained permission from the Pope to use Latin as a liturgical language again (Tabard 2007). Yet, in the postsocialist context, this quest for Greek roots has taken new forms: literature in Hungarian about Greece and Byzantine Orthodoxy became available after the end of socialism. Agnés, a priest's wife, explains:

[11] Several small Christian Orthodox Churches (Russian, Greek, Romanian, Serb, and Bulgarian) in Hungary have an ethnic dimension.

> What happened is that, in the beginning of the 1990s, when religion was liberalized, some books were published in Hungarian, a literature that allowed us to get more information about Greek Orthodoxy, about Byzantine Orthodoxy. And what I remember as well is that in 1990–91 there was a flood of reproductions of icons. Before, it was only the Latin style, Mary, the Sacred Heart, but then we discovered the Greek icons. What is at stake, in this search for eastern roots, is the depth of the religious experience. It is characteristic of people who have a certain demand in their faith, people for whom Greek Catholicism isn't only attending Sunday's mass, quickly, fifty minutes and that's it, but people who want more, who want to deepen their faith.

For Agnés and many of my informants, the search for Eastern roots in Greece is connected with the intensity of the religious experience. For her, it is characteristic of people not satisfied by weekly church attendance, but looking for something else, something stronger. My informants were overrepresented by the advocates of a re-orientalization of the Church, who share Agnés's arguments about the depth of the religious experience. It is hard to estimate with precision their influence within the HGCC, but many know each other, and are often related to one another. The Greek Catholics are a rather small religious group (230,000 believers, located mostly in northeast Hungary) with a very centralized church in one diocese. The 236 Greek Catholic priests practice a high level of endogamy among the sometimes very large priestly families:[12] families with seven or eight children are not unusual. Many informants proudly noted this point. Besides regular weekly religious life, many events are organized for all the Hungarian Greek Catholics, often by the 'pro-East' advocates.

Religious Events and Social Interaction

Before presenting the religious events that mark the liturgical year, I must emphasize that a crucial place for the first socialization of the Greek Catholic elite is the Benedictine High School and Boarding School of Pannonhalma. Although it is situated in western Hungary, far from the historical Greek Catholic area in northeast Hungary, this was one of the few religious schools that stayed open during the socialist period, and many students from Greek Catholic families were sent there to study. During my field trip in 2004, I was helped in starting my fieldwork by a sociologist, a practicing Roman Catholic, who had studied in Pannonhalma during the 1980s. Many

[12] According to the Byzantine rules, Greek Catholic priests have no obligation to celibacy.

of the priests we met had studied there; our meetings always began with references to the priests' common acquaintances.

During my fieldwork, I took part in many activities organized by the Greek Catholic Church. Once a year, young people make a pilgrimage on foot to Máriapócs (the *ifjúsági gyalogos zarándoklat*).[13] In 2005, when I took part in the group's arrival in Máriapócs, the walk had started on 7 August at Sátoraljaújhely, some 80 kilometres away from the shrine. The group stopped in Dámóc, a very important Greek Catholic monastery led by two monks who play a crucial role in the dissemination of Eastern spirituality to the youth, and arrived in Máriapócs on 12 August, to celebrate the youth's pilgrimage (*Ifjúsági Búcsú*). The large group gathered near the cathedral *(kegytemplom)*, and sang scout-like secular songs. Later, 200 young people attended an *Acathist* prayer session[14] in the cathedral. Many stayed until the Feast of the Assumption on 14 and 15 August (*Nagy Búcsú*), when tens of thousands of pilgrims gathered from all over Hungary and neighbouring Slovakia and Ukraine. The pilgrimage to Máriapócs, which I attended in 2004 and 2005, is a very important event for the HGCC. Many pilgrims arrived on 14 August, slept overnight around the cathedral, and took part in the late-night liturgies. Many liturgies were celebrated during the pilgrimage, and additional prayer sessions included the rosary. After the Assumption morning's open-air liturgy, pilgrims went inside the cathedral to kiss the miraculous weeping icon of Our Lady of Máriapócs.[15] An important open-air fair takes place every year during the days of the pilgrimage, where many Latin-style religious pictures and statues are sold. Máriapócs is an important place for Hungarian Greek Catholics, both fervent believers and occasional churchgoers.

In August 2005, I participated in the KÖZ (*Keresztény Összejövetel Zemplényben*, a retreat/summer camp) in Sárospatak, a town in northeast Hungary. The participants, 14–20 years old, took part in cultural events, theatre, and spiritual exercises. During the other religious events I attended, for example, ordinations to the priesthood (like the one I attended in Göröm-

[13] Many retreats are held during the summer, like the *Szent Damján tábor* in Komlóska organized by the Nyíregyháza seminary students.

[14] *The Acathist Hymn to the Mother of God,* from the sixth century, is considered a typical Byzantine prayer hymn exalting the mystery of the Incarnation.

[15] The weeping icon, painted in 1675 in a popular Carpathian Baroque style (Puskas 1991) is said to have wept for the first time in 1696. The emperor's troops then transferred it to St Stephen's Basilica in Vienna, where it never wept again. A second icon was painted and shed tears twice, in 1715 and 1905. What remains of it has been put into a golden frame, inside Mariapócs Basilica, which hosts an enormous Baroque iconostasis.

böly in August 2004),[16] but also during my visit to the Greek Catholic communities of Budapest and in western Hungary, I always met someone who knew someone I had already met. Agnés, married to a Greek Catholic priest, explains that most practicing Greek Catholics know each other, even the occasional churchgoers:

> What makes the Greek Catholics different from the rest of the Churches is that they all know each other. For instance, if someone moves to Budapest, and goes to the church in Rozsáktere, very often he or she will find common acquaintances; even if they don't know the faces, they know they all come from the same region. And all the events taking place within our diocese, all the people who have a religious practice, even on a smaller scale, they know about it, going to Máriapócs once or twice is enough to know the people. Since it is such a small diocese, there are some people, some priests, who put people in touch, 'Ah! But I know him or her! Ah! But I do know him/her as well!' or 'But me too I took part in this spiritual exercise! Me too!' And one realizes very quickly then the personal dimension of the life of the Church.

I too quickly became familiar with such a personal dimension, which I also experienced in Romania during my research Greek Catholic communities there. Yet, during my fieldtrips in 2004 and 2005 in Hungary, I was impressed by the difference from what I had witnessed in Romania during previous research on their still emerging Greek Catholic Church. Certainly this personal dimension existed as well, but the Romanians' priority was the return of property rather than defining the liturgical norm (Mahieu 2009). In Romania, there was a balance between the advocates of a return to the Eastern tradition, and the defenders of the status quo, a combination of Latin and Eastern elements in the liturgy, who claim that a too radical attempt to change it would lead the faithful out of the Church. I did not encounter such a balance in Hungary; there my strong impression was that the vast majority of the people I met on different occasions favoured a return to the Eastern tradition.

The *Vad Bizánciak*: Fundamentalists, Rigorists, or Charismatics?

How to define this movement? Interestingly, my informants who do not share their views call them the extremists or the wild Byzantines (*Vad Bizánciak*). They seem to share common characteristics with other religious

[16] I met there a group of Italian scouts who belonged to the Italo-Albanian Catholic Byzantine Church. They came from the region of Piana degli Albanesi in Sicily. Their chaplain had studied in Rome with the young Hungarian priest.

movements that advocate a return to tradition and religious purification. Anthropological and sociological literature abounds with terminology to classify these religious movements, which want to 'purify' the religious tradition: fundamentalism, rigorism, extremism, traditionalism, and integrism. The term 'fundamentalist' has been used in various religious contexts: it was used in the 1920s to describe Evangelical Protestantism in the United States and was later extended to qualify Islamist movements, as well as revivalist groups in Judaism, Hinduism, and other religions (Harding 1991; Gellner 1992; Bruce 2000; Riesebrodt 2000). It is connected with the idea that 'a given faith is to be upheld firmly in its full and literal form, free of compromise, softening, re-interpretation or diminution' (Gellner 1992: 2), and often has pejorative overtones. In a recent article, Makrides (2004) prefers 'rigorism' to 'fundamentalism', in order to describe a movement in the Greek Orthodox Church, arguing that the first term is more neutral than the latter. Makrides's article is of great interest because very few authors in the literature on religious traditionalism have studied Eastern Christianity. Rigorism in Greece is heterogeneous and exemplified by movements such as the Old Calendarists who deny the Gregorian calendar reform, the Zealots of Mount Athos, some brotherhoods like *Zoi*, and organizations like the Pan-Hellenic Orthodox Union. These very diverse movements share a vision of the Greek Orthodox Church as the staunch guardian of the nation and the truth, and a critical attitude towards its current positions favouring ecumenical dialogue and pro-European statements (for Russia, see Rock 2003). The terms extremism and traditionalism also often appear in the literature (Casanova 1997). In the French context of the Lefebvrist schismatic movement, the *intégristes* followed Archbishop Lefebvre after his excommunication, while the *traditionalistes* decided to stay within the Catholic Church (Tabard 2007: 35). However, all these terms emphasize these movements' anti-modern, anti-European, socially conservative orientations, often linked to specific territories, which have little to do with the positions of the trend I am studying here, which is to be seen as part of a more globalized movement.

'Charismatics' seems a more appropriate term for the advocates of a re-orientalization of the HGCC, both for the nature of the religious experience they promote and the transnational dimension of their movement. It refers to the *charisma*, the gift of the Holy Spirit, and to the atmosphere of early Christianity. Charismatic movements (often associated with Pentecostal movements and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost) advocate a religious renewal through a deeply emotional and spiritual religious experience; they are increasingly transnational movements (Poewe 1994; Coleman 2000). Even though, as previously mentioned, the idea of renewal belongs

by definition outside of Eastern Christian theology, the arguments made by those among the Hungarian Greek Catholics who want to return to the Eastern tradition are much closer to those defended by the charismatic movements. Among the priests I met, several mentioned that they organized *Cursillo* sessions. The *Cursillo* (literally 'little course' in Spanish) is an intense spiritual movement, which originated in the 1940s in Spain. This originally Roman Catholic movement has been extended to some Protestant Churches such as the United Methodist Church (Blackwell 1991). The *Cursillo* movement is often associated with the *Catholic Charismatic Renewal* movement, a powerful movement born in the 1960s among Catholic believers disappointed by the lukewarm religious experience they encountered in their church (McGuire 1975; Csordas 2007). Yet, as I will argue, the type of charismatic Christianity advocated within the HGCC presents significant differences from its Roman Catholic counterpart, most of all in moral matters, but also in the status of the Holy Spirit. As theologian Robert Taft argues, while the old Roman Catholic *Canon Missae* is most of all Christological and does not mention the Holy Spirit, the Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom is radically Trinitarian and puts a great emphasis on the Holy Spirit (Taft 1999: 37).

One of my first questions was to evaluate the real influence of the *Vad Bizánciak*. Was my 'entry' to the field biased from the beginning? Unlike Romania, where I conducted intensive fieldwork in 1998–2000 and where I could start my research without meeting top members of the Greek Catholic hierarchy, I soon realised that in Hungary I would have to go through certain official channels if I wanted to conduct proper fieldwork. A possible consequence of the 'snowball technique' in ethnography is being sent to people who shared my first informants' views: possibly limiting my access to people not on this quest for Eastern spirituality. In addition, my access to those who do not advocate a return to 'the East' was very difficult, because Hungary has a much lower level of church attendance than Romania, especially among young people (in 1999, more than 90% of Romanians had attended church but barely 50% of Hungarians; see Zrinščak 2004). Finding churchgoers was much more difficult in Hungary than in Romania; therefore, I contacted them mostly through organized church channels. In Romania, my Greek Catholic informants identified the danger that people would stay (or come back, after a Greek Catholic attempt - see Zerilli in this volume) in the Orthodox – or less often the Roman Catholic – Church. In Hungary, my Greek Catholic informants expressed this fear as well (about the Roman Catholic Church) but, most of all, presented secularization as the biggest threat for the younger generation. Gábor, a priest in a suburb of

Budapest whose influence in the HGCC is important, commented on the low level of church attendance among Greek Catholic youth:

> It is a rather disappointing reality, but I think it depends on us. The everyday life in our Budapest parishes is really calm, tepid. Young people say: 'Why should I go [to the church]?' I always say that if I wasn't a priest, I wouldn't go to the church! Why go? The mass is short, a few words, no, really, it isn't worth…

Gábor, who passionately advocates a return to the East, presents it as a solution to the problem of young people not attending church. For him, the liturgy and the Latin devotions that accompany it, lack intensity; this explains why people, especially among the younger generations, do not attend church. From that point of view, the contemporary Hungarian situation resembles the recent religious patterns in Western Europe as described by sociologists: young people switch from regular weekly attendance at Mass to, on the one hand, no church attendance at all, and, on the other hand, a more occasional but very intense participation in collective gatherings such as the *World Youth Days* (1997 in Paris, 2000 in Rome, 2005 in Cologne) or meetings at the ecumenical Taizé community (Davie 2000: 149). This 'religious sociability of emotional communities' (Hervieu-Léger 1997: 113) became clear in my discussions with the youthful participants in the KÖZ retreat: most were occasional churchgoers. Some were non-practicing Roman Catholics with a Greek Catholic background and some irregular Greek Catholic churchgoers.

Through other channels, I eventually could meet other HGCC members outside the very visible and influential movement advocating a reorientalization of the church. Again, the difference with Romania was striking: in Romania, due to a forty-year prohibition, everything had to be reconstructed, including the definition of the rite. Those believers not in favour of a return to Eastern roots gave explicit arguments. They thought that both variants (the Latin and the Byzantine) had their beauty: the first being more accessible, the second more intense, and that combining the two was not a problem. They continually compared the various rites and sometimes argued with the priests about what the Greek Catholic liturgy should be like. This probably results from the majority of my Greek Catholic informants having attended the Roman Catholic Church and/or the Orthodox Church during the socialist period, and therefore having an awareness of a 'pure' Latin or Byzantine rite (Mahieu 2009). In Hungary, on the contrary, my informants usually answered my questions about why they did not favour a 'purification' of the rite by saying that they did not see any reason to do anything other than what their ancestors had done. Except for the most fervent, my younger informants were not very aware of an Eastern trend. The HGCC

has, on the one hand, a numerically small but extremely influential trend represented by the advocates of a return to the East, which encompasses, on a looser basis, occasional young churchgoers looking for short, intense religious experiences. On the other hand, a group generally composed of elderly people attached to their hybrid Latin-influenced prayers and supported by the HGCC Bishop considers radical changes unnecessary.

Yet, the two trends should not be considered as a mechanical opposition between the elite and the people, between modernity and tradition, between official and popular religion, or a generational problem. First, even though almost all advocates of re-orientalization belong to the elite, part of this elite (including the bishop!) defends the status quo because they do not want to create unnecessary tensions. József, a priest, explains:

> It is not that easy to keep peace and unity within our diocese. Today, I think that there is less [eastern] extremism; our Bishop tries to bring peace in liturgical matters, even though he had a strong eastern sensibility. […] But he likes liturgical peace, he wants to keep the situation as it is today; it is not ideal, but it is not too bad either. I agree with him, even though I think that some little changes are necessary.

Second, the classical opposition between tradition and invention is blurred in the HGCC: the advocates of a return to the – sometimes invented – traditions, are, sociologically speaking, the most modern people, who live in cities and travel abroad. In addition, this quest for a purified liturgy does not go along with a moral conservatism: in this domain, the Eastern conception of morality is very visible within the HGCC. As Robert Taft notes, the Latin Church always put a strong emphasis on the moral aspects of religious life, while the Eastern Churches were more interested in 'the mystery of the Church than on its earthly forms' (Taft 1999: 32). The quest for spiritual depth and liturgical authenticity presented by my informants does not apply as much in moral domains within the Catholic charismatic movements. The fact that in the Greek Catholic Churches, priests do not have the obligation to celibacy certainly influences the type of morality they teach, and in this domain there is probably more moral conservatism in rural regions than in the cities. The partisans of a liturgical purification are aware that the only way to stem the massive drop in church attendance, especially among young people, is to follow the current trends in European religion: promoting occasional highly emotional religious experiences rather than weekly services. The major argument to promote a return to the 'true' rite is that the Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom belongs to the Greek Catholic tradition – deeper, more intense than the Latin tradition – and that those who

promote such a return connect with Eastern spirituality. In the next section, I will illustrate how they try to implement this return in their parishes.

How to Learn the Tradition and How to Transform It

The first issue I will address is the level of formalism of the current liturgical norm. I often asked my informants how the knowledge of the rite is learned and transmitted. I was, of course, thinking of what I had seen in Romania, where, everything had to be redefined from nothing; but also where the liturgical norm defined by the Romanian Orthodox Church was a clear landmark. However, in Hungary, who defines the tradition? Of course, the norm is the Byzantine Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom. The current Hungarian version of the liturgy was translated from Greek, and differs from the Rusyn or the Romanian versions (Ivancsó 1995). The Orthodox and the Greek Catholic liturgies differ primarily in that the Greek Catholic version tends to be shorter. There is no 'Small Litany', and only the first verse of the antiphons is said. In addition, the two first antiphons are cut off, and sometimes the litanies following the antiphons are also suppressed. This explains why a Greek liturgy can last up to four hours, while the Greek Catholic liturgy's length rarely exceeds one hour. This can vary from one country to another, but since there was no rupture during the socialist period, the liturgical norm seems more or less homogeneous in Hungary. This homogeneity also results from many priests coming from priestly families; for example, my informant Péter, the son and grandson of Greek Catholic priests:

> We have our own [liturgical] tradition, and half of the clergy comes from a priestly family: This is why we know what the liturgy looks like, we have landmarks. Yet, the oral norm is always confirmed by small *Liturgicon* [service book] editions.

Indeed, this norm has to be confirmed by the bishop. Recently, some younger priests who studied in Rome, read Greek, and have access to Greek liturgical literature have introduced prayers or parts of the liturgy that do not correspond to the established norm. András, who is clearly in favour of the return to the East, explains how the bishop defines the liturgical norm:

> It is often made in an indirect way, when someone is sanctioned, then we know that it doesn't correspond to the Bishop's standpoint! [he laughs]. But in the Bishop's circular letters, this point is not addressed, or very rarely. But we know what his positions are, because every time he sees a priest who practices the liturgy in a different way than his, then… [laughs].

This quotation reflects a common trend among the younger generation of priests who understand that the bishop wants to keep peace in the diocese, but would like the changes to be more radical. One should also not forget the

role played by the priest's wife in the everyday life of a parish, which also includes liturgical matters, such as the preparation of the *prosphora*, the bread of the Eucharist. Agnés, married to a Greek Catholic priest, explains how priests' wives learn the liturgical norm:

> There are two ways to learn how to make the *prosphora* and other things: the first one is that very often, the priests' wives are themselves daughters of priests, therefore they have seen their mother doing it; they've learned it since they were children. The other way, like for me, who doesn't come from a priestly family, is to learn with your mother-in-law. Mine was both a daughter and a wife of a priest. If you don't have either a mother or a mother-in-law, and well before the ordination to priesthood of your husband, you will participate in special exercises, as part of a spiritual training you get as the wife of a future priest.

Their role is crucial in the sense that they sometimes have a closer contact with the groups of elderly women who cherish the rosary or other Latin prayers than their husbands may have, and can play an important role as go-betweens. Indeed, the most visible Latin elements of the HGCC religious life are not part of the Divine Liturgy itself, but are prayers such as the rosary or the cult of the Sacred Heart. Moreover, elderly people are very attached to these prayers. As János, a priest in Nyíregyháza, explains how he gradually introduced the Acathist Hymn instead of the rosary:

> We have to be very careful and to implement this renewal very slowly. If not, it will perturb the faithful, and they will go to the Roman Catholic Church. If we fight among us, the faithful will look for a quieter place. For instance, the rosary was a very Latin prayer; in my parish they used to practice it, and I let them. I said: 'Pray! Pray!' It is important to pray. And then, little by little, we introduced the Acathist Hymn, an eastern prayer, to venerate the Mother of God. And now, they sing and pray the *Acathist*, they don't do the rosary anymore. But we didn't say: 'Stop the rosary now!' We did it slowly, gradually.

This shows that even the most passionate advocates of an introduction of Eastern prayers are aware that this cannot be done without important pedagogical work among their parishioners. The last section will illustrate how a young priest, also a fervent advocate of re-orientalization of the HGCC, was sent to a small village and tries to implement his reform agenda without hurting his parishioners.

András, a priest in his forties, was appointed to a small, 'traditional' village in the Zemplén area of northeast Hungary. He openly advocates a rediscovery of the HGCC's Eastern roots. He studied in the Nyíregyháza

seminary in the early 1990s, and recognizes that this period corresponds to the most pro-Oriental trend in the seminary, when the students studied patristic Greek, liturgical Greek, and so on. Since being appointed to the village with his young wife, he has been trying to smoothly change the habits of his parishioners, but he recognizes that a rapid and radical return to a 'pure' Byzantine form of the liturgy is not possible, and perhaps not even desirable. And, indeed, during the Vespers liturgies I attended, I could see long rosary sessions with primarily elderly women participating, especially during the weekday offices. The priest's wife led the choir. The small village church is in a very Latin style with many representations of the Sacred Heart, Latin frescos, and a very baroque iconostasis. Even though András knows of his parishioners' possible resistance to new, more Eastern forms of prayers, he implements the changes through careful teaching:

> As soon as there is an explanation, if it is well explained, the believers follow the change with enthusiasm … For sure, the younger generation will not go on doing the rosary, they will probably adopt other forms of prayer more faithful to the eastern tradition. But I am sure that even if the rosary is replaced by a more eastern form of prayer, the elderly generation won't stand in the way of it; they will be wise enough to understand the benefits of it.

Besides the necessary consensus he had to reach with his parishioners about Latin prayers like the rosary, András expresses strong opposition to cutting off parts of the Divine Liturgy, even though this is not a leading position within the HGCC:

> If a priest cuts off the liturgy, no one blames him, but if someone tries to celebrate the liturgy in a truly complete way, conforming to the eastern tradition, one is immediately labelled as an eastern-oriented person, and is sent into the countryside, as a punishment.

One may speculate that this was his case, which seems likely. Yet, András took advantage of his off-centre position. His village, as well as several other villages I visited where the local priests are fervent partisans of a 'return to the East', has become a place of retreat for young Greek Catholics who live in urban areas. There they can have an intense, short-term Byzantine religious experience as in the Byzantine monastic tradition, characterized by its high degree of mysticism (Alfeyev 2000). András also successfully managed to create his own charitable NGO. As I have argued (Mahieu 2006), creating an independent Greek Catholic charity, in the context of HGCC's single diocese, is a way to gain autonomy from the bishop's positions in the lively debate about how deeply the liturgy should be purged of its Latin elements. In addition, many of my informants underlined that the biggest challenge in the next decade for the HGCC is keeping the younger generation. By orga-

nizing retreats and charitable activities, both based on Byzantine monastic mysticism, András has been able to implement, through an emotionalization of religion, the Byzantine religious renewal he advocates, without hurting his parishioners during their weekly participation. One could argue that this apparent quest for Eastern mysticism is more part of an 'orientalization' discourse, characteristic of this tiny minority of mostly young, well educated people, than a significantly different religious experience. The 'orientalizers' most certainly do not have the exclusiveness of a deep religious experience, which can be lived through other channels than the Eastern prayers. In addition, the mystical experience they advocate resembles other highly emotional religious moments such as the Taizé meetings or the World Youth Days. This is why, even though I underlined the theological differences between Latin and Eastern religious traditions, I have argued that the most pertinent way to classify the advocates of a re-orientalization of the HGCC is as *charismatics*.

Conclusion

Since Vatican II, but mostly during the past decade, the Vatican has strongly encouraged the European Greek Catholic Churches to tackle an important liturgical change and eliminate, in these highly hybrid churches, the Latin elements gradually introduced to the Byzantine Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom throughout the centuries. This illustrates recent Vatican positions in its role as a 'globalized actor' seeking increased ecumenical dialogue with the Eastern Orthodox Churches. I have focused in this paper on the Hungarian Greek Catholic Church's responses to the Vatican's appeal. Even though the HGCC, because of its favourable situation during the socialist period, was the first Greek Catholic Church to start implementing the Vatican's instruction, the speed and the form of this 'anti-syncretic' process has resulted in a lively debate.

The higher authorities of the HGCC have recently adopted a consensual position towards this change, arguing that Hungary cannot go faster than its sister churches. However, a significant proportion of the priests and the most devoted believers argue that liturgical re-orientalization is the only way to stem the ongoing secularization of Greek Catholic youth and to live a true, intense religious experience. In a country with no national Orthodox Church, the HGCC regards Greek Orthodoxy, with its highly mystical tradition, as their reference when trying to define the tradition to which they seek to return.

The trend represented by the advocates of a liturgical purification is not characteristic of religious fundamentalism: they mostly hold pro-European positions and do not profess moral conservatism. This is much

more characteristic of charismatic movements, which put an emphasis on the depth of the encounter with God. However, the two trends that co-exist within the HGCC, one advocating liturgical purification, and the other more favourable to the status quo in order to maintain contact with the other, more Latinized Greek Catholic Churches, must reach an agreement. The ethnographical examples in this chapter illustrate how, at the parish level, even the most passionate advocates of a liturgical re-orientalization negotiate with their parishioners, especially among the elderly people who depend on Latin prayers. Through their charitable and spiritual activities such as short-term retreats or *Cursillo* sessions, however, they manage to retain their striving for a deep religious experience.

Because it remained free to operate during the socialist period, the HGCC did not need to undergo the same revitalization process as the other Greek Catholic Churches. Its current situation – as a dynamic minority church – reflects this distinctiveness. Like many other Central and Western European churches, however, the HGCC is confronted with a significant drop in church attendance because of the recent migrations from its traditional territory to Budapest and western Hungary. In addition, the neighbouring Greek Catholic Churches have started implementing the Vatican's instruction on liturgical purification. Therefore, one might expect that the 'Eastern trend' will strengthen its influence in the future.

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PART THREE

EXTERNAL REORDERING: PROPERTY, MEMORY AND RELIGIOUS COMPETITION

Chapter 7
'Real Men' in Postsocialist Transition: The Greek Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Neoliberalism in a Transylvanian Village

Filippo M. Zerilli

Is Romanian Greek Catholicism Disappearing?

In this chapter[1] I reflect upon some of the issues raised by the reconstitution of the Greek Catholic Church in Romania.[2] Particularly, this chapter focuses on postsocialist conflicts regarding the restitution of the former Greek Catholic places of worship, most of which have been – and currently are – used by the Orthodox Church, although the buildings are legally under state administration. The question at the national level includes two inherently interconnected issues (see Zerilli 2005): a conflict of authority between the state and the dominant church (the Orthodox Church representing almost 87% of the Romanian population) and a rivalry between two 'national

[1] This chapter is dedicated to Laurențiu Moisin, *in memoriam*. I would like to thank Stéphanie Mahieu for her provocative editorial suggestions on earlier drafts of this essay. I am indebted to many people in Mihalt, and I wish to express my profound gratitude to all of them, especially to Petrica Stinea and his family. Funding for fieldwork came from the University of Cagliari. The usual disclaimers apply.

[2] Other works provide more details on the historical circumstances that gave birth to the Romanian Greek Catholic Church (see Somesan 1999, also Magocsi, this volume). Briefly, this institution was formed in late seventeenth-century Transylvania, when the Habsburg regime persuaded Orthodox priests to accept Catholicism and the authority of the Pope and gain equal civil rights with the Catholic Church and the Hungarian and German Protestant Churches. While uniting with the Roman Catholic Church (from which comes its official name: the 'Romanian Church United with Rome – Greek Catholic', also known as the 'Uniate Church') the new confession could maintain its Eastern (Orthodox) liturgical ceremonies (thus, it is also known as the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite). After 1990, many studies of this church appeared (see, among others, Prunduş and Plaianu 1999; Bota and Ioniţoiu 2001; Stirban 2001; Vasile 2003a, 2003b). However, despite some exceptions (e.g. Mahieu 2003, 2004; Zerilli 2005), few scholars have approached the recreation of the Romanian Greek Catholic Church after 1989 from an ethnographic perspective. For a summary presentation of all of the religious confessions represented in Romania see Brânzea and Ioniţa (1999).

churches' about the right to possess the loyalty of the nation (see Verdery 1999: 74–7). Considering this, it is not surprising that no postsocialist government has succeeded in finding a legal solution for the restitution of 2,600 Greek Catholic places of worship (according to APADOR-CH 2001). The lack of legal resolution partially explains why the ongoing reconfiguration of the Greek Catholic parishes after 1989 has had so many different outcomes around the country (see Mahieu 2003, 2004).[3]

According to the 2002 national census, Greek Catholics in Romania represent a very small minority, less than 1 per cent of the population; in comparison, 7 per cent of the population had called themselves Greek Catholics before a 1948 declaration (Decree n. 358/1948) banned this particular religious confession and pushed its clergy and believers to join the Orthodox Church. Moreover, the number of Greek Catholic faithful decreased by 15 per cent between 1992 and 2002, and, as a result, some observers argue that the Greek Catholic Church will disappear, its followers gradually absorbed by either the Roman Catholic or the Orthodox Church (see Baconski 2004). Interestingly, some informants claim that this process is by no means the result of a lack of interest in Greek Catholicism; rather, they say, it should be considered the result of an institutional and political plot that aims at nothing less than 'to kill the Greek Catholics' or more subtly 'to let them fade away' (as one informant put it).[4]

However, if the national figures tell us something about what sociologists would call 'a trend', they do not say much about the social processes that allowed the actual remaking of Greek Catholic belonging in certain localities and not in others. In other words, we do not know very much about the particular reasons for the successes and failures of Greek Catholicism. Therefore, it seems relevant to study, from an ethnographic perspective, the everyday social practices that facilitate, produce, prevent, or even obstruct the reconfiguration of Greek Catholic parishes in the context of postsocialist Romania, exploring 'tactical' (Wolf 2000) as well as 'structural' (Wolf 2000, echoing Foucault 1977, 1984) local, and global forms of power dynamics in which they are embedded.

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[3] With the institutionalization of the interconfessional 'Joint Dialogue Commissions' (through Law No. 126/1990), the state left the problem of restitution of Greek Catholic properties to religious hierarchies and finally to the courts. In actual practice, this legitimized the status quo, clearly at the expense of the minority confessions, as many observers have noticed (see, e.g. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2005). As a consequence, the number of Greek Catholics is significantly decreasing at a national level.

[4] For a detailed examination of the legal aspects involved in the restitution of Greek Catholic places of worship see Turcescu in this volume. On the particular legal case concerning the recovery of the Bucharest Greek Catholic church 'Sf Vasile-Polona', see Zerilli 2005.

Before discussing an ethnographic case, in the next section, I outline how the 'spirit of neoliberalism' could be profitably theorized and 'localized' in contemporary Romania.

Localizing Neoliberalism

In recent years (at least since Harvey 1990), many social theorists have become increasingly concerned about 'the global'. Anthropologists have reacted critically to this trend but nonetheless have contributed significantly to a still growing body of literature on what is commonly known as 'globalization' (e.g. Inda and Rosaldo 2002). Given their traditional commitment to 'the local' and thus theorizing differently about 'the global' (see Tsing 2002), most anthropologists disagree with the idea that global processes simply imply cultural homogenization. Predictably, at the level of everyday social practices and discourses, any presumed cultural homogeneity almost immediately dissolves. I suggest that a similar argument can be usefully applied to another powerful concept just as elusive and akin to globalization, namely 'neoliberalism'. Neoliberalism is widely employed in current anthropological scholarship and its use will probably increase significantly in the future.

According to Gledhill (2004: 340), neoliberalism 'is the ideology of the period in which capitalism deepened to embrace the production of social life itself, *seeking* to make a commodity of the most intimate of human relations and the production of identity and personhood' (my italics). Among others (see Harvey 2005), this definition is a stimulating starting point; instead of characterizing neoliberalism simply as a historical social fact, it underscores neoliberalism's ideological dimension and most of all its only relative effectiveness. In fact, if the prominent feature of neoliberal ideology is to commoditize 'the most intimate of human relations', it is not at all certain *if* and *how* it will be able to do so. In other words, methodologically it is worth stressing the utopian character of neoliberal ideology, a feature well described by Pierre Bourdieu (1998). Bearing this in mind, I suggest treating neoliberalism as a complex set of possibly conflicting projects only partially achieved. Neoliberalism here is not conceived as a single coherent and accomplished 'thing'. Following Moore (2004), we could describe neoliberalism as a 'concept-metaphor' of heuristic value, one that should help us to avoid the risk of reification of 'the global'. After all, what we can observe, as ethnographers, is not neoliberalism per se – an abstraction – but rather how single individuals and groups cope, engage, and come to terms with neoliberal discourses and practices, and how symbolic (ideological and material) changes might be produced in these social and political processes. It follows that neoliberalism could be better grasped as a complex of concrete relation-

ships entailing socially constructed images and behaviours, including cultural ambivalence and ambiguity. Therefore, anthropologists are well positioned to contribute to an understanding of what, echoing Max Weber (1965 [1905]), I refer to as the 'spirit of neoliberalism', asking how it actually takes shape in a concrete historical, ethnographic realm.

Notwithstanding its hegemonic position within the current processes of globalizing or 'fast' capitalism, the ideology of neoliberalism must be submitted to analytical scrutiny, notably studying how it is locally talked of, practiced, perceived, appropriated, and creatively elaborated by different social actors in specific social fields, commonly characterized by struggle and contestation (see Bourdieu 1980). From this perspective, I am not certain that it is useful to distinguish between anthropological research concerned *with* neoliberalism and an anthropology *of* neoliberalism itself, as someone has interestingly suggested (Hoffman, DeHart and Collier 2006). Ultimately, could studying how people (regardless of their position within global and/or local network of powers) cope with and make sense of the 'spirit of neoliberalism' in particular localities and temporalities be the way to articulate finally what neoliberalism is all about? This implies dissolving the artificial opposition between the places from which neoliberalism presumably spread (the global) and the places where it is seemingly applied, reproduced, resisted, or whatever (the local). In short, for a better understanding of what neoliberalism is and how it works, we should try to show, globally and locally, how neoliberalism is specifically localized.

In postsocialist Romania, people have been facing major political, economic, national, and international changes, from the dismantling of the socialist regime up to entry into the European Union in January 2007. In this context, neoliberal principles and policies, such as privatization, deregulation, flexible labour policies, and so on, guide the 'transition' – presumably towards democracy and a market economy – as even a simple survey of the influential role played by institutional actors such as the IMF and the EU in Romania easily demonstrates.[5] Paradoxically, while neoliberal programs and techniques no longer offer precisely what they promised sixteen years ago, the undeniable changes they introduced could also represent powerful opportunities for local communities; people can use their own economic and cultural resources, including neoliberalism, to enact political and social transformation.

As demonstrated in the specific case discussed below, a crucial element for rearticulating the structure of power relations at the local level is the idea that individual liberty and human rights, especially religious free-

[5] See, for instance, the annual *Regular Report on Romania's Progress towards Accession*, by the Commission of the European Communities.

dom, can best be protected and achieved within a context of effective private property rights and that the necessary conditions for a better world include a free market, competition, and trade. Interestingly, this imagined better world, according to both neoliberal theorists and local actors, one in which individual initiative can best flourish, is locally supported by a parallel construction of a religious ethic (the Greek Catholic) alternative to the locally and nationally dominant Orthodox. From this perspective, histories and meanings associated with a peculiar religious tradition and the faith in private property rights are strictly interwoven. Therefore, here, private property is not simply the leading principle organizing the effective functioning of neoliberal democracy, it is also a powerful symbol used to secure religious freedom and most of all to construct a renewed ethical moral order. Conversely, 'religion' also serves strongly felt social and economic aspirations and ultimately becomes a vehicle to accompany a political, civilizing project.

In subsequent sections, I am not going to ask if Greek Catholic properties should be returned or not (I assume the answer is self-evident), or whether a place of worship belongs to the religious institution or to the community using it (a question I presume cynical). Rather, I will explore the relationship between an emerging Greek Catholic ethic and the globalizing 'culture of neo-liberalism' (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001), and ask how both intersect with local identity politics in a Transylvanian village called Mihalț where the construction of a new Greek Catholic church building reshapes the village's internal and external symbolic boundaries.

The remaining part of this chapter is organized as follows. First, largely using local narratives, I explore how the Greek Catholic faithful of Mihalț experienced failures and successes in their efforts to attain legal and social recognition. The next section, largely based on direct observation and conversation with and among villagers, illustrates how, with the construction of a new church alongside a number of related ventures, Greek Catholics are trying to redefine the village as a whole, projecting its role and future developments into a globalizing world. The subsequent section discusses further the connections between the emerging Greek Catholic ethic and the languages and practices of neoliberal ideology. Finally, using fieldwork observations, I draw some conclusions about a local claim for the recovery of a religious property acquiring meaning within a fast changing, rural neoliberalizing context.

Schism and Continuity in the Greek Catholic Community of Mihalț

Settled between Alba Iulia and Blaj, two Transylvanian towns with significant symbolic implications for the history of Romania and its Greek Catholicism,[6] Mihalț is a village with approximately 2,500 inhabitants. Currently three churches exist in the village: a Greek Catholic church (now run by the Orthodox Church), an Orthodox church and a Baptist church.[7] Additionally, the Greek Catholic parish recently (2003) recovered and restored a long-contested parish house that currently functions as its place of worship. Finally, in 2004, construction began on a Greek Catholic church.

For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the 'old (Greek Catholic) church', one of the two churches currently in use by the Orthodox faithful, and the 'new (Greek Catholic) church', the one now under construction. Through their positioning in relation to these two religious places, local people involved in the dispute creatively make sense of what has happened since 1989 and what is happening now, in Mihalț and beyond.

The village's population and 'ethnic' composition are essentially the same as before 1948,[8] but statistics on religious affiliation have been affected by the important changes between 1948 and 1989, as well as changes after

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[6] The union with the Catholic Church of Rome was officially proclaimed in Alba Iulia in 1698 (see Someşan 1999: 39). Moreover, Alba Iulia is the historical town where the unification of Transylvania with the old kingdom of Romania (containing the Moldavian and Walachia Principalities) was officially celebrated on 1 December 1918 (now the 'Day of the Nation') and formed the national political entity known as 'The Great Romania' (*România mare*, see Durandin 1995: 235–313). Blaj is the heart of the Romanian Greek Catholic Church, and since its creation has been its official seat. Interestingly, the Greek Catholic faithful often echo the nineteenth-century national poet Mihai Eminescu and refer to Blaj as 'little Rome' (*mică Romă*) an epithet that stresses its close ties with the center of the Catholic world.

[7] The Greek Catholic Metropolitanate of Blaj built the oldest and largest church of the village in 1890, apparently with financial support from the Vatican. Set on the principal road to the village centre, this is locally called 'the united church' (*Biserica unită)*, while it is also known as 'the lower church' (*Biserica din jos*). For administrative purposes after 1989, it was officially named Orthodox Parish II (*Parohia Ortodoxa II*). The second church, in size and date of construction (1903), is traditionally Orthodox and is called 'the hill church' (*Biserica din deal*) or 'the upper church' (*Biserica din sus*). Its official name is Orthodox Parish I (*Parohia Ortodoxa I*). While a bit confusing, the two official appellations well reflect the Orthodox appropriation of the Greek Catholic church. The third and smallest church of the village is the Baptist one, built under socialism in 1968.

[8] 'Ours is a purely Romanian village', say the villagers, often and smugly, implying that no Hungarians, no Jews, and no Roma are represented in Mihalț (this is only partially confirmed by the 2002 census data and by my own observations).

this period.[9] Between 1992 and 2002, the number of Greek Catholic faithful in Mihalț consistently declined. In order to explain why, we should set aside the image of the struggle between two religious communities. Interestingly, instead of evoking the competition between Orthodox and Greek Catholics, as the national press conventionally does, the locals prefer to explain this reduction as a result of a 'schism' within the Greek Catholic community. Greek Catholics themselves were eager to make plain to the ethnographer that there is no interconfessional conflict in Mihalț: 'we do not have anything against the Orthodox. In Mihalț we have always lived peacefully together and married between communities'.[10] In fact, what Greek Catholics found problematic was the fragmentation of the Greek Catholic community, or more precisely among those families that, before and during socialism, were all affiliated to the 'old church' and its cemetery. The image that most frequently appears in their narratives is that of a painful separation *inside* the Greek Catholic community (*dezbinarea comunității greco-catolice*), for which I have suggested here the word 'schism'. Thus, it seems important to understand how and why, according to local logic, this actually happened.

Staying in or Leaving the 'Old Church'

Usually, a painful separation has at least one culprit. Besides blaming communism, which was for Greek Catholics the symbol of their past and current humiliation, according to most of my informants, the Orthodox priest should be held responsible for the split in the religious community affiliated to the 'old church'. Appointed to this church in 1983, this priest decided in 1989 to keep the parish within the Orthodox structures, which forced the faithful to choose between staying in 'their church' or leaving it and moving somewhere else to join the recreated Greek Catholic parish, and return to their (or their parents') religion. Therefore, if the Orthodox priest, himself a Mihalț villager, born in 1948 and from a Greek Catholic family, had instead decided

[9] According to the 1930 census, Mihalț had 1,391 Greek Catholics and 1,361 Orthodox (see Breaz-Nucu 2001: 189). At the time of the first post-1989 census, in 1992, 866 people declared themselves Greek Catholic, 1,479 Orthodox, and 33 Baptist. The most recent census (in 2002) indicated the number of Baptists remained almost the same (35), the Greek Catholics decreased to 320 affiliates, while the Orthodox increased to 1,973 (official records from the Mihalț municipality, kindly communicated by Daniela Cârnaț for which I warmly thank her).

[10] The image of a harmonious coexistence of the two religious communities is a leitmotiv in the rhetoric between both Greek Catholic and Orthodox informants. Historically, despite the influential role played by nearby Blaj, two religious confessions have coexisted in Mihalț from the time of the unification with the Roman Catholic Church (see Breaz-Nucu 2001: 183–193). Similarly, interconfessional or 'mixed' marriages have always been and still are ordinary practices.

to bring his parish within Greek Catholic structures, the faithful of the 'old church' would have not suffered any division. Thus, most of the villagers, both Greek Catholics and many Orthodox, consider him 'the guilty one' (*el e de vină*).

Nevertheless, the Greek Catholic faithful speculate greatly about the reasons that pushed most of the people who actually declared themselves Greek Catholics in 1992 to remain in the 'old church', sacrificing, at least nominally, their traditional religious affiliation. Three main reasons are often given for this. First, they have a physical attachment to this place of worship (where they were baptized, married, and received religious education) and above all to the attached church cemetery, where members of their families are buried.[11] Second, they participate in or are close to the social network of the Orthodox priest's kinship and political alliances. The Orthodox priest, according to whom the Orthodox Church is 'clearly the genuine and most traditional Romanian religion' (in my interview with him), is well known for exercising enormous influence using both his religious knowledge and his close ties with members of the left-wing party coalition that led the Mihalț municipality from 1990 to 1996, and then again from 1999 to 2003. In the explanation why the majority of those who declared themselves Greek Catholics in the early 1990s decided not to leave the 'old church', a third important reason is 'personal interest'. This generally implies the material and economic benefits that traditionally derived from affiliation to the 'old church', such as the cultivation of arable land belonging to the church and the commercialization/consumption of its related products, as well as the working opportunities the church itself, actually the priest himself, could offer.

While widespread, these explanations are by no means exhaustive, nor are they mutually exclusive. Indeed, despite any analytical effort of locals or outside observers, including this ethnographer, they collapse any rigid distinction between economic, political, kinship, and religious factors. In fact, all these are strictly interwoven, defying any narrow definition of what religion is or how it could be explained. Within the symbolic geography of

[11] Elaborate rituals concerning the dead are intensely felt and widely practiced in Romania (for a recent appreciation see Geană 2005). Unsurprisingly, when a cemetery is contested by two religious communities this becomes a hostile and highly politicized arena, as is now the case in Mihalț. Similar tensions have been recently observed between Catholic religious factions in western Sicily (see Palumbo 2003: 89–110). On the political implications of postsocialist reburial practices see Verdery 1999 (especially pp. 55–93, discussing the reburial of the Transylvanian Greek Catholic Bishop, Inochentie Micu-Klein, in Blaj Cathedral, October 1997). In a different ethnographic context, among the Manus established in central France, Williams (2003) has produced a gifted analysis of the fundamental role the 'places of the dead' play in the politics of identity and difference.

the village, the 'old church' site materially expresses the complex combination of all these elements and probably others.

However, according to most members of the Greek Catholic minority group that decided to leave the 'old church' to recreate their own parish, no pragmatic motive is strong enough to cancel out what they call 'our tradition'. As one of them stated: 'we are not selling our faith!' (*noi nu ne vindem credința noastră!*). To be sure, their attachment to the 'old church' and its cemetery is no less strong than among those who decided not to leave this church. In fact, quite the contrary: their choice to celebrate religious services in unusual spaces, such as private backyards or the unheated classrooms of the municipal school, is precisely what turned the contested church into the public and tangible object of their religious fidelity. Paradoxically, stressing the superior value of their faith in contrast with various kinds of 'interests', their religious tradition materializes into the 'old church', that is a *valuable* good they will not renounce 'at any cost'.

Between 1995 and 2000, Mihalț had many reports of accusations, discrimination, and even physical violence towards Greek Catholic believers and the priests coming from the town of Blaj to celebrate their religious services outside the 'old church'. Among many stories from this period, the Orthodox priest supposedly went to the Greek Catholic Metropolitan in Blaj, holding a knife and threatened: 'If you keep sending Greek Catholic priests to Mihalț, I will cut your throat!' While anecdotal, this incident serves to introduce the next section; the question of being a 'real man', according to the people of Mihalț.

Strength, Pride, and Defence of One's Rights as Local Rhetorical Strategies

In 2001, things began to change, when the Metropolitanate of Blaj agreed to appoint as a new Greek Catholic priest to Mihalț, a man born in the village in 1974 and who grew up there. This young priest's two university degrees in history and theology and current doctoral studies at the 'Babeş-Bolyai' University in Cluj-Napoca, confer on him the prestige reserved for those who have acquired knowledge through study (*băiat cu carte*). Even more importantly he is, as the locals say, 'a son of the village' (*fiul satului*), that is a 'real' *Mihalțean*. This counts for a lot; being from Mihalț, he has, like his Orthodox counterpart, important local resources such as kinship-based and political alliances.[12] In addition, he addresses his faithful in the local lan-

[12] The hard core of the young priest's local alliances is based on families (including some of the larger Mihalț land owners) traditionally affiliated with the right-wing National Peasant Party – Christian Democrat (hereafter PNȚ-CD), the heir of the historical party with the same

guage, using the right words, and he represents, beginning with his robust appearance (he is 1.92 m. tall and weighs 120 kg), the socially standardized characteristics of being *Mihălțean*: strength (*forța fizică*), pride (*mîndrie*), bravery (*curaj*), masculinity (*bărbățimea*), attitude to work (*ştie să lucreze*), land ownership (*are pămînt*), and property spirit (*simțul proprietății*). These roughly summarized, stereotypical attributes of Mihalț distinctiveness play a leading role in the Greek Catholics' history of their progressive emancipation: from resistance to land nationalization during socialism and up to the current claims for the restitution of their church. Of course, those characteristics are not at all the monopoly of the Greek Catholic group; on the contrary, they are effectively evoked precisely because they are widely diffused and shared across the village, regardless of religious affiliation.

A brief review of Mihalț's popularly accepted history helps clarify how Mihalț villagers imagine their local identity in contrast with 'others' from nearby villages. Particularly important is the 300-page monograph celebrating the 713 years of the village's existence, written by the local historian Ioan Breaz-Nucu (2001). This work retraces the history of Mihalț from its first documented appearance in 1288, up to the end of socialism. Throughout the book, the author, himself a 'son of the village', underscores the villagers' active participation in the most important historical experiences of Transylvania and Romania including: the historically controversial Horea's Revolt in 1784 (see Verdery 1991: 215–255); the struggles for independence during the 1848 Revolution; the unification of Transylvania and Romania in 1918; and the opposition to land collectivization during socialism. According to Breaz-Nucu (2001 *passim*) on all these occasions, people from Mihalț demonstrated their bravery, pride, and combative character. In regards to the 'Butchery of Mihalț' (*Măcelul Mihalțului*), described as 'the bloody massacre opening the struggles between the Romanians and the Hungarians during the Revolution of 1848' (p. 82), Breaz-Nucu quotes a nineteenth century report compiled by the regional Hungarian authority:

> From ancient times, Mihalț was the nest of the most rebellious and least obedient of men with evil inclinations; on the other hand, they are lairds. In the past, they have given proof of insubordination….

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name founded between the two world wars. Despite the current PNȚ-CD crisis, the relationship between Greek Catholics and right-wing parties is still noticeable in many Transylvanian municipalities, especially in the Alba district, including Mihalț. On the other hand, post-1989 social-democratic and left-wing parties such as PDS or PD (often called 'neocommunists' by their adversaries) have generally supported the Orthodox Church and have been supported by it. Nevertheless, the Orthodox Church has constantly sought privileged affinity with those in charge, i.e. with all post-1989 governments regardless of their political tendency (see Mungiu-Pippidi 1998).

> They refuse to recognize any authority; they seek to occupy the land belonging to the lords and to expropriate their pastures.

The 1848 events, concludes the Mihalț historian, 'showed the government of the time that it is better not to mess around with people from Mihalț, especially when their lives and the defence of their rights are at stake' (p. 90).

While one can assume that the village's local history is differently weighted and articulated among the villagers, according to their personal education, knowledge and interest, in his Mihalț monograph, the local historian legitimizes the identity constantly performed, developed and reproduced in everyday social relations, discourses and practices. This is further confirmed by frequent stories and jokes concerning two objects important in agricultural work, the pruning knife (*cosor*) and the tractor. (The villagers take pride in possessing numerous tractors.[13]) While the *cosor*, a slightly curved knife mostly used to trim vines symbolizes Mihalț pride and the warlike character of the past, the tractor projects the local Mihalț identity into modernity.[14] Today, the tractor displays the essentials of what one Greek Catholic informant from Bucharest describes as, those 'real men' (*bărbații adevărați*) from Mihalț.

In the same way that he thoughtfully manages the history of Greek Catholicism, the young priest understands how to make use of these crucial objects articulating Mihalț local identity, both metaphorically and in actual practice. Notably, this means fighting the Orthodox priest's opposition to Greek Catholic believers entering their parish house, or to merging his activity as a pastor with that of a good farmer (*gospodar*), 'without any shame' as he says smiling to a visiting priest while driving his huge harvester. But most of all, he appropriates local virtues and translates them into the universal language of human rights, stressing notions such as Europeanization, modernization, religious pluralism, and democracy, while at the same time creating, for the 'Mihalț case', a complex representational strategy at regional, national and international level.[15]

Therefore, following the appointment of the young Greek Catholic priest, the conflict for the 'old church' in Mihalț left its strictly local dimen-

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[13] The total number of tractors (250), combine-harvesters (around 30) and other agricultural machine tools – actually far above the average in nearby villages – is frequently mentioned by Mihalț villagers as the unquestionable evidence of their renowned individual initiative, property-minded attitude and devotion or self-denial, as some villagers say, towards (agricultural) work.

[14] As several informants have ironically recounted: 'while in the past, we used to say *Look, the knife!* [*Nii cosorul!*], we now say *Look, the tractor!* [*Nii tractorul!*]'. Note that in Romanian this rather childish joke makes a rhyme.

[15] Incidentally, this also explains the friendly welcome Europeans and generally people from the 'West', including the ethnographer, receive in the village, at least among Greek Catholics.

sion through public demonstrations and protest initiatives between 2001 and 2003. Initially the activists protested before regional state institutions such as the Prefecture and the Council of Alba Iulia District. To stress the Greek Catholic contribution to the major event in Romanian history, they strategically organized protests to coincide with the 'Day of the Nation' (1 December) that celebrates the 1918 unification of Transylvania with Romania. Later, when the local conflict around the restitution of the Greek Catholic parish house reached its climax, the young priest, with the most devoted among his faithful, all dressed in Transylvanian peasant costumes, went several times to Bucharest to protest in front of central state institutions such as the government and the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs, as well as before international bodies such as various European and the U.S. embassies. Logistically supported by the Romanian section of the Caritas network and above all by the Bucharest Lay Association of Greek Catholics (AGRU-B) they announced extreme forms of protest such as the hunger strike, subtly using all their contacts with the national press and civic associations protecting human rights (including the politically influential APADOR-CH). During one Bucharest protest, I asked group members if they actually observed the hunger strike as printed on their banners, some laughed slyly. After all, what is important is that 'we make a mess!' (*trebuie să facem scandal!*), the young priest said, in order to reach a wider audience, that is, publicize their claims outside the narrow confines of an almost unknown village, Mihalț.

Finally, all these initiatives, widely publicized by the media, led the Minister of Culture and Religious Affairs, the art historian Răzvan Theodorescu, to propose an agreement between the two churches' official representatives. In order to end the conflict in Mihalț, the Orthodox Church agreed to return the parish house to the Greek Catholics, while the government assured funding for the construction of a new Greek Catholic church building, as well as for a new parish house for the Orthodox.

The Making of the 'New Church' or the Transfiguration of Mihalț

Encouraged by government funding as well as the PNȚ-CD led coalition's results in the 2003 local elections,[16] the Greek Catholic parish committee

[16] In June 2003, Mihalț elected its municipal council, which resulted in a new PNȚ-CD mayor whose work in favour of Greek Catholics has been widely known in the village since the early 1990s. The young Greek Catholic priest, appearing next to the mayor in political advertising during the 2003 electoral campaign, overtly promoted the winning coalition. While we could hardly affirm that all Greek Catholics expressed their vote in favour of the coalition led by the PNȚ-CD, the limited number of ballots that decided the election results (38 votes) certainly increased the significance of Greek Catholic political support. Unsurprisingly, a few months

euphorically inaugurated construction for the 'new church'. Some members regarded this as an authentic civilizing mission to reconcile the 'schism' suffered by the original Greek Catholic community in the early nineties. As the young priest and others speculate: 'when the new church is functioning, the lost little sheep [the Greek Catholics who remained at the 'old church'] will certainly join us at the new church in droves'.

Nevertheless, without any intent or calculation, the issue is the transformation of Mihalț itself. 'A church', says the accountant of the parish committee, 'is constructed once every two or three hundred years'. The faithful show awareness of participating in a project that will 'make a mark on history', something to transmit through generations and will leave evidence of their sacrifices and efforts. From this perspective, at the beginning of the construction, it was locally less relevant to know *when* the church would be completed than to discuss *how* and *for whom* it should be built.

According to architectural plans, the new church will be the largest in Mihalț with a bell tower ten metres higher than that of the 'old church': 'it will be seen from the Apuseni Mountains!' exclaims a Greek Catholic. In 2006 the ceiling and the floor of the church are not yet ready, and the parish committee wonders if money should be invested for a hidden heating and air conditioning system to encourage church attendance throughout the year. When I point out that as far as I know in Rome most churches have no heating at all, people are surprised.

The plans include building a new cemetery in the church's backyard. I was told that this would be in 'Western style, provided with crypts all arranged around a small garden *like in your countries*' (my italics). This is judged a much needed project to modernize and improve hygienic conditions, especially when considering the current state of the old cemetery, where 'the dead are buried one on top of the other', 'there is no place anymore', and 'they risk coming out of the earth', as one former Greek Catholic explained. Interestingly, he is one of those currently staying with the 'old church' but is prepared to move to the new one upon its completion.

In the house next to the church, two further projects are also planned: a nursery school and, more recently, an ethnographic museum. The first will be 'for all the children of the village', implying that its purpose would to help the community with increased child-care: 'the church is ours but open to everybody and if there is competition that's even better', someone said. Another church member immediately made clear: 'where there is competition something good always comes out of it, doesn't it?' The second project, the museum, aims to 'revitalize the traditions of the villagers, their time

following the local elections, the new council facilitated the administrative process for the recovery of property assets legally belonging to the Greek Catholic Church.

immemorial habits and their simple and healthy lifestyle' (quoting the young priest). However, the museum also aims to attract visitors and tourists to Mihalț.

Actually, the new church is seen as bringing Mihalț beyond its provincial, or more aptly perhaps, its 'parochial' borders, making it accessible to a wider community of people. One of the group predicted:

> During the most important holy celebrations Blaj will send a large number of priests and a choir; Romanians from other villages and districts, as well as tourists from abroad will come in order to visit the new church, as they do with the famous monastic centers of the region, Nicula and Râmeț.

At the same time, and in the same spirit, the young priest, whose role seems increasingly that of an executive managing a new enterprise, travels thousands of kilometres around Europe. Over several years, he repeatedly went to Germany, Austria, and Italy, and more recently to Spain. These expeditions primarily sought funding necessary to complete the construction of the church. However, these were also useful opportunities to strengthen or establish a network of institutional ties, such as the project to build links to a Spanish town with a recently settled migrant community from Mihalț and thus include Mihalț within a European circuit. In return, people from the 'West' are kindly invited to stay at the recently restored 1920s parish house, which some believers describe as 'a luxury residence provided with five star hotel facilities'.

Meanwhile, the young priest continues to negotiate with the Metropolitanate in Blaj over the interior decoration of the new church. Paintings will be made according to 'traditional religious canon and style'.[17] Nevertheless, the young priest explains, 'We want to produce something special and unique'. At the church entrance, a fresco will display Pope John Paul II next to George Bush, Senior and Mikhail Gorbachev. As the priest again makes plain: 'Those are the three men who destroyed communism and it is thanks to them our Church is reviving. Those three people exerted a powerful influence in destroying the red monster, which annihilated Greek Catholics'.

A process of monumentalizing Greek Catholic socialist and postsocialist suffering and struggles is now well advanced, and the concrete as much as symbolic image of the church construction site – right in the middle of the village – means that a transformation already in motion can be projected into the future, as even the very name given to the church metaphori-

[17] The iconostasis (i.e. the panel decorated with icons dividing the sanctuary from the nave) will display the identical religious scenes that appear on that of the Greek Catholic Cathedral in Blaj. As interior decoration a group of wall paintings will represent the Greek Catholic bishops, 'martyrs of communism', along with their major achievements.

cally suggests: 'The Transfiguration of Christ' (*Schimbarea la față a Domnului*). Ironically, at the local level, this explicitly recalls the secular transfiguration of Mihalț (*Schimbarea la față a Mihalțului*), namely, its transformation into a glorious, perfect village.

We still do not know *when* the 'new church' will be ready, and it is probably too early to predict successive developments and the social consequences of an ongoing cultural and political process. However, we now know that it will be the largest church in the village, providing evidence of the Greek Catholic past and actual presence in Mihalț. The church will possibly be heated during the winter and cooled in the summer, certainly looking towards 'Western' standards and values. This will be a church that publicly acknowledges the crimes perpetrated by the communists during the cold war and it will be open to all – Catholics, Orthodox, and other religious confessions – as well as to visitors and tourists. The church will provide social services such as a kindergarten and will promote educational activities as a cultural institution does. To summarize, a positive benefit for the global community with much to offer on what is often called the 'religious marketplace', even if we are far from being able to predict its actual success.[18]

In this last respect, the Greek Catholic parish of Mihalț has now initiated a new legal action for the recovery of the 'old church' and might, eventually, get it back. If this happens, by the time of the next census in 2012 and with two churches, the old and the new one, Greek Catholicism might become the mainstream confession of the village as it was before 1948, thus reversing the national statistical trend I noted at the beginning of this chapter. Instead of imagining a Greek Catholic disappearance, commentators would thus be forced to evoke the image of its prosperous rebirth, at least in Mihalț.[19]

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[18] In evoking the market metaphor I am not implying that 'rational choice theory' would best suit the purpose for understanding and explaining the nature of religious practice (on religion and rational choice theory see the sociological debate in Young 1997; see also Hann 2000 and the introduction to the volume). Because any general theory of religion presupposes a definition of religion, which is problematic (see Smith 1998), here I am more concerned in showing how a group actually invokes and uses a specific religious tradition in order to mobilize political and legal action. Thus, market metaphors and, more generally, neoliberal discourses and practices are first relevant at the local level. To what extent the Greek Catholic faithful (all or part of it) consciously participate in such an undertaking will not be resolved in this chapter. Obviously, the split within the Greek Catholic community that I discussed previously suggests that local subjects conceive 'religion', its role and functions, in different terms.

[19] According to rumours heard in Mihalț while carrying out fieldwork, if the Greek Catholics recover their 'old church' the Orthodox will soon build another church on a piece of land located right in the centre of the village (land they have recently purchased in order to build their new parish house).

God Helps Those Who Help Themselves

As most readers will certainly have noticed, this chapter's title recalls the celebrated work of Max Weber on the Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism (see Weber 1965 [1905]). While it is not my purpose to discuss Weber's thesis, it seems useful to provide some clarification.[20]

First, central to this chapter is the general perspective Weber put forward exploring the relationship between religion, politics, and economics. In fact, despite Weber's influential contribution, those spheres are frequently conceptualized, both in popular and accepted academic wisdom, as separate or independent social fields. More specifically, Weber's work establishes a connection between religious ideas, the Protestant 'ethic' or 'worldview', and the realm of economic practices, capitalism, and its 'spirit' or 'mentality'. In developing this inspiring perspective, Weber stresses the role of the Protestant concept of 'calling' (*Beruf*), suggesting how religious principles and values such as the doctrine of salvation could be and in some cases are secularized (see Weber 1965: 138–163). At the same time, in a somewhat isomorphic fashion, everyday secular practices such as work are imbued with religious ideas and values.[21] Finally, in Weber's work the distinct feature of the Protestant or, more precisely, Calvinist worldview is not only historically established but always relationally located, defined in contrast to other religious confessions, or even with respect to 'traditionalist' versions of Protestantism itself, such as Lutheranism (see Weber 1965: 165–258).

Unsurprisingly, Weber's analysis stimulates parallel reflections concerning the 'ethic of business' within different world religions, including Catholicism (see Novak 2002). Without claiming a Weberian perspective, I note significant similarities between Weber's argument and the situation of the Greek Catholic followers in Mihalț.[22] According to them, Greek Catholicism, as a distinct religious tradition, has clear and direct implications for political and economic development at the local and global level. Particularly, the claim of European and universalistic origin informs the Greek Catholic worldview with a number of related consequences for local dis-

[20] See Lehmann and Roth 1993 for a general assessment of Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Keyes 2002 has recently offered an original appreciation of Weber's work and its influence on English speaking anthropology.

[21] Incidentally, this is why Weber's thesis has been subjected to the criticism of being somewhat tautological. On the contrary, I would argue that his refusal to establish a rigid causal relationship between 'the religious' on the one hand and 'the secular' on the other, is precisely one of the most stimulating points about his contribution.

[22] The provocative idea of never-ending mutual conversations between 'folk voices' and 'centric texts' is finely developed in the work of Gudeman and Rivera 1991.

courses and actions.[23] Moreover, like Weber's Calvinists, Greek Catholics from Mihalț believe that 'God helps those who help themselves'. From their point of view, this should be clear enough if one looks at what they obtained thanks to their struggles for the 'old church'. According to them, state intervention, through the agreement promoted by the government, and the influence played by the official Greek Catholic hierarchy, that is, the role of Blaj, in settling the conflict in Mihalț were, after all, driven by the villagers' public protests and demonstrations carried out thanks to their aggressive spirit. Here Weber's framework is further (ethnographically) complicated by the existence of a historically legitimized local identity embodied in everyday social practices such as agricultural work, which plays a fundamental role in understanding the villagers' self-constructed images. Nevertheless, in Mihalț as in Weber's essay, specific ethical configurations emerge in relation one to the other, that is, via comparison. In transforming their struggle for the recovery of the 'old church' into a civil project of local development, Greek Catholics identify themselves as opposed to Orthodox conservatism (perhaps consistent with Weber's 'traditionalism').[24] In fact, despite their explicit refusal to portray the conflict over property in Mihalț as a controversy between two religious communities, the Orthodox ethic is the 'other' against which Greek Catholics construct their own social and political aspirations in order to transform and civilize Mihalț into a modern and pluralistic village, open to market principles and values.

Interestingly, in order to accomplish this civilizing mission, both secular and religious at the same time, God is not needed, but some 'real men', who know how to interpret the direction of history, who follow their religious traditions and who possess local knowledge and virtues. In fact, if the proposed project can be achieved, it is because its makers are enmeshed in village life and habits, and, above all, because they embody the identity traits of *Mihălțean-ness* and can translate these characteristics into the dominant language of the free-market, neoliberal economy. Indeed, social actors engaged in this political endeavour appeal to social logic, practices, and

[23] Interesting in this respect is the statement of another Romanian Greek Catholic priest working in the same region: 'We want to develop the politics of faith, of love, of comprehension, of the unity of the Romanian people, of the enlargement of the European Union ... The Greek Catholic Church is longing to enter the EU, this church is part of a universal church, it is not national, it is a way through which we can get quick access to the EU, because we are part of a universal church and the EU defines itself in its universalism ... we sustain this idea of universality because we are universal, we are Catholics'.

[24] Insights on the 'conservatism' and even 'fundamentalism' of the Romanian Orthodox Church in the past as much as in the present can be found in various authors such as the late historian of religion Ion P. Culianu (1991), the human rights activist G. Andreescu (2003), and the historians O. Gillet (1997) and C. Vasile (2006).

values that make sense and are widely shared in the local context. However, they are also creatively producing and transforming the context in which they act, no matter the actual results of the process they initiated.

So far in this chapter, I have argued that in Mihalț the competition over religious property and the construction of a new church building is supported by the parallel constructions of a Greek Catholic ethic, self-promoting and more skilled than the Orthodox in interpreting the 'spirit' of neoliberalism from which it develops ideas, language and attitudes. The socially standardized characteristics of Mihalț's local identity are performed and rephrased in terms of entrepreneurial capacity, market economy, competition, and above all recognition of the fundamental ('natural') value of private property rights. Simultaneously, the Greek Catholic faction considers itself proficient in interpreting the village's needs and appropriates local virtues and merits. According to this very same emergent ethic, this village in transformation simply waits to be Europeanized, modernized, democratized, and, last but not least, cleansed of communism.

As in other localities in Romania, Mihalț's changing religious landscape engages local subjects in place-making tactics and strategies. Interestingly, these produce a spatial and social reconfiguration that goes far beyond the meaning associated with the places of worship, including how the village is experienced, imagined and constructed within an increasingly globalized and changing world. Of course, this is a symbolic construction, as much a product of discursive practices, projects and actions as a producer of them.

'Those People Are Still in the Middle Ages!'

Instead of a conclusion, let me just evoke this thought provoking image I captured while doing fieldwork. On a scorching hot summer afternoon, the young priest and I crossed the village in his four-wheel drive Mitsubishi. Mihalț had a spectral air; it appeared desolate, as most of villagers were working on their land or were inside their homes. Abruptly, we saw a very old lady, entirely dressed in black, wearing a huge pair of 1950s-style sunglasses and sitting in front of her house's wooden door. Neither the priest nor I could avoid seeing her: she responded with an almost imperceptible movement of the head. It was just a moment. Soon after, the young priest looked at me with an expression that I interpreted as a mixture of shame (for his village), irony (detachment from his village, that is, from himself as well) and outrage (or maybe just surprise). At the same time, he raised his hands from the wheel he exclaimed: 'These people are still in the Middle Ages!' Only a few hundred metres further on, going out of the village where the amount of arable land overwhelms that of built-up territory, he told me in a serious tone: 'If communism had not existed here, all over these fields in

front of us we would now have landing strips for helicopters. You know, people are hard workers in Mihalț!' (*Ştii, oamenii sînt harnici la Mihalț!*).

This apparently trivial fragment of social life clearly suggests that a claim of ownership went well beyond the comprehensible purpose of restating rights or of pursuing an action defending the freedom of religion. Greek Catholicism, in its old and recent history, in its ties with Rome and the Vatican, and more generally with Western Catholic Europe, represents in Mihalț a special kind of symbolic resource, a patrimony that a number of local subjects spend in order to understand the direction of history in terms of backwardness and modernization. Thus, the patrimonial claim becomes a device for social change and expresses the project of a society, one that is constitutive of the Greek Catholic ethic and at the same time constituting it, by using 'local' and 'global' symbols alike.

Paradoxically, the increasing number of migrants moving from Mihalț to Western Europe – no matter of what religious affiliation – is locally conceptualized as a welcome development. Another informant from the Greek Catholic group explicitly drew this point to my attention when she said: 'Be careful: our young people go to Spain, to Italy, to Catholic countries, they are not going everywhere!' Therefore, the history of Greek Catholicism and the contemporary movements across the world are ultimately perceived as if they were pointing in the same direction, one that is imagined 'natural' and almost self-evident if not mandatory: the road of Catholic Europe. From a Greek Catholic perspective, those who do not follow, risk becoming lost.

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Chapter 8

Collective Memory and Religious Transmission: A Greek Catholic Example in Western Ukraine

Jacek Nowak

Introduction

The recent transformations in East-Central Europe have led to the discovery of new areas of research into social reality. A key factor in the changes taking place in Europe has been the modifications in the framework of public debates about the past. Among other things, anthropologists have now added collective memory and religion to the range of their fields of study – analysing how families, communities, and institutions filter, select, and interpret memories so as to fit changing group needs. The most salient questions are the ways in which memory is questioned and transmitted, the role of memory with reference to power and ideology, as well as the ways in which memory is expressed through violence or silence. Memory can thus be discussed and negotiated, accepted or rejected, and articulated in many different ways.

Observing the changes in Ukraine, we see that collective memory – understood here as a set of shared beliefs a community holds about its past – is subject to processes of democratization. These invite all participants to freely express their competing accounts of the past through different means including via the mass media. Here one perceives that the memory of socialism is so deeply embedded in the consciousness of some societies that it still dominates the construction of a new reality. Under these circumstances, religion has become one of the most socially significant spheres in discussions on group identity. Inasmuch as the state usurped national history, religion and churches nominated themselves as patrons of private and collective memory, of family and community memory. In fact, churches often acted as the focus of such memories, organizing and making use of them; through chapels, shrines, or religious statues, the past is remembered and a system of meaning is built.

More recently, many micronarratives regarding the past have emerged and become the basis for societal discussions. When the 1990s brought in

processes of transformation and the building of new states, private boundaries were gradually reduced; religion and its memory shifted to the public sphere. Where religion previously had been marginalized, it gained value and became significant in the construction of the new order. Not only did it come back out into the open, it also began to overshadow the rest; its previously peripheral status now became a trump card in the debates about identity.

My observations in western Ukraine illustrate a duality in the processes connected with the reinvention of religion, which began in the 1990s. On the one hand, I witnessed how Greek Catholics have used religion and memory to redefine their national identity; on the other, I have come to realize that they are unable to use them to overcome a crisis of values and build new social ties.

In western Ukraine (once encompassed by Galicia, an autonomous region of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) religion has its ethnic value, constituting to some extent a part of the national ideology, symbols, and tradition. Moreover, its sacred dimension is a key factor in the negotiation of identity. If nothing more, religion is the main component building the symbolic boundaries of a community; in a multicultural or borderland context it delineates the dividing line between 'us' and 'them'. In this chapter I am interested in religion and its role in the processes of ethnic revival as well as its links to identity. I examine the process by which religion is reinvented in particular Greek Catholic communities in western Ukraine. Drawing on my ethnographic research in the village of Kukilniki, I will illustrate the ways in which rural communities take advantage of the past and of the marriage of memory and religion in the construction of their identity. Taking the revival of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) as a prime example, I will describe its role and functions in the building of a new social order. I will show that Greek Catholicism perfectly facilitates the use of memory by acting as an anchor for national tradition; it thus becomes the fundamental motor powering national content in this postsocialist society.

Nonetheless, we must bear in mind that the social functions of religion significantly change in certain contexts, being limited to some aspects of life or even marginalized in others. The experience of communism deeply altered social life: traditional structures that had provided the framework for social life were torn apart, social bonds were severed, and religious identity deconstructed. Today, however, it appears that the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has preserved patterns of tradition that are being applied in the construction of a modern civil society.

Religion and Memory: The Role of the Greek Catholic Church in the Construction of Ukrainian Identity

Any attempt to portray the mechanisms that reinvent religion must begin by depicting how religion, in particular the Greek Catholic Church, has been used in national politics in the past. The most crucial aspect will be to distinguish those issues used in today's politics of memory and, thus, to identify the memory constructs employed in building a new Ukrainian social identity.

The intricate past of western Ukraine is a key factor in the modern nation-building processes. During various periods, Poland, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russia, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Ukraine itself have ruled these territories. Varying political, national, or religious patterns determined the historical development of the region, and continue today to act as the starting point in the building of Ukrainian national politics. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, itself a historical contingency, has played a key role in the emergence of a national discourse in western Ukraine. At the end of the nineteenth century, on the wave of rising claims for national independence within the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the UGCC became a fundamental carrier of national ideals In Greek Catholic seminaries, the Ukrainian nationalist movement began to come to life (Himka 1984). The Ukrainian Greek Catholic clergy started energetically implanting national values in the territories of western Ukraine. The effects of this intellectual effort became clear during the 1848 Revolutions, when Ukrainian nationalists shifted from the cultural to the political sphere. Priests concentrated their activities at the parish level – animating civic involvement, founding associations, and educating parishioners. Very oriented to economic and national matters, they encouraged voting for Ukrainian candidates during each successive election. For many priests, such work became the cornerstone of their ministry. This, in turn, led to civil society actions and civil behaviour being embedded in a Ukrainian collective memory of this region. A model was shaped that pointed to religion's social function in nation-building.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Greek Catholic Church was dominated by the figure of Andrei Sheptyts'ki. As Bishop of Stanisławów (Ivano-Frankivsk), and later Archbishop of Halych, he not only directed the church but also significantly contributed to the promotion of Ukrainian interests in Galicia. At this point, the Greek Catholic Church became even more embedded in the Ukrainian national movement. When Russia occupied Galicia during the First World War, Sheptyts'ki was arrested, and the new authorities put into practice a concerted policy of con-

verting Ukrainians to Orthodoxy.[1] After the Austro-Hungarian Empire had collapsed and during the war with Poland, the Greek Catholic Church unequivocally supported Ukrainian endeavours to achieve statehood. Over the course of the interwar years, this church was the sole force systematically working on building a Ukrainian identity. The Ukrainian nation – deprived of any institutions and of state representation – viewed the church as its leader and its priests as activists in the process of national birth. Once the Germans occupied this territory in 1941, the battle for Ukrainian statehood began to take on forms that the church could not support. Things did not improve after the USSR regained Ukraine, and among the main reasons for the persecution that followed was the leading role the UGCC had played in fostering 'Ukrainian-ness'. When all of its bishops and the greater part of its clergy were arrested, the church began to work underground. In 1989, it began to function legally – initially in the former Galician areas, and then across the entire country. Today it perceives itself – and is perceived by western Ukrainians – as a national church.

The historical trajectory of the Greek Catholic Church in western Ukraine illustrates its role as a crucial carrier of national identity (Wanner 1998; Shulman 1999). My research shows that even today, despite socialism and secularization, Greek Catholicism remains an essential and indispensable transmitter of historical memory in the Ukrainian nation-building process. This was the institution that invigorated the sociopolitical sphere by mobilizing communities and contributing to the emergence of the new Ukrainian state. A new system of cultural codes referring to the Ukrainian martyrology and national ideals, and taking particular advantage of an anti-imperial (anti-Russian) rhetoric, is spreading. The UGCC embeds very well this representation, drawing on its historical relation to Ukrainian nationalism and the painful experiences under communism (Senyk 2002).

Nevertheless, the present-day religious pluralism of Ukraine and the regionalization of religion do not facilitate the building of a consistent national religious identity (Krindach 2003). Apart from UGCC, three Orthodox Churches are currently engaged in a confessional fight for control and leadership of Ukrainian Christians. As a result, many believers do not know which Orthodox Church they belong to. 'They are *simply Orthodox*, just as it has always been in Ukraine', some Ukrainians say. In the western part of the country, former followers of the Orthodox Church have turned to, or 'gone back' to Greek Catholicism. Interestingly, in the region where I undertook my research, the return to Greek Catholicism happened collectively. Whole villages left the Orthodox Church all of a sudden, without having time for

[1] Freed after the February Revolution (1917) Sheptyts'ki returned to Galicia in glory as someone who had suffered for his faith and nation.

reflection; this was a time for revolution, and Greek Catholics were well prepared for such action. Although the vast majority of Ukrainians declare that they are Orthodox, it would be difficult today to determine if any one of the churches has a chance of being the sole repository of national identity. Furthermore, national rhetoric in western Ukraine had always been associated with the Greek Catholics; hence, the present national renaissance is rarely linked to Orthodoxy, which is perceived as being dependent upon Moscow and disapproving of the new state. The lack of shared social space – uniting the nation with religion, language, and similar economic interests or even just lifestyles – shows that society is clearly divided into western and eastern Ukraine.

In traditional societies, collective memory was wholly embedded in religious structures, customs, and language. Individual and group memories were among the social artifacts of a community, which religious institutions were duty bound to maintain and preserve. The double bond between memory and religion facilitated their preservation and reproduction in the respective societies. Maurice Halbwachs in his deliberations on the social frameworks of memory ([1925] 1992) – including family, class, and, key to this discussion, religion – presumed that the past is not only what remains in unchanged form but, above all, is reconstructed via individuals in the course of social interactions. He considered that a confrontation of experiences takes place in the social context; this leads to a set version of events that matches the group's interests and contributes to the formation of its collective memory. Quoting David Thelen (1989), one could say that 'People depend on others to help them decide which experiences to forget and which to remember and what interpretation to place on an experience. People develop a shared identity by identifying, exploring, and agreeing on memories' (ibid: 1122).

Any traumatic social change causes a crisis of memory and weakens the lines of faith. The experiences of the Second World War and of totalitarianism – particularly communism – nearly destroyed the sense of community in western Ukraine. Additionally, modernization and globalization, accompanied by urbanization, formalized mass education, and technologically advancing mass communication, have all led to new perceptions. Individuals constantly meet others with whom they do not share the same beliefs or values. An analysis of contemporary religious phenomena evidences a lack of continuity in practice and belief. This means weakened links to the past and to other members of an ethnic community, with whom one no longer shares a common history. The recent political, economic, and social transformations in the postsocialist nation-states have clearly led to such a phenomenon: a loss of the balance holding collective identity together.

Against this backdrop the stormy history of the Greek Catholic Church – so intricately connected to the history of western Ukraine – illustrates unmistakably the reinvention of religion. Its history matches that of the nation, and its content suits the needs of a society requiring explication and elucidation of the new ordering of the world. With globalizing processes reaching Ukraine as well, pluralism has not only altered religion from an institutional perspective but has also evoked changes in the realm of individual consciousness.

Theoreticians who write about globalization – such as Zygmunt Bauman (1998) or Anthony Giddens (1999) – note that religion is no longer an obvious given (one can choose a secular strategy), while religious institutions, even if they still play a leading role in some societies, have lost their status as unquestionable authorities (one can believe without belonging; see Davie 1994). A 'religious market place' (see Rogers 2005) has opened up in which 'clients' can choose among different religions and churches; this choice, however, is not permanent and that instability leads to religious dynamics. Moreover, rituals and traditions can be mixed and matched, forming a personalized, tailor-made patchwork religion.

In 'Religion as a Chain of Memory' (2000), Danielle Hervieu-Léger asserts that religion is a form of imagination and collective memory. Nonetheless, as modernity decomposes and deconstructs religion, we deal increasingly not with one memory but with many. All depends on the individuals or groups who decide which ones and how to best take advantage of them. Modernity provokes changes in the forms of religious expression as well as the lack of a need to refer to tradition. The processes associated with industrialization, urbanization, and so on, destroy 'communities of memories'; there is a tendency instead to 'expand and homogenize memory which is the effect of a blurring of social distinctions which are concentrated on the collective memory of specific, heterogeneous groups' (Hervieu-Léger 2000: 173). This phenomenon was earlier described by Maurice Halbwachs, drawing attention to the increasing destruction of social structures that had supported intergenerational transmission. For him, memory was becoming flattened and superficial, while its normative and creative abilities were destroyed ([1925] 1992).

The nineteenth-century conception of the nation – assuming the homogenization of a population possessing a particular territory, culture, and religion – often endowed a church with the right to identify with and represent national identity. In western Ukraine, the Greek Catholic Church, to a great extent, reigned over the unofficial memory and systematized the means by which it was recalled and preserved. This role was most evident during the fight for national independence, when certain forms of remembrance

could appear either officially or unofficially – primarily under the auspices of the church. Its deep involvement in constructing an independent Ukraine at the beginning of the twentieth century and its positive bias towards nationalistic parties meant that the church has proven itself; Ukrainians have no doubts about its loyalties. Thus, the UGCC in Galicia became the transmitter of memory, especially of content once forgotten or forbidden. This was born out when the church functioned in hiding; today, when free Ukraine has unleashed a serious conflict of memory in its society, Greek Catholicism has once again manifested itself as a harbour for national identity.

The UGCC has also been a mediator between the state and its institutionalized, official history and the collective memory of western Ukrainian society, which has contested (to a degree) that very account. The church plays two roles: not only does it serve the people, but it is often called upon to legitimize certain actions or endeavours of the government via ceremony, ritual, and holidays, thus shaping a privileged memory space for the residents of western Ukraine.

The conflict of memory does not pertain only to questions about what 'really' happened. Memory also becomes a side to be taken in the identity discourse. It becomes an ideological tool for legitimization; it confirms or negates national ideologies. By sharing memories, people build their identity and the social bonds that connect them to one another. However, the contested memory of another group can mark 'otherness', and can lead to their exclusion from different contexts of life (e.g. the social, political, or economic). A state strengthens its power through the preference for a specific version of the past and with reference to its collective memory. The clear divide between western and eastern Ukraine perfectly illustrates the role of memory and religion in present-day Ukraine. In general, Greek Catholicism is the majority religion of the western part of the country while the religion of the eastern part is Orthodoxy. The inhabitants of the former Galicia see the UGCC as embodying national aims underscored by this very institution's history; for the inhabitants of the east, this religious institution represents a narrow-minded jingoism. Moreover, the UGCC is seen in the east as pushing Ukraine into the arms of Europe, and shutting it off from good relations with Russia. The UGCC's continuation of the nationalistic traditions of the inter-war years is perceived as dragging the country in a direction conflicting with the political interest of the whole country. In turn, the Orthodox Church of eastern Ukraine emphasizes its ties to Russia, something unacceptable to Galician western Ukraine. The latter perceives Orthodoxy as personifying a dishonourable past in which Ukraine surrendered to Moscow – whether as representative of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.

Naturally, the rhetoric of political candidates or parties during electoral campaigns reflect this conflict, but it also influences the viewpoints and lifestyles of the people in the two regions. The differences are particularly legible in rituals and celebrations of the past. Western Ukraine commemorates any anniversary associated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), whereas eastern Ukraine prefers to honor the memory of Red Army soldiers. In the west, the Great Famine of the 1930s and the victims of Stalinist repressions are remembered publicly, while in the east such memories are pushed carefully aside. The First World War Polish military cemetery in L'viv has sparked many sensitive debates in the city, but a few hundred kilometres to the east the issue seems to bother no one. The Orange Revolution heartened Europe and western Ukraine, while Russia and eastern Ukraine saw that event as an attack on the true social order. A list of points of variance could go on almost indefinitely, yet they confirm how various visions of the past mark current politics and visions of Ukraine's future.

Soviet communism has been undoubtedly an important factor in the memory divergences because it not only endowed the past with special meaning, but also appropriated it completely. Social, economic, and political aims were always justified by the past; control over the past gave authorities the possibility to decide contemporary social development and foresee the future to some degree. Control of the media, educational programs, and all political channels ensured the production of the official version of history. This history dominated the public sphere, pushing any other memories into the private sphere (primarily that of the family). But the communist regime also controlled religion. With the banning of almost all religious activity, only the Orthodox Church was permitted, to a limited extent, into the public sphere; this facilitated manipulation of content and, along the way, achieved a far-reaching secularization. But here too matters took on a different tone in western Ukraine. First, both tradition and religion remained alive, which permitted the preservation of patterns from the past. Second, despite persecution, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church maintained its influence in the region. After a period of intense persecution the UGCC reorganized itself, starting to function in the underground and moving from the public into the private sphere. The clergy supported local communities, celebrated the sacraments, and tended to memories of the past. With the UGCC unable to communicate otherwise, the family became the most popular channel, and ties were based on mutual trust. This subsequently led the way to the formation of communities interlinked by informal networks. Hence, collective memory became a way of resistance against the ideology of the state and the reconstruction of the past – for example, in the form of a traditional religious service – became a symbol of opposition (Shlikhta 2004).

The Return of Religion in the 1990s: A Case Study in Western Ukraine

The church lived in the memory of its followers where that dissident memory could be safeguarded. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of western Ukraine returned to its churches en masse, leaving no doubt that the institution as a whole had not been lost and forgotten. During that initial period, the dynamics and range of religious activity demonstrated a religious revival. First, the Ukrainian people wanted to pray. Second, they noticed that thanks to religion – and the Greek Catholic Church in particular – they could support their national goals. Finally, they were ready to oppose Orthodoxy and, in doing so, oppose Moscow. Rural residents with whom I spoke clearly wanted to restore the previous order and believed it to be inscribed in this particular church and its memory. They were certain that this was the path to building a new and better Ukraine.

Memory inscribed in texts, monuments, edifices, landscape, rituals, and ceremonies becomes an important factor in fostering close communion. The religious renaissance was dependent upon the rediscovery of those bearers of memory that concurrently created and revived the network binding western Ukrainians together. A church (or a shrine, a cemetery, etc.) is a *lieu de mémoire* (Nora 1996) composed of layers of orders and meanings: symbolic, material, and functional. The recovery of buildings has thus been of great significance for the community, one step towards the construction of a new identity. Even if the material or functional aspect could be of minimal importance in the end because much property had been seriously damaged or destroyed, the symbolic dimension remained very important. This has been the case with the Greek Catholics in Ukraine as well as with the Łemkos in Poland (Nowak 2000). Part of the reorganization characteristic of postsocialist societies has been the dispute related to the restitution of property – and the fight for regaining churches has been among the most prominent cases in this process (Hann 1998).

People were not only preoccupied with getting back their old church buildings, however they also struggled to build new ones. Across the region in which I conducted research, over a dozen new churches were erected within a few years after 1991. Churches were a priority in almost every community. For instance, the village of Kukilniki – rapidly, and according to plans that had been archived since the 1930s, on the exact sites selected over half a century before – put all its efforts towards rebuilding the Greek Catholic church. The convergence of events, space, and memory supported this process in which a community creates a landscape of memory at a specific site, it preserves collective memory, and it underlines continuities. People

build where their forefathers had their sacrum; by looking after what is material and real, people see themselves as deserving heirs to a legacy. They prove themselves capable of upholding the values of the community. Elements of sacred space become the objects of intensive and enduring interaction between a set of material, aesthetic, and symbolic values and a concrete social group. Religion, as mentioned earlier, is – apart from historical memory – a critical deliverer of resources for the shaping of an ethnic identity. Religion can draw people to a site and organize the space; rules and rituals regulate social life. Furthermore, in a local community, religion is the guarantor of protection against others. In Kukilniki, for Greek Catholics, religion also evokes a sense of connection to the past and of continuity into the future – all linked to a particular place.

Most religious communities follow a similar path. The Roman Catholic Church in western Ukraine – taking advantage of democratic rights and privileges – is trying to restore ruined churches and arouse the few remaining religious communities. New parishes emerge around devastated and seemingly forgotten sanctuaries. In Halycz (a small city in western Ukraine) – once the heart of historic Galicia and an important city for both Ukrainians and Poles – Franciscan monks are rebuilding a Roman Catholic church. Meanwhile, the local Poles, who had resigned themselves to a world that excluded the church from their lives, are also uniting. While conducting research, I met a Polish woman who had survived the war as well as the ethnic cleansing in this region. She spoke of how the entire local Polish population had left Halycz – including her entire family – while she stayed behind with her Ukrainian husband. Until recently she had regretted her decision. Life had not been easy with her Ukrainian neighbours; only the memory of the past kept her spirits up. Yet once the Roman Catholic church began to be restored, her hopes for a normal life awoke. Not only can she attend services again, as she had with her mother so many decades ago, but she has rediscovered other Poles in the area who have also been drawn by the church. As she put it, with the revival of the Polish church she has 'returned to life' and rediscovered its sense. Sunday services draw about twenty people, but more important feasts bring in Poles from the whole area. Encouraged by this success, Roman Catholics are emboldened and have begun to reactivate more and more places of worship; en route they arouse successive communities of their kind. In nearby Byszywce and Izopol, Roman Catholic priests are remodeling the future churches, inviting those who have not forgotten their religion to reaffirm their identity.[2]

[2] The end of the twentieth century left people wondering whether continuity with the past could be built, maintained, or rebuilt – perhaps intuitively but granting communities hope for a more promising future. Religion was perceived as the key to repairing the severed lines with

Against the backdrop of western Ukraine, in which we observe a rebirth of religion, Kukilniki is an exceptional case showing both sides of the coin. Not only do we see religion being replanted, but also – in a relatively brief period – we see the difficulty of actually re-rooting it in a community. In this settlement, religion is practised mainly at the level of the nation-state, and it is dormant or marginalized at the family-community level. The feelings of national pride stirred up by Ukraine's independence were quickly dashed by the ever-worsening material conditions and the drastic shock to the country's economy. Many Ukrainians in the area where I conducted my research could not give a clear opinion about their independent state. This ambivalence is caused primarily by a manifestation of 'Ukrainianness' and secondarily by economic stress, which in turn sparks nostalgia for the Soviet state. The free-market mechanisms that have been so laboriously introduced have little meaning for these people, and the memory of communism still hangs over rural Ukraine. Communism deepened social isolation and was in favour of a certain type of particularism. People sheltered themselves from state interference by keeping themselves at home. When I was there in 1996 inflation had been halted, there was a new currency, and there was hope for a better quality of life. Village residents proudly called themselves shareholders of the company created from a collective farm. Paid workers from the village tilled the land, and the shareholders would receive dividends in the form of grain or beetroot.

Returning to Ukraine in 2004, I was interested to see whether the company had survived under the circumstances, and whether the village had developed. The massive post-*kolkhoz* complex, which had formerly towered with pride over the surrounding countryside, was all but a ruin. Villagers, irritated by commercial ineffectiveness and inadequate management, decided to take matters into their own hands, literally, by robbing all of the assets of the company. Anyone who was healthy and strong enough took whatever was possible. 'After all, it was our property', they told me sadly. After a few weeks, the buildings were demolished and the machinery was either taken away or sold for scrap metal. Some people, mainly managers, took more; others, such as pensioners and those who simply did not have their own means of transportation, took less. The hill where the collective farm buildings once stood had turned into a moonscape, hence the new name of the place: *Nahorny Karabakh*. Not one new building had been constructed for well over a decade, a few buildings had been deserted, and a new roof,

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the past. In the examples presented above, we see how local residents began to feel like members of a united community again. Families came together, and the towns and villages were revived. Something that had been broken long ago was being repaired. Hopes were high that the threads of religion, which had been woven by their ancestors, would be restored.

which was meant to protect an eighteenth-century Catholic church from total collapse, had been stolen. Meanwhile, the inhabitants, who were incapable of making any proposals to keep the village from further desolation, voted in a village leader (*sołtys*) who was one of the managers of the post-*kolkhoz* companies and led to its downfall. The result, arising from the lack of leadership, was a few hundred hectares of fertile land full of weeds. In 2002 the land was given away for 'next to nothing', as locals told me, to a few 'farmers' from neighbouring towns. These farmers were former Party apparatchiks who had become important players with the local authorities. The only thing villagers were sure of was that Ukraine is run by the mafia. What they had heard about corruption in far-off Kyiv or in the Donbass had become a reality in their own *raion*.

Kukilniki was home, for several centuries to three churches: Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Greek Catholic. The first historical documentation of this locality dates back to the fifteenth century when the first church – the Orthodox one – was built. Subsequently, Kukilniki became the second-most important centre for Roman Catholic archbishops, after L'viv. The eighteenth century brought two new churches – one Ukrainian Greek Catholic and the other Polish Roman Catholic. The end of the Second World War led to the expulsion of Poles and thus the neglect of the Roman Catholic church, which, after standing empty for some time, was handed over to the local Ukrainian population. In 1946, Stalin dissolved the Greek Catholic Church, and its buildings were handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church. For lack of attendance, the Greek Catholic church in Kukilniki fell into ruin. In 1960, the Greek Catholic church was demolished, while the Roman Catholic continued to stand, designated to serve as a cultural centre. In practice this meant the closing of the church and of all religious activities. The cross was pulled down (local residents still speak about this) and destroyed, while precious artifacts were stolen from the inside. The cultural centre was never established, but the building was used as a storehouse for the local collective farm. In 2004 discussions among locals still concentrated on this church and its history. In the meantime, Greek Catholics celebrated services in the neighbouring village of Zahirie, where a small church had managed to survive the Soviet period. In their recollections, this group often returns to that time, referring to it as the exile of religion from their town.

At the beginning of the 1990s, it seemed that the rebirth of religion would forge anew the social bonds of the community. From the moment of the Ukrainian independence, the Greek Catholic Church was needed for the celebration of nationhood and 'Ukrainianness'. Religious activity rose significantly, very often in relation to political events associated with the shaping of the new state. The new national holidays became both religious

and national rituals. Back in Kukilniki, the local population mobilized itself for the first time in years to build a Greek Catholic church in 1992. Above all, the church was important to celebrate the nation. The church also became a practical launching pad for old apparatchiks to acquire new positions, and former Communist Party members played an important role in the life of rural churches. Religion gave life to the community for a short while, during which time the inhabitants came together to build a church, forgot about former differences and quarrels, and helped each other. They even began to draw up plans to rebuild the old community centre. The village concentrated on the project of national rebirth, overcoming the passivity and submissiveness that had characterized the society for decades. The new church became the symbol of a new era. First, it symbolized a victory in the battle with the communist past; it was the opposite of the old order, a way of shoving it into the forgotten past. Second, the church building became a symbol of hope for a better future. Third, through it, the inhabitants of Kukilniki expressed their solidarity with the nation, which inherited the material and spiritual bequest of Orthodoxy (associated with Moscow and the *ancien régime*).

Nonetheless, when the elation of national revival had passed, the new church did not seem as attractive. In 2004, just a few years after this communal fervour, the village population did not even resemble a unified force. People recalled with sadness how the whole village participated in building the church. On this wave of euphoria, most of them then attended services, until one day it no longer seemed so natural. Those for whom religion was not a spiritual need noticed that there was no antagonist, no one persecuting them for their faith; not having to prove anything to anyone anymore, they gradually stopped going. In fact, only the former communists who wanted to ensure themselves a place in the new reality and gain social legitimacy continued to attend Sunday services usually conducted by a priest from elsewhere.

At this point, I propose an explanation related to the fact that the social function of religion limited itself, in this particular context, solely to national-political themes. A sense of insecurity and instability dominated in the community of Kukilniki. The prevailing attitude was one of expectancy – towards someone who would come and point the community in the right direction. The new national and local governmental institutions did not manage to take the place of the former communist 'leaders' and become new leaders. The social crisis was only deepening, residents were increasingly suspicious, and their behaviour was inconsistent and chaotic. Quite often my respondents complained during interviews that the government had forgotten them, that they have been marginalized and left to their own resorts. This was supplemented by ethical ambivalence and a moral crisis, which mani-

fested itself in borderline illegal behaviour and moral dilemmas. I observed, too, a difficulty in defining identification with and belonging to western Ukraine or the whole Ukrainian state.

Hence, in 2004 personal gain dominated over social interest. A typical reaction to social instability and mistrust is a retreat into the private, individual, and familial sphere. Residents concentrated on activities connected with the goals of their close kin. A lack of prospects for the future or some ready-made patterns for action left the local community disintegrated, and anomy was setting in. In this context, only nationalism would seem capable of organizing society and establishing firm goals for it. When undertaking such an analysis on the building of social identity in postsocialist countries, it is worth reaching for the concept that explains the disappearance of social cohesion. In describing the effects of postsocialist transformations, one has to approach the idea of 'trust' as a crucial element against social anomy. Political scientist Robert Putnam (1993) believes that the reasons for the success or failure of transformation can be found in various forms of social relations. At the heart of 'good' social capital lies an unwritten trust and the will to cooperate, while 'bad' social capital is based on narrow-mindedness and trust is limited to families and clans. The level of social trust is thus one of the basic conditioning factors of society. Church institutions are bound to reflect national institutions, and in Ukraine all seem to experience a problem of legitimacy. Villagers do not trust any institutions, not even churches. The period of change in Ukraine has been a critical time for social identity. The disappearance of old borders and divisions that made up society has left chaos in its wake. What is more, emerging divisions are still ambiguous and long-standing. Since identity is created through interaction with other people, if this process is disrupted by an omnipresent lack of trust, solidarity, and tolerance, then what emerges is a crisis of identity. The rural society I have focused on has no community institutions to promote trust and social identity.

An important factor in understanding the current social crisis is the generational dimension. My research reveals an intergenerational discrepancy in the understanding of the role and function of religion in community life. This is crucial, insofar as it indicates a break in the transmission of religious values and religious practice, indeed a gap in the collective memory of the community. In Kukilniki the younger generation, which should undertake the task of maintaining and preserving the community, had a rather ambivalent attitude towards religion. Religion did not play the same role in their lives as it did in that of their forefathers. This intergenerational transmission has been severed. Communism destroyed the old order and shifted religion into the distant background. Even those who grew up in

homes in which they received a full compendium of knowledge on their faith did not pass it down to their children. From this point on, society has rather distanced itself from religion; regular practice has been going on in only a handful of families. Those who remember the times before communism set in recall a completely different image of religion than that existing today. Grandparents were the last ones for whom religion was an important part of their lives – a model for moral behaviour and social life, as well as the foundation of their system of values. Their religious upbringing extended far beyond church buildings and religious practice. It was the cornerstone of family life, and taught them mutual respect for others, for work, and for the land. They were united in a shared outlook on history, the nation, life, and religion itself. But they could not transmit this world-view to their children and grandchildren – something that some see as a personal failure. The context of progressive secularization only hinders them and stands as an obstacle to the rebuilding of a religious identity.

Religion, a fundamental mechanism for building and integrating communities, does not, in this case, fully meet expectations; the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church does not appear in the case of Kukilniki to be the institution around which the life of the community could be organized. In fact, a typical trait of the UGCC is that it avoids taking a stand in social and political affairs. I attended many services in Ukraine and never heard the clergy speak out about the increasing poverty, unemployment, corruption, or alcoholism; there was also neither praise nor criticism of the new democratic institutions.

Furthermore, to those born before the war, the complex history of Ukraine taught tolerance for other religions and nationalities. Reciprocal consideration for one another and even, at times, shared participation in important religious ceremonies made for a relationship that was more than just ‘proper’. Thus, many informants were concerned about the condition and fate of the Roman Catholic Church building. Elders remembered how important this church was in their village under Polish rule. Roman Catholic priests organized processions and religious celebrations, guests came from miles around, and the church marked the centre of the village. Precisely this old generation has been the force behind religious renewal in the new Ukrainian state. Above all, senior community members have been the core builders of the postsocialist UGCC. Nation and history were always a key element in the lives of the oldest generation, although viewed through the prism of intimacy: ‘our land, our village, our language, and our religion’. In western Ukraine, rural areas had preserved a relatively ‘unrussified’ local culture. Several people interviewed for this study felt that precisely the

traditional villages had sustained values that should now constitute Ukrainian national values.

The oldest generation has preserved those images necessary in the construction of the new reality. Hence, they were the most concerned about the vanishing of religiousness among the youngest. In 2004 nearly everyone appeared to be resigned to the sad daily conditions; they no longer felt that the Greek Catholic Church could change much. When it had become clear that a prosperous state did not arise in a couple of years and unemployment and poverty increased, religion did not seem to compensate for these. The church has not organized enduring communities and has not shaped bonds that would outlast the initial exhilaration. There were a few moments in which religion and nation brought the community together again. The declaration of independence in 1991 and the presidential elections in 2004 were such occasions. Kukilniki did unite again, and religion returned once more to the public sphere. Local residents gladly attended services, and religious symbols accompanied the national festival. Religion fulfilled its role in the opening phase of the creation of nationhood; it supported society in the elections and it contributed to important village celebrations. Nonetheless, in Kukilniki, I did not observe the UGCC to be a significant influence in the formation of social bonds; the church did not energize village life and has not become a crucial element in family life. It did not shape a new system of values; nor did it affect the moral condition. Based on my research I would argue that what we are facing in this case is the marginalization of religion. It has been shunted off to the side and deprived of some of its social functions. This village may not be typical of rural western Ukraine – I also visited villages in which it was possible to observe a certain rekindling of religious communities. But on the whole, I would say that religion has been pushed aside, marginalized, and cleansed of some of its social functions. Only its link to the national heritage has been retained.

Conclusion

Since the early 1990s, many postsocialist countries in Eastern Europe have faced similar instances of religious revivals. Once again, language and religion have become crucial conditions for the constitution or rebirth of ethnic communities. The social reality was succumbing to redefinition, and groups renegotiated their identity seeking a path to social emancipation. The freedom of religion that came with democracy has turned out to be one of the most valuable rewards of the fall of communism in the region. For minority groups, this was a sphere in which they could manifest ethnicity and a path along which to renew their identity. Alongside the ethnic rebirth and revival, a place has been made for religion. Churches, chapels, and shrines –

the most manifest symbols of ethnicity and bearers of collective memory – were being restored. Because the territory has become the cornerstone of community identification, all efforts were being directed to the symbolic marking of space.

In this context it would be hard not to notice that Greek Catholicism is a religion of a distinctive sort – particularly if we examine its social function. Above all, it is perceived as a hybrid between Russian Orthodoxy and Polish Roman Catholicism. Second, it is seen as a bridge between the East and West, as it incorporates elements of both civilizations. Third, its conflictual nature, stemming precisely from these factors, becomes manifest. The primary task of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church – in western Ukraine much as for the Greek Catholic Churches elsewhere in Eastern Europe – has been to protect the collective memory contested by subsequent rulers and a significant portion of the population in this region. The maintenance and defence of this religion under communism facilitated the preservation of a forbidden past. Here the church performed an important social function as a transmitter of national and ethnic values. Today, by emphasizing the memory it has conserved, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is redefining its mission in assisting and supporting the construction of a collective identity.

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Chapter 9
'Religion in Motion': Routes of Identification among Hungarian Greek Catholics in Subcarpathia

Bertalan Pusztai and Erzsébet Pilipkó

This chapter examines processes of identification among Hungarian Greek Catholics who live within the Carpathian Basin but in Ukraine. During 1990–2000 we conducted ethnographic fieldwork among Hungarian Greek Catholic communities in the Uzhhorod, Vynohradiv, and Berehove regions. Greek Catholics who identify themselves as Hungarian are a very distinctive minority. First, they constitute a religious minority vis-à-vis the mainstream, Roman Catholic, Reformed, and Orthodox Churches in the Carpathian Basin. Second, their Rusyn and Romanian origins but Hungarian identity have placed them in an intermediary situation and given them a multiple belonging, which renders them suspicious to all nationalities in the area. Hungarian Greek Catholic identity emerged and stabilized in the century between 1850 and 1950 (Pusztai 2005, 2007). However, only the Greek Catholics living within the borders of Hungary could enjoy relative tranquility after the end of the Second World War. In all other parts of the region Greek Catholics were forced to continue their struggles for identification. Our chapter shows the various routes of identification Hungarian Greek Catholics have taken both as a religious minority among Hungarians and as a national minority in Ukraine. Although their total number is not very large, members of this once-unified group now belong to three different religious communities.

We begin with a review of the post-1920 history of the Greek Catholic Church in Subcarpathia. We then present ethnographic descriptions of the two possible identifications – Roman Catholic and Orthodox – available in recent decades to ethnic Hungarians who belonged traditionally to the Greek Catholic Church in Subcarpathia. First, we describe the evolution that led certain former Greek Catholic communities to join the Roman Catholic Church after the 1940s. Second, we describe the route that has led other communities into the Orthodox Church. This material is based on fieldwork

conducted by Erzsébet Pilipkó in the region of Vynohradiv throughout the 1990s.

Until 1918, the four counties of Subcarpathia (*Kárpátalja* in Hungarian) belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In the Hungarian 'national landscape imagery' (Häyrynen 2000) this area had no independent existence and no unified regional identity. At the end of the First World War, Hungary declared it to be the semi-autonomous region of *Ruska Kraina*, but in 1920 the Trianon Peace Treaty allocated it to Czechoslovakia. Thus began its territorial reorganization as *Podkarpatska Rus,* which led in turn to modifications of its ethnic composition. In 1938–39, with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, this territory was returned to Hungary. At the end of the Second World War the area came under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union as the *Zakarpatska Oblast*. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Subcarpathia now constitutes a county (*oblast*) of an independent Ukraine.[1]

One-fifth of the nearly 600 settlements in Subcarpathia have significant numbers of Hungarians living either in continuous blocks or mixed with other ethnic groups.[2] Hungarians are the majority in about 80 villages and in the town of Berehovo. In Ukraine's total population they form a minority of no more than half of 1 per cent (Dupka, Horváth and Móricz 1990: 4–5).

The Greek Catholic Church in Subcarpathia

The 1920 border changes had little effect on the area of the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Mukachevo: apart from one parish and two affiliated churches that remained in Hungary, it was transferred to Czechoslovakia in its entirety (Botlik 1997: 229). The new Czechoslovak government discriminated against the Greek Catholics, dubbing their Eparchy 'Hungarophile'. Instead, the authorities supported the Russian Orthodox Church in the region (Bonkáló 1996; Botlik 1997), and in 1931 an Orthodox diocese was established in Mukachevo. This administrative act had antecedents in the 'Schismatic Movement' of the 1910s, which had significantly helped spread Orthodoxy in the region (Mayer 1997). Organized from a distance, this move-

[1] These frequent political changes had a critical effect on cultural perceptions of the region. Before 1989 nomenclature was highly politicized. *Zakarpatska* means Transcarpathian; when seen from Moscow or Kiev, the region certainly is beyond the Carpathians. However, when seen from Budapest (or Prague), these villages and towns are at the feet of the Carpathian Mountains, and the use of the term Subcarpathia implies even today a protest against the official order (Fejös 1996: 127–128; Balla 1998). This chapter uses the term Subcarpathia because it is concerned with the Hungarian minority, among whom this term (*Kárpátalja*) has remained the standard designation.

[2] According to the 2001 census, they constituted 76.1% of the population of Berehovo, 26.2% of Vynogradiv, and 33.4% of Uzhhorod districts (Molnár and Molnár 2003: 91–94.).

ment had been a Russian Orthodox propaganda campaign, but its influence can be explained by deep social reasons. The appearance of Russian Orthodoxy disrupted the religious unity of Rusyns.[3]

Events after the Second World War resulted in no minor tribulation for the peoples in the Carpathian Basin. Until 1944, the Eparchy of Mukachevo had 350 priests, 320 churches, and 450,000 followers, with an overwhelming majority of Rusyns but also including 28,000 Hungarians, 16,000 Romanians, 3,000 Slovaks, and others (Ortutay 1993: 48). The diocese had its own seminary, women's and men's teacher training colleges, an orphanage, boarding schools, and an archive. In October 1944, the Soviet Army occupied the Theological College in Uzhhorod Castle (Bendász 2001: 100). As early as 1946, Soviet authorities took a secret decision to close the institution, 'the hotbed of the Uniates', but for tactical reasons, they postponed it to a later date. In 1945, however, church property was nationalized and religious education in schools was prohibited. In addition, Greek Catholic priests began to be induced by promises and threats to reunite with the Orthodox.[4] The Stalinist regime aimed to wrench the Eparchy of Mukachevo out of the jurisdiction of the Pope, thereby eliminating Vatican influence and Western orientation. Already in March 1946 the L'viv Synod decided to dissolve the four Galician Greek Catholic dioceses.[5]

Bishop Theodore Romzha of the Eparchy of Mukachevo sought to ensure the personal continuity of the diocese by secretly consecrating two priests, Sándor Chira and Péter Orosz, as bishops (Bendász 1994: 128; Bendász 2001: 100). On 1 November 1947 Romhza was murdered.[6] Teaching at the seminary continued under the leadership of Sándor Chira until his arrest in February 1949. Thereafter, the Eparchy of Mukachevo was liquidated and church services conducted by Greek Catholic priests were completely prohibited. According to church historical records, 129 (Hungarian and Rusyn) priests were declared 'enemies of the Soviet people' for refusing to participate in reunification.[7] The Greek Catholic parish churches were either transferred to the Orthodox Church or closed and used as warehouses. The Eparchy of Mukachevo, as well as the other Greek Catholic Eparchies,

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[3] For the Russophile and the Ukrainophile movements, see Bonkáló 1996: 81–101.

[4] Between 1945 and 1948, 35 Greek Catholic priests lost their lives in the religious persecution (Bendász and Bendász 1994: 9).

[5] By reference to the testimony of István Bendász (Riskó 1995: 181).

[6] On 27 October 1947, Bishop Theodor Romzha was seriously hurt in a car accident arranged by the Russian secret services. He survived the attack and on 1 November was poisoned in the Mukachevo hospital. He was beatified as a martyr in 2001 (Riskó 1995; Bendász 1999).

[7] Of the 129 priests, 30 never returned,. The survivors were freed in the amnesty of 1955–56, but were not allowed to practise, and, if caught, were liable to another five years of forced labour (Ortutay 1993: 50; Botlik 1997: 287).

were thus deprived of all their rights until December 1989. In spite of this, the Mukachevo Episcopacy never lost its continuity. In the course of these four decades, it lived on as a catacomb church, much as early Christianity had done. Some of the priests who had refused 'reunification' left their homes and went into hiding – thereby evading state retribution – and continued practising their religious vocation. Outwitting the secret police, they performed liturgical, baptismal, and funeral services in private, family circles to uphold the essential sacraments of their faith communities. In 1952, when arrests stopped, forty-seven priests were still secretly serving the faithful. These outlaw priests were monitored and pursued by the authorities. An interlocuteur described the capture and murder of a parish priest, Péter Orosz:

> Father Péter Orosz … was serving at Bilke [Ukrainian: Bilki] in 1949, and would not subscribe [to Orthodoxy]; so he had to go into hiding in various villages; he'd celebrate mass in the middle of the night; if need be, he'd baptize, confirm, marry couples, administer the Sacraments to the ailing, confess, and bury. He was in hiding between 1949 and 1953, the *bespeak*[8] had been after him, and one night he was called to a sick person … he started out, but when he took the train at Beregkisfalud [Ukrainian: Siltse] station, a railwayman recognized him, and reported it to the militiaman on the train, who immediately arrested him and wanted to take him to Ilosva [Ukrainian: Irshava]. On their way, at a cross just outside Beregkisfalud, the father asked the militiaman to let him say a prayer, which he did. Then the father knelt down at the foot of the cross, and then militiaman took out his gun and shot him in the back of the neck. He is a martyr (Field interview from Kvasove, 2001).[9]

Employing sophisticated organizational tactics, the underground Mukachevo Eparchy continued to train and ordain priests for the ministry (Bendász 2001). Upon returning from prison, parish priests lacked textbooks and thus had to teach their successors with their own hand-written notes. Even in the late 1970s, tutors often had to endure long hours of house searches, the confiscation of their notes, and the turning of their homes upside down. The novices visiting the flats of their teachers took similar risks, as they were well aware of being followed. Nevertheless, the Mukachevo Eparchy managed to maintain even its institutional continuity: Sándor Chira, the bishop

[8] The popular Ukrainian name of the various Soviet secret agencies, such as NKVD and KGB, which the Hungarians took over and use to this very day.

[9] Since the topic is very sensitive and the communities discussed are small communities, easily recognizable the authors have chosen to use only place and date to identify the interviews.

consecrated *sub rosa*, and later the vicar apostolic, Miklós Murányi, ensured the continuity of church leadership (Chira 1994; Botlik 1997). Several decades of tribulation prepared the ground for great popular respect for the church. Bishop József Holovács stated that the underground activity 'explains why our churches, as soon as the Greek Catholic Church was reauthorized (1989), were immediately filled with believers' (Holovács 1997). Presumably, the four-decade catacomb existence of the Greek Catholic Church provided indisputable legitimacy for starting anew in 1989; nonetheless, the masses of believers have returned to the Greek Catholic church for reasons not directly related to this.

On 13 December 1989 the Soviet government issued its decree re-establishing the rights of the Greek Catholic Church in Subcarpathia. After the initial euphoria about regaining rights, these changes in church policy led to ongoing conflicts in parishes. The Greek Catholic Church, prohibited in 1949, regained its legitimacy, and its reorganization began soon after. The law provided for the restitution of Greek Catholic property seized by the state and given to the Orthodox Church. This involved many churches and manses. In practice, however, the provision proved far more complicated than expected. 'Return' was not unequivocal, even in Hungarian Greek Catholic or both Greek and Roman Catholic settlements, not to mention Rusyn areas. Communities could vote as to whether they wanted to belong to the Greek Catholic or the Orthodox, or, in some cases, the Roman Catholic Church. Based on such a decision, property was restored to one or the other churches. In cases of a divided community, the use of the church often led to verbal or physical aggression. The church-owning communities at the time of the political transformation, in other words, the Orthodox in the central parts of the southern belt of Subcarpathia and the Roman Catholic in the western parts, would not only refuse to restore churches to their original owners, but would not even share them with Greek Catholics. Most communities would not accept a compromise of temporarily using an alternate church. This uncooperative attitude was driven by suspicion and fear that, should the 'other' be let in; they, the proprietors for the past decades, would be driven out of their church. Thus, the first legal Greek Catholic mass in forty years in many cases was celebrated in village churchyards in the biting cold of winter 1990.

Hungarian Greek Catholic Survival Strategies during Soviet Times

After the banning of the Greek Catholic Church, Rusyn and Hungarian parish communities no longer had any chance of unobstructed Greek Catholic life. In the following section, we shall attempt to outline the possible modes of Greek Catholic existence, and reveal why former Hungarian Greek Catholics practise their faith in vastly divergent communities, often in grave conflicts with one another. Our study focuses exclusively on the Hungarian-speaking communities, a minor portion of the Greek Catholic population in the region.

Besides the small-scale clandestine existence, Greek Catholics could choose from two other options: escaping into the Roman Catholic Church or remaining within the Byzantine rite, but in the Orthodox Church. A conscious and hidden Greek Catholic religious life, a 'catacomb church', was the choice of the few and could hardly gain a widespread following. Escape into Roman Catholicism or a formal change to Orthodoxy involved far larger portions of the population. The Hungarian Greek Catholic communities of the westernmost part of southern Subcarpathia practised their faith in the Roman Catholic Church already from the end of the 1940s. By contrast, Orthodox parishes providing a latent mode of Greek Catholic existence emerged in the central and easternmost parts of the Hungarian belt (the areas around Vynohradiv and Berehovo).

During Soviet times catacomb existence was an option for only a few small Greek Catholic groups in Subcarpathia. The Greek Catholics of the southwestern parts of the Hungarian belt of Subcarpathia, the region around Uzhhorod, joined the Roman Catholic Church. Their decision brought about fundamental changes in the life of the villages south of Uzhhorod, as our fieldwork in the villages of Sislivci, Halocs, and Komarivcihas demonstrated. These villages are still predominantly Hungarian settlements south of Uzhhorod, near the Ukrainian and Slovak border (Pusztai 2001).[10]

[10] The three settlements are situated 10–20 kilometres south of Uzhhorod, close to the Ukrainian-Slovakian border. All three villages were part of the mainly Hungarian inhabited Nagykapos district (today Veľké Kapušany in East Slovakia) prior to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Halocs (Hungarian: Gálocs) has a population of 545, with about 400 ethnic Hungarians; Sislivci (Hungarian: Sislóc) has 330 inhabitants, of whom approximately 70% are ethnic Hungarians; Komarivci (Hungarian: Palágykomoróc) has a population of 925, of whom roughly 80% are considered Hungarian. The Greek Catholic Rusyn population migrated to the region in the eighteenth century. In course of the nineteenth century, this population changed their mother tongue while keeping their denomination. After the mid-twentieth century, a second wave of emigration started. These villages are situated on the Hungarian-Rusyn linguistic border.

According to late eighteenth-century censuses, 25 to 40 per cent of the population of the three villages was Rusyn, and hence Greek Catholic. However, by 1806, Rusyns had assimilated into Hungarians, so that in certain Greek Catholic parishes, religious homilies were preached in Hungarian more than Rusyn. At the turn of the nineteenth century, villagers identified themselves as fully Hungarian and remained so even at the 1941 census.[11] Besides their 'Magyarization', Greek Catholics also went through a process of 'Latinization', in which both their domestic culture and their church services were influenced by those of the Roman Catholics.[12]

As Greek Catholics began to speak Hungarian as their mother tongue, strong inter-denominational ties developed. People remember a lively connection between the two Catholic denominations between the two world wars: the Roman Catholics sometimes attended Greek Catholic mass, and when only a Roman Catholic mass was celebrated, the Greek Catholics would participate in it. Intermarriages were also quite regular.

After the Second World War, Greek Catholic ministers and communities were given a chance to practise their religion, but only within the bounds of the Russian Orthodox Church and according to its rite. Priests not conforming to this were deported. The Hungarian-speaking Greek Catholics of the region did not opt for the Orthodox rite in Church Slavonic. Thus, one of the Greek Catholic churches was turned into a training hall, another one was closed down and then transformed into a museum, and the third one became the gymnasium of a nearby school.

The Roman Catholics of all three villages were bereft of both priest and church. But the circumstances of the two Catholic Churches were entirely different: even though some Roman Catholic priests were deported, their theological seminary was closed, and priests were not replaced, the Roman Catholic Church at least *existed formally*. Although it was far away (in Uzhhorod), the church still functioned, and its followers could worship according to their creed and receive the sacraments. The Hungarian Greek Catholics of the region also went to worship, to be baptized, and to marry in the same Uzhhorod Roman Catholic church.

In the period following these changes the two Catholic communities sharing the Roman Catholic in Uzhhorod gradually merged into one. The dividing line between them slowly disappeared because of the sense of being

[11] On the process of assimilation with Hungarians in Halocs, see Pusztai 1993.

[12] In the settlements we studied, the Reformed population formed the religious majority, while the number of Roman and Greek Catholics was roughly the same. However, only the Greek Catholics possessed a church of their own in all the three villages examined, with one priest residing in each of them. In addition, the Roman Catholics lost their parish, as it was annexed to Slovakia in 1945.

endangered and of the acquiescence in the immutable. Those who knew only the Roman Catholic Rite were in their fifties when the changes came, but it was also for fifty years that their elders practiced this faith and observed its holidays. Between 1949 and 1990 the ethnic composition of Subcarpathia also altered fundamentally and the entire microregion was transformed from this point of view.

The late 1980s brought with them a political relaxation that created the possibility for Greek Catholics to reclaim their churches. However, as the Russian Orthodox Church had a dominant position in the Soviet Union at the time, closed churches could only be reopened as Roman Catholic ones. Naturally, all three villages immediately reclaimed their churches, and an old Roman Catholic priest, serving several affiliated churches and traveling 50 kilometres, conducted liturgies in all three villages. The possibility of regular masses brought about a new group formation among the villagers: all those who thought of themselves as Catholics after so many decades started to take part in the Catholic mass and helped restore and furnish the church, thereby showing their affiliation to this church. In order to supply worship conditions, a churchwarden and other responsible persons had to be chosen. Churchwardenship and membership in local church councils were increasingly seen as new sources of social prestige in the 1990s. Seeking these church offices was a natural and primary goal of people with a propensity to partake in public life, if they had not achieved their aims in the newly elected municipalities or in the leadership of the local schools, in other words, in the newly legitimate organizations.

In 1991 word spread in these villages that the Greek Catholic Church existed, and that it could reclaim its former church buildings.[13] However, the emerging Roman Catholic communities were already administering the former Greek Catholic churches. From the outside, the changes would have seemed to have no effect on these village communities, as no underground Greek Catholic Church had existed, and as a result of the dissolution of denominational differences all Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics saw themselves as members of one church.

The first local crisis broke out when the Greek Catholics of Sislivci attempted to take possession of their former church. As a result, the Roman Catholics began to build their own church, and soon the newly completed church became a vivid symbol of community discord. The Greek Catholics would have been ready to share their church with their Roman Catholic brethren, but they insisted on it being a Greek Catholic church again. Instead, the Roman Catholics decided they would rather build their own new

[13] Although the Greek Catholic Church had been permitted to function again in the Soviet Union already in 1989, in the villages studied the problem only surfaced in 1991.

church, and thus left the Greek Catholics alone to renovate the old church. When the Greek Catholics speak of the time-consuming and painstaking renovation of their church, they always note that they never received so much external help as the Roman Catholics did. In truth, the Roman Catholics were given a lot from Hungary. The Roman Catholics, on their part, have nowadays a different account of the same story. They say that the Greek Catholics – according to them, a handful of old people – forcefully demanded the church back, practically reoccupied it, and did not allow Roman Catholics to enter the church again. All this, of course, happened when the renovation of the church, to which they had significantly contributed, neared completion. The conflict in this village has now more or less abated. The construction of the new church has pacified opinion and clarified what rights people are entitled to and where. The Roman Catholics, by deciding to build a new church, assigned themselves a new goal that has come to symbolize their community.

In Komarivci, the church was returned to the Greek Catholic Church without any crisis, and the two Catholic communities continued to share it. However, tension over its use can be clearly observed. During one of our field trips we witnessed how Roman Catholics preparing for Sunday mass moved the altar to the centre of the church because it had been placed to the side by Greek Catholics. They found it irritating to have the altar placed at the side between Roman Catholic masses. We were still present when the Greek Catholic vicar arrived and emphatically warned the movers of the altar that in the future this could only be done with his permission. He believed this Roman Catholic practice was mere 'table-worship', not the worship of God.

The greatest conflict emerged in Halocs, when the Roman Catholic churchwarden refused entry to Greek Catholic minister and his followers on the second day of Christmas so they could hold their first Holy Liturgy.[14] He said that the village's Roman Catholic priest had not notified him and that therefore he could not open the church. The Greek Catholic mass was thus held in the cemetery in the late-December cold. So far, the Roman Catholic Church possesses the building and the Greek Catholic community attends worship in the very same church. Greek Catholics have accepted that their Roman Catholic colleagues at present own the church building, but they still hope for a more viable solution. The two groups have different perspectives: while Roman Catholics are convinced that only a few old people consider themselves Greek Catholics, the others believe only a few people have

[14] According to local informants, this happened in 1990. Legalization occurred in 1989 and became widely known in 1990–91. Conflicts around former Greek Catholic ecclesiastical properties are still not completely resolved.

remained Roman Catholic and that the majority is, in fact, Greek Catholic but attends mass according to the Roman Rite out of mere nostalgia.

Roman Catholics believe that the majority of Greek Catholics in Subcarpathia are Rusyn. After fifty years of propaganda and prohibition Greek Catholics consider themselves Ukrainian. Neither public opinion nor the political elites recognize the meagre Hungarian Greek Catholic population. The common belief is that wherever a Greek Catholic church exists, the community must be Ukrainian. Roman Catholics doubt whether the Mukachevo Eparchy, under the direct supervision of the Holy See (*ecclesia sui iuris*), will be able to maintain its status. They are positive that in the long run the will of L'viv will prevail and the eparchy will lose its independence and be incorporated in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.[15]

According to the story circulated in Roman Catholic circles in nearby Sislivci, the few old Hungarian Greek Catholics practised the Latin mass for fifty years but they wanted their church back primarily because of individual ambition and self-assertion and not because they so much remembered the Byzantine Rite. And Rusyns have already appeared claiming the sermon and the Gospel readings in their mother tongue during the mass celebrated in Hungarian. It is expected, then, that Rusyns will soon outnumber Hungarians and take over the church, thus also changing the liturgical language.

The Roman Catholics in the neighboring villages to Sislivci refer to this is as a warning example. In fact, of the three villages studied, Sislivci was where the most Rusyns have settled; the church is affiliated with the highly 'Ukrainianized' Sztorozsnicja. Sislivci is a good example of how the churches can come to be involved in, and even cause, ethnic conflicts. Because neighbouring Sztorozsnicja has a Rusyn majority, they use the Julian calendar. Naturally, the affiliated churchgoers in Sislivci also follow this practice. The Roman Catholic Hungarians who use the Gregorian calendar and who live here as well as in the neighbouring villages regard this as evidence of forced 'Ukrainization', since these Greek Catholic Hungarians have to observe holidays together with Greek Catholic Ukrainians and not the more familiar Roman Catholic and Protestant Hungarians.

The former Greek Catholic Hungarian communities around Uzhhorod thus split apart. Currently, those from former Greek Catholic families are either re-establishing Greek Catholic parishes or belong to Roman Catholic parishes. Although no clear statistics are available, probably the number and proportion of Hungarians in formerly significant Greek Catholic communi-

[15] In the case of such a change, Elemér Ortutay, a Hungarian Greek Catholic priest, expresses similar fears on limiting the rights of non-Rusyn speaking minorities: 'If we were to give up our status, the Hungarian, Romanian and Slovak [i.e. Greek Catholic] believers would necessarily be thrust into the background' (Bottlik and Dupka 1993: 49).

ties has decreased, but the Rusyn population that moved in recent decades has strengthened these groups. According to our observation, the different choices of Greek Catholic Hungarians have been influenced primarily by different visions of Hungarians as a national minority in Ukraine. One of our interviewees, active in the Hungarian political movement, naturally did not support the reorganization of the Greek Catholic parish, while his politically inactive elder brother, who had had childhood experiences with the Greek Catholic Rite, became a leading proponent of its reorganization. Apart from this, one cannot overlook the personal reasons, generational differences, and individual motives that have influenced such decisions.

The Attraction of the Byzantine Rite: 'Reunification' and the Making of Hungarian Orthodoxy[16]

Several groups of Hungarian Greek Catholics in Subcarpathia, especially around Berehovo and Vynohradiv, where there had been no viable Roman Catholic community outside towns, refused to give up their Byzantine Rite in the past decades. This led to conflicts even more vehement and complicated than those around Uzhhorod. In order to understand these, we have to examine how these parish communities reacted to political changes. We will illustrate the case of communities upholding their Byzantine Rite with the example of two settlements, Salanki and Bobove.[17]

Life without Priests – Rejecters of Reunion

Most Greek Catholic communities were related to the forced reunification with the Orthodox Church through the choice of their parish priest (Pilipkó 2004). In most cases the priest formally accepted the reunion, 'subscribed to it', and thus could continue his ministry in the parish. There were, however, cases in which the priest refused to accept, thereby facing twenty-five years of forced labour. Following the deportation of these priests, most communities in the Berehovo and Vynohradiv regions decided for passive resistance:

[16] Apart from the Serbian, Greek, and Romanian Orthodox communities in Hungary, there is also a small Hungarian Orthodox community but this is rather an elite tradition in Hungarian culture, which has no roots in Subcarpathia.

[17] Bobove (Hungarian: Tiszabökény) is situated south of Vynohradiv on the bank of the River Tisza. Greek Catholic Rusyn migration started in the eighteenth century to the Reformed Hungarian Bobove. In the predominantly Hungarian environment, the Rusyn language disappeared in the nineteenth century, whereas Greek Catholicism remained. According to the 1989 census, 2,550 of the 2,600 inhabitants identify themselves as ethnic Hungarian. Salanki (Hungarian: Salánk) lies north of Vynohradiv. Salanki has 3,160 inhabitants with 97% ethnic Hungarians.

they refused to accept the Orthodox priest using Church Slavonic imposed on them, but rather celebrated their liturgies under the guidance of their cantor. Nonetheless, there was profound uncertainty about the future of their church life: 'Well, we would just go because we're used to going to church; we would need no new priest … you can't go without a priest, our father told us, but it was to be an Orthodox priest, and that would not do … So we began going without a priest' (Field interview from Bobove, 1999).

Religious teaching and practice intertwined all aspects of parish life with a traditional order of values. Without a priest, the daily routine could not be maintained: community arrangements related to life and death – the baptism of a newborn and a funeral for the dead – called for urgent solutions. Parishes without priest found a solution in asking the 'subscribed' priests of neighbouring parishes to celebrate services for them: 'We heard the Greek priests weren't carried off here and there, the neighbouring villages, so we called them to bury, baptize, and marry' (Field interview from Bobove, 1999).

After a while, these 'reunited' priests were asked to administer not only the occasional but also the regular rituals, and they would 'serve across' in various parishes. Judging from what these parishioners said in 1999, they did not regard these 'reunited' priests as 'Orthodox': 'well, them poor men, they subscribed to save their hides, but deep in their hearts, they were Greek all right, and we knew that' (Field interview from Bobove, 1999). Another parishioner noted: 'My sons, none of them are Orthodox, they were all baptized by such "subscribed" priests, because the priests of Salanki, Vynohradiv, Vilok were never Orthodox' (Field interview from Bobove, 1999).

The priests who rejected the reunion with Orthodoxy have tried to provide their flocks with guidance for the future. Before being forced to leave they tried to make clear to their communities that the Greek Catholic church in the parish would cease to exist and an Orthodox priest would come to replace them. Some recommended that their parishioners should not go to the Orthodox church but practice their deep piety and hold on to their Catholicism in private. This naturally led some parishioners to choosing the Roman Catholic churches functioning under much constraint but at least legally in some of the nearby towns. Other priests let their parishioners decide for themselves. In practice, however, it was not so much these recommendations that determined the decisions but the self-organizing capacities of each community. A vivid example is the village of Salanki where the 'mightily faithful' priest, who had served in the village for thirty-three years, would not hear of any compromise in cooperating with the Orthodox

Church, either by his parish or himself. Given the circumstances he could not evade internment, and the parish was left to itself.

The Formal Acceptance of Reunion – The Latent Mode of Greek Catholic Existence

In communities where Greek Catholic priests subscribed to reunion with Orthodoxy, church buildings were automatically reregistered as Orthodox parishes. However, most parishioners did not realize that they attended services in Orthodox churches, and that, in fact, they themselves had become Orthodox. Some came to realize it much later, and hence withdrew from the community, deciding not to take up the new confession of their 'apostate' priest (e.g. the village of Deda). The majority of the Greek Catholic population, however, came to live in a sort of latent Greek Catholicism.

Mentioned previously as an example of resistance, Salanki developed a rather paradoxical situation; after the elderly priest had been incarcerated, the village community arranged for a new 'reunited' priest to lead the parish, who was actually the imprisoned priest's son, a young man who had served in another parish. The cantor of Salanki, well-versed in church matters, recognized that the religious homogenizing policy of the new 'state religion' was also driven by ethnic homogenization. So, getting the whole parish involved, he arranged to move the young priest into the parish, thereby ensuring the continuity of religious practice and preservation of the mother tongue: 'He too had been imprisoned [like his father], but the villagers looked him up, and talked him into it, they told him they'd do justice to him before God and man, but he must stand up for his people because they were going to saddle us with some Slavic-speaking priest and that would be the end of us and our Hungarianness' (Field interview from Salanki, 1992).

The 'reunited' priest had served afterwards for thirty-nine years in the parish practising a latent mode of Greek Catholic existence. In the eyes of his parishioners, he upheld an authentic Greek Catholicism and, thus, apart from a few formal elements, their religious life, their customs, and language remained the same.[18] In spite of the ideological pressure and the formal turn

[18] All over the region in communities where the parish priest could be convinced 'locally' to accept 'reunion', the shift to the Orthodox Church was smoother. The necessary formal changes were rather superficial: e.g. images of the Sacred Heart of Jesus were repainted onto cloth, images of St Anthony were changed to St Michael, or sculptures were removed from churches. There were also places, however, where all was left untouched. One significant element changed in the liturgy; specifically, the pope's name was left publicly unsaid. In order not to state the Moscow patriarch's name aloud, 'reunited' priests would whisper the insertion on the 'superiors' within the liturgy. Of course, the laity noticed these changes, but accepted them as a compromise.

to the Orthodox Church, this upholding of religious and ethnic identity through everyday practice made possible Greek Catholic continuity in local communities.

The End of the Latent Mode of Greek Catholic Existence – The Dying Out of the Reunited Priesthood

In the following years the number of believers shifting to Roman Catholic churches increased in parishes where the 'apostate' priests could not remain working (as a result of old age or death). In such cases, the old, formerly Greek Catholic priests were replaced by Orthodox priests. The new priests made fundamental changes in the community life by changing the liturgical order and even the liturgical language. This was a most traumatic experience for parishioners, and brought about vehement protests in most parishes. In no such rebellious parish could Orthodox priests stay for extended periods, and, thus, they had to be continually replaced. The Orthodox priests who kept Hungarian as the liturgical language were received with more benevolence by parishioners. Furthermore in such cases, locals tried to *train* priests into local customs.[19] Orthodox priests usually did not rule out such requests, (Pilipkó 1997), and they even fulfilled special requests, such as healing and exorcism. In Salanki, when the 'reunited' priest who had maintained a latent mode of Greek Catholic existence died in 1988, the parish community rejected and forced out any succeeding Orthodox priests who knew no Hungarian and wished to introduce Church Slavonic in the liturgy. Because of the frequent changes and the living memory of Greek Catholic identity, the community unanimously stood up for the reorganization of the Greek Catholic parish at the time of the political transformations. The exact content and form of Greek Catholicism in the village, however, was to become the subject of heated debates.

In the 1980s, the Orthodox Church had two Hungarian-speaking priests who had serious chances of defending Hungarian communities in Subcarpathia. One had studied to be an Orthodox priest and was appointed to the Greek Catholic parish of Bobove in 1982. The village had had no permanent priest for over three decades and considering religious policies of the time, they were lucky to receive a Hungarian priest, even if he was Orthodox. However, nobody knew then that because of the Hungarian Orthodox priest the Orthodox Church would prevail in the parish when laws allowed re-establishment of the Greek Catholic Church:

[19] Generally meaning that the person closest to the priest, usually, the sexton, who was also the ministrant, would advise the priest on the parish's customs and expectations, making clear to him that he could stay as long as he took these into consideration.

> So, then [in 1982], we would receive him, of course we would, he was Hungarian, the young priest, he was from Jánosi [Ukrainian: Janosi] nearby … We couldn't know that the state of religion would change, could we? That we would one day be Greeks again, that religion would turn back to proper (Field interview from Bobove, 1999).

After decades of abandonment the arrival of the Hungarian Orthodox priest in the 1980s created a chance to practise the Eastern Liturgy in Hungarian. The locals overlooked the fact that the new priest was Orthodox and as the liturgies are similar they thought to practise Greek Catholicism while apparently taking part in forming an Orthodox parish. As a result the latent mode of Greek Catholic existence in Bobove came alive. The rebirth of church life and the use of Hungarian in liturgical services concealed the fundamental fact that an Orthodox parish was being organized.

New Trends in the 1990s

The peace that the arrival of the Orthodox priest brought to the village was short-lived. With the revival of the Greek Catholic Church all over the region local communities started to reclaim their churches to Greek Catholicism. In Bobove, however, most Eastern-Rite believers remained Orthodox (see also Geszti 2001; Pilipkó 2002a). The local council passed a resolution ordering the Orthodox priest to leave the village within two weeks and transfer the church to the newly reorganized Greek Catholic parish. In its resolution, the council referred to the referendum in the Greek Catholic community, and the parishioners voted for the Greek Catholic Church. However, the Orthodox priest refused to accept the result of the referendum and stated that the people loved him and the referendum had been falsified, nothing but 'Communist manipulation'. Thus, Bobove remained the only registered Hungarian Orthodox community in all of Subcarpathia.

In other villages, the Rusyn Orthodox clergy that had, either of their own accord or under slight pressure, learned to speak Hungarian, resigned from their posts at the head of the newly re-established Greek Catholic parishes, and founded Rusyn-language Orthodox parishes. The Orthodox priest of Bobove, as an ethnic Hungarian, realized he had little chance to find another parish and decided to fight for this one.

The village leadership in Bobove was composed mostly of members of the Roman Catholic and Reformed churches, but most of them because of their positions were party members and therefore formally atheists.[20] After

[20] Local surveys indicate that the past decades' discriminatory social policies encouraged social groups with a secondary or higher education, especially professionals, into formal

the changes, the local elite returned to their forbears' churches, and, as village leaders, decided to put into practice the law on re-establishing the Greek Catholic Church. They were, however, caught unaware by the tough resistance offered by the local Orthodox priest. The latter felt it unjust that after almost ten years of service he should leave the village, where '*people have loved him'*, so he went around his parish canvassing for signatures to prove the peoples' affection for him. Thereafter the village community split in two: one group insisted on their priest, while the other subjected his staying to the condition that he '*shifts*' to Greek Catholicism. The priest could not manage the 'shift', but managed very well to keep half of his flock Orthodox.

The Motives of Identification after 1990

The massive reorganization of Hungarian Greek Catholic parishes in the 1990s demonstrates that the forty-year religious hegemony of the Orthodox Church could not function as a force capable of shaping a group's identity. The social-psychological conditions for creating such an identity were missing in the first place. First, personal life stories preserved the memories of the forced reunification of the Greek Catholic Church, the internment of its priests, the capricious fate of its churches. Second, the Orthodox Church in Subcarpathia was generally associated with the 'coming in of the Ruskies' and the painful memories of *malenky robot*,[21] to which Hungarian Greek Catholics fell victim just as much as their Reformed or Roman Catholic brethren, were connected to Russians. Third, and perhaps most important, the use of Hungarian in church services had a role in maintaining ethnic identity in both individual and community consciousness. These Hungarian-speaking Greek Catholics by preserving their language and culture deemed themselves members of the larger Hungarian nation. By choosing to provide them with Hungarian-speaking priests, the Orthodox Church recognized the usefulness of this ethnic identity. This attempt proved so successful in Bobove that the majority of the Greek Catholic community remained Orthodox even after the changes of the early 1990s.

Bobove was a rather peculiar case because, officially, the whole community had been Orthodox for forty years. Nevertheless, this was not enough time for a cohesive Orthodox identity to take root among the parishioners, who always thought of themselves as Greek Catholics. When faced

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irreligiosity. After the changes in 1990 and the end of official antireligious ideology, several members of these groups reaffiliated with their parishes (Pilipkó 1999: 7–9).

[21] The manner of speaking of the Soviet military, meaning literally 'little work', when collecting people for labour camps.

with the choice of remaining Orthodox or returning to Greek Catholicism, the parishioners must have reflected on the differences between the two confessional identities. However, only a very small group of people in Bobove, mainly the members of the parish council, the cantor, the sexton, the curator (the 'Orthodox core'), felt it as their duty to motivate their choice. The village community was quite differentiated on their motives in belonging to a particular church identity. The majority continued to profess that they are 'Greek Catholics but go to the Orthodox priest'. They were the so-called undecided. The third group was the 'unconscious Orthodox', who not only did not admit that they are Orthodox but said: 'we go to the Greek Catholic church, so we can only be Greek Catholics'.

The 'Orthodox core' belonged to the middle generation born after 1949, and their first and most firm ground of reference was that they were 'baptized by the Orthodox priest and so can hardly be anything but Orthodox'. They renounced their forbears' Greek Catholic tradition; history for them began in the 1950s when they were 'born into' the Orthodox Church.

> When this Soviet system came in, with it came the whole Orthodox religion, and, from then on, whoever was born was [baptized] Orthodox … we're all born after that, and we can't help that, why would we deny our religion … we don't mind what religion there had been here before 1949 (Field interview from Bobove, 2000).

Identity is relative to some other identity: in this given case, the entity brought into comparison is the community of Greek Catholic parishioners. According to the interpretation of the 'Orthodox core', several Greek Catholics – about 20 families – did not *persevere* with their community, because, with the coming of the Orthodox priest in 1982, they left it, and began going to the Roman Catholic church in the neighboring village, Vilok. Members of the 'Orthodox core' say that those villagers indicated by their behaviour that they refused to partake in the duty of maintaining the parish, which fell to the ones remaining at home, the nowadays members of the Orthodox parish. As the Greek Catholic Church was legalized again in the beginning of 1990s, these 'deserting' families were the most ardent supporters and organizers of the local Greek Catholic parish. They were the ones who felt they persevered in their principles and held on to their Catholic identity.

The second group consisted of the 'undecided', their attitude being the most ambivalent. They, particularly the elderly, consciously professed their Greek Catholicism in spite of attending Orthodox services: 'We're Greek who go to the Orthodox priest', people in the village say. In the course of the conflicts between the Greek Catholics and the Orthodox, these people were so deeply offended that they felt their only choice was full dissociation from the Greek Catholic side: 'How would I go with them when they'd sent me

out of the church – me, the cantor'. In the community's daily routine, these negative attitudes between the opposing groups have mellowed, lost much of their aggression and fervour, but not their distance.

The third, 'unaware Orthodox', group deems itself Greek Catholic but not by conscious decision. They thought of themselves as Greek Catholics because they 'used to go to the Greek Catholic church', to the priest they had gone to before (i.e. the Orthodox priest of the village since 1982), and they therefore were 'Greek Catholics as always, and remained so, and did not go running to other churches or priests'. This reflects a particular connection between space and identity, hinted at by the Orthodox priest's behaviour when he was forced to return the formerly Greek Catholic church building. He insisted on building his independent church on the very site next to the present Greek Catholic church, which had been chosen as the site of a future Greek Catholic church with foundations already laid. This is quite an extraordinary 'continuity-shaping' solution by the newly organized Hungarian Orthodox community.

For the new Orthodox church, village authorities had chosen a site in the centre of the village still used for agriculture. The Orthodox priest, however, categorically rejected this site, arguing that this would put the newly organized community in a peripheral situation. The location of the site in the village centre was not peripheral geographically but in a sacral sense. It was further away from the upper quarter of the settlement, the location of all the religious spaces: not only the Greek Catholic, but also the Roman Catholic and the Reformed churches. Thus, the village's new Orthodox church would have not only been 'far' from its current religious centre, but, due to the large expanse of the village, it could even have attained a central position. Nevertheless, the Orthodox priest would not accept the proposal. In a neutral location, the new Orthodox church as a physical object would embody Orthodoxy, and this exclusivity itself would keep many villagers away from it, not to mention the 'unconscious Orthodox' group whose individual Orthodox religious lives were connected to the old Greek Catholic church. The Orthodox priest had to decide: he could either build a new church for a community of smaller size or hold on to his parishioners and postpone the construction of the church. The Orthodox community built its own church in the end (in 2000), but not on the site offered by the local council, which continued to be seen as peripheral. Instead they are building it on the grounds of a shop they acquired close to the Greek Catholic church. The impressive church building will certainly bring about important changes in the village sacral structure.

The Liturgical Order

After the forced reunion of 1949, Greek Catholic churches in Subcarpathia were ordered by higher ecclesiastical authorities to remove certain objects that bore Latin associations (e.g. statues), while certain devotions of Latin origin (the cults of the Virgin Mary and Saint Joseph in rosary societies) were not only tolerated but taken over by Orthodox priests in certain parishes. For instance, the Novena to Saint Joseph was introduced in the Bobove parish by the Orthodox priest installed in 1982. He had known this devotion from the Greek Catholic village of his birth, and, sensing its community-preserving potential, he adapted it to his own parish.

Greek Catholics who withdrew from the Orthodox communities after 1990, however, lost these particular devotions. The newly reorganized Greek Catholic parishes were served by 'circuit' priests from a distance; these priests had no time for supplemental devotions. Many of these priests, often coming from Hungary or having studied there, were influenced by the Second Vatican Council resolution that prescribed the revision of the self-interpretation of the Eastern Churches, fostered the rediscovery of their values, and encouraged a return to their traditions (Pirigyi 1990: 164; also Buzalka, Mahieu, this volume). This recommendation consciously sought to remove Latin elements from the liturgy, and shorten it in accordance with the requirements of modern times. This attitude had already taken root in the Hajdúdorog Episcopacy in Hungary. Thus, the Subcarpathian priests who had studied in Hungary returned to their parishes with the aim to put these ideas into practice. Parishioners, however, objected to this process of 'Byzantinization'.

Although in the reorganized Greek Catholic parish in Bobove this process did not face any resistance, in communities that fully returned to Greek Catholicism it encountered strong opposition (Pilipkó 2002b). The changes in the liturgy, its shortening, and the removal of Western (but here customary) elements from it provided a good pretext for parish communities that held on to Orthodoxy to prove that they took the right way, that they 'held on to Catholicism', because the liturgy presented by the Orthodox priest was closer to the older Greek Catholic liturgy as they knew it.

Indeed, based on the 'Byzantinization' proposed by the Second Vatican Council,[22] the Orthodox and Greek Catholic rites (excluding certain motifs of dogma) should have come closer to each other. Paradoxically, however, the Orthodox liturgy retained certain elements of Latin origin familiar to believers (e.g. the Novena to Saint Joseph), while the Greek Catholic liturgy was shortened and excluded customary Latin elements.

[22] Reinforced by the release, in 1990, of the *Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches.*

Conclusion

The emergence of confessional conflicts in Subcarpathian villages was a result of the more general sociopolitical transformations. Conflicts arose from collisions of identity within the Greek Catholic Hungarian community in Subcarpathia. Some people wanted to re-establish their former church, and this was deemed harmless in certain regions, where people thought they were returning to the true order of things by re-establishing institutions that had been violently destroyed. Others believed that mere nostalgia or personal ambition fed the desire for religious reorganization and, thus, it was dangerous for the whole community. Villages became divided, with at least two groups with different sets of values emerging in this process; they verged on seeing one another as enemies. In fact, some quarrels descended into mob-law. For decades, otherness had had no chance of manifesting itself in these communities. Conflicts could only surface with the help of a newer, large-scale social change, which modified social relations to such an extent that everyone had to redefine his or her position.

The confessional conflict, as far as we see it, constitutes the symbolic struggle for high-prestige positions, or the process of the apparently homogeneous village communities falling apart into several communities of different views and interests. Formerly important and prestigious elements of identity either disappeared or became causes of negative discrimination (e.g. Communist Party membership), and formerly disparaged public roles (churchwardenship and activity in the Hungarian Cultural Association of Subcarpathia) and conditions (church membership) now acquired valuable elements of identity for everyone. The struggle is symbolic because the different 'parties' did not openly attempt to gain one another's positions or to question one another's honesty. Everyone was fighting for the church and the legitimacy springing from the possession of the church. Even today the most important source of legitimacy and power, indeed, the most important resource, is the church.

The conflicts described previously were mostly characteristic of Hungarian communities in the vicinity of the Hungarian-Rusyn language border. We argue that they cannot be regarded as simple ethnic conflicts. The notions of the 'other' appearing in the eyes of the community as dangerous clearly point out that, in the final count, the various outbursts of temper were rooted in the different interpretations of reality held by communities with different identities. In all the communities studied, the participants with the most 'Eastern' background were regarded as suspect, namely: in southwest Subcarpathia, the Greek Catholics and in the central and eastern regions, the Orthodox. The dominant groups in Hungarian communities always identified

the most Eastern participants with the majority Ukrainian society. This clearly points to the referential basis of local elites (Pusztai 1997).

In approaching the end of our analysis, we have to turn back to the widely acknowledged phenomenon that ethnic and religious identities, in most cases, support each other in Central Europe (e.g. Roman Catholic Croats vs. Orthodox Serbs, Roman Catholic and Protestant Hungarians vs. [mainly] Orthodox [and partly Greek Catholic] Romanians in Transylvania). Because we have reported about conflicts between ethnicity and religion, this chapter, at first, seems to suggest just the contrary. However, the motives of those attempting to obstruct the rebirth of Hungarian Greek Catholicism in the Uzhhorod region can, in fact, be explained by the former, seemingly disproved principle. Those fighting against Hungarian Greek Catholicism in Subcarpathia want to equate religion and ethnicity exactly because they want them to support each other, because they do not want local Hungarians, as they say, to 'pull apart'. Religion, that is, the preference for 'Hungarian [= Western] religions', as opposed to the suspect Greek Catholicism, is, in fact, the primary means of preserving an ethnic group in this situation (Gans 1994: 584).

The complexity of the situation is well demonstrated by the fact that these tensions only occur in the western parts of the areas inhabited by Hungarians. In more eastern regions, especially around Vynohradiv, Hungarian Greek Catholics had always thought of the Byzantine Rite as part of their identity. This is why the authorities tried to integrate the Hungarian parish communities in Orthodoxy by permitting Hungarian as the language of the Eastern liturgy, as the introduction of Church Slavonic never met with success.

The legalization of Greek Catholicism in Subcarpathia fuelled two parallel developments: the revival of religious traditions and the formation of modern religious life. These two processes harshly collided in contemporary Subcarpathian Hungarian Greek Catholicism, which is overwritten with generational conflicts. Old and new attitudes and identities came into conflict. The clergy defined the content of tradition divergently. For the older generation, pre-1949 Latinized Greek Catholicism is the legitimate heritage; whereas for the younger generation, educated in Hungary, the post-Vatican II revival of the Eastern traditions should be considered the true tradition. The contradictory interpretations of the clergy over what is the legitimate tradition have practical effects in parish life. Ordinary believers without detailed knowledge of church history were both witnesses and victims of the seemingly insoluble contradictions surrounding Greek Catholic tradition.

In examining the reawakening of Greek Catholicism, quite obviously the heart of the debate is over its authentic form. We can observe tradition

and modernity competing and the social construction of mutually supporting arguments. Which is the truly authentic form of Greek Catholicism: Following the Julian or the Gregorian calendar? Using the traditional, Latinized liturgy, as sometimes done by Orthodox priests, or using the modernist, shortened, Byzantinized, and locally repelling forms, which young priests from Hungary try to introduce? Who will be faithful to their forbears' faith, the ones who go to the Orthodox priest forced on them earlier, or the ones who attend imported Greek Catholic liturgies full of innovations? Broken traditions have clearly proliferated systems of arguments appealing to authenticity; each system of arguments bases itself on the tradition, which bewilderingly calls attention to the fundamental, ontological, intermediacy of Greek Catholicism.

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PART FOUR

EXCEPTIONAL MOMENTS: PILGRIMAGES AND APPARITIONS

Chapter 10
Greek Catholics of Zemplin: Dilemmas of Contemporary Identity Politics

Agnieszka Halemba

This chapter analyzes the basic premises of the official identity politics pursued by authorities of the Slovak Greek Catholic Church, especially with regard to the occidentalization/orientalization debate. I am interested in how particular arrangements of church-state relations influence day-to-day religious choices of believers and how they affect relations between different religious communities. In particular, I show some ways in which the Greek Catholic Church tries to revive 'religion as a chain of memory' (Hervieu-Léger 2000) through such actions as the Byzantinization of aesthetics or encouragement of official pilgrimages, like those to Klokočov. I finish the chapter with an example of some alternative religious practices, namely pilgrimages to recent – yet unofficial – Marian apparition sites such as Pri Brale or Litmanova. These pilgrimages are pursued by Catholic believers, whether they belong to the Roman or the Greek branches of the Catholic Church. I will argue that the church institutions must face the problem that for many laypeople the subjective truth of their own life of belief, their own religious experience, is more important than the 'tradition as truth' (Boyer 1990) dispensed by the official church authorities. Still, even if it seems that the official Greek Catholic Church would like to act again as a repository of collective memory and guardian of tradition, before it can fully embark on the mission to establish itself as such, it must be clear about the kind of memory and tradition it would like to advance. What should be supported and encouraged? What symbols should be promoted? What is the vision for the future of the Greek Catholic Church and from what past should it emerge?

The chapter is based on research comparing the current situation of Greek Catholics on both sides of the Ukrainian-Slovak border, with special

attention to those regions, which used to form one Eparchy of Mukachevo.[1] Hence, the focus has been on the Košice Exarchate[2], although some comparative fieldwork in the Prešov Eparchy has started and will continue.[3] Moreover, although I concentrate here, following the structure of this volume, mainly on the Slovakian side, the comparative objective of the overall project has shaped the primary questions and observations in the field. Until now, research had been conducted in Slovakia primarily in the Michalovce district, which belongs to a broader region known as Zemplin. In the Ukrainian site, the focus was on the western part of the Transcarpathian region (*Zakarpatska oblast'*), especially in the area next to Mukachevo.[4]

The Current Challenges Facing the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia

Currently, two Greek Catholic Church administrative units in Slovakia lie under the direct jurisdiction of Rome: the Prešov Eparchy, established in 1818 (Drozd 2004), and the Košice Exarchate, which was founded only in 1997. The territory of the exarchate partially belonged to the Mukachevo Eparchy until 1939, when a separate apostolic administration for Slovakia was created (Vasil' n.d.). However, until after the Second World War, some parishes remained formally under jurisdiction of the bishops of Mukachevo; although in practice the Bishop of Prešov supervised all of the Greek Catholic communities of Czechoslovakia. In 1950, the Greek Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia was de-legalized. It was re-legalized in 1968, but, as Marcel Gajdoš writes, only with the 1997 establishment of the Košice Exarchate were some parishes in eastern Slovakia finally both legally and practically released from administration by the bishops in Mukachevo (Gajdoš 1997: 91). Currently, the territory of the Košice Exarchate corresponds exactly to that of the state administrative region of Košice; it also includes the area of Zemplin, site of my current research.

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[1] This research is part of a DFG funded project 'Religious tradition, communism and cultural re-evaluation: Transnationalism in post-1989 East European cultures of remembrance', realized at the Geisteswissenschaftliches Zentrum Geschichte und Kultur Ostmitteleuropas (GWZO) at the University of Leipzig, Germany under the leadership of Professor Stefan Troebst.

[2] Shortly before the publication of this article the status of exarchate was changed and the Eparchy of Košice has been established (see also Konečný this volume).

[3] The project is in its initial phase. The first field research was conducted in summer 2006 in the Kosice Exarchate and around Mukachevo in Ukraine. The second round of fieldwork was conducted in spring 2007, which also includes research in the Prešov Eparchy.

[4] Special thanks for directing my attention to Klokočov in Slovakia and to a recent Marian apparition site in Dzhublyk in Ukraine go to Jurai Buzalka and Vlad Naumescu.

The history and national composition of the two administrative units of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia poses different problems for the church hierarchy. Most of the Ruthenian (Rusyn) population of Slovakia lives on the territory of the Prešov Eparchy, and their presence and demands pose constant challenges. Some Ruthenian Greek Catholic priests would like to see a separate church administration for Slovakia's northeastern regions. They also support using the Rusyn language in prayers and readings in church, as well as the use of Old Slavonic for the liturgy; while, in general, the hierarchy prefers using the Slovak language.

The Košice Exarchate is more uniformly Slovak. The small Rusyn minority in the north of the exarchate and the small Hungarian community in the south do not clearly state demands, and conflicts have not led to suspensions of priests and monks, as has happened in Prešov.[5] Instead, the links with Ukraine are important. Many Slovak priests, according to their own wording, have been 'lent' to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, in order to support its re-establishment in Transcarpathia. This 'lending' extends to the highest levels; currently the head of the Mukachevo Eparchy in Ukraine is a Slovak, Milan Šasik, a former Roman Catholic retrained to pursue his service in the Byzantine Rite. Some see his appointment as an attempt to overcome the disagreements within the Greek Catholic Church in Transcarpathia. Šasik had been a parish priest in Ukraine for a few years before his appointment, but because he is neither Ruthenian nor Ukrainian, he was not involved in the disputes between various factions within the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine. Nevertheless, some of my other informants in Slovakia think that the appointment of a Roman Catholic as head of the Greek Catholic Church in Transcarpathia clearly indicates further Latinization of the Greek Catholic Church in general, despite the official declarations of Rome and the Slovak hierarchy's apparent efforts at Byzantinization.

Those supporting this 'crypto-latinization' thesis point out that the personalities of both heads of Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia were moulded through their membership in two monastic orders: the Jesuits and the Redemptorists. The head of the Prešov Eparchy, Jan Babjak, is a Jesuit, while the head of the Košice Exarchate, Milan Chautur, is a Redemptorist. At the moment, both encourage the revival of Eastern liturgical, aesthetic, and religious practices. Some of their opponents, however, claim that because of their religious education in those orders, they cannot be fully committed to Byzantine practices; Babjak and Chautur can and do support Byzantine liturgy and aesthetics, but supposedly lack 'Eastern spirituality'.

[5] See www.geocities.com/timkovic (accessed August 2007).

Priests in Slovakia generally perceive East and West as two basic modes of being, extending far beyond the realm of liturgical practices, as if 'East' and 'West' were two essences, hard to combine within one person or one practice. These concepts are used in narratives, with 'East' standing for the more mystical, contemplative, and experiential versus the more pragmatic and rational 'West'. The Greek Catholic Church is seen as the church that must deal directly with this dichotomy. Milan Lach, a Jesuit and head of the Centre for Spirituality 'East-West' in Košice, writes in his master's thesis, prepared under the supervision of Jan Babjak:

> Eastern Catholics are not far spiritually from the Orthodox and they are influenced by the West and by the spirituality of the Latin Rite. They are sort of a 'hybrid', fully encompassed neither by the East nor by the West (Lach 2001: 12).

It is a challenging endeavour to build a unique identity around the two complex notions, present in a public discourse, but also largely absent from the believers' everyday concerns. On the one hand, the concepts of East and the West still seem to epitomize the incompatible and re-emerge constantly in discussions and debates. On the other hand, they are often collapsed with the division between the Byzantine and the Latin that, as I show below, for some believers in the area of Zemplin has already ceased to be the division worth preserving.

In Slovakia, the state subsidizes churches to a great extent (see Gradoš 2004), and therefore one should consider the direct dependence of some church activities on the state. State financing of churches has greatly influenced the practical day-to-day life of believers, as well as the relations between different religious communities. In some areas, this influence is largely positive; for example, it seems to restrain interdenominational conflicts and to provide churches with relative financial security. Stéphanie Mahieu argues that in the case of conflicts over property in Romania, 'what has radically calmed the situation is the building of new churches both by the Greek Catholics and the Orthodox' (2004: 7). The same seems to be true for Slovakia. The landscape of Zemplin is dotted with new church buildings of various religious groups, sometimes as many as three or four different churches in settlements of no more than 1,000 inhabitants. Again, as in the Romanian case, the principle of *simultaneum* (the shared use of a single church building) is rarely applied (Mahieu 2004). Instead, the case of one church building belonging to one religious community is predominant and seems to result in the relatively peaceful coexistence of various religious groups (especially in comparison with the situation in Ukraine). On the level of local communities, people do not require so much a return of a specific

building, but instead care about exclusive right to use a place of worship, regardless of its former formal ownership.[6]

Nevertheless, the Slovak model of church-state relations is a matter of constant discussions both in the specialist literature and among the priests and believers (Mulík 1997; Jozefčaková 2003). At present, in consultation with representatives of the churches, the Slovakian Ministry of Culture financially supports churches and religious societies. All priests receive a salary from the state, according to an official table (see Gradoš 2004 for detailed numbers). Financial disbursements by the state also serve as a means to control church activities. For example, all church-related youth organizations can receive financial support for their activities (summer camps, pilgrimages, concerts, exhibitions, and so on) if they register within a centralized online system.[7] Hence, although there is no formal obligation to inform state authorities about church-related activities, there is a clear financial incentive to do so.

Some of my Greek Catholic informants claimed that the state's direct financial support of the church makes priests, and especially the hierarchs, too independent from the laity. This may be understood in at least two ways. On the one hand, the believers, being aware that their parish priest receives a salary from the state, may be less willing to contribute with donations and may cease to perceive the local parish as their direct responsibility. On the other hand, the institutional church's decision-making is relatively independent of the laypeople's wishes. For example, churches can pursue their particular politics on liturgical language or apparition sites without much concern for eventual financial loss if some believers withdraw or redirect their support. It seems that currently the main concern of Greek Catholic authorities in the Košice Exarchate is not to lose believers in general, beyond the level of individual parishes. They work hard to keep young people close to the church by providing them with a multitude of extra activities: summer camps, bicycle trips, water sports, and so on. One village priest bought a trampoline so the young boys who serve at the altar during the mass can have some additional amusement afterwards. Another priest installed a police-like siren in his car, which is illegal, but provides young people with a

[6] This is true, however, mainly with regard to village churches that are not particularly symbolically loaded (e.g. ones that do not contain miraculous images) and have not been included in the symbolic struggle between various groups, usually led by urban intellectuals. If a given building becomes not only a place of prayer but also stands for the suffering, identity, or future of a religious or national group, the struggle can focus on return of the particular temple (see, e.g. Hann 1998; Mahieu 2004). Moreover, in Ukrainian Transcarpathia, the situation is different, and many communities struggle to this day to reclaim old church buildings.

[7] www.mladez.sk (accessed August 2007).

lot of fun when they ride in his car in the village. The relative financial stability of the church enables many initiatives to be aimed at young people, with the explicit aim of keeping them close to the church. Yet, the question remains: what kind of church should it be?

Is the Greek Catholic Identity Important in Zemplin?

A similar question for the Greek Catholic authorities in Slovakia may be posed as that set by Chris Hann in his article on Byzantine and Latin music styles in the Greek Catholic Church in the Ukrainian-Polish borderland: 'How could Greek Catholics genuinely (re-)embrace Byzantine traditions of worship while remaining loyal to universal Catholicism?' (Hann 2003: 229). Hann suggested that in Poland, the distinctions between Byzantine and Latin styles have been actively used in order to reinforce another division, between presumably culturally different East and West in a context where religious differences readily fit differences of national identity (Polish and Ukrainian). In the Zemplin region, however, distinctions cannot be easily attached to different national groups with different histories, memories, and sentiments. In the villages where I worked, Slovaks make up the vast majority of Catholics, either Roman or Greek, and the division between East and West falls within one national group. One of my informants,[8] a Greek Catholic priest, sees it thus:

> We [Greek Catholics] are lost here in Slovakia, because we live in a society whose mentality is Western. Still, the liturgy is Eastern, this Eastern liturgy is Eastern! To understand it one has to go back to ancient times. Eastern liturgy, this is Greece, this is East, this is another world, completely different man. He does not need to understand. He does not need to hear what the priest is saying. He has to know that there is Christ in this bread and this is it. When he enters a temple, he must be immediately in a completely different world. There are the icons, there is smell, there are all the symbols. He has to experience. In the West – no. This is completely different. Everything is purely built on reason. A prayer should be short and to the point. This is why all the Eucharistic Latin canons are so packed with content! And a man is trying all the time to understand this all. To find an essence in this, theological essence – scary! And a man in Slovakia has something from this.

[8] In order to respect their privacy and avoid possible negative consequences for them, I provide neither names of my informants nor any information that could enable their immediate identification. I only give names of public figures.

The Greek Catholic hierarchy fostered close connections between the Greek Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic Church during the socialist era and before (for comparative material from Romania and Hungary, see Mahieu 2009). Church members remember the head of the Prešov Eparchy until 2002, Jan Hirka, as a person who encouraged these connections beyond the dogmatic and administrative levels. He continued extending Roman Catholic influences to those areas of religious practice that, in principle, should mark a distinction between these two branches of the Catholic Church. These include liturgy, architecture, aesthetics, and regulations on the priests' lives. In the Zemplin region, where particular church membership does not coincide with different national identities,[9] the aspects of religious life enumerated above can be seen as constituting the very distinctiveness of the Greek Catholic Church.

The Greek Catholic priests with whom I talked during my fieldwork pointed out that Latinization of the Greek Catholic liturgy started to reverse only after establishment of the Košice Exarchate in 1997, and in Prešov after Jan Hirka retired in 2002. Both of the current heads of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia seem to be concerned with establishing a place for their church in the country's religious landscape. In order to do so, they attempt to create and sustain a delicate balance between belonging to a Catholic Church under Rome's jurisdiction and belonging to a Byzantine liturgical tradition. My research suggests, however, that in the Košice Exarchate, the demarcation of differences between Latin and Byzantine liturgy, architecture, and aesthetics is important more for the Greek Catholic priests and hierarchy than it is for lay believers. I suggest that, at the moment, the Greek Catholic hierarchy faces two major challenges. First, the laity in general loses interest in church-related religious practices. Second, the Greek Catholic Church struggles to find a position for itself among other religious institutions in Slovakia, both on the official level (which has been done quite successfully) and also in the hearts and minds of laypeople. A young Redemptorist from Michalovce described this issue:

> This, our Greek Catholic Church, well, not everyone likes it, but it is finding itself again at the moment … It defines its identity again. This is because the situation was as follows: when in the 1950s it was decided that, well, the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia does not exist, there were villages that turned towards Orthodoxy … After 1968, there were some things done, well, they changed the things that were hindering closeness between the Roman and Greek Catho-

[9] The situation might be different in those parts of northern and eastern Slovakia that are inhabited also by Ruthenians (or Rusyns), large numbers of whom also adhere to the Greek Catholic Church.

> lic Churches. The liturgy was cut, so it can be shorter. This had reasons: many people who did not have a church [in their village] went to the Latins. And they are there until now. And the aim has been to bring them back … The identity of Greek Catholics has been lost. And some people ask until now – what is the difference, the same Pope … Well, why should I have to stand for 1 hour or for 1.5 hours when there [in the Roman Catholic Church] I stand only for 30 minutes! This is the same mass, right? And, this is difficult for me to tell someone: man, there are also such things as moral obligation, it comes from grandfathers to sons, it is your obligation to keep it up!

Those challenges facing the Greek Catholic Church can be analyzed both in the light of recent debates over relations between religion and modernity, as well as critiques of earlier secularization theories (Casanova 1994; Berger 1999; Davie 1999; Hervieu-Leger 2000; Davie 2004). Those works are linked by the assertion that rather than focus on religion's declining importance in the contemporary world, one should focus on changes in how 'the religious' (Hervieu-Léger 2000) exists at the level of religious practice and belief as well as the level of religious institutions.

Grace Davie (2004) notes that European religious practices shift from obligation to consumption as they come to be perceived to be the result of personal choice rather than 'given' to a person as a part of group identity. Church services no longer are obligatory; instead one can choose to attend or not (Davie 2004: 79). The Redemptorist monk quoted above noted this lack of a sense of obligation when he lamented the fruitlessness of encouraging people to attend long Byzantine liturgies, when they have the option of shorter and simpler Latin ones. The only argument that he considered still worth trying on the Greek-Catholic-turned-Latin, but difficult, was the appeal to tradition: 'think about your forefathers and their ways!' Still, just as the sense of obligation does not seem to be strong any longer, so, too, 'religion as a chain of memory' also seems broken.

Daniele Hervieu-Leger (2000) associates religion with collective memory. From her perspective, all religion implies mobilization of collective memory, but this mobilization is done in different ways. In small societies, all aspects of life contain collective memory, hence the religious is plaited within the practice of life itself. In differentiated societies, where distinctive communities of faith emerge, collective memory, intertwined with religion, is constantly (re)constituted by religious institutions. They seek to establish a vertical 'chain of belief' among members of the religious group by constructing a horizontal 'chain of belief', linking past, present, and future.

According to Hervieu-Leger, however, contemporary Europe has a crisis of collective memory in the religious sphere, which is accompanied by

the diminishing role of traditional church institutions, now mainly seen as guardians of tradition and builders of the past-present-future chain of belief. Yet, in some cases, as in the case of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia, it remains unclear what kind of memory and tradition churches should advance, what kind of symbols they should promote.

These questions remind me of my previous research, also done in a postsocialist context but in remote parts of Siberia, where the Altaian intellectuals discussed different possibilities for the religious future of the Altaian nation (Halemba 2006). They expressed the need for a set of beliefs and practices that should be defined and linked with the past in order to build a community of believers. However, in the Republic of Altai, they faced a lack of formal religious institutions that could be readily seen as repositories of tradition. Hence, they initiated processes of institutionalization of religious beliefs; that is, forming church-like structures, hierarchies as well as fixed cosmologies. In Slovakia, although official church institutions exist, their challenges and concerns are not so dissimilar from the Altaian ones as it would seem at the first sight. Here, the church hierarchy strives to decide what precisely constitutes the Greek Catholic tradition and what should lie at the basis of Greek Catholic 'chain of belief'. These concerns shine through attempts to place Greek Catholic practice on a more or less specified point on the continuum between the Latin and the Byzantine rites and take form in the orientalization-occidentalization debate.

On the one level, the present politics of the church authorities can be seen as a return to the Byzantine traditions. Churches receive iconostases; the school of *ikonopis* (literally the writing of icons) has been initiated in Košice; morning and evening rites typical for Byzantine traditions are encouraged; and beautiful publications present the liturgical traditions and icons of the Greek Catholic Church (e.g. Boháč and Peters 2004). On another level, the Byzantinization process has to be carefully managed, as the aim is to create an image of Greek Catholic Church that is *both* united with Rome and Byzantine at the same time. Moreover, the aim is to retain believers, who have become accustomed to many religious practices within the Latin tradition, such as the rosary, the adoration of the Holy Sacrament, and the separation of baptism and confirmation.

Stéphanie Mahieu (2009) quotes one of her informants, a Hungarian Greek Catholic priest, who confirms that such prayers as the rosary are very popular among believers but that ideally they should be gradually and carefully replaced by such Byzantine prayers as the Akathist. In Slovakia, there have been attempts to introduce the Akathist, but I have never heard anyone suggesting that the rosary should be abandoned. To the contrary, Milan

Chautur is a great supporter of the rosary and of Fatima's Saturdays.[10] In a conversation with one Greek Catholic priest from the region of Michalovce, I asked if encouraging such religious practices as the rosary or Fatima's Saturdays is consistent with a general trend towards orientalization:

> Fatima's Saturdays help the people; they help that this place Klokočov becomes known. This is needed now, and he [Milan Chautur] gives a lot of attention to Klokočov … Fatima's Saturdays are for people, that they go to confession, that they pray, that they make pilgrimage … But with regard to liturgy he is oriented towards the East more than he was 10 years ago.

One of the most important methods of re-establishing a common identity among the Greek Catholics in the Košice Exarchate is to encourage pilgrimages to officially recognized devotional sites on the territory of the exarchate like Klokočov or Sečovce.[11] But there are also recent alternative pilgrimage sites, such as the Marian apparition site Pri Brale (only a few kilometres away from Sečovce) or Litmanova, which, even though they are not recognized by the hierarchy, are becoming increasingly popular.

Pilgrimages and Apparitions Sites

Hervieu-Léger suggests that to maintain their visibility in contemporary society, the institutional religions encourage 'marrying the emotivity of belonging with a reasoned appeal to ethico-cultural heritage' by supporting pilgrimages (Hervieu-Léger 2000: 175). She writes about primarily top-down approaches of launching worldwide pilgrimages of young people to places of special significance in Christian history. In the case of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia, which does not necessarily seek to strengthen the institutionalized church in general, but rather to create support for a particular form of Catholicism, these are local pilgrimages rather than worldwide ones that are encouraged. Particularly encouraged are those pilgrimage sites that could possibly localize the revived vertical and horizontal 'chain of belief' more precisely than within the overall framework of Catholic Church institutions. However, the official church does not welcome the alternative pilgrimage sites that have been growing around the recent apparitions of the Virgin Mary. Despite this, the alternative sites can be accepted (even if only informally) if the institutional church gains a substan-

[10] During her apparition in Fatima, the Virgin Mary promised special blessings to those who would meditate and pray the rosary on the first Saturday of five consecutive months. This type of devotion was particularly supported by the late Pope John Paul II.

[11] There are four officially recognized sites: Klokočov, Sečovce, Michalovce and Košice. See http://www.grkatke.sk/ or http://www.exarchat.rcc.sk/ (accessed August 2007).

tial control over both the income generated by the site and its symbolic construction.

On both sides of the Ukrainian-Slovak border, the Greek Catholic hierarchy seems to agree on a need for measures to encourage believers' identification with Greek Catholic Church both in general and in particular, that is, with their particular exarchate or eparchy. On both sides of the border, creation and encouragement of pilgrimages to sacred sites is seen as one of the most fruitful measures aimed at fostering those processes of identification. Both local priests and laypeople say that they have clearly experienced the efforts of bishop Milan Chautur to encourage pilgrimages to the four officially recognized pilgrimage sites of the exarchate. The first on the list of pilgrimage places of the Košice Exarchate is Klokočov.

Klokočov, a small village of approximately 360 inhabitants, sits close to the bank of an artificial lake, Zemplinska Sirava, one of the most popular sites for internal Slovak tourism. According to statistical data, over 90 per cent of its inhabitants have been Slovak all through the nineteenth and twentieth century, apart from the census in 1910, when 90 per cent of Klokočov people apparently declared themselves to be Ruthenian (Kònya 2005). Although this sudden change forms an interesting case and would provide a starting point for a study of census practices, what is important for the present chapter is that currently most of Klokočov's inhabitants declare themselves to be Slovak and Greek Catholic.

Klokočov stands out from other small villages in the region because of an image of Mary with a Child in a local Greek Catholic church. The picture is said to have shed tears in the seventeenth century when enemy troops attacked the church. In the booklet distributed by the local priest, the Hungarian Calvinist army is presented as the attackers:

> The people of Klokočov were also praying in front of their beloved icon, when Hungarian Calvinist army troops were standing already next to Michalovce and everything seemed hopeless. And then, according to trustworthy witnesses, the picture of the Mother of God started to shed tears. As chronicles say, the heart of the Mother of Jesus Christ and Our Mother started to cry over a doom that was coming unstoppably over the country and over the people, above all over the most powerless and the poorest. At that moment, the Calvinist soldiers came to Klokočov as occupiers. They did not want to believe that the picture really shed tears, so they took it out from the iconostasis, threw it to the ground, and cut it. They battered it, but when the believers put it back onto the honourable place, it started to shed tears again and more intensively than before (Klokočov n.d.: 3).

The old wooden church subsequently burned down, but the miraculous image was saved and taken to Prešov and Vienna.[12] The original picture's current location is not clear; the Klokočov church has a venerated copy. Other copies of this image exist, the most recent ones located in Uzhhorod's Greek Catholic Cathedral and in the Greek Catholic church in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. In the second half of the 1990s, another copy, held in the neighbouring village of Kusin, was taken on a tour of all of the Greek Catholic parishes in Slovakia. The Greek Catholic exarchate greatly promotes this image of the Virgin Mary.

The previously cited excerpt from the booklet describes, as do most other church publications, the image as an icon (see, e.g. Hospodár and Žeňuch 2007). Still, the Klokočov Greek Catholic parish priest pointed out to me that the image's style cannot be clearly recognized as Byzantine. He supposed that the original image was 'more like an icon', but in a process of double copying the image has lost some of its Byzantine features, so it would fit perfectly in any Roman Catholic Church. The church authorities, seeking a re-orientalization of church aesthetics, needed a careful strategy to deal with this fact. The Virgin Mary of Klokočov is already well-established as a venerated image among Greek Catholics in Košice Exarchate, which does not have many possible pilgrimage sites and miraculous images. Hence, its veneration is encouraged, but more recently the picture when displayed is accompanied by more Byzantine images. On 15 August 2006, when several thousand believers gathered in Klokočov, an open-air altar was erected in front of the church building, decorated with modern but clearly Byzantine-style paintings. After an hour taking photographs during the celebrations, I first noticed that a copy of the miraculous image (the one held usually in Kusin) was also placed on the altar, but in such a way that the majority of pilgrims could not really see it.

Another actively promoted pilgrimage site of the Košice Exarchate is the Church of Sts Cyril and Methodius in Sečovce, which has been renovated in modern Byzantine style. Because of the exarchate's devotion to Sts Cyril and Methodius, Milan Chautur loves this pilgrimage site, and pilgrimages there are very much encouraged. However, church authorities do not welcome an alternative site of worship that appeared recently a few kilometres from Sečovce, an apparition site of the Virgin Mary in Pri Brale. The number of apparition sites in contemporary Slovakia is difficult to evaluate, as some local sites may exist that are unknown outside the immediate region. The only contemporary apparition site on the territory of the Košice Exarchate that I know of, the previously mentioned Pri Brale, would probably

[12] The story resembles the narratives about the miraculous icon of Máriapócs (Hungary), the biggest Hungarian pilgrimage site (see Mahieu this volume).

remain unknown if not for the efforts of a Slovakian organization, *Magnificat Slovakia*, concerned with spreading and supporting the cult of the Virgin Mary. The most influential activity of this Bratislava-based organization is publishing a monthly magazine, *MRosa*.[13] Church authorities treat this widely distributed and popular publication skeptically. The journalists of *MRosa* publish mainly reports from apparition sites in Slovakia plus reports from Medjugorje, which has grown to be the ultimate ideal for how the apparition site should look and work. They are not particularly concerned with acceptance of apparitions by the official church. To the contrary, they often criticize the church for being too skeptical and for denying the experiences of the visionaries.

Currently, *MRosa* delivers regular information about three contemporary apparition sites in Slovakia: Dechtice, Litmanova, and Pri Brale (Sečovce), as well as about several older ones, most importantly Turzovka. Limanova and Pri Brale can be regarded as Greek Catholic sites, as at least some of the visionaries have been Greek Catholic, the apparitions occurred on territories with a considerable number of Greek Catholic believers who attend the sites, and local Greek Catholic priests have been involved in establishing and managing the sites. *MRosa*, however, does not make any difference in its reports between Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic sites – for the journalists the main task is to follow the Virgin Mary. The aesthetic style of *MRosa* reminds one of colourful pop magazines, and the Virgin Mary is uniformly portrayed as a beautiful young woman in white or blue robes, in a style known from Roman Catholic iconography throughout the world (see Zimdars-Swartz 1991).

MRosa most often reports on Litmanova, currently the best-established Slovakian apparition site. It is situated not far from the Polish-Slovakian border on the territory of the Prešov Eparchy, and the Virgin Mary supposedly appeared there on the Žvir hill between 1990 and 1995. Since then, Litmanova has become a popular pilgrimage site, mainly for Roman and Greek Catholics from Slovakia and Poland. In summer 2006 I visited this site with a bus pilgrimage from the Michalovce region. My fellow pilgrims noted that the image on the main altar had changed from the year before. Previously, the main altar's image was of the Virgin Mary in white and blue robes, with a golden halo, standing in a glow of light. Now, the image on the main altar is an icon – a painting of Mary, clearly in the Byzantine style. I was told that it was painted by a Russian *ikonopisec* based on the descriptions of the visionaries. I discussed this change with some Greek Catholic priests, who said that it indicated that the Greek Catholic Church

[13] All issues of *MRosa* are available at www.magnificat.sk (accessed August 2007).

treats Litmanova seriously[14] and that the hierarchy tries to direct this popular apparition site into a general tendency towards re-orientalization. As one of them said:

> Yes … Much depends on the upbringing in a seminary. Fifteen years ago, when Litmanova was starting, even priests did not have much idea what an icon was. Well, maybe some … but little. But a lot of has changed since 1990, and this has been going towards the East … Both the archbishops now, in Košice and in Prešov, are new and younger. I would say this is a new school. Especially when the Košice Exarchate was established, Vladyka Milan as his first goal took a reform of the liturgy: not only of words and singing but also of icons.

Another apparition site on which the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia has been forced to have an opinion, mainly because of its wide coverage in *MRosa*, is the previously mentioned Pri Brale, very close to a pilgrimage site of Sts Cyril and Methodius in Sečovce. The Virgin Mary, who introduced herself as the Ruler of the World (*Vladkyna Sveta*), appeared there from 2002 until 2005, first to a little girl and then to Agata Burejova, a young Basilian nun subsequently encouraged to withdraw from the order. In a conversation with me, the visionary nun said that she had been seeing the Virgin Mary for a longer time, but the Virgin Mary would not allow her to tell anyone about the messages she gave. The Virgin Mary apparently still comes to the visionary, but her messages are no longer widely distributed.

This apparition receives a different treatment from the official church than the apparition in Litmanova. In his official statement, which was read in all the Greek Catholic parishes in the Košice Exarchate, Milan Chautur stated that:

> From the up-to-date analysis of the circumstances, the messages, and the fruit among the pilgrims of the so-called apparitions next to Sečovce, nothing indicates the transcendental cause of the apparitions. To the contrary, we express a serious doubt, that this may be a case of conscious manipulation … We recommend all Catholics in Slovakia and above all the youth that they, instead of organizing pilgrimages to Brale, work towards growth in faith through reading of the Holy Scriptures, participation in sacred liturgies, and development of Marian worship (Chautur 2004).

[14] Although church authorities do not officially recognise Litmanova as an apparition site, they have declared it as a 'place of prayer'. With this statement, the head of the Prešov Eparchy has confirmed that he does not see any impediment to people gathering there and praying.

Because such apparitions are initially almost never welcomed by the official church hierarchy (Bax 1995; Christian 1996), such an attitude by the head of the Greek Catholic Church should not be surprising. Very few apparitions, even the ones visited by hundreds of thousands of pilgrims each year, as in Medjugorje, have been officially accepted by church authorities. Still, the case of Pri Brale seems to be especially difficult. There was almost no discussion about this apparition, and no special committee to judge its genuineness has been established, whereas Litmanova has such a church committee. Instead, the priests were forbidden to conduct liturgies at Pri Brale, and believers were discouraged from visiting the site.

Despite a clear negative message from the church hierarchy, the apparition site of Pri Brale so far survives. On the seventeenth day of each month and each Sunday, people gather there to pray. This site's most interesting feature regarding this chapter's argument is the insistence of the visionary and her supporters that the separation between the Latin and the Byzantine, the Greek and the Roman Catholic, is unnecessary. Greek Catholic crosses mark the main altar and confessional boxes, but a huge cross with a sculpture of suffering Christ stands in front of the altar. Masses are mainly celebrated by Roman Catholic priests; apparently no Greek Catholic priests attend this place anymore. Although the Roman Catholic hierarchy shares the skepticism towards the apparitions, it has not reacted as severely as the head of the Košice Exarchate. The Roman Catholic priests who attended the site have been moved to parishes further away, and only in the extreme cases of unfading support for the visionary have they chosen to accept suspension.

According to the visionary, the most urgent request of the Virgin Mary is the establishment of a new monastic order, one that will be neither Greek Catholic nor Roman Catholic:

> I could not talk about this earlier, but a few weeks ago Mary told me that I could now. These messages I received much earlier, just I could not talk, and they were the reason for my withdrawal from a monastery. Mary wishes for a new monastic order to be established, a contemplative-apostolic one, which will spread the cult of Mary, the Ruler of the World. And this order has to enrich itself mutually with spiritual richness of the West and the East. It will be neither Greek nor Roman Catholic – it should be both. All the prayers, all the masses should be one, should include both rites.
>
> A.H.: But the liturgies are different. How to achieve this in practice?
>
> This is not about destroying them. Rather, they should mutually enrich each other. The richness of both rites has to be accepted … The

> order will have blue clothes, with white details and with a white rosary at the belt. And they will have medals: on one side will be Mary, the Ruler of the World, and on the other side, St Michael the Archangel with a sword. It will be an order for both men and women. At the moment, there are only two people in it and the other two are beginning. This is just a beginning. On 17 July this year [2006] it was done. The order is called *The Winning Armada of the Virgin Mary, the Ruler of the World*.

When I questioned the legality of this endeavour, that is, that the Pope should approve new religious orders, the visionary said that it would all be done when the right time came. Actually, during the mass I attended at Pri Brale on 17 April 2007, the homily's main theme was the role of the Pope in the life of the Catholic Church as the highest judge of morality and matters of belief. The celebrant seemed to hope that with time, despite hostility from the local hierarchy, Pri Brale will be recognized by Rome.

This site's survival potential is difficult to judge, however. During the previously mentioned mass, about 150 people attended; although it was in the middle of the week, the prayers started at 1 p.m., a time when many people work. The believers were of various age groups, from the elderly to young couples with children. The *Magnificat* representatives were also present, filming the proceedings, which were subsequently archived on videotapes and DVDs. Although the hierarchy does not like this site, its main message fits perfectly with sentiments of many local believers, who seem to think that there is really no difference between the two branches of one Catholic Church.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have used the example of the Zemplin region in Slovakia to show some aspects of the dilemmas of contemporary pastoral care. Catholic preaching often uses an image of Christ as a shepherd leading his Church in this world towards his Heavenly Father. However, this image is hierarchical like the Catholic Church. If all the members are led by Jesus, then He has helpers: in the Greek Catholic Church these are hierarchs, *protopresibiterians*, *protosynkels*, *synkels,* and parish priests (Gajdoš 1997). However, the Church's crucial members are the lay believers, the subjects of multiple pastoral efforts. In Slovakia those pastoral efforts meet with some important and specific challenges. Some are common to many old European religious communities and have been analyzed and re-analyzed within the so-called secularization theories and the ensuing debates (Casanova 1994; Berger 1999; Davie 1999; Hervieu-Léger 2000; Davie 2004). The most general conclusion of those later discussions is that the modern era (late modern,

post-traditional, or postmodern – however the particular author chooses to describe the contemporary world) does not necessarily engender a decreasing presence of religion. Instead, 'the religious' in the contemporary world changes its role, significance, and mode of operation. For the readers of *MRosa* an official, traditional Greek Catholic Church as the guardian of memory has lost much of its power and appeal. Instead of being primarily Greek Catholic or Roman Catholic, they are worshippers of the Virgin Mary.

On one level, this identification should be acceptable to church authorities – the Virgin Mary is a very important figure in Catholic theology, and the late Pope John Paul II particularly encouraged devotion to her. Still, the insistence of *Magnificat Slovakia* on Marian apparitions poses a problem for the official church. For centuries, such apparitions have been indicators of conflict, often between different regimes (monastic versus diocesan) within the institutionalized Catholic Church (Perry and Echeverria 1988; Bax 1995; Christian 1996). They have always challenged some aspects of the church's activities. The present Marian apparitions, still often initiated in relation to the monastic-diocesan tension, create moreover the alternative modes of religious identification located outside the boundaries of particular churches as institutions. They question the notion of tradition and of church as its guardian. According to Hervieu-Leger's argument, such an attitude has to be seen as impediment to the institutionalized church's position. Moreover, in a situation in which the leaders of one branch of the Catholic Church feel that its followers are losing their distinctiveness based on liturgical differences, the unspecified liturgical tradition of the cult of the Virgin Mary is seen as a danger. The cases of Litmanova and Pri Brale show two ways of dealing with such phenomena. In the case of Litmanova, there is an attempt to guide the cult into the aesthetic framework of Byzantine tradition and, hence, to put it within the Greek Catholic 'chain of memory'. In the case of Pri Brale, with its explicit combination of Latin and Byzantine elements, the reaction is one of absolute ban.

As argued earlier, the main concern of Greek Catholic authorities in the Košice Exarchate is not to lose believers, specially among young people, with an explicit goal of keeping them close to church. Still, even if one assumes that young people would like to identify with any institutionalized church at all, this does not answer the question of which particular church they should adhere to. Even if they decide to stay within the Catholic Church, they could easily become Roman Catholics, who also provide more then just prayers, pilgrimages, and masses. The problem is to convince people of a significant difference between the Latin and the Byzantine, and that having and defending a Greek Catholic identity is a worthwhile endeavour. For this, a problem is posed by the (too) close brotherhood that grew in

socialist times between the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic Churches in Slovakia. When, after 1968, the Greek Catholic Church tried to distance itself from the Orthodox Church, many liturgical and aesthetic changes were introduced, which in turn led to diminishing in the eyes of believers the very difference between the Roman and the Greek Catholic Churches. After 1989 and until 1997 for Košice, and 2002 for the Prešov Eparchy, the 'Western style' was further encouraged, as it seemed that the believers wanted shorter liturgies, the Slovak language, and Western aesthetics dominating their everyday lives. Only after the establishment of the Košice Exarchate has the situation changed, as the church authorities realized that the relations with the Roman Catholic Church have to be more carefully managed and balanced.

Buzalka and Mahieu (in this volume) described similar processes in Poland and Hungary in terms of discussions about two basic options: the one of orientalization and the one of sustaining the status quo, that is, accepting the existing influences of Roman Catholic practices and aesthetics in the Greek Catholic Church. Such an analysis could be only partially applicable to Slovakia, as here the church authorities at the same time encourage orientalization (e.g. in the style of paintings) and occidentalization (e.g. supporting such religious practices as the rosary or use of the Gregorian calendar). At the same time, the church authorities have to deal with those believers and their organizations (represented here by *Magnificat Slovakia*), who do not care about the division into Latin and Byzantine traditions in the first place. Instead, those believers support such religious cults as can be realized beyond the traditional divisions of the Catholic Church. For them, the questions of adherence to either the Byzantine or Latin tradition is not even stated – the readers of *MRosa* magazine are followers and worshippers of the Virgin Mary, and their Greek or Roman Catholic identity is of no significant importance.

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Chapter 11
The Land of the Virgin Mary: A Greek Catholic Ukrainian Pilgrimage to Lourdes

Valérie Kozlowski

'Are you going to the Lourdes pilgrimage with our parish?' The question echoed among the faithful at the Sunday Mass. For over eighty years, the Greek Catholic Ukrainian faithful, or those of Ukrainian origin, of the St Volodymyr Cathedral in Paris have gone on pilgrimages to this sanctuary where the Virgin Mary is said to have appeared. As the departure date grew near, the question echoed more faintly. It was not easy to take such a decision, and the number of pilgrims could not be increased. People were saying that only newcomers would be accepted this time. 'The elders know their house very well', was the answer I got when asking why. I began my study of the Greek Catholic Ukrainian diaspora three years ago, and for the first time I had been permitted to join this pilgrimage that seemed to require the whole community's efforts; to quote the participants themselves, 'this was a journey to the land of the Virgin Mary'. Three days to be lived out intensely, three days listening to the memories of the older people of both the dead and the living, memories hovering about, giving rise to a new trail of feelings and emotions which the course of this journey will have to put a name to. This was also be a time of healing when the hardship of exile became reality and words were given to illustrate it. A time when what could be said, what was to be said, was spoken out loud around the Virgin Mary as leitmotiv. This left an underlying creative experience intricately linked to a process of remembrance, for what was it all about if not Ukraine?

What is anamnesis? More than a mere recollection of the past, is it not a restructuring of the past itself? The subject of this study is thus our relationship with the past, with the re-enacted experience of our native or ancestral land according to successive generations yet in relation to the present. It is no easy task trying to explore the memory of a people long kept away from the motherland through language, as was the case with the Ukrainians who came to France after the 1917 Revolution. This task becomes even more

difficult when a community delves through its own past to find roots for a new identity.

If Ukrainians had, from the beginning, seen their homeland being absorbed into a much larger geopolitical world, hence making the first and second generations the actors in a shared experience or fate that would take over that of the whole community, this does not necessarily imply that there is a shared memory for all, or even a common destiny (Bourdieu 1980). Underlining this fact makes even more sense insofar as exile may be regarded as a metonymy for the annihilation of collective representation. Having considered this, what are the grounds for remembrance? Could pilgrimage be one?

It is therefore essential to consider the modus operandi that such a pilgrimage entails so as to understand better what links it to collective remembrance.

The French Greek Catholic Community and St Volodymyr Cathedral

The Greek Catholic Ukrainian diaspora is characterized by various communities, primarily in North America, which emerged after the political upheavals in Ukraine at the start of the twentieth century. These upheavals peaked in 1933: a famine organized by the Soviet government led to the death or exile of millions of Ukrainians (Joukovsky 1993).[1] Ukrainian immigration to France stemmed from a different process; people first only stopped there on their way to transatlantic liners bound for the United States. The majority of Ukrainians in France were naturalized after the Second World War, along with other communities such as the Armenian or the Italian. A large number of Ukrainians of the second generation entered the country during the Cold War to visit their families. New waves of immigration occurred later, in particular after 1992, when Ukraine became independent. These various events explain the social and cultural diversity of the Greek Catholic population in France. We may now talk of a heterogeneous community at times almost completely divided socially, politically, or culturally.

This historical complexity is still visible today when referring to Ukrainians. In the French press,[2] journalists do not really know how to label

[1] Nationalist movements began in 1921 in Galicia, which is the native region of most Ukrainians in France. Communist oppression was particularly violent after Eastern Galicia became part of the Soviet Union. See also Magocsi, this volume.

[2] A newspaper such as *La voix de l'Ukraine* has been for a long time published both in France and in Ukraine, via clandestine networks that claim the voice of 'oppressed people'. It is

this group; should it be referred to as a people, a nation, a religious minority, or a community? The question is linked to the process of integration into French society. This process began three generations ago, but one has to bear in mind the importance of geographical uprooting and the fragmentation of cultural references. Until 1990s the harsh political changes meant numerous arrests and casualties among the 'nationalist' Ukrainians of Galicia and Greek Catholics in the region. Just like the terrible memory of the 'famine-genocide'[3] of 1933, these events represent in the minds of these communities the collapse of historical continuity that interrupted the transmission of a national heritage and meant the collapse of collective existence.

Hence, what followed could be described in terms of 'survivor's psychology' (Fresco 1981), in relation to the trail of casualties among these people. To live in France implies the need to testify, to account for the mere fact of being a survivor and to account for the fact of being deprived. Living with Ukrainian identity is itself an ordeal, because it means a constant reassessment of the reasons that motivated exile. Two generations of Ukrainians have had to go through this and have had to justify leaving their motherland in order to maintain the history of their people and, in so doing, to avoid cultural decline. The country of exile represents for many the hopes for regained dignity within the frame of societal bearings.

Among those bearings the most important was probably abiding by the Greek Catholic religion. This was even more the case considering that this religious faith was persecuted in Ukraine as early as 1917 (Klosowski 1990). This national faith survived thanks to the strong will of exiled communities, which kept alive the bond between them and their homeland, thus making their faith part of a collective remembrance. Religion is, then, the structural basis of the Greek Catholic Ukrainian community in France.

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in France dates back to the first wave of immigrants at the end of the nineteenth century. The first Ukrainian church was consecrated on 30 January 1852 at 69 rue de Babylone in Paris, thanks to the repeated efforts of Ukrainian priest Hippolyte Terlecky. This church was the forerunner of the Ukrainian Catholic mission (Perridon 1952). In 1937, Cardinal Eugène Tisserant, then Cardinal Secretary for the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church, aware of the problems faced by the Greek Catholic faithful in France, founded the Mission for Ukrainians

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published in French, and this implies diffusion from one elite to another, because only an elite social class had command of this language. Moreover, Russian was seen as a colonial language and was not used in these publications. Greek Catholics, in this paper, were called '*New Martyrdom People*' because the Soviets banned the Greek Catholic Church.

[3] American and French historians hotly debate whether 'genocide' can be applied to the 1933 famine in Ukraine. In this chapter I try to use the term that people in my field use, and that is 'genocide'. For examples of the controversies, see Martenchenko and Woropay (1983).

in the heart of Paris. The priest Jean Leskowycz then headed the Catholic Ukrainian Mission of France. In the early 1950s, it grew to become a major centre of the Greek Catholic Church in the diaspora. Indeed, prior to having their own place of worship, the faithful in the diaspora had to make a painful choice between a Roman Catholic church of the Latin Rite or an Orthodox church following the Moscow Patriarchate and using the Orthodox Byzantine Rite.

The main Greek Catholic church in Paris was founded primarily because of the joint efforts of two men: Monseigneur Jacques Perridon, responsible for the French Catholic Ukrainian Mission, and Monseigneur Emmanuel Chaptal, Assistant Bishop of Paris in charge of helping foreigners. Their cooperation was decisive in carrying out this major project. The community's main place of worship started in a rented, empty chapel belonging to the Sorbonne – a place they still use today. In May 1943 the church was consecrated and publicly assigned to the Greek Catholic community under the patronage of Saint Volodymyr the Great.

While Ukrainian immigrants fulfilled their dream to have a church in France, the Greek Catholic Church was banned in Ukraine in 1946 and its members were persecuted. To survive, Greek Catholics in Ukraine went underground. At this time, Ukrainian refugees started considering that they might be the saviours as well as the guardians of their religion in exile. As a result, many of the first generation of immigrants in France regarded such a ban as one more good reason to justify their exile as well as a valid reason to cherish the hope that someday they might go back to Ukraine and see their 'real faith' take over.

In 1960, the Parisian church became the seat of a newly founded Ukrainian Apostolic Exarchate. In 1963, the Greek Catholic church of Saint Volodymyr became the seat of a major archbishopric. The 1957 motu proprio *Cleri sanctitati* of Pope Pius XII allows the Ukrainian exarch of France to participate in the French episcopal proceedings. This greatly contributed to making the church at rue des Saints Pères part of the religious life of the neighborhood, if not of Paris and even France. The church then became the 'place of remembrance' (Nora 1984) of the Ukrainian community, its centre and spiritual home, a major improvement for those generations born in and living in France and who are now part of French life.

The Group of Pilgrims

Each year the Ukrainian parish in Paris organizes a pilgrimage to Lourdes led by Father Michael.[4] He is in his early forties and comes from Ivano-Frankivsk oblast in Ukraine. He studied in the Greek Catholic Ukrainian Ecclesiastical School in Rome and was ordained as a priest in L'viv. In 1995 he became the principal priest of the Saint Volodymyr the Great Cathedral in Paris. Among the several generations that have belonged to the parish since 1910, only newcomers are asked to attend this pilgrimage. A true rite of passage, the pilgrimage is important in constructing a new identity for newcomers who need to be joined to the entire community. Not a single French person of Ukrainian origin travels with the group, no one to represent the French community. The group does, however, include several families and their relatives. Grandmothers take their grandchildren for whom they consider this a unique experience: 'It is the chance of a lifetime!' they say. The group is formed just before the event so people inside it do not know each other; Father Michael serves as reference and guide for all.

Some forty pilgrims gathered at 7 a.m. at the Gare Montparnasse ready to board the train to Lourdes. The priest distributed to everyone a little badge coloured with the blue and yellow of the Ukrainian flag, and noting in French, 'Ukrainian Cathedral Saint Volodymyr in Paris pilgrimage to Lourdes July 22–25 2004'. The pilgrims were identified and named; each could easily identify members and nonmembers of the group. Progressively the group members switched from their personal identities to that of 'Pilgrim on the way to Lourdes', a mechanism that took place all along the journey and never ceased to question this complex notion of identity. They sat according to their ticket reservations and soon they became a new small community. Everyone spoke the same language – Ukrainian. Single women sat together, and their personal histories were similar: whether they were teachers or canteen workers, they could not afford to support their children's education in Ukraine. It was not unusual for them to go and find work in another country such as Germany, Italy, or Poland. The children, however, stayed with their fathers and sometimes with their grandparents. The women found themselves in France without legal working papers and could not work at their real professions; hence they became caretakers of children or elderly people.

Thus, these women were going through a rather difficult situation with a constant fear of being reported and expelled from France. Given these conditions, they rarely mingled with the French population. Also, they did

[4] As the deontological code of anthropologists requires, all names of informants in this paper have been changed.

not really mention their destination. Why were they going to Lourdes? What were they looking for there? They did not really know the story of Bernadette.[5] All they knew is that they were going where the Virgin Mary has been seen, where the water purifies and heals. In fact, they were quite talkative about the water and its mysterious powers; it was actually an important part of the journey and they intended to see for themselves what the 'water of the Virgin Mary' could do. Many talked of a spring back home thought to have healing powers. Was the water from Lourdes any different? So many questions were still unanswered as the train finally reached its destination.

As they got off the train quite a few of the pilgrims were astonished by the resemblance of the landscape to their motherland:

> Those mountains look just like the Carpathians!
>
> The priests told me it was quite some way! Yes this is all I know, but which way is the city itself?
>
> Don't ask me! All I know is this is our motherland … outside of that I haven't got a clue where we are! It's almost like we're back home![6]

The newcomers, thus, faced a new time and space dimension. They should go and see the Virgin Mary, but where exactly was She supposed to be? No one really knew yet, but expectations were great. The geographical uprooting was very much in keeping with such a journey, when one is likely to meet with a supernatural entity (Sax 1990; Claverie 2003), whether a sanctified persona or even the Blessed Virgin herself. All the group's members looked for change in their lives, but they did not all know why they came and what they expected to find in this sanctuary. In this sense, this journey offered a mental departure and as well a positive break from the everyday routine: a gate to a new dimension of existence.

Building Spaces: Ukraine in Lourdes

Many believers regard this pilgrimage as part of the trial of their religious life. This is partly because everything here has been thought out so that the cultural aspect, more than an incentive, is also the result of carefully structured organization. As a result, directly outside the train station, a new neighbourhood has blossomed close to the original holy sites. Overlooking the Catholic church and the Massabielle grotto sits the Ukrainian church on

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[5] Bernadette Soubirous, a miller's daughter from Lourdes, first saw the Virgin Mary on 11 February 1858 at the age of 14. She continued to have 17 more visions, which established Lourdes as an important Marian site of healing and pilgrimage. She was canonized in 1933 by the Catholic Church as the patron saint of the sick, of family, and poverty.

[6] In interviews, informants used a 'curious' oral Polish: the Galician dialect, used both in southern Poland and in western Ukraine. Two of my inside sources, Sister Yaroslava and Father Michael, spoke to me in French.

the rue de l'Ukraine, as well as the church-owned, Ukrainian hotel operated by a Ukrainian couple, Ernesto and Maria. The Greek Catholic Ukrainian church of Lourdes employs this couple to watch over the pilgrims during the season (from March to September).

The church, built behind the road leading to Pau, towers above the Blessed Virgin's holy sanctuaries located on a street that the town council renamed as rue de l'Ukraine. The sanctuaries below are confronted by the building, with its resolutely Byzantine architecture, with its gilded domes, and with its own history and stories. The 2004 group came to believe that the founder of this place, Father Pryjma was a 'real martyr'.[7] Indeed, he did live clandestinely in Ukraine and was sent in exile to the Gulag. During those times of hardship he promised himself that if he survived he would have a church built right here, among the sanctuaries of Lourdes, because he had decided to worship the Blessed Virgin, the patroness of the land of his religious faith. Because of the funds he raised and the help of various generations of Ukrainians, the church was built. One of my female informants, with Ukrainian parents from Ternopil, told me about the opening ceremony:

> I remember the day of the opening ceremony of the chapel, I was there and the crowd was huge! Father Pryjma had been begging for money all over the place, even overseas. Some people actually came to work on the project for free, that church you see is the work of all the Ukrainians … there was a procession from the church to the Basilica … he really made this happen … you see my father was a farmer and we would always bring a lot of food with us. Oftentimes the church was empty, so we'd walk in and there was Father Pryjma eating his soup … it was just like in our villages back home, my father would spend some time with them, he was a choirboy for him! My dad never went to school but he learned to write Ukrainian in France. Back where we lived there was no community life and Lourdes was the place to meet people from Ukraine in summer! My father had made friends with many pilgrims of the second generation and when we were back home we'd all do some writing together and it created some bonds … my father would go twice a year at least, he would stay with Pryjma all day long, they had morning Mass at 6 a.m. together, they would sing along at meals, and in the evenings they would always march to the Basilica.

Trying to understand the process of remembrance achieved by pilgrims on such a journey means pointing out the complex interaction between memory and land. Thus, this testimony helps us understand the relationship of the

[7] I have put this in quotation marks because the subject of martyrdom of Greek Catholic Ukrainians is still a controversial subject, not the least in Ukraine itself.

people towards their land and the reshaping of its boundaries so as to preserve an unadulterated memory. Creating a place of unity outside the traditional holy sanctuaries then becomes necessary. In the main church among the town's sanctuaries, a little altar devoted to Ukraine had been placed as a reminder to pilgrims of the tragic destiny of this 'church of the catacombs'.

Being a pilgrim and simultaneously remembering may entail different approaches, yet both need to be tackled from the individual angle, as much as from a group perspective. And for that matter in this particular case religious and political history are involved. In his study on Christian pilgrimage Victor Turner (1978) showed how travels, whether in space or time, within a specific social group, entail creative experiences the innermost meaning of which requires exegesis. Seen in this light, to consider a pilgrimage as a journey, or to quote Turner, as 'a trial', is very much akin to considering the underlying notion of community, whether it be a figment of the imagination or made up of a nucleus and a body of individuals with a religious and political common heritage. In this case, the shared experience consists in having a church built under the spiritual guidance of a martyr. Treading in the footsteps of forefathers involves an awareness of belonging to a particular lineage stemming from them while reasserting one's own personal identity, namely that of a Greek Catholic Ukrainian.

On the first day, the group proceeded towards the grotto of the Blessed Virgin. The next day, at dawn, Father Michael celebrated the Mass with the Bishop of Lourdes. The group became very emotional and many held pictures of relatives, alive or dead. The pictures and their accompanying stories were passed around, and even the bravest in the group needed to share the feeling of being uprooted. Everybody told his or her stories outside the grotto. The words were moving, and the personal stories were told without shame. Tears were shed too; prayers usually mumbled were being voiced out to 'Our Mother'. The same conversations could be heard outside the baths that the group visited once a day.[8] In those moments Veronika, a single woman and a domestic worker in Paris, told me:

> Be not afraid to talk to Her, She knows and understands you, this is the right place to share all your feelings, you'll see it's a peaceful and soothing experience. I usually pray to Our Mother a lot but here it is as if I was going to Her, here I don't feel ashamed to speak out loud, I don't feel ashamed to speak out my sorrow in front of all the others because we are all brothers in arms. Sure I am not physically

[8] The Lourdes water coming from the grotto of the apparition is said to have healing properties, and many pilgrims come to bathe in this water. Reportedly only 67 miraculous healings have been recognized by the Catholic Church, but every pilgrim leaves Lourdes with some of its water.

> maimed as my suffering is only mental, I am not in a wheelchair yet my mother's heart is bleeding too, and the Blessed Virgin is here to help.

While hardship is a reality for most pilgrims, they do not come here hoping for a miracle. They come here with the idea of a 'transaction', so to speak, with the Blessed Virgin. Here they have the opportunity to speak out their misfortune on numerous occasions, with a view to overcoming this suffering because they are able to put their pain into words. The variety of sanctuaries devoted to the cult offer the pilgrims the opportunity to ease their pain at any time of day or night, which they do, in an effort to put words to these miscellaneous sorrows (Hughes-Freeland 1997). The Greek Catholic pilgrims, however, are not allotted a particular building on the premises of the sanctuary; they use the same facilities as everyone else. What differentiates them from the rest of the crowd is the route they use to go from one house to another. Father Michael has found a personal set of winding and steep narrow paths that run through backyards and hospices, through tiny little streets and stairways, through private roads and 'backstage' alleyways. These pilgrims' progress is a journey within a journey, a motion from the sense of togetherness towards the outer world. By following this particular journey the 2004 Ukrainian group made this worldwide sanctuary its own. Boundaries were altered, at least from a symbolic standpoint, between the three poles of attraction: the Greek Catholic church, the grotto's sanctuaries for Mary, and the healing baths.

The Transmission of Knowledge

I mentioned that the pilgrims did not know the story of Bernadette or even that of the sites before they came to Lourdes. All they knew about before was Mary's grotto and the healing waters. Throughout the journey they had to go through a learning process among themselves but also with the help of the priest.

This is why, on the second day of the pilgrimage and before they went to the baths, Father Michael organized a little tour of the various sanctuaries. All the members of the group were invited to visit Father Peyrammale's church, which is the church of the city of Lourdes itself, slightly aside from the rest of sanctuaries. Inside, due to its location, the crowd was smaller. There the priest spent some time telling the group about the difference between the Eastern Rite and the Roman one. The tour soon became an occasion for learning. The priest, who uses the Oriental Rite in all worship, went over the important ideas of the Eastern Rite in what became a catechism lesson:

> You must understand the symbolism involved to fully appreciate today's Mass. It will be divided into three periods of time, each representing a span of Jesus Christ's life … there used to be a time, long before you and I, when catechumens at some point were asked to leave the church in this part of Mass but this has been left aside since most people are baptized at a very early age these days. Well, just like catechumens those who abide by the Roman Rite must leave when the Holy Bible is being raised.

In this way religious knowledge is handled by the priest who needs to carry out what is in fact a cultural translation. His approach consisted in pointing out the cultural diversity between the Roman and the Greek Catholic Church. And in so doing he insisted on the similarities but also on the differences between practices and rites in the Western and the Eastern Church. The rite here in France is significantly different from that in Ukraine, as is the history. The priest also told the group about the importance of the church in both countries, insofar as the church helped settle and structure them on a political level. His speech put into perspective the parallels between religion and the nation on the collective plane as well. Thus, through this stroll in the form of a journey of initiation in the wake of Bernadette's footsteps, the group became aware of religious differences in the Catholic Church and shaped its own identity. Father Michael then went on with his speech about Ukraine, referring to the link between the history of the people and that of the church.

The next day, the women told one another about their dreams on the way to baths saying that they heard the voices of their faraway children during their sleep:

> Even though I was in the land of the Blessed Virgin, I had a strange feeling that I had gone back to my parents, out there in the mountains, the scenery was beautiful and peace prevailed, and my son was walking alongside with me as if it was right here, I felt blissful and a little voice was saying 'here they are, all together again at last!' Then I was seized with fright as I thought my parents are dead, how come my son is here then? And what am I doing here myself? But I soon realized I was in Lourdes and a sweet young voice was telling me it was a favour from sweet old mother who had allowed me to see all my loved ones again and that they were happy! It was a soothing vision but when I awoke I felt the pain and I started sobbing thinking about all my loved ones and how far away they were … it is not unusual for this to happen in Lourdes, the dead come and speak to the living in the flesh …

Relating one's dreams was a major occupation during the whole stay; it was a bridge between two separations, that is, the dead and the living on the one hand, motherland and new-found land on the other. Hence, the trauma of exile was displayed because of the disruption between the set of rules between the living and the dead. This period of the pilgrimage helped restore such relations. The dramatic experience of exile dwindled progressively as it was an experience shared by all the pilgrims, and this was another journey in a series of journeys. When a group has lost its bearings, when its lineage has been jeopardized, the handing down of knowledge, whether social or genealogical may be dramatically altered if not completely broken. The breaking up of social bearings is loaded with emotion and steeped in the awareness of such a people, an awareness that is most likely to become a scheme of thought (Attias-Donfut 1988). This journey in the land of the forefathers fostered the community's awareness of its line of descent. The journey took on its full meaning for the pilgrims in their attempt to redefine notions of present and past events. Waiting outside the baths was another important occasion for the transmission of knowledge. A few women held different prayer books, which were actually hand-written notes, an earlier tradition among families from the time when missals and other religious booklets were not published owing to the religious ban. People would recite those prayers learnt by rote and handed down by underground priests or nuns[9] and would write them down in notebooks hidden in their homes along with holy pictures of devotion. Several women kept such books, the last remnants of a disappearing past, the last memory of relatives who handed these down as a priceless yet dangerous legacy.

Pilgrims had been whispering such prayers from childhood, and the louder readings of the first day had been replaced by now by these more intimate mutterings preceding the immersion in holy water, which should heal and appease their souls. Another pilgrim confessed:

> Here water means a lot you know, holy water gives you tremendous power … but this is even more special since this is the Blessed Virgin's water. The water, which She blessed mankind with to help healing. This will be a unique experience, I know it will appease me too, I know I will bear my life without the presence of my son for another two years! It will appease my soul; it will help the pain go away.

[9] After 1946 when the Greek Catholic Church was forbidden in Ukraine, many priests or nuns continued to practice clandestinely. However, in many cases, these priests were denounced and ended up in the Siberian Gulag. They became the new martyrs of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and in 2001 Pope John Paul II beatified twenty-seven of them (see Horiacha and Hurkina, this volume).

For the benefit of pilgrims, all the sanctuaries have at their centre the water from Lourdes. Yet the Greek Catholics slightly alter the devotional tradition in Lourdes as they bring their personal prayer books with them, those books that were passed from generations of Christians who continued to believe in times of religious persecution. The ceremony of the baths triggers a plethora of memories, a set of mixed emotions, a feeling of belonging to the religious community on a larger scale, but also to the Greek Catholic community on a smaller one. Hence, memory is passed on once again through this experience of the Lourdes waters, and the group is vested with a new identity.

The Results of the Learning Experience: The Last Day of the Pilgrimage

Only in the very last day of the journey, during the liturgy in the Greek Catholic Church, did pilgrims hear from the mouth of Sister Yaroslava the story of the building of this Greek Catholic Ukrainian church in Lourdes. Sister Yaroslava was about sixty years old and she has been in Lourdes since 1987. She grew up in Ternopil oblast in Ukraine before going with her brother to Australia, where he took a job in the petroleum industry. She practised her vocation in the Greek Catholic Ukrainian School in Rome and came back to Ukraine at the time of its independence. Since then, she has been sent to Lourdes. Numerous prayers interrupted her narrative, and she refered to the church as 'our house, the house that belongs to all Greek Catholic Ukrainians throughout the world'.

The group has had to follow Bernadette's footsteps and go through what all pilgrims to Lourdes have gone through. They went through many religious ceremonies before they finally learnt about the history of the Ukrainian community in Lourdes. This is a special history because it is made up of and for the members of the diaspora. All the stories of Ukrainians who quit their homeland are gathered in the walls of this church.

The group has had to go through various learning processes such as finding an idiom to express their complaints and ask for help from above. They have also had to question their identity in the course of diverse religious experiences with others. They have had to reconsider the social attributes of the whole group to discover their real identity. And this identity is part of a much larger one embodied in the diaspora. The group of pilgrims is now part of this new identity and is no longer uprooted or permanently in exile. These pilgrims now belong to a larger group whose identity will be moulded by the next generations of priests.

The pilgrims were then shown the crypts with all the names of benefactors and the amount of money donated, all of which is engraved on mar-

ble slabs onto the walls. Male and female members of the group could see all those names, all those generations of Ukrainians who have been away from their country for years, even generations, and yet have been able to keep their 'Ukrainian soul'. Everyone went over the list of names in an admiring litany. Many wouldn't have thought there were that many Ukrainians throughout the world, so many people who had apparently 'made it' in so many different countries. It was the time to take some pictures in front of the slabs, as it was done earlier in front of the altar and in front of the church. Exile, thus, in no way whatsoever implies a loss of identity. On the contrary, one gains of lot from the company of others. The final therapeutic stage of the learning process has come. Personal experience in history is no longer an individual concern, and the end point is this bridge between here and elsewhere. Sister Yaroslava gave everyone a little medal, which is the token of a successful trial. The pilgrims had finally joined the diaspora; they had left the world of the dead to rejoin that of the living.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the Ukrainian pilgrimage to Lourdes as an experience of learning to create a new identity for diaspora Ukrainians. In keeping with Turner's theories of pilgrimage, insofar as these regard pilgrimage as liminal and based on a partial modification of the social structure, rather than as a reflection of the latter, the notions that prevail are those of individual experience and tentative community creation. The knowledge acquired during this pilgrimage is a freestanding notion not hampered by hierarchy yet part of a stable scheme of thought. The community is united by genuine solidarity, it is at once diffuse yet homogeneous, the result of a momentary disintegration and commanded by social discrepancies and hierarchies that allow the renewal of social order. This explains why only the newcomers are taken to Lourdes. They are supposed to join a new community but not cast away the religious heritage of their forefathers, a new yet genuine community unscathed and renewing itself each year during this trial, this intellectual understanding of the elders by new generations.

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Index

akathist (also acathist) 197, 217, 217n, 224, 307
Akcja Wisła, *see Operation Vistula*
anti-syncretism 185-7, 190, 195, 201, 203-4
Apostolic Letter *Orientale Lumen* 210
apparitions 9, 15, 25, 165, 167, 172, 198, 201, 297, 299-300, 303, 308, 310-5, 326n, *see also* Virgin Mary
assimilation; linguistic 11; national 45-6, 53

Basilian order 48, 89, 91, 93, 94, 120, 162, 165, 202
Blaj (Metropolitanate of) 8n, 44, 105, 238-41, 246, 249
bricolage 3, 6, 7
Byzantinization 4-5, 19, 22, 189, 190, 193, 195, 204, 291, 299, 301, 307

Catholic dogma 99, *see also* encyclicals; John Paul II
Catholic Church 161n, 166, 168-9, 172, 175, 184, 188, 195, 198n, 202, 210-1, 219, 233n, 238n, 266, 305, 308, 314-6, 324, 326n, 328, *see also* celibacy; Greek Catholic Church; Roman Catholic Church
celibacy 48, 70, 73, 74, 100, 144n, 191, 202-3, 216n, 222
Charnetskyi, M. 48
Christianity; Eastern versus Western 1, 2-4, 8, 19, 22, 36, 157, 159-60, 183, 190, 192-4, 203, 208n, 219, *see also* Catholicism; Orthodoxy; tradition
church; catacomb 15, 16, 125; institutions 94, 268, 299, 307-8; and the media 166, 210; and religious education 136, 240, 275, 301; and state 9, 10, 35n, 39-40, 43, 47-9, 52-3, 56, 68, 68n, 74, 86-8, 91-2, 100-8, 111-4, 117-9, 121, 125, 125n, 128-30, 136, 138, 146, 151; (un)canonical 40, 54, 94, 128, 134, 147n, *see also* Greek Catholic Church; Roman Catholic Church; underground
Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches 5, 21, 131, 178n, 189, 210-2, 291n
commemoration 72, 169n, 198
Concordat 47, 90, 94, 100
conflict; ethnic 293-4; over property 13, 14, 23, 24, 119, 214, 249, 302; religious 90, 101, 103, 106, 161
conversion 11, 18, 99, 100, 107, 175
Council of Florence (also Florentine Union) 3, 38, 39, 43
Częstochowa 89, 199, 200

diaspora church(es) 2, 3, 22, 25, 70, 319, 320, 322
Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom 4, 210, 220, 222-3, 226

encyclicals 5, 72, 188, 209n
ethnic cleansing 264
ethnicity 9, 11, 24, 35n, 42, 270, 271, 293, 295
Europe; and multiculturalism 3, 23, 50, 53, 132, 133

Fatima 137, 165, 308
Fellay, B. 161n, 165-7, 179
Filioque 3, 38n, 40
France 25, 135n, 193, 211, 240n, 319-23, 325

Galicia 2, 5, 41, 47-56, 112, 125-7, 129, 131-5, 151, 184, 188, 256-8, 261, 264, 320-1
Greek Catholic Church; early history 71, 73; foundation of 14, 71, 138, 290; repression of 2n, 14, 71, 114, 158, 171, 175, 207; return to 18, 22-4, 51, 57, 92, 104, 126, 166, 195, *see also* Hungarian GCC; Romanian GCC; Slovak GCC; Ukrainian GCC; Ukrainian GCC in Poland

Hajdúdorog (Eparchy of) 45, 46, 57, 214, 215, 291
Halbwachs, M. 16, 259, 260
Halych, *see* Galicia
Hann, C. 1, 8, 14, 17, 20, 157, 183n, 186-7, 212, 247n, 304
Hervieu-Léger, D. 7, 25, 208, 260, 306, 308, 314-5
Hobsbawm, E. 211
Hopko, V. 57n, 113, 116
Hungarian Greek Catholic Church 2n, 11, 12, 14, 20-2, 24, 79, 207, 214, 226
Hungary 2-3, 5, 6, 10-12, 14, 20, 21, 42-53, 57, 67-79, 111, 112, 207, 208, 210-8, 220-9, 273, 274, 281, 283n, 291, 293-4, 305, 310n, 316, 334
Husar, L. 105, 131, 134, 146n, 166-7
hybrid (also hybridity) 3, 7, 186, 201, 207, 212, 222, 226, 271, 302

iconography 160n, 197, 215, 311
identity; ethnic 11, 51, 74, 215, 264, 286, 288; national 11, 24, 41, 43, 45, 51, 92, 256, 258-61, 304; religious 1, 5, 10, 16, 51, 256, 258, 269
invented tradition 211

John Paul II (pope); authority 167, 184, 314; and civil society 6; in Greek Catholic liturgy 172, 285n, 306, 314; and North America 150; and Poland 89, 90; representation of 246; and Slovakia 113-6; and support to the Greek Catholic Churches 210, 308n, 315, 329n; and Ukraine 126, 130, 132-4, 137, 173n; and underground church 58, 177; visit to Hungary 69, 213

Khomyshyn, H. 48
Klein, Inochentie Micu 11, 14, 18, 44, 240n
knowledge; religious 160, 240, 328; theological 20, 159, 174; transmission of 19, 327, 329
Košice; Eparchy of 121, 300n; Exarchate 115
Kotsylovskyi, J. 48, 86, 202
Kovpak, V. 162-8, 172-4, 178, 179
Kyivan Metropolitanate 41, 129, 131, 134, *see also* Patriarchate
Kyiv-Halych (Greek Catholic) Metropolitanate 41, 47, 53, 131-2, 135
Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) 10, 129

Lakota, H. 86
Latinization 4, 5, 8, 19, 51, 56, 171, 187-90, 196, 199-202, 209n, 212, 214, 279, 301, 305
Lefebvre, M. 161n, 165, 219
Lefebvrist; bishop 22, 165-7; movement 161, 178, 219; priest 162n
Lemko(s) 10n, 51, 92; Apostolic Administration 52, 55-6, 85-6; region 41, 50, 52
Leo XIII (pope) 5, 188, 209n
liturgy (also liturgical); language 11, 45, 46n, 49, 69n, 192, 215, 282, 286, 301, 303, 316; practice 22, 135, 147n, 301-2

Lourdes 25, 319, 323-31
Lubachivsky, M. I. 89, 120n, 127, 131, 146n, 173n
L'viv; L'viv Council (also L'viv Synod) 5, 5n, 40, 47, 54, 55, 89, 94, 112, 126-36, 151, 201, 202, 275

Magocsi, P. R. 3n, 10n, 45n, 47n, 49n, 52n, 53n, 143, 233n, 320n
Máriapócs 69, 72, 72n, 75, 77, 78, 214, 217, 218, 310n
Martyniak, J. 89-90, 93
martyr(s) 22, 130, 130n, 138, 140, 173, 175-7, 179, 246n, 275-6, 325, 326, 329n, *see also* saint
memory; collective 16, 24, 177, 255, 257, 259-63, 268, 271, 299, 306; community of 255-6, 268, 286, 306; and place 176, 269; politics of 257; and religion 160, 255, 256, 259, 261; and violence 255, *see also* commemoration; remembrance
Millenium of Christianity (in Ukraine) 89, 125
Miskolc (Exarchate of) 71, 74, 214
modes; doctrinal 22, 160, 177; imagistic 22, 160, 177; of religiosity 19, 22, 160, 177, 178
monastic (also monasticism) 23, 47, 48, 56, 88, 89, 94, 116, 132n, 136-41, 148, 162n, 171-4, 176, 178, 188, 199n, 225-6, 246, 301, 313, 315
Mother of God 89, 117, 137, 169n, 194, 197-200, 217n, 224, 309
movement; national 158, 178, 219, 257, 320n; political 283; religious 6, 167, 212, 219; revivalist 219; splinter 22, 161, 165; traditionalist 23, 157, 161-4, 166, 167, 173, 174, 178, 179, 208, 215
Mukachevo (Eparchy of) 43-5, 48-55, 72, 111, 112, 115, 274-6, 282, 300, 301
mysticism 23, 192, 208, 225, 226, *see also* spirituality

national minorities 10, 12, 273, 283, *see also* ethnicity
nationalism 9, 11; in Eastern Europe 11; Polish 184, 198; Ukrainian 92, 112, 185, 188-9, 204, 258, 268; under socialism 188, 195
neoliberalism 15, 23, 233, 235, 236, 250
North America 3, 12, 15, 21, 35-8, 49-51, 143-52, 320
nostalgia 147, 157, 163, 265, 282, 292
Nyíregyháza 10, 12, 45, 57, 63, 69-72, 76-82, 84, 208, 214, 217n, 224

Operation Vistula (*Akcja Wisła*) 86, 95, 185
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) 36, 95
Oriental(izers) 5, 21, 213, 225, 327; Churches 36-7, 133n, 211, 321
Orientale Lumen (apostolic letter) 5
Orientalium Dignitas (encyclical) 5, 72, 80, 188, 189, 209n
Orientalium Ecclesiarum (decree) 5, 147, 209, 210
orthodoxy (ritual) 8, 25, 157, 170, 172, 190, 208; and orthopraxy 8
Orthodoxy 9, 14, 23-4, 39, 41, 46, 100, 128, 157, 159-60, 162-3, 170-3, 176, 187-8, 190-1, 194-5, 197, 203, 210, 259, 261, 263, 267, 290-1; Greek (Byzantine) 159, 215-6, 226; return (convert) to 17-8, 44, 46, 49-52, 55-6, 100, 112-4, 125, 168, 174, 258, 276, 278, 284-5, 293, 305; (Roman) Catholicism and 9, 191, 203; Rus-

sian 92, 271; switch from 14n, 23-4; Ukrainian 129n, 158n, 176

Patriarchate; Constantinople 46, 60, Kievan Rus 10, 129, 132; Moscow 10, 54-5, 62, 127-9, 132-4, 322
Pentecostal Church 15, 18
Pentecostalism 219
Pius XII (pope) 86, 189, 322
Poland 2n, 3, 6, 10, 17, 20, 21, 22, 27, 39-41, 46-51, 53, 55-59, 61, 62, 64, 85-94, 97, 128, 136, 149, 165, 183-204 *passim*, 207n, 215, 257-8, 263, 304, 311, 316, 323-4
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 38, 39, 46, 184
political (nationalist) movement 158, 257, 283, 320n
popular religion 3, 8, 9, 73, 222, *see also* religion
postsocialism 3, 15, 27
Prešov (Eparchy of) 42, 44-64 *passim*, 111-21, 300-1, 305, 310-2, 316
property; battle over 14; church 12, 50, 53, 91, 103, 114, 119, 138, 174, 185, 275; claims 12, 16, 20, 21, 119; conflict over 13, 23, 24, 107, 249; restitution 3, 12, 101, 106-8, 117, 207; rights 12, 90, 101, 237, 250
Przemyśl 10, 14, 22, 41, 47-8, 51-2, 55-6, 62, 64, 85, 85n, 88-97, 131, 183-5, 189-204
purification (of rite) 5, 9, 176-7, 195, 204, 208, 213, 219; liturgical 6, 7n, 22-3, 222, 226-7; of tradition 6, 185-6, 208

Radio Maryja 198
Redemptorist 47, 116, 126n, 135-6, 165n, 172, 174, 301, 305-6
reformation and counter-reformation 1, 4, 57
religion; and class 4; and meaning 19; and memory 16, 17, 19, 20, 22-3, 255-7, 261, 306; and modernization 306; and rite 1n, 4-5, 19, 36, 37, 39n, 42-6, 51n, 69n, 88-93, 111, 116, 130, 132n, 150; and secularization 122, 144; and social transformation 89
religious; entrepreneur 15, 16; pluralism 3, 9, 10, 243, 258
'religious marketplace' 3, 14-6, 247
remembrance 18, 25, 261, 300n, 319-22, 325
rite; Byzantine 36-7, 39n, 42, 44-6, 51n, 55, 69, 116, 130, 132n, 150, 184, 213, 221, 233, 278, 282-3, 293, 301, 307, 322; Eastern 1, 5, 48, 70, 72, 86-8, 90, 111, 149n, 188, 190, 191n, 193-6, 201, 208-9, 327; Greek Catholic 5, 19, 87-9, 168, 171n, 177, 283, 291; Latin (Roman Catholic) 43, 67, 86-8, 111, 145, 146n, 150, 162n, 172, 190, 209n, 211n, 280, 282, 302, 322, 328; Western 187, 194
restitutio in integrum 13, 102, 109
Roman Catholic Church; attitude towards popular religion 8-9, 10; conflict over property 2, 13, 24; in Hungary 69, 70, 208; in Poland 56, 87-8, 94, 184-9, 194-5, 197-9, 201-3; return (convert to) 224; and Second Vatican Council 172, 209; secularism 23-4, 208; in Slovakia 111, 113, 118, 305-6, 310, 316; in Subcarpathia 273, 277-9, 281; union with 1, 3, 38-40, 233n, 239n; in Ukraine 127, 157, 161, 169, 175, 178n, 264, 269; *World Youth Days* 220-1, *see also* Council of Florence; popular religion; property; Second Vatican Council; secular; union
Romania 2-3, 8-14, 18, 20-3, 42, 45, 47, 52-7, 67n, 69n, 99, 100, 102-5, 107, 108, 111, 145n, 149, 151,

207n, 214, 218, 221, 233-4, 236, 238, 240n, 242, 305
Romanian Greek Catholic Church 2n, 12, 14, 18, 21, 44, 56, 99-108, 153, 163n, 213, 233n, 238n
Romanian Orthodox Church 56, 99, 103-6, 108, 223, 233-4, 238-40, 244, 249
Romzha, T. 55, 73, 135, 275, 275n
Rusyn(s); language 11, 11n, 46, 50-1, 73, 111-2, 116, 147, 149-51, 223, 278n, 282n, 283n, 287, 292, 301; nation 10-1, 43-6, 49, 52-3, 55, 57n
Ruthenians 10-2, 20, 24, 39, 41-5, 51n, 111-2, 116, 147-51, 275, 279, 282, 301, 305n, *see also* Rusyn(s)

saint 14, 73, 159n, 194, 324n, *see also* martyr
Second Vatican Council 5, 69n, 132, 161n, 172, 174, 187, 187n, 189, 192n, 201, 209-10, 291
secular (also secularism) 10, 38-40, 48, 57-8, 144, 144n, 151, 166, 172, 193, 201, 203, 209n, 217, 247-9, 260
Sheptyts'kyi, A. 5, 41, 47-8, 53, 135n, 158, 171n, 173, 188-9, 195, 197, 202, 257-8
simultaneum 13, 104, 302
Slipyi, I. 55, 55n, 189
Slovak Greek Catholic Church 2n, 9, 15, 20, 21, 25, 111-17, 121, 122, 299
Slovakia 3, 10-2, 20, 21, 25, 42, 45, 47, 56n, 67n, 111-2, 114-22, 146-7, 211, 214, 217, 278n, 279n, 300-16 *passim*
socialism 2n, 14, 71, 114, 158n, 163, 188, 195, 200-3, 210, 214-5, 238-9, 242, 255, 258
spirituality; Eastern 48, 70, 121, 146, 217, 220, 223, 301
splinter(ing) group 22, 161, 165, 178
Sterniuk, V. 126-7, 133, 173n
Stewart, C. 6, 185-6
Studite; order 47-8, 94, 136, 137, 171, 171n, 174, 188
Subcarpathia (also Subcarpathian Rus'; Transcarpathia) 20, 23-4, 42, 47-9, 51-3, 67n, 69, 111, 214-5, 273-6, 278, 280, 283, 286-8, 291-3, *see also* Subcarpathian Ukraine
syncretism 6-8, 185-6, 201, 203-4

theology 70, 72, 94, 106, 119, 122, 135-6, 146-7, 162, 166n, 220, 241, 315
tolerance 114, 203, 204, 268, 269
tradition; 'authentic' 6, 173; Catholic 167, 168, 215; Eastern Christian 19, 38, 176, 195, 199n; great and little 157, 159; Greek Catholic 5, 9, 72, 145, 166, 168, 171-3, 187n, 190, 195, 222, 289, 293, 307; invented 211; local 8, 14n, 157, 159, 161, 170, 199n; monastic 23, 225; mystical 226; Orthodox 39, 56, 159n, 175, 178n; religious 6-9, 19, 151, 157-61, 169-71, 175, 176, 178, 186, 219, 226, 237, 241, 247-9, 293, 300n; true 21, 22, 167-8, 201, 211, 293
traditionalist; bishop 22; church 23, 179; movement 157, 161-7, 173-4, 179, 208, 215, 219
transmission; intergenerational 260, 268; of memory 16; religious 3, 16, 19, 20, 159, 160, 178, 207, 255, 268
Transylvania(n) School 2, 8-11, 23, 42, 44, 47, 52, 53, 74, 99, 233, 237-8, 242, 244, 293
Trianon; Treaty of 12, 67, 274

Ukraine 2n, 3, 6, 11-2, 18n, 24-5, 57, 87-9, 91, 94-5, 111, 117, 120, 126-38, 143-4, 146, 149, 165, 170,

194, 199, 200-2, 207, 211, 214, 217, 255-71, 273, 283, 301-2, 317, 320-30; central 41, 131; eastern 131, 176, 259, 261-2; (great) famine in 262, 321; Greek Catholic Church in 94-5, 100, 125, 137-8, 141, 189, 263, 301, 322; history of 269, 274, 320; independent (independence of) 128, 135n, 137, 261, 265; (present) modern-day 38-9, 42, 261; Soviet 53-5, 86, 171, 185, 189; Subcarpathian (Transcarpathian oblast) 23-4, 42, 67n, 69; synod 145n; western 9-10, 20-1, 90, 125, 157-9, 161-2, 164, 167, 172-6, 185n, 201, 255-71, 324n
Ukrainian Catholic University 135, 161, 162, 333
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church 10, 11, 18n, 20, 21, 35n, 36n, 47, 54n, 55n, 86, 87, 94, 95, 100, 125-7, 131, 135-8, 157, 189, 256-7, 262, 269, 271, 272, 282, 301, 321, 329n
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Poland 2n, 39-41, 55, 85-6, 89, 91, 93-4, 183-5, 188-9, 191, 198, 202
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) 184, 185n, 262
Ukrainian minority 189
Ukrainian Orthodox Church 127-9; Autocephalous (UOAC) 127, 175; Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) 10, 129; Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) 10, 54n, 127-34, 322
underground; church 16-8, 20, 22, 58, 137, 158n, 161, 163-4, 167, 169, 171n, 173, 175-7, 179; practical adaptability 2, 168, 170; practice 2, 17, 162n, 177, *see also* catacomb church
Uniate 7, 36, 40-5, 54n, 59, 86, 99n, 126n, 145n, 157-8, 170, 171n, 178n, 187, 191, 196, 233n, 275, *see also* Greek Catholic Church
union (church) 1-3, 38-9, 40, 42-4
Union of Alba Iulia 43, 238, 244
Union of Brest 39n, 40, 42, 45-6, 54n, 55, 112, 129, 139, 184, 187, 196
Union of Uzhhorod 42, 111, 112, 214

Virgin Mary 117, 135n, 137, 172, 197-8, 291, 308, 310-5, 319, 324, *see also* apparitions; Mother of God

Weber, M. 236, 248, 249, 253
Whitehouse, H. 19, 160, 177
Wyszyński, S. 86-8

Yugoslavia 3n, 37, 47, 57, 149

Zarvanytsia 126, 199

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