










# After Globalization: The Future of World Society



Christian Suter and  
Patrick Ziltener (Eds)



LIT

Christian Suter and Patrick Ziltener  
(Eds. for the World Society Foundation)

After Globalization:  
The Future of World Society

# World Society Studies

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Volume 2024

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LIT

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Christian Suter and Patrick Ziltener  
(Eds. for the World Society Foundation)

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# Contents

About the World Society Foundation	ix
Preface	xi
1 Towards Deglobalization? Studying World Society in the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century <i>Christian Suter and Patrick Ziltener</i>	1
PART I: Conceptualizing World Society in the Face of Deglobalization	
2 Fifty Years of Research on World Society—The Zurich “World Observ- atory” <i>Christian Suter, Patrick Ziltener, and Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach</i>	21
3 Dynamics of Global Change and the Concept(s) of World Society <i>Mathias Albert</i>	43
4 Global Warming and the Concepts of World Society: The Coincidence of Epistemological and Political Challenges <i>Veronika Wittmann</i>	63
5 No Justice Without a World Society? <i>Nadja Wolf</i>	89
6 Producing Functional Ignorance for Global Capitalism: Rise and De- cline of the Concept of the Noosphere <i>Andrzej W. Nowak</i>	107
7 The “New” Globalization: Rethinking North-South Relations and In- equalities from an Afro-Renaissance Perspective <i>Salifou Ndam</i>	129
8 The Decolonization of Knowledge as Challenge for World Society: Re- flections from a Sociologist of Social Policies in South Africa and Brazil <i>Madalitso Zililo Phiri</i>	149

PART II: The World-Economy in the Context of Deglobalization

- 9 Globalization Undone 179  
*Robert K. Schaeffer*
- 10 Supply Chain Crises: Harbingers of Deglobalization? A Look at Automobiles, Steel, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and Amazon 203  
*Paul S. Ciccantell, Spencer Louis Potiker, David A. Smith, and Elizabeth Sowers*
- 11 Beyond the Global Value Chain World 221  
*Benjamin Selwyn*
- 12 Chains of Dependency: Changing Importation Practices in the Democratic Republic of Congo 243  
*Lesley Nicole Braun*
- 13 Is the World Economy “Deglobalizing”? The Shifting Economic Geography of Foreign Investment (FDI) Networks and Its Impact on Economic Growth, 2009–2017 269  
*Jeffrey Kentor and Rob Clark*
- 14 The New Geography of Global Inequality and the Evolution of the World City System Since 1993 287  
*Helge Marahrens and Arthur S. Alderson*
- 15 The Globalization of Production and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Capitalist Democracies: Retrenchment and Convergence Revisited 311  
*Anthony J. Roberts and Matthew C. Mahutga*

PART III: Social Structures and Cleavages, Social and Political Mobilization and Participation in a Deglobalizing World Society

- 16 Transnationalization and Perceptions of Winners of Globalization: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Germany 345  
*Rasmus Ollroge*
- 17 Has Global Semiperiphery Ended in the Era of Deglobalization? Transforming Epicenter of Antisystemic Movements in the Global South 367  
*Chungse Jung*

18	Deglobalizing Patterns of Youth Political Engagement in Countries with Varying Democratic and Egalitarian Profiles <i>Melissa Lopez Reyes, Shayne G. Polias, and Ma. Concha B. de la Cruz</i>	389
19	The Intensification/Expansion of the Neoliberal Agenda and Resistance in the Philippine Context: Implications for a Movement Towards Deglobalization <i>Ligaya Lindio-McGovern</i>	419
20	International Tourists as Guardians of National Democracies? <i>Georg P. Mueller</i>	439
21	Globality and Particularity of Legal Norms in South Africa’s Relation with World Society <i>Jürgen Schraten</i>	459
22	Social Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Non-Globalization of World Society <i>Daniel Künzler</i>	477
PART IV: Global Rivalry and Geopolitics “After Globalization”		
23	After Globalization: The Political Economy of Mercantilism <i>Robert A. Denemark</i>	499
24	From <i>The Belt &amp; Road Initiative</i> to <i>A Community of Shared Future for Mankind</i> : Contesting China’s Aspiration and Road Map for a Future World Society <i>Zhan Zhang</i>	517
25	The Cold War 2.0 Fallacy: An Exploratory Study of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations Between China and the US <i>Alexandre Abdal and Douglas Meira Ferreira</i>	541
26	Rings of Geopolitical Power: The Emergence of the Space Ring <i>Albert J. Bergesen</i>	567
Contributors		575





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## About the World Society Foundation

The World Society Foundation (WSF) was established in 1982 by Peter Heintz with the aim of encouraging and supporting research on world society, that is, its emergence and historical evolution, its structure, its dynamics, and current transformation. Until 2003, the main purpose of the Foundation's sponsoring activities was to finance entire research projects focusing on the various processes of social integration and disintegration within worldwide systems—world culture, world economy, world politics, and intergovernmental systems—and on how global processes affect the perceptions and actions of individual and collective actors worldwide. Its current sponsoring policy is to provide award programs for research papers and to support international conferences on world society topics. In accordance with this new policy, the Foundation has introduced its WSF Award Program for Research Papers on World Society and held a series of international conferences (2007, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021, 2022, 2023) in order to maintain a network of excellent scholars interested in transnational and global research topics. The World Society Foundation Award honors outstanding research papers on world society that address a specific topic announced by the Foundation in its Award Program. The World Society Foundation also publishes the book series *World Society Studies*. The World Society Foundation is domiciled in Zurich, Switzerland. The current members of the Board are: Mark Herkenrath, Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach, and Christian Suter (President). Former members of the Board included: Peter Heintz, Karl W. Deutsch, Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, Bruno Fritsch, and Volker Bornschier. More detailed information on past research projects sponsored, the topics and recipients of the 2007–2022 WSF Awards, the WSF book series *World Society Studies*, and the call for papers of the current WSF conferences (2024–2025) can be found on the Foundation's website at [www.worldsociety.ch](http://www.worldsociety.ch).



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## Preface

In 2021, on the occasion of its 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary, the World Society Foundation (WSF), established by Peter Heintz in 1982, launched an award program with a call for papers for an international online conference on the topic of “After Globalization: The Future of World Society.” Social sciences scholars were invited to submit research papers dealing with the issue of “deglobalization,” including regional fragmentation and/or reconfiguration of the global economic, political, societal, and cultural order, and the concept of world society in a context of “after globalization,” characterized by the decline in global integration and international exchange in the wake of several partly overlapping global economic, political and societal crises (like the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, the US-China trade war, the COVID-19 pandemic, or Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine). Some 60 applications were submitted by researchers from all over the world, of which 30 were invited to elaborate their proposals into a full research paper and to participate in the World Society Foundation Award for Research Papers program. The authors (including co-authors) were mostly from the Global North (22 = 73%), less from the Global South (8 = 27%). Most of them were from North America (13 = 43%), nine from Europe (= 30%), three from Asia (= 13%), two each from Africa and Latin America (= 7% each). 22 of them were men (= 73%), 8 women (= 27%). 14 of them are professors or advanced researchers (= 47%), 16 participants can be qualified as junior scholars (= 53%). The international online conference, which included 5 sessions and 22 paper presentations, was held on August 25–26, 2022.

The *global* international online conference was combined with a *local* anniversary celebration, which took place at the Theater Stadelhofen in Zurich on August 27, in the building of the Swiss Social Archives, where also the scientific estate of the Foundation’s founder, Peter Heintz, is housed (repository Ar 163). The Swiss Social Archives, of which Peter Heintz served as chair of its board between 1966 and 1971, put also together in August 2022 a small public exhibition at the library on Peter Heintz and his work.

The anniversary celebration included a keynote by Mathias Albert (University of Bielefeld) on the “Dynamics of global change and the concepts of world society,” a subsequent panel discussion with the keynote speaker and invited guests (Veronika

Wittmann, University of Linz, Boris Holzer, University of Konstanz), and an exhibition of a cultural installation with (dancing) mechanical figures created by Urs Lendi and Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach representing different perspectives and images of world society (see chapter 2). The anniversary celebration concluded with the presentation of the winners of the 2022 WSF-Award, honoring outstanding contributions on the topic of deglobalization. The following three papers were awarded: Helge Marahrens' and Arthur Alderson's (Indiana University) paper on "The new geography of global inequality and the evolution of the world city system since 1993," Anthony Roberts' (Colorado State University) and Matthew Mahutga's (University of California at Riverside) paper on "The globalization of production and wage bargaining in advanced capitalist democracies: Retrenchment and convergence revisited," and Zhan Zhang's (Università della Svizzera Italiana) paper "From the belt & road initiative to a community of shared future for mankind: Contesting China's aspiration and roadmap for a future world society." All three papers demonstrate, contrary to the thesis of deglobalization, long-term stability of global structures. At the same time, the three papers point to significant, but specific recent changes, without however completely transforming the existing overall structures of world society.

The three award winning papers, together with contributions presented and discussed at the international online conference and the local anniversary celebration are included in the present volume on "After Globalization." The aim of the present volume and the 2022 conferences has been to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of stability and change in global structures by analyzing and discussing key aspects of "deglobalization" from historical, comparative, and interdisciplinary perspectives.<sup>1</sup>

The World Society Foundation aims to support and strengthen research on world society, while insisting on promoting diverse voices. Indeed, the Foundation aims to gather researchers from different parts of the world and different cultural, historical, and academic contexts who represent different social science disciplines and use a variety of theoretical and methodological backgrounds. Importantly, the World Society Foundation seeks to bring these different perspectives and voices into dialogue, and this book has significantly contributed to this core mission.

Many people have contributed to the realization of this volume as well as the 2022 conference and anniversary celebration. First and foremost, the World Society Foundation and the editors would like to thank the authors for their stimulating contributions and their patience during the reviewing and copyediting process. A big thank-you is due to Urs Lendi for the cultural installation with the inspiring dances of *universa*, *entropica*, *prismatica*, and *observa* (see chapter 2). Our thanks

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1 More details on the 2022 conference, the World Society Foundation, the WSF conference and research paper sponsoring program, and the WSF book series *World Society Studies* are available on the WSF website at [www.worldsociety.ch](http://www.worldsociety.ch).

also go to the Swiss Social Archives and its director, Christian Koller, and the Theater Stadelhofen for providing the location for the Foundation's anniversary celebration, for arranging the accompanying exhibition, and for housing the archive of Peter Heintz. We should also like to thank Louis Hua for the cover image and the conference poster.

Zurich, Switzerland, May 2024

Christian Suter, President of the World Society Foundation, Zurich

Patrick Ziltener, Associated Professor of Sociology, University of Zurich



# Towards Deglobalization? Studying World Society in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

Christian Suter and Patrick Ziltener

## Is the Globalization Pendulum Swinging Back?

“Have we reached peak globalization?” has asked Bloomberg News in 2020 (January 24, 2020), and Foreign Affairs added in December 2022 “What comes after globalization?” (Foreign Affairs, 2022). Similarly, many social scientists argue that globalization is “in reverse” (Gong et al., 2022) and facing a “backlash” (Crouch, 2018; Walter, 2021), whereas “limits” of globalization have already been discussed for a while (Altvater and Mahnkopf, 1996; Sassen, 1998). Several scholars identify a new trend towards “deglobalization” (Abdal and Ferriera, 2021; van Bergeijk, 2019; James, 2018), a paradigm originally developed in the early 2000s within the context of the anti-globalization movement, at that time as a utopia (Bello, 2002).

After several decades of significantly increasing global economic, socio-cultural, and political integration, the globalization pendulum thus appears swinging back in recent years. The current US-China trade war and the crisis of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the institutional backbone of the rapid economic globalization in the 1990s and 2000s, are key aspects pointing to this new trend towards deglobalization. International trade and investment in particular slowed down in recent years, and this even before the severe disruption of global production and supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, and the consequent restructuring and relocation (re- or nearshoring) of production back or closer to the final consumer markets of the Global North.

The rise and demise of the WTO in particular is highly instructive: during the 1990s and early 2000s the institutional framework provided by the WTO considerably speeded up economic globalization, notably with China’s and other Asian countries accession to the WTO. However, over the past years, and particularly since the Trump administration, the WTO became blocked and unable to act. Since 2015 no substantial agreement could be negotiated. Even worse, the WTO has recently become unable to solve international trade disputes and/or to punish countries breaking WTO rules, since the United States has refused to approve new judges of the WTO dispute settlement body. In the meantime regional bod-



ies, like the North American USMCA (US-Mexico-Canada-Agreement, the revised NAFTA agreement), have taken over these regulatory and arbitration functions.

Symptomatic for the considerable vulnerability of global trade has also been the blocking of the Suez Canal in 2021 by the grounded container ship *Ever Given*, and more recently by the ship attacks of Yemen's Houthi militias in the Red Sea, forcing international shipping companies to take the longer and more expensive trade routes around Africa. The recent COVID-19 pandemic and the current (Ukraine and Palestine) wars have considerably hampered globalization. But globalization slowed down much earlier, namely as a result of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 and the subsequent and partly overlapping economic, political, and societal crises, within a context of rising nationalism, populism, authoritarianism, and geopolitical rivalry.

As evidenced by the KOF (Swiss Economic Institute) globalization index, economic globalization, which has strongly and continuously increased since the early 1990s, is stagnating since the global financial and economic crisis of 2007/08 (Dreher, 2006; Gygli et al., 2019). Trade globalization in particular has been substantially affected by these adverse developments. Thus, while financial globalization (slowly) recovered over the past 15 years, showing a higher level of globalization in 2021 compared to 2007/2008 (and also slightly higher compared to the pre-pandemic level of 2019), "de facto" trade globalization (e.g. exports and imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP) has further decreased during the past ten years and is still considerably below the pre-2008-crisis (and the pre-pandemic) levels.

Despite these hints of an emerging trend towards deglobalization several qualifications and clarifications have been raised in the recent scientific debate (see for instance O'Neil, 2022; van Bergeijk, 2019). Five key aspects, which will be further discussed and debated in the individual chapters of this volume, are of particular importance: firstly, the diversity and multidimensionality of globalization, secondly, the need of re-conceptualizing globalization (and world society) within a context of multiple global crises and restructurings, thirdly, the historical and cyclical dynamics of globalization, fourthly, the relationships between globalization and regionalization, and fifthly, the impact of geopolitics and great power rivalry on globalization.

### **Different (de)globalization dynamics in different domains of globalization**

Many scholars correctly insist that one should speak of globalizations in the plural rather than in the singular (e.g. Rocher, 2001). Most globalization approaches and studies are focusing on economic aspects (e.g. Chase-Dunn, 1989; Wallerstein, 1974a; 1974b), like international trade (e.g. Chase-Dunn et al., 2000), foreign investment (e.g. Bornschieer and Chase-Dunn, 1985), or external debt (Suter, 1992). Political, legal, and institutional aspects of globalization also have been extensively

researched and documented (e.g. Held et al., 1999). Finally, world cultural aspects and processes emphasized already by John W. Meyer (1980) and Peter Heintz (1980; 1982a; 1982b) have been debated more widely more recently (e.g. Hellmann, 2018; Jung and Stetter, 2019), not least as a result of the profound communicational and informational globalization processes (e.g. internet, social media etc.) in the wake of the digital transformation of contemporary society. Although it seems reasonable to assume that the various dimensions of globalization are closely interrelated, i.e. that economic globalization is associated with political and cultural globalization and vice versa, the different aspects of globalization may show quite different temporal and/or spatial dynamics.

This can be illustrated by the evolution of the various sub-indicators of the KOF globalization measure over the past years. Thus, not only financial globalization (as mentioned above), but in particular information globalization (measured in the KOF index by internet access, international internet bandwidth, international patents, high technology exports, etc.) and cultural globalization (measured by exports and imports of cultural goods and services, international trademarks, number of McDonald's restaurants and IKEA stores, etc.) have been significantly and continuously increasing over the past 15 years, apparently unaffected by economic crises and the pandemic. Again another pattern may be found for the sub-index of interpersonal social globalization (measured by international telephone traffic, international tourism, international students, migration, international monetary transfers, etc.): After steadily increasing for decades this index started to decline only from 2015 onwards. Like international trade, interpersonal social globalization has been heavily affected by the restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic resulting in a considerable decrease in levels of globalization in 2020–2021. Thus, while some globalization domains are suffering from a slowdown or a decline pointing towards processes of deglobalization, globalization in other areas, like digital cross-border activities, is not affected and is even speeding up. This suggests a process of reshaping and restructuring of globalization, rather than of deglobalization.

### **Re-examining the concepts of globalization and world society**

The multidimensional (and global) nature of globalization mentioned above implies that researchers from different parts of the world and different cultural and historical contexts, and from various disciplines within the social sciences and humanities are dealing with this social phenomenon using a variety of theoretical, methodological, and epistemological approaches. Furthermore, globalization is not just an academic concept, but also often referred to in the political and public discourse. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is a considerable variety of definitions and no commonly accepted terminology. The concept of globalization, therefore, remains often vague, without precise definitions and operationalizations.

Considering the current reshaping of globalization as discussed above emphasizes the importance of re-examining and re-theorizing globalization. Such re-conceptualization should also take into account the profound impact of the several consecutive and partly overlapping (financial, economic, ecological, sanitary, social, and political) crises, which have been hitting and challenging world society over the past few years. In view of the current deglobalization and/or reconfiguration of global economic, political, societal, and cultural order the question of how world society as an analytical tool should be (re)conceptualized also arises and will be dealt with in this volume (on the concept of world society see Bauer, 2014; Bornschieer, 2002; Bornschieer and Lengyel, 1990; Heintz, 1982b; Greve and Heintz, 2005).

For conceptual and methodological reasons, this research on processes of deglobalization should be based on the concept of world society (see chapters 2 and 3). When preparing the Call for Papers for its 2022 anniversary conference, the World Society Foundation (WSF) has identified the following topics as most significant:

- Deglobalization-fragmentation or reconfiguration of world society: What are the current trends and long-term structural transformations of the global economic, political, societal, and cultural order?
- Re-examining and (re)theorizing the concept of world society in the context of deglobalization: What are the conceptual origins and the theoretical developments, the usefulness and utilization of the concept of world society in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? How should the concept of world society as an analytical tool in a context of the “after globalization” arguments be further developed?
- The periphery and semiperiphery as part and driver of a deglobalizing world society, especially with a view to the regional dimension: Are we witnessing a regional fragmentation or a regional reconfiguration of world society?
- Deglobalization and digitization of world society: How is digitalization related to (de)globalization? What role does the digital divide between North and South, core and periphery, play?
- Deglobalization and democracy in retreat: How does deglobalization impact on democracy? Does rising isolationism, nationalism and populism undermine democracy and democratic movements in the global North and the global South, or does it increase individual autonomy and the collective capacity to act?
- World cultural de-standardization, (sub)cultural differentiation, and resistance: Do we observe a cultural segmentation and differentiation of world society? What forms and dynamics of cultural resistance are emerging?
- The ecological transformation of world society: How do processes of deglobalization impact on ecological transformation and the capabilities of mitigating climate change?

Most of these topics have been addressed in one or several papers presented at the 2022 WSF anniversary conference and the chapters included in this volume.

## **The long-term historical dynamics of globalization**

Historically, the globalization wave characterizing the period between the early 1990s and 2008 is not a new phenomenon. Similarly, there are historical predecessors of the current deglobalization trend, like the period of the 1930s. As demonstrated by a considerable body of empirical and historical research (see Chase-Dunn, 1989; Chase-Dunn et al., 2000; Easterlin, 1968; Edelstein, 1982; Suter, 1992; Therborn, 2000; Thomas, 1972; van Bergeijk, 2019) globalization and deglobalization are recurrent phases shaped by a cyclical dynamic, particularly since the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Depending upon the specific aspect of globalization that is taken into account (i.e. trade globalization, financial globalization) and its operationalization, the exact periodization and duration of globalization cycles may vary. But most authors agree that waves of economic globalization, similar to that of the 1990s and early 2000s, occurred between the 1850s and the world economic crisis of 1873 (often labelled as the first cycle of economic globalization), during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century until the outbreak of World War I, and during the 1920s until the global economic crisis of 1929. Against the background of this historical evidence the current slowdown of globalization may be interpreted as just another downswing phase—which will be followed by a new upswing of a next round of globalization.

## **Fragmentation, reglobalization, or regionalization**

The above-mentioned processes of restructuring of global production and value chains towards a re- or nearshoring (in order to protect enterprises and consumers from supply chain disruptions), points to the importance of regional trade exchanges and networks. The issue of reshoring and the emergence of regional trading blocs has been intensively debated at the 2023 annual meeting of the Davos World Economic Forum (WEF), that took place under the telling general theme “Cooperation in a fragmented world,” in order to address “the manifold political, economic and social forces creating increased fragmentation on a global and national level.” The WEF organizers even published a short video on the 2023 WEF buzzwords of “friendshoring,” “nearshoring,” “reshoring,” and “offshoring.” “Friendshoring” (sometimes also called allyshoring) has been defined as a practice of businesses relying “on countries with shared values, when looking for raw materials or possible manufacturing bases” (WEF, 2023a).

In the months during the re-normalization from the pandemic situation (and more frequently in the months before the 2023 WEF meeting), there was a swarm of voices pleading for the continuation of (economic) globalization. Thus, in late 2022, a group of top German business executives warned against “withdrawing from China, while acknowledging that it’s right for Germany to redefine its relationship with Beijing” (Associated Press, 2022). Facing US pressure, German chancellor Scholz encouraged German companies “to diversify but not discouraging business

with China [...] we don't want decoupling from China" but "we will reduce one-sided dependencies in the spirit of smart diversification" (Associated Press, 2022). As a reaction to these and many other voices, the 2023 World Economic Forum proclaimed the age of "reglobalization." Thus, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala warned that a decoupling of the global economy into two trading blocs would cause "serious costs," up to minus 5% of global GDP over the longer term, for emerging markets and developing countries this would even add up to double digit—minus 12% of GDP. In reaction to the globalization critics, she stated: "We need a new type of globalization, not the old type [...] What we are calling reglobalization at the WTO" (WEF, 2023b). She called for building resilience into the global economy, more specifically, for decentralizing and diversifying supply chains, "bringing in those countries at the margins of the global value chains."

While there occurred some reshoring (and/or diversifying suppliers) in the past few years by US firms, particularly concerning strategic goods (IT) and in sectors where trade restrictions have been sufficiently strong, available international trade data, does not (yet) show a significant shift towards re- or nearshoring. In the case of the European Union, for instance, recent empirical evidence rather suggests a slight increase of the share of (intermediate) goods imported from outside the EU and Europe (Di Sano et al., 2023). More important than this slight offshoring (i.e. the reversal of the previous reshoring trend), however, is the great importance of regional trade networks in general. Thus, over the past ten years between 50% and 60% of the Euro area imports of intermediate goods (an indicator of global production chains) have been imported from within Europe (Di Sano et al., 2023). While Europe is the most densely integrated trading area, Asian countries have been catching up over the past twenty years and are currently not far behind Europe. The North American trading bloc (NAFTA/USMCA), the third most integrated trading area of the world-economy, is less consolidated; only recently the share of internal trade within this region has slightly increased (to about 40%; see O'Neil 2022). In all other regions (Latin America, Africa, Middle East) internal commercial connections are significantly less developed. As highlighted by O'Neil (2022) the expansion of international trade over the past thirty years has been driven by regional trade agreements and networks; in a nutshell: in reality, globalization has been regionalization. According to O'Neill (2022), the process of nearshoring is underway, and will set the corporate agenda in the coming years.

### **The impact of geopolitics**

International trade, investment, tourism, migration, etc. requires a minimum level of global political cooperation and ordering. The marked increase in geopolitical tensions, conflicts, and wars during the last years have negatively impacted on economic globalization. Protectionist restrictions have significantly increased in most countries and outnumbered liberalization measures. Control of exports of strategic

goods (semiconductors, pharmaceutical, critical minerals and raw materials, etc.) will further reduce international trade. The Indian journalist Shereen Bhan summarized the WEF 2023 discussions on “reglobalization” as follows “There is no consensus on where the global economy is headed [...] Where there is consensus is that globalization as we knew it has changed. There is a reshaping of the world that’s taking place, driven largely by geopolitics, which is now dictating how geoeconomics is going to work” (WEF, 2023c).

The current geopolitical situation is characterized by increased rivalry among great powers and a decline of US world-political leadership (Bergesen and Suter, 2018a); this is mirrored by the weakness and de-legitimization of the institutional foundations of US global supremacy, as in the case of the WTO discussed above (another telling example is the weakening of the IMF). Looking back at previous globalization cycles reveals that they have been related to geopolitical world leadership cycles. Thus, economic globalization during the 19<sup>th</sup> century relied on British hegemony, and the dramatic expansion of the world-economy after World War II took place under the hegemony of the United States. With the demise of British world leadership in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century geopolitics became the dominant logic of international relations leading to a wave of colonialism, and two world wars (which may be considered as a single thirty years war) and to the collapse of international trade in the wake of the Great Depression. This recurrent transition from economic globalization to geopolitics and back to globalization has been called the “Globalization/Geopolitics Cycle” by Bergesen and Suter (2018b).

## Overview of the Contributions

This volume debates the processes of globalization and deglobalization and discusses what avenues are opened right now, for a re-shaping of world-economy and world society. The 25 contributions of this volume were originally presented at the World Society Foundation’s (WSF) online conference “After Globalization: The Future of World Society,” held on August 25–26, 2022, and at the subsequent 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration of the Foundation held in Zurich, Switzerland at the *Theater Stadelhofen* on August 27, 2022.

The volume is organized into four parts dealing with four core issues raised in the previous section. The first of these issues concerns the need of re-conceptualization and re-theorization world society (and globalization) within the current context of re-structuring of global economic, political, societal, cultural, and ecological order. The second core topic refers to the dynamics that are currently (re)shaping the world-economy and its sub-domains of production, trade, and finance, i.e. processes of deglobalization, regionalization, and reglobalization, including the issue of global and regional polarization. The third issue deals with the evolution of social structures and cleavages, including political mobilization and participation, and

social policies. Finally, the fourth core topic concerns the current increasing great power conflicts and rivalries and their impact on processes of (de)globalization.

The *first part* of this volume with its focus on conceptual and theoretical issues contains seven chapters. These contributions are addressing the world society perspective developed by Peter Heintz at the University of Zurich (Suter et al.), the dynamics of global change and its impact on conceptualizing world society (Albert), the challenge of global warming and its inclusion into the concept of world society (Wittmann), global justice (Wolf), the concept of noosphere (Nowak), the perspective of the Afro-Renaissance (Ndam), and of decolonization (Phiri).

Looking back to fifty years of the Zurich “world observatory” the chapter by *Christian Suter, Patrick Ziltener, and Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach* introduces the world society perspective developed by Peter Heintz at the University of Zurich in the early 1970s. The chapter shows that this world society perspective inspired a plethora of research long before the globalization term became the dominant concept. The chapter describes the world society approach of Peter Heintz, but also his institution building activities: Peter Heintz is the founder of the World Society Foundation (Zurich, Switzerland), and he established also the Sociological Institute of the University of Zurich, and several sociological departments and institutes in Latin America. Reviewing the research funding activities of the Zurich based World Society Foundation during the past forty years, the chapter documents how the World Society Foundation has carried on Peter Heintz’s heritage. It highlights in particular the changing and contrasting codes and images of world society over the past decades pointing to universalistic, entropic, and prismatic transformations.

The chapter by *Mathias Albert* introduces and compares three different world society concepts, namely the approaches of Peter Heintz, Niklas Luhmann, and John W. Meyer. The chapter elaborates the complementarity of these three theories, focusing on the issues of how to think about globality and globalization and of how to conceptualize changing world political orders. The chapter shows that different world society approaches can usefully be brought together and concludes that world society research understood in a theoretically open analytical sense is well-suited in the current situation of multiple crises to serve as an antidote against all kinds of reductionist approaches.

Exploring the pivotal role science plays for searching for solution to tackle the challenges of global warming the chapter by *Veronika Wittmann* highlights the open-mindedness and cross-disciplinarity of science. Facts, based on scientific evidence, on global warming call for multilateralism and science diplomacy<sup>4</sup>environment as tools for global policy to manage joint future risks scenarios in a peaceful manner. The chapter demonstrates that concepts of world society offer a variety of starting points for reacting to the challenge of global warming. Epistemologically, they are able to contribute to the necessary de-nationalization of concepts and methods of empirical research. Wittmann argues that politically, world society scholars can ac-

tively participate in discourses on global warming, as part of a highly complex multi-stakeholder process and presents the contours of a common future research agenda.

Employing the theoretical perspectives of Rawls' Theory of Justice and Sen's Idea of Justice the chapter of *Nadja Wolf* investigates to what extent the concept world society is needed for the development and implementation of the principles of justice and fair international rules. Wolf demonstrates that although both the approaches of Rawls and Sen are formulated at the national and individual levels (rational decisions of individuals within a context of liberal democracies) without mentioning or explicitly referring to the concept of world society, the process of constant societal debate and reviewing, which is inherent to both approaches, necessitate a global society. The chapter concludes that a global justice system has to emerge as a result of global societal debates taking place at the level of world society: just global principles cannot be defended in the absence of a world society.

The chapter by *Andrzej W. Nowak* takes up the concept of noosphere popularized and developed by the Russian-Ukrainian scientist Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky before World War II, describing a new evolutionary stage in the development of the biosphere with a balanced human-nature relationship. Contrasting Vernadsky's optimistic perspective based on a rational humanity with the more recent dystopian Anthropocene narrative pointing to the threatening eco-doom, Nowak demonstrates in his chapter how hope transformed to doom by analyzing the emergence of a "Fear-Uncertainty-Doubt" strategy which characterized the period of the Cold War and the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. The chapter concludes that today's global transition phase requires recreating the hope of noosphere by revitalizing universalistic global institutions of world society.

The two last chapters of Part I are focusing on Africa. The contribution of *Salifou Ndam* adopts an "Afro-Renaissance" approach on globalization and world society, developed by Diop and Ela and based on the postulate of resistance to westernization and neoliberal capitalism. Building on the "marginalized," "underprivileged" and "disenfranchised" people "from below" (notably the peasants and people from the countryside), the "Afro-Renaissance" approach emphasizes participatory and dialogical research strategies and a new epistemological posture of the investigator developed around the involvement, cooperation, and partnership in research with the producers of social reality (i.e. the people "from below"). Similarly, the chapter by *Madalitso Zililo Phiri* provides an epistemological and methodological reflection on knowledge production in the social sciences based on contemporary debates on decolonization and a comparison of South African and Brazilian social policies evolving in a context of highly unequal societies and a historical legacy of racism, slavery, and colonial domination. Both chapters highlight the asymmetrical relationship in knowledge production on African societies between the Global North and the Global South and emphasize the importance of a more democratic and more balanced North-South relationship in knowledge production in world society.



The *second part* of this volume includes seven chapters exploring the current dynamics that are (re)shaping the world-economy. These contributions address the disintegration and deglobalization of the world-economy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of the Ukraine (Schaeffer), the evolution global value chains and the supply chain disruption of 2020–22 and its impact on selected economic sectors and goods in countries of the Global North and Global South (Ciccantell et al., Selwyn, Braun), the deglobalization and regionalization of foreign direct investment (Kentor and Clark), the evolution of the world city system and the recent transformations in this global urban hierarchy (Marahrens and Alderson), and the impact of globalization on wage bargaining in liberal and coordinated market economies of the Global North (Roberts and Mahutga).

The chapter by *Robert K. Schaeffer* provides an overview on the processes of globalization and deglobalization over the past forty years. Examining the onset of the globalization wave in the 1980s the chapter emphasizes the role of the U.S. stock-prices inflation forcing firms to adopt outsourcing, merger, and labour-saving technology strategies that made Wall Street an “engin of global capital accumulation.” But the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 damaged the legitimacy and the foundations of globalization. Attacked from movements and parties on the left and the right, several consecutive and partly overlapping crises (U.S.-China trade war, COVID-19 pandemic, wars in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe) accelerated deglobalization. Schaeffer concludes that “globalization is being undone” by these developments.

The chapter by *Paul S. Ciccantell, Spencer Louis Potiker, David A. Smith, and Elizabeth Sowers* deals with the supply chain crisis of 2020–2022, which, as a result of growing trade conflicts, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, disrupted production, transportation, distribution and consumption and increased costs and prices across almost all industries. Providing a comparative analysis of critical global commodity chains the chapter examines manufactured products such as automobiles, raw materials-based industries such as steel and LNG, and logistics (Amazon), and analyzes the causes of these disruptions and the extent to which firms and states are seeking to promote deglobalization in these industries. The empirical evidence provided by these case studies for the potential of deglobalization, however, is mixed. The authors conclude that despite the vulnerabilities of the global commodity chains and growing nationalist political rhetoric in many countries, deglobalization in the 2020s remains an open question.

The chapter by *Benjamin Selwyn* also addresses the issue of global value chains and demonstrates that global value chains, which represents, according to Selwyn, the highest form of monopoly capitalism, intensify two of capitalism’s core dynamic: labor exploitation and environmental commodification/destruction. Employing data and evidence from the World Bank and the World Trade Organization the chapter show that even such ardent supporters of global value chains recognize

these tendencies. The chapter argues that in the current context of economic, (geo) political and environmental crises, it is time to consider how to transcend the global value chains world.

The chapter by *Lesley Nicole Braun* provides a case study on how the global disruption of value chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted on traders in a Sub-Saharan African country, the Democratic Republic of Congo. The chapter demonstrates that with the COVID-19 pandemic, countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, where individual traders themselves manage import logistics and travel abroad to select goods to be packed into cargo containers or suitcases to be transported to Africa, have been confronted by challenges with regards to the way in which geographic immobility has stymied the flow of goods into the country. Through an examination of the gendered geographies of supply chains as well as local social networks, the chapter demonstrates that despite the pandemic, African traders, in particular women, continued traveling abroad in the search of goods to import. The pandemic, however, affected the rhythms of trade and migration. China is no longer the only destination as Dubai and Turkey are now more common destinations for wholesale trade.

The chapter by *Jeffrey Kentor and Rob Clark* addresses the questions of whether the world economy is deglobalizing regarding foreign direct investment and whether these changes are uniform across main world regions. Employing a social network framework the chapter examines the number and network density of foreign direct investment ties both within and across economic regions for 2009 and 2017. The chapter finds that the global economy as a whole has deglobalized in terms of the overall number and density of foreign direct investment linkages. However, these overall findings obscure substantial differences across economic regions. Thus, the higher income countries of the Global North decline in the total number of foreign direct investment ties, the density of their foreign direct investment networks, and the regionalization of these ties. Conversely, lower income countries of the Global South increase in the overall number of foreign direct investment ties, network density and regionalization.

The chapter by *Helge Marahrens and Arthur S. Alderson* addresses the question of how the global hierarchy of the world city system has been transforming in the current era. Based on new data on headquarter and branch locations of the world's largest multinationals from 1993 to 2020 and using network methods to describe changes to the overall network and linear mixed models to trace the power and prestige of cities by world-system position and region, the chapter finds a substantial "reshuffling of the deck," where the rank of a city in 1993 on most measures of centrality is not highly correlated with its rank three decades later. Regarding the evolution and transformation of global inequality the evidence is mixed: While inequality in the distribution of centrality is high by many measures, such inequality increased with respect to some measures, but declined concerning other measures. Neither does the development of the world city system reflect the emergence of

“new geographies of inequality”: overall, there is little difference between 1993 and 2020. However, while regional inequality in the world city system remains stable in most regions between 1993 and 2020, there is a remarkable convergence within the East Asian and Pacific region.

The chapter by *Anthony J. Roberts and Matthew C. Mahutga* investigates the long-run and isomorphic effects of globalization on industrial relations and whether the configuration of national institutions condition these effects. Based on a panel sample of 22 advanced capitalist countries from 1965 to 2015 the chapter finds that the degree of corporatist wage bargaining is declining across advanced capitalist countries and wage bargaining systems are converging. However, the rate of convergence varies across the “Varieties of Capitalism” among advanced capitalist countries. Most importantly, the chapter finds that the rate of convergence is conditioned by the globalization of production and these conditional effects are amplified in liberal market economies compared to coordinated and mixed market economies.

The *third part* of this volume deals with the evolution and dynamics of global social and cultural structures in a context of deglobalization. This includes the emergence of a new globalization cleavage between winners and losers of globalization and its impact on global societal integration (Ollroge), the evolution of antisystemic movements and popular protest in the Global South (Jung), political engagement and disengagement of the youth in the Global North and the Global South (Reyes et al.), the emergence of the neoliberal nation-state and the resistance by social movements against the neoliberal project in the Philippine context (Lindio-McGovern), democracy as a core value of world society addressed in the two chapters dealing with the (positive) impact of international tourism on democracy (Mueller) and a case study on democratic transition in South Africa taking place in a context of referencing to global values (Schraten), and the global diffusion of social policy models (Künzler).

The chapter by *Rasmus Ollroge* deals with global societal cleavages and social transnationalization, which is examined by analyzing how people perceive the winners of globalization. Based on data from a conjoint experiment in Germany, in which respondents categorize presented profiles as in-group or out-group members based on how transnational the profiles’ characteristics are, the chapter finds that the winners of globalization are overwhelmingly perceived as an out-group by the majority of the German population; only people on the left and under the age of thirty-five have positive perceptions. This suggests that most people remain skeptical about transnationalization, making the emergence of a global society unlikely.

Based on a dataset covering 43 countries in the Global South over the period from 1870 to 2016 the chapter by *Chungse Jung* explores the evolution and the historical dynamics of popular protests and antisystemic movements in the periphery and semiperiphery of world society. The empirical evidence presented in the chapter points to four protest waves with peaks in the 1930s, 1950s, 1980s, and 2010s.

Interestingly, the first three protest waves have been dominated by semiperipheral countries, whereas the most recent protest wave of the 2010s has its center in the (strong) periphery. The chapter concludes in the era of deglobalization the (strong) periphery has emerged as a revolutionary space.

The chapter by *Melissa Lopez Reyes, Shayne G. Polias, and Ma. Concha B. de la Cruz* examines trends of political engagement and disengagement of the youth across countries. Based on data of the ISSP citizenship surveys cluster analyses of more than 30 countries in 2004 and 2014 were conducted. The chapter finds three stable clusters in 2004 and 2014 but no convergence across countries over time. In the first cluster composed of core countries with democratic cultures the youth exhibit high levels of political trust and engagement. The other two clusters are composed of semiperipheral and peripheral countries showing less favorable conditions (regarding democratic political culture, government functioning, GDP per capita, inequality) and a youth that is politically disengaged, in one cluster also politically distrustful, in the other politically ambivalent.

The chapter by *Ligaya Lindio-McGovern* provides a case study of the Philippines as a neoliberal nation-state in the Global South in order to examine the dynamics of neoliberalism and the resistance it engenders by various social movements. The chapter argues that there is currently an intensification of the neoliberal project, rather than a process of deglobalization. The chapter concludes that movement towards deglobalization must (a) control the extractivist expansion of transnational corporations; (b) respect the economic sovereignty and territorial sovereign rights of nations as a basis for regional cooperation for peace; (c) humanize and protect the dignity of labor through job security; (d) promote development policies that create jobs in the local economy (e) transform bureaucrat capitalism to narrow the gap between the rich and poor; and (f) halt the IMF inspired structural adjustment policies.

The chapter by *Georg P. Mueller* explores the effects of international tourism on democracy. Mueller argues that the increasing moralization of consumer behavior may lead to boycotts of travel to countries, where authoritarian regimes curb democratic freedom. The empirical evidence provided in the chapter confirms the expected positive effects of international tourism on democracy. In most cases, however, this impact is only weak. Thus, the impact of international tourism matters only if civil society is weak and political freedom is highly restricted. Moreover, the economic and financial dependency on international tourism of the country must be exceptionally high. The chapter, therefore, concludes that international tourists are only in exceptional cases the “guardians” of democracy.

The chapter by *Jürgen Schraten* deals with South Africa’s transition to democracy in the 1990s. Reviewing the evolution of South Africa’s legal norms according to the concepts of “power” and “prestige” of Peter Heintz the chapter describes the transformation of values into legal norms during two periods of political transition: the formation of the authoritarian apartheid regime after World War II on the one

hand, and the transition to constitutional democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s on the other. While the apartheid regime has been defined and established by separating the country's development from world society, the transition to democracy took place in a context of global reintegration. Thus, the chapter demonstrates that both political actors, the democratic forces of the opposition and the representatives of the old regime, deliberately addressed core values of world society during the transition phase to democracy: civil and political rights, values of justice and equality on the one hand, and economic freedom and property rights on the other. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the importance of openness in the competition for values in the current context of new political calls suggesting a separation of South African from world society.

The chapter by *Daniel Künzler* deals with the global diffusion of social policy models. The author provides a comparative study of cash transfer programs in six sub-Saharan countries (Nigeria, Ethiopia, DR Congo, South Africa, Tanzania, and Kenya). The chapter shows that cash transfers programs played a role in all countries demonstrating the importance of individual responsibility as core value in global social policy. The chapter also shows that there is no dominant model but a considerable variety of cash transfer programs. The weak institutionalization of most programs and considerable gaps between intended policies and implemented practices points to strategies of decoupling and demonstrates the limits of global norms advocated by international organizations and NGOs.

The *forth and final part* of this volume addresses the issue of global rivalry and geopolitics and its impacts on (de)globalization. The four chapters of this part deal with the return of mercantilist policies (Denemark), China's perception of the changing world order and the Chinese approach towards globalization (Zhang), the U.S.-China "Cold War 2.0," i.e. the increasing conflicts and tensions in the Sino-American diplomatic and commercial relations over the past years (Abdal and Ferreira), and the current geopolitical transformation characterized by a shift from sea to space power (Bergesen).

The chapter by *Robert A. Denemark* deals with the political economy of mercantilism. Starting from the observation that global cooperation rises during hegemonic periods and declines during periods of global rivalry, the author argues that the current deglobalization is generated by hegemonic decline and that international political economy will see a return to mercantilism, which already dominated in previous periods of global rivalry. Denemark shows that mercantilism is characterized by (1) conflicts over new polity forms, notably tensions between smaller and larger polity structures; (2) a particular concept of wealth that includes infrastructural elements and patterns; (3) the importance of specie inflow in order to avoid balance of trade and other forms of deficit the; and (3) a policy toolbox that is varied in order to be adapted to the possible diverse contexts. In the realm of security, the author expects reduced obstacles to great power war. Finally, in geoculture the

previously dominant ideology and belief system of the hegemonic culture will be replaced by increasing geocultural competition including cultural wars.

The chapter by *Zhan Zhang* deals with China's perception of changing world order and the Chinese approach towards globalization. Zhan Zang provides a critical analysis of how the Chinese concepts of the Belt & Road Initiative and the Community of Shared Future have shaped China's foreign policy since 2013. The chapter shows that, based on these two concepts, China did not follow the anti-globalization claims of the second half of the 2010s, but rather took the historical opportunity to step into world society in a big way. However, China's optimistic pro-globalization approach met with the world society's increasingly pessimistic view of China. Zhang analyzes how these two concepts of the Belt & Road Initiative and the Community of Shared Future have been popularized in an official Chinese news app and in the research funded by the Chinese National Social Science Fund. The chapter shows that the Chinese discourse supports globalization by emphasizing multilateralism (including country specific development models) with China and the Chinese party-government as a major nation-state player and responsible stakeholder contributing to the "harmony under heaven" for world society.

The chapter by *Alexandre Abdal and Douglas Meira Ferreira* assesses the hypothesis of a US-China "Cold War 2.0." Based on an analysis of Sino-American diplomatic and commercial relations the chapter demonstrates that despite the increasing political tensions over the past years, trade relations between the two countries remained strong. Moreover, China and the United States are linked by complementary trade structures: China shows a structural trade surplus in manufactured products and deficits in commodities, whereas the opposite happened on the US side. The chapter concludes that this strong and stable commercial cooperation is very different from that of the Cold War era between the USSR and the US; the Cold War analogy, therefore, does hardly apply.

Employing a geopolitical perspective on current transformations in world society the last chapter by *Albert Bergesen* presents a model of global rings of geopolitical power: a sea ring of global naval power surrounding land continents (and land power), and a more recent ring of orbital space power. The chapter reminds us that the capitalist world-economy has been constituted and transformed over the past 500 years by the dominance of global naval powers (by Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States). The chapter identifies a new profound geopolitical transformation which is currently taking place: the shift from sea to space power, based on the control of the space by satellites. This current transformation corresponds to the previous world historical shift from land power to sea power. Bergesen concludes that geopolitics is transforming into astro-politics.

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**PART I:**

**Conceptualizing World Society  
in the Face of Deglobalization**



## Fifty Years of Research on World Society— The Zurich “World Observatory”

Christian Suter, Patrick Ziltener, and Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach

This chapter looks back to fifty years “world observatory” Zurich. It traces the roots of the concept world society, introduces the world society theory as developed by Peter Heintz fifty years ago and describes the research strand based on it, largely initiated and sponsored by the World Society Foundation (WSF). During his years at the University of Zurich (1966–1983), Peter Heintz developed the informally used notion “world society” to a comprehensive analytical concept that served as macro-theoretical basis for many single analyses at the Sociological Institute of the University of Zurich. Beyond that, “world society” inspired a plethora of research questions and designs—twenty years before the notion “globalization” rocked the social sciences and drove them out of the constricted paradigm of methodological nationalism. The WSF, founded by Peter Heintz in 1982, has had a profound and long-lasting impact. In the forty years of its sponsoring of world society-related research and debate, many scholars—particularly from the Global South—benefited from the Foundation’s activities. With the funding of more than 100 individual research projects and 15 international conferences the WSF supported about 700 researchers from 50 countries worldwide; results of the funded research have been published in many articles, papers, and books; a selection has been included in the Foundation’s book series *World Society Studies* (11 volumes).

## Introduction

World society is something which is, at the same time, highly relevant and widely ignored [...] world society is as it is because it is widely ignored [...] world society is, in fact, a self-reproducing structure of ignorance and knowledge.

Peter Heintz, Founder of the World Society Foundation (1980, 99)

Long before the notion of “globalization” went viral in the 1990s, scholars used different analytical approaches to come to the conclusion that binding the notion of “society” to the concept of nations based on states and placing the nation at the center of sociological analysis was untenable and even misleading. Certainly, the conceptualization of the world as an “international system” has had a long tradition in academic disciplines such as political science, international relations, and international law. However, the dominant perspectives have approached the “international system” as a simple consequence of the incidental interaction of its independent units, echoing the concept of the market in mainstream economics. Thus, the concept of “world society,” which emerged in sociology in the 1960s and early 1970s, has gone beyond the “global interaction system of national societies/nation-states” (GISN) model (Ziltener, 2021).

Looking back to fifty years “world observatory” Zurich this chapter deals with the world society perspective of Peter Heintz and how the World Society Foundation (WSF), established in Zurich in 1982 by Peter Heintz, has carried on the founder’s heritage. The first section of the chapter traces the roots of the concept of “world society,” developed by several scholars in international law, international relations, global studies, and sociology fifty years ago. Sections 2 and 3 describe the world society perspective initiated by Peter Heintz in the 1960s and 1970s during his years at the University of Zurich. Based on selected examples of funded research, section 4 presents a review of the Foundation’s forty years of research funding activity, revealing changing codes and images of world society, that point to universalistic, entropic, and prismatic transformations. The final section concludes with some basic principles which have guided research funding of the World Society Foundation.

## From “International System” to “World Society”

Before the 1970s, only a few social theorists had developed a “beyond the GISN” perspective on the world. The idea of a “world society” was first mentioned by an expert of international law, George Schwarzenberger, in his book *Power Politics*. Schwarzenberger, who earned his PhD at the London School of Economics and wrote his thesis on *The League of Nations and World Order*, held a position at

the London Institute of World Affairs. Addressing the rule of law of peace (and war), i.e. the creation, functioning, and transformation of international rules, Schwarzenberger adopted a sociological perspective on international law to uncover the power politics that operated behind international rules. While the first edition of *Power Politics* (1941) was subtitled *An introduction to the study of international relations and post-war planning* and, therefore, still reflected a traditional international relations perspective, the subtitle was changed in the second (1951) and third editions (1963) of the book to *A study of international society* and *A study of world society*, respectively. Drawing on Ferdinand Tönnies' distinction between "society" and "community," Schwarzenberger argued that the international system had to be conceptualized as a society, rather than as a community. Thus, in the 1951 edition of his book, he stated, that

[...] modern international society is a reality for the reason that in groups co-exist within it which are both interdependent and independent of each other [...] The bond that holds world society together is not a vague community of spiritual interests. It is power. (Schwarzenberger 1951, 251)

It is no coincidence that Scharzenberger, a German emigrant whose Jewish family had been forced to leave Germany for political reasons, conceptualized world society by turning to a pronounced interdisciplinary approach that combined international law and international relations with sociology.

A second impetus for global thinking goes back to Wilbert E. Moore, former president of the American Sociological Association (ASA). In his presidential address at the 1965 ASA convention, Moore (1966, 475) called upon to develop "global sociology," a "sociology of the globe, of mankind" in the face of the "growing ubiquity of similar problems and similar solutions in the world of events." He traced global thinking back to a "grand tradition" that included thinkers such as Polybius and Ibn Khaldun and assumed the unity of humankind. Since Antiquity, the metaphor of humankind as one "body" had been used frequently, e.g. in Seneca's "membra sumus corporis magni" ("we are members of a large body," cf. Motto, 1955). Having been Talcott Parsons' student, Moore ended his 1965 address with "we must rediscover super-systems" (Moore, 1966, 482).

A third decisive initiative of the 1960s and early 1970s concerns the rise of various "world models" developed in the context of increasing global ecological risks and the boundaries placed on the planet by a dominant resource-intensive, growth-based development path, which had been pursued by most countries but in particular by those of the Global North. Heintz (1982a, 11) noted in his introduction to a special issue of the UNESCO *International Social Science Journal* focused on world society an increased interest within the scientific community in world society as a topic. He explained this rising interest as resulting from the construction of world models, in particular economic, resource-oriented, and international

relations models. The two most important world models, the first Club of Rome publication on *Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al., 1972) and the “Latin American” counter model published by the Argentine Bariloche Foundation (Herrera et al., 1976) received considerable public attention across the globe. Based on computer simulations and focused on the interactions among selected global problems (in particular population density, waste, environmental deterioration, famine, poverty, and criminality) the Club of Rome’s publications presented a fundamental critique of (resource-intensive) economic growth and pointed to the risks of a general collapse of the international system if there was no move to a more sustainable model of development.

This global catastrophe scenario was criticized as neo-Malthusian by the authors of the Bariloche model who emphasized in their social sciences-based counter model the importance and impact of socio-structural factors, in particular global disparities, inequality, and over-consumption (in the Global North). Heintz, who established the social sciences department at the Bariloche Foundation in the 1960s, maintained close contacts and research collaborations with the researchers at the Bariloche Foundation, including the authors of the “Latin American” world model. Although Heintz was not part of the Bariloche model’s authors, his structural-theoretical, developmental-sociological approach, which includes a focus on global stratification, institutionalized power, and prestige, was closely related to the Bariloche model perspective.

As they interrogated world society, these three early initiatives had quite different impacts on research agendas in the social sciences and on the public debate about global issues. Thus, while Schwarzenberger remained an “outsider” and his interdisciplinary approach was not taken up and further developed in international law, the world models’ perspectives have had a profound influence and contributed to linking development, global inequalities, and the environment more explicitly. Thus, proponents of these models initiated, 50 years ago, an eco-developmental agenda for global sustainability that is still robustly shaping today’s public debate (see Wittmann, chapter 4 in this volume).

## **Heintz’s World Society Concept: Global Stratification, Development, and Tensions**

Peter Heintz (born in 1920, Davos, Switzerland) started using the concept of “world society” in the early 1970s. A few years earlier, in 1966, he had been appointed as a full professor of sociology at the University of Zurich, where he had established the Sociological Institute, which became, under his guidance, one of the most important centers of empirical social research in Switzerland. Heintz had studied economics and social sciences in Zurich, Paris, and Cologne, and spent several years in South America from 1956 to 1965 after receiving his habilitation under the leadership of Rene König at the University of Cologne, Germany. As an expert for UNESCO, he

had contributed to the institutional development of sociological research and teaching in several South American countries, notably at the *Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)* in Santiago de Chile and at the *Bariloche Foundation* in Argentina. This experience in the Global South strongly influenced his work once he returned to Europe, as can be seen not only in his macro-sociological, developmentalist (structural theoretical) approach and his emphasis on intercultural and comparative analyses but also in his interest in sociological teaching and public sociology (see Heintz, 1960). His experience shaped his world view: He learned—as he said himself—“to take a world perspective. Seen from the highly developed countries, only a small part of the world is illuminated, while the outlines of the larger part are hardly visible” (Heintz, 1976).


Heintz informally introduced his concept of “world society” in 1972 through two contributions targeted at the general public; indeed, he was interested in reaching beyond the limited scholarly audience of sociologists and academics. The first of these two publications was an article entitled *The world society and its citizens*, published (in German) in the weekend edition of the liberal, center-left Basel-based newspaper *National-Zeitung am Wochenende* (Heintz, 1972c). Two years later, he wrote a similar article, entitled *The structural transformation of world society from the perspective of sociology*, for the broader public of the University of Zurich magazine (Heintz, 1974). Therefore, he had already been using the term for a few years when he published his first scientific publication explicitly addressing the topic of world society in 1977 (Heintz and Obrecht, 1977; see Figure 2).

Before that time, Heintz had still used terms such as “international system” or “international system of development stratification” in his scientific writings, for instance in his 1972 analysis of *Switzerland's position in the structure of the international system: A sociological analysis*, (Heintz, 1972a) or in the volumes *A macrosociological theory of societal systems: With special reference to the international system* (Heintz, 1972b) and *The future of development* (Heintz and Heintz, 1973), which constituted two of his most important scientific publications in that period. At that time, he also started developing a global approach that went beyond the international systems perspective by emphasizing the structural and institutional foundations of the international system and its impact on the national and local levels. Indeed, he argued that his analysis was based on the assumption that

The notion of structure, i.e. institutionalized power and prestige, implies a differential distribution of chances, or even a distribution governed by different laws for different regions, as for instance, for the region of the developing countries and for that of the highly developed nations. The structure of the international system is thus conceived of as representing the distribution of nations' chances to realize the values of development. (Heintz, 1972a, 81)




Figure 1: Seminar Weltgesellschaft (world society), 1976/77




Source: P. Heintz, Unterlagen Seminar Weltgesellschaft (university course World Society), Wintersemester 1976/77, University of Zurich. Swiss Social Archives, Zurich, Ar 163.1.

Figures 2, 3: Early publications on world society



Source: Swiss Social Archives, Zurich.



Heintz also increasingly used the topic of world society in his teaching. Thus, from 1976 onwards he delivered university seminars on “world society” (Figure 1), including a lecture series *On the sociology of world society*. He also disseminated the concept of world society through international conferences in Zurich, e.g. at a symposium entitled *Report on World Society and Educational Code* in January of 1976. Four years later, in November 1980, he organized an international seminar on *Diversity and Change of World Society Images* at the University of Zurich. Several papers presented at that conference were published in 1982 in a special issue of UNESCO’s *International Social Science Journal* (no. 34/1, 1982; Figure 3) under the title *Images of World Society. Emerging global understanding and praxis*. His research program at that time was quite ambitious, as he aimed to develop “a sociological code for the description of world society and its change.”

At the center of Heintz’s world society concept lies the idea of global stratification, more precisely the “international system of development stratification,” which is characterized by a multi dimensional and a multi-level structure (of local, subnational, national, regional, and global levels) embedding individuals, organizations and institutions, and states into a comprehensive social reality.<sup>1</sup> Heintz conceptualized world society as a hierarchically structured international development system shaped by the unequal positions of individual nations on interrelated stratification dimensions such as income, education, urbanization, industrialization, and tertiarization. Heintz’s structural-theoretical, developmentalist conceptualization of world society considerably differs from other world society or global society approaches developed in the 1970s, such as Niklas Luhmann’s systems model (Luhmann, 1982; Stichweh, 2000), Ulrich Beck’s (2009) world at risk approach, John W. Meyer’s neo-institutionalist world polity approach (Meyer, 1980; Meyer et al., 1997), or Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) world systems theory. Thus, while the world systems theory relies primarily on global economic interactions and the world polity approach is based on political and institutional factors, Heintz emphasized the diffusion of global cultural values, norms, and societal institutions as the principal integrating forces of world society.<sup>2</sup>

Heintz considered that the primary factors of integration and stability in world society are a consensus on the value of social and economic development and the existence of mobility channels permitting and regulating access to hierarchical positions within the multidimensional stratification system. Structural and anomic tensions constitute crucial aspects of this approach. They are caused by incomplete status configurations or imbalances in the positions held by social actors, whether

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1 The subsequent section is partly based on Suter (2005).

2 For a more detailed discussion of the various world society approaches, see Bornschier and Lengyel (1990), Wobbe (2000), Bornschier (2002), Greve and Heintz (2005), Bauer (2014), Wittmann (2014 and in this volume), Albert (in this volume).

the latter are individuals or nation states. According to Heintz, structural and anomie tensions occur across different system levels within world society, that is, across global, national, regional, organizational, and individual levels. In the 1960s and early 1970s, he predicted that increasing contradictions and tensions within world society would result in a general deficit of legitimacy and in increasing tendencies toward disintegration.

## Pros and Cons of Studying World Society

In a short, but remarkable contribution in Johan Galtung's *Festschrift* in 1980, Peter Heintz critically reflected on the pros and cons of studying world society and developed four main arguments in favor of such endeavor. First, he argued that studying world society entails a concern with the "only truly global society," whereas national societies are, in structural terms, not global, even when they might be socially defined as such. Second, for Heintz, studying world society is to address a topic common to all social scientists, regardless of the region or culture to which they belong. This commonality is based on the idea that everyone can consider herself/himself to be a member of a (loose) worldwide community of social scientists. Third, Heintz advanced that studying world society is innovative, even when the scale of study is modest, since this topic has been "highly neglected" by social scientists so far. Fourth, studying world society means understanding a "very particular type of society," which promises to be highly productive for further theory building. This particular type of society was characterized by Heintz (1980, 97) as a stateless, highly complex society without identity, i.e., a society that is not perceived as such by most of its members.

Among the reasons *not* to approach the world as a world society, Heintz mentioned the following four arguments. First, he noted that there had been little to no demand for knowledge on world society; he added, that there seemed to be no social problem related to world society that required sociological knowledge and analysis. Second, Heintz mentioned that only a small, globalized elite (made of foreign policy makers and managers of multinational corporations) might be interested in research findings on world society; moreover, research results might strengthen the power of these elites, which would hardly be in the interest of sociology. Third, for Heintz, studying world society would be to pretend to be able to overcome the structural limitations of one's own perspective, which is always influenced by the specific place and position someone occupies in society. Fourth, Heintz (1980) argued that data on world society were lacking; moreover, these data, like governmental statistics or media news, might be quite biased.

In conclusion, Heintz (1982a, 20) called for an exploration of the "possibilities of shaping world society on the basis of solid knowledge shared by different groups," in spite of "strong social and cultural forces" preventing such an exploration. For him, "a meaningful world society could only result from a commonly shared knowl-

edge revealing action spaces and making people true participants in this society; without, of course, by any means denying the continued existence of antagonistic interests.” It is striking that several arguments advanced by Heintz fifty years ago are still valid, such as his characterization of world society as a stateless, highly complex society without identity. Other aspects discussed by Heintz have fundamentally changed, for instance, his observation that no social problem seems to be related to world society. Already the wave of rapidly increasing economic globalization that characterized the world between the 1980s and the early 2000s was related to the emergence of several severe global social problems (such as, for instance, increasing global inequalities and social stratification, or increasing global migration). The subsequent multiple global (financial, economic, political, military, sanitary, social, environmental, etc.) crises that have marked the years since 2008 and which have contributed to a considerable fragmentation challenging today’s world demonstrates the persistence and relevance of global social problems and the ongoing necessity of applying a world society approach.

## The “World Observatory”: Fifty Years Studying World Society in Zurich

### Scholars and topics

In his late work, before his untimely death in 1983, Heintz focused on codes and images to describe world society and the structure and evolution of political regimes at the periphery (Heintz, 1982b). Although he did not produce a specific “Zurich school” out of world society research, but lay ground to a “world observatory” in Zurich.<sup>3</sup> Heintz inspired students, collaborators, and colleagues to further develop research on world society into the twenty-first century. The volume *World Society and Social Structure* published in German in 1980 contains 38 contributions and is an example of these scholars’ work (Hischier et al., 1980). The most prominent of Heintz’s students has been Volker Bornschier, who served as president of the World Society Foundation in the 1980s and 1990s. Bornschier analyzed the (negative) impact of foreign investment dependence on economic growth and development at the periphery of the world economy (see Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985); he also focused on state-building processes, processes of convergence and divergence in institutional orders, and societal models at the core of world society (Bornschier, 1996). Other themes included the role of socio-cultural factors such as generalized trust and social capital for political and economic development (Bornschier, 2004). Many other contributions of scholars who have been students and collaborators of Peter Heintz are worth mentioning, in particular Georg P. Müller’s (1988) *World*

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3 We take the inspiring notion from Wobbe (2000, 14).

*Data Handbook*, Christian Suter's (1992, 1999, 2012) analysis on global sovereign debt cycles and regime change in Latin America, and Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach's research on post-socialist transformation in Eastern Europe (Meier-Dallach and Juchler, 2001).

### **Forty years of research funding by the World Society Foundation: Universalistic, entropic, and prismatic perspectives on global transformations**

When Heintz established the World Society Foundation in 1982, it was an important step toward strengthening and institutionalizing research on world society. The Foundation, now in its fortieth year of activity as a “world observatory” on global change has supported social sciences scholars and scientific research all over the world to reinforce the investigation into the various processes of global integration, disintegration, (re)structuring, and (re)configuration. In doing so, the Foundation has supported about 700 researchers from about 50 countries worldwide through various instruments, but in particular through the sponsorship of research projects and international conferences.

Over the last few years, the Foundation has mainly promoted international conference sponsoring. Through this reorientation, the Foundation's board has intended to give better access to researchers from the Global South, who have been markedly underrepresented in the distribution of project grants. Within the framework of the conference sponsoring activity, a special focus has been placed on topics of particular interest for countries of the Global South, such as the emergence of a rapidly growing middle class there (see Suter et al., 2020) or the increasing relationships among non-core Global South countries (see Ziltener and Suter, 2022), relations which traditionally have been neglected in the scholarship produced in core countries.

The Foundation also established the World Society Foundation Research Paper Award and, together with Nicole Shea, founded the WSF Writing Lab for Global South scholars; it has also supported (open access) publications on various world society topics, in particular for Global South scholars. The output of this funding has been substantial, as can be seen in the numerous conference presentations, journal articles, books, edited volumes, and special issues published by the supported researchers. The Foundation has also established its own book series in *World Society Studies*,<sup>4</sup> in which results of outstanding research projects and conference papers have been featured.<sup>5</sup>

4 The series comprises 11 volumes so far; most of them are freely accessible at [www.worldsociety.ch](http://www.worldsociety.ch).

5 Detailed information on the Foundation's past and current activities, as well as access to electronic versions of papers, chapters, and books of supported research, are available on the Foundation's website at [www.worldsociety.ch](http://www.worldsociety.ch).

Figure 4: The World Society Foundation's graphic concept for the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary, 2022



Graphic concept developed by Louis Hua. *Source:* WSF, 2022.

A review of the Foundation's forty years of research funding reveals, on the one hand, an extensive thematic, theoretical, and methodological approach, as well as a great disciplinary and regional diversity in the research supported. On the other hand, different trends, related to the structural transformations and changing images of world society over the past decades, have emerged. More specifically, three types of transformations and images may be distinguished: universalistic, entropic, and prismatic. These trends can be illustrated through representative funded research projects and images of the mechanical figures and installations (Figures 5–7 and 11) exhibited in August 2022 during the Foundation's fortieth anniversary celebration Zurich, Switzerland (Figures 8–10).

Figure 5: Universa



*Linea universalis*: The world society develops on a progressing line towards a unity and to the utopia of concentric circles. Source: © Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach and Urs Lendi, 2022.

The *universalistic* transformation of (and perspective on) world society concerns the processes of global evolutionary progress, modernization, and peaceful change that spread, sometimes in waves, to all regions, nations, and individuals of the world to make them into one single “civil” world. This integrative, open, and participative development is illustrated in Figure 5 by the interplay of concentric circles. Exemplifying this approach, the project on *A Democratic and Therefore*

*Peaceful World Society?* by Bruce Russett was funded by the Foundation in 1991. Employing the vision of a “Kantian Peace” based on democratic constitutions and cosmopolitanism (including international commerce, free trade, international law, treaties among countries, and global norms of peaceful conflict resolution), Russett empirically demonstrated, based on several thousands of conflict episodes and interstate disputes during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that democracies in general do not fight each other through threats or the use of force and war (they may, however, use violence against non-democratic states and governments; see Russett, 1994).

The *entropic* worldview represents the antithesis of the universalistic perspective. As illustrated in Figure 6, confusion, over-complexity, and chaos dominate entropic, and no clear evolutionary processes or developments may be identified there. The current world situation, with its multiple crises, such as the ecological crisis, global warming, the global COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–22, the globalization crisis characterized by considerable global supply chain challenges, the Russian-Ukraine war of 2022, and the subsequent food and energy crises, clearly corresponds to this vision of entropic transformation. Various scholars, however, have placed the early beginnings of these entropic processes in the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis that disrupted the economic foundations of world society and slowed down the process of economic globalization. In fact, entropic transformations already played a prominent role in Heintz’s thinking, since he had observed an increasing de-legitimization and disintegration of the international system of development stratification during the 1970s and early 1980s. Research on crises and wars has been widely funded by the World Society Foundation. For example, Perry Anderson received funding from the Foundation in 1985 to explore the nature and impact of the wars of liberation and independence that transformed the Spanish Empire in the Americas into several independent Latin American republics in the early nineteenth century. Anderson highlighted the impact of the revolutionary ideas of the Enlightenment (mediated by the example of the North American Revolution), i.e. the autonomy and power of an ideological superstructure of ideas, principles, and doctrines. Anderson showed that, while revolutionary power was able to destroy the old order, it did not, however, succeed in creating the new expected order of “liberty, equality, property, and security.” Rather, independence brought with it deep economic stagnation and social disintegration—a deterioration of the public order characterized by *caudillismo*, i.e., rising political conflicts and wars within and between countries over several decades in most Latin American countries (see Anderson, 1990). Another example of entropic processes is the Foundation’s funding of research on economic and financial crises. Based on historical data about sovereign default and debt restructuring, Suter et al. (1990) demonstrated the global dynamics of sovereign debt crises in the Global South through an exploration of the repeated Southern debt crises waves, which culminated in the 1820s, 1830s, early 1890s, the 1930s, the mid-1970s, and the



Figure 6: Entropica



*Linea entropica*: Lines are hardly detectable; complexity, confusion, and chaos dominate, co-determining events and developments. Source: © Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach and Urs Lendi, 2022.

1980s. The impact of the most recent global economic and financial crisis of 2008 was addressed at a stand-alone international conference organized by the Foundation in 2010, which resulted in a volume of the Foundation's *World Society Studies* in 2012 that included the most important contributions (see Suter and Herkenrath, 2012).

The *prismatic* perspective on world society addresses risks and insecurities with

Figure 7: Prismatica



*Linea prismatica* The universal line is broken, colours alternate, the past spirals into the present, the future is shining brightly. *Source:* © Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach and Urs Lendi, 2022.

an emphasis on the diversity of responses and outcomes across different societies and regions and on the ways in which this diversity results from specific historical experiences, cultural premises, and institutional structures and dynamics. Indeed, Figure 7 shows a creation in which broken lines and alternating colors have been arranged in a spiral that symbolizes the past, the present, and the future.

The 40th anniversary celebration of the World Society Foundation held in Zurich, Switzerland, at the Theater Stadelhofen, August 27, 2022



Figure 8: Opening of the celebration event by Christian Suter, President of the WSF



Source: Photos © Thomas S. Eberle (Figures 8, 10), Christian Suter (Figure 9).

Figures 9, 10: Panel discussion *Weltgesellschaft, World Society, société-monde—Konzept und Realität*; WSF Award winner Zhan Zhang



On the stage (from left to right): Boris Holzer (U Konstanz, Germany), Matthias Albert (U Bielefeld, Germany), Veronika Wittmann (U Linz, Austria), moderator Marc Herkenrath (World Society Foundation board member)



Figure 11: Observa



Observer stands for the world observatory, in front of a Swiss landscape. Eyes on the facets of events between West and East, North and South of world society. *Source:* © Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach and Urs Lendi, 2022.

Shmuel Eisenstadt's and Salvatore Babones's described the prismatic transformations of world society in their respective projects. Eisenstadt's work on the *Dynamics of Civilizations and Institutional Variability in Modern Societies* (supported in 1988) demonstrated the prismatic character of modernization. Indeed, this scholar considered modernity as a specific type of civilization that originated in Europe and spread throughout the world (Eisenstadt 1992). For him, modernity did not, however, result in one single civilization or institutional response (as suggested by the universalistic worldview); instead, the result is a great variety of modern and modernizing societies, which generate their own dynamics, institutional formations, and restructurings. Eisenstadt, therefore, describes these processes as "multiple modernities." Babones (2018) focused on China's ambition to become a global leader in a context of growing geopolitical rivalry characterized by nationalism, economic protectionism, border disputes, and wars. The rise of non Western great powers has challenged the current global order, which is still based on the traditional Westphalian state system that has been in existence since 1648 and has had to adapt to the increasing variety in global cultures. Babones hypothesized a transformation of the current (declining) US hegemony into a post-Westphalian system resembling the imperial Chinese system of *tianxia* ("all-under-the-heaven"),

implying a combination of Asian and Western principles in a future global governance structure.

## Conclusion: World Society as a Code Guiding the Foundation

Within the context of increasing globalization—in particular in the fields of economic relations, communication, and global risks—research in the social sciences and public debates on global issues have considerably intensified over the past decades. Various concepts describing a so-called world society and different perspectives have developed since the 1960s and contributed to improving our understanding of global transformations. Heintz insisted on the importance of world society as the most comprehensive unit of analysis and a fundamental concept in social science. However, his approach, unlike Luhmann’s systems theory and Wallerstein’s world-systems approach, is not a closed and coherent theory, but rather a general (sociological) code that can be used to better describe and understand events, structures, and processes occurring at the global level of world society. Heintz also indicated that every individual member of world society adopts a code or an image of this society to get oriented. The socialization process emphasizes immediate neighborhoods and loyalties to the family, the local community, and the nation. However, most individuals have, according to Heintz (1982a, 12), a “rather vague, unstructured, poor and inconsistent image of world society” and mostly behave with regard to the wider world “as members of national or subnational societies.”

The World Society Foundation has carried on Heintz’s heritage by funding research activities since 1982 with the aim to better understand global structures and transformations. Using the world society perspective Heintz advanced in his book *Events in the Mirror of World Society* (1982b), a review of the Foundation’s research funding endeavors reveals changing and contrasting codes and images of world society that emphasize universalistic, entropic, and prismatic transformations. Four basic principles have guided the practice and research funding of the World Society Foundation:

First, its global and transnational mission regarding research funding has led the Foundation to support research all over the world, most of the funding allocated having gone to researchers outside Switzerland and outside Europe.

Second, the Foundation has been guided by a multi- and cross-disciplinary perspective in its support of all disciplines, in particular in the social sciences and humanities, which address world society issues.

Third, the Foundation has relied on broad theoretical and methodological orientation to support research regardless of the theoretical approach and methodology employed.

Fourth, in the past few years, the Foundation has particularly focused on encouraging and supporting researchers from the “Global South,” in order to hear the

voices of those who generally have had limited access to research funding and publication opportunities in academic journals.

These guiding principles are also reflected in the activities related to the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the World Society Foundation. Thus, deglobalization is analyzed in this work from different angles, diverse cultural backgrounds, theoretical and methodological orientations, including non-European and Global South perspectives.

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## Dynamics of Global Change and the Concept(s) of World Society

Mathias Albert

This chapter argues that different concepts and theories of world society can usefully complement each other when it comes to analyzing large-scale processes of change. It first introduces different concepts of world society, with a particular focus on those contributed by Peter Heintz, Niklas Luhmann, and John W. Meyer. It then elaborates on the complementarity of these approaches in relation to two *big* issues: firstly, the issue of how to think about globality and associated social processes of globalization; secondly, the question of how to conceptualize changing world political orders. The purpose of outlining those complementarities not only consists in identifying analytical vistas in which different theoretical forces could usefully be brought together. It also allows identifying gaps shared between the different theoretical approaches.

### Introduction: *World Society* between Niche and Central Concept

While certainly not a complete unknown, there is no mistaking the fact that both across the social sciences and humanities, let alone in public discourse, *world society* remains somewhat of a niche concept. While having stimulated quite a range of different approaches and research efforts particularly in Sociology and International Relations, it arguably has not gained the status of a central concept (*Grundbegriff*) that would be unavoidable in those discipline's undergraduate textbooks and curricula. The most probable reason for this situation is that most—although by no means all—concepts of world society use *society* in a way that is not compatible with the still most common, “classical” understanding of the term as referring to a social entity that exists through its integration by norms and some form of an associated collective identity, that is a *Gemeinschaft*, and in that sense then usually refers to a

society that is firmly bound to the political-legal construct of the modern territorial nation-state.<sup>1</sup>

Why then, given its seemingly persistent resistance to making it to a central and highly prominent concept, have some scholars been so insisting in using it as a central concept in their research, sometimes identifying the latter as *world society research*, sometimes even associated with some kind of *world society theory*?<sup>2</sup> The answer to this question that forms the starting point of this chapter is quite simple: because the concept of world society permits analyzing the social world on a global scale in a fruitful way without being bound to the analytical limitations that necessarily go along with the so-called *methodological nationalism*—that is basically a world view that not only sees nation-states as the basic units or “building blocks” of world orders, but also analyzes these in terms of basic concepts strongly tied to these units (most notably the idea of society as a nation-state society).

It is at this point, however, where the simplicity already appears to be ending. There exists an obvious diversity even between concepts of world society that can quite possibly claim to operate beyond the confines of the methodological nationalism mentioned. However, this diversity, even if to some degree it might reflect incompatibilities between basic concepts and theoretical designs, must not necessarily be read as a stumbling block when it comes to building research vistas in a situation where, for better or worse, a significant methodological nationalism still reigns primary particularly in the fields of International Relations and Sociology. Rather, the basic argument of the present contribution is that, to varying degrees, different concepts and theories of world society can actually usefully complement each other when it comes to analyzing large-scale processes of change. This is not to argue away conceptual and theoretical differences, but to emphasize possible complementarities when it comes to research strategies.

This argument will be developed with a brief introduction to the concepts of world society referred to. This brief introduction will also provide a rationale for the inclusion of some concepts—namely, the concepts of world society in their (in alphabetical order of the last names of the leading authors associated with the concepts) *Heintz*,<sup>3</sup> *Luhmann*, *Meyer*-versions, the “half-inclusion” of the *English School*

1 This means that in the ideal-typical distinction between *integration* and *differentiation* models of society (cf. Schimank and Volkmann, 1999) most of the world society concepts discussed here are on, or trend towards, the differentiation side.

2 A note on language seems in order here: while the notion of *Weltgesellschaftstheorie* (world society theory) can quite frequently be found in the literature in German, this is almost never the case for the literature in English (save for native German-speaking authors writing in English). This is probably due to the fact that in general the very concept of *Gesellschaftstheorie*, i.e. theory of society, is far less established in English, mostly filing under the rubric of social theory there.

3 Whenever in this contribution there is a reference to *Heintz* as last name only, it is to Peter Heintz. This is worth mentioning as also Bettina Heintz (related) is quoted, who also has worked

of *International Relations* and *World Society Research Group* versions, and the only marginal inclusion of approaches such as world systems theory.

Following this introduction, the main part of this chapter will then elaborate on the complementarity of these approaches in relation to two, admittedly rather big, issues: firstly, the issue of how to think about globality and associated social processes of globalization; secondly, the question of how they allow conceptualizing and studying changing world political orders. The purpose of outlining those complementarities not only consists in identifying analytical vistas in which different theoretical forces could usefully be brought together. It also allows identifying gaps shared between the different theoretical approaches. This will lead to a final section that will briefly discuss the issue of the future of world society research, understanding this to denote a field much wider than, but inseparable from, world society *theory*.

## The Variety of World Society Concepts

There exists no common understanding of the concept of world society among the approaches that most commonly employ the term. Nor does there, as far as I can see it, exist either an extensive bibliography that documents the many uses of it, nor a systematic conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*) in any language.<sup>4</sup> What seems safe to say, however, is that many—if not most—uses of the term actually do not refer to any explicit theoretical tradition that would bestow a specific meaning to the notion of world society, but use it in a rather loose fashion. In this context, it is sometimes understood as generally denoting the fact of global interconnectedness; sometimes in the sense of an *integrated* national society on a global scale (diagnosed as either existing or not); and in both senses is often used more or less interchangeably with *global society*.

These rather superficial or little specified uses are of little interest here. At most they might be useful when it comes to asking whether, and to which degree, some of the theoretically denser conceptualizations of world society carry affinities to the

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(and continues to work) on world society.

4 What does exist are *stocktakings* of a number of world society concepts. Wobbe (2000) is an introductory comparison of the world society concepts of Peter Heintz, Niklas Luhmann and John Meyer. See also Wittmann (2014). A range of contributions in Albert and Hilkermeier (2004) particularly inspect the concept of world society in various theoretical traditions in their particular relation to the Luhmannian concept of world society. A 2005 Special Issue of the *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* (B. Heintz et al., 2005) reflects upon advances in a range of theoretical traditions, but particularly can be seen as a stocktaking exercise on different branches of world society research that build on different versions of world society theory. The present contribution in a sense continues these stocktaking exercises, but goes beyond them in light of more recent research, and particularly seeks to push forward to its limits the identification of possible analytical overlaps that can be generated from what at their bases are quite different theories.

“classical model” of understanding society as a normatively integrated one (see also Jung, 1998). When briefly delving into some world society approaches in the following—for the purpose of arguing later that in relation to some substantive issues they actually could speak to each other—the prime selection criterion was their use of world society as a *comprehensive concept*. “Comprehensive” here means that while world society does not necessarily need to be taken to be the same as the social world in its entirety (such as in Luhmann’s theory), there is in a sense at least no “escaping” from it within this social world—everything social at least is related to world society, although it does not necessarily have to be the same as world society. What such an understanding excludes are concepts in which world society is seen to signify only a distinct segment or stratum of a social whole designated otherwise (or not designated at all).<sup>5</sup> Most notably this leaves out world system theory, where world society at most refers to a cultural realm definitely subdued under the primacy of economic relations in the *whole* of the capitalist world system. It also excludes some, but not all, uses of the term in the so-called *English School of International Relations*, namely those in which world society is taken to constitute realm clearly distinct from an international society (of states).

Specifying these rather abstract points: what the concepts of world society that are of interest here share are, at a minimum, two things: Firstly, the view that social orders are not only, and probably not even primarily, situated in the context of territorially demarcated, national societies, which then in turn would form the main “building blocs” of social orders that (both historically and/or logically) emerge somehow “above” them, most notably through their interaction in *international relations*. Secondly, the idea that however ex- or inclusive a social order called a *world society*—that cannot be reduced to being an emergent phenomenon that rises out of the assembly of nation-states (-societies)—might be, it is a distinctly global order, irrespective of the particular historical emergence of that globality.

Beyond these shared minimum aspects, the various conceptualizations of world society differ significantly. These differences, however, must be seen in the light in which these conceptualizations appear in the context of very different theories that aim to do very different things. These theories do not compete in trying to offer the best possible explanations of a world society, whose shape and character would somehow be given empirically, only *in search* for its best possible theory. Rather, the empirical character of world society is, for most parts, a function of some central theoretical aims and assumptions.

What is important in this respect, however, is that this relation certainly also works the other way around, meaning that theories necessarily are always also a reflection of the times in which they were devised. While it is of course not possible to provide a full reconstruction of the theories in this respect, and while they were

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5 This argument is developed in more detail in Albert and Buzan (2013).

mostly not laid down in single, defining books, but developed over a longer term in the *œuvres* of a number of thinkers, these thinkers shared a range of horizons. I would argue that most important in relation to the theories of world society is the double experience of (1) a world largely bifurcated and divided along the lines of the East-West conflict, together with the realization of the possibility of global nuclear extinction; and (2) the global spread and domination of the model of the sovereign territorial-cum-nation state in the course of decolonization, together with an increasing awareness of planetary connections in the dawning space age. In an abstract sense, one could say that while the former provided encouragement to continue thinking about the world as a whole in the tradition of earlier world state or global federalist approaches, the latter provided a healthy dose of skepticism towards the integrative designs of these approaches in light of the realization that global emancipation (from empires) could also take the form of national division and parochialism. Put differently: what these theories arguably share is both a commitment to see the (social) world in terms of its necessary interconnectedness, but also a deep awareness of the traps entailed in seeing that interconnectedness as a *bottom-up* one, that means accepting the idea of the nation-state as the basic "building bloc" of world order/society (this would be the basic operation of methodological nationalism).

Turning to the individual theories, it seems worthwhile to start each individual characterization with a kind of bird's eye view over the individual theoretical context. The spectrum here ranges from, on the one hand, a full-blown theory of society conceived as a theory of world society, to, on the other hand, theories of international relations in which world society enters as a logic of action or a logic of ordering. We find Luhmann, Heintz and Meyer as the theories obviously tilting more towards the former end of the spectrum, yet with remarkable differences.<sup>6</sup>

With Luhmann we find, in a sense, the most extreme and advanced theory of world society.<sup>7</sup> However, in an important respect pertaining to empirical references, it could also be seen as the least developed one. It is extreme in the sense that it proposes a complete theory of society that not only argues that society *is* nothing else but world society, but also that it *cannot be* anything else but world society. This view seems quite unavoidable if one follows the basic theoretical move to conceive of social systems as constituted by communication only, and to relegate psychic systems (i.e. individual consciousness) as another type of meaning-processing system

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6 The following overview puts various theories next to each other and compares them with a view particularly on the later elaboration of their views on globalization and world politics. For an earlier concise comparison particularly of Heintz, Luhmann and Meyer, see again Wobbe (2000).

7 As Luhmann's theory of society is taken to be co-extensive with world society theory, there is no *central* text on the latter. The most pronounced introduction and summary are to be found in Luhmann (1971) and within Luhmann (1997).

to the environment of social systems.<sup>8</sup> If now, so the argument goes, all communication can, at least in principle, relate to all other communication, then society cannot be anything else but world society. More precisely: a plurality of world societies—in which different societies, with no or scant knowledge of each other's existence for themselves define a distinct world horizon—turns into a single world society at the moment in which a formerly separate world society cannot sustain the claim to be the only world society. One could enter into lengthy arguments about exact historical dates and processes (or into discussions about exceptions pertaining to a few remaining pocket tribal societies without any contact to other societies). But in the basic sense of the theory—that is, with society being constituted by and as communication only—there can be no doubt that today there is only one world society, and that this has been in existence for roughly half a millennium at least, even if undisputedly the connectivity required was to a large degree produced by discovery and (colonizing) exploitation.

The probably most important point about Luhmann's theory of society as a theory of world society is to note that society is not seen as something that is at its core integrated through, for example, a *Gemeinschaft*, a specific set of norms, a cultural or national identity, etc. Rather, and seemingly paradoxical at first glance, it only appears as a unity once it becomes observable as such on the basis of its internal differentiation. Put simply: the image of a unity of society can only arise *negatively* with the transition from stratification to functional differentiation as the prime form of social differentiation typical for Western modernity: namely as something (that is, a unity) that is not there in face of functional differentiation and for most theories of society in classical sociology up until Parsons and Habermas therefore constantly needs to be (re-)produced and stabilized by some "societal community" (Parsons) or "lifeworld" (Habermas).

World society in this sense *is* a differentiated society, and nothing else. There is no element of structural or social integration underpinning a unity, while nonetheless the *unity as internal differentiation*-figure does require and produce a range of semantics of unity, such as references to a common heritage of humankind, or in aspirational world state discourses. However, acknowledging the existence of such semantics is something very different from postulating the unity of society as a theoretical presupposition. Equally different is the issue of relating this theoretical construct of world society to its empirical contours. As a figure of social evolution, Luhmann's staged theory of social differentiation is quite straightforward: while segmentation and stratification continue to exist as important forms of social differenti-

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8 It is this move that underpins Luhmann's famous dictum, quite often causing some confusion and even irritation in relation to his theory, that human beings are no parts of society. In a nutshell, this means nothing else but that people are included in social systems only as addresses of communication, and that whatever meaning is processed within a psychic system only becomes meaningful in a social system if observed by the latter.

ation, they do so only under the condition of a primacy of functional differentiation. Thus, for example, while internally the political and legal systems of world society might primarily be differentiated in a segmented fashion, this does not invalidate that primarily they are differentiated functionally against, for example, the economic or religious systems. Arguably, the only uncertainty in this context pertains to the question of whether center-periphery constitutes a form of social differentiation on equal footing with segmentation, stratification, and functional differentiation, or whether it should rather be seen as a specific geographic expression of stratification. What seems certain, however, is that, scant references notwithstanding (see, for example, Luhmann, 1995), Luhmann developed his theory of world society and the account of its internal differentiation largely with what could be called “Western modernity” in mind. What is missing in Luhmann is a sensitivity for what probably is quite a range of variances when it comes to the relative importance of different forms of social differentiation. This diagnosis is not new and in fact has led to quite a number of works in different fields that do, on the one hand, seek to bolster the empirical side of world society studies in the Luhmannian theoretical tradition (see, for example, some of the contributions in B. Heintz et al., 2005), or that, relatedly, address the relation between different forms of social differentiation as a question to be explored empirically (see Albert et al., 2013; Hayoz and Stichweh, 2018).

With Peter Heintz, the situation is in many respects similar to Luhmann, however also with some profound differences. One of the main similarities is that both Heintz and Luhmann are interested in a more general theory of society as a theory of social systems, and that both attribute a central, if not constitutive, role to communication (which in Heintz is specified as “interaction;” cf. Greve and Heintz, 2005, 106).<sup>9</sup> The main difference in this regard might at first seem quite marginal, but it is important: For both, world society is the highest-order social system possible that *includes* all other social systems (interaction systems, organizations and function systems for Luhmann; levels and substantively specified systems for Heintz). This means that there are no social systems outside of, or next to world society. All different types of social systems happen within world society. There is a contrast in the nuances: while for Heintz, equally to Luhmann, world society is the highest order social system possible and in existence, for him this does not completely displace the concept of society as a concept useful for describing social formations on a different order (where Luhmann would see the reference to a society on a national level as the semantics of the self-description of primarily the political and legal systems). To quite some degree this difference can be explained by the difference in

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<sup>9</sup> For the most general overview over Heintz’ view of society, see his introduction to sociological theory (Heintz, 1968), in which, however, world society does not play a role; his most systematic elaboration on the latter is his *Die Weltgesellschaft im Spiegel von Ereignissen* (Heintz, 1982). It should be noted that in a rare direct engagement, Luhmann wrote a book review on the latter (friendly, but also very critical of it as a theory of society; Luhmann, 1983).



historical focus: while for Luhmann world society comes into existence when every communication enters the horizon of any other communication as possibility, that is somewhere probably in the sixteenth century, for Heintz the facticity of world society has to do with the structural consolidation of connectivity. Put differently: it is not the possibility of communication connecting to every other communication, but the facticity of a tremendous increase in connectivity particularly in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and in the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries that underpins the emergence of world society.

This observation also directly points towards the empirical observation of world society, and a resulting assessment of the forms of social differentiation, that is quite different in Heintz when compared to Luhmann. While Luhmann's observations of world society are, arguably, empirically mostly based on his perception of what could loosely be called the *Western world*, but with a historically potentially wider and more strict understanding of world society, Heintz bases a somewhat less inclusive understanding of world society on the empirical observation of global structural connectivity and (inter-)dependence. While in practice this is a historically more narrow view when focused particularly on the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the dynamics of decolonization, its historical underpinnings are of course much deeper to the degree that it partially links to world systems theory views and the history of capitalist accumulation.<sup>10</sup> What is noteworthy, however, is that all this leads Heintz to a different view of the social differentiation of world society compared to Luhmann: for Heintz, world society is *primarily stratified*. While the global system of strata allows for functional differentiation—most prominently between an (economic) international system of development stratification and an intergovernmental (political) system, the latter is secondary to the former. Stratification trumps functional differentiation. Not only does the international system of development stratification (*internationales Entwicklungsschichtungssystem*) represent the “most integrated image of world society” (Heintz, 1982, 32), but also are all other systems on the highest level compared according to their relation to this international system of development stratification (*ibid.*)

In terms of its view of social differentiation, world society theory in the tradition of sociological neo-institutionalism, that is the so-called *Stanford School* mainly centered around John W. Meyer, acknowledges a primacy of functional differentiation, but social differentiation in general plays a secondary role as it is seen to be mediated and constituted by a world cultural context that particularly pushes

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10 I cannot explore here in any detail, but only mention the observation that much of Peter Heintz' work seems to have been, and continues to be, received in the world system studies broadly understood, without the latter however engaging significantly with the sociological consequences of the concept of *world society* for the understanding of a *world system*. In addition, in contrast to Heintz' diagnosis of a primacy of stratification in world society, world systems theory would usually explicitly diagnose a primacy of center-periphery differentiation, combined with (often more implicitly) a functional differentiation under whose condition the economic system trumps other function systems.

for a society-wide (instrumental) rationalization across functionally differentiated spheres (see Thomas, 2013).<sup>11</sup> This variant of world society theory is at its core a theory of a society made up of institutions and organizations.<sup>12</sup> The history of world society here is the history of the global diffusion of organizational models through world cultural scripts that coalesce around the Western concept of instrumental rationality. In this sense, world society finds its expression in things as different as the regulation of specific technical standards and the concept and organizational form of the nation-state (see Meyer et al., 1997). World society is expressed in a world culture that is pervasive, yet also distinctly limited to the global spread of forms of (bureaucratic) rationality and organizational forms and scripts, which are then mediated by regional and local cultural specifications. While, thus, at its core, this variant of world society theory could be seen to constitute a specific theory of modernization, with a particular focus on organizations and institutional isomorphisms, and while its historical-empirical core clearly pertains to the spread of Western forms of rationality and associated organizational models, it retains an empirical openness when it comes to regional and local specifications of world cultural scripts. World society remains inescapable, but can mean very different things in different places. Thus, for example, the *script* mandates that every nation-state has to organize a health system, a schooling system, etc.; it has to put ministries responsible for this organizing into a building; and even the most extreme governments do not think of not organizing it. *How* this organizing is done, however, will differ vastly, and save the fact that it is about organized schooling with some associated basic institutions (e.g. the teacher-pupil role distinction), the organization of the school system in, say, Afghanistan, will have little similarities to its organization in, for example, Switzerland.

Putting other similarities and differences aside, what unites the world society theories of Heintz, Luhmann and Meyer is that they are at their core *theories of society*. They could not be more different in terms of theory design, elaboration, and indeed in terms of many of the core concepts used. However, they share a view on the *inevitability* of world society. It may be possible to have highly specific *pockets* with rather specific institutional de-couplings, peculiarities on the regional level, or even *anomalies* in terms of social differentiation: however, there is no society that would exist outside of world society.

This latter point needs to be emphasized particularly given the fact that in the discipline of International Relations (IR) a usage of the term *world society* has become quite prominent, so that it merits to be seen in conjunction with the three

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11 Such a world cultural context also plays a role as an important mediating factor in Heintz' account of world society, but does not in Luhmann's.

12 In this sense, it is much closer to Heintz, whose over-reliance on organization Luhmann (1983) criticizes.

approaches mentioned thus far. However, in IR these uses tend to remain more *applications* of theories of society rather than attempts towards providing theories of society themselves. It is possible to identify two main strands of usage in this respect (with many variations contained in each of these strands). On the one hand, uses of the concept of world society that refer to a more classical concept of society, as a form that is socially integrated through process of *Vergesellschaftung* and *Vergemeinschaftung*. World society, in this context, is either imagined as the possibility of a form of social integration akin to a nation-state society on a global level, in its most idealistic version leading to an integrated world state (cf. Albert and Stichweh, 2007). Alternatively, world society is conceptualized as a level of society- and community formation that underpins the emergence of social integrated structures that are however not seen to be in an exclusive relation to nationally framed forms of social integration (cf. Albert et al., 2000). The other main strand of world society usage in IR occurs in the context of the so-called *English School of International Relations*. Here, the traditional version identifies world society as a distinct domain that (in more normative/“solidarist” accounts) correlates with a specific logic of action. World society appears as the inter-human realm next to an anarchical international system of states and a norms- and rules-integrated international society of states, or as a *Kantian*, cosmopolitan logic of action next to a *Grotian*, rights-based and a *Hobbesian* anarchical logic of action (for the classical statement, see Bull, 1977). In more recent contributions in this tradition, there is a strong tendency, particularly in the writings of Barry Buzan (2004, 2023), to take world society as a more encompassing concept spanning the entirety of global social formations, including international system and society. This more expansive use of the concept of world society arguably brings this line of thought rather close to encompassing accounts of global history (although the latter tend to avoid the concept of world society; cf. Albert, 2021).

Viewing these world society approaches together, there is no mistaking the fact that in terms of many aspects of their theoretical designs and basic concepts—most notably the concept of world society itself—, as well as the theoretical traditions they draw upon, there exist many differences and even outright incompatibilities. However, the purpose of such an overview is not to attempt—or even to insinuate the possibility of—an *integration* of quite different social or IR theories. The purpose is to view the field in order to distill some analytical mileage that could be gained by bringing them together with the analytical goal of understanding some central features and evolutionary threads of world society as an expression of a *theorizable*, meaningful assemblage of global social structures and formations that is more than the simple addition of particularistic social structures and formations—even though there is no theoretical agreement on the core term of world society. In the following sections, such an exercise will be attempted by inspecting the approaches mentioned in relation to their understanding of globalization and the evolution of

world politics—again: not with an interest of *integrating* them, but in the interest of reading them together and distill analytically complementary perspectives.

## The Globality and Globalization of World Society

All of the world society approaches mentioned share one underlying assumption, which they specify or explicate to varying degrees: namely, that at least contemporary world society is a global phenomenon. When seen in terms of geographical scope, this globality is usually identified as (or implicitly assumed to extend to) all social relations and structures on the entire planet Earth.<sup>13</sup> What all world society approaches share, put simply, is that once a world society—specified according to the individual approaches' criteria—exists, it is a global one in terms of this planetary extension. Beyond that, however, differences pertain to the exact characteristic of globality and associated processes of (historical and ongoing) globalization, which in turn directly relate to underlying differences regarding basic theoretical concepts and, as mentioned above, differences in viewing the social differentiation of world society.

In the Luhmannian version, world society starts to exist once every corner of the planet could, in principle, be connected to every other. This situation historically can be seen to have existed since the conclusion of most (Western) journeys of exploration and discovery (and be located somewhere in the 16<sup>th</sup> century).<sup>14</sup> It is important to note in this respect that given Luhmann's conceptualization of world society in terms of the entirety of communication, this historical *full discovery* situation does not mean that world society starts to exist in a strict sense. Rather, it represents the point at which a single world society starts to emerge out of a plurality of different world societies that existed on the planet independently of each other. Because of this (phenomenological) understanding of *world* as the horizon of meaning and communication, Luhmann's approach here is the only one which, at least historically, sees no necessary connection between *world* (in a phenomenological sense) and the *global* (in terms of planetary extension): all earlier world societies were non-global world societies.<sup>15</sup> The single (global) world society is then however a structur-

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13 All of the world society approaches mentioned are specifically approaches that focus on social systems. In this capacity, they do not negate the importance of natural world, but conceptualize them as environments to social systems. This marks an important distance to approaches that seek to integrate a natural Earth system with social systems in a comprehensive perspective in order to understand ongoing changes in combined terms of Earth history (i.e. debates on the Anthropocene).

14 See Holzer (2021) for a detailed account.

15 One could say that strictly speaking this would actually mean that world society did not (or still does not?) exist until every human population on the planet knows of and acknowledges the existence of others.

ally rather *weak* society. It provides the precondition for being seen, in its entirety, in terms of an *internal* social differentiation. No external social differentiation is possible (i.e. no *new* world societies are created and somehow completely put outside the world horizon of society as a result of the differentiation of world society). However, global connectivity is weak. In a sense, the historical emergence of a single world society as a global society marks the very starting point for any processes of globalization which then proceed in two different ways: Firstly, in terms of the densification (and subsequent more intensive use) of infrastructures of communication (e.g. telegraph, railways, steam ships, airplanes, internet etc.). Secondly, in terms of a varied and—both internally as well as compared to each other—highly unequal globalization of individual function systems. While all function systems, such as the political system, the economic system, the legal system etc., are global in a single world society, their actualization of global connectivity differs vastly, and it does so in strong relation to the way in which they are internally differentiated. Thus, the economic system is characterized by historically early and intensive forms of globalization (global trade routes, financial markets), while particularly the political and legal systems retain a *low* level of globalization because they increasingly tend towards strong segmentation, particularly in the nineteenth century (emergence of the principle of sovereign equality; the ascent of the nation-state; de-colonization in the twentieth century). However, in order to emphasize this point again: this does not mean that the political and legal systems of world society would not be global. Rather, it means that in order to reconcile their globality with their internal segmentation, they develop specialized, functionally differentiated subsystems in the forms of international law and world/international politics (cf. Albert, 2016).

Put in a nutshell, one could say that whereas with Luhmann the single world society, once existing, can only differentiate internally into different systems which then globalize individually, with Heintz it is still emerging—in a sense putting itself together—through the globalization of different, yet interwoven systems. Thus, an international system, understood as an inter-societal system, overlapping with an intergovernmental system, and an inter-organizational system (composed of non-governmental organizations) each follow individual globalizing trajectories and, taken together, form world society, which then in turn is expressed as an international system of development stratification that includes these systems (Heintz, 1982, 27ff). When for Heintz world society is expressed and functions through the different systems codes of the individual systems mentioned, there exists—despite underlying basic theoretical differences in the definitions of “systems” and “codes”—a roughly similar understanding to Luhmann when it comes to observing non-synchronous globalization dynamics between different (function) systems. Both approaches share a view of globalization being endemic to world society, but proceeding unequally between its internally differentiated or co-constitutive parts. In both, globalization is not a kind of *mega-trend* that would take place in world society being spread equally, let alone proceeding in a linear fashion. Where they

differ to a significant extent, however, is how this unequal globalization plays itself out in world society empirically. Luhmann here remains restricted by his theoretical design and the observation of distinct function systems of society. Heintz starts with the empirical observation of systems which he then puts together. I would strongly argue that with a strict analytical (not: theoretical) interest, both approaches can be put together in a symbiotic fashion. What Luhmann brings to the table is the suggestion that there are globalizing systems that operate independently and individually, on the basis of “codes” that do not feature prominently in Heintz’ account (e.g. systems of science, religion, education, etc.). Heintz, on the other hand, adds empirical observations which both question and at the same time supplement Luhmann’s account. On the one hand, he identifies an inter-governmental system for which Luhmann has no place, save reading it as a semantic for the segmentation of the political system (he at one point admits having no place for an *international system* in his vocabulary; see Albert, 2016, on the proposal to read the system of world politics as a functionally differentiated subsystem of the political system; cf. also below). On the other hand, Heintz’ identification of the international system of development stratification can be read as claiming that for world society as a whole stratification plays a role more important than for an account of world society which sees it as primarily functionally differentiated. Such a perspective re-phrases the question of differentiation as an empirical one: the relation between different forms of social differentiation is ever-changing, and it becomes a question of historically constant shifting relative importance (rather than an issue of regional variations of functional differentiation).

In contrast to the image of a world society with different forms and speeds of globalization in its different realms/systems, sociological neo-institutionalism seems to be narrower in its account. At its core, globalization here is the global proliferation of Western forms of rationality, with accompanying organizational forms, spread through institutional isomorphism. There is a high degree of variation built into this kind of globalization nonetheless. On the one hand, there are different speeds and intensities in which historically this kind of globalization has spread in world society. On the other hand, there remain radical disjunctures in the expression of globalization. Because of the central mechanism of de-coupling organizational and institutional forms might spread globally, but their actual implementation on the ground will vary extremely. Put simply: the fact that the form of the sovereign territorial nation-state becomes the globally universal legitimate form of organizing political authority says very little about how political authority is organized in individual states: while formal institutional similarities will exist amass (there is, for example, barely any state without a parliament, even if it is a totalitarian system), substantive discrepancies in forms of government and the policies and politics pursued in the shadow of these institutional similarities are more the rule than the exception.

Where these approaches, despite their differences, converge, is that at their core all their—more or less explicit—accounts of globalization are accounts of the global

spread of some form of “Western modernity” as the characteristic frame of world society. Although infrastructural and connective density does play a role in this context, this global spread cannot be reduced to this kind of intensification (as it has been, most notably, in much of the “globalization” hype of the 1990s). Rather, it goes along with the *primacy* pressure (if possibly not necessarily the global factual primacy) of functional differentiation and stratification, combined with and based on specific frames and model of organizational/bureaucratic rationality and ideas of rational actorhood. It is in this respect that they complement each other, actually opening up a range of possibly fruitful vistas if put together in the interest of formulating an empirical research agenda (see more below).

The seemingly odd person out in this respect are the IR world society approaches. While, *in nucleo*, they contain “Western modernity”-expansion stories (first in very crude, later in far more nuanced forms; see Bull and Watson, 1984, on the former; Buzan and Lawson, 2015, and Dunne and Reus-Smit, 2017, on the latter), they are more restricted in the sense that they more or less narrowly look at this expansion through the prism of the development of world politics as a distinct form of social relation. In doing so, however—but in a sense also quite naturally because of their disciplinary background—, they add something that seems to occupy an odd (if not a missing) place in the sociological concepts of world society: namely a conceptualization of world politics as a distinct system or sphere of world society.

## The World Politics of World Society

I am raising the issue of world politics’ place in the various theories of world society here not only because of my personal background in the field of IR and a long-standing interest in the subject. Rather, the point here is that under the impression of deep and ongoing world political change, there remains a strong need to conceptualize it in both sociologically and historically rich terms, and that theories of world society are able to provide exactly these terms.

IR conceptualizations of change in world politics that do refer to concepts of world society retain a quite notorious problem: whether conceptualizing world society more in terms of normative integration, or whether ultimately conceptualizing it more in terms of an overarching global network and background of connectivity: what they notoriously lack is an understanding of how and *international system, international relations, international politics* and *world politics* sit within, and on that basis relate to, a wider social environment. There are, to be sure, many accounts of the emergence of a distinctly *modern* form of international relations (usually taken to mean post-1648)—as much, however, as there are transpositions of the concept of an “international system” to millennia B.C.E. (see, for example Buzan and Little, 2000). There are equally many rich explorations that explore the distinct links between the functionally differentiated system of politics and other function systems in an international realm, such as in the field of “International Political Economy.”

And there are indeed even—if somewhat implicit—claims that in a sense IR might actually be responsible for everything social happening on a big scale, thus in a sense forming a kind of *primus inter pares* discipline for studying not only world politics but world society as a whole.<sup>16</sup> However, what is strangely missing in most of these accounts is a conceptualization of boundary of the international, a problem probably more aggravated than solved by trying to provide essentializing definitions of the international.<sup>17</sup>

Despite rich and sometimes historically deep accounts of the evolution of world politics, this lack of reflection about the (constitutive) boundaries of world/international/global politics—whether conceptualized in terms of a system or not—seems to be one of the main factors that underlies a common operation of simplification in observations of world politics, namely the tendency to depict world politics as characterized by *one* (or at least by one globally dominant) form of order with an accompanying ordering principle. While in IR this simplification can be found both in more abstract theoretical contributions, such as on the anarchic structure of an international system only varying in the polar distribution of power (structural realism), as well as in more empirically oriented historical descriptions of international order, it arguably misses the *historical normal* of a plurality and variety of (non-synchronized) forms of order and according ordering principles in world politics. While, as implicated in the name, two World Wars as well as the superpower-centered East-West conflict might have underpinned the extreme orientation of various forms of order towards the attractor of a single dominating global conflict system, it should not have (but in many cases seemingly actually has) taken Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a reminder that, most notably, imperial forms of ordering and inter-imperial competition remain a prevalent form of order in world politics even long after the end of formal empires in an international system *imagined* as a form of order dominated by sovereign territorial nation-states. Put somewhat polemically, this simplicity (that remains constitutive and characteristic of much of IR as a discipline) even is maintained in diagnoses of the emergence of *two* forms of co-existing international orders after the demise of an allegedly globally dominant single liberal order (cf., for example, Owen, 2021).

It is at this point where the world society perspective can add a useful dose of a nuanced perspective that allows studying world politics and change in world politics in a broader societal context. In addition, as I would maintain, this perspective can be analytically extremely useful particularly when heuristically combining the

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16 See Albert and Buzan (2017) for an extensive discussion of this.

17 It should be noted that there is an interesting debate going on that seeks to remedy this situation by focusing on the plurality and unevenness of developments as an alternative to simplifying or essentializing accounts. However, rather than reflect about the concept of (world) society and associated questions of (internal) boundaries, in this debate “multiplicity” is declared to be the fundament of an IR-specific view of the social world (cf. Rosenberg and Tallis, 2022).



different world society approaches mentioned. In that respect, many of the IR world society approaches do provide good starting points when they point out a range of evolutionary trends, ranging from the analysis of the plurality of actors, over the study of emerging and shifting forms of governance, to various forms of conflict in world politics. Simplifying to a certain extent, it is the more sociologically oriented world society approaches that provide an analytical frame here that allows to see these trends in social-historical contexts beyond IR's particular methodological internationalism. This might sound surprising to the extent that these approaches themselves mostly do not deal with what would usually be subsumed under *world politics*, rather in a sense making the latter appear as desiderata in their own approaches. It is only Heintz who reserves an explicit role for a distinct intergovernmental system (that comes pretty close to the concepts of an international system or society of states in IR). Luhmann (see also Stichweh, 2000) sees states as expressions of the segmentation of the political system of world society,<sup>18</sup> Meyer et al. as a world polity expressing a world culture: both account for the globality of the phenomenon, but themselves do not seem to have reserved a place for a specific form of interaction/communication of international or world politics.

What, taken together, these approaches have to contribute to the understanding of world politics is a range of perspectives that allow to analytically structure the plurality of forms of order and ordering in world politics without unduly reducing them to an historically implausible small coexisting number of such forms. I have argued at length elsewhere (see Albert, 2016) that even from a Luhmannian world society theory vantage point world politics can (and indeed should) be seen as a distinct functionally differentiated subsystem of the political system of world society (rather than something that is somehow made up from state segments as constitutive units of such a political system). In terms of a differentiation theory approach, such a clear identification of world politics as a distinct functionally differentiated system within the system of world politics then permits to openly ask about its *internal* differentiation. It is here, then, that it becomes possible to describe the system in terms of overlapping forms of differentiation and often competing ordering principles that go along with these forms. Thus, there can be little doubt that segmentation into territorial states, stratification (between empires/great powers and smaller powers), and functional differentiation (international "regimes," global governance) manifest themselves in varying expressions and importance relative to each other. But they all continue to characterize the system of world politics to such a degree that the narrative of nation-states having replaced empires in the twentieth century can be de-mystified—and the return of empires should indeed come as little

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18 In relation to world or international politics, at a quite marginal place in a footnote Luhmann wonders "how an 'inter' could be a system. It is more useful to talk about a 'system of states'...It then becomes clear that this can only mean the political system of world society" (Luhmann, 1997, 160 fn218).

surprise. The key here is that such an approach almost automatically conceptualizes world politics in terms of its internal differentiation and the multiplicity of forms of order that go along with it, provides an analytical safety valve against declarations of the emergence of a *single new* world order (or even two of them), as it always forces open questions about the differentiation, the boundaries, and the unity of the difference between such world orders.

The analytically interesting point that Heintz adds here is to draw attention to the fact that although developments within the system of world politics are things that strictly speaking take place within a functionally differentiated political system of world society, they are invariably influenced by structures that cannot be fully grasped if, as is often the case in systems theory, reading a “primacy” of a functional differentiation of world society as an “exclusivity” of functional differentiation. The original contribution of identifying an international development stratification system here lies in the stark reminder that for world society *in toto* stratification still plays an important role that cuts across order formed under the condition of functional differentiation—not in terms of a hierarchy between function systems, but with solid stratification that affects more than one of them.<sup>19</sup> That a world society in which different forms of differentiation are at play, and in which world political change both reacts to and expresses these different forms is probably nowhere more visible than in the world political dynamics of organizations: after all, as neo-institutionalism shows, world society is also a world society of organizations. This pervasiveness of organizations in world society becomes visible in the fact that there is no trend whatsoever of a *de-organizing* world society: in world politics, some states might refuse to cooperate in, or even leave, specific organizations—but the usual thing to do then is to join or found another organization rather than being part of none: which organizations operate, with which members, for what purposes, and with which internal hierarchies, in this sense can serve as a good measuring device for the *state of differentiation* of world society in general, but also of world politics characterized by the field of intergovernmental organizations in particular.

## The Future of World Society Research

As pointed out, the purpose for viewing different versions of world society theory/research together was not to propose some kind of theoretical reconciliation. But different theoretical bases or disciplinary backgrounds should not stand in the way of making analytical use of the diversity and the individual strengths of these various approaches. As briefly illustrated regarding the different takes on globalization and

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19 While in many respects remaining highly unspecific, the term “Global South” that has pretty much replaced the terms of the “developing” or “Third World” has one distinct advantage of being able to identify stratified structures which are exactly not bound to a specific place (and in that sense the geographic orientation of the term is a contradiction), i.e. one can be in the “Global North” in parts of Johannesburg, but in the “Global South” in parts of Duisburg.

world politics, the various world society approaches and usefully complement each other when it comes to a dense historical-sociological reconstruction of the *conditio orbis*. Taken together, they do serve as a stark reminder that this condition in all its complexity requires analytical perspectives that are attuned to the specific ways in which differences are produced and reproduced in a unity—world society—that ultimately always only appears as a unity because of its internal differentiation. World society research understood in this theoretically open analytical sense can serve as an important antidote against all the kinds of analytical reductionism that go along with various forms of methodological nationalism (or, in the case of IR, methodological internationalism). Particularly in times in which a sense of manifest or possible crises seems to come to prevail not only on public perception and the mass media, but also in research agendas, world society research should be well-suited not to alleviate immediate senses of crisis, but to provide a multi-perspectival analytical contribution on the shape of, and evolutionary trajectories within world society, that hopefully could contribute to put seemingly radical evolutionary trends into historical and social perspective.

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# Global Warming and the Concepts of World Society: The Coincidence of Epistemological and Political Challenges

Veronika Wittmann

Science plays a pivotal role for searching for solution options to tackle global warming as the biggest challenge of humanity. Following the basic assumption of the necessity of the holistic view science, two aspects regarding the role of science are highlighted in this chapter: open-mindedness and cross-disciplinarity. Facts, based on scientific evidence, on global warming call for multilateralism and science diplomacy<sup>4</sup>environment as tools for global policy to manage joint future risks scenarios in a peaceful manner. Concepts of world society offer a variety of starting points for reacting to the challenge of global warming. Epistemologically, they are able to contribute to the necessary de-nationalization of concepts and methods of empirical research. Politically, world society scholars can actively participate in discourses on global warming, as part of a highly complex multi-stakeholder process. In the last part of this chapter, contours of common future research are presented.

## Introduction

“Never let a good crisis go to waste,” a statement articulated by Winston Churchill (2019) by the time of establishing the United Nations after the end of World War II, remains valid to this day. The possibilities of letting crises pass unused have in the 21<sup>st</sup> century become numerous. There is a plethora of crises, ranging from the pandemic COVID-19, economic turmoils, global warming and the of loss of biodiversity to the lack of digital governance to mention just a few.

What unites these crises? They are *global by nature*. Several universal challenges in this century share common features: they transcend conventional boundaries; no state is capable to deal with them on its own and they have a genuine scientific dimension. By far the greatest challenge facing humanity is global warming.

What are the implications of this central assumption? The first consequence looks at the role of states in the current world-political order, the second implication addresses the role of science.

Firstly, it is clear that *states can no longer deal with this crisis alone and on their own*. Even the strongest military power in the world, which is currently the United States of America—once described by Joseph Nye (2002) as “the world’s only, but lonely superpower”—can overcome this crisis only in cooperation with other countries.

Secondly, *science has in the 21<sup>st</sup> century to develop solution options in a global perspective*. This assumption leads to two central aspects regarding the role of science: one discusses the world-spanning dimension of science; the other one looks at the tradition of professional disciplines and raises the question, if they are capable to deal with a universal challenge like global warming separated from one another. In the following, these two major aspects of science are discussed by keeping in mind the role science plays in efforts to deal with the challenges posed by global warming.

## The Holistic View of Science

### Open-mindedness of science?

Regarding the world of science through a geographical lens, it can be stated that there are still blind spots, referring to world-regions in the Global South, existing. To put it pointly, the cartographers are not only unaware of the fact that whole continents are unknown to them, but they take what they know for the world. And that’s what distorts the picture.

Drawing a sketch of mankind, the following data outline a trenchant summary of contemporary demography, economy and politics in a global perspective. Three quarters of humanity lives in Africa and Asia (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2022). The 21<sup>st</sup> *saeculum* is labeled as the “Asia Pacific Century” (Lowther, 2019). In economic terms, China is the world’s largest economy with regard to purchase power parity (PPP), India is the third largest, as evidenced by World Bank data (Purdie, 2019). In this context, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (2012) has already a decade ago been designating North America and Europe as “old empires.” Considering the variety of political systems in the world, ranging from authoritarian regimes to various forms of democratic regimes, the *Global Democracy Index 2020* published by *The Economist* (2021) notes that only 8.4% of the world’s population lives in a full democracy. More than a third live under authoritarian rule.

What implications result from this short data-based description of the world for science, specifically for its open-mindedness? In a normative approach, science has to reach out to all of humanity. Due to the challenges, which are global by nature, science has to have a *holistic view of the world*. This is more than just “thinking outside the box” or taking a “perspective sitting on a fence;” the latter expression refers to the argument that only by looking into the neighbor’s garden, one actually can see the own garden.

Considering the etymology of the word theories, rooting in the ancient Greek term *theoréin*, the term's basic meaning is "to look at." Looking at global warming and science: a holistic view is required. Any limited perception of the world does not enable scientists to see the whole picture; and as such is not adequate to be able to comprehend and analyze a universal issue like global warming. As such, science needs to take a planetary outlook to get the overall image; any fragmented or limited view of the world will not lead to find sustainable solution options for humanity faced by the universal threat of global warming. This assumption is based on the understanding of Aristotle (2006, 23ff.), who noted the insight that "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts."

### Cross-disciplinarity

Global warming as the biggest challenge ahead of mankind requires research from more than one discipline. As such, it is essential to foster collaboration between natural science, social science and law. Considering specifically the interface between natural science and social science for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the common-sense division of academic labor was taken for granted: Natural scientists investigated the non-human world. Social scientists concentrated on people and societies. However, by the 1980s things were changing as knowledge of global environmental risks emerged, and it has become more evident that the fate of the *natural* and *social worlds* is inevitably intertwined. Global warming enhances this central assumption: the people and the ecosystem of the planet are inseparably connected and both affected by the consequences of environmental destruction.

As much as scientists met in Zurich in 2022 on the occasion to celebrate 50 years world observatory and 40 years World Society Foundation, there is another honouree celebrating its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary this year: the Club of Rome publication *Limits to Growth* by Donella Meadows et al. (1972). In this widely quoted book, the authors referred already half a century ago to *planetary boundaries*. This essential insight is still being discussed in contemporary research on global warming (Weizsäcker and Wijkman, 2018). Furthermore, there are already scientific networks existing like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an intergovernmental body of the UN, the Club of Rome or the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) working in a cross-disciplinary way on global warming. This cross-disciplinarity must be reinforced and enhanced at academic institutions across the globe. Joint research and cooperation among various disciplines is by far more complex than working in traditional disciplinary "containers." Trying to find common ground by searching for joint terms and methods is a challenging task for scientists deriving from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, but it is the most promising way to find sustainable solution options how humanity can manage the world-encompassing risk of global warming.



A globalized world facing universal hazards such as global warming requires globally and cross-disciplinary orientated science. The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that any disciplinary solo-efforts are not sufficient to handle universal risks. A world-spanning threat like global warming demands comprehensive change in academia in order to find solution options how to enable a world worth living for in the future. Consequently, it takes more than one discipline, it needs more than one state or world-region and a *holistic view of the world* to cope with the challenges posed by global warming.

## Facts on Global Warming

The facts that have been worked out by scientists so far on global warming are ominous. Researchers from natural science were at the forefront of building an enormous database of facts and figures around global warming and its effects on life on Earth. The IPCC (2021) recently published an update on the current greenhouse gas emission predictions. In 2019, researchers assumed a total remaining carbon dioxide budget of 420 Gt to stay below the critical 1.5 K temperature increase limit. Assuming constant CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, this budget will be depleted within 9 years. Presupposing that CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are reduced to one third, the period of time for critical climate-related changes is delayed until 2028; for net zero emissions until 2050 (see for the graph demonstrating how fast CO<sub>2</sub> reductions must happen to stay below a 1.5 K increase also Andrew 2021). All states across the globe signed the Paris Agreement (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015), which aims at keeping the global temperature to 1.5 K above pre-industrial era levels. There is scientific evidence to support the efforts of this international convention to limit global warming to 1.5°C. A research article, published in *Science* (Armstrong McKay et al., 2022) states that “exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points,” and as such can result in conditions beyond which changes in a part of the climate system become self-perpetuating. These alterations could void to sudden, irreversible, and perilous impacts with grave consequences for humanity. In their analysis the researchers came to the conclusion that four tipping points—the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets, the dying of tropical coral reefs and the thawing of the permafrost—for the global climate will be reached by 2030.

Scientific, evidence-based facts gathered by natural scientists are also reflected in publications on the perception of global crisis by various stakeholders such as entrepreneurs, journalists and civil society activists. In this respect, the annually published Global Risks Report by the World Economic Forum (2022) lists from 2013 onwards environmental risks among the Top 5 global risks in terms of likelihood and impact for mankind. Humanity will face drastic conflicts in the coming decades: the impacts of global warming trigger displacement; refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and the stateless are already on the front lines of climate emergency and

environmental conflict scenarios. The *Global Trends in Forced Displacement* report by UNHCR (2021) reveals that 95% of all conflict displacements in 2020 took place in states vulnerable or highly vulnerable to global warming. In 2020, more people had to leave their regions of origin because of environmental degradation than due to violent military conflicts: 80 million people worldwide (UNHCR, 2021), being the largest number of displaced people ever since World War II. Given the ongoing environmental destruction; it is evident that these numbers will increase rapidly.

This trend is going to lead to severe humanitarian crises: Environmentally displaced people do not only signify humanitarian catastrophes in the Global South, as much as these world regions are highly affected by environmental destruction due to global warming; but it will also have an impact on the stability of political systems and questions of human security in Europe. Climate wars (Dyer, 2011; Mann, 2021; Welzer, 2017; Rose, 2017) are not only a future scenario, they are already taking place contemporarily. Global warming will jeopardize human security, specifically in vulnerable world regions like, e.g., parts of the African continent. Violent conflicts caused by global warming will aggravate the already existing conflicts and will weaken the resilience structures of fragile states. The *Fragile States Index* by the Fund for Peace (2021) enumerates for 2021 only 1 out of 55 states in Africa as politically stable; all the other states are categorized as “alert” or “warning” fragile states. If these already existing weak governmental structures will be confronted with high numbers of refugees due to global warming a dystopian future scenario for the population in the Sahel region, North Africa and Southern Africa arises. Environmentally caused migration will not only lead to humanitarian catastrophes in states and world-regions of the Global South and endangering human security (German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2007), but it will at the same time also destabilize political systems in Europe.

Peace and security issues are two sides of the same coin. Immanuel Kant (1903; 2007) elaborated in his philosophical sketch *Perpetual Peace* ideas on how to establish and maintain peace on a global scale by formulating ideas on international law and *ius cosmopolitanum*, which later on were transferred and enshrined in the charter of the UN (1945) as well as in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UN, 1948). His postulate was that world trade and the absence of peace inherently contradict each other. As such, trade is a crucial driver for peaceful international relations. Kant’s postulate must now be supplemented by environmental issues: limiting global warming is a cornerstone for peaceful international relations.

The time-frame left to mitigate the universal risks caused by global warming is narrow. As noted above, the tipping points of the earth will be reached in 2030. All of the scientific, evidence-based facts on global warming directly point to the necessity of fostering open-mindedness and cross-disciplinary endeavors of science.

## Implication: *Bonjour tristesse?*

The image portrayed by the scientific, evidence-based facts on global warming as set out above creates not an encouraging future for the people and the planet. Is it time to say: *Bonjour tristesse?* The answer being given here on this dystopian question is short and clear: no. But humanity needs a “new enlightenment” as stated by Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker and Anders Wijkman (2018) and Kant 2.0. There are two appropriate tools to foster this agenda of “new enlightenment.” The first one is a clear plea to foster multilateralism in international relations, the second one is enhancing science diplomacy4environment.

Multilateralism, being defined as the “process by which three or more countries cooperate to address a common issue” (Kerr and Wiseman, 2013, 354), has already been applied by states regarding global warming. Policy makers across the globe signed the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997) as well as the Paris Agreement (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). This is a clear indication that states are capable of multilateralism. Besides states, global warming calls for multiple stakeholders to implement multilateralism. Among those stakeholders is science, which is playing a pivotal role in developing solution options to mankind’s biggest challenge.

Based on a fundamental understanding of science, using the universal value of scientific knowledge should remain a goal for all scientists at any given time. The right to share as well as to benefit from advances in science is enshrined in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948). This includes the right to engage in scientific enquiry and to pursue and communicate knowledge. Along with rights come responsibilities. Considering global warming it is the responsibility of scientists to contribute their knowledge in the public space and to share it with policy makers and diplomats. This responds to the essential ability of scientists as outlined by the International Science Council (Boulton, 2021) in its vision of science as a global public good.

Science open borders. Scientific values such as rationality, transparency and universality are the same across the globe. As such, they can contribute to build trust between states. Science provides a non-ideological environment for participation and the free exchange of ideas between people, regardless of their cultural or governmental background. Science is a global public good (Boulton, 2021) as well as a source of what Joseph Nye (2004) calls soft power. Academia works globally across national borders on problems of common interest and is therefore ideally placed to support emerging forms of diplomacy that require non-traditional alliances of states, sectors and international non-governmental organizations.

Scientific diplomacy is part and parcel of science diplomacy, here interpreted as an intersection where policy makers, scientists and diplomats can jointly elaborate the complex interplay between world-societal impacts and environmental issues. One component of science diplomacy is the concept of “Science for Diplomacy”:

Using scientific cooperation to improve international relations between states. Scientific diplomacy is a relevant stakeholder to create new forms of multilateralism. Scientific cooperation elevates the role of science to address global challenges.

Scientists are an epistemic community and need to keep shared science as the blueprint of human progress, as humanity jointly and instantaneously has to tackle universal hazards, like global warming and biodiversity loss. Tracking global risks by rebuilding trust and perceiving e.g., global warming as a joint human endeavor is the core of science diplomacy. The common agenda of science diplomacy must be driven by transnational cooperation, by the principle of collaborating, recognizing that humans are bound to each other and that no state, however powerful, can cope with global challenges on its own. Confronted with global warming humanity needs “a new enlightenment,” as outlined by Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker and Anders Wijkman (2018). To do this, science must abandon disciplinary and national “container” thinking in favour of a more systems approach. The aim is to act as a bridge in developing skills and capacity-building towards science advice and scientific diplomacy for all of humanity.

A sustainable world signifies respecting key planetary boundaries. There is a growing awareness of the international community that the most serious threats to humanity derive from global environmental risks. In the last decades the proliferation of scientific knowledge about global warming (see e.g. Juniper, 2021; Helm, 2020; Rich, 2019; Hawken, 2017; Wallace-Wells, 2020) and planetary boundaries (see e.g. Meadows et al., 1972; Weizsäcker and Wijkman, 2018) along with public awareness of trust in science were core drivers in shaping the course of science diplomacy<sup>4</sup>environment. Environmental diplomacy (see for an overview on environmental diplomacy Susskind and Ali, 2014; Dodds and Spence, 2022; Kuokkanen et al., 2017; Nicolas and Kallab, 2021; Bjola and Kornprobst, 2018, 66ff.) as understood here, provides important insights for global politics and international relations to tackle global warming as the major challenge of humanity. Furthermore, environmental diplomacy is interpreted as an area of global governance (Cooper et al., 2008), which will have a crucial impact on shaping global politics, international relations and human security as humanity is facing increasing environmental threats (see for environmental risks in terms of impact and likelihood World Economic Forum, 2022). Science diplomacy here plays an orchestrating part in intersecting environmental governance fields and global environmental governance.

Environment and human security are essential cornerstones for the future of humanity and are more and more becoming parts and parcel of global politics and international relations. Global warming is not about stressing geo-political competition, but regarding the stability of political systems. As such, it is a security issue. In a global outlook and based on a normative approach, science diplomacy can address the interplay of global warming and its nexus to violent conflicts and peace building. There is a discourse how joint environmental risks resulting from global warming is capable of being a driving force for multilateral cooperation and as such can assist

to mitigate tensions, enable establishing trust and ultimately foster global stability and sustainable peace.

Following this assumption, challenges resulting from global warming are interpreted as a driving force for cosmopolitanism (see for an overview Brown and Held, 2010; Chakrabarty et al., 2002; Delanty, 2017; Fine, 2007; Kendall et al., 2009; Rovisco and Nowicka, 2011), global risks and their practical and discursive treatment create transnational communities. Kant 2.0. signifies the insight for the international community to abandon national “container” thinking in favor of a more holistic and global approach. This point refers also to various stakeholders of science diplomacy and the necessity of gaining 21<sup>st</sup> century skills. Science alone is not sufficient. Diplomacy alone is not sufficient. Policy makers alone are not sufficient. Building trust among the stakeholders is a necessity of time for enhancing stability, peace and human security. Global warming is the biggest risk for humanity and needs strategic coordination among various stakeholders. In order to enhance multilateralism science diplomacy4environment has to have funding resources and an institutional framework.

Science diplomacy is not a panacea for all global challenges, but it is an important tool for humanity to manage joint future risks scenarios in a peaceful way. Achieving global stability, enhancing human security and conserving a livable environment are hereby inextricably linked to each other. The interface between science, policy and diplomacy on the issue of global warming is a crucial point for humanity in this century: as such, science diplomacy4environment matters! Building effective global institutions that can deal appropriately with universal crises is not just an ethical imperative, it is in everyone’s interest.

As much as scientists were celebrating 40 years of the Foundation of World Society in Zurich, humans sometimes step into a midlife crisis at this age. This should not be the case for scientists working on concepts of world society. They can not only rely on decades of research on societal issue in a world-wide perspective, but they also have a lot to contribute to current discussions on global warming. Based on the assumption of the importance of a holistic view on the world, the interrelatedness of humans and nature, the significance of cross-disciplinary research on global warming, the relevance of multilateralism and the role of science diplomacy4environment, the nexus between concepts of world society and debates on global warming is outlined in the following.

## **Concepts of World Society Offer a Variety of Starting Points for Discourses on Global Warming**

There is a huge variety of schools of thought on the notion of world society (see Wittmann, 2011, 2015). Furthermore, there were also numerous concepts of world society being developed by scholars in the last decades. As such, scientists in con-

temporary times can rely upon the shoulders of the giants that were before them. The merits of world society researchers in early years are manifold.

At a first glance, the structural analysis of world society enables comparison between different states and world regions embedded in socio-economic framework conditions; systems theory brings in the interdisciplinary perspective as well as the breaking with specialist traditions and terms of Sociology, prominently revealed by its different notion of the term society itself, being totally distinct from all other uses of the notion in concepts of world society; and world-polity can enrich the discourse by its basic idea of a worldwide diffusion of institutional patterns. This basic concept can be found in the formulation and agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals, proclaimed by the United Nations in 2015 and approved by all its member states. Furthermore, the empirical application of world-polity offers insights in data-driven facts of this approach. And the cosmopolitan tradition being the base for *The World at Risk* by Ulrich Beck (2007, 2009), addresses normative aspects of world society and as such, contributes to discourses by stating the necessity of global citizenship in the current world-political order. The new generations of world society scholars can benefit from the intellectual legacy potential of all these researchers and their models of world society.

The nexus of global warming and concepts of world society is here outlined in the following by looking specifically at four schools of thought on world society. First the multi-level model of world society designed by Peter Heintz (see 1968, 1982), the systems theory model of world society based on the work of Niklas Luhmann (see 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2012, 2013), the world polity approach grounded by John Meyer (see Meyer et al., 1997; Meyer et al., 2000; Meyer et al., 2005), and finally the cosmopolitan model of world society elaborated by Ulrich Beck (see 2002, 2007).

### **Multi-level model designed by Peter Heintz**

A central presupposition in this concept is stratification, as such world society is here interpreted as essentially stratified. In that respect, the international system of development stratification (see Heintz, 1982, 32) depicts and symbolizes world society. Overall, multi-level models, identifying and analyzing positions of units in a specific system, enable comparisons. Regarding global warming they can depict how well countries and regions are in a world-wide framework positioned to deal with ecological risks and disasters. The units of the analyze by Peter Heintz are states, which are categorized in the framework of the international system of development. Peter Heintz (1982, 79f.) divides the dimensions per capita income, education level, degree of urbanization and primary, secondary and tertiary sections of the economy in order to represent a stratification of states and to illustrate the structures of world society.

The positioning of states and world regions in a multi-level system provides perspectives on different starting positions in order to be able to deal with global warming as an endangering threat. This aspect directly points to questions of global justice and the issue of shared responsibilities among various regions in the world. In fact, although mankind will jointly bear the consequences of global warming, the extent of its impacts will affect world regions differently and will vary over time, thereby the most affected world regions are located in the Global South. There is a broad discussion going on in climate-related discourses on who is responsible for the current environmental dangers and who is carrying the burden of the consequences. The debate led to the adoption of climate funds, where states in the Global North announced to provide financial assistance to states in the Global South to set up programs of climate mitigation, adaptation and resilience. However, far more effort to establish resilience is required also in vulnerable world regions and specifically for the most vulnerable people; as a matter of fact, this part of humanity contributes the least to global warming but pays the heaviest price. Nonetheless, resilience and adaptation action still does not get the subsidy it requires. States in the Global North therefore “(...) must deliver their commitment to provide USD 100 billion a year for mitigation, adaptation and resilience in developing countries.” (UN News, 2020).

The vulnerability of states and world-regions to deal with the effects of environmental destruction differ hugely; it is states and world regions in the Global South who clearly suffer the most from the consequences of global warming. At the same time, the people living in these states and world regions contribute the less to the current ecological disaster on the planet. In this respect, the work of Peter Heintz enables perspectives to look at different starting points of states in the Global North and in the Global South to deal with global warming as an universal, but differently affected threat of humanity. Furthermore, there is a nexus to be seen between the work by Peter Heinz and current research on resilience, gaining momentum in environmental debates: the vulnerability of states and world-regions due to global warming can be outlined by combining it to multi-level models.

### **Systems theory models of world society based on the work of Niklas Luhmann**

One merit of the systems theory research initiated by Niklas Luhmann, which sees world society as primarily functionally differentiated, is its cross-disciplinary approach. This concept of world society extended the traditional view of Sociology by taking assumptions of cognitive biology and informatics in its model of world society. As such, not only the term of society was defined in an outstanding way—a society that does not include humans and is *per definitionem* radically anti-human, constructive, anti-regional and does not rely on space and time anymore; but this concept of world society was from the beginning onwards cross-disciplinary in its central assumptions and scope. This tradition of breaking disciplinary boundaries of Sociology can function as a starting point for future research on global warm-

ing and world society. The fundamental principles of informatics as a basement of systems theory, the binary codes—yes or no—and the perception of world society as a functional system can stimulate further cross-disciplinary research. The same applies to reducing environmental risks caused by global warming and the use of artificial intelligence tools, like drones etc. The systems theory approach can hereby due to its tradition of informatics contribute a lot to future research work on global warming and its handling by means of artificial intelligence.

Another merit of the systems theory concept of world society is its holistic view: there is nothing outside of the system of world society. This central assumption of systems theory enables the essential perspective on perceiving global warming as an universal agenda.

### **The world polity approach grounded by the work of John Meyer**

One merit of the researchers working in the tradition of the world-polity approach is the claim to work empirically on world society. Time series analyzes enable historical comparisons on global warming as much as data collection and interpretation can e.g. extend the Assessment Reports by the IPCC (2022), based predominantly on natural science facts. There are also linkages depictable between global warming and the world-polity approach regarding isomorphisms: there is an increase in curricula at universities across the globe on sustainability studies. The same applies to ministries for environment being established in numerous states of the world. At the level of United Nations programs were set up like UNEP or UNDP, who have environmental issues as a core element of their agendas, and last but not least with the proclamation of the Sustainable Development Goals by the United Nations there is a framework being established by the international community that plays the script of *Weltkultur* on a global scale. As much as the world-polity approach perceives the state to function as the main actor to implement the script of *Weltkultur*; a connection for future research on global warming and this concept of world society becomes apparent: it was states, who signed the Paris Agreement (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015) and it is states who are the main actors to implement the targets of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Another nexus between global warming and the world-polity approach can be found in the description of social agency assumed in this model of world society (see Meyer et al., 2000): there is a growing legal recognition that nature has rights and there is already a recognition of rivers and forests as legal subjects taking place. Ecuador e.g., recognizes natural sights as legal subjects with specific rights and also lists environmental conservation as a constitutional law (Margil, 2018). As much as world-polity is not an actor-centered approach, it involves the assumption of agency for nature (rain forests, whales, etc.). In reality, nature is already enshrined as a legal subject in numerous states; as can be seen by the constitution of e.g., Ecuador, where nature is a rights-bearing entity.



## The world at risk elaborated by Ulrich Beck

Based on the cosmopolitan tradition, the concept of world society being coined by universal hazards by Ulrich Beck (2007; 2009), contains the merit to point to climate change and environmental risks at a time when the linkage between social science and natural science was not prominently discussed in Sociology. Among the three mentioned global risks in this approach of world society, environmental hazards are creating new forms of transnationalism and global cooperation. Specifically civil society organizations are outlined that not only play a watch dog role on what governments are doing with regard to environmental agendas, e.g., considering the implementation of the Paris Agreement (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015) or the Sustainable Development Goals, but they are perceived to be an important actor in global politics. Considering global civil society and the universal risk of global warming people all over the world are creating transnational political spaces and reshaping global politics. Millions of people participated in 5000 events in 156 countries on 20 September 2019 at rallies ahead of the UN climate summit (Zeitonline, 2019).

Environmentalism puts world society itself in the context of the Earth as ecosystem. That dependence is an essential component of global awareness. Environmentalism has risen into an influential world-spanning movement and actors like Fridays for Future, a movement led by young people in various states of the world, are increasingly influencing global issues and thereby becoming geopolitical forces in their own right. As such, environmentalism's ecological results may be uncertain, but as a social innovation reshaping world politics it has already had a significant impact. Besides civil society organizations, there is also a connection between this concept of world society and global warming detectable considering multi-stakeholder approaches to manage environmental risks.

All of the four mentioned concepts of world society, although quite different in their central assumptions and approaches, enable promising starting points for future research on concepts of world society and global warming.

## Concepts of World Society and the Role of Science

Science has a key role to play in managing effects of global warming. As such, it is noteworthy to look into concepts of world society, how they perceive the role of science and discuss links of concepts of world society, the role of science and global warming.

One aspect that demonstrates clearly the variety of concepts of world society are the different perspectives on the *role of science* itself. Peter Heintz had a long tradition of collaborating with UNESCO and due to his research stays in Latin America also paid attention to the positioning of states in different world-regions and scientific approaches deriving from the Global South. Peter Heintz's many years

of experience in Latin America have given him a realistic approach to his research topics. As such, he distances himself from purely cognitive theory education based on literature and thought processes and claims to learn and experience sociology through “cognitive adventures” (see Geser, 1983).

The systems theoretical approach by Niklas Luhmann analyzed science as a functional system. Here, science is supposed to gain new insights for the system of world society. The world-polity approach puts science, besides states, as one of the main actors to play the script of *Weltkultur*, thereby scientists as a professional group are important agents to diffuse the patterns of world-polity across the globe (see Drori et al., 2003; Meyer et al. 1992). In this tradition, the rising of curricula at universities all over the world, who deal with the notion of sustainability, is an indicator for isomorphism caused by the world-wide diffusion of cultural patterns. The strongest critique on the role of science, specifically in its form undertaken in states of the Global North, derives from Ulrich Beck in his cosmopolitan approach. He not only claims that the indispensable trust in scientific knowledge of the first modernity led to unintended side effects in the second modernity—e.g. the invention of nuclear energy and its catastrophic results in case of an explosion of a nuclear power plant, but he also calls for inclusiveness of scientists from states of the Global South (Beck 2007, 333). As such, he points to the self-centeredness of scientists in states of the Global North and argues for a more comprehensive discourse of scientists coming from various regions in the world.

In a broad and normative sense, science is never limited to a state or world region as much as scientific knowledge belongs to humanity. This ethical imperative of science applies to both: concepts of world society and global warming. Based on this understanding, science in the 21<sup>st</sup> century can function as a laboratory for humanity. Global warming requires research beyond conventional disciplinary boundaries, as such science has to be transformed. *ReThinking Science for humanity* includes aspects like to focus on a BIG question, this definitely applies to global warming; it involves the understanding to realize that “Problems cannot be solved with the same way of thinking that created them!”, as Albert Einstein (2019, 2) stated; it calls for cross-disciplinary research; and the creation of global narratives as articulated by Global Citizenship Education (UNESCO, 2020); science has to speak a universal language; scientific relations can enable bridges to a peaceful future; and finally, science has to *explore future scenarios to transform the present*.

## Concepts of World Society and the Role of the State

One aspect, where the difference of the concepts of world society is evident, is *the role of the state*. As stated, it needs states to set up international agreements to reduce global warming. The Paris Agreement (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015) was signed by states; no other stakeholder in the field of discourses on global warming, like entrepreneurs or civil-society actors, has the le-

gal personality to sign international treaties. In fact, it requires states. The idea to establish a world state is not mentioned in any of the four discussed concepts of world society; but the role of the state itself in the models reveals radically diverging approaches.

Peter Heintz puts in his multi-level model the state as an actor who follows the path of socio-economic development as proclaimed by many UN organizations and programs after World War II. So, it is the state and governmental realpolitik, who is responsible where any given country is positioned in the multi-level system of the world. This image of a world of states is also reflected in models of International Society (see Bull et al., 1984; Buzan, 2004).

In the systems theoretical concept of world society, which contains the policy of society, it is basically assumed that one can only speak of a segmentary differentiation in states (see Stichweh, 2000, 19). The state serves mainly as an addressee for global political communication; the main function of realpolitik for the system of world society is to make decisions. Policy is viewed as a subsystem of the social system of world society. World Politics is here described as a specific social system set within the wider political system of world society (Albert, 2016). The world political system is divided into states, this fact is not a theory-immanent problem in this approach and its concept of world society. In the systems theoretical model state boundaries are not considered to be negligible. There is no changing role of the state assumed in this concept of world society. Systems theory and the world polity approach agree on the point of the role of the state in contributing to the spread of isomorphic patterns worldwide (for approaches combining world-polity and systems-theory see Holzer et al., 2014).

The world-polity model perceives the state to be the most important actor to display the script of *Weltkultur* and as such puts the state in a prominent position. The state is here perceived as a stable key player in world society, and not one that undergoes changes. On the contrary, its existence and its acting cause to a large extent the existence of world society. In this approach there is a basic assumption that the state is the principal actor in modern world polity; it plays a central role in the diffusion of *Weltkultur* (Meyer 2005; Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer et al. 2000). This is also reflected on the basis of empirical studies of this concept of world society. Thus, there are numerous studies based on empirical data on the role of the state in this approach of world society. Here, the state being culturally coined itself (Meyer 2005, 133ff), is considered to be the main actor for the diffusion of institutional patterns derived from the West. The state is considered as a guarantor for the diffusion of the cultural patterns of world polity. As such, there is no assumption for any changing role of the state in the world polity approach.

Contrary to this view of the unchanging role of the state, is the cosmopolitan approach articulated by Ulrich Beck and other scholars. Here a blatant change of role of the nation-state is assumed. Ulrich Beck (2007) argues in *The World at Risk* and various other publications that the state itself is not only responsible for the

unintended side-effects of the second modernity, but states have to transform. In the cosmopolitan approach the state is subjected to rapid changes and is only one actor among many that can open new political action and perception spaces due to the need for cooperation in the face of global risks. State boundaries increasingly lose importance in this concept of world society—given the cosmopolitan reality. Policy is here discussed with reference to the actor level, whereby the termination of the “organized irresponsibility” of policy (Beck; 1988) is called for. Considering universal hazards endangering humanity; any state alone cannot cope with the threats on its own anymore and as such is forced to transform itself. In this context the term *Zwangskosmopolitismus* is used, already being mentioned by Immanuel Kant (1903), who stated back in 1795 in his work on *Perpetual Peace* that “need compels insight.” This assertion describes the *conditio sine qua non* for states to change. Whether states like it or not. Finally, only those states who are willing and capable to transform themselves to cosmopolitan states will be successful. “Whoever draws the national card, loses” as Ulrich Beck (2007, 368) articulated.

Complementing concepts of world society in a meaningful way in order to analyze trends of global political order, all discussed approaches by Peter Heintz, Niklas Luhmann, John Meyer and Ulrich Beck offer starting points for discourses on the role of the state in times of global warming. This does not only mean filling in the gaps of any specific concept, but goes far beyond that. It refers to a broader understanding: what can concepts of world society contribute to find solution options to global warming.

At the same time, establishing linkages to discourses on global warming enables concepts of world society not only to break out from a limited social science discourse, but it could also serve the purpose of making the approaches known to a wider scientific public. The same applies to UN organizations and the interface between science, policy and diplomacy.

As such, fostering the nexus of concepts of world society to global warming can lead to a *better marketing of concepts of world society*. Such an undertaking would not require modesty by scholars of world society; there are numerous inputs by world society approaches, which can be used constructively in the field of realpolitik as well as diplomacy. So, there are plentiful insights that concepts of world society can offer to discourses on global warming.

On the other side, world society research itself can also profit from this connection to global warming. In the following, it will be discussed what world society scholars can gain by linking its discourses to global warming.

## Contours of Future Research for Global Warming and Concepts of World Society

In general, social sciences are not only forced to open up to topics like global warming due to processes that affect every part of the world, but as specialist disciplines,

they also have to repeatedly ask themselves which future research agendas they have at their disposal which can contribute to enabling to shape scientific discourses in an innovative and contemporary way. This also applies to discourses on world society. Therefore, a formulation of future research, which can be formative for the concepts of world society in connection with global warming, is outlined.

In the following, aspects are discussed to what extent the link between global warming and concepts of world society can make relevant contributions with regard to the development tendencies of world society research itself. The nexus between global warming and concepts of world society are outlined on the basis of six future scenarios of research collaboration.

Firstly, an obvious gain for world society researchers resulting from collaboration with global warming debates can be seen in making the concepts of world society more popular in various professional fields. The narration of the term world society is so far underrepresented in various publications by international organizations dealing with global warming. As such, a collaboration between global warming and world society scholars can serve the purpose of a better marketing of the term world society itself. At this point, world society approaches are able to contribute to the de-nationalization of concepts and methods of empirical research. When it comes to the topic of world society, an *ad hoc* de-nationalization of terms and methods of empirical social research sets in. Referring to the aspect of de-nationalization of terms, the merging of the concept of the world and the concept of society—world society—is able to transfer the use of the concept of society for a state or local context in a historical framework.

Secondly, world society scholars can gain *cross-disciplinary perspectives*; specifically regarding to overcome the long-lasting tradition of separation between natural and social sciences. Linking concepts of world society with global warming means accepting challenges from cross-disciplinary fields. The social, economic, political, legal and ecological dimensions of global warming are directly related to each other and can *de facto* not be dealt with by one discipline alone. At this point, cross-disciplinary cooperation is an indispensable requirement in order to deal with this global threat of humanity in a scientifically comprehensive manner. As such, it takes cross-disciplinary cooperation between various disciplines in order to meet the challenges brought about by global warming.

Thirdly, world society research can step out of the “ivory tower” of science and world society scholars can gain insights on the work areas of policy and diplomacy. As such, they can expand knowledge on the *interface between science, policy and diplomacy* and by doing so obtaining expertise in the field of science diplomacy4environment.

Fourthly, world society concepts can overcome the *western-centeredness* of their approaches. As much as there is Western-centricity in the Bielefeld approach detectable, this also applies to the world polity approach. The modern state itself is a European idea, as much as the origins of the United Nations are a playbook of the

West. In this sense, debates about the changing role of states as well as on reforms of the United Nations dispatch the script of the West. The consequences of global warming are predominately taking place in states of the Global South. As such, a collaboration between global warming and world society research can stimulate more open-mindedness of the world of science.

Fifthly, global warming involves various stakeholders, ranging from states to entrepreneurs to civil society actors to scientists. By participating in discourses on global warming world society scholars can actively engage in this highly complex *multi-stakeholder processes*.

Sixthly, global warming is a universal risk, which directly refers to the increase in the formation of transnational contexts of thought. Global warming is identified as a key area of research by various scientific networks, like e.g., the International Science Council. By collaborating with researchers in this field world society scholars can not only connect to global scientific discourses, signifying being involved in this world-spanning scientific debate, but they also can present their respective research inputs there. By doing so, world society scholars can participate in a wide scientific network working on global warming while at the same time contribute their concepts in joint research. Bundling the existing scientific competencies to strengthen cross-disciplinary cooperation on humanity's most challenging risk in a *global research network* is essential and world society scholars can benefit from this.

In the third millennium, the development of scientific knowledge will have to face the worldwide challenge of global warming. Genuine innovations and the discussion of continuity and discontinuity in theory and concept formation, as well as the development of methods for recording global social, economical, political, legal and ecological changes are contemporary requirements of science in view of global warming. At this point, staying in local, state or even regional "containers" is not considered to be constructive for the further development of the concepts of world society. In this respect, retreating into the "snail shell of the traditional" would not enhance further progress for world society research, but would lead to the opposite effect.

## Global Warming and Global Political Order Models

Contemporarily, there is no global political order through a world state detectable in pragmatic terms. The creation of a world state is one aspect which all various concepts of world society have not taken as a basic assumption in their models. It was Peter Heintz (1980, 97) who stated more than 40 years ago, when he was asked what he is doing when he undertakes world society research: "I am studying a stateless society of immense complexity." This statement is still valid today. As such, there is no concept of world society that claims the establishment of a world state in its model of world society.

Regarding global political order models and (de-)globalization processes, world politics in pragmatic terms reflect a G2 World. Several scholars proceed from the premise that this century will be coined by geo-political tensions between the United States of America and the rising of the People's Republic of China (see e.g. Bergsten, 2005). Compared to the end of the bipolar world order in the 1990s and the notion of one world, there was a decrease in global orientation and world-spanning ideas in pragmatic terms in the last decades. Whereas in the 1990s globalization was increasing, the trend in realpolitik after the millennium was leading in the opposite direction, demonstrating the "Globalization of Nationalism," as Colin Crouch (2022) noted. This process of deglobalization is interpreted here as a main obstacle to deal with universal hazards like global warming. The effects of environmental destruction and its implications for the people and the planet require global cooperation in realpolitik. As a matter of fact, if the permafrost soils in the Russian Federation is damaged and melting, it will have consequences for the entire planet. The same applies to the deforestation of the rain forest in the Amazonas region; this will not only have effects in Brazil and other states bordering in South America; but as much as the Amazon is popularly labeled as the "lung of the Earth," the consequences of destructing the rain forest have an impact on the whole world. As such, global warming is not an issue affecting only one state or world region, but it has consequences for the whole of mankind and the ecosystem on Earth.

Environmental risks are transboundary, they are transcending states, world-regions and continents and as such can only be tackled in a sustainable way by joint efforts of policy makers and other stakeholders. In this respect, e.g., the UN (2022) has set up a Climate Ambassador Program, thereby global ambassadors with a range of expertise and knowledge are supporting the race to zero and the race to resilience. Global warming needs a universal perspective, it requires globally orientated policy-makers who are capable of collaborating in a peaceful manner. In this sense, geo-political competition would be a false path for humanity's survival. On the contrary, there is a need for a common global approach towards the biggest challenge of humanity. A universal crisis like global warming cannot be managed by states or world-regions, but has to be tackled by global cooperation. Considering the linkages between environmental risks, global warming and geopolitics states are important players in this field. But only by cooperating they can effectively and sustainably manage this universal hazard. As such, processes of deglobalization and unilateralism are endangering the people and the planet and a realpolitik focusing on geo-political tensions rather than on cooperation implicates a dystopian scenario for the future of humanity. Addressing trends of deglobalization in pragmatic terms, global warming represents the counterpart of these processes. It calls for global awareness and a holistic outlook, it demands policy-makers being capable to think and act beyond national or regional borders and a new framework for global governance.

## Conclusions

*The Economist* published soon after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic a cartoon (Kal, 2020), portraying a boxing ring with one champion as humanity and planet earth and the opponent champion represents the new Corona virus. The two boxers are designed to be of equal size. So far, so good. But outside the boxing area there is already a significantly larger opponent waiting for humanity and the planet: an opponent portrayed as a giant by physical stature. This Hercules figure bears the name climate change.

When it comes to existential questions of humanity and the lifestyle of people on this planet, it is worth dealing with the basic questions of philosophy. Immanuel Kant formulated fundamental questions of philosophy with exceptional simplicity and clarity. The first three questions—what can I know?, what should I do?, what can I hope?—were already stated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, 1997), the last question—what is the human? is mentioned in his lectures on logic (see Korpora, 2022). The conclusion relates to these four basic questions of philosophy by putting them in the context of global warming and its nexus to concepts of world society. As such, the insight given here is not a philosophical one, but a summing up of the findings and discourses elaborated in this chapter.

### What can I know?

The knowledge being collected by researchers about global warming is enormous, specifically the facts being gathered by scholars from science since decades prove evidence that humanity is on the edge of self-destruction, if it continues the path of environmental devastation. The facts speak a clear language and the data and figures from science are in principle available. As such, science has completed its task. What has to be accelerated is enhanced cooperation among disciplines, specifically the cross-disciplinary endeavors between natural science and social sciences were outlined in the chapter. Furthermore, global warming can effectively be dealt with a holistic view on the world. There are still gaps on the open-mindedness of science and the necessity to be more inclusive regarding the knowledge of the Global South. The world of science does not stop at national or world-regional borders and has to reach out beyond these limits.

### What should I do?

Given the facts and the data available on global warming and considering the gaps that still need to be filled by science—open-mindedness and cross-disciplinarity—this chapter discussed the role of multilateralism and science diplomacy as a tool to manage the universal threat of global warming. Science diplomacy4environment



was presented as a tool to handle global environmental risks in a peaceful manner. Global warming calls for globally orientated scientists, for realpolitik fostering multilateralism and for a stronger linkage between science and policy. Facts only gathered by science alone are not sufficient, they have to be transferred to policy makers, who can set up political decisions and agendas. Furthermore, limiting global warming requires global diplomats, who in the understanding of world citizenship not only work in the interest of a given state, but also share their professional expertise in the interest of mankind.

Concepts of world society offer a variety of starting points to contribute to discourses on global warming. As different as their central assumptions might be, they all have a world-spanning view on society and as such enrich global awareness. The four specifically discussed concepts—the multi-level model designed by Peter Heintz, the systems theory model of world society based on the work of Niklas Luhmann, the world polity approach grounded by the work of John Meyer as well as the the world at risk concept elaborated by Ulrich Beck—can all contribute to cross-disciplinary discourses on global warming. The nexus between concepts of world society and environmental hazards endangering the people and the planet are extensive and wide-ranging. As demonstrated in the article, they range from the holistic view on the world, the possibility to compare the vulnerabilities of different states and world-regions in a multi-level model over the long tradition of breaking disciplinary boundaries and as such enabling pathways to cross-disciplinary research to environmental protection as part and parcel of the script of *Weltkultur* up to the creation of transnationalism due to environmental hazards. In the latter sense, they describe a paradox situation: arguing, it is the global risk of climate change that actually enables global cooperation. In other words: if environmental risks would not exist, they would need to be invented, because they initiate up a process of global cooperation. As has been set out here, concepts of world society offer in all their diversity various links to discourses around global warming.

### **What can I hope?**

The answer being given to this question, is the hope for rationality and the resulting insight that reducing the endangering effects of global warming on people and the planet is not only an ethical imperative, but it is simply in everybody's interest. The costs of not acting are too high and given the limited time horizon of approaching the tipping points, there is hope that all of the stakeholders—scientists, policy-makers as well as diplomats—contribute their professional expertise on the agenda of managing global warming by sharing their knowledge and working jointly to figure out sustainable solution options on a world-wide scale.

## What is the human?

Confronted with the joint universal hazard of global warming, humanity has to realize that humans are just one species among millions of others on the planet. Future scenarios can portray a planet without humans, as such the assumption of the systems theory model of world society, that does not rely on humans anymore to explain society, would seem appropriate. Even though this idea might depict a dystopian scenario for humanity's survival. Other world society approaches are human-centered, in the cosmopolitan tradition humans are in principle always capable of learning. *Sapere aude*—this plea for having the courage to make use of one's own reason, derived from the period of European enlightenment, must be further developed into a “new enlightenment” as outlined in the article by referring to the work of Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker and Anders Wijkman (2018). Humans and nature are indiscernible linked to one another and respect for environment might be a key word for scientific research as well as real political space in contemporary times.

Concepts of world society, in all their diversities, definitely can contribute to a large extend on the agenda to search for sustainable solutions to deal with the biggest challenge of humanity.

There is no planet B, but there are promising pathways for world society scholars to contribute to discourses on global warming and as such to enrich the cross-disciplinary discussion by insights on world society approaches while at the same time stimulate innovative future research for world society itself.

In this sense, *bonne anniversaire* to the World Society Foundation and *ad multos annos!*

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## No Justice Without a World Society?

Nadja Wolf

The world is in a constant process of change, but there are lasting values and goals, such as the idea of a just order. John Rawls and Amartya Sen demonstrated distinct approaches to the development of fair international political rules. This chapter investigates to what extent world society is needed for the discovery and theoretical implementation of just principles. Therefore, it must be determined whether a downward influence from a world society is possible or even necessary for justice. Both theories begin with an analysis of a world with national societies, and the authors attempt to avoid the consequences of societally influenced decisions. The philosophical foundation is based on rational decisions made by individuals. But—contrary to these thoughts—the sense of justice (or injustice) allows for the social imprinting of the concept of justice. Both theories are designed for democracies (or at least for liberal peoples from well-ordered societies) and are based on transnational communication. The analysis shows: Sen's global democratic approach needs to form global majorities and global opposition at some point. It can be assumed that some force of formation is required to awaken such global working structures. At this point, a world society could perhaps have such an impact. However, the concept of a world society is not mentioned in the theories. But the examination shows: it should be included. Even if finding just rules without a world society were possible, there is a critical point to consider: the process of constant review, which is inherent in both theories, appears to necessitate society. A global justice system, however it emerges, that is not subject to global societal debate, most likely initiated by the existence of a world society, appears dangerous.

### Introduction

Is a world society necessary for the creation of a more equitable world? This chapter seeks to answer this question through a hermeneutic analysis of the main works of John Rawls and Amartya Sen, two theorists who demonstrate distinct approaches to the development of fair international political rules. In general, theories of justice



seek to establish universally fair principles unattached to specific societal conditions. This chapter will investigate to what extent world society is needed for the discovery and theoretical implementation of just principles. Therefore, it must be determined whether a downward influence from a world society is possible or even necessary for justice. The above question will be addressed by analyzing Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* (1999) and Sen's *The Idea of Justice* (2009). Each of the two theories will be briefly summarized. However, this chapter does not seek to comprehensively represent the content of these theories. Rather, the aspects of the theories that are relevant to the guiding question are emphasized. After the two theories are presented, they will be analyzed in relation to the research question to determine the extent to which the assumed existence of a world society would have an impact on justice. Finally, the conclusions will be summarized and compared.

## World Society

Various theories have been developed to examine the concept of a 'world society.' The major theoretical approaches are the nonnormative concepts of Peter Heintz, John W. Meyer, and Niklas Luhmann (Wobbe, 2000) and the theory of Immanuel Wallerstein (Wittmann, 2018). When compared, these theories reveal both differences and similarities. For example, the theories all recognize the emergence of a global system that affects all social units, implying that the theories assume downward causation (Greve and Heintz, 2005).

Because definitions of the concept of world society differ, this work will begin with the broad definition used by Rudolf Stichweh:

The concept of world society postulates that there is only one societal system on earth which includes all communications and actions in the world into its domain. [...] World society is based on global connectivity, but that does not mean that everything is connected to everything else and that dependencies are ubiquitous. [...] Communication is the elementary operation which is the operative basis of all events in world society. (Stichweh, 2019, 515)

Stichweh also identified structures within world society that bridge regional differences, including functional differentiation, small-world networks, formal organization, the epistemic community, the global interaction system, and world events (ibid.). Accordingly, the present work focuses on this described character of world society instead of the approach of the English School, which is based on institutions and "the idea of shared norms and values at the individual level, but transcending the state" (Buzan, 2001).

The examination herein assumes that any theory of world society eventually leads to questions of justice. For example, Heintz named some conditions that are

necessary for a “minimal legitimacy of the overall system” (1982, 87), such as distributive justice. Thus, Luhmann’s theory cannot be easily transferred to this examination because it regards the political sector as an independent system that does not seek justice. The political sector is justified by the common good, not by justice (2002, 100/123/361).

This examination is interdisciplinary, as it combines political theories of justice with the sociological concept of world society. Both theories of justice examined for this work seek to expand the requirements of justice to an international level, but since there is a distinction between global and international justice (Brock, 2021), Rawls’ approach must be ascribed to the latter.

## John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice*

The first theory examined in this chapter is Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice*. Rawls famously starts his theory in 1999 with rational people in the hypothetical situation of an “original position” (ibid., 11). Rawls acts on the assumption of a closed society, which is one of his critics’ main points of contention. Sen showed very well how many problems arose from the closed society, particularly problems related to a closed form of impartiality.<sup>1</sup> Rawls presented the idea of the “veil of ignorance,” which causes people to be unaware of their social standings, such as class position or social status. Furthermore, people are unaware of the specific circumstances of their own society and conception of “the good,” as well as their economic or political situation or the level of civilization and culture. The people in the original position base their decisions on the principle of “insufficient reason” (ibid., 143). They must, however, understand political affairs as well as economic theory principles.

The search for a rational life plan is the source of the decisions in the original position. Because Rawls defined “goodness as rationality,” rational choice is regarded here as a moral foundation (1999, 347ff.). Moreover, to define how the plan could align, he proposed the Aristotelian principle: “Other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity” (ibid., 374).<sup>2</sup> For the rational, long-term plan of life, the distribution of primary social goods is essential. These goods include rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, and a sense of one’s own worth.

Under these conditions, people in the original position select the fundamental principles of a society. First, there is the principle of greatest equal liberty, followed

1 Sen named, for example, the exclusionary neglect, the inclusionary incoherence, and the procedural parochialism (2009, 138ff.).

2 Rawls argues that the rational plan is sustainable, even if the Aristotelian Principle is not true (1999, 378).

by the principle of equality of opportunity, and finally, there is the difference principle. The basic liberties can be restricted for the sake of liberty: "There are two cases: (a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberties shared by all; (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty" (ibid., 266). Rawls based these rules on the demand for the compensation of natural contingencies and accidental social circumstances. These principles serve as the foundation for the primary institutions of a constitutional democracy. The principles of justice are not the result of a debate. This is emphasized by critics, including Jürgen Habermas. The parties in the original decision were motivated by "mutual disinterestedness" (Rawls, 1999, 127).

Rawls concretely excluded social solidarity and goodwill as motivations. The "love of mankind" is something that could come close to solidarity, but for Rawls, this love is "well beyond our natural duties and obligations" (ibid., 419). Fraternity or solidarity, according to this theory, cannot be a requirement for the principles of justice. The other way around, Rawls assumed that the principles of justice realize fraternity and solidarity. Rawls is naming this initial situation as "fair" because of the "symmetry of everyone's relations to each other" (ibid., 11). Therefore, Rawls is repealing the natural structures of a society internally: "It is a state of affairs in which the parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social forces" (ibid., 104). Rawls' construction allows for the disregard of societal functions or malfunctions in decision-making, which is criticized even by Michael Walzer (1983).

Rawls wanted to show that his principles are a workable political conception. He paradigmatically showed this by referring to the political system of constitutional democracy. The author set out a four-stage sequence to elucidate how the institutional principles are to be applied. In the interim, people must construct a political system through the convention of a constitution. For this task, decision-makers still have no information about particular individuals, but they have some information regarding the general facts of their society. Following these steps, citizens return to their places in society. Rawls defined society as "a fair system of cooperation over the time" and public reason as an "idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens" (2005, 15/441). Informed citizens check, among other things, that the principles satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. As a result, citizens hold the responsibility of judging the system based on adherence to basic principles:

First of all, he must judge the justice of legislation and social policies. But he also knows that his opinions will not always coincide with those of others, since men's judgments and beliefs are likely to differ especially when their interests are engaged. Therefore secondly, a citizen must decide which constitutional arrangements are just for reconciling conflicting opinions of justice. (Rawls, 1999, 171)

The application of the theory's principles ensures stability.<sup>3</sup> The society is held together by an "overlapping consensus" (ibid., 134) of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Again, Rawls distinguished moral feelings from justice:

The intense convictions of the majority, if they are indeed mere preferences without any foundation in the principles of justice antecedently established, have no weight to begin with [...] Indeed, we may think of the principles of justice as an agreement not to take into account certain feelings when assessing the conduct of others. (Rawls, 1999, 395)

Rawls referred to this as "classical liberal doctrine" (ibid., 395). In *Political Liberalism*, he summarized as follows:

The central idea is that political liberalism moves within the category of the political and leaves philosophy as it is. It leaves untouched all kinds of doctrines, religious, metaphysical, and moral, with their long traditions of development and interpretation. Political philosophy proceeds apart from all such doctrines, and presents itself in its own terms as freestanding. (Rawls, 2005, 134).

In *The Law of Peoples*, Rawls presented the idea of a second original position. The rational representatives of liberal peoples from well-ordered societies come together, and under similar circumstances as in the first original position, decide upon international rules. Based on some changes in the preconditions, the outcome essentially constitutes the existing law of nations rather than the two principles of the first original position. The second original position is not entirely comprehensive. Rawls called the peoples who agree to the rules "the Society of Peoples" (2000, IV). Unlike the first original position, Rawls assumed that liberal peoples are united by "common sympathies" because they have a "certain moral character" (ibid., 24/25). The Society of peoples must constrain outlaw states while adhering to international rules. Rawls defined eight principles, the last of which includes the "duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime" (ibid., 37). That is clearly much less than the difference principle, which Rawls defined as an interpretation of the principle of fraternity. Solidarity, as defined as the "willingness to share risks" (van der Veen et al, 2012, 9) or as the "legitimation for social systems" (Bayertz, 1998, 34), is almost non-existent in Rawls' international vision. Rawls adhered to the idea of liberal systems that collaborate but remain separate from each other as nations. He distinguished the theoretical approach in *Law of Peoples* from a cosmopolitan view, as the latter is

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3 Rawls defended this belated verification as part of the Rawls-Habermas debate (Habermas, 1995, 153).

concerned with “the well-being of individuals and not the justice of societies” (2000, 119).

### The closed society

Rawls argued that the original position could not include “all actual or possible persons,” because the concept otherwise would “cease to be a natural guide to intuition and would lack a clear sense” (1999, 120). He defended this constructed society by arguing: “Thus to see our place in society from the perspective of this position is to see it *sub specie aeternitatis*: it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of view” (ibid., 514). Sen (2009) focused on this issue when he argued for alternatives to the contractarian approach, such as the Smithian impartial spectator, to avoid local parochialism. The closing of the society ignores many problems, such as global issues including migration or asylum. In *Political Liberalism*, Rawls discussed the reasons for this narrow view of society. Here, Rawls argued that, for example, immigration was not mentioned in his theory for getting an “uncluttered view” of the fundamental questions of political philosophy. However, what would have obstructed the philosophical viewpoint? Sen raised the same question and summed up: “The question that is begged here is whether considering ideas and experiences from elsewhere are matters of ‘distracting details’ that are somehow to be shunned for the purity of the exercise of fairness” (ibid., 151).

### The sense of justice

Moral people who decide in the original position share a “sense of justice” (ibid., 11), which serves as the connection between sociological and psychological sciences. Following Rawls, the sense of justice is founded on various concepts such as social learning theory, the theory of Jean Piaget, and the ideas of George Herbert Mead. However, no concepts that describe the balances and structures of power in a society are mentioned in the literature, such as by Bourdieu or Foucault. Rawls defined three steps of personal development: In the first step, children learn to love; in the second step, the person develops ties of friendship and trust toward others; and in the last step, the person gains a sense of justice as he “recognizes that he and those for whom he cares are the beneficiaries of these arrangements” (ibid., 429/430). All three steps occur in settings that can be judged as just, such as through a caring parental dynamic or, later, fair institutions. Rawls distinguished the sense of justice from the love of mankind: “the latter is supererogatory, going beyond the moral requirements and not invoking the exemptions which the principles of natural duty and obligation allow” (ibid., 417).

Habermas argued that the sense of justice necessarily comes with a minimal understanding of sociality:

On the one hand, they take no interest in one another. [...] On the other hand, they are equipped with a 'purely formal' sense of justice, for they are supposed to know that they will conform to whatever principles are agreed upon in their future role as citizens living in a well-ordered society [...] This can be understood to mean that the parties in the original position are at least cognizant of the kind of binding mutuality that will characterize the life of their clients in the future [...] (Habermas, 1995, 13).

The sense of justice is not only the basis for decision-making in the original position but also the source for the evaluation of constitutional democracy. People in the original position are reflecting this assertion: "If a conception of justice is unlikely to generate its own support, or lacks stability, this fact must not be overlooked" (Rawls, 1999, 125). Thus, the concept of justice must generate its own support. Elsewhere, Rawls probably showed his own objections to the sense of justice, as he argued people are motivated by various interests, such as the desire for power, prestige, and wealth. And in reality, people might force their personal interests, perhaps under the guise of moral arguments.

### **Civil disobedience**

In his theory, Rawls described conditions that necessitate civil disobedience. According to him, civil disobedience is justified in two cases: serious violations of the first principle of justice, and flagrant violations of the second part of the second principle. At this point, Rawls reverted to the abstract sense of justice for justification:

I shall begin by defining civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government. By acting in this way one addresses the sense of justice of the majority of the community and declares that in one's considered opinion the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men are not being respected. (Rawls, 1999, 320)

He recapped: "The final court of appeal is not the court, nor the executive, nor the legislature, but the electorate as a whole" (ibid., 342). Rawls regarded civil disobedience as a "stabilizing device of a constitutional system, although by definition an illegal one" (ibid., 336).

### **Rawls on international justice and world society**

The main focus of this examination is the question of whether the existence of a world society is required to achieve justice on a global scale. According to Rawls, the theoretical findings of principles of justice is free of all societal constraints. The

principles are yielded by theoretical and philosophical reflection. According to Rawls any reasonable person would reach the same conclusions about fairness. This perspective is consistent with a cosmopolitan view of humanity.

In his theory, Rawls deconstructed society and its attributes. Solidarity could be the outcome, but not the starting-point of the theory. This corresponds to a definition of solidarity “as the social and cultural infrastructure for justice” and the following conclusion: “One cannot have solidarity without justice, but one can have justice without solidarity” (ter Meulen and Houpten, 2000, 336). This may be particularly true in the global context. For example, Ursula Dallinger argued that “solidarity with strangers” on a macroscopic level is dependent on institutions (2009, 146).

Conversely, the finding of fair principles is linked to society because the sense of justice, required for the decision in the original position, is produced by societies, specifically fair societies. But there is no need for a world society so far. People could come from various fair societies, all of which with appropriate systems for creating a sense of justice. Furthermore, the closed society obstructs the influence of a world society. Moreover, the closed society excludes politically relevant issues such as migration. What is left is a much more homogeneous society than exists in reality, which could conceal feelings like solidarity (Wolf, 2021), especially when the sense of justice stems from similar sociological backgrounds. Hence, an open society, that would be necessary for the potential influence of a world society, could possibly affect the conclusiveness of the theory at all, as it is not clear, if people in an open society would decide for the same principles of justice.

International justice, according to Rawls, is the continuation of the rational decision in the original position. But the focus is now on nations, not on people, what was criticized because it could lead to theoretical inconsistencies, as demonstrated by Pogge and Menko (1989). Contrary to, for example, the new institutionalism of John Meyer and his colleagues (1997), Rawls believed that the accordance of the representatives of the people is not influenced by a world culture. Rawls could imagine a status that is close to world society:

Yet as cooperation between peoples proceeds apace they may come to care about each other, and affinity between them becomes stronger. [...] Gradually, peoples are no longer moved by self-interest alone or by their mutual caring alone, but come to affirm their liberal and decent civilization and culture, until eventually they become ready to act on the ideals and principles their civilization specifies. (Rawls, 2000, 113)

This could be interpreted as an end point of fair rules, but downward causation is not compatible with Rawls’ theory. However, there is another point to consider: an adequate international political system would include international, democratically legitimate institutions capable of winning a majority. This institutional binding of the theory is another main argument against Rawls’ theory. Nevertheless, even if global, democratic bounded, institutions were established, these structures would

not, according to Rawls, be seen as results of a world society, nor would they necessarily lead to a world society. But actually, the concept of a world society is now required to meet Rawls' own requirements for justice. As separate societies vote for representatives to lead these institutions or bind themselves to contracts, it is not acceptable that there is no outside power to control them. Rawls demanded this counter-power for the liberal society, particularly in the case of the necessity of civil disobedience. In *Law of Peoples*, he saw the problem, when he wrote about the implementation of fair-trade standards: "Should these cooperative organizations have unjustified distributive effects between peoples, these would have to be corrected." (ibid., 43). But who could demand these corrections? In Rawls' political system, society is the main guardian. For these functions to be transferred to a global environment, a world society must be sufficiently developed to form and articulate a political will and, in the worst-case scenario, to spark a global revolution.

## The Theory of Amartya Sen

Amartya Sen, who developed the capability approach in *The Idea of Justice* (2009), is one of the main critics of Rawls. However, unlike Rawls, Sen does not assert a complete theoretical concept. He explicitly does not want to answer the last questions: "Despite its own intellectual interest, the question 'what is a just society?' is not, I have argued, a good starting-point for a useful theory of justice. To that has to be added the further conclusion that it may not be a plausible end-point either" (ibid., 105). His comparative approach is, instead, to critically debate existing theories, firstly, Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*. Sen criticized the total priority of liberty and argued that Rawls failed to consider "the wide variations they have in being able to convert primary goods into good living" (ibid., 66). Sen wanted to replace primary goods with capabilities.<sup>4</sup> He defined his capability approach as follows:

Individual advantage is judged in the capability approach by a person's capability to do things he or she has reason to value. A person's advantage in terms of opportunities is judged to be lower than that of another if she has less capability—less real opportunity—to achieve those things that she has reason to value. The focus here is on the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that—things that he or she may value doing or being. (ibid., 231)

Sen highlighted why he prefers his formulation of justice by demonstrating that the capability approach allows for the differentiation of *niti* and *nyaya*<sup>5</sup>, concepts

4 This idea is very much criticized by Thomas W. Pogge (2002).

5 Both words stand for justice, but *niti* are "organizational propriety and behavioural correctness" and *nyaya* stands for "a comprehensive concept of realized justice" (Sen, 2009, 20).



from Indian philosophy. However, he emphasized that he does not believe the capability approach can do the work of other parts of Rawlsian theory, such as the special status of liberty and the demands of procedural fairness.

Martha Nussbaum, who worked together with Sen, created a list of capabilities for a good life (Nussbaum, 1998). Although Sen argued that it would be “hard to accommodate this understanding with inflexible use of some predetermined weights in a noncontingent form” (Sen, 2009, 243), he supported Nussbaum’s elaboration decidedly. Nevertheless, Sen stressed that partial rankings and limited agreements are compatible with his approach. However, Thomas W. Pogge analyzed that the focus on capabilities introduces a wide range of questions, especially if Martha Nussbaum’s list is considered.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the establishment of practical rules could over-stress the society, regarding the interpretable definition of justice.

To develop practical rules, Sen advocated for democracy, which he defined as “government by discussion” (ibid., 324). He referred to the broad comprehension of democracy as an “exercise of public reason” (ibid., 324). Following Sen’s view, a free and independent press is needed to strengthen the “global public reasoning” (ibid., 335), not only for obtaining information but also for forming values via communication. These shared values are fundamental for democracy because they are the precondition for navigating “across divisive barriers” (ibid., 353). Additionally, the activism of politically engaged citizens is critical for supporting the democratic process. From a global perspective, Sen argued for human rights as a shared ethical claim.

### The sense of injustice

The basis for Sen’s theory is introduced on the first page of the preface of *The Idea of Justice*: “the sense of manifest injustices” (2009, vii). The concept of justice is founded on reason and objectivity, which corresponds to Rawls’ basic assumptions. Sen referred not only to Rawls but also to Smith and Habermas by setting this individual starting point: “The important role given to reasoning in this work relates to the need for objective reasoning in thinking about issues of justice and injustice” (ibid., 41). Sen did not describe the origin of the sense of injustice, but an ontological origin can be assumed. Sen connected the sense of justice to preponderant feelings, such as outrage and ire, and at the end of the book, he linked justice with the “kind of creatures we human beings are” (ibid., 414). Also, he referred several times to Martha Nussbaum’s assumption that the Aristotelian theory and the capability approach are connected. However, he only marginally referred to the concept of the “good life.” Instead, he defended his approach against the accusation of methodolog-

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<sup>6</sup> Pogge showed, with Ann and Sam examples (2002, 46ff), problems that arise from natural diversity in regard to distributive justice—even focusing on capabilities.

ical individualism by elucidating that the capability approach never assumes “any kind of a detached view of individuals from the society around them” (ibid., 245). Moreover, he pointed out several times that the sense of injustice is not recursively directed to one’s own situation. Interestingly, Sen did not refer to sociologists to reinforce this thesis but to religious sources, specifically the Bible, to show the deep embeddedness of these thoughts: “There is a long history of attempts to go beyond the positional confinement of our moral concerns to the proximate ‘neighborhood,’ resisting the relational vision that something is owed to one’s neighbors that is not, in any way, owed to people outside the neighborhood” (ibid., 170ff). Thus, individuals could also make decisions in respect of group capabilities: “In valuing a person’s ability to take part in the life of the society, there is an implicit valuation of the life of the society itself, and that is an important enough aspect of the capability perspective” (ibid., 246). He also deduced a duty for acting from unequal positions of power and repeatedly mentioned sympathy as a driver for fair decisions, as it will be discussed later on.

### The comparative approach

Sen differentiated two traditions of enlightenment—the contractarian and the comparative—and chose the latter for his own theory. Through this, he argued that it is perhaps not possible to find a convincing definition of justice. Sen argued that it is not necessary to find a perfect definition of justice to identify what is essentially just.<sup>7</sup> With this idea as his backdrop, Sen pointed out the relevance of social choice theory to the theory of justice. As a procedure for finding justice, Sen advocated for Thomas M. Scanlon’s contractual approach. He emphasized that Scanlon’s approach does not produce a single set of principles, unlike Rawls’ “Principles of Justice,” but multiple principles. A partial ranking could be a legitimate outcome, without a “guarantee that a ‘best’ or a ‘right’ choice must invariably emerge in every case” (ibid., 398). Sen put his evolutionary approach in words by saying: “We go as far as we reasonably can” (ibid., 401).

### Ethical feelings

Sen also included approaches that focus on ethical feelings<sup>8</sup> and defended this against the critique of the enlightenment tradition. Although Sen did not mention

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7 Sen explained the comparative approach by using figurative examples as the Mona Lisa-example (15ff.) or the Mount Everest-example (102).

8 Sen mentioned the text *What we owe to each other* by Thomas Scanlon and the theories of Adam Smith and David Hume.

the word “solidarity” in his book,<sup>9</sup> we can find mutual feelings in some parts of the book, that are similar to the concept of solidarity. Sen’s work shows some indications of an assumption that feelings shared by all people around the world exist. The aim of the theory is to “partly or wholly” (*ibid.*, 170) overcome positionality, particularly moral positionality:

We are increasingly linked not only by our mutual economic, social and political relations, but also by vaguely shared but far-reaching concerns about injustice and inhumanity that challenge our world, and the violence and terrorism that threaten it. Even our shared frustrations and shared thoughts on global helplessness can unite rather than divide. There are few non-neighbors left in the world today. (Sen, 2009, 173)

Martha Nussbaum’s work (1994) contributes to this cosmopolitan viewpoint as well.

Shortly after this, Sen focused again on the ontological aspect of mutual sympathy—this time in a global framework. Sen critically examined the rational choice approach, including the limitations of bounded rationality and the focus on self-interest. Sen asserted that “being considerate of the desires and pursuits of others need not be seen as a violation of rationality” (*ibid.*, 193). In this context, Sen differentiated two foundations for other-regarding behavior: sympathy and commitment (*ibid.*, 188).<sup>10</sup> He summed up:

There is, related to this question, the issue of sympathy, which makes other people’s concerns—and the freedom to pursue them—among one’s own derivative involvements. The reach and force of sympathy must be part of the conceptual underpinning of human rights. (Sen, 2009, 327)

Pogge argued that Sen left behind the discussion of justice and rights all together: “They can speak of duties of humanity or solidarity instead” (2002, 62).

### **Sen’s concept of global justice and the world society**

The following analysis is meant to illustrate the potential role of a world society in two areas of Sen’s theory: the development of justice principles and the implementation of fair rules. Sen’s sense of injustice is similar to Rawls sense of justice.

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9 Sen mentioned the word “fraternity” once in a different context (2009, 274).

10 Following Sen, sympathy “refers to ‘one person’s welfare being affected by the position of others’ (for example, a person can feel depressed at the sight of misery of others), whereas ‘commitment’ is ‘concerned with breaking the tight link between individual welfare (with or without sympathy) and the choice of action (for example, being committed to help remove some misery even though one personally does not suffer from it)’ (2009, 188ff.).

Unfortunately, Sen did not further analyze if the sense of injustice is bound to certain social conditions. Moreover, he did not explain the difference between the sense of justice and the sense of injustice.<sup>11</sup> If we assume social imprinting of the sense of injustice, at least to the extent Rawls explicated the connection, this would open the door for the influence of world society, particularly in light of Sen's assumption of open impartiality.

Nevertheless, world society is not a prerequisite for using the capability approach to evaluate justice. Sen proposed that public reasoning can be used to supplement the self-centered reflected evaluation by reasoning because "social evaluations may be starved of useful information and good arguments if they are entirely based on separated and sequestered cogitation" (2009, 242). In fact, public reasoning is not a concept for integrating the entirety of world society but rather for defending the thinking process from local limitations. Here, we find similarities to Rawls', as both want to free the process of reasoning from societal influences, albeit in different ways.

Elsewhere in his writings, Sen brought up the concept of altruism. If the ethical feelings, as they are shown in Sen's theory, are connected to the concept of solidarity, then achieving global justice may be a reciprocal process. That is, for example, a two-sided concept, with solidarity as the "reverse side of justice," as suggested by Jürgen Habermas (1990). Hence, global solidarity as a "global horizon of expectation" (Stichweh, 2004a) in a world society would be accompanied by global justice, or vice versa.

Sen did not abandon the concept of institutions but rather modified it by emphasizing democracy as the process of public reasoning. He stressed the importance of all types of institutions, such as "groups that cut across national boundaries" (1999, 122). Hence, a shared democratic value would obviously be required. This described international democratic process is susceptible to influences from a world society. However, because Sen's theory has no end point, the entire democratic process does not have the idealistic aim to include everyone at some time. In a footnote, he added: "for democracy too the central question is not so much the characterization of an imagined perfect democracy (even if there could be agreement on what it would be like), but how the reach and vigor of democracy can be enhanced" (2009, 408ff.). At the very least, the philosopher does not rule out the possibility of global justice:

The point is often made, with evident plausibility, that, for the foreseeable future, it is really impossible to have a global state, and therefore *a fortiori* a global democratic state. This is indeed so, and yet if democracy is seen in terms of public reasoning, then the practice of global democracy need not be put in indefinite cold storage. (Sen, 2009, 408)

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11 In the preface of the German translation the preposition "in" in "injustice" is not even translated.

Therefore, it can be assumed that the more people who participate in the democratic process, the better the outcome. Moreover, the existence of global communication structures can be viewed as a precondition for the achievement of a global democratic process.

Sen's global democratic approach needs to form global majorities and global opposition at some point. It can be assumed that some force of formation is required to awaken such global working structures. At this point, a world society could perhaps have such an impact.

In his work, Sen is seeking the possibility of a better world, not an entirely fair world. For the implementation of societal rules, he first mentioned mutually agreed-upon and enforceable contracts. However, he also mentioned social norms, which may work hegemonically in the direction of establishing fairness. Interestingly, Sen referred to the economist and Nobel laureate in economics, Elinor Ostrom, in this context. Ostrom examined forms of cooperation based on the development and growth of social norms (2000). Sen did not favor the sociological approach, but he elevated Ostrom's less well-known approach by giving equal weight to both. The latter is probably more open to a downward causation model, as shared norms are connected to the concept of society.

## Conclusion

Is it possible to have a just world without a world society? According to Rawls and Sen, it is possible to establish just principles for the world without the need for a world society. Both theories attempt to avoid the consequences of societally influenced decisions. The philosophical foundation is Aristotelian, and it refers to rational decisions made by individuals. Hence, both approaches are influenced from the bottom up, rather than from the top down, as theories of world society assume.

Both theories are based on intellectual reflection on the good life. Decisions about fair rules are made with a sense of justice in mind (or injustice). The sense of justice allows for the social imprinting of the concept of justice. Sen's theory suggests that a world society could influence one's sense of justice, whereas this would be unlikely in Rawls' closed society.

Both theories begin with an analysis of a world with national societies. The theories' global application in practice is limited. Rawls' approach is not intended to be used in this manner. The principles of justice have not been completely transferred to the *Law of Peoples*. Sen's approach is intended to allow for international expansion, but Sen emphasized his theory's vertical indifference by not focusing on the just society as a starting or end point. Because the theory is evolutionary, the evolution of global justice may be regarded as desirable but not as necessary or even as attainable. Also, as previously stated, the capability approach is so interpretable that it would most likely overburden the world society's ability to fulfill justice. As Sen

mentioned, his approach is better suited to examining the existing rules rather than devising new ones.

Both theories are designed for democracies (or at least for liberal peoples from well-ordered societies) and are based on transnational communication. Rawls' national democracies are open to external influence, and the hypothetical second original position can be viewed as an international communication structure similar to the establishment of the existing international institutions or rules. Sen's approach is based on the principle of open impartiality. Therefore, communication structures are required for the finding of fair principles, but these structures do not have to form a world society for the theory to function.

Sen's approach, at the very least, is compatible with theories of world society. Sen did not specify a top-down approach, but it is possible. The evolutionary approach can be combined with Heintz's theory, which focuses on the existing fields of interactions ("Interaktionsfeld," 1982, 9) or Stichweh's global spheres of relevance ("Relevanzräume," 2004b), in which similar interested and motivated audiences communicate. This could be true in the case of the communication about justice. However, other concepts, such as the theory of globalization, are at least compatible with the theories.

Mutual feelings and shared values are prevalent in Sen's theory. This may allow for the existence of solidarity. Under certain conditions, solidarity is even hidden in Rawls' closed society. If global solidarity is required for global justice, the existence of a world society would influence the development of fair rules, assuming that the concept of world society is linked to the concept of solidarity, as is assumed for national societies.

Even if finding just rules without a world society were possible, there is a critical point to consider: the process of constant review, which is inherent in both theories, appears to necessitate society. A global justice system, however it emerges, that is not subject to global societal debate, most likely initiated by the existence of a world society, appears dangerous. Truly, a world society cannot protect the world from unfair decisions because it may mislead itself. As Stichweh pointed out:

If the hypothesis of world society is correct, then there is no sociality and no socially relevant information outside of this one system. In some respects, one could say that this world society obviously is a very risky social structure, because if something goes wrong in this large social system (climate problems, nuclear war), it cannot be corrected by other societies evading these problems and finding better solutions. (Stichweh, 2017, 110)

Nonetheless, this implies that global justice and world society are mutually influenced. Just principles could be requested by a world society, and just principles cannot be defended in the absence of a world society.

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## Producing Functional Ignorance for Global Capitalism: Rise and Decline of the Concept of the Noosphere

Andrzej W. Nowak

In this chapter, I ask whether it is possible to recover the hope that Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky associated with the notion of Noosphere, a knowledge that encompasses the entire planet and represents a new level of systemic self-organization of humanity. According to Vernadsky, the Noosphere is a new evolutionary stage in the development of the biosphere when human-and-nature interaction will be consciously balanced. For Vernadsky, it was a cause for hope, a chance for global, rational humanity capable of directing its own destiny. For many contemporaries, those attached to the Anthropocene-style doom-pill narrative are a source of dismay. In this chapter, I want to show how we came from hope to doom and point out that this process involved both the ideological struggles of the Cold War and the hegemony of capitalism, which in its neoliberal form promotes a non-alternative capitalist realism. For this purpose, I will analyze the emergence of a FUD strategy (Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt). It originated initially as the so-called tobacco strategy, which was a way for tobacco corporations to rid themselves of responsibility for the fact that smoking caused cancer. This strategy became the matrix for other fights around knowledge concerning: acid rain, vaccinations, or, finally, global climate change. As a result, knowledge structures are thus threatened today by deliberately manufactured ignorance. In conclusion, I ask whether we are able today to recreate the hope of Noosphere and reinvigorate universalistic global institutions to stabilize knowledge structures for a future World Society.

Wouldn't it be better to spin narratives of how humans are marvelously resourceful creatures who could do a lot better with the intellectual, social, and material resources we have? That new collectivities could together make a world better than the capitalist mess we've inherited? As someone who finds the temptation of pessimism too alluring, I keep reminding myself that recovering a utopian sensibility is about the most practical thing we could do right now. Dystopia is for losers. (Henwood, 2012, 15)

## Introduction

Climate change, global warming, the economic crisis of 2008, and especially the pandemic of COVID-19 have made apocalyptic, millenarian sentiments popular. Collapsology has become the "topic of the day." It is worth noting, however, that collapsological discourse can be dangerous. It is not always just a warning call. It does not always have to lead to action. Excessive fear of catastrophe can create a mood of panic or marasmus. It is also noted that the threat of ecological disaster and the use of the term "Anthropocene" can be a strategy for depoliticizing discussion and a form of "capitalist realism."

Catastrophism can become a paralyzing narrative and often unaware ally of the FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt) strategy. Spreading fear, increasing social atomization, and undermining social trust in public institutions are functional for the world where the "law of the mightiest" prevails. The "might one" may be a religious movement, a corporation running billions, or an influential political organization. Knowledge structures are thus threatened today by deliberately manufactured ignorance. Agnotology (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008) is an attempt to create a research platform to study the manufacture of ignorance. Bonneuil and Fressoz (2017) even use the name Agnotocene to show how the production of ignorance intertwines with the challenges of the Anthropocene and becomes a indicator of our era. We, therefore, face a double threat to the sustainability of knowledge structures, the direct threat of manufactured ignorance, and the indirect threat of climate change and related destabilization processes on a global scale.

In this context, I would like to ask whether it is possible to recover the hope that Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky associated with the notion of Noosphere, knowledge that encompasses the entire planet and represents a new level of systemic rational self-organization of humanity. According to Vernadsky, the noosphere is a new evolutionary stage in the development of the biosphere when human-and-nature interaction will be consciously balanced. This, perhaps naïve, vision that goes along the lines of Russian Cosmism is an inquiry about the prospect of sustainable platforms for universalist projects. Invented before World War II, the concept of the Noosphere only became truly popular after the end of the war and inspired the creation of UNESCO and other global noospheric institutions. From its very conception, it crossed the divides of the Cold War, on the one hand, popularized by the

Jesuit Teilhard de Chardin, and on the other popular among thinkers in the USSR until its collapse (Rindzevičiūtė, 2016). These ideas were shared by John Desmond Bernal, a physicist, and communist, who, on the one hand, was considered the forefather of transhumanism. On the other, a scholar whose *Social Function of Science* has for years been a model of combining scientific rigor with social and political engagement. I want to point out that this progressive dream of a universal knowledge platform was not simply forgotten but deliberately wrecked and became a victim of the Cold War struggles.

## Many Faces of Anthropocene

Anthropocene is making a name for itself, initially associated only with the geological and climate sciences. It has quickly become one of the “buzz words”-terms that have become trending and all too convenient from the standpoint of critical reflection. The term is usually associated with the name of Zalasiewicz, a geologist who led a research team to determine the geological evidence for the existence of the Anthropocene and establish its time frame (Zalasiewicz et al., 2015). The concept of the Anthropocene was theoretically concerned only with determining whether human development had become a force capable of changing the Earth on such a scale as to be recorded in the geological sciences. However, the political dimension of the discussion of the Anthropocene quickly became apparent. The term itself owes its career to the fact that it was soon intertwined with climate change discussions (Steffen et al., 2011; Zalasiewicz et al., 2010). The politicization of the concept of the Anthropocene has made the term a node/moment of transition for many discussions in politics, the social sciences, and the sciences and broader ecology and activism (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017). The reference to the Anthropocene in the case of activism is not clear-cut; admittedly, it can stimulate action, provide a good starting point for remodeling society and politics in a more emancipatory direction (Klein, 2015), can, however, introduce a dystopian mood, inhibiting all activity and promoting a dreamy waiting for the annihilation of the Earth and humanity (Lilley et al., 2012). This politicization has also affected the very concept of the Anthropocene, with many scholars beginning to point out that it is misleading and moves us away from crucial discussions about social justice and responsibility for environmental changes (Malm, 2016, 2021; Malm and Hornborg, 2014; Moore, 2015, 2016). It emphasizes that it is not all of humanity in the abstract but specific forms of economic and technological development that have caused environmental change on a planetary scale. The concept of the Anthropocene allows the wealthiest and most privileged countries of the world, whose inhabitants have the most significant impact on the environment, to escape responsibility, whether through increased consumption of fossil resources, consumption of goods, or increased consumption of industrially produced meat (Weis, 2013). Therefore, ecologically oriented Marxists propose replacing the term Anthropocene with Capitalocene to

emphasize that it is the capitalist form of exploitation and appropriation of nature responsible for the scale of change and its character (Moore, 2015). In summary, the Anthropocene today is simultaneously becoming an increasingly expansive, fashionable term, but is itself subject to deconstruction in the course of ongoing discussions, exemplified by the emergence of further notions ending in -cene, such as Chthulucene, Agnotocene, Anglocene, Thermocene, etc. (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017; Chwałczyk, 2020).

Today, Anthropocene has become a capacious container into which many issues are thrown, and various discussions are connected. It began to function peculiarly, became as writes Annemarie Mol, “more than one, less than many” (Mol, 2002, 55). Mol used this phrase to show how the body and illness function in medical research. The phrase summarizes her proposed idea of fractality namely ontological reinterpretation of epistemological relativism. In her example, epistemologically, we can imagine several ways of examining a sick body, but only one of the possibilities is actualized and enacted in medical practice. This makes it essential to point out the political dimension of ontology (Mol, 1999). An analogy can be made with the concept of the Anthropocene. However, in the discussion, at the epistemological level, we can distinguish at least eighty variants of the definition of this concept (Chwałczyk, 2020). Ontologically, on a global scale, the strategies and policies implemented will narrow the field of choice (Nold, 2018). At stake in these ontological policies will be global development and its directions. Of these eighty definitions, I am most interested in two: Capitalocene (Moore, 2015) and Agnotocene (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017; Chwałczyk, 2020, 4458). That is because I will be most interested in the challenge of producing functional ignorance for global capitalism (Nowak, 2022).

## **The Anthropocene Doom Pill or Hope of the Noosphere**

I will be examining the concept of the Anthropocene and the implications that the phenomena it describes may have for our knowledge structures and, by extension, our cultural memory, cultural reproduction, and science. This global challenge is diagnosed in two ways. In the first approach, the Anthropocene is treated as an expression of a threat, an apocalyptic prophecy, a foretelling of the destruction of humanity and the Earth as we know. In the second approach, the analysis of the Anthropocene focuses on the hope for planetary political, social, and ethical change. According to this view, the Anthropocene is evidence that humanity has reached a level of agency that allows it to control its own development and the development of nature on a planetary scale.

Will the Anthropocene simply turn out to be a very short era in which humanity blindly careens forward, continuing to transform the Earth until the planet loses its capacity to support us? Or might humanity rise to the challenge posed by Vernadsky, becoming the reflective, thinking, and proactive agent that transforms the biosphere into a noosphere,

and consciously striving to shape a niche for ourselves in a sustainable Anthropocene? (Schellnhuber et al., 2004, 6)

The above quote illustrates well the challenge we face. On the one hand, contemporary discussions of the Anthropocene make us aware of the scale of humanity's causality, at least in its negative dimension. We are capable of changing the atmosphere, its composition, and temperature, we are leaving a mark that will be visible in future rock deposits, and we are a major factor in the so-called sixth extinction (McBrien, 2016). Against this background, optimistic visions of self-controlling humanity, of conscious and rational development, appear utopian not only in the positive sense as a progressive vision but also in the more common sense—as something unrealistic (Norblad, 2014; Zwart, 2022). Framed in this way, the question of the Anthropocene is a good test for us, for our knowledge structures, ideals, and economic and social systems: what is the reason for such a huge disproportion between what we can do and how much we can prudently, reasonably direct our actions. With such a problem posed, humanity appears as a giant, but not so much on legs of clay, but with a pinhead. Vernadsky and other utopians hoped that this giant-humanity might awaken and realize its full potential. This awakening, however, requires a serious revision of previous forms of development. It is here that the critique of the Anthropocene as a concept and the hope for an Anthropocene understood as a Noosphere meet the critique of capitalism mentioned in the introduction. Dreaming of the Anthropocene as Utopia (Guillaume, 2014) means abandoning the naive vision of it—free from the political economy of late capitalism, and consequently a political economy of Noosphere. It requires us to think “the impossible,” that is, to think fully about the famous phrase, which we know mainly from its reformulation by Frederic Jameson and originally used by H. Bruce Franklin: “What could Ballard create if he were able to envision the end of capitalism as not the end, but the beginning, of a human world?” (Franklin, 1978, 105). Thus, it is clear that the possibility of conceiving of the Anthropocene (Noosphere) as a positive utopia requires us to go beyond the capitalist vocabulary and attempt to conceive of the world in a different order. Such a departure in terms is, in some ways, simpler than it seems. As a critic of the concept of the Anthropocene, Jason W. Moore points out that a thorough analysis of how capitalism has founded itself on the appropriation and exploitation of “cheap nature” makes it clear that this is also capitalism's weak point. The ability to develop and accumulate capital was based on constant borrowing, living on credit. Capitalist development “borrows” natural resources, clean air and water, stable ecosystems and appropriate human work (Moore, 2014). Capitalist development is not concerned with whether there will ever be a moment of repayment. Therefore, as states Jason W. Moore: “To call for capitalism to pay its way is to call for the abolition of capitalism” (Moore, 2015, 145). This call, however, must not remain only a negative reference point, it is worth following the indication

of one of the representatives of the utopian attempt to reinterpret the concept of the Anthropocene, who stated:

One which already possesses in imagination the means and the will to undo the workings of the Anthropocene. [...] We all know this civilization can't last. Let's make another. (Wark, 2015, 280)

This positive program linking the Anthropocene to the Noosphere is older than the concept of the Anthropocene (at least in its current, fashionable variant of meaning).

The noosphere is a new geological phenomenon on our planet. In it for the first time man becomes a large-scale geological force. He can and must rebuild the province of his life by his work and thought, rebuild it radically in comparison with the past. Wider and wider creative possibilities open before him. It may be that the generation of our grandchildren will approach their blossoming. (Vernadsky, 1945, 9)

Julia Nordblad summarizes the hopes for the Anthropocene and the Noosphere well in her cross-cutting text *The Future of Noosphere* (Nordblad, 2014). Referring to the Bergsonians: Teilhard de Chardin, Edouard Le Roy, and Vladimir I. Vernadsky (Oldfield and Shaw, 2006), she shows the history of origin and development of the concept of Noosphere. This concept created as a counterpart to the biosphere meant a new state of co-connected humanity, a higher state of consciousness. The Noosphere was a stage in the development of science and knowledge, which created a new level of self-organization through emergence. However there is a difference between both of this vision of Noosphere:

While Teilhard de Chardin created the concept of the noosphere to describe the ultimate stage of human progress, where cosmos, God, reason and the material world would unite, Vernadsky saw the noosphere as a stage of the development of living matter, the biosphere, where humankind becomes a geological force and human reason (*razum* in Russian) acquires power to drive the change. (Rindzevičiūtė, 2020, 2)

The concept of the Noosphere resonated with the thinking of the era in which it arose and was a reaction to the development of technoscience. Teilhard de Chardin resonates with such critics of technology as Heidegger, and the Frankfurt School (Zwart, 2022). However, it is worth noting that his approach, like Vernadsky's, was much more nuanced and did not yield only to the neo-Luddite attitude that harmonizes with cultural pessimism. Vernadsky and his philosophy what is important to this chapter was very influential in Soviet Union, shapes its policies and influence go far beyond natural science and was transformed into a social policy by Nikita Moiseev (Moiseev, 1999; Rindzevičiūtė, 2020, 180). The latter was also known for

having worked with Crutzen on the nuclear winter hypothesis in the 80 and its help him to think about governing Earth on global scale (Rindzevičiūtė, 2020, 181–182).

Yes, the Noosphere is a new—technoscientific—stage of human evolution in de Chardin's and Vernadsky's interpretation, creating a unique situation—it opens the future (Norblad, 2014, 39). This hope, however, is not deterministic. That is, Vernadsky notes that human agency matters and influences the evolution of the Noosphere. The systemic law of emergence gives us an evolutionary potential that we should fulfill. The development of science, and its acceleration, according to him, gave such hope (Vernadsky, 1945, 2), but what was most important for him was to “match” the level of the political and ethical development of humankind to the efficiency it had achieved:

Now we live in the period of a new geological evolutionary change in the biosphere. We are entering the noosphere. This new elemental geological process is taking place at a stormy time, in the epoch of a destructive world war. But the important fact is that our democratic ideals are in tune with the elemental geological processes, with the laws of nature, and with the noosphere. Therefore we may face the future with confidence. It is in our hands. We will not let it go. (Vernadsky, 1945, 10)

These words were written by Vernadsky in 1943, during the Second World War, and appeared in print in 1945. At the end of the WWII, the hopes raised, despite the Cold War for a while, both rival bloc seemed to support the idea of the Noosphere. With the creation of the UN, UNESCO (Norblad, 2014, 40) and the wave of decolonization appeared to confirm the ideas of Vernadsky and De Chardin that the hominization of humanity, its political and cultural development would at least to some extent realize the potential of global causality. Unfortunately, the hopes associated with the Noosphere began to dim. This was primarily because with the end of the USSR, the new capitalist realism changed the horizon of expectations. The USSR was not the country of the fulfilled communist ideal. Moreover, the ecological practices of the “real communism” system showed that it exploited nature on an equal footing with the capitalist countries. It was another face of the same extractivist world-system (Gagyi, 2020). However, despite this, within the structures of knowledge, Cold War polarization meant that there were still centers that wanted reconciliation across the two poles. This hope guided Sakharov (Council of Europe, 2010, 138), in part also Gorbachev, who was, not coincidentally but advised informally by Moiseev (Rindzevičiūtė, 2020, 182), referred to Vernadsky as the inspiration for perestroika and wrote the introduction to a reader on the Noosphere and Biosphere (Pitt and Samson, 2012).

The collapse of the Eastern Bloc changed a lot; the lack of viable alternatives (Rindzevičiūtė, 2020) and discussions caused the neoliberal globalization machine to change the globe in an unfettered way. This was also true for the question of knowledge that interests us (Chernikova et al., 2021; Crouch, 2016; Lee,



2011; Mirowski, 2011; Nowak, 2022). The Noosphere as a dream today must face a threat within itself. Its productive potential has unfortunately been taken over by capitalist machinery. In coupling with the global network society, the potential that Vernadsky saw has largely become an ally of neoliberal capitalism.<sup>1</sup> What could have become the highest embodiment of the Enlightenment became an ally of the new reactionary order, which might be called variously the New Middle Ages or the Dark Enlightenment.

To realize the difficulty in refreshing the hope associated with the Noosphere today, one must begin by recalling the Enlightenment-rationalist promise that gave science such a high status in modernity. Science, scientific knowledge, and then technoscientific pragmatic success promised liberation from the world of contingency and determinism. Both external and internal nature were to be tamed. This dream was taken up by the radicalization of Enlightenment, which was communism. Perhaps the most radical example is Evald Ilyenkov and his text *Cosmology of the Spirit* (Ilyenkov, 2017; Penzin, 2018; Vivaldi, 2017; Voznyak and Lymonchenko, 2020). In his philosophical phantasmagoria, Ilyenkov radically transcends the horizon and exceeds our known horizon of expectations. The reason is not only marching through history (like in Condorcet, Hegel, or Marx systems) but through the history of Earth and Cosmos (Universe). This radical vision encompassed Spinoza and Engels, and shows communism as the destiny of humanity. This radical vision of Ilyenkov, in which the fulfillment of thinking matter is self-organization into a higher being, which is communism understood on the model of the Noosphere, unites the elements mentioned and vital to me—knowledge, political hope, and thinking on a global scale. For Ilyenkov, the communist state of humanity, the Noosphere was to be not only a hope for overcoming determinisms on a global scale, but also on a cosmic scale. He drew a bold picture in which future humanity would be so causal that it would not only be able to evacuate Earth when, millions of years from now, life in the solar system would be impossible as a result of the sun's transformation. But Ilyenkov was even more imaginative; he saw communist humanity as being able to prevent the heat death of the universe and entropy. This communist-eschatological need not fully convince us. Still, the important thing is that it grew out of a particular modernist dream, a certain modern vitality that we have forgotten.

It is worth reminding here that Ilyenkov's utopian vision, philosophical phantasy, sets a specific horizon, but in practice, it is about creating actual noospheric activity. The fact that it is possible was shown by the already mentioned in the introduction physicist, communist J. D. Bernal (Bernal, 1929, 1939; Werskey, 1978) great-grandfather of STS (Science Technology Studies) and Science of Science (Sheehan, 2007, 2021). Like Ilyenkov, he developed a transhumanist vision of causal humanity at the

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1 Some indication of this is that the well-known neocon think tank Rand Corporation has prepared as many as two reports on the Noosphere concept, indicating that they deliberately want to capture and shape this concept for their purposes (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999, 2020).

cosmic level in 1929 in his book *The World, the Flesh & the Devil—An Enquiry into the Future of the Three Enemies of the Rational Soul* (Bernal, 1929). But regardless of this fantasia, he presented a meticulous program for the development and reform of science (Bernal, 1939). In it, he showed how science can co-create a just and global society. Bernal, along with Joliot Curie, was also responsible for placing the 'S' in UNESCO (Archibald, 2006) and co-organized the World Peace Congresses (Brown, 2007, 70–71). Bernal and his strongly committed vision of science were part of the Cold War dynamic and, unfortunately, eroded along with that dynamic. Bernal was popular in the USSR and Eastern Bloc countries, such as Poland (Kokowski, 2016), and he shared fate with a course of “real socialism.”

The progressive vision of the Noosphere, together with the spirit of the 'UN' and UNESCO, was in part dependent on the success of communist and socialist ideas, even though the Noosphere itself was not necessarily a socialist or communist idea. After all, the co-founder of this concept, Teilhard de Chardin, was a Catholic priest. What is more, the continuator of his ideas, Marshall McLuhan, was also a convert to Catholicism. Yes, the Noosphere was not necessarily a leftist idea, but it meshed well with the utopian dimension of socialist and communist thought as a universalist idea. This provided a platform for political ideas, ethics, and knowledge to meet.

## **Dismantling Modernity, Anti-communism, and the Irrationalization of Noosphere**

The crisis of the 1960s, involving the undermining of faith in modernity, also undermined and changed the character of the discussion about the Noosphere. From a concrete debate about the United Nations, global science, rationalization, and the struggle for peace, it became irrational. The concept of the Noosphere was marked from its very inception by a specific religious, mystical trait, and this was obvious in Teilhard de Chardin or evident in Vernadsky. But contrary to the critics (Medawar, 1961), it was supra-, trans- scientific rather than anti-scientific (Simmons, 2000). It went beyond the empirical evidence available to science, but it tried not to contradict science. When science and its position in culture were strong in the high modernistic era, the concept of the noosphere served to humanize the technoscientific era. The situation changed around the global revolution of 1968; this is not the place for a complete historical outline, but it is worth noting that the optimistic voice dominated for decades, with its culmination in the years of “high modernity” (high modernism). It was intertwined with the global cycle—science, including social science and humanities, has achieved its higher esteem and role in organizing knowledge that reached its peak of development in the post-1945 period, with its climax in the 1960s (Lee, 2011, 6; Lee and Wallerstein, 2004, 229) and declined after 1968 (Lee, 2011, 67). This period is also the peak of the ambiguous relationship between the universality achieved by science and the role of science in stabilizing

the capitalist system. It is also a moment when the fate of Noosphere as a universal frame of humanity is at stake.

Here comes a particularly interesting moment, showing the entanglement of this global story of knowledge and the hope associated with it at the very core of the Cold War (Aronova, 2012). Teilhard de Chardin's project was not innocent; it was embroiled in rather disturbing alliances. For me, it is particularly noteworthy that:

Then there was Teilhard de Chardin, the brilliant Jesuit paleontologist-philosopher who died in relative obscurity in 1960, only to become a kind of posthumous court theologian to the New Frontier and the Great Society. His intellectual system was a shotgun marriage of Darwinism and Christianity, floated on a cloud of buzzwords—hominization! excentration! Christo-genesis! Pleromization!—and perfectly tailored for a moment in which the cautious and disillusioned leaders of the World War II generation were giving way to John F. Kennedy's whiz kids. (De Chardin was reportedly Robert McNamara's favorite theologian.) (Douthat, 2013, 86)

Thus, we see that the Noosphere was the umbrella under which both communist dreams of progress and similar technocratic dreams operated on the other side of the Iron Curtain. This is no surprise then that, referring to McNamara Boltanski and Chiapello claim that "For management in the 1960s, the association of reason and freedom, in opposition to passion and barbarism, goes without saying" (Twomey, 1999). Unfortunately, the Noosphere so strongly legitimized a particular political faction caused it to bind itself to its death. Therefore the failure of Johnson's policy in Vietnam is not only a failure of American imperialism but also a failure of the alliance of state as a vehicle for progress embodied in the unfulfilled plan of Great Society (Johnson was representative of the former New Deal elite) And the subsequent undermining of the progressive vision associated with the Noosphere.<sup>2</sup> The American noospheric dream was a utopian extension of an alliance of science with the Keynesian state, and symbolically ended in the jungles of Vietnam. And McNamara became a symbol of this negative, instrumental role of science (Twomey, 1999) and became a symbol of the decay of Noosphere (at least in this variant).

1968 was also a significant blow to the legitimacy of global socialism/communism. The brutal suppression of the Prague Spring reverberated globally and divided leftist movements worldwide. It is worth adding that the Prague Spring also had its own dimension related to the Noosphere and visions of noospheric development of humanity, associated with the project of scientific and technological development of humanity. And this was the philosophical project proposed by Radovan Richta (Richta, 2018; Sommer, 2016). It is worth mentioning that Richta was the creator of

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<sup>2</sup> This helped to fuel to unmaking the New Deal as a source of legitimation of American politics (Storrs, 2013).

the slogan “Socialism with a human face” and he embodied hopes connected with 1968 and Dubček’s reforms. Russian tanks not only crushed the Prague revolt and the attempt to reform the communist system but also put to death one strand of the Noospherian dream (Sirůček and Džbánkova, 2018).

Unfortunately, the turn of the 1960s/70s, the global revolt of 1968 up to the oil crisis, and the collapse of confidence in the secularization trend symbolized by Khomeini and John Paul II marked the end of this optimism. Rationality and its alliance with science and technology began to be problematic. Instead of bringing stability and nullifying fears, they themselves began to be their source. Of course, one of the main problems was the Cold War fears of nuclear annihilation. The Noosphere movement became less and less connected to a universal but scientifically and rationally based political hope and more and more irrationalized like the whole western geoculture sharing it with the Eastern bloc.<sup>3</sup>

This was due to the fact that countercultural criticism, by combating the system of power, simultaneously delegitimized science as a medium of universality (and reason). The crisis of structures of knowledge intertwined with the outbreak of the new spirituality, which strongly plowed through the “1968 revolt generation” strengthened this process. In the 1970s, the USA and the rest of the West were a period of cuts in expenditure on science and a slow beginning of the neoliberalisation of scientific institutions, the effects of which we are experiencing today (Crouch, 2016; Mirowski, 2011). This was in line with the “new spirit of capitalism” and the transition from a Fordist to a flexible-neoliberal model of capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2018) driven by the “Californian ideology” (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996; Maliński, 2017):

The original promise of the Californian Ideology, was that the computers would liberate us from all the old forms of political control, and we would become Randian heroes, in control of our own destiny. Instead, today, we feel the opposite—that we are helpless components in a global system—a system that is controlled by a rigid logic that we are powerless to challenge or to change. (Curtis, 2011)

The Noosphere has also been “counter-culturalized,” with hopes for a global humanity shifting from the institutional construction of a global society of knowledge, democracy, and freedom to vague promises of unification. The popularity of Marshall McLuhan, the reactionary, conservative, and anti-modern prophet who gave expression to this new version of Noosphere in the notion of the global village, may stay a symbol of this. It is worth remembering that McLuhan felt himself to be a disciple and continuator of de Chardin’s thought. Only that this new version of the Noosphere was no longer intertwined with science as in Vernadsky’s vision but with

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3 About the irrationalization of late “real communism” see Velminski (2017).

global, tribal, emotional empathy. Instead of the realm of reason, the Noosphere became the realm of feeling, of cosmic communion, and its prophets, the acid communion of Timothy Leary or, in a more frightening version, the deadly communion of the Jim Jones sect.

Close to them was Bateson and the cusp of cybernetic systemic thought. As the aforementioned Adam Curtis pointed out, it was the transformation and capture of systemic and cybernetic ideas that gave us the world of California ideology (Barbrook, 2007; Barbrook and Cameron, 1996), an anti-enlightenment, depoliticized world ruled by online emotions at the dictates of a few billionaires. This was not necessarily the case; for many years, both systems thinking and cybernetics were symbols of a new and better Enlightenment embodied in Noosphere.

Cybersyn may be the symbol of the rise and fall of the dream of a Noosphere. I consider September 11, 1973, to be one of the symbolic moments of the polarity, the axial time when anti-modern forces began to regain the territory they had lost, as it turned out temporarily. General Pinochet's murder of Allende was not only part of the Cold War conflict between East and West. It is also part of undermining the dream of a rational world in which we can govern ourselves and not just be governed. Allende's death also destroyed the embryonic Cybersyn project, a cybernetic project of scientific, technological, and political revolution (Medina, 2011). This project embodied how the Enlightenment, at least in its cybernetic-socialist version, attempted to tame reality. The Cybersyn project was a dream of cybernetic, computer, and networked economy management on a national scale. Based on a feedback system, was supposed to eliminate the fundamental ills facing the over-ambitious plans of socialist countries, namely the inadequacy of feedback to enable planning and management. With ambitions that may seem too bold, this project became a symbol of Noosphere, what the Internet is not today. More such potential avenues for alternative Internet development into direction of Noosphere Hope have been available such as Andrew Feenberg's much-discussed French state-run Minitel (Feenberg, 2010, 83–106). Attempts to develop an alternative computer network were also made in the Eastern Bloc, for example, in the USSR, where the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv became for a moment the world center of cybernetics inspired computer network-project (Peters, 2017) which should not be surprising, considering that the idea of the Noosphere—a new stage of humanity in which we will be communicatively connected in one mega-mind was co-created right there (Вернадский, 1991). The failure of Cybersyn is not accidental, nor is the date and context. For the Noosphere did not “die” but was murdered. We will see this below.

## **Merchants of Doubts, Fear, and Ignorance or a Long Shadow of Cold War**

Today we know that the correlation between the neoliberalization of capitalism, deregulation, the production of ignorance, and the spread of fear and doubts is

not merely coincidental—at least since the books by Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway *Merchants of Doubts* as well as Jane Mayer's *Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right*.

By tracing institutional and financial connections, we can analyze how influential and wealthy people like the Koch brothers influenced politics, views, and the spread of certain worldviews and produced fear, doubt, and ignorance functional to them—and in effect, “killed” the dream of the Noosphere. This was derived from the fact that the target was “communism,” which was anything that opposed the anarcho-tyranny of the “free market.” Of course, within the framework of the Cold War, this enemy was also real communism, but not only; all state regulations and attempts to control the world of determinism were considered “communism.”

It is crucial that their crusade against “stateism” and regulation took place both directly and indirectly. The former is obvious—it is the financing of neo-liberal institutions to promote libertarianism, to create a network to support “classical economics” and “Chicago Boys” as the only economic option, as Susan George (1997) and Susan Meyer (2017) showed. As both indicate, the major players have pumped millions of dollars into promoting the neoliberal right: American Enterprise Institute Heritage Foundation, billionaires like the Koch brothers (oil industry), Scaife, Olins (chemical, munitions), Mellon (steel), DeVos (Amway), and the Bradley brothers. This money was used to strengthen the power of the right and to take over the universities as a thread, platform responsible for pro-democratic, pro-universal process of change. In response to the 1968 revolt, the billionaires' goal, as they themselves say, was to create a right-wing counter-intelligentsia (Mayer, 2017, 111). Their goal was to counter any universalistic idea, which could lead to self-govern, rational humanity, and some results we can observe soon—during the above mentioned Pinochet coup. This was needed to neutralize and then take over the university campuses revolted at the turn of 60/70. The plan was that this would be done not by shooting students as was done during the suppression of strikes and riots but in a non-controversial and unnoticed manner (Mayer, 2017, 108). So financing books, sponsoring grants, and paying for research will change the ideas that dominate the campus. Educated masses was seen as a thread, and general education became on target. This was well demonstrated by the voice of Robert Freeman, the conservative educational adviser of Robert Nixon, also later working for Ronald Reagan:

We are in danger of producing an educated proletariat. That's dynamite! We have to be selective on who we allow to go through higher education. If not, we will have a large number of highly trained and unemployed people. (Franklin, 2000, 126)

This quote demonstrates well how early the conservative-right forces recognized the danger of the potential for a rational space and democratic politics to emerge with mass education. As Baranowski points out when commenting on this quote

along with his analysis of the neoliberalization of education, we should talk about political education following the lead of political economy (Baranowski, 2020, 12).

The irrationalisation of the Noosphere and the divergence of the paths of progress, the dream of human causality through science, was just then get impact but its origins are earlier and connect with strategy called “merchanting of doubts.” This strategy called dates back to the 1950s and the lawsuits for compensation for discovering the link between smoking and cancer (Oreskes and Conway, 2011, 10). Tobacco magnates, in order to avoid responsibility, hired PR companies to create a campaign, which was later labeled “tobacco strategy.”<sup>4</sup> This strategy created and fueled controversies around tobacco, acid rain, the ozone hole, global warming, and DDT. This “fog of doubts” helps to indirectly promote free-market fundamentalism, aided by a too-conforming media. “Tobacco Strategy” is intended to create and maintain the controversy, then make a substitute for public debate and keep it thriving. In results any regulation and rationalization of public sphere were threaten as communist and heavily combated. The main goal is not to win the argument but to settle the disagreement for itself; as they described it, “doubt is our product” (Oreskes and Conway, 2011, 16).<sup>5</sup> This became the matrix used by corporations and right-wing think tanks to seize and retain power in later years. As results, together with an alliance with religious Christian fundamentalist its undermine hope for Noosphere in its rational/scientific driven version.

As I mentioned, this strategy was linked to the anti-communist Cold War agenda. “Merchants of doubt” by undermining confidence in science and public debate, created a veil of doubt and infected the audience with “bad” skepticism, which did not lead to increased critical thinking but killed hope and will to act. This allowed also to paralyze the work of government agencies that wanted to regulate big business. And in a world without regulation, they could create their neoliberal mayhem—a world without control and without responsibility in which industry and corporate can accumulate do not pay for the damage they do because the “fog of doubt” and the lack of regulation make it impossible (Mayer, 2017, 129). In such a world—Agnotocene, the dream of the Noosphere as derived from science and reason was no longer possible. Scientific illiteracy (Mooney and Kirshenbaum, 2009) was a weapon and simultaneously a tool for installing anti-socialist, pro-neoliberal agenda and in result as a biproduct our chance for rational Noosphere were diminished. Extensive anarcho-capitalist network of institutions, think tanks, promoting a kind of anarcho-totalitarianism (Mayer, 2017, 11) replaced noospheric institutions such UN and UNESCO as agents of political and social change. Adam Curtis

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4 <https://www.merchantsofdoubt.org/>.

5 This strategy can be treated as something equivalent to known CIA advice on how to sabotage organizational meetings: [https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2012-featured-story-archive/CleanedUOSSSimpleSabotage\\_sm.pdf](https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2012-featured-story-archive/CleanedUOSSSimpleSabotage_sm.pdf).

(Curtis, 2011) convincingly shows how this dream of a rational Noosphere has today turned into a legitimization of neoliberal, networked capitalism. This takeover, or rather the death of the Noosphere as it was originally conceived, had three components: Ayn Rand's libertarian utopia of self-organization, the use of the biological idea of self-controlled systems, and a fascination with the Internet. And so, instead of rational humanity, we got the irrational world of the modern internet at the service of the Dark Enlightenment.

This anarcho-totalitarianism, a monstrous system straight out of the *Mad Max* movies, shows that the collapse of the Noosphere's hopes was no accident, it was a victim of the Cold War. The anti-communism driving the Western side of the Iron Curtain unleashed demons that could not be controlled. The Noosphere and its promise in the Soviet Union was also having a hard time, as it became intertwined with the fate of the Real Socialism/Communism system (Yurchak, 2013). With its demise, these progressive versions of the Noosphere declined all the more when support was lacking. This was also because the internal contradictions of the Soviet system, and the abuses, cast a shadow over this universalist utopia. Gorbachev, as we remember, a supporter of the Noospheric idea, is, in today's Russia, a symbol of failure; Sakharov also lost; after his death, the Soviet dissident movement turned to Solzhenitsyn's nationalist-religious vision<sup>6</sup> rather than Sakharov's Noospheric idea (Sakharov and Salisbury, 1974)<sup>7</sup>.

## The Unfulfilled Promise of Noosphere—Do We Dare to Dream It Again?

Do you ask if I want to praise despair in this chapter? No, I want to praise political realism, only one that will be subordinated to the utopian dreams of the humanistic vision of Noosphere (Moiseev, 1999). Today, we are at a crossroads, threatened by deglobalization, the disintegration of the global order. This is the tipping point, the phase transition, the moment of polarity that Wallerstein spoke (Ascione, 2021; Wallerstein, 2000). The slightest fluctuations can have severe consequences in the future when the change stabilizes and solidifies. The question is whether we can afford to languish, doom pill as the Anthropocene story serves us, reinforcing capitalist realism. The idea of Noosphere shows that it can feed our imagination in a variety of ways. It can give impetus to the construction of a noospheric institution like UNESCO, but it can also provide a breeding ground for irrational or even reactionary ideas, like Eurasianism. The noosphere is a concept that can be a Rorschach

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6 It is worthy to mention, that concept of Noosphere was also developed by Lev Gumilev (and Moiseev disagreed with this interpretation), Gumilev ideas today are developed by Aleksandr Dugin and are the ideological core of the reactionary ideology of Eurasianism legitimizing Putinism (Bassin and Suny, 2016, 227).

7 <http://wilsonweb.physics.harvard.edu/sakharovconference/76953998.pdf>.



test—we will see in it what we want to see. Therefore, it is important not to forget that one can see in this idea the dream of a global, rational and causal humanity. You can see the dream of being able to overcome a world of determinisms. We don't have to think of it as a utopia that has to be realized in excruciating detail. It is enough that such a dream be strong enough to allow legitimizing action at the local and concrete level, to save a planet, to create the Ark (Zwart, 2016).

Maybe now is the time when to be realistic, means to think about the impossible.

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## The “New” Globalization: Rethinking North-South Relations and Inequalities from an Afro-Renaissance Perspective

Salifou Ndam

The marginalization and exclusion of the people “from below” force them to adopt subversive modes of behavior that are understood as centers of inventiveness, creativity, innovation, and multiple forms of living. It is under the banner of this logic of sociological observation that the approach known as “Afro-Renaissance” unfolds. It stands first for an epistemological break that generates a new grid of observation of society, and for determining the places of observation of the social reality that are the world of the resourceful, the *Do It Yourself (DIY)*, and the peasant world. To reach these people from below in their social logic, it is therefore necessary to mobilize participatory and active observation, conversation, interaction, and scientific “confession” through a new posture of the investigator developed around the involvement, cooperation, and partnership in research with the producers of social reality that are the people from below. This chapter starts from the “Ela theory” to demonstrate that the approach to the notion of African development in the context of globalization poses a problem of renovation of the scientific view and knowledge on Africa. It is this reminiscence of the remade African history that invites to the rediscovery of the place of observation of social realities, and to exorcise the scientific knowledge of Africans for the rebirth of the continent in the world society.



On a global scale, inequality between individuals is measured by taking into account two levels of inequality: within countries and between countries. (Boutaud, 2010, 13)<sup>1</sup>

At a time in history when the stakes are high, an urgency is felt in all areas that open up new tasks of thought to African intelligence: to develop the capacity to reflect on our problems and to find solutions that must stand out from those of the outside world. (Ela, 1994, 123f.)

## Introduction

The marginalization and exclusion of the people “from below” force them to adopt subversive modes of behavior that are understood as centers of inventiveness, creativity, innovation, and multiple forms of living. It is under the banner of this logic of sociological observation that the approach known as “Afro-Renaissance” unfolds. It stands first for an epistemological break that generates a new grid of observation of society, and for determining the places of observation of the social reality that are the world of the resourceful, the *Do It Yourself (DIY)*, and the peasant world. To reach these people from below in their social logic, it is therefore necessary to mobilize participatory and active observation, conversation, interaction, and scientific “confession” through a new posture of the investigator developed around the involvement, cooperation, and partnership in research with the producers of social reality that are the people from below. However, the rehabilitation of this approach supposes to put aside a Marxist reading of the social field.

To speak of a sociological approach known as “Afro-Renaissance” implies, in this perspective, to pose and, better still, to unveil the canons and logics of this theoretical approach to a rehabilitated reading of Africa starting from the itineraries of an epistemology of transgression. The Afro-Renaissance that we are talking about here is an approach that is born out of the “resistance” of the people from below to neoliberal ideologies of leveling the world. From this resistance to Westernization, a spirit of resilience develops that is rooted in the inventiveness, creativity, and innovation; in short, in the multiple forms of living and doing of the people from below, which reveal their social dynamics and their capacity for emulation. It is a new way of looking at things that the Cameroonian sociologist invites us to discover, a way of looking through the eyes of the “nothing at all,” of those who are left behind, of *The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon, 2004), and that constitutes the basis for specific solutions to the crises that threaten their existence. This is where the interest of this contribution lies. It attempts to propose, in the light of Ela’s work, the instruments for assessing an idea or a “theory” that can be expressed in terms of a “theory of Afro-Renaissance.” This epistemological expedition is unique in that it relies on the

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1 All translations from French original into English by the author.

gaze of the marginalized to read present-day society, once seen through the prism of Western determinisms, archaeological views, and evidence of institutionalized Western scientific potentates with the complicit gaze of policymakers (Anta Diop, 1967; Ela, 1998b, 1982). To do this, this chapter intends to start from the "Ela theory" to demonstrate that the approach to the notion of African development in the context of globalization poses a problem of renovation of the scientific view and knowledge on Africa. It is this reminiscence of the remade African history that invites to the rediscovery of the place of observation of social realities, and to exorcise the scientific knowledge of Africans for the rebirth of the continent in the world society.

## **From Scientific Determinism to the Production of an Epistemological Faith in Ela: Genesis of a Theory**

Ela's scholarly production reveals a literary commitment which purpose is similar to a production of faith. That is, in reading him, one observes an inclination towards "the underprivileged," "the disenfranchised," "the oppressed," or "the downtrodden" (Ela 1980, 1982, 1990, 1998a). Very soon, he became more dedicated to advocacy, for which his real source of inspiration was his role as a theologian and analyst of globalization in a context where the most disadvantaged are marginalized. As a result, his entire sociology aims at "the liberation of man" (Assogba, 1999). This is captured through the epistemological break he makes with the history of science on Africa by unthinking it as prescribed by Wallerstein (1991).

### **Distancing oneself from Afro-pessimism as a starting point**

The idea of an epistemological break is presented in one of his books entitled (transl.) "restituting history to African societies—promoting social sciences in Black Africa." He postulates that since the institution of Prometheus and Greco-Western Hellenism, the view of Africa has been consumed under the prism of a historical falsification that has corrupted the strategies of thought and social action. His reflections drive him to propose a crisis of perception: the end of the accepted certainties on Africa of former times, which has however enough resources, but Westernist policies of development have turned into a continent of despair. So, "Afro-Renaissance" is this logic of scientific action that relies on a reconversion of the scientific view and development ideologies on Africa. Clearly, its aim is to "challenge the fantasies and assumptions of the Western gaze on indigenous societies" (Ela, 1994a, 45) that posits globalization as the solution to all ills. If this is the case, Africa must quickly rethink a development model that places it in a new era of integrated and equitable globalization.

From this point on, it should be remembered that this consideration is a reaction to the works of authors who in one way or another embraced Afro-pessimism.

Thus, Giri (1986), Dumont (1962, 1991), Dumont and Mottin (1980), Kabou (2010), Gosselin (1978), defend in their scientific posture that the African evil would be specific to Africans themselves. It is in this sense that Nzhie Engono (2013), through his approach to Afro-modernity, has managed to deconstruct the victimizing tendencies of Africans who consider that their ills come from elsewhere, revealing the behaviors that, developed by themselves, contribute to their own marginalization. This would mean that the question of underdevelopment in Africa should be posed in terms of the relationship of Africans to the governance of society, to the dynamics of socio-political behaviors that they emphasize, of the way they arrange public and territorial policies, and of the forms of cooperation they establish with the West etc. The list is far from exhaustive. This tendency shows a continent that is therefore responsible for its own maldevelopment. This view, presented as Afro-pessimistic, has ignored colonialism, neo-colonialism, globalization etc., in the analysis of the problem of underdevelopment in Africa.

However, many authors, working on this issue, have demonstrated the contrary. These include Ziegler (1980) and Latouche (1986, 1989, 1991, 2004) who have clearly demonstrated the effects of neoliberal thinking on the social, political, economic, and cultural organization of African societies. However, the Afro-Renaissance perspective runs counter to this principle and posits instead that if Africa has broken down, has been off to a bad start, and is strangled; it is because it refuses market-based development, a development which logic would be antithetical to the realities of Africa today. This position is based on the idea that certain decisions taken in the name of the globalization of Africa sound like a scientific and social determinism that must be rethought.

From this point of view, science is, according to Bourdieusian logic, an interrogation of itself an inscription in a movement of self-analysis which consists of a critical self-assessment (Bourdieu, 1994). Thus, the understanding of the analysis presented by the Cameroonian sociologist Ela, for example, is situated in this approach, namely an approach that puts sociology of Africa face to face with its object, an object which is not necessarily external to it (Boukraa, 2003). Motaze Akam (2011) agrees with this view when he speaks of the sociology of scientific production in Ela. From this perspective, Ela tries to revisit some of the failures of the globalist and developmentalist scientific construction through numerous works (1994a, 2001, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). Thus, he proposes to “proceed with a paradigm adjustment, to restructure the field of knowledge and to review the concepts, grids, methods of analysis and reference systems, in short to question the traditional discourses on Africa” (1998a, 27). In other words, his understanding rejects an elitist science that has long hindered the considerations of the people from below. It is therefore against this perspective that the thinking of the Cameroonian sociologist Ela is positioned when he suggests a new grid of observation of African society.

## The Afro-Renaissance, a new reading grid of African societies

The new grid for observing society that the “African sociologist and theologian” proposes is part of a dynamic of African Afro-renaissance. To understand this philosophy of reconstruction of African thought, it is important to recall the genesis of the renaissance before developing the perspective in which Ela’s work fits.

In literature, the idea of renaissance corresponds to the period starting from the 13<sup>th</sup> to the 16<sup>th</sup> century and designates a literary trend that underlies the adoption of a humanist philosophy, and the revival of classical literature of the ancient era. Afterward, the renaissance leaves the literary field to become a political philosophy that will serve to overthrow the social, political, and economic order in Japan with Emperor Mutsu Hito (1868–1912). This political vision is called “the Meiji era” or “the era of lights.” It will also take place in the United States. Renaissance here appears as a result of the demands of the populations of African-American origin opposing the racist ideal that the white people had built the United States. This vast movement would flourish in Harlem-New York, under the leadership of the Baptist churches under the aegis of Reverend Martin Luther King Junior. The aim of this black movement was the rebirth of society: a transition to a society where the rights of all people—black or white—would be respected. Hence the call for the rebirth of American society. However, one should not lose sight of the idea that the Harlem Renaissance, a movement to revive African American culture, played also an important part in the recognition of efforts to revive Negro thought (Bodenner, 2006). In the United States, it was the beginning of a reflection for a liberation of black Americans from the constraints of slavery and segregation. It was this renaissance that allowed for the improvement of the social conditions of blacks in Harlem (Ndiaye, 2006). The Harlem Renaissance was interesting in that it offered arguments for cultural integration and against socio-cultural and political exclusion in American society. This process of African American liberation essentially translates the refusal of cultural imperialism and created positive elements to initiate the reconstruction of American society.

The idea of African renaissance can also be understood from a scientific and epistemological point of view through the work of Anta Diop. In fact, the Egyptologist grapples with the scientific evidence constructed by the West, which was devoted to the potentates of science (Ela, 1989). This reading is relativized when Anta Diop manages to demonstrate that Black African culture predates that of the West through his studies on Pharaonic (ancient) Egypt. This leads him to conclude that Africa is the cradle of humanity. Indeed, this great civilization saw the emergence of technical and philosophical sciences with Thales (late 6<sup>th</sup>–early 7<sup>th</sup> c. BC), Pythagoras of Samos (590–530 BC), Heraclitus of Ephesus (540–480 BC), Plato (427–347 BC), etc. Thus, notes Anta Diop:

It is striking that almost no name of Egyptian scholar has survived. On the other hand, almost all their Greek disciples have passed to posterity by attributing to themselves the inventions and discoveries of their anonymous Egyptian masters. This is what emerges from the preceding passages of Jamblicus, and from the writings of Herodotus alluding to Pythagoras who passed himself off as the inventor of the ideas of his masters. (Anta Diop, 1967, 47)

This presupposes a modern falsification of the history of knowledge, founded on the heresy of instituted knowledge and on the myth of the Negro (Anta Diop, 1967). This leads to the establishment of a dynamic of restitution of African memory (1994a), which is certainly complex but constitutes a long path toward African freedom (Mandela, 1996). The central aspect of the paradigm of the African renaissance is that African culture and values, rethought and renewed, are predestined to play the same role in development as the Greco-Roman cultures in Western civilizations (Anta Diop, 1954). Consequently, the idea of rebirth as conveyed by the work of the Egyptologist supposes *in fine* a break with the obvious, i.e., the certainties of Western thought present in the paradigm of the Negro.

The policy paradigm is therefore operational in nature, and its goal is the africanization of South Africa, that is, its inclusion as a nation on the international scene, and the defeat of the apartheid culture by legitimizing an authentic South African institution based on the homogenization and democratization of social, cultural, and political forms (Crouzel, 2000). The South African renaissance leads to the relocalization of South African political power through the monumental work of Thabo Mbeki. This renaissance thus asserts itself as a policy paradigm that denotes non-racist South African authenticity and sees itself as a vocation for the renaissance of all Africa. In simple terms, African renaissance entails the construction of a new African order around “democracy, peace and stability, sustainable development and a better life for people, absence of racism and sexism, equality among nations, and a system of international governance that is just and democratic” (Crouzel, 2000, 172). In other words, it is part of a dynamic of creating meaning for Africa.

However, Thabo Mbeki’s idea of African renaissance retains an element of complacency for the simple reason that it aims to position South Africa, an economic power since the late 1990s and early 2000s, with the need to create a network of partners, as the “moral conscience” of the continent. This vision of African renaissance is one-sided in the sense that it rests on a presupposition, given South Africa’s history and economic and cultural strength, of symbolic and material power over the continent. African renaissance has become a gimmick that is only wielded when South African interests are at stake. However, this perspective is like that prescribed by Anta Diop in that it rejects a conception of Africa as poor, underdeveloped, and Afro-pessimistic. It advocates taking Africa back into its own hands. It is therefore in competition with Western logics conveyed by good governance and neoliberal policies. It is unique in that it has been operationalized in South Africa. In addition,

it is to a unilateral vision that the African sociologist and theologian in boubou has chosen to reread and rewrite African history to build an idea of the entire reconstruction of the continent. It is not based on political or utilitarian presuppositions, but rather on scientific constructs that call for the breaking down of epistemological barriers and the de-marginalization of knowledge (Ela, 2001, 44).

It follows from the genesis and maturation of African renaissance that the review of African socio-historical and scientific literature and heritage must lead to African renaissance. This renaissance invites us, so to speak, to rethink social science, that is, to constantly rethink it, to get rid of the elitist and Promethean science that rests on presuppositions and prejudices that are misleading, and on restrictive hypotheses (Wallerstein, 1991). This posture therefore requires a liberation of the thought that considers that "before African independence, the making of history has been, since the Renaissance, on the side of a political power, that of the West" (Ela, 1989, 16). That said, the idea of Afro-Renaissance, or a restoration of African scientific consciousness, comes from the observation of the failure of neoliberal thinking, which today has incorporated African societies in a civilization where money and exchange are the elements that condition the structure of social relations. It is therefore an invitation to break out with outdated forms of thinking about development strategies. It is through this enterprise that Africans can move from servitude to relative freedom.

Although development is based on science, it is not a science inspired by exotic considerations, as a certain Africanist science maintained, as mentioned above, during the colonial era and even during the post-colonial period. But it is a science rewritten from the historicity of African societies, one that creates new issues, one that discovers itself by discovering its environment—and by discovering itself—; a science that is burned by its own heat because of what it studies. In short, it is a science that breaks with "an ethnological present" (Ela, 1994a, 45). It follows that the scientific view of Africa cannot necessarily be constructed in the light of the canons with which the West has been modeled. Even if this were the case, it would be necessary to avoid a scientific mimicry and elitism that considers Africa to be the land of childhood where it would be impossible to develop a Hellenistic aptitude. At the same time, Africans should rather develop practices that reflect an awareness of their shortcomings and the abyss in which they are situated. As an illustration, it is often paradoxical to listen to a leader of an African country in charge of the road program in his country say how much he loves the beautiful avenues of Paris, London, or Berlin, yet he diverts public funds put at his disposal for this purpose.

In view of the foregoing, Ela's work should be seen as having a sociological vocation to go beyond the study of African realities. For the latter poses the problem of the re-foundation of science as conveyed in Africa. Therefore, in one of his works, he proposes to restore history to African societies to see Africa take off as a continent of the future (Ela, 1994a). Ela makes this wager concrete through what should

be called the theory of Afro-Renaissance, which tools and approach are constituted by the place of observation itself and by a truly re-foundational approach.

### **Postulates and concepts of Afro-Renaissance**

Afro-Renaissance as a theory allows us to evoke the postulate that it intends to defend and the concepts that it has constructed.

#### *Postulate of the Afro-Renaissance*

As a theory, Afro-Renaissance is based on the postulate of resistance of African societies to a development which logic goes against the fabric of local logic based on social elements: living together, conviviality, sociability, and sociality (Motaze Akam, 2009). Indeed, Ela's scientific production, through his scientific itinerary, reveals first, at the beginning of his career, the presentation of an idea, that of the liberation of man (1980, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1990). Developed in a specific way in his article published in *Les archives du Monde diplomatique* (Ela, 1998b) entitled "refusal of development or failure of Westernization? The ways of Afro-Renaissance," Afro-Renaissance, because of the failure of development imposed from above, poses reactivity as a refusal of development as conveyed by Western trends and logics. Afro-Renaissance proceeds by deconstructing the scientific viewpoint on studies that give little hope to Africa. Thus, Ela demonstrates that development, as illustrated by Rist (1996), is a Western belief that subjects the social structures of the African economy to market capitalism. This mismatch between the logics of the people from below and the capitalist logics is at the root of the emergence of the resilience and resistance reflexes of the people from below. This resistance is therefore the result of a disconnection between cultural and social links and is manifested in the failure of Westernization and development programs and projects in Africa. Thus, the failure of capitalism in Black Africa has led the world below to rely on a basis of daily life actions, to create, to invent, to innovate from its plurality, its actuality, its "anthropo-logics" (Balandier, 1974, 1982, 2004); in short, to rely on its daily life while waiting for the solutions of the structuring actors of the world-system (Ela, 1998a). Thus, Afro-Renaissance, as underpinned by Ela's work, starts from this characterization to develop the reactive, creative, inventive and innovative dimension of the world from below, which until now has seen development imposed upon it. From this point of view, Afro-Renaissance underpins the idea of the resistance of African societies to neoliberal ideologies of development (slavery, colonization/imperialism, globalization etc.).

In any case, the setting in motion of Afro-Renaissance requires the awakening of the associative movement, reflexes of conviviality and solidarity in sub-Saharan Africa, which translates into experiences of solidarity-based development (Ela, 1998b). This consideration establishes a posture of "rupture and disconnection" of Africa from the logics of violence and exclusion to which the Westerners subject the

Africans. It is therefore necessary to understand that Afro-Renaissance, beyond a call for an epistemological disconnection with the order of world leveling supported by the socio-political, economic and cultural alienating forms which "destroys the fundamental values dear to the African man" (Ela, 1998b, 3), calls for new approaches to lead development in Africa.

### *The concepts of Afro-Renaissance*

The path of Ela's sociologies—sociology of theology, sociology of the world below and sociology of scientific production—reveals a use of the concept of the world below that includes the people of the bush, the people from below, the resourcefulness, the *bricolage*, the resistance, the creativity, the innovation, the inventiveness etc. It is not possible to be very exhaustive about the concepts found in Ela's scientific production. Therefore, in addition to the terms resistance and creativity that will be discussed in this chapter, the notions of people from below, bush people, innovation, resourcefulness, and *bricolage* have been addressed in this text.

The resistance of African societies supposes the refusal to undergo "the enormous costs of strategies and programs that have been incapable of getting them out of the bog in which the austerity measures dictated by the international financial institutions have put them in" (Ela, 1998b, 3). This implies that resistance is close to the idea of retaliation, subversion, silent strategies; in short, it evokes the idea of divergent and opposed logics to the *Western-imperialist* order. It also implies the healing of Africa's diseases—among which are corruption and disinterest in public affairs—and the considering of endogenous knowledge, that is, the capacity of intellectual production and the persistence of African know-how.

Creativity in Ela's scientific production does not imply the closing in of Africa on itself, but the invention of forms of doing (De Certeau, 1990), combining endogenous know-how and skills drawn from outside Africa, that can lead Africa to its (re)birth. Clearly, it is a question of privileging internal dynamics, of orientation towards African reference systems (Ela, 1990) and acceptance of rather supervised globalization. It is a question of envisaging "forms of creativity that unfold on the margins of the dominant system, according to a kind of 'intelligence of cunning'" (Ela, 1998b, 4). Thus, it is this form of social action that develops in opposition to the capitalist ideology and allows the world from below to (over)live.

Afro-Renaissance conveys the idea of an epistemological break with the view of science in Africa and considers the logic of the people from below who are bearers of another view of Africa through resistance, innovation, creativity, and inventiveness. Consequently, to be part of such an enterprise is not an unsuccessful effort, insofar as it must be recognized that "writing history from the situation of the 'damned of the earth' requires a kind of dethronement, an irreligious act about a deified power (...) exorcising the savage in order to make it a reality. To exorcise the savage for the staging of another narrative of reality (...), [no longer] to fall asleep to the humming of the catechisms of administrators, teachers and colonial missionaries" (Ela, 1989,



16f.). The materialization of these ideas unfolds through the construction of a new approach.

## **From the Bottom Up, a Look at Emerging Development through the Lens of Afro-Renaissance**

In fact, there is no such thing as Afro-Renaissance theory created by Ela. But from his work, it is possible to evoke the idea of an integrated paradigm for a new globalization. The notion of renaissance here consists of a process of renewal of thought, of refuting a certain idea of victimization of Africa, of reviving its logic and historicity which, until now, has been based on neoliberal thinking, a way of thinking that has failed in terms of African development. Afro-Renaissance is therefore part of this dynamic of (re)creating the canons that once characterized the thought models of societies, especially those mobilized to drive (or lead) Africa's development.

### **From the construction of Afro-Renaissance viewing place: The world below**

The construction of any scientific knowledge must necessarily be based on a place of observation from which the object of observation is observed, conquered, and constructed (Bachelard, 1970). To this end, the results of an observed reality must not be perverted or distorted at the time of its restitution. All the epistemological literature by Ela on the ideological discourse of development has led to the observation of a break that every researcher must make. This break consists in changing the way in which realities have been observed up to now, namely that of the people from above and of Westerners. It is consequently this effort to re-shape the scientific approach that Ela makes when he undertakes to look at what he calls the world below. He classifies it into two categories: the world of the resourceful and the world of the bush.

#### *The farming world*

Ela's "underworld" is in fact the Africa of today, an Africa where the bush people, the poor, the peasants, the resourceful etc., live. In simple terms, the world below refers to men, women, young people and children who are languishing in the crisis driven by the world above and are developing informal and multi-faceted strategies to overcome the crisis they experience on a daily basis. This scientific logic that characterizes the world below, analyzed by Ela in *LAfrique des villages* (1982) and *Quand l'État pénètre en brousse* (1990), is made up of the people of the bush and the countryside. This category includes peasants who have an umbilical relationship with the land through agriculture, fish farming or pastoral activities. It also includes outcasts, people marginalized by societies that after independence chose to exclude them from the enjoyment of the fruits of nationalist struggles. In other words, the world below includes those individuals who have been punctured by the penetra-

tion of the state and the farmers in patent leather shoes, still called white-collar workers in the bush (Ela, 1998a, 10). Ela presents in this world from below peasants who are oppressed and who confront the destructuring of their mode of production by the logics of the capitalist mode of production. This destructuring inaugurates their pauperization, their proletarianization, and finally their *de-peasantization*. It is therefore necessary to understand in this logic of sociological observation, an approach that positions the Cameroonian sociologist as a spokesperson for peasants captivated by the world-system and its structuring actors. This infatuation for the peasant world is expressed in multiple works (between 1981 and 1990) that have already been mentioned and makes him the godfather of the damned of the earth. This marginal status represents a social category that is best understood as being part of the class of "forgotten individuals" that account for the African realities of today. Despite this marginalization, these damned of the earth manage to fight back in a punctual manner against the complex forms of the temporal exclusion they face.

### *The world of resourcefulness*

The world below also refers to what Ela calls "the milieu of resourcefulness." Among these people from below are young people and women whom he considers, according to Motaze Akam (2011), as "social cadets." In the African social understanding, it represents a category that inherits, according to the social structures, a fragile and subordinate status. This fringe of people from below constitutes a resourceful industry thanks to the ad hoc responses they develop in urban areas—notably income-generating activities—to improve their existence and permanent survival. However, these activities, which are neglected by the ruling class and sometimes escape administrative and fiscal scrutiny, allow them to survive development (Latouche, 2004) in a context where times are "*ndjindja*"<sup>2</sup> (Ela, 1998a, 12). It is therefore these individuals who create, innovate, discover, and invent activities, objects, trades, or small street jobs which importance in social and family care in urban areas is no longer in question. In his analyses, he also states that these marginalized people produce their own reality at the limit of the formal, which he captures through the vocabulary of the street, "*gombo*"<sup>3</sup>. Therefore, he presents the world from below as the place of observation from which development issues must find the beginning of solutions through the "multiple arts of living" (Ela, 1998a, 19), or the innovations developed by the actors from below. This sociological logic proposes to "return to the world below, which is the place par excellence where we can observe Africa to-

2 This means, in the Cameroonian context, for example: "times are hard," "times are bitter," or "times are strong." To illustrate this, Ela speaks of "it's hard on me," "it's going bad," "I have pocket pains," "there's no money." These are all expressions used to translate the new poverty due to the neoliberal model.

3 The resourcefulness or low-paid temporary activities from the point of view of the International Labour Organization (ILO).

day” (Ela, 1998a, 10). It is also a place that can be referred to as “the fire of society” (Touraine, 1974). The world from below and its dynamics of social and economic production finally constitutes a promising sector for development in Africa.

Broadly speaking, Ela’s place of observation includes urban and rural African poor. However, the approach prescribed by the Cameroonian sociologist in *boubou* does not only consist in reaching out to the “nothing-of-all-trades” and the “unimportant” in their places of knowledge production, but also in assisting them in transforming their knowledge into social knowledge at the service of society. Following this train of thought, he does not fail to define the research methodology that models and surveys data collection strategies and the investigator’s posture in the field.

### **From the bottom up: participatory and dialogical research processes**

Afro-Renaissance theory as prescribed in Ela’s work is not subjected to an ideal or paradigmatic perspective. It has strategies and a process to convene, to reveal, understand and explain social reality. It is not only participative,<sup>4</sup> but also reactive. Thus, discovering the world consists in meeting the people from below with the intention of grasping all the possible elements which can allow us to understand the substance of social reality. According to Ela, three aspects define the heart of this research technique: observation from the perspective of the people from below, conversation, interaction or “confession” in the field, and the (re)definition of the researcher’s posture in the field.

#### *Observation from the perspective of the people from below*

Observation, in general, is always defined in terms of the researcher’s gaze—or the viewpoint of the beholder—and this time conceals limits that Ela disavows in his work. In fact, the gaze cast on an object of observation retains a presumption of subjectivity on the part of the researcher and does not always faithfully reproduce the social reality as it is produced, arranged, and conveyed. This is what leads us to see in the studies carried out by Ela, and in his pastoral experience, the sharp character of an assisted observation which gaze is not that of the researcher, but that of the respondent to which the investigator must have recourse to better decipher the social reality that he wants to study. The observation, in this logic, beyond its photographic vocation, would also present a monographic dimension given not by the

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4 The idea of participation in Ela does not refer to a literal and generic meaning as in classical French. It refers to this co-active, cooperative or partnership research posture between the researcher/investigator and the respondent. Participation thus assumes that the respondent is the producer of the social reality, either consciously or unconsciously, through a process of restitution and dialogue of the data collected with the researcher. That said, the research as proposed by Ela rejects an elitist science, but at the same time retains an affinity with the work of the sociologists of the ethnomethodological school.

researcher, who risks biasing the meaning of the observed object, but by the respondent himself in the process of dissimulation of the facts that he produces or what he knows. This is the case when the researcher observes the crisis and the strategies of the poor through social innovations and the renaissance of Black Africa, and the challenges of the world below (1998a). He relies on the eyes of Africans themselves to describe and conduct a monograph of everyday life in Black Africa.

In essence, Afro-Renaissance implies scrutinizing the realities of the peasants. It means living with them. As he so aptly puts it:

What is immediately striking is that the men of the rock among whom I will have to live for many years are not only despised and excluded from any decision (...) they are exploited and oppressed. (Ela, 1985, 24).

This means that sociological observation is not only participatory, but also active, even reactive. Thus, the new approach is not limited to an academic, administrative, or formalist expedition, but rather invites the researcher to more conviviality, merging and dissolution with the subjects (Touraine, 1965) and the places of observation of social realities. This is what justifies in any case the cry of the African man that he utters every time he observes the peasants in their daily life and in the universe of the resourceful (Ela, 1980).

#### *Conversation, interaction, or "confession" in the field*

Ela's information gathering process necessarily involves conversation, that is, an exchange of words (spontaneous or natural), which is in fact an approach that breaks down the barriers between the researcher and the respondent. It is a technique that deeply integrates the researcher into the intricacies of the places of observation from which he wants to collect his data. It is also a form of courting in disguise, which can also be called "the submarine technique." It makes it possible to consider popular knowledge (Olivier de Sardan, 1995b) by not neglecting any individual in the process of understanding society. Thus, it considers that the individual, contrary to what certain theories have often designated as a passive being, is above all a social actor.

As a social actor, the individual, regardless of his or her social category, participates in one way or another in making the history of his or her society: he or she is the center of endogenous knowledge. This *Elanian* posture also exploits daily interactions with the people from below. In fact, these interactions make it possible to become more immersed in social reality and to better question the discourses of social actors. It is the "privileged, often the most economical, means of producing discursive data giving access to emic, indigenous, local representations" (Olivier de Sardan, 1995a, 6). That said, the investigator's posture predisposes him or her, according to the epistemological logic evoked by Ela, to a better deployment on the place of observation of African realities.

*For a new posture of the investigator in the field*

Afro-Renaissance is also the postulate of taking charge of the people from below in the construction of local knowledge for their development. In fact, Ela's discovery of the people from below takes the form of two initiatives: the first consists of joining the world below in its realities and its logic. In other words, it is a question of conducting a sociology of the everyday life of African urban and rural environments. This entails a participatory or subjectivist attitude on the researcher. However, it is an objectivist subjectivity that shows a balanced commitment and distancing according to the case study. This epistemological and methodical posture of the researcher can be understood as participatory. Moreover, he speaks of cooperative research (Ela, 2001). The second is a posture of discovering the world from below, which aims, according to Afro-Renaissance logic, is to reach the daily life of the people from below by grasping the different alternative strategies that they use to continually resolve the specific problems that they face, sometimes in opposition with public institutions in decadence. Thus, it is a question of seizing the innovations of the world from below which can give an impulse to the African rebirth.

In the same sense, Ela uses his posture as a "man of faith" to facilitate his entry into the observation place. His double role, first as a theologian and then as a sociologist, constitutes a symbolic capital that prepares the respondents for his role-playing during the conversation or scientific "confession" sessions. At the same time, he develops the reflexes of a man who is in love with mercy and the priesthood, with humility and compassion for his respondents. He will then take advantage of this confidence to explore to the utmost the realities of the people of the world below. By proposing mechanisms for renegotiating partnerships on an egalitarian basis, the people from below are on the path of conversion and hope to be the heirs of the new path (Ela, 1992). The symbolic capital conferred by the priesthood and his modesty, even the simplicity of his being and his existence, makes it easy for him to establish contact with his subjects.

Ultimately, Afro-Renaissance aims to restore science to the service of citizens, which would make the people of the world below heirs in the search of new paths (Ela, 1982). It implies putting knowledge at the service of citizens' needs, *that is*, knowledge developed to directly serve individuals in solving their specific problems (Motaze Akam, 2011). It is therefore in this sense that science produced by Africans is not only used to fill libraries, but also to contribute to the well-being of the African man. In other words, to improve the quality of life of most Africans in social, economic, human, political and sustainability terms.

## **Overcoming the Opposition between the World Above and the World Below**

At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the "eternal" notions of "world above" and "world below" are indeed a social reality but are primarily an intelligible

construct underpinned by a concern for the evolutionary transition of individuals to an egalitarian society. Like the Marxist and neo-Marxist theses of social classes, Afro-Renaissance, as prescribed by Ela, does not consider the realities of the world above, because he is considered the executioner of the world above. In this way, when this analysis is rendered in a Bourdieusian logic, one easily understands that this posture is a discourse that is painted with bias, that denounces, and envisages a future or a futurelessness for the people above. Thus, it is necessary to recognize that science is always relative and rests on preferential and subjective values. It is a "matter of point of view," as Pierre Bourdieu puts it, and we should bear in mind that "the peculiarity of my point of view is that it is a point of view on another point of view" (Bourdieu, 1980, 40).

Thus, this revolutionary way of thinking which does not exhaust the criticisms addressed to Marxism (Weber, 1964)<sup>5</sup>, for the reason that, even if social reconstruction leads to the overthrow and reconversion of the world from above, it is not excluded that it will tame the world from above and follow the perspective of subjugation of its tormentor and the reproduction of the same logics of power relations in the social field. This means that Afro-Renaissance is not intended to oppose "the punitive and authoritarian logics of the state toward the inventive alternative strategies of the peasantry" (Motaze Akam, 2011, 54). Afro-Renaissance refuses a posture of victimization of the people from below, of their confinement in desolation, marginalization, and exclusion that serves, so to speak, the nostalgia for the production and reproduction of the logics of domination of *the nothing at all*, which has become "a scientific business."

In this respect, it follows that no paradigm can assess in advance or attempt to predict the reactions of the people from below in detail. This would mean that it is difficult to make a trial of intent or a simulation of prophetic and predictable actions of actors in the world below. Moreover, the natural opposition between the two worlds—from below and from above—is part of African social structures since these arrangements constitute hierarchies and strata that African societies have set up to facilitate the management of cities. There is no society that is not based on differentiation or distinction between social classes, however ephemeral they may be (Touraine, 1974). Whether we are talking about the world below or the world above, there is a sequence or superposition of fields in which forms of social, cultural, and economic life are set up in a permanent quest to overturn the existing order to acquire power (Jouvenel, 1972; Chazel, 1974).

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5 On the criticism of Marxism, Weber demonstrates thanks to his sociology of culture that capitalism is a system of production whose finality is not necessarily capital, but the search for well-being. According to Weber (1964), this system of capitalist production is based on Calvinist morality, which states that in order to go to heaven, one must live well on earth. But to be well on earth is to have capital. Contrary to Weber, Marx had established that capital is the foundation and the finality of the relations of production.

Moreover, especially in the era of globalization—cultural, political or economic—the sometimes caricatured considerations attributed to the so-called people from below are deconstructed to be configured differently. For globalization is an element of redefinition of individuals for the simple reason that it breaks down, however hard they may be, the barriers of social classes. It offers, even if disproportionately, the possibility to the so-called “poor” individuals to live. In this sense, it seems unrealistic to think that “being down” is a fixed condition of existence where social data cannot change. On the other hand, even in the lower class, there are those who are above and who do not envisage life in society in the same way as other “people from below.” The same is true of the class above. In other words, there are crevices in each class for the purpose of self-distinction: this is how one could conclude that there is the “class from below, from below,” the “class from above, from below,” the “class from below, from above” and the “class from above, from above.” Social classes are not closed in on themselves. They move, are dynamic and elusive. They are essentially complex.

## Conclusion

This chapter has started from the work of Ela and the literature on African renaissance to propose an analytical grid of what is appropriate to the “new” globalization under a perspective of Afro-renaissance. It is the prerequisite for a better understanding of North-South relations and the inequalities that arise from them. It emerges that Ela’s scientific work makes a considerable contribution to the intelligibility of the social condition of Africans, and to the development of intellectual visibility of Black Africa. His work is thus necessary for African renaissance, concerned with an ambitious and victorious Africa. It makes African renaissance an opportunity to reconstruct thought, but also and above all a committed approach to development. That said,

no viable and sustainable development can be conceived without massive investment and a general mobilization of intelligence [...] the future of development in Africa lies in scientific research. (Ela, 1998a, 409)

The epistemological legacy that this author bequeaths to posterity is to assume a duty to renew thought and to rebuild development models, of which “Afro-Renaissance” constitutes the fundamental scientific pillar. However, it should be noted that the development (social, political, cultural, etc.) of Africa does not necessarily require a certain self-reflexivity—under the pretext of a marginalization and oblivion of Africa in the scientific interests of “people from elsewhere” (Western scientists)—, but rather a “de-complexation (a neologism derived from decomplexing) and its connection to the sociology practiced elsewhere” (Abé, 2008, 592). This would allow us to better face the realities that make Africa a continent that ques-

tions and wonders. In any case, the idea of a so-called African sociology, based on reasons for the marginalization of Africa, is unsuitable for the analysis of African societies. Rather, it contributes to the marginalization of Africa in terms of its current epistemological posture (Nga Ndongo, 2003, 2015). Revisiting today's Africa, a plural Africa, an Africa on the move, requires us to adopt Afro-Renaissance, and to pose new development issues based on the African context.

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## The Decolonization of Knowledge as Challenge for World Society: Reflections from a Sociologist of Social Policies in South Africa and Brazil

Madalitso Zililo Phiri

Contemporary debates on decolonization have reluctantly forced the academe and world society at large to engage lingering power relations on institutional racism and epistemology in the research process. My research recasts this debate through methodological reflections that compared South Africa's and Brazil's social policies by centering the interpellations of racial capitalism, poverty, inequality, and social exclusion. I have conducted 45 in-depth interviews with beneficiaries of social assistance programs such as the Social Grants and *Bolsa Familia* as well as policy makers in South Africa and Brazil. Both countries offer compelling cases for comparison because they share important characteristics: histories of anti-black racism, slavery, and colonial domination, which have provided grounds for what today are highly unequal societies. I ask, how does the generation of knowledge in comparative public policy deployed in my doctoral thesis aid in advancing methodological perspectives that lead towards the imagination of a more democratic global social science? The production and dissemination of knowledge in public policy is defined by academic imperialism exemplified in the global division of labor; where the Global South exists as a *zone of collecting data* and the Global North produces and reproduces itself as a *zone of theory and knowing*. My aim is not to draw from my research interlocutors, rather to offer a methodological reflexivity that underscores the importance of how local questions offer a radical departure of reordering world society on a path toward knowledge decolonization. Overcoming Eurocentric sociology requires that we rethink Sociology as a project of *worldmaking*. I achieve this by critiquing positivist Comparative Sociology thereby shifting the locus of enunciation to prioritize the generation of knowledge from the geography of the subaltern. Language, geography, and the researchers' positionality in the global division of labor were problematized as social artefacts to overcome academic imperialism.

## Introduction

The production of knowledge in the social sciences is a global enterprise shaped by asymmetrical power relations such as, political, social, geographical, and economic imperialism. The relationship between race and epistemology has been more pronounced since the onset of colonial violence and modernity, achieved through the construction of the “Other” (see Said, 1978, 1993, 1994; Hall, 2019[1992]; Alatas, 2000, 2003; Amin, 2009[1989]; Smith, 2012[1999]; Gordon, 2014, 2019; Mamdani, 1996, 2021). Global comparative public policy studies are indicted in entrenching academic imperialism by positioning the Global South as a “zone of data collection” handicapped to offer any methodological and theoretical extrapolations (see Alatas, 2000, 2003, 2006). My doctoral project compared South Africa’s and Brazil’s social policies in their social policy architectures. I collected data from 45 in-depth interviews of beneficiaries of social assistance programs such as the Social Grants and *Bolsa Familia* as well as policymakers in South Africa and Brazil. How does the generation of knowledge in comparative public policy aid in advancing scholarship that leads toward the imagination of a more democratic global social science? Both South Africa and Brazil offer compelling cases for comparison because they share important characteristics: histories of anti-black racism, slavery, and colonial domination, which have provided grounds for what today are highly unequal societies (see Marx, 1998; Horne, 2007; Telles, 2004; Phiri, 2017, 2020a).

Drawing on my interlocutors and longitudinal public datasets on income, wealth, and social inequality the doctoral study concluded that the commodification of social provisioning in an era of a hierarchical racialized neoliberal social policy making threatens the imagination of a new social contract (Phiri, 2017, 2020a). Neither countries are prototypical examples of 21<sup>st</sup>-century progressive social policies of the Global South. While progressive in design, the two countries’ social policies are residual, failing to challenge institutional legacies of anti-Black racism and Black genocide which are foundational to citizenship in both South Africa and Brazil (see Phiri, 2017, 2020b; Magubane, 1996; Nyoka, 2016, 2019; Mamdani, 2021). This research, however, problematizes and critiques colonially constructed permutations that for knowledge to be considered “true knowledge” it should be Western (see Mignolo, 2009, 2011). It was common at various stages of my doctoral career for both Western and African academic colleagues, in several conferences that I presented, on the African continent and across the world, to ask “why should an African, a Malawian for that matter be fit to conduct a comparative study of South Africa and Brazil?” One would be excused to be left in oblivion to believe that such a question is neutral and therefore does not raise what is considered *dated* and/or *anachronistic* discussions on colonial legacies that have defined global geographical classifications and hierarchization of knowledge ecologies.

Global academia is presented as a neutral space that champions a democratic sharing of knowledge and ideas yet abstracted from the racialized hierarchies it has perpetuated for centuries. It goes without saying that emerging scholars enmeshed in a Eurocentric canon of producing knowledge do not face similar levels of scrutiny. This point was made clear in the 2006 Hollywood blockbuster, *The Last King of Scotland*, that documented the rise and fall of the Ugandan despot Idi Amin. The film portrays the fictional character of a young Scottish medical student, Nicholas Garrigan with dull prospects at home, who decides to seek adventure abroad by working at a Ugandan missionary clinic. He stumbles upon his newfound purpose by tossing a coin that falls on the map of Uganda, which becomes his preferred destination to explore a career in medicine. The young medical student's desires and ambitions are not subject to any scrutiny, as Uganda becomes for him *terra nullius*, providing a sense of ownership of space, wonder, adventure, and sexual experimentations with what has been polarizing constructed as the "Native" which was cemented through a "discourse of alterity" (Mafeje, 1992) and "the bastardized Other" (Fanon, 1963; Said, 1978, 1993). The relationship between race and epistemology becomes more pronounced as such ambitions do not place questions on the privileged positions that "Whiteness" as a mythical hegemonic concept of total existence exerts in the global knowledge production ecology.

That knowledge was colonized, hierarchical, Eurocentric and therefore racialized is not a new phenomenon. Had not Hegel's *Philosophy of History* mythologized "Africa proper" as the land of childhood, asks Mamdani (1996: 4). Yet radical Black theorists never viewed the European canon as a theoretical and intellectual *cul-de-sac*; but rather agitated for emancipatory knowledge ecologies for the erstwhile oppressed people of African descent (see Fanon, 1963; Cesaire, 1972; Nkrumah, 1973; Diop, 1981; Mudimbe, 1988; Mafeje, 1992; Nyoka, 2019). According to the Eurocentric mind, "Africans were no ordinary children. They were destined to be so perpetually—in the words of Christopher Fyfe, Peter Pan children who can never grow up, a child race" (Mamdani, 1996, 4). This chapter problematizes the comparative method by reifying the importance of thinking with Global Southern theorists methodologically to make sense of empirical comparative studies. In contemporary times the global academic project has been animated with novel imaginations toward knowledge decolonization such as the *#RhodesMustFall* and *#BlackLivesMatter* in South Africa, Europe, and across the Black Atlantic. In the past decade, these Fallists movements attempted to challenge hegemonic Eurocentric traditions of the syllabi premised on sovereign epistemologies that are deeply ingrained in a global academic project. While this wave is noble and should be applauded some scholarly responses border on the hagiographic and charlatan intellectualism; by not tapping into a reach repository of an African intellectual archive that has historically been positioned to sovereignly withstand academic imperialism and the Eurocentric nature of the global academic project. Borrowing from the Malaysian sociologist Fareed Hussein Alatas (2003), I define academic imperialism as the West's monopo-

listic control and influence over the nature and flows of social scientific knowledge even though political independence has been achieved across erstwhile colonized countries.

This chapter brings to the fore the researcher's dexterity and ability to navigate social artefacts such as, language, gender, and geography as pivotal to advancing knowledge decolonization. Both South Africa and Brazil continue to exist in the "metaphysical empires" that were cemented since the inception of colonial modernity. Simultaneously, I challenge the assumption that local questions should be localized. Local questions invoke universal applications and vice versa. For decades, research about societies in the Global South has been advanced by scholarship located in the Global North (see Alatas 2000, 2003, 2006). While this asymmetrical research relationship has yielded substantial theoretical approaches to understanding poverty, inequality, social change, and political developments; local lead researchers have been peripherized and at times marginalized not as interlocutors in the global knowledge ecology. Overcoming Eurocentric sociology requires that we rethink Sociology as a project of *worldmaking*. Through the lenses of thinking with theory and methods, this research contributes to critical debates on race and epistemology by pivoting the perspectives of the erstwhile colonized and oppressed peoples of the world as interlocutors and co-creators in the global knowledge ecology (see Smith, 2012; Sandoval, 2000; Bonilla-Silva and Zuberi, 2008; Chilisa, 2012).

## **Academic Imperialism and Comparative Public Policy Studies: South Africa and Brazil through the Lenses of the Comparative Method**

The epistemological foundations of "Comparative Sociology" encompasses asymmetrical knowledge production relations between the Global North and South. Since the 1960s and 1970s there had been several approaches to comparative theorizations (Gee, 1950; Rokkan, 1966; Verba, 1967; Sartori, 1970; Mill, 1973; Skocpol, 1979; Skocpol and Somers, 1980) which had advanced "Comparative Studies" and "knowledge" about the evolution of Western state formation as well as the Global South. Ragin (1981) argued that it is impossible to think without comparison. For Ragin although some perspectives suggested that, virtually all social scientific methods are comparative in the broad sense; in sociology the term comparative method usually is used to refer to the comparison of whole societies. Comparative Sociology cannot be abstracted from the colonial and imperial machinations that have perpetuated epistemic racism for decades. Most theorists that are considered pioneering figures of Sociology as a discipline let alone "Comparative Sociology" have theorized about "society" or "societies" from privileged polarized localities while their scholarship was enmeshed in fiendish ideas of racial hierarchy, imperialism and White supremacy (see Rabaka, 2022, 2021, 2010; Morris, 2015; Bhambra and Holmwood, 2021). Implicit in the ideational composition of most comparative

studies is an “academic imperialism” that is couched in political, economic, social and cultural imperialism that was forged since the inception of Euro/American colonial modernity. Alatas suggests the following:

Today, academic imperialism is more indirect than direct [...] In the postcolonial period what we have is academic neo-imperialism or academic neo-colonialism as the West’s monopolistic control and influence over the nature and flows of social scientific knowledge remain intact even though political independence has been achieved. (Alatas, 2003, 601f.)

Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, intellectual imperialism was achieved through a narcissistic and divisive thirst for geo-political dominance agenda of an insecure United States empire, that birthed American Studies and Area Studies. Burden-Stelly (2018, 78) notes: “the American studies project was conceived to describe, construct—and later critique—a particular American culture and civilization (i.e. national self-determination) *vis-à-vis* other ‘great’ civilizations in order to provide a scholarly basis for American empire.” In the same breadth, Area Studies overtly and covertly championed the gathering of ‘knowledge’ of erstwhile colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, as the United States was enmeshed in a bi-polar rivalry with the Soviet Union, justifying the State Department’s funding of a global project of knowledge domination. The Malawian historian, Paul Zeleza, critiques this approach highlighting the polarizing effects this had in the global knowledge ecology. He argues,

The social science and humanities disciplines strutting into the American academy remained resolutely ethnocentric. They concocted from sanitized American and European experiences universal models and theories that blissfully ignored the reality and diversity of global histories and geographies, cultures and societies, politics, and economies. The area studies project enabled the disciplines both to retain their epistemic superiority and acquire new testing sites for the affirmation of their supposedly eternal theoretical probity. (Zeleza, 2019, 8)

The West as a concept created an avatar of its civilization, the nation-state, which cemented cultural imperialism (Said, 1993) through classification, comparison, and criteria of evaluation, thereby consolidating ideas that perpetuate asymmetrical location of knowledge from the Global South knowledge as inferior. But what exactly is the West? The Jamaican born British scholar Stuart Hall (2019) contested the idea of the West as located in a rigid trans-geographical location. Rather he suggested, “the West” is a historical, not a geographical construct. Hall avers:

[B]y “Western” we mean the type of society that is developed, industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, secular, and modern. Such societies arose at a particular historical period—



roughly, during the sixteenth century, after the Middle Ages and the breakup of feudalism. (Hall, 2019, 142)

Not only does the West exist as a historical construct, but the amalgamation of ideas, practices, symbol formation, values, and institutions since the inception of colonial modernity produced the West as a concept. Hall (2019) identifies four traits that solidified the West as a concept. First, the West “allows us to characterize and classify societies into different categories—i.e., ‘Western,’ ‘non-Western.’ It is a tool to think with. It sets a certain structure of thought and knowledge in motion” (Hall, 2019, 142). Second, “it is an image, or set of images. It condenses a number of different characteristics into one picture” (Hall, 2019, 143). Third, it provides a standard or model of comparison. It allows us to compare to what extent different societies resemble, or differ from, one another. Non-Western societies can accordingly be said to be “close to” or “far away from” or “catching up with” the West. It helps to explain difference (Hall, 2019, 143). Fourth, it provides criteria of evaluation against which other societies are ranked and around which powerful positive and negative feelings cluster (Hall, 2019, 143).

Academic imperialism is more evident in public policy discourses which have canonized policy experiences of Western industrial democracies, and the quantification of policy contours through statistical modeling. By suggesting this, I am not advocating the non-usage of statistical modeling in the social sciences; and also arguing that the Global South and North are homogeneous research entities. However, we do ourselves a disservice to not underscore the importance of racism and epistemology within the ambits of public policy studies. In several explanatory studies of comparative public policy, the Global South is deemed not to contain rigorous statistical, theoretical, and methodological contributions that warrant theorization. Bonilla-Silva and Zuberi (2008) provide a comprehensive account of how contemporary statistical modeling was inextricably linked to the numerical analysis of human difference. They opine that, “eugenic ideas were at the heart of the development of statistical logic. Statistical logic, as well as the regression-type models that they employed, is the foundation on which modern statistical analysis is based” (Bonilla-Silva and Zuberi 2008, 8). Further, several edited comprehensive volumes on public policy and methodology published between 2000 and 2020 either erase the public policy experiences of the Global South or completely engage in a colonially informed lexicography that perpetuates alterity (see Moran et al., 2018; Fischer et al., 2007; Lunn, 2013). The thematic line of argument pursued in these handbooks is that policy decisions combine sophisticated technical knowledge with complex social and political realities but defining public policy itself has confronted various problems. The Global South is condemned to an anachronistic period divorced from the “canon of thinking” and “belonging”, therefore excluded from the normative teleological goals of Western public policy.

The persistent opposition to the project of colonial modernity is what has pre-occupied critical scholars on the African continent and Global South whose experiences had been profoundly scarred by colonial modes of being and consciousness (Said, 1978, 1993, 1994; wa Thiong'o, 1986, 2012; Mudimbe, 1988; Hall, 2019; Chakrabarty, 2000; Mamdani, 2013, 2021; Mkandawire, 2005; Gordon, 2011, 2019; Hoppers and Richards, 2012). Since the inception of public policy, the discipline envisioned a multidisciplinary enterprise capable of guiding political decision processes of post Second World War industrial societies (Moran et al., 2018; Fischer et al., 2007; Lodge, 2007). This vision of public policy was to cut across various specializations, including contributions from political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, statistics and mathematics, and even the physical and natural sciences in some cases (Lodge, 2007). Most societies of the Global South existed as colonial appendages; and could therefore not bring novel approaches to the development of the field. This has been the case, where the asymmetrical power relations produced a policy discourse where Western democratic experiences have matured and therefore warrant being studied, whereas the Global South exists outside the bounds of all policy experiences. While most policy scholars and practitioners in the West abandoned this myopic vision of public policy for a narrower view of development, most societies in the Global South had not reached the teleological goal of comprehending trends in public policy. Even Esping-Andersen's (1985, 1990, 2013) Welfare Regime Approach is only focused on industrial democracies. In the so-called Global South, countries that are taken "seriously" are South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, China and India whose public policy institutions straddle between the normative worlds of "industrial democracies" and "developing societies."

In contrast, my doctoral study attempted to transcend academic imperialism by comparing two societies in the Global South, carved out of imperial, colonial and racist capitalisms. South Africa's public policies predate the post democratic settlement, rooted in the polarizing redistributive mechanisms of British colonial institutions and apartheid segregated social provisioning throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Brazil's rediscovery of social policy has been presented as a panacea and a model for the Global South to address institutional inequality and poverty. However, Brazil's social citizenship has been masqueraded under the inclusivity of racial diversity and pluralism. Colonial institutions cemented racial classification, hierarchization and heterogeneity. Portuguese colonialism in Brazil in particular bred division, White supremacy, racialization, social stratification, and marginalization and the skewed applications of social policies in the republican and authoritarian eras. Slavery, as a foundational institutional principle of capitalist production and social control assumes an unquestionable status shaping subsequent social policy regimes that were developed throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The nature of Brazil's capitalist development and social policy was rooted in eugenics, blood purity of Europeans, White Supremacy and anti-black racism (see Phiri, 2017, 2020a). The qualitative element of my doctoral study was divided into two sectors: beneficiaries of social assistance

(amounting to 38 interviewees) and 7 policy makers; across race, class, gender, and geography of the interlocutors. In total, 45 qualitative interviews were conducted in both South Africa and Brazil that focused on both the lived experiences of poverty and inequality and the policy perspectives from social policy experts in both countries. The 38 in-depth interviews targeted beneficiaries of welfare programs in both South Africa and Brazil. The 7 key informant interviews were conducted with policymakers and academics with expert knowledge on the ideas and designs of South Africa and Brazil's social policy architectures.

Key informant interviews were administered to assess the technical and comprehensive articulations of policy contestations in both South Africa and Brazil. In South Africa, beneficiaries of social grants were interviewed in Mangalase, Chiawelo and Lawley in Soweto in Gauteng Province, and two villages in Ntshuxi and Bungeni in Limpopo between August and October 2015. Policy perspectives were provided by social policy experts and government officials from the Department of Social Development (DSD) and The Presidency in the City of Tshwane between September 2015 and October 2015. One key informant interview from South Africa was conducted in February 2016 after the researcher had returned from Brazil. In Brazil, beneficiaries of *Bolsa Familia* and other social assistance programs were interviewed in urban peripheries: Casa Forte in Recife, State of Pernambuco, and Osasco and Vila Nova de Juguario in the city and State of São Paulo between November and December 2015. Policy perspectives were provided by social policy experts and government officials from Brazil's Ministry of Social Development (MSD) in Brasilia and São Paulo in the same period. *Table 1* illustrates the contours of composition of South Africa's and Brazil's social policy architectures as well as the social and political artefacts that have shaped public policy responses of both countries.

Several studies have explained the nature of durable poverty and inequality in South Africa and Brazil (Seidman, 2010; Huchzermeyer, 2002, 2004; Barrientos, 2013; van der Westhuizen, 2012, 2013; Leubolt, 2013, 2014, 2015). Fewer studies, however, have advanced the approach of comparative public policies within the two countries' social policy architectures. In both countries, the social policy architectures oscillate between liberal and conservative regimes. There is a dearth of comparative public policy in the Global South for the purpose of theory building and interrogation of thorough sociological explanations of the persistence of poverty, inequality, and social exclusion. If the methodological developments are present, they lack the methodological groundings for further theorizations. As early as the 1970s, Porter went on to suggest that "despite a strong emphasis on the comparative tradition, a rigorous comparative methodology had not emerged. The reason for this lack had to do with great difficulties that a rigorous comparative methodology would impose" (Porter, 1970, 144). By centering my research reflexivity of the 38 beneficiaries of social assist programs, I contribute to methodological approaches

that fortify comparative public policy studies from the Global South for global relevance.

## **Comparative Reflexivity in Conducting Research in South Africa and Brazil**

### **South Africa**

The in-depth interviews were administered over a three-month period between July and September 2015. The participants in the South African cohort identified themselves as poor as they are below an income threshold where the state categorizes them as poor. The research had to overcome the discourse of studying poverty that is ubiquitous in international humanitarian discourse and therefore synonymous with poverty as a “social zoo.” In these approaches, interlocutors are constantly probed to speak about the experiential perspectives of marginalization and exclusion in a democratic polity such as South Africa. While these strategies have somewhat yielded substantial data to inform policy decisions at national and international levels, the research process itself can be dehumanizing to respondents. The poor areas of the township are associated with inertia and impossibilities that characterize the post-apartheid democratic settlement. At the point of interaction with the researcher, the interviewed cohort did not describe themselves as being poor. This does not mean, however, that they are not poor, yet it confirms Nguyen’s argument to understand Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) messages in the developing world:

The increasing scope of humanitarian intervention in today’s world has drawn attention to how the humanitarian industry constructs a logic of intervention that displaces local politics and contributes to the fashioning of new identities, a process that has been described as “mobile sovereignty.” The humanitarian “apparatus,” blending military and biomedical intervention, is a specialized and highly structured crystallization of broader, more diffuse transnational processes wherein a diversity of groups, often referred to as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), involved in a plethora of activities ranging from advocacy to service delivery, coalesce across different settings around specific issues. Humanitarian issues are most sharply expressed as health issues—threats to the lives and well-being of populations, as in the case of famines, war, and epidemics, are those that call forth the deployment of humanitarian apparatuses and the need for timely intervention. (Nguyen, 2004, 125f.)

**Table 1: Historical institutional legacies and politics in South Africa and Brazil's social policy architectures**

Case	Institutional legacies, demographics	Typology of social policy architecture	Political system	Coverage of social assistance and % of country's GDP
<b>South Africa</b>	Settler colonialism (Dutch, British colonial and imperial institutions)	Liberal to conservative	Constitutional democracy	Social grants (child support grant, old age pension, disability grant)
	Slavery, colonialism, indentured labor, Apartheid, 1500 to 1994	Quasi-universal	Quasi federal state	17 million recipients
	Multi-racial/ethnic, multilingual, Black African (80%), White European (8%), Coloured (9%), Indian/Asian (3%)	Targeted programs with no conditions	Dominant one party since democratic transition in 1994	
	Racial Capitalism discourse that cemented fragmented nation(s)	Social wage (no-fee paying school, expanded public works, public housing for the poor, healthcare, school feeding schemes)	ANC electoral dominance between 2000 and 2016	3.5% of South Africa's US\$343 billion GDP

Table 1 (cont.)

Case	Institutional legacies, demographics	Typology of social policy architecture	Political system	Coverage of social assistance and % of country's GDP
<b>Brazil</b>	Settler colony (mainly Portuguese albeit other European influences)	Conservative	Constitutional democracy	<i>Bolsa Familia</i> , City Income, National Minimum Wage
	Slavery, colonialism, coerced labor, patrimonialism until 1888	Universal access	Decentralized federative republic	14 million recipients
	Multi-ethnic, monolingual White European (48%), Pardo (43%), Black (8%), Asian (1%), Indigenous (0.4%)	Means-tested targeted programs with conditions	Fragmented coalition politics since democratic transition in 1988	
	Racial democracy discourse cemented a one-nation narrative	Social wage (universal access to healthcare, limited public housing, no-fee paying school, school feeding schemes)	Worker's Party coalition governance between 2003 and 2016	0.5% of Brazil's US\$2 trillion GDP

Source: Author; CIA World Factbook.

In all the interviews, the researcher was explicit that the contents of the in-depth interviews would not immediately lead to a radical shift in the perceived policies that keep marginalized citizens in conditions of indigence. Poor and marginalized citizens live with a sense of expectation and optimism that, somehow, their situations will change. In this instance, the in-depth interview guide presents a neutrality that is associated with the interviewer. Empathy to victims of structural poverty has in recent times been highlighted as crucial to informing a novel discourse on understanding power asymmetries that are embedded in research practices. The World Bank series titled *Voices of the Poor* (2000), at the turn of the century, incorporated primary research using Participatory Poverty Assessment (PAR) aimed at shifting polarizing discourses that had defined poverty research for decades. While this approach was noble, as it incorporated the interactions of the poor, and multi-level analyses of how the poor interact with institutions of power, the present study, from the onset, aimed to balance the ethical bankruptcy of what has been suggested as “confessional technologies” and the realities of how the poor see their lives being lived in a politically dynamic context.

The aim of the in-depth interview was not to induce emotions that would drive the respondent to arrive at baseless inferences, rather to theorize with the beneficiaries of Social Grants as interlocutors. The questions were designed thematically to ensure that social assistance beneficiaries could relate their lived experiences with a politically dynamic polity. This was more evident in South Africa’s urban and rural areas. The researcher had initially planned that one-on-one interviews would be conducted with willing participants; yet the fieldwork experience, in some instances, was contrary. In South Africa, some of my interlocutors decided to invite their friends to listen to their perspectives of living in a society that administers social assistance to them. Rather, the in-depth interview could be used for multiple functions to gain insights into the normative understanding of the complex emergencies in the researched area.

For example, one beneficiary, who the researcher interviewed in Limpopo, had been previously married to a man who was then deceased, but had practiced polygamy. The first wife agreed to be interviewed; yet she also insisted that the second wife who had been previously married to the deceased be part of the interview. After the interview was concluded, the interviewees insisted that the script should be recorded and transcribed as one voice, as the views that were expressed by both reflected what they deemed to be important in relation to the social assistance received. It is crucial to see the effectiveness in using the instrument not as the only method of obtaining data. Some scholars caution against the use of Focus Groups,

to the exclusion of other methods, citing the potential for the silencing of voices, especially when group members have ongoing social relations. Because of small-group dynamics, minority opinions can be silenced, or group members with less power may be less willing to present their views. (Mitchell, 1999, 28)

The design of the in-depth interview catered for individually focused interviews; yet the experiences in the fieldwork were an aberration from the original design. The same trend was also noted in Chiawelo, where residents decided to listen-in on the interviews that were carried out. Similar to this occurrence, the researcher was confronted with instances in both Chiawelo and Ntshuxi where the interviewees living in sole households decided to be interviewed all at once. There are key differences in the group and individual emphasis of the nature of these interviews. Short (2006, 107) "has suggested that, with focus groups, the unit of analysis is the group not the individual. Participants respond directly to a moderator's questions and to comments made by other members of the group." Yet the researcher did not depart from the original intent of the research design which was to administer in-depth interviews of selected participants by maintaining their individuality. In Chiawelo, complications emerged as some of the beneficiaries had decided to talk about private expenditure patterns of social assistance benefits with the lives of their friends/neighbors. At times, other beneficiaries told their friends to include information that they thought was being omitted by them. This was not a form of interference.

The silence that was observed by participants even when gently probed to answer the questions can be explained on multiple levels. Firstly, the in-depth interviews were conducted in areas where the researcher would establish relations with local key informants and the leading administrative figures such as chiefs. Gaining this trust with local administrators did not mean respondents would be amenable to the contents of the questions. Some respondents felt that they could not discuss these issues as they suspected that the government was gathering information so that social assistance would be rescinded. Secondly, the silence also explains some of the hidden power relations of the history of research, South Africa's social history, language, and gender dimensions. How can a non-South African person understand fully the lived experiences of poverty, marginalization, and social exclusion? Simultaneously, how can a male researcher ask questions about the experiences of poverty and inequality as they relate to race, class and gender? A comprehension of the bifurcated knowledge production of colonial modernity however, points to a different theorization of gender stratification in the global value chain. Oyewùmi (2002) suggests that

a hallmark of the modern era is the expansion of Europe and the establishment of Euro/American cultural hegemony throughout the world. Nowhere is this more profound than in the production of knowledge about human behavior, history, societies, and cultures. One effect of this Eurocentrism is the racialization of knowledge: Europe is represented as the source of knowledge and Europeans as knowers. Thus, male gender privilege as an essential part of European ethos is enshrined in the culture of modernity. (Oyewùmi, 2002, 1)



South Africa is woven in a complex web of social and power relations that are shaped by a history of imperial domination, racial capitalism, and the production of racialized knowledge. These complexities cannot be overcome by administering an in-depth interview guide and simply stating that the foundational premises of sociology as a discipline are Eurocentric. In so far as these categories exist, for outsiders, the task of doing research in the South African context is fraught with managing these complex social relations. The answers that were given by respondents are relevant to explaining what they perceived to be important. The researcher is not able to manipulate the discussions of the respondents so that they were amenable to the findings of the research. The researcher is always in constant dialogue that the imperial practices that are associated may not be replicated. Smith (2012, 58) cautions that “research through ‘imperial eyes’ describes an approach which assumes that Western ideas about the most fundamental things are the only ideas possible to hold, certainly the only rational ideas, and the only ideas which can make sense of the world, of reality, of social life and of human beings.” In the same breath, the researcher’s physical endowments come with their own limitations and baggage, whether it is being male (gender), educated (class) and Malawian (nationality). The most important attribute of any research, however, is that the empirical data should either validate or subvert a theory.

## Brazil

The interviews in Brazil were administered over a three-month period between October and December 2015. The researcher was also aware of the power dynamics that have shaped practices of research on the underprivileged in the Brazilian context. A heightened sensitivity to the depiction and framing of poverty as something that is associated with the Brazilian *favelas* needed to be demystified. In the initial site of research, Recife’s Casa Forte, the power and social relations were evident from the onset. The researcher was introduced to a community organizer and a representative of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)*—(Worker’s Party), who facilitated a meeting with my interlocutors in Casa Forte. All the interviews in Casa Forte, except for one, were conducted inside the homes of beneficiaries of social assistance. Contrary to the framing of Brazil’s race relations through the lenses of a “racial democracy” (which has been challenged in recent times in Brazil’s complicated socio-historical context) all the respondents mentioned their delineated racial categories. The in-depth interview stressed the importance of identifying the categories of location, age, race and gender.

The ten interviewees in Casa Forte initially showed reluctance to categorize themselves in the vast classifications in which Brazil defines race. The in-depth interview questionnaire did not make a distinction to the conceptualization of race and racialism in Brazil’s social context. For example, one respondent had to rethink their racial identification and categorization more than twice. The category “race”

does not warrant a straightforward answer in the Brazilian context. For most of the respondents, racial categorizations speak directly to the phenotype, how Brazil has understood racial categorization. Some scholars reified the historical importance of *branciamento* (whitening), relating it to nation-building (see Hasenbalg and Huntington, 1982; Andrews, 1996; Telles, 2004), yet in contemporary times the quotidian experiences of Black genocide, negation and necropolitics have been highlighted by critical Black Brazilian Scholars (Alves, 2014a, b, 2018; Alves and Vargas, 2020). Traditionally this contrasts with the perspectives of racial identification as more evident in the Anglo-Saxon project of racial hierarchization and classification. While the researcher was acquainted with this history prior to the beginning of the project, the instrument was fraught with limitations in identifying the racial classifications that have been produced by this colonial architecture.

In the same breath that these racial categorizations could not be clearly identified, the instrument also demonstrated a level of dynamism. Given the fact that race, gender and class were a crucial component to framing of the entry point of the questions, respondents were afforded the opportunity to answer questions through a critical lens of a discourse that they are not used to in Brazilian society. While the comparative instrument may not meet all the equivalent racial categorizes on both sides there are commonalities of shared histories of anti-black racism, Black and Native genocide, exclusion, and marginalization that can be captured in the narration. Shrank (2006, 176) suggests that “while the case study is by no means the appropriate research design for each and every social scientific problem and is indeed ill suited to traditional, probabilistic causal analysis, it is anything but useless.” Hence, a populated in-depth interview guide proved more effective to bring out the complicated histories of race, slavery and social marginalization that are less salient in Brazilian society and scholarship in general. Discussing race, class and gender and social exclusion may not be the bargaining point of entry when Brazilians want to engage in a social discourse. In contemporary times, theorists rooted in Black Radical Tradition have continued to challenge the overt erasures of racialized discourses in Brazil (Alves, 2014a, b, 2018; Alves and Vargas, 2020).

While race remained a point of departure in the Brazilian context compared to South Africa, the household as a social artefact was also an important category. There are undisrupted kinship ties that cannot be solely captured in the in-depth interview. For example, one respondent in Casa Forte mentioned that the category “household” and “eating from one pot” is not something that they cannot identify with in Brazil. Firstly, a household in the Brazilian *favela* goes beyond the expanded definitions of a nuclear family. Some respondents indicated that they were more accustomed to solidarity practices that are beyond the sole definition of income expenditure being shared in one household. The household consists of kinship networks that are outside the confines of the intimate spaces that the researcher was welcomed into. In the South African contexts, this would include kith and kin. In the Brazilian context however, it includes *vizinho* (neighbors), who dispense love,

hospitality and community beyond the traditional definition of a nuclear family. Secondly, the notion of “eating from one pot” denotes indigence that is unfathomable in the Brazilian context. This may even be culturally offensive for some respondents, as autonomy is meant to be safeguarded when you are poor. These nuances cannot be captured in an in-depth interview guide. Neither does this mean that questions need to be tweaked to get amenable responses; however, they should enable the narration of the data in such a way that allows that history and context should be observed to make sense of complex social realities.

The Brazilian context, however, generated lengthy responses compared to the South African interviews. Scheduled participants of *Bolsa Familia* recipients in Salvador de Bahia refused to be interviewed, as they feared that their benefits would be rescinded. This is rather a different form of silencing that has been instigated by the identification of the social policy tools to the political project rather than citizenship demands. The administration of the in-depth interview was further complicated by the researcher’s positionality in the discourse of framing poverty. For example, most respondents in Casa Forte questioned why an African was asking questions about poverty and inequality in Brazil. The interlocutors were not questioning the integrity of the interview process, or the in-depth interview guides themselves, rather the sensibilities of the principal investigator’s position in the hierarchization of the nation-states themselves. Unfortunately, the in-depth interview guide did not anticipate these levels of theorizations; rather, there are problematic motifs that are informed by colonial representations and Brazil’s place globally. These categories of poverty as a discourse that is pervasive in Africa is framed by a polarizing narrative that has been cemented as part of the Manichean processes of knowledge gathering and processing.

The final destination to engage with Brazilian interlocutors was conducted in the South-eastern city of São Paulo and Osasco between November and December 2015. The administration of the in-depth interview was conducted at a place where *Bolsa Familia* recipients were being trained to access benefits. The researcher had been introduced to municipal workers who are responsible for ensuring that beneficiaries can access state administered social assistance with ease. *Bolsa Familia* recipients preferred to speak through a local interlocutor who could explain to them the colloquial equivalents of concepts that had been crafted as part of the interview. The biggest challenge encountered was when respondents were asked about social assistance, social rights and democracy in Brazil. Brazil is not like South Africa, where the end of apartheid signified a radical shift in its social contract. Beneficiaries preferred to respond to the question, [When did you start accessing the benefits of *Bolsa Familia*?], when the researcher inquired on questions that pertained to democracy and social citizenship. The researcher also avoided equating the periodization to the Brazilian transition to democracy in 1988 as a crucial date. The in-depth questionnaire had to accommodate this element, as the conceptualization of democracy and social citizenship in Brazil is not directly correlated to a

demise of a colonial order. The realization of social assistance in Brazil is equated to the triumph of the PT in 2002; and this is what most beneficiaries could remember.

The proposition that data needed to be manipulated to find exact equivalents with South Africa does not hold in principle. Neither is the Brazilian context being interpreted through the lenses of a South African initial experimentation with the in-depth questionnaire. Brazil is a uniquely different society, but not exceptional, which warranted that the in-depth questionnaire should make sense of its social context. The threshold that had been used to assess expenditure on consumer goods and service affordability is not the same across all Brazilian cities. This is much more acute in the comparative responses that are provided by residents in Casa Forte and São Paulo. São Paulo and Osasco are urban metropolises, poor inhabitants of which are constrained by the expensive costs of transportation, food, clothing, electricity and the on-going effects of gentrification. The same is not true of Casa Forte, the poor inhabitants of which are shielded from the relatively low-cost marginal living given Recife's position as a smaller urban metropolis. The in-depth interview guide had to adjust cost of living given these differentiations. The instrument itself did not change, rather it had to consider geographical and cultural specificities in this vast territory.

As was previously noted in the South African context, gender barriers proved to be a limitation to interviewing respondents. On one hand, the researcher benefited from the narrative of an African interlocutor conducting research in Brazil. There was a sense of curiosity and anticipation that respondents demonstrated with the present study offering an alternative entry point to understanding social assistance. However, given the fact that all the interlocutors that I interviewed were women, the asymmetrical power relations between the man and the woman were more difficult with the result that the cultural depth and nuances may not be incorporated in the greater scope of the research.

## **Immersion, Geography and Language in South Africa and Brazil**

This research from the onset was confronted with issues of geography, language and the researcher's positionality in the academic global division of labor. Sociology itself as a discipline has largely been defined by the Northern metropole where conceptual and methodological tools have been advanced even to make sense of comparative studies in the South (Rabaka, 2022, 2021, 2010; Morris, 2015; Alatas, 2003, 2006; Nyoka, 2013, 2019; Adésinà, 2006, 2008). African researchers and doctoral candidates, to be more specific, continue to exhibit strong tendencies of what Hountodji (1990) has called "theoretical extroversion," the feverish importation of paradigms, problematics, and perspectives and the search for legitimation and respectability from the intellectual establishments of the North. If the division of labor that for many centuries has labeled the Global South as a "zone of data collection" and the

North as a “zone of knowing” (Said, 1993, 1994; Zeleza, 2002, 2019; Akpan, 2011), then this asymmetrical power relationship is informed by the imperial and colonial imagination of geography and knowledge (Said, 1978, 1993, 1994; Mamdani, 1996, 2013, 2021; Hall, 2019). Said (1993, 7) argued “that just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.” At issue here is an ideational imagination that gave rise to “sovereign” experiences and methodologies that have inferiorized knowledge generated from the Global South (Said, 1993, 1994; Alatas, 2002, 2006; Zeleza, 2002, 2019; Akpan, 2011). Making sense of these shifting social realities in the Global South requires researchers to navigate the “metaphysical empires” bequeathed to both South Africa and Brazil whereby worlds that are linguistically not converged still define their social realities.

Comparative studies at least those that pertain to “whole societies” as defined before have been advanced by the West’s monopolistic control and domination of norms and values of engagement and interactions particularly within the realms of the nation-state. In the traditional historical definition of Westphalia, the nation-state guarantees individuals with a sense of belonging and being, which forges identities that at times can become “inclusive” to its “citizens” and exclusive to members of the peoples of the Global South who historically belonged to a bastardized and non-human entity (see Cesaire, 1972; Fanon, 1963; Mamdani, 2021). The British Marxist scholar Benedict Anderson (1983) suggests that contemporary nation-statehood, were “imagined communities” whereby nationality, or as one might prefer to put it nation-ness or as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind which need to be understood in their historical evolution. The research experience and hierarchy has tended to follow similar patterns. While historically Euro/American modernity positioned itself at the center of global history and a totalizing human project through epistemicide and the *Mission Civilisatrice*, contemporary sociology and social sciences have mimicked its cannon by reproducing a discourse that further entrenches the “North”/“South” divide.

Colonial modernity positioned itself as a self-referential civilization on a global scale, through a totalizing project of domination without consent that pivots Euro-American worldviews and values, predominantly organized around capitalist economic institutions, draconian laws, violence, force and manipulation, exerting itself across bio-politics, society, cultural affiliations, symbol formations, norms which influence global scientific flows. “Knowledge” and “the idea of knowing” was/is equated to a teleological goal of a homogeneous modernity which has led to bifurcated forms of producing knowledge a reality still felt in contemporary global social sciences (Said, 1978, 1993, 1994; Mamdani, 1996, 2013, 2021; Zeleza, 2002, 2019; Alatas, 2003, 2006). Some contemporary approaches to challenge these knowledge production asymmetries is to champion “inter-disciplinarity.” However, for the African context Nyoka’s (2019) thorough examination of Mafeje’s works jettisons

narrow theorizations of overcoming Eurocentrism across the social sciences by invoking Mafeje's conceptualization of "non-disciplinarity." Nyoka observes the following:

One wonders, however, whether there have not been any rigorous studies conducted and written from interdisciplinary perspectives. Perhaps a more valid reason to transcend inter/disciplinarity is ideological rather than methodological. The reason would be to transcend the social sciences because of Eurocentrism and imperialism, rather than intractable methodological demands. At any rate, Mafeje's proposed methodological approach is "the discursive method" (Mafeje, 1991, 1996, 2001). What he [Mafeje 1991] wants to do is to learn from African societies themselves, rather than approaching fieldwork with a predetermined theory or epistemology. (Nyoka, 2019, 7)

The entry point in engaging with the terms and conditions of the Western canon of knowledge production is that researchers have to emulate its ways and seek to preserve the status quo. This is not to say that scientific practices of producing knowledge should not be followed, rather as Said (1993, 48) has argued for the contemporary social scientist centuries later, the coincidence or similarity between one vision of a world system and the other, between geography and literary history, seems interesting but problematic. The contemporary global setting overlapping territories, intertwined histories was already prefigured and inscribed in the coincidences and convergences among geography, culture, and history that were so important to the pioneers of comparative literature (in this case comparative studies) (Said, 1993, 1994). The task that Said set for the next generation of social scientist was to make sense of the "social question" from the position of the subaltern, given the historical precedence that the subaltern was never allowed to be included in the global canon of "knowing."

There is no reason why knowledge ecologies from the Global South should not be prioritized, as long as boundaries and binaries produced by colonial modernity are mortified. Zeleza's (2002) strident rebuke suggested that if the binary of producing knowledge continues to exist in the Western canon, then the international intellectual division of labor will continue to be reinforced, whereby African universities and social scientists import appropriate packages of "universal" theory and, at best, export empirical data; to be consumers of advanced research conducted in the universities of the North. Contemporary approaches to knowledge production entrench Nativism, where the Native only exists to explain localized realities like magical realism, rituals, and witchcraft. For the scholar that is geographically located in the Global South, their research realities can therefore not transcend their geography. In the case of this research, the Malawian "Native," is condemned to a "zone of erasure," as his transnational research encounters, upbringing and dexterity across Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa seeking to understand Africa's position is unsatisfactory to provide a worthy explanation in global dynamics.

The only way out of this knowledge impasse is to think of “Sociology as world-making.” In its current existence Eurocentric Sociology neither transcends this “Nativist” bias, nor provides an epistemological break as its foundational conceptualizations were to understand the growing concerns of metropolitan Europe (Alatas, 2003, 2006). On an anecdotal level Africanists are imbued with hagiographical presentations of the continent and at times the entire Global South explaining its historical, social, and political evolutions. While such scholarship may have yielded some methodological and theoretical theorizations, it is trapped in its own time where local interlocutors are often missing or in other disciplines like political sciences reinforced through a contextually distant statistical modeling. Recent attempts to challenge the epistemological foundations of knowledge production by Connell (2007) and Comaroff and Comaroff (2012), in Sociology and Anthropology in general further suffer from an ontological dislocation. Both texts are informed by a lengthy repository of references of pioneering work by other scholars in the Global South and thus seek to appropriate it. It is as if for “knowledge in the Global South” to be “true knowledge” it must be appropriated first by the Western-centric or Africanists approaches, and then speak on behalf of the subaltern.

Cognizance of these limitations the researcher approached these issues as an “outsider and insider.” The biases that are entrenched in the world of research are to a larger extent informed by the bifurcated construction of knowledge and geography predicated on Euro/American modernity. As Said had noted (1994), all of us live in a society and are members of a nationality with its own language, tradition, and historical situation. The question that was posed from the onset while conceptualizing the research instruments as Said also noted is to what extent are researchers and intellectuals’ servants of these actualities and to what extent enemies? In the first instance the researcher recognized that geographical and knowledge limitations existed from the onset of the research. The researcher relied on an approach of “being an insider and outsider” simultaneously for the interviewed cohort to reflect on experiences reflected in their context. In the South African context, the researcher entered the research field of transcending the linguistic isolations that exist.

The researcher was an outsider by a *de facto* category of being a “Black African.” Here the researcher was immersed in specific communities for research in solidarity with the weak and the oppressed. At the very same time in both South Africa and Brazil; the researched themselves have been weakened by the vagaries of marketization of public policies and distorted histories which led to perceptions that the in-depth interview guides were intrusive leading to the researcher’s label as that of a “government spy.” Given these realities, both the position of being an insider and an outsider as a subaltern were crucial in achieving the stated goals spelled out in the research instruments. The researcher’s immersion confirmed what had been suggested by Said (1994) that the real or true intellectual is always an outsider, living in self-imposed exile, and on the margins of society. He or she speaks to, as well as for, a public, necessarily in public, and is properly on the side of the dispos-

sessed, the un-represented, and the forgotten. The immersion of being an “outsider and insider” attempts to transcend what Zeleza (2002) calls a “culture of imported scientific consumerism.” Zeleza (2002, 9f.) argues that African social scientists have been caught in the bind of addressing African realities in borrowed languages and paradigms, conversing with each other through publications and media controlled by foreign academic communities, and producing prescriptive knowledge for what Mkandawire (2005) calls the unfinished historical and humanistic tasks of African nationalism: decolonization, development, democracy, and nation-building. At the very same time, the interactions with the research cohort attempted to forge a “new universalism,” by raising local questions that are globally relevant as Said (1994) has suggested.

The asymmetrical power relations in the global production knowledge value chain has made it possible that “Whiteness” and research premised on “White supremacy” can easily access the subaltern so that the Western cannon itself becomes the mouthpiece of struggle, alienation and social stratification. While such studies have yielded some methodological and theoretical perspectives, simultaneously, a universalism that advances a discourse framing the Global South as a “zone of pathology” is sustained. Akpan (2011) suggested that this approach can be termed as a “conspiracy of empathy” whereby indigenous knowledge is deemed a target of “caring” thought and a subject of quiet disdain. Local knowledge is typically described in terms that acknowledge it as the “worth of indigenous and local communities,” and in terms that recognize it as the ‘information base of society.’ In the South African context, the researcher’s bargaining point of entry made it difficult as he was introduced as a “doctoral student from Malawi,” studying social assistance in various districts where research was carried out. In the Brazilian context, the researcher was introduced as a “South African” with an interest in comparative perspectives of social assistance in South Africa and Brazil.

Both places still reinforced the power asymmetries that tie themselves to the Western cannon that the “African” is globally positioned not to “know” or explain social phenomenon. It is one characteristic Alatas (2003) identified as the global division of labor where he highlights “the division between other country studies and own country studies.” In South Africa, some of my interlocutors asked “how is it possible that a ‘Malawian doctoral student’ can study South Africa’s social phenomenon as Malawi itself is associated with pathology.” In similar vein, some respondents in Brazil raised questions as to how an “African researcher” seeks to understand the lived experiences of social assistance as opposed to being in “Africa” where there is already so much pathology. These research idiosyncrasies cannot be divorced from the design of studies that are standard practices in Western universities, civil society, and international organizations, which is enabled by the ‘empowering the poor’ discourse. While approaches like the PAR aimed to transcend these challenges, a poverty of ideas is ubiquitous in the world of policy and academe, thereby reinforcing a social imagination that reflects the triumph of a Euro/American discourse that



does not seek to see the “local” as part of a “global discourse.” Akpan suggests the following:

the discourse of empowerment is not necessarily the same thing as bringing down the artificial walls that separate the “local” from the “global”; rather it seems in practice to be more about demanding of the poor to retain the “local” if necessary, but to assimilate the “global” by all means. In the global knowledge power play, therefore, the relationship between “global” and “local” is not unlike that of master and servant. (Akpan, 2011, 118)

In my research the “local” was positioned as an interlocutor of their own narratives to give back power to the researched and thereby challenge the asymmetrical relationship of producing knowledge rooted in European epistemicide. While that is the case, the research also recognizes that the biological category of being a “man” may have interfered with answers that provide some reflections of the cohort of women that were interviewed. In the South African context, this was made difficult by translators that may not adequately explain social concepts in the vernacular, and social relations where the male/female category is clearly demarcated. In São Paulo for example, the local informants were Brazilians in the category of “brancos”, whereby the interviewed subaltern “parda,” “morena” and “negra” were not able to adequately expand on their social experiences. Simultaneously, the research aimed at finding common themes that arrive at sociology of the “normal” and not “pathology.” Akpan (2010) suggests that there cannot be a permanent epistemic thrill in sociology with a ubiquitous conceptualization of social dysfunction, discord, pathologies, and pessimism. This research attempted to transcend the struggles of the subaltern by framing its methodological orientation in the world of the living with “sociations that are defined by cohesion, cooperation, actualization, fulfillment, progress and hope” (Akpan, 2010). This can only be achieved when local interlocutors are central to the processes of narrating their lived experiences to challenge existing epistemologies.

## Conclusion

This research aimed to recast old age debates that have defined the relationship between race and epistemology in the global academe. The global knowledge ecological enterprise is imbued with in-built knowledge asymmetrical that exerts influences on the “what” or “who” is a progenitor of “a knowledge.” Public policy research has been defined by epistemic racism and power asymmetries as the Global South is categorically relegated to the “zone of collecting data” and therefore incapable of generating theoretical excavations. The chapter problematized the positivist methodological approaches by delineating gender, language and geography as key artefacts that need to be navigated to bring about a more democratic social science to make sense of the conditions that lead to further stratification in both South Africa

and Brazil. While studies in comparative public policy have yielded substantial methodological and theoretical theorizations; local interlocutors in the process are at times absent. This practice is informed by a discourse of Euro/America modernity and disciplines that have been at the center of defining knowledge, thereby peripherizing the quest for a more democratic social science. Thinking about Sociology as worldmaking provides a modality to escape the trappings of Eurocentrism a project that has entrenched epistemicide. This chapter recasts the importance of thinking with Global South critical theorists to aid in dismantling problematic relations and asymmetrical power relations in research, where the Global South exists as a “zone of data collection” and the Global North as a “zone of theory.”

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## **PART II:**

# **The World-Economy in the Context of Deglobalization**





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## Globalization Undone

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During the 1980s, separate state policies channeled new resources into Wall Street and ignited stock-price inflation. This forced firms to adopt strategies—outsourcing, mergers, and new technologies—that made Wall Street an engine of capital accumulation and global social change. But “globalization” led to rising inequality and escalating economic crises in the United States and around the world. In 2008, the financial crisis and costly government bailouts to save Wall Street and revive stock-price inflation fueled the emergence of social movements on the left and right that attacked the foundations of globalization. Meanwhile, separate crises across the Middle East, Africa, and Eurasia also contributed to disintegration and deglobalization. Then in the early 2020s, the COVID pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine compounded and accelerated deglobalization. Globalization is being undone by these developments.

### State Policies, Stock-price Inflation, and Globalization

On August 12, 1982, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed at 777. But a series of state policies soon channeled huge new financial resources into “Wall Street,” (the network of stock, bond, and commodity markets in the U.S.), roused the stock market from its decades-long doldrums, and ignited stock-price inflation that propelled the Dow from 777 in 1982 to 36,000 in 2021. State officials adopted four policies that funneled money into the stock market. First, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates to sky-high levels to battle inflation. This provided bondholders with large gains. When inflation eased and interest rates fell, bondholders invested their gains in the stock market, which promised higher rates of return. Second, Reagan cut taxes on the rich from 70 to 28 percent, and they invested their new savings first in bonds and then, increasingly, in stocks, as they had always done. Third, one of the measures taken to reduce Social Security deficits extended Individual Retirement Accounts to all adults and made 401k accounts more widely available to businesses and employees (Laursen, 2012, 245; Cassidy, 2002, 63f.). Worker households poured billions into IRAs and 401k: IRA deposits climbed from \$31 billion in 1982 to \$1.2

trillion in 1995; 401k deposits grew from \$15 billion in 1982 to \$675 billion in 1995 (Laursen, 2012, 245; Nolde, 1981, 260). Because risk-averse workers relied on mutual funds to provide *diversified* portfolios, they funded a *broad* advance in the market. When the market faltered in 1987, workers not only kept their money in the market but continued to make new annual contributions because they had become “persistent investors,” and this helped build a floor under prices (Holden et al., 2006). Fourth, to reduce U.S. trade deficits, the Reagan administration in 1985 persuaded its G-5 partners to devalue the dollar by half. Foreign investors began buying bargain-basement priced stocks and by 1986 had purchased \$176 billion worth of stocks and owned 6 percent of U.S. equities (Friedman, 1988, 71ff.).

Together, these separate state policies provided wealthy Americans, worker-households, and foreign investors with the means to buy stocks. These new and enthusiastic investments drove stock prices from 777 to 2,722 in 1987 and ignited stock-price inflation. Although the market crashed, with increasing violence, in 1987, 2000, 2008, and 2020, the state took exceptional measures to revive stock-price inflation, and the market climbed to Himalayan altitudes during the next 40 years.

But stock-price inflation also forced corporate managers to increase profits and payouts to investors to keep up with the Dow and prevent Price/Earning ratios from widening. If they did not, they risked investor wrath and hostile takeovers. To increase profits and payouts in an inflationary stock-price environment, managers outsourced production, merged with other firms, and introduced new labor-saving technologies. These collective strategies became a force for global economic, political, and social change, laying the foundations for contemporary “globalization.”

### *Outsourcing*

U.S. firms outsourced production to cut labor costs, first to Mexico, then to East Asia, and then, increasingly, to China. U.S. firms began in Mexico, where the Border Industrialization Program had provided a low-wage, export-processing zone (EPZ) along the border in northern Mexico (Tiano, 1990, 19; Van Waas, 1981, 2, 4). Although it had been designed to provide jobs for unemployed male Mexican workers, firms hired lower-wage female workers in the *maquilas*, a practice adopted by managers in EPZs around the world (Van Waas, 1981, 202).

The Mexican model was adopted by other countries in East Asia, but firms from the United States and other countries gravitated to China. China became the center of global outsourcing because the United States had provided China with political recognition and crucial direct foreign investment and because the dictatorship adopted reforms that provided low-wage workers to EPZs, repeatedly devaluated the yuan against the dollar to make its exports cheaper than export-producers in other countries, and because economic crises in other countries persuaded investors to withdraw from EPZs in countries where exchange and interest rates were un-

certain and invest instead in China, which provided a stable outsourcing platform (Schaeffer, 2012).

While U.S. firms outsourced production to other countries, they also attacked domestic unions to cut costs, a long-term goal, and used outsourcing or the threat of runaway shops to eliminate union workers or force them to engage in concessionary bargaining. Overall, outsourcing resulted in job loss and falling wages for American workers (Greenhouse, 2008, 79, 82, 148).

### *Mergers*

Corporations merged with other firms in the U.S. and around the world to consolidate businesses, lay off redundant workers, increase their bargaining power with suppliers and vendors, acquire new technologies and markets, eliminate competitors, prevent hostile takeovers, increase market share, and raise prices. On average, firms charged prices that were 18 percent higher than their costs in 1980 but, as a result of massive consolidation, charged prices that were 67 percent higher than their costs in 2014, and “companies that became the most concentrated had the highest profit margins and the highest stock returns” (Tepper, 2019, 13, 42, 224–8; Gaughan, 2018, 158f.). In 1980, managers had completed 1,565 mergers worth \$33 billion, but the Reagan administration quickly abandoned anti-trust-law enforcement and managers completed 3,428 mergers worth \$145 billion in 1985 and 9,000 mergers worth \$470 billion in 1995 (Smiley, 1995, 47). U.S. firms also merged with other firms around the world: the value of mergers worldwide totaled \$35 trillion between 1985 and 2016 (Institute for Mergers, n.d.). Like outsourcing, mergers resulted in job loss, though typically in administrative jobs, while outsourcing generally eliminated manufacturing jobs.

### *Technology*

Corporate managers also introduced new labor-saving technologies to cut labor costs and adopted new “substitutionist” technologies to reduce the costs of raw materials. They used new labor-saving technologies in manufacturing, which increased productivity from a sickly 0.7 percent annually in the 1970s to a robust 2.6 percent annually between 1980 and 2000, and then to 3.5 percent between 2002 and 2005 (Tonelson and Kearns, 2010). By 2009, U.S. workers “needed 40 percent fewer hours to produce the same unit of output as in 1980” (Tonelson and Kearns, 2010). They also deployed more prosaic “substitutionist” technologies to cut the cost of raw materials (Schaeffer, 2007). High oil prices persuaded firms to introduce energy-saving technologies—fuel-efficient engines, composite materials to replace steel, solar panels and fiberglass insulation in homes and offices, compressors in refrigerators—to reduce demand for oil, what scholars called a “negawatt revolution.” (Hawken et al., 2001: 125). They also used plastic pipes to replace copper plumbing and fiber-optic cable and wireless phones to cut demand for copper and switched from cane sugar to high-fructose corn sweetener and artificial sugars to reduce the

demand for sugar (Schaeffer, 1997, 79, 2007, 208f.). These and other substitutionist technologies reduced the demand for raw materials, lowered prices, and resulted in massive job loss, though mostly in peripheral countries that exported raw materials.

While U.S. officials had adopted separate policies that fueled stock-price inflation, they also took concerted steps to assist corporate managers who outsourced production, merged with other firms, and adopted new technologies to survive and thrive in an inflationary stock-price environment. Government officials and federal courts abandoned anti-trust law to facilitate mergers, arguing that the consumer benefits of mergers outweighed the harm to other “inefficient” businesses and workers (Van Cise, 1994, 30–2, 271). They attacked unions, weakened labor-law enforcement, and sued unions for discriminatory behavior. They negotiated regional and global free trade agreements to facilitate outsourcing, and used Structural Adjustment Programs to force indebted countries to open their markets to U.S. trade and investment. They privatized or transferred taxpayer-funded technologies (computer chips, the internet) to private firms at little or no cost (Goldin and Katz, 2008, 44f.). And when the market faltered or failed (1987, 2000, 2008, 2020), they adopted monetary policies and injected trillions of taxpayer dollars into the market to revive it. Although scholars have often described this as the spread of “neo-liberalism,” they have neglected the role that state officials played in jumpstarting stock-price inflation, facilitating corporate strategies in this new environment, rescuing market actors during periodic crashes, and spending trillions to restart stock-price inflation.

The state policies and corporate practices associated with stock-price inflation created three related problems. First, they sped capital accumulation and generated wealth for investors and managers, suppressed wages for workers, and increased economic inequality to levels not seen since 1929, when the top 10 percent captured half of all income in the United States and the other 90 percent received the other half (Piketty and Saez, 2003, 11). After 1929, the gap between the rich and the rest narrowed substantially and, by 1980, the top 10 percent claimed less than 35 percent of all income (Piketty and Saez, 2003: 11). But starting in 1980, inequality increased and by 2008, the top 10 percent once again claimed 50 percent of all income (Noah, 2012 19).

Second, the adoption of policies and practices associated with stock-price inflation created economic crises in countries around the world. When they opened their economies to foreign trade and investment, U.S. managers invested in export manufacturing while mutual and pension funds on Wall Street invested in local stock, currency, bond, and real estate markets to diversify their portfolios and obtain high rates of return. Large-scale foreign direct investment and “portfolio” investment raised the value of local currencies and made their exports more expensive, while consumers splurged on less expensive foreign goods, creating trade deficits. When trade deficits grew large, foreign portfolio investors worried that governments would eventually have to devalue their currencies to reduce trade

deficits, which would reduce the value of their holdings, so they sold off and fled, which resulted in the collapse of local currency, stock, bond, and real estate markets (Wade, 1999, 364f.). Governments tried to forestall devaluations to reassure investors, but their attempts to defend their currencies exhausted their foreign exchange reserves and, in the end, failed to prevent devaluations. When they ran out of money, they were forced to seek help from the IMF, which imposed onerous structural programs as a condition for aid, which plunged them into deep recessions. This kind of globalization-induced crisis struck Mexico in 1994, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, and, importantly, Russia in 1997–8 (Bluestein, 2001, 7, 9). In Russia, the conspicuous failure of globalization led to Yeltsin's resignation and the appointment of Vladimir Putin as president, and the adoption of mercantilist economic policies that distanced Russia from the West.

China was the principle beneficiary of crises in other countries. Crises persuaded corporate managers to withdraw from countries where exchange and interest rates were uncertain and invest instead in China, where low-wage workers and currency devaluations provided them with the lowest-cost outsourcing platform (Schaeffer, 2012; Naughton, 2018, 404f.). Normally, a huge influx of FDI would have increased the value of the yuan in a market-based economy. But the regime did not allow the value of the yuan to be determined by markets and instead set the value of the yuan by government fiat, without interference from currency traders, and it did not allow portfolio investors to purchase Chinese assets. These mercantilist measures allowed it to undercut their competitors and avoid the problems associated with FDI and portfolio investment, claim the lion's share of global FDI and, in 2005, become the world's leading recipient of FDI.

Third, stock-price inflation created recurring and deepening crises in the United States. The stock market first crashed in 1987, again in 2000 and 2008, which triggered the onset of the Great Recession in the U.S. and Western Europe. In the United States, 14 million workers lost their jobs and 9 million lost their homes (Tooze, 2018, 157). To prevent the onset of a Great Depression, the government spent trillions of dollars to bailout Wall Street and revive stock-price inflation. But this led to the emergence of anti-globalization movements on the right and left that attacked its foundations and contributed to deglobalization in the decade that followed.

## **Crises and Social Movements in the United States and the European Union**

The financial crisis and Great Recession wrecked the legitimacy of globalization and stimulated the (re)emergence of anti-globalization movements—Occupify Wall Street and Syriza on the left and the Tea Party and Brexit on the right—that objected to growing economic inequality and governments that spent trillions of dollars/euros to bailout stock and commodity markets while doing little to assist the millions of workers who lost jobs and homes.

Although scholars describe them both as “populist,” it is misleading and inaccurate to do so. Left movements attack economic and political elites on behalf of “the People,” the “99 percent,” an *inclusive* conception of the People. Like the left, right movements attack economic and political elites, but they *also* attack “undeserving” peoples, “the takers,” the “moocher class” below them, a very *restrictive* conception of “the People” (Judis, 2016, 56f.; Skocpol and Williamson, 2012, 65–7). In the United States, Tea Party activists opposed bailouts for the rich but also bailouts given to some homeowners ruined by the collapse of the housing market. Left movements would more accurately be described as *inclusive*, “aspiring” movements; right movements as *exclusive*, “restrictionist” movements that would restrict the rights and opportunities of other, undeserving citizens (Schaeffer, 2014, 175–207).

In Europe, left anti-globalization movements—Syriza and Podemos—emerged in Greece and Spain. On the right, Brexit emerged in the United Kingdom, restrictionist right and “illiberal” movements emerged across Europe, and separatist-restrictionist movements emerged in Spain, Italy, Belgium, and elsewhere.

In the United States, the anti-globalization left was absorbed and muted by the Obama administration while the Tea Party, with assistance from the Republican party and corporate funders, became an important faction within the Republican party and Congress. In 2016, Donald Trump mobilized the restrictionist right by attacking globalization and immigration, long an important but neglected grievance of Tea Party supporters (Judis, 2016, 67f.).

As President, Trump attacked the corporate practices (outsourcing and mergers) associated with stock-price inflation, the state policies (free trade agreements, U.S. partnership with China; neglect of anti-trust law) that facilitated these practices, and the institutions that structured global relations and “disadvantaged” the United States: the United Nations, IMF and World Bank, NATO, the Organization of American States, the African Union, the European Union, and military alliances with South Korea and Japan. Trump attacked “the fake song of globalization” and said the United States should begin “uncoupling” China and other countries that took advantage of the United States in trade, a long list that included the European Union and U.S. allies in North America and East Asia (Crowley and Sanger, 2019; Irwin, 2020). He launched trade wars with U.S. allies and China and abandoned the longstanding “partnership” and pushed for “decoupling” the relationship and treating the regime as a competitor and a threat (Osnos, 2020, 35).

Trump attacked Big Tech monopolies and filed anti-trust suits against them, the first assault on monopolies since the 1970s, and attacked “green” substitutionist technologies that might displace coal or disrupt oil production (McCabe and Kang, 2020).

These developments resulted in the first sustained attack on globalization in the United States. In *Europe*, restrictionist parties led by Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson campaigned successfully for Brexit in 2016. The United Kingdom’s departure from the EU in 2020 led to the disruption of European and global supply chains and labor

migrations that had been constructed as part of the globalization process in Europe. Other restrictionist movements attacked the European Union, the European Parliament and bureaucracy, and the Euro as a shared currency, arguing that their political sovereignty be “returned” so they could put their countries “first.”

The onset of the COVID pandemic in early 2020 created a crisis that accelerated deglobalization. The virulent, fast-spreading virus proved impossible to contain without a vaccine, which took a year to develop, and took an enormous toll on human health and the global economy. President Trump downplayed the threat, was slow to adopt effective public-health measures, devolved federal authority to unprepared state governments to manage the crisis, and urged an end to constraints before it was safe. The result was catastrophic failure: “With only 4 percent of the world’s population,” the United States “accounted for 22 percent of coronavirus deaths,” and 300,000 had died by the end of 2020 (Leonhardt, 2020).

The pandemic also triggered an economic crisis, what Paul Krugman called the “Greater Recession.” The Dow fell from 29,000 to 19,000, the economy withered, and 40 million workers lost their jobs (New York Times, 2020). The GDP fell 9.5 percent in the second quarter, “the most devastating collapse on record,” wiping out five years of economic growth (Casselmann, 2020).

Governments responded by adopting stimulus packages (\$2 trillion in the U.S.; \$1 trillion each in the EU and China) to prevent economic collapse and, in the United States, preserve Trump’s hopes of winning re-election in November. COVID disrupted global supply chains, raised prices for imported goods, and persuaded or forced corporations to re-source and in-source some production, which resulted in a vast reorganization of global outsourcing and persuaded managers to rethink their dependence on China. The crisis “exposed how a factory closure in one part of the world can shut down an assembly line in a different place” (Ewing, 2020). McKinsey analysts estimated that 16–24 percent of world trade, worth between \$2.9 and \$4.6 trillion, would move elsewhere over the next five years (Krugman, 2020). “The global supply chains built over the last 20 years were shaped by cost efficiency and a just-in-time mentality,” said Susan Lind. “Now a just-in-case mentality has emerged. It’s the start of a different chapter.” (Krugman, 2020).

The pandemic also accelerated the consolidation of monopolies, which raised prices and increased earnings, at a time when 400,000 medium and small businesses were forced to close (Isaac, 2020). This revealed the problematic role played by Big Tech monopolies in the economy. Congress attacked Big Tech executives and Trump officials filed anti-trust actions against Google and Facebook and prepared new laws to constrain Apple and Amazon (Kang and McCabe, 2020). Countries in Europe and Asia also adopted new anti-trust measures (Satariano, 2020).

In 2020, Joe Biden won the presidential election with help from black voters outraged by the murder of George Floyd by police and from the revived anti-globalization left, a coalition of environmental, labor and citizens groups that had first organized protests against free-trade agreements and the WTO during the 1990s.



In 2016 and 2020, the anti-globalization left found new expression by Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, who campaigned against Wall Street, the “Billionaire class,” monopoly power and economic inequality. President Biden then adopted anti-globalization policies that continued and extended Trump’s attacks on outsourcing, the U.S. partnership with China, and monopolies. Despite their partisan animosities on most issues, Democrats and Republican shared an opposition to globalization. Importantly, this led to the formation of an informal, bi-partisan, anti-globalization coalition in Congress that contributed to the ongoing process of deglobalization.

Biden adopted policies to “bolster supply chain resiliency” by persuading firms to in-source production and by investing in the creation of new domestic supply chains, and he vowed to “hold China accountable” for its failure to live up to the commitments it made when joining the WTO and the trade deal reached with the Trump administration in 2020 (Swanson, 2022a, 2021). “China has not moved to embrace market-oriented principles on which the WTO and its rules are based, despite the representations it made when it joined 20 years ago,” U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai said (Swanson, 2021). Republican leaders supported this approach, arguing that “Beijing’s military might, challenge to democracy, technological ambitions and influence over the global market are an even more serious and systematic threat than the Soviet Union ever did” (Hounshell and Askarinam, 2022).

Corporate managers who long relied on outsourcing faced a series of problems associated with the “Great Supply Chain Disruption” that increased the costs and risks of outsourcing, particularly to China, which is home to one-third of global manufacturing (Goodman, 2021, 2022 a, b; Bradsher, 2022a). In its efforts to contain COVID, the Chinese regime imposed strict lockdowns that disrupted production and supply chains for exports at a time when the demand for manufactured goods increased in the United States and the European Union. Supply shortages, rising demand, and delays caused by supply-chain bottlenecks drove up prices for outsourced goods. The cost to ship a container from China to the United States rose 12-fold between 2020 and 2022. (Bradsher, 2022a). The three firms that control 80 percent of the world’s container shipping also combined to drive up fees and prices (Swanson. 2022b). Outsourcing was intended to cut costs. But supply chain problems substantially increased costs and reduced corporate enthusiasm for outsourcing.

The political and economic risks of outsourcing have also increased. The U.S.-China trade war, the deterioration of U.S.-China relations, China’s increasingly authoritarian polices, and falling birth rates in China, which will shrink the pool of low-wage labor and eventually drive up wages, has created an increasingly uncertain economic environment for outsourcing firms. A Biden administration report warned that future supply-chain disruptions were inevitable (Casselman and Swanson, 2022).

In response to rising costs and risks, corporate managers are hedging against supply-chain disruptions by adopting several strategies. First, they have begun to re-source export manufacturing to other countries. They often keep some production in China but secure goods from other countries to duplicate or “backup” production so their supply chains are more resilient. “They making duplicative investments in other parts of the world in order to manage the risk and uncertainty,” Alan Beebe, American Chamber Commerce president observed (Bradsher, 2022b). Second, firms are also “near-sourcing,” moving supply chains closer to consumers, so U.S. and Asian firms are returning to northern Mexico, home of the original *maquilas*, close to U.S. markets, while European firms opened factories in Eastern Europe and Ukraine to serve markets in France and Germany (Schwartz, 2022). Third, firms are “re-shoring” or “in-sourcing” production to their own countries, either by returning from abroad or by creating new domestic supply chains from scratch (Goodman, 2021). “Reshoring is not going to happen overnight, but it is happening. If you place an order offshore, there’s so much uncertainty with a longer lead time. All that adds up,” one executive explained (Schwartz, 2022). Because firms often introduce new labor-saving technology when they in-source, they may increase domestic manufacturing without doing much to increase employment in manufacturing. Even so, US jobs in manufacturing increased slightly in the last decade, from 11.5 million in 2010 to 12.5 in 2022 (Schwartz, 2022).

Biden also continued and extended the anti-trust policies initiated by Trump. Biden appointed Lina Khan, a prominent anti-trust activist to head the Federal Trade Commission, which revived anti-trust action against Facebook, and placed activist advocates in prominent positions, and deployed anti-trust teams to investigate price gouging by the big three container shipping firms and by the meatpacking industry who “use their market power to extract bigger profit margins for themselves.” (Tankersley and Rappeport, 2021; Kang, 2022). By investigating these industries, Biden issued a warning shot to other consolidated industries that engaged in practices that contributed to inflation, and introduced a line of argument—that monopolies don’t benefit consumers but instead harm them—that the courts might find persuasive.

Meanwhile, the bi-partisan anti-globalization coalition of Democrats and Republicans in Congress drafted six new anti-trust bills designed to address problems with Big Tech and contemporary practices not addressed in earlier legislation, and asked the Justice Department to launch a criminal investigation of Amazon for lying to Congress and obstructing its investigation into Amazon (Kang and McCabe, 2022; Swisher, 2021). New, far-reaching anti-trust legislation was also adopted by the European Union. The Digital Markets Act was significant because European standards are often adopted worldwide because “it is easier for companies to apply them across their entire organization rather than one geography” (Satariano, 2022).

There is also growing recognition among economists and policymakers that monopolies may actually *inhibit* technological development, either because they don’t

spend money on technological innovation but instead devote resources to shareholders or because they rely on other firms to develop technologies and then buy them up, a process that often results in buying and then burying new technologies (Manjoo, 2022). And many firms adopt what economists call “so-so technologies” that replace workers but do not yield big gains in productivity, such as self-checkout stands in grocery stores or automated customer service over the telephone. By contrast, they don’t often deploy “truly ‘significant technologies’ [that] create new jobs elsewhere, lifting employment and wages” (Lohr, 2022; Acemoglu, 2021, 6).

These developments have contributed to ongoing deglobalization, though it is a protracted process. It takes time to reconfigure/realign supply chains and a reliance on outsourcing to China; anti-trust laws take time to legislate, enforce and adjudicate in courts; the development of significant technologies take a long time and good fortune to develop. For example, while COVID vaccines were quickly deployed, they were decades in the making. Still, political and economic developments in the core have given deglobalization considerable momentum, and this process has been compounded by developments in the semi-periphery and periphery that, for separate reasons, have also led to disintegration and deglobalization.

## **Crisis and Deglobalization in the Middle East, Africa and Eurasia**

Crises with separate origins in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-Saharan Africa, and Eurasia also contributed to deglobalization. To some extent, deglobalization was a product of exclusion, indifference or neglect by states in the core, to some extent it was the result of a failure by states in the semi-periphery and periphery to promote integrationist economic development.

### *MENA*

In 1973, oil producers in MENA persuaded other OPEC countries to cut production by 25 percent, raise prices, arrest the decades-long decline in the terms of trade, and establish an “extortionate power” over core states by the end of the decade (Kepel, 2020, 16). But during the next 40 years, their efforts would be undone by sectarian conflicts across MENA that destroyed their solidarity, and by pushback from core countries, who used substitutionist technologies and military intervention to curb OPEC’s “extortionate power” and tilt the terms of trade back to the West. In MENA, these developments led to the destruction of states across the region and triggered massive migrations to neighboring states and Western Europe.

In 1979, dictatorships and monarchies in Muslim states across MENA were united in their support for OPEC and their opposition to Israel. But oil-producing states disagreed about how best to exercise their newfound power. The Gulf monarchies with small populations supported moderate but not exorbitant oil prices. The moderate-price “Doves” were willing to settle for moderate prices because low-priced oil

provided great wealth for small populations (Kuwait had only one million residents) and because they did not want to antagonize their U.S. ally, which provided them with military protection. But dictatorships with much larger populations in Iran and Iraq, the “Hawks,” demanded higher prices to finance heavy military spending, provide riches for elites, and modest economic benefits to keep restive populations at bay (Yergin, 1991, 637; Halliday, 1979, 190; Pelletiere, 2001, 155; Keddie, 1981, 176). Because the Doves, led by Saudi Arabia, had larger oil reserves, they could set the terms of the trade, which angered the Hawks. Conflicts among Hawks and between Hawks and Doves would create deep fissures that divided people across the region by class, national, religious, and ethnic lines. Three Gulf wars and the Arab Spring created divisions that would widen during the next 40 years.

*First Gulf War.* In 1978–79, revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan ignited civil wars and triggered foreign invasions. During the Iranian Revolution, Iraq invaded Iran to seize its oil fields and obtain the leverage Iraq needed to dominate OPEC and obtain higher prices. Revolution and war in Iran pitted Arabs against Persians, Sunni against Shia, and Hawk against Hawk, creating new political fissures in the region. The long Iraq–Iran war ended in a draw in 1988 (Hero, 1991).

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to protect a faction of communist revolutionaries that had overthrown the monarchy and defend it from mujahedeen insurgents (Rubin, 1995). This conflict pitted secular communists against insurgent mujahedeen, and the Soviet Union against the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and their mujahedeen allies. The Soviets withdrew in 1989, but civil wars continued until 1999, when the Taliban gained control of most of the country.

*Second Gulf War.* In 1990, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait created new fissures in the region. Iraq invaded Kuwait so it could use its control of 20 percent of OPEC production and 25 percent of world reserves to leverage higher prices and eliminate the \$50 billion debt it owed to Kuwait, which Iraq had used to finance its war with Iran (Hero, 1991, 243; Kepel, 2020, 38). This conflict pitted Arab against Arab, Sunni against Sunni, Hawk against Dove. Unlike the first Gulf War, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq and Kuwait to protect its ally, a moderate Dove, from a predatory Hawk.

*Third Gulf War.* The 2011 attacks on 9/11 triggered a third development: the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Although U.S. forces quickly achieved their immediate objectives—the overthrow of regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq—these invasions triggered long civil wars that pitted Sunni vs Shiite, Arab vs Kurd in Iraq; the U.S. and its Afghan allies vs the Taliban and its Pakistani ally in Afghanistan. These long civil wars ended many years later with the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

*Arab Spring.* Revolutions during the “Arab Spring” in 2011 were the fourth major development. Peaceful movements demanding democracy led to protests against regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and some Gulf States. This led, for a time, to democratic governments in Tunisia and Egypt, though they were eventually defeated and returned to authoritarian rule. But in Libya and Syria, protests led to

destructive, multi-sided civil wars and foreign interventions that are still ongoing. In Syria, ISIS mounted an insurgency that waged war not only against the regime but other Sunni, other Moslems and non-Moslems. Although its efforts to create a Caliphate in Syria and Iraq failed, its adherents hived off franchises in other countries, where they declared war on everyone else (Kepel, 2020, 151f.).

The conflicts that erupted in 1979, 1990, 2001, and 2011 created political divisions that destroyed the collective solidarity of states across the region and weakened the economic power of oil-producing states. Wars became increasingly sectarian in character. The Egyptian cleric and Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb provided the ideological rationale for sectarian politics by arguing that Muslims had a duty not only to engage in a violent struggle or *jihad* against infidels in the United States, Israel and the West, but also to fight “so-called Muslims” in government who aided or abetted the West (Kepel, 2020, 13f.). His arguments licensed Muslim movements to attack fellow Muslims, members of the same faith. And movements in the region—the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban, Al Shabaab, and ISIS—did just that (Kepel, 2020, 67, 110). Some scholars have argued that this sectarian conflict has contributed to “an anti-globalization mindset of distancing oneself from the West,” but also, I would add, from each other (Faath and Matters, 2014, 162).

While revolutions and sectarian conflicts fractured the Muslim world, the United States and countries in the core made determined efforts to battle oil-price inflation and curb OPEC’s extortionate power, and adopted two strategies to achieve this. First, they labored to increase oil supplies from non-OPEC sources—Mexico, the North Sea, and Alaska—to reduce their dependence on OPEC oil. Importantly, the United States also persuaded its G-5 partners in 1985 to devalue the dollar by half, which reduced the real price of oil (oil is traded in dollars worldwide).

Second, they deployed “brown” and “green” substitutionist technologies to replace OPEC oil. The United States pioneered “brown” fracking technologies to wring oil out of oil shale and old fields, which enabled the United States to export oil again, and developed new natural gas and ethanol fuels to replace oil. It also introduced new “green” technologies—fuel efficient, hybrid and electric cars; new heating and cooling systems; solar power—that reduced the demand for oil (Yergin, 1991, 718; Schaeffer, 1997, 2007). These new substitutionist technologies helped drive down the price of oil. Of course, the outbreak of recurrent wars in the Gulf and growing demand in China drove prices up for brief periods. But recurrent recessions (2008, 2020) weakened demand, curbed prices, and accelerated the adoption of substitutionist technologies. These developments have curbed oil-price inflation in real terms.

Third, the United States and its allies intervened in the second and third Gulf wars to weaken the power of oil-producing Hawks and defend oil-producing Doves. U.S. military intervention triggered insurgencies in the Gulf but also in Syria, Lebanon,

Libya, and Afghanistan, and these un-civil wars wrecked states and divided people, developments that resulted in the deglobalization of states across MENA.

### *Sub-Saharan Africa*

In the 1960s, post-colonial states in Africa found it difficult to develop economically because they inherited poor infrastructures from European empires and depended on the production and export of raw materials to finance growth. During the 1970s, commodity prices rose, boosting their incomes, and they borrowed heavily to finance public and private development, which resulted in substantial growth. But in the 1980s, rising U.S. interest rates created a debt crisis that forced indebted states to cut public spending and increase commodity production to repay debt, which increased supplies and drove down commodity prices (Riley and Parfitt, 1994, 137). The 1985 dollar devaluation then cut real prices in half. By 1986 “average commodity prices in Africa were the lowest recorded in this century,” and they fell another 20–30 percent in the 1990s (Sandbrook, 1993, 5, 15). Moreover, the end of the Cold War in 1989/1992 reduced U.S. foreign aid and eliminated Soviet aid to their client states in Africa. The United States had spent \$70 billion in foreign and economic aid to African countries and the Soviets \$30 billion (Klare, 1984, 1, 9). “When the Cold War ended, America’s strategic interest in Africa ended,” one analyst observed, and President G.W. Bush announced, “Africa does not fit into the national strategic interest” (Taylor, 2010, 25; Booker, 2001, 195). These developments contributed to the West’s growing political *indifference* and economic *disinterest* in most Africa countries, which marginalized them, a form of deglobalization.

African states with valuable oil and minerals promoted some development and remained connected to the world economy. But authoritarian regimes in countries across Africa—Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Madagascar—were unable to promote economic growth or curb rapid population growth and, as a result, fell into “low-level equilibrium traps,” where marginal economic gains were consumed by rapidly growing populations, so that no real growth occurred (Nelson, 1956, 894–908).

Economic development proved difficult because states were heavily indebted and could not attract foreign investment (which was focused on China) to finance growth, because commodity prices remained low, and because corrupt governments and elites siphoned off whatever money from debt, investment or aid might have available for public and private investment. These developments stunted economic growth.

At the same time, public policies and patriarchal practices that disadvantaged women and girls kept birth rates high and populations growing at a rapid rate. Inadequate funding for public education kept girls out of school, and girls with little education married early (13–15 years old) and had more children during their child-bearing years. The government’s inability to fight infectious diseases or fund public

health kept infant mortality high. Where the risk of disease and infant mortality is high, women have more children than they would if the real or perceived dangers were lower. In Niger, where infant mortality is high, women say they want nine children (Winthrop, 2011, 186). The lack of access to family planning contributes to high fertility rates, and the widespread practice of forced marriages and wartime rape also keeps birthrates high. As a result, birthrates remain high in many countries: seven children per women in Niger, six in Somalia, Uganda, Zambia, Congo, and Angola, five in Mozambique, Nigeria and a dozen other countries. Consequently, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 200 million between 2010 and 2020 (Lazuta, 2013).

The underdevelopment created by low-level equilibrium traps persuaded disadvantaged groups to organize social movements and fight corrupt governments to secure the scarce economic resources that state power might provide (Bruckner and Ciccone, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2003, 75–90). They fought with *different* ethnic groups for a share of wealth and power, and they fought with their “own,” members of the *same* “ideological” families: Marxists fought Marxists in the Horn of Africa (South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia); Catholics fought Catholics in Burundi and Rwanda (a conflict that led to genocide in 1994); and Muslims fought Muslims across the Sahel.

These fratricidal sectarian wars resulted in the deaths of millions, mostly from starvation and disease. In the Congo, 60 armed militias wage multisided wars in an “ungovernable space.” The COVID pandemic exacerbated the crisis. Since 2021, military leaders have launched seven coups in six countries across the Sahel—Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Sudan—a development that the UN Secretary General Antonio Gutierrez called “an epidemic of coups” (Maclean, 2022).

Where states have collapsed or lack the means to provide public services or security, US and European states have tasked the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide peacekeeping forces and refugee camps, food, medicine, housing, and schools. NGOs provide the rudimentary services that governments and post-imperial states are unwilling to provide. But the UN lacks the authority to end the fighting and NGOs have no authority to borrow money or raise taxes to fund permanent public infrastructures and they lack the legitimacy that elected officials might provide. As a result, “NGOs are a cloud cover, delivering services [on a temporary basis] that states cannot provide” (Tarshen, 2016, 172).

Deepening poverty and the onslaught of sectarian conflicts across the region triggered massive migrations to neighboring states and north, over the Sahara and across the Mediterranean to the European Union. But the massive influx of migrants from Africa and the Middle East persuaded EU members to restrict the entry of migrants and adopt what they call “Migration Management” policies to hire proxy militias in North Africa to intercept, detain, and return migrants (Kingsley and Willis, 2020; Penny, 2018).

Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa has led to the disintegration of states and the marginalization of economies and societies across the region, an acute form of deglobalization.

### *Eurasia*

When communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989, democratizing states quickly adopted “neo-liberal” economic policies to develop capitalism, facilitate globalization, and integrate their economies into Western Europe. West Germany spent \$1 trillion to incorporate East Germany, the EU invested \$175 billion for infrastructure in Eastern Europe states and tens of billions of dollars in agricultural subsidies, while private investors made \$350 billion of direct foreign investment in the East, “sums comparable in scale to the [...] Marshall Plan” (Simons, 1991, 162; Tooze, 2018, 123; Jaraus, 1994, 137–9).

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992, it also divided, and post-Soviet republics separately tried to develop capitalism and globalize like Eastern European states. But the transition was more difficult and, with the exception of the Baltic states, efforts to incorporate post-Soviet states failed.

Although the United States and Western Europe provided the foreign investment and aid needed to globalize Eastern Europe, they did not extend substantial investment and aid to post-Soviet states. The incorporation of Eastern Europe made enormous demands on the capital and public resources in the EU, which exhausted their ability to invest across Eurasia, a much larger project. Meanwhile, investors in the United States and around the world preferred to invest in China, still a *communist* dictatorship, rather than invest in *democratizing* post-Soviet states (Breslauer, 1995, 224). In the 1990s, China received the bulk of global FDI, \$40 billion annually, while Russia received only \$1 billion. Without meaningful investment or aid, Russia and other post-Soviet states were forced to rely on foreign loans to finance globalization. As a result, Russia and the rest tried to develop without adequate means.

To globalize successfully, Russia needed to privatize state assets and create functioning businesses and markets. But unlike China, where leaders had adopted reforms that facilitated a rapid transition to capitalism, the transition in Russia proved more problematic. The privatization process was seized by former communist party elites who scooped up assets and created a corrupt oligarchy that controlled “over 50 percent of Russia’s economic activity” and invested much of their new wealth abroad (\$136 billion between 1993 and 1998) (Goldman, 2003, 92–6; Kagarlitsky, 2002, 98). Capital flight from Russia and the lack of foreign investment forced the government to borrow abroad, and its foreign debt tripled from \$51 billion to \$145 billion during the 1990s (O’Brien, 1999).

To globalize the economy, Yeltsin abandoned Soviet protectionist policies and opened Russian markets to foreign trade. Domestic consumers rushed to buy foreign imports. But they refused to buy shoddy Russian goods and foreign consumers refused to buy Russian exports. As a result trade deficits mounted and the govern-



ment was forced to devalue the ruble. The devaluation made it impossible to repay loans and Russia was forced to default in 1998. Although the IMF provided a structural adjustment program to prevent collapse, the resulting crash resulted in massive job loss and the GNP fell by half, “the most abrupt decline in any major industrial country since the Great Depression” (Thornton, 1997, 133).

The economic crisis created a political crisis. Yeltsin resigned and chose Putin as his successor. Putin corralled the oligarchs and consolidated control of oil and other assets for himself and his supporters. Russia revived the oil industry, when wars in the Middle East and growing demand in China drove prices up, from \$9.57 a barrel in 1998 to \$94 a barrel in 2008 (Tooze, 2018, 128). Oil provided the government with the revenue it needed to balance its budget (oil revenues provided 30–50 percent of the government’s budgets), provide benefits to workers and pensioners and purchase their political loyalty, earn dollars to build up Russia’s foreign reserves (which grew from \$12 billion 1998 to \$598 billion in 2008), stabilize the ruble, cushion the blows from the Great Recession, and allow Putin to stay in power for the next 20 years. (Dale, 2001, 79ff.). Agriculture in Russia also revived and Russia, along with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, began exporting large volumes of wheat in the 2000s and, by the 2010s, accounted for 30 percent of global wheat exports (Nicas, 2022; Krugman, 2022).

The crisis in Russia also created crises in other republics, which had adopted similar policies and relied on industrial goods and raw materials from Russia and each other. People distressed by the economic crisis and disenchanted with the corrupt and less-than-democratic governments run by former communists and supported by residual Russian-speaking population (26 million Russians lived outside Russia), organized “Color Revolutions” (2003 “Rose” revolution in Georgia, 2005 “Tulip” revolution in Kyrgyzstan, 2006 “Jeans” revolution in Belarus, 2009 “Grape” revolution in Moldova, and 2018 “Velvet” revolution in Armenia) to oust ruling parties and develop democratic and capitalist institutions that could integrate with the EU and NATO, as states in the Baltics and Eastern Europe had done. Russian populations generally exercised considerable political power and privilege in other republics until color revolutions challenged them, and they often resented the loss of minority power, sought help from Russia to “protect” them from democratic majority rule, and often migrated “back” to Russia.

In 2004, demonstrators organized a peaceful “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, the second most populous republic, to oppose a fraudulent election conducted by the corrupt, authoritarian and pro-Russian president, Victor Yanukovich, who was supported by Putin and the large, residual Russian population in Eastern Ukraine. The demonstrators forced new elections, which were won by Viktor Yushchenko, an Orange Revolution leader, who vowed to reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russian oil and apply for eventual membership in the EU and NATO (Pifer, 2012, 108).

Putin objected to these revolutions, which undermined Russian efforts to reassert their economic and political hegemony in the region and build a new, mercantil-

ist “commonwealth” under Russian leadership, and fought to prevent Georgia from pursuing EU and NATO membership and “protect” separatist Russian and other minorities from majority rule. Putin supported demands by the Muslim minority in Abkhazia and ethnic Russians in South Ossetia to secede from Georgia and in 2008 invaded Georgia and recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states (Fuller, 1993, 334; Cornell, 2011, 284).

In Ukraine, the pro-Russian leader Yanukovich returned to power in 2010, but was ousted in 2013 by a second Orange Revolution. In retaliation, Putin in 2014 ordered Russian troops to invade and annex Crimea and provide arms and troops to support separatist Russians in Eastern Ukraine who had launched an insurgency against the democratic government, much as Putin had done earlier in Georgia (MacFarquhar, 2015; Tooze, 2018, 498; Charap and Cotton, 2018, 127). Russian intervention effectively divided and sub-divided Ukraine and saddled it with a ruinous, protracted military conflict in the East.

After 2014, falling oil prices crippled Russia’s oil-dependent development, while the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia for the invasion of Ukraine corroded political and economic ties between Russia and the West (Aleksashenko, 2018, 172f.).

In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine for a second time to detach two Russian separatist regions in the East from Ukraine, depose the democratic, pro-EU/NATO government, replace it with Russian surrogates and, perhaps, dissolve the sovereign state and annex Ukraine. But the Ukrainian army strenuously resisted the invasion, the initial Russian blitzkrieg failed, bitter war ensued, and millions of Ukrainian civilians fled to Western Europe. The United States and the EU imposed strenuous economic sanctions and embargoes on Russia and Belarus, provided aid and supplied advanced weapons to Ukraine (Koeze, 2022). The invasion created a series of global problems that accelerated deglobalization.

The war disrupted global supply chains (some based in Ukraine), shipping and transportation networks, and internet connections (Satariano and Hopkins, 2022; Ewing 2022). These disruptions contributed to “surging costs [...] and prolonged deliveries for companies trying to move goods around the world” (Swanson, 2022c). The war also disrupted Russian oil exports (it provided 10 percent of the world’s oil supplies) that fueled its economy, and drove oil prices up dramatically (Goodman, 2022b). In response, the United States and European Union accelerated their efforts to deploy “brown” and “green” substitutionist technologies to increase oil supplies and alternative energy sources (Plumer, 2022). The war also increased world grain prices dramatically (wheat up 21 percent, barley 33 percent, and fertilizer 40 percent) because Ukraine is a major exporter of wheat and grains and Russia is a big exporter of wheat and is the world’s largest fertilizer exporter (Cohen and Reed, 2022). “There is no precedent even close to this since World War II,” the UN’s World Food Program reported. “The war’s impact on the global food market could cause an additional 7.6 to 13.1 million people to go hungry” (Nicass, 2022).

Supply chain disruptions and rising energy and food prices fueled inflation around the world, much as they had during the inflationary 1970s (when the Arab-Israeli war and Soviet grain shortages drove inflation), forcing governments to raise interest rates that might trigger recessions. These developments, like the preceding crises, have contributed to ongoing deglobalization and the further marginalization, isolation, and exile of Eurasia from the world-economy.

## Globalization Undone

Globalization was undone by separate crises that collectively undermined its economic and political foundations. In the United States, the problems associated with globalization—job loss and stagnant wages, growing inequality and recurrent economic crises—persuaded state officials to adopt policies that challenged U.S.-China relations and the outsourcing based in China and revived anti-trust laws to constrain mergers, monopolies, and rising prices. These bipartisan policies undermined the foundations of globalization.

Across Asia and Latin America, in countries that opened their economies to foreign investment and trade, globalization was undone by trade deficits, currency devaluations, capital flight, economic crises, and growing competition from China, which captured investment from around the world.

In MENA, globalization was undone by internecine battles to control oil prices and sectarian conflicts that destroyed states, divided peoples, ruined economies, and triggered socially disruptive migrations. It was also undone by determined U.S. efforts to curb the “extortionate power” of oil-producing countries and reverse the terms of trade.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, globalization was undone by the West’s economic disinterest, political indifference and neglect, and by indigenous battles over increasingly scarce resources that triggered sectarian wars and socially disruptive migrations.

In Eurasia, globalization was undone by Western political indifference and economic neglect and by the emergence of a corrupt oil-igarchy that revived mercantilist economics and attempted to reassert Russian hegemony over post-Soviet republics, a development that led to ruinous wars in Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine and socially disruptive migrations across the region.

Although deglobalization had separate causes in different regions, the process often had similar consequences: economic crises, sectarian conflicts, and socially disruptive migrations. These separate developments collectively contributed to deglobalization, a process accelerated by the COVID pandemic and Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine.

Globalization was largely a product of U.S. government policies that channeled huge new financial resources into Wall Street that fueled stock price inflation, which became the engine of global economic change. Stock-price inflation exacted a heavy toll, creating economic crises and political turmoil in the United States and around

the world. It forced governments to spend trillions of taxpayer dollars to save Wall Street and re-inflate stock-prices. The fact that corporate managers and investors regularly withdraw money from the stock market abruptly, as they did in 1987, 2000, 2008, and 2020, means that the stock market will crash again. But will governments and taxpayers do whatever it takes to revive stock-price inflation? Given the enormous economic costs and the enormous political costs of doing so, the answer might just be no. And if it is, stock-price *deflation* could fundamentally alter the conditions that made globalization possible, with important consequences for investors, businesses, workers, and governments around the world.

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## **Supply Chain Crises: Harbingers of Deglobalization? A Look at Automobiles, Steel, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and Amazon**

Paul S. Ciccantell, Spencer Louis Potiker, David A. Smith, and Elizabeth Sowers

The ongoing supply chain disruptions of 2020–22 raise fundamental questions about the future of globalization and the potential for deglobalization. The growth of trade conflicts, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine disrupted production, transportation, distribution and consumption and increased costs and prices across almost all industries. Reliance on global commodity chains that separated stages of extraction, production and consumption into many linked nodes became unstable, unreliable, and vulnerable to disruption. In this chapter, we extend our comparative analysis of critical global commodity chains during the supply chain crises of 2020–22. We examine both manufactured products such as automobiles and raw materials-based industries such as steel that confront severe disruptions. We analyze the causes of these disruptions and the extent to which firms and states may be seeking to promote deglobalization in these industries. We also examine Amazon's efforts to overcome potential deglobalization.

### **Introduction: Commodity Chains and the Future of Globalization**

The ongoing supply chain disruptions of 2020–22 raise fundamental questions about the future of globalization and the potential for deglobalization. The growth of trade conflicts, most notably between the U.S. and China, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine disrupted production, transportation, distribution and consumption and increased costs and prices across almost all industries. Reliance on global commodity chains that separated stages of extraction, production and consumption into many linked nodes that often relied on just in time delivery became unstable, unreliable, and vulnerable to disruption. Politicians and consumers confronted the realization that essential supplies of basic goods were no longer available within national borders due to reliance on global commodity chains. Is this the end of globalization and the onset of deglobalization?

In this chapter, we will extend our comparative analysis of critical global commodity chains during the supply chain crises of 2020–22. We will examine both manufactured products such as automobiles and raw materials-based industries such as steel that confront severe disruptions of their global supply chains. We will analyze the causes of these disruptions and the extent to which firms and states may be seeking to promote deglobalization in these industries.

One other case study we will examine is Amazon and its efforts to overcome potential deglobalization. We will look at Amazon's efforts to deal with trade wars, supply chain disruptions, COVID, etc. via creating Amazon Air, chartering ships to move goods, and the new Amazon local service to connect to customers. Amazon fundamentally depends on globalization for cheap goods, so its efforts to keep the current model going (along with many other firms) and avoid deglobalization make it a key case study.

In January 2020, Bloomberg News asked a question which seemed absurd only recently: "Have we reached peak globalization?" (Bloomberg News, January 24, 2020). Some analysts interviewed strongly disagreed with the potential of peak globalization, such as the Chief Economist of the German multinational financial services company Allianz SE (*ibid.*). Others, however, expressed strong doubts. Dani Rodrik, now a vocal skeptic of globalization and its consequences, noted that globalization produces

consequences (that) are now familiar: anti-globalization backlash at home and trade war abroad. The illiberal, nativist impulse of the reaction should not deceive us into thinking we can return safely to the *status quo ante* if the political center holds. A complete collapse of economic globalization seems unlikely. But we will have to settle for a thinner model of globalization that leaves nations room for rebuilding domestic social contracts. (Bloomberg News, January 24, 2020).

In the United States a great deal of anti-globalist nationalism is directed at China (see, e.g., Navarro, 2011; see Ciccantell et al., 2020).

The COVID-19 pandemic that began in early 2020 brought questions about the benefits, costs and risks of dependence on global supply chains. The health risks of global travel, the lack of availability of personal protective equipment and medical supplies, the source of this new global health threat, efforts to assign blame, and vows to reduce dependence on global supply chains in many countries reinforced the pressures for deglobalization. This was further exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, exposing the costs and risks of dependence on global supply chains in oil and gas and in food crops, with fuel and food prices rising rapidly and worries about food supplies leading to serious problems, including inflation. All of this heighten the urgency of addressing Bloomberg's question about globalization and the potential for deglobalization that motivates this conference.

In the following section, we briefly outline our theoretical and methodological approach for understanding supply chains and the current structure and operation of the capitalist world-economy. We then discuss our findings from earlier case studies of some commodity chains in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, emphasizing their dependence on the existing model of globalization and the challenges they face in the current era of supply chain crises and potential deglobalization. We will then analyze Amazon's efforts to maintain the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century model of globalization. Our conclusion returns to the broad question of whether the 2020s mark the end of globalization and the rise of deglobalization.

## **Approaches to Analyzing GCCs and Their Role in the World Economy**

We analyze the current conjuncture of challenges to globalization grounded in what we term raw materialist lengthened global commodity chains (GCCs) (Ciccantell and Smith, 2009; Sowers et al., 2014). We focus on the role of GCCs in long term social change and how these changes in GCCs are rooted in the broader framework of economic and geopolitical shifts over long periods. The raw materialist lengthened global commodity chains theoretical and methodological model brings together the global commodity chains model (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Bair, 2005, 2009) and new historical materialism (Bunker and Ciccantell, 2005, 2007), or “raw materialism.” The goal is to move past the global/local and nature/society dualisms with a model that can move between examining, for example, issues as diverse as the impacts of a particular mine on a particular mountain to global geopolitical processes that limit the ability of workers in many locations to organize during a particular era in the evolution of the capitalist world-economy.

The raw materialist model begins from a focus on the material process of economic ascent in the capitalist world-economy. The key problem for rapidly growing economies over the past five centuries was obtaining raw materials in large and increasing volumes to supply their continued economic development in the context of economic and geopolitical cooperation and conflict with the existing hegemon and other rising economies. Economies of scale offer opportunities to reduce costs and create competitive advantages, but raw materials depletion and increasing transport distances create diseconomies of space (increasing costs due to the need to bring raw materials from ever more distant extractive peripheries to the consuming regions) that make finding economic, technological and sociopolitical “fixes” via increasing economies of scale difficult to achieve, maintain, and eventually reconstruct on an even larger scale.

The raw materialist lengthened global commodity chains model (Ciccantell and Smith, 2009; Sowers et al., 2014) begins analysis by focusing on raw materials extraction and processing and on the transport and communications technologies

that link multiple nodes of the chain from its raw materials sources through industrial processing to consumption and eventually waste disposal. It provides a lens to examine spatially-based disarticulations (the marginalization or outright elimination of particular nodes from a GCC) (Bair and Werner, 2011) and contestations over extraction, processing, transport, consumption, and waste disposal across these chains. This approach highlights the role of contestation and resistance to the construction and reproduction of a particular commodity chain in particular places (Ciccantell and Smith, 2009; Sowers et al., 2014).

Our analytic approach follows a long tradition of making multiple comparisons across time and space within the context of an evolving global system (see, e.g., Wallerstein, 1974; Chase-Dunn, 1989; Arrighi, 1994; Bunker and Ciccantell, 2005). The GCC approach makes comparisons between parts of the same commodity chain in different nations and between different chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994). We follow this approach, focusing particular attention on the upstream stages of these GCCs and on their role in the long term evolution of the capitalist world-economy, including their roles in economic and geopolitical competitions.

Our larger goal in extending our analysis to these lengthened commodity chains is to analyze the role of transport and distribution (“logistics”) as generative sectors driving economic development via economies of scale, reducing diseconomies of space, and expanding the geographic scale and scope of GCCs. In attempting to formulate a “sociology of logistics,” we emphasize the contributions of transport and distribution to capital accumulation, the turnover of capital, and the efficiency of capital investments at both the upstream raw materials and downstream consumer ends of these GCCs. Bonacich and Hardie (2006, 163) highlight two meanings of logistics, the classic “nuts-and-bolts distribution functions that a firm must undertake, namely, transportation and warehousing” and the more recent “management of the supply chain, including the relations between retailers, their producers/suppliers and their carrier/transportation providers.” As Allen (2020, 153) emphasizes in his analysis of UPS, “the rise of modern logistics [is] the force reshaping global capitalism.”

There may be a misperception among some political economists that value is primarily created via production or perhaps via extraction. In fact, Marx himself in *Capital* Volume II did argue that “circulation” operates at a specific mode of accumulation by selling a “change in location” (Marx, 1978; Chua, 2021). However, neither popular nor scholarly discussions about economic growth and dynamism tends to emphasize this as a driver of accumulation (the focus is much more likely to be on labor, capital or finance). Chua (2021) evocatively argues that we need to focus on how “logistics enmeshes” infrastructure, people, society and territory into a larger and larger “machine of supply chain capital” via growing “logics of distributive efficiency.” This is something relatively new, but undeniably important; it needs more attention!

In recent decades, transportation and distribution emerged as absolutely essential elements to lengthening GCCs due to chains linking extraction, production, and consumption in distant parts of the globe. These lengthened GCCs are constantly building more complex networks linking producers and consumers. Of course, there were historic precursors to all this. Our argument is that to understand the dynamics of global capitalism, we need to appreciate how key innovations in transport and distribution were critical as generative sectors leading to economic growth.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, examining these lengthened GCCs reveals that there is something rather *new* for Amazon and other e-commerce firms: the issue of “the last mile” (the cost to get goods from warehouses, distribution centers, and fulfillment centers to consumers’ homes). This is yet another daunting diseconomy of space, given the tremendous challenges and costs for firms that the distance to and dispersal of these many locations creates. Warehouses (the traditional term for facilities in which firms store goods prior to distribution to stores and consumers), distribution centers (the term coined by Wal-Mart to describe their increasingly sophisticated and efficient warehouses that supplied their growing national and then international network of stores), and fulfillment centers (Amazon’s restructured facilities that were modeled on Wal-Mart but in recent years were reorganized to increase the efficiency of distribution to consumers’ homes) are key links in organizational strategies and in product movement across GCCs (see Stone, 2013, chapter 6). In and of themselves, warehouses and distribution centers are not recent developments. Warehouses were critical elements of the early twentieth century rise of the A&P grocery chain, the world’s largest retailer for most of the twentieth century (Levinson, 2011) and later for Wal-Mart, the model for much of Amazon’s corporate strategy today (Stone, 2013; Levinson, 2011; Moody, 2020).

Similarly, economies of scale are critical to reduce the diseconomies of space for retailers, a strategy embraced by A&P to produce their rapid growth in the first half of the twentieth century, by Wal-Mart to drive smaller competitors out of business through purchasing and distribution economies, and by Amazon’s economies of scale typified through their status as the “everything store” (Levinson, 2011; Stone, 2013, 2021). It is, however, important to recognize that economies of scale are not simply about efficiency, but also offer a variety of other benefits, including increased negotiating power over suppliers, lower marketing costs, and “everyday low prices” compared to competitors with higher costs. Economies of scale and the ability to overcome diseconomies of space (e.g., Amazon’s efforts to resolve the “last mile” problem by creating their own logistics delivery network) are not simply evidence of economic efficiency; they are critical sources of power over competitors, consumers, and states. While state investigations of A&P, Wal-Mart, and Amazon as the largest retailers were not uncommon over the past century (Stone, 2021, 202), these investigations are typically limited in their impact because of the economic and political power of these firms.

Picking up on the logic of their precursor, Wal-Mart, the geographic dispersal and small scale of locally and regionally focused economic activity represented an opportunity for Amazon to use its economies of scale and economic and political power to earn incredible profits. In this new era of e-commerce, the problems of diseconomies of space (with the “race to the bottom” in outsourcing of production as part of the broader process of globalization) now constitute a new challenge to overcome the “last mile” delivery cost problem. What appeared as an inefficiency and economic opportunity for Amazon was in fact a protective diseconomy of space for local and regional firms, economies, and communities that promoted the interests of firms, workers and governments. The pressures for deglobalization represent an effort to reevaluate the benefits, costs and risks of globalization by a wide range of actors, a reevaluation that often includes critiques of Amazon and its dependence on GCCs that extend thousands of miles in search of low cost raw materials and labor.

## **Case Studies of Raw Materialist Lengthened GCCs**

In this section, we summarize key findings from a few case studies of raw materialist lengthened global commodity chains. These studies reveal the impacts of globalization over the last several decades and the challenges of and pressures for deglobalization (Sowers et al., 2014, 2018). We will focus on automobiles, steel, and natural gas, globalized industries confronting a different world in the 2020s.

### **Automobiles: From U.S. dominance to globalization/rearticulation**

In terms of employment, technological leadership, economic value, and its multiplier effects, the automobile industry became the central domestic generative sector in the U.S. for much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Rubenstein, 2014), with much of its raw materials extraction, industrial processing, and consumption taking place within the U.S. According to the American Automotive Policy Council (2018), the automobile industry comprised 3% of the U.S. GDP in 2018, in addition to being the U.S.’s largest exporter and a major investor in research and development. U.S. passenger car production peaked in the mid-1960s at more than 9.3 million vehicles and fell to 2.5 million by 2019 and to 1.9 million in 2020 with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, but commercial vehicle production continued to grow during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries to more than 8.5 million in 2019 before declining in 2020 (U.S. Department of Transportation, n.d.).

In the global automobile industry, while the U.S. once dominated the production of passenger cars in the 1960s (48.5% of world production in 1961), it is now only the fourth largest producer, making only 4.7% of the world total in 2020. Japan’s dramatic rise in the auto industry from the 1970s made it the world leader until 2009, when it was surpassed due to China’s rapid growth in the 2000s (U.S. Department

of Transportation, n.d.). China's production now dwarfs Japan, Germany and the U.S. The U.S. auto industry was outcompeted by Japanese firms, then South Korean firms, and, most recently, by Chinese firms in the global market, resulting in rapid production declines. U.S. auto employment peaked in 2000 at almost 1.3 million and then declined dramatically around the turn of the century to 640,000, only to rebound slowly until 2020 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.).

One of the enduring lessons of the GCC framework is that understanding how commodity chains are articulated—or delinked and rearticulated—is critically important. The shifting geography of auto production in the U.S. is particularly interesting. Auto manufacturing shifted to states with anti-trade unions “right to work” laws and very low wages during the 1980s and 1990s as production declined overall. But the key political battleground in the U.S. 2016 election was the traditional heart of auto country: Trump won Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania by less than 100,000 *combined* votes. He campaigned extensively in those states and promised to “help” the US manufacturing sector by bringing production back to the U.S. However, domestic auto production continued to decline under the Trump Administration; “America First” deglobalization did not happen. Even “domestic” auto production in the U.S. includes a very large share of imported components; efforts to deglobalize this industry were very unsuccessful in the 2010s.

In the wake of COVID-19, inadequate domestic production of computer chips became a critical issue for domestic auto production. Lockdowns and factory closures in China created severe chip shortages that sharply constrained U.S. auto production, leading to factory slowdowns and long delays in shipments of cars and trucks and, due to inadequate production, rapid increases in prices. While some efforts are underway to build new domestic computer chip production facilities (Henry, 2022), deglobalization is not a viable option for the auto industry.

### **Steel: From U.S. dominance to poster child of a trade war**

Steel built the ascendant U.S. economy of the late 1800s and early 1900s and the U.S. hegemonic political economy of the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. This building was both literally physical and as a central domestic generative sector that drove economic ascent and served as the model for the broader U.S. political economy (Bunker and Ciccantell, 2005). The U.S. caught up to the economy that first developed the modern steel industry, the U.K., and then surpassed it and the other largest ascendant economy of the time, Germany (Bunker and Ciccantell, 2005). Following the massive destruction of World War II and rapid growth in the U.S. to supply the Allied war effort, the U.S. was the world's dominant steel producer in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Warrian, 2016).

U.S. steel production peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s. U.S. imports tripled since the mid-1970s. U.S. steel employment was around 550,000 in the 1950s,



but then fell steadily due to increases in productivity and technological innovation during the 1960s and early 1970s (U.S. Geological Survey, n.d.; Warrian, 2016). Employment fell by half between 1975 and 1985 (from 433,800 to 208,000) and continued to fall, reaching 143,000 in 2021 (U.S. Geological Survey, n.d.).

World steel production grew steadily over the last century, but has undergone dramatic locational shifts. Japanese steel production increased rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s as Japanese steel companies became technological leaders in the world industry (Bunker and Ciccantell, 2005, 2007; Warrian, 2016). However, Japanese steel production peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s and stagnated for the past thirty years (U.S. Geological Survey, n.d.; Wilson, 2013; Warrian, 2016). In contrast, world steel production doubled between 2000 and 2017 (U.S. Geological Survey, n.d.), with most of that growth coming from China's rapid economic ascent. Chinese steel production rose from 129 million tons in 2000 to 1,100 million tons in 2021, with China now producing more than half of the world's total steel production of 1.9 billion tons (*ibid.*). The Chinese steel industry and Chinese steel firms now dominate the world industry (Wilson, 2013; Warrian, 2016), while the U.S. steel industry now produces only 87 million tons, 8% of China's production (U.S. Geological Survey, n.d.). The U.S. now depends heavily on low cost steel imports from China to meet domestic demand.

The U.S. Department of Commerce (2018, 27f.) report on steel imports identified a large number of steel mill closures and declines in employment that sector. The economic ascent of China and resulting high prices for steel around the world in the 2000s (Ciccantell, 2009) helped revive the U.S. steel industry to a limited extent, as has the shift to more efficient mini-mill production and investments in newer technology in the U.S. (Warrian, 2016), but the story of steel and the majority of employment in the steel sector relocated to China (Wilson, 2013), with relatively few steel jobs left in the U.S., despite the Trump administration's rhetoric.

The Trump Administration's Department of Commerce (2018, 5f.) report found that large quantities of steel imports and global excess steel capacity were negatively impacting the steel industry and the broader economy, as well as threatening U.S. national security. Based on these findings, the report recommended "the President take immediate action by adjusting the level of these imports through quotas or tariffs" (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2018, 7). The 25% tariff on steel imports subsequently imposed by the Trump Administration were calculated to accomplish this goal of protecting the domestic steel industry, but actually did little to change the dominant global position of the Chinese steel industry and the marginal position of the U.S. industry. This effort to deglobalize the steel industry by promoting domestic U.S. production largely failed, highlighting the difficulties confronting efforts to re-shore production and reduce vulnerability to GCCs.

## Liquefied natural gas (LNG)

The liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry began as a means to make use of natural gas resources in socially remote regions. In a fundamental sense, this natural gas was transformed from a waste product of little human use into transportable LNG that could be moved thousands of miles to market. Hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and new drilling technologies transformed useless rock into immense reserves of natural gas that drove down prices with excess production and fomented a search for new markets via LNG processing. This new raw material is reshaping economies, communities, industries and ecosystems in the U.S. and in other parts of the world (Ciccantell, 2020).

Several consequences of the LNG industry are critical, including the movement toward the creation of a global natural gas market (Grigas, 2017), the role of LNG exports from the U.S. in challenging Russian dominance over and geopolitical use of natural gas as a weapon (Grigas, 2017; Rao, 2012), particularly in the wake of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and how fracked natural gas reduces U.S. energy costs for industry and consumers, supporting U.S. economic growth and the re-shoring of some industries (Smil, 2015; Rao, 2012; Kleinhenz and Associates, 2019). Investments of tens of billions of dollars are pouring into LNG export facilities in the U.S. as existing facilities expand and numerous new facilities are announced (Halper, 2022; Bloomberg, April 28, 2022), while European nations seeking to replace Russian natural gas imports build LNG terminals and sign contracts for LNG imports (Smith, 2022).

In the political realm, LNG exports took on a new identity as what the Trump Administration labeled "freedom gas" and "molecules of U.S. freedom to be exported to the world" (Mufson, 2019). In a fundamental sense, this represented a key dimension of the "America First" policy orientation of the Trump Administration. This policy orientation guided U.S. efforts to delink from or restructure key elements of the U.S. role in the world economy and geopolitics, including reduced dependence on traditional alliances and delinking from some chains, most notably the Middle East-based oil industry commodity chain. This effort by the U.S. was only possible because the U.S. was recapturing its long-lost role as the world's leading producer and potentially exporter of these critical commodities, creating a situation that the Trump Administration called energy dominance (Schneider and Peeples, 2018, 1). Without energy independence and growing leverage in global markets, the U.S. would remain vulnerable to resource nationalism in oil and gas producing regions and involved in the seemingly endless wars in the Middle East. LNG is being used as geopolitical weapon by the U.S. against Russia and its efforts to reshape economic and political relations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia (Grigas, 2017; Ciccantell, 2020) even more extensively in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine.

The U.S. is clearly returning to its historical role of energy exporter, as it was in the early decades of the oil industry (Grigas, 2017). Grigas sees this as an unques-

tioned economic and geopolitical positive change that will enhance the U.S. economy and global standing: “American gas could secure and diversify Europe’s supplies, reign (sic) in Russia’s energy influence, woo energy-hungry Asia, and ensure that the twenty-first century once again remains in the firm grasp of the United States and its allies” (Grigas, 2017, 1). This highly positive reading seems highly problematic as global climate change accelerates. A contrasting interpretation would emphasize that the U.S. is moving back to being an extractive periphery, in this case for ascendant China, as it was for Europe and especially Great Britain well into the nineteenth century (Arrighi, 1994; Wallerstein, 1974, 1979). This is a process of re-peripheralization, exploiting U.S. natural resources in support of China’s economic ascent while leaving large areas of the U.S. with depleted resources, damaged ecosystems, and disrupted communities from fracking (Ciccantell, 2020).

LNG is perhaps the clearest case of a sort of successful deglobalization, reducing U.S. dependence on imported energy and returning to the U.S.’ role as an energy exporter, one that takes on much greater significance in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Europe’s dependence on imports of Russian gas. The ability of this new U.S.-centric GCC to quickly reduce European dependence on and vulnerability to Russian gas diplomacy is, however, quite limited, again demonstrating the challenges facing deglobalization.

### **Amazon, globalization and potential deglobalization**

In this section, we will examine the physical dimensions of Amazon’s supply chains, highlighting its dependence on globalization and the challenges to this model that emerged in the 2020s. To understand Amazon’s logistics system, we also need to appreciate how that company “controls” and “internalizes” logistics processes to the maximum effect. This is rather different from other logistic patterns that involved warehouse and nodes controlled by other mainly logistic-focused firms. By having direct “control” of all aspects of these chains (including the various logistical works and trucks decked out with Amazon’s logos), it may be easier for this company to fully be “in charge.” Furthermore, Amazon tends to create redundancies in its network in order to hedge against possible disruptions, such as using several hubs in the same area instead of using a “super-hub.” This, in turn, creates a flexible system of nodes within their distribution network, allowing for substitution in the face of a supply chain problem at any particular node.

There are several key material trends in logistics that can be identified in 2022. First, the rapid increase in the scale of container shipping that moves manufactured goods but also a surprisingly large share of grain, metals and other bulk commodities around the world continues (Khalili, 2020). However, the incredible risks involved in the increasing scale of shipping were dramatically illustrated when the *EverGiven*, an enormous ship piled high with containers, blocked the Suez Canal for an extended period, delaying many billions of dollars of trade. The *EverGiven* itself

was estimated to be carrying US\$1 billion in goods, while the total cost of delayed goods, reopening the canal, and other associated costs were estimated at US\$9.6 billion per day (Tharoor, 2021). The Suez Canal is one of the world's most important physical and logistical chokepoints (Khalili, 2020, 215), as the *EverGiven's* grounding and ongoing lawsuits over its costs dramatically illustrated. Thus, economies of scale reduce per unit costs, but also create huge new risks in GCCs.

Second, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed several critical challenges for logistics and GCCs more generally. Supply chains across all industries were disrupted by lockdowns, worker illnesses, port closures and backlogs, and border closures. For example, in January 2021, 42 ships were waiting to unload at the port of Los Angeles, even though all warehouses within 60 miles of the port were already full (Lynch, 2021). Port delays in China in mid-2021 were actually worse than the delays from the earlier Suez Canal blockage (Bloomberg, June 17, 2021). Air freight networks were disrupted because of the decline in passenger air travel, since many goods moved as freight in the holds of passenger planes (Murray and Monteiro, 2020). One study estimated that GCC disruptions during 2020–21 cost large corporations an average of US\$184 million per year (AJOT, June 24, 2021). However, in contrast to the pandemic-era struggles of most industries and firms, the demand and profits for Amazon soared in large part due to these disruptions (Stone, 2021).

Third, ongoing consolidation in ocean shipping, railroads, and other transportation industries and policy efforts in the U.S. and other nations to counteract consolidation, increasing market power, and rising prices created intense conflicts in the U.S. and other countries. Allen (2020, 169) highlights industry consolidation in logistics networks. China-U.S. container shipping costs per container rose by 229% from July 2020 to July 2021, reaching almost US\$10,000 per container (Murray, 2021a). The Biden Administration is very concerned about high shipping costs. They issued an Executive Order for the Federal Maritime Commission to investigate high shipping costs and concentration in container shipping (Murray, 2021b).

Fourth, while GCC disruption created opportunities for organized labor at port chokepoints, e.g., the Montreal dockworkers' strike in 2020 (AJOT, August 10, 2020), Amazon's corporate strategies focus on avoiding the risk of chokepoints and the power of labor. This tension is exemplified within Amazon itself. On the one hand, MacGillis (2021, 133) emphasizes "the bigger Amazon got and the more it dominated local labor markets, the less competition it faced for workers, and the less it needed to pay to hire them...[and] it made it much easier to stamp out union efforts to organize warehouse workers." On the other hand, "the tighter the supply chain, and the faster goods move into, through, and out of Amazon's capital-intensive facilities, the more vulnerable is its logistics system to disruption" (Moody, 2020, 28). As we argue elsewhere (Sowers et al., 2014, 2017, 2018), these vulnerabilities or chokepoints in GCCs are key potential locations for workers and social movement organizations to exert power over large corporations such as Amazon.

Logistics has always been a central element of Amazon's business, beginning with the challenge of shipping consumers' purchases from the "World's Largest Bookstore" (Stone, 2013). Amazon's logistics evolved from individuals carrying boxes of books to the U.S. Postal Service, UPS, and FedEx, to closely coupled partnerships with these firms, to often acrimonious contract negotiations as sales volumes exploded, to building an increasingly extensive internal logistics capability of trucks, airplanes, delivery vans, and hundreds of fulfillment centers and other facilities (Stone, 2013, 2021; Allen, 2020). Some analysts expect that, in the 2020s, Amazon will compete directly for logistics customers with FedEx, UPS, and other former partners (Premack, 2019).

While the firm was not averse to outsourcing and subcontracting of parts of the chain, it is important to emphasize, again, that Amazon's dominant recent logic is to *internalize* shipping and logistics as a strategy, increasing profits and giving Amazon greater competitive advantages (Premack, 2019; Stone, 2021; Greene, 2020). This runs counter to many other corporate strategies among firms producing and marketing similar goods who rely on other logistics firms to distribute their products. Interestingly, Amazon's corporate strategy may be closer to Henry Ford's model of vertical integration to avoid vulnerability to other firms than to Post-Fordism or "flexible production." Given its vast global reach and power, Amazon could be a trendsetter for this sort of strategy as means to coordinate between producing and consuming regions via articulation and disarticulation across space. This is a dynamic process, involving the articulation and disarticulation of nodes in GCCs as Amazon has sought to expand its control over logistics, suppliers, etc. (Stone, 2021, chapter 9). While it has "internalized" much of the logistics process, though, it is also undeniable that Amazon, in various world contexts and places, also actively promotes the use of informal and gig economy labor. So we are seeing a bit of a "hybrid model" of economic regulation that incorporate elements of Fordism, as well as "flexibility" in the furtherance of mega-profits. A potential area of interest will be to see how Amazon handles recent efforts to unionize workers in their facilities, e.g., Amazon Labor Union's recent successful election in Staten Island.

Amazon's scale and network of distribution centers creates a vast network with potential chokepoints that could be exploited by labor and social movements. The company consistently recognizes this and strategizes to avoid being vulnerable to these potential chokepoints; indeed, some suggest that they've learned from other companies. Currently, Amazon is opening distribution centers and delivery stations across the U.S. seemingly every few days. Two key recent strategies include the opening of the CVG airhub for Amazon's air network and the development of the Otay Mesa San Diego warehouse.

*Amazon's Air Network—toward centrality at Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International (CVG).* Recently, Amazon has entered the air freight market. In 2015, Amazon launched Amazon Air, in part to vertically integrate their supply chain (Schwieterman et al., 2021). To date Amazon follows a different logic than other

third party logistics (3PL) firms. While 3PLs use central hubs like UPS's World-Port in Louisville, KY and FedEx's Superhub in Memphis, TN, Amazon's air network is used to directly connect warehouses across its supply chain (Schwieterman and Walls, 2020). This gives Amazon a strategic advantage in that its airfreight networks are more flexible, but also can lead to higher costs of transport (Negrey et al., 2011).

Although Amazon does use a diffuse airfreight network to meet its demands, in 2017, Amazon Air broke ground on a major project just south of Cincinnati in Hebron, Kentucky. Schwieterman and Walls (2020) report

This hub appears to be the lynchpin to Amazon's efforts to develop a comprehensive array of domestic delivery services across the United States. This hub, when complete, will likely have a role similar to FedEx 'megahub' in Memphis. (Schwieterman and Walls, 2020)

Amazon's presence at CVG, which is already its busiest airport, is expected to grow over the next decade. By year end, industry experts predict that Amazon flights will double to around 50 flights per day at CVG. Amazon's new air hub is fundamentally a way to keep the current model of globalization's supply chains flowing via the ability to move good on its own and chartered airplanes through its own air facility and on into its own distribution system, exploiting the existing system of global commodity chains.

*Otay Mesa—Amazon's mega border warehouse.* During the pandemic Amazon constructed their largest warehouse in the world—3.3 million square feet—within walking distance of the Otay Mesa Port of Entry in San Diego, CA. Shortly after the mega warehouse was constructed, Amazon began construction on a second Otay Warehouse directly across the street. These warehouses are intriguing for many reasons, including their location and the racialization of their workforce.

The distance from the border and capacity to be an intake warehouse for goods northbound from Mexico makes this warehouse of strategic importance to Amazon. The combination of multiple international political factors amplifies these warehouses' importance to Amazon's supply chain strategy. First, there has been a massive increase in tariffs for goods produced in China due to Trump's trade war. Also, there are new incentives to relocate parts of the supply chain to Mexico due to the signing of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Lastly, there are special amendments in the trade agreement between the United States and Mexico that allow e-commerce companies to ship goods duty free from Mexico to the United States if they are sending under \$800 worth of finished products a day to the end consumer.

These warehouses' locations next to the border also create a type of racialization of the workforce, namely the ability to employ Mexican workers living in the Tijuana area. These daily commutes across the border are typical of workers in the Otay

Mesa region. Employment in the Otay Mesa census district in which the Amazon warehouse is located is over 60% Latinx (US Census Bureau, 2018).

Also, the warehouse will only be used to ship goods that fit inside a tote bag, according to a statement made by the general manager of the facility at a public event. This function of the warehouse only for small size goods implies that it will be used for goods coming in and going out from Tijuana's airport located less than a mile from the facility. The location and function of the Otay Mesa Amazon warehouse implies that it will be closely intertwined with both trade with Mexico and Amazon's North American air network. Because Amazon's logistics network is diffuse with redundancies built into the system to avoid chokepoints identifying key nodes in their network such as CVG and Otay Mesa are key for labor organizing.

## **Conclusion: Will the 2020s Be the Decade of Deglobalization?**

What do our various case studies say about the potential for deglobalization in the 2020s? For steel the Trump Administration tried to use tariffs as a mechanism to re-shore production and put "America First" to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with China and gain political support from regions that historically produced this key industrial commodity. However, this effort was largely a failure. LNG and more broadly oil and gas were more successful at displacing imports with domestic production, and LNG may play a significant role in expanding a new Russia-excluded global natural gas commodity chain in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. However, that is not really deglobalization; it is the creation of a different type of GCC with the U.S. as raw materials supplier to Europe.

The case of Amazon's dependence on the model of globalization of the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century is a similarly mixed bag for the potential for deglobalization. Amazon is internalizing many of the functions that it outsourced in logistics early in its existence, defying corporate worries about excessive bureaucratic growth and ossification. Amazon is explicitly contradicting its own earlier precepts in order to maintain the existing model of globalization. Chartering their own container ships and airplanes may provide short term relief to supply chain delays, but Fordist vertical integration and growing concerns in many countries about Amazon's role in eliminating local competitors may make it vulnerable to economic nationalism and pressures for deglobalization. Overall, our case studies emphasize pressures for deglobalization and the challenges confronting attempts to move away from the existing model of globalization, despite the vulnerabilities of GCCs and growing nationalist political rhetoric in many countries. Deglobalization in the 2020s remains an open question.

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## Beyond the Global Value Chain World

Benjamin Selwyn

Over the last four decades Global Value Chains (GVCs) have proliferated to the extent that it is possible to speak of a GVC world. Mainstream academics and institutions proclaim that GVCs benefit firms, consumers and developing countries and, in these crisis-ridden times, are committed to rejuvenating them. By contrast, this chapter argues that the GVC world represents the highest form, so far, of monopoly capitalism. It argues that monopoly capitalism intensifies two of capitalism's core dynamics—labor exploitation and environmental commodification/destruction. The chapter uses data and evidence from core publications by the World Bank and World Trade Organization to show that even such ardent supporters of GVCs recognize these tendencies. It also argues that in the current context—of economic, (geo)political and environmental crises—it is time to consider how to transcend the GVC world.

### Introduction

Right now, in Shanghai, China, a factory owned by the Taiwanese Pegatron Group is pushing out millions of units of the iPhone 6s for Apple. There, its young production workers toil six days a week in 12-hour shifts. Each day they are paid for 10 and half hours of work, not counting 15 minutes of unpaid meetings. The mandatory overtime shift runs from 5:30 pm until 8:00 pm. Most workers will not eat dinner before doing overtime because the 30-break given for a meal is not enough time. Before overtime pay, workers making the iPhone earn only the local minimum wage of USD318 per month, or about USD1.85 per hour. This is not a living wage. Even if the factory did not mandate overtime as it does, workers would still depend on their 60-hour workweeks to get by. (China Labor Watch, 2015)

Global meat consumption is increasing and with it the demand for soy, a protein-rich crop primarily used as cattle feed. This is having a disastrous impact on people, the environment and the climate. Forests are being cleared and the natural environment destroyed on a large scale, especially in South America, to free up land for soy cultivation. The greenhouse gases this releases are contributing to climate change. Soy cultivation also has harmful effects on local, often indigenous populations. They are losing the land and forest they need to survive. Excessive use of herbicides is leading to severe water and air pollution and is creating serious health risks, especially for women and children. (Both Ends, 2022)

These two vignettes—of labor exploitation in the electronics industry, and of environmental destruction and degradation of indigenous livelihoods through the globalized food trade—are emblematic of the global value chain (GVC) mode of capital accumulation. GVC production and trade turbo-charged the post-1991 globalization decades—expanding to encompass up to 80 percent of world trade by the mid 2000s (World Bank, 2020; UNCTAD, 2013).<sup>1</sup> The extent of this transformation was so great that it is now possible to speak of a “GVC World” (Mayer and Phillips, 2017).

GVCs have been promoted—first by academics, and more recently by international organizations and policy makers—as benefiting firms, consumers, developing countries and their populations. This chapter argues, by contrast, that GVCs are best conceptualized through the lens of monopoly-capital theory, and further, that monopoly capitalism intensifies two of capital’s core dynamics—labor exploitation and environmental commodification/destruction.

The chapter uses data and evidence from core publications by the World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO) to show that even such ardent supporters of GVCs recognize these dynamics. The World Bank’s recent report *Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains* acknowledges how “[t]he concentration of trade in a few importing-exporting firms is extreme. Two-way traders account for about 15 percent of all trading firms...[and]...capture almost 80 percent of total trade” (World Bank, 2020, 30f.). It refers to highly concentrated and powerful firms as “superstars,” and notes their deleterious impact upon workers’ wages:

U.S. industries are increasingly concentrated, with a small number of productive firms accounting for large shares of the market and large profits [...] In the United States,

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1 The World Bank defines GVCs as systems of production where “at least two stages [are] conducted in different countries” (World Bank, 2020, 265). According to its calculations GVC trade reached 52% of world trade by the time of the great economic crisis of 2008, but stagnated since then. This might be an understatement, as the UDP calculates that 80% of global trade occurs in GVCs linked to trans-national corporations (TNCs; UNCTAD, 2013). The difference between these estimations derives from the World Bank’s focus on two-stages of production, and UNCTAD’s emphasis on the trade of commodities within TNC-dominated GVCs.

superstar firms that are more productive and earn higher profits also have lower labor shares, and their increasing concentration has contributed to the declining labor share within industries. (ibid., 84, 86)

Notwithstanding these, and other acknowledgments by the World Bank and WTO about the deleterious socio-economic-environmental impacts of GVCs (see below), both organizations steadfastly support the GVC mode of capital accumulation.

Despite (or perhaps because of) the centrality of GVCs to the contemporary world, Mayer and Phillips (2017, 134) note how “politics, and by extension states, are marginal in debates about the genesis, evolution and functioning of the GVC based global economy.” Mayer and Phillips highlight the importance of global institutions in particular of the WTO and the proliferation of multi and bi-lateral trade agreements in establishing the conditions for GVC trade, and the more pervasive ideology of GVCs for development. While they identify heightened inequality associated with GVCs, they miss the significance of *transformations* in capital-labor and capital-nature relations that underpin the GVC world and its specific form of wealth generation and distribution. Such an omission effectively excludes the very foundations of the GVC world, since “[n]ature is just as much the source of use values [...] as labor; which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power” (Marx, 1875).

Under the GVC mode of capitalism, these resources to capital—of human labor and nature—are exploited and degraded to an unprecedented degree. By bringing into sharper focus these relations and processes, not only are we able to understand better the formation and reproduction of the GVC world, but the case is strengthened for transcending it. Such a call is all the more apposite in the contemporary context of global economic, (geo)political and environmental crises.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic proponents of the GVC world have sought to formulate policies to increase supply chain resilience—entailing reshoring/nearshoring, deployment of new technologies and seeking out new sources of cheap labor (Xing et al., 2021). They have presented their solutions in universal terms—as benefiting larger and small firms, capital and labor, and the environment. The COVID-19 crisis has, however, not only generated problems of supply chain resilience, it has also exacerbated capitalism’s inner tendencies of capital concentration. A World Bank publication notes how:

COVID-19 could cause a further rise in corporations’ market power because large corporations are in the best position to withstand the economic downturn and deploy new technologies [...] In the past three recessions, the share prices of US firms in the top quartile across 10 sectors rose by an average of 6 percent whereas the share prices of those in the bottom quartile fell by 44 percent. The same divergence has been evident since the start of the COVID-19 outbreak. (Qiang et al., 2021, 65)

A recent Oxfam report brings out more clearly the human consequences of these tendencies, noting how:

The world's ten richest men more than doubled their fortunes from USD700 billion to USD1.5 trillion—at a rate of USD15,000 per second or USD1.3 billion a day—during the first two years of a pandemic that has seen the incomes of 99 percent of humanity fall and over 160 million more people forced into poverty. (Oxfam, 2022)

The re-shoring narrative was deployed by former US president Donald Trump in his America First agenda, claiming that by “bringing back” to the USA production from locations such as China and Mexico, his policies would restore pre-neoliberal/pre-rustbelt industries and jobs. However, reflecting global wage differentiation—where although wages in China are rising, they are still a fraction of US wages (Suwandi, 2019), his agenda attracted few global firms (back) to the US. For example, in 2017 he hailed Foxconn's plans to invest USD10 billion in Wisconsin, generating 13,000 blue-collar jobs. By 2021 the Taiwanese electronics giant had reduced its investments to under USD1 billion with under 1,500 expected new (mostly white collar) jobs blaming relatively high US labor costs (Shepardson and Pierog, 2021). A recent World Bank report argues that “there is no sign yet that this shift [global reshoring to high-income countries and China] is occurring” (Brenton et al., 2022, X11). As the Financial Times noted “coronavirus-induced ‘reshoring’ is not happening” (Beattie, 2020).

While the GVC mainstream is promoting supply chain resilience as a solution to the GVC world's crises, other social forces are contesting the reproduction of the GVC mode of capital accumulation. Most recently, workers at Amazon's Staten island factory won an historic battle for trade union recognition. The extent of the climate crisis is leading to the proliferation of social movements seeking green transitions, de-growth, and more sustainable futures—all of which would require radical re-ordering of global production and trade. While the latter movements are largely ignored by advocates of enhanced supply chain resilience, this chapter argues that they represent attempts to challenge and transcend the GVC world. This chapter aims to contribute to these movements' endeavors by illuminating the basis of the GVC world in workers' exploitation and environmental commodification/despoliation.

Following this introduction, section two provides the chapter's theoretical outline, arguing that the GVC world is best understood from a monopoly capital perspective. Section three outlines the formation and reproduction of the GVC world—focusing on its expanding laboring class. Section four shows how the GVC world is founded upon a ramping up of the commodification/environmental despoliation. Section five discusses movements mobilizing within and against the GVC mode of capitalism, and section six concludes.

## The GVC World as Monopoly Capitalism

Mainstream academic GVC analysis posits that “development requires linking up with the most significant lead firm in the industry” (Gereffi, 2001, 1622). OECD Secretary General Angel Gurría articulates the policy mainstream, arguing that “[e]veryone can benefit from global value chains” [and that] “encouraging the development of and participation in global value chains is the road to more jobs and sustainable growth for our economies” (OECD, 2013). The World Bank (2020) represents the highest-profile attempt to date by an International Organization to promote the GVC mode of capital accumulation, claiming that “GVCs boost incomes, create better jobs and reduce poverty” (World Bank, 2020, 3).

The Report evokes Adam Smith’s model of the economic beneficial effects of division of labor/specialization/productivity enhancement—albeit now operating on a global scale, with lead firms assisting suppliers upgrade production:

[P]articipation in global value chains can deliver a double dividend. First, firms are more likely to specialize in the tasks in which they are most productive. Second, firms are able to gain from connections with foreign firms, which pass on the best managerial and technological practices. As a result, countries enjoy faster income growth and falling poverty. (World Bank, 2020, xii)

Perhaps predictably, the World Bank’s (2020) report’s benign Smithian notion of the division of labor ignores later observations about its potentially negative impacts upon workers. Writing half a century after Smith, Charles Babbage (1835) showed how the factory division of labor could be used to cut capital’s wage costs. He observed that skilled workers often undertook unskilled tasks, and argued that it would be possible to allocate skilled tasks only to skilled and higher paid workers and other tasks to less skilled and lower paid workers, thus establishing a hierarchy of wages. Three years later Andrew Ure advanced Babbage’s argument, arguing that the trend in manufacturing industry was, if not “to superseded human labor altogether” at a minimum “to *diminish* its cost, by substituting the industry of women and children for that of men; or that of ordinary laborers, for trained artisans” (1967 [1835], 23; emphasis added). Unlike Smith, then, Babbage and Ure viewed explicitly the division of labor as a tool to place constant downward pressure upon labor to the benefit of capital.

Notwithstanding its claims that GVCs boost incomes, create better jobs and reduce poverty, the World Bank’s report comes close to acknowledging a contrary reality, where GVCs represses workers’ incomes, concentrate wealth in the hands of giant TNCs and degrade the environment. For example, it states how GVCs “have contributed to lower inflation via *downward pressures on labor* through heightened competition across countries to attract tasks, in particular when low-wage countries are integrated in supply chains” (World Bank, 2020, 106 emphasis added).



Relatedly, in an OECD working paper Andrews et al. (2018, 21) note that stronger GVC integration “can put downward pressure on wage growth through the use of foreign workers embodied in inputs who thus become more direct competitors to domestic workers.” The World Bank acknowledges that:

In 63 developed and developing economies, GVC integration as well as other domestic within industry forces, such as technology or markups, contributed significantly to the *reallocation of value added from labor to capital* within countries between 1995 and 2011. (World Bank, 2020, 86; emphasis added).

The Report also notes how GVCs have favored lead over supplier firms, in turn exerting still greater pressure upon the latter’s workers:

Large corporations that outsource parts and tasks to developing countries have seen rising markups and profits, suggesting that a growing share of cost reductions from global value chain participation are not being passed on to consumers. At the same time, markups for the producers in developing countries are declining. (World Bank, 2020, 3)

In short, the World Bank’s 2020 report provides sufficient grounds to argue that the GVC mode of capital accumulation contributes directly to capital concentration and wage repression. But these conclusions are not reflected in its headline message that GVCs boost incomes, create better jobs and reduce poverty. To understand the relations between these negative outcomes and the inner relations of the GVC world we need to look elsewhere.

Marx’s critique of capitalism illuminated its tendencies towards capital concentration, heightened labor exploitation and environmental degradation: “[C]apital grows in one place to a huge mass in a single hand, because it has in another place been lost by many.” Consequently “along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation” (Marx, 1990, 777, 929). Later theorists in the monopoly capital tradition detailed how the ever-greater sub-division of and managerial control over the labor process (“hyperspecialization”) reflects capital’s “incessant drive to enlarge and perfect machinery on the one hand, and to diminish the worker on the other” (Braverman, 1998: 157). John Bellamy Foster et al. (2011, 1) note how “as the internationalization of monopoly capital grows...the result is a worldwide heightening of the rate of exploitation (and of the degree of monopoly)” and that when possible, capital resorts to super-exploitation—paying workers “less than the historically determined value of labor power” (ibid., cf. Selwyn, 2019).

Marx’s notion of the metabolic rift illuminates how nature’s cycles are ever-more subordinated to the endless dynamics of competitive capital accumulation to the

detriment of the former. Whilst the metabolic rift characterizes capitalism's relationship with nature *tout court*, as we shall see below it is intensified markedly under the GVC form of monopoly capitalism:

Large-scale industry and industrially pursued large-scale agriculture have the same effect. If they are originally distinguished by the fact that the former lays waste and ruins labor-power and thus the natural power of man, whereas the latter does the same to the natural power of the soil, they link up in the later course of development, since the industrial system applied to agriculture also enervates the workers there, while industry and trade for their part provide agriculture with the means of exhausting the soil. (Marx, 1990, 638)

At its outset, capitalist globalization was constituted by environmental destruction and geographic inequality. As Jason Moore notes, earth's nutrients were "pumped out of one eco system in the periphery and transferred to another in the core. In essence, the land was progressively mined until its relative exhaustion fettered profitability" (Moore, 2000, 124). Brett Clarke and John Bellamy-Foster illuminate how such hierarchies were constituted in the early days of the industrial revolution:

This global metabolic rift involved the decline of soil fertility in Britain, the transfer of Chinese labor to Peru to work the guano islands, the export of natural fertilizer to core nations, the degradation of the Peruvian/Chilean environment, the creation of debt-laden economies, and the War of the Pacific as Chile (backed covertly by Britain) and Peru fought against each other to control resources desired by Britain. It also allowed Britain and other core powers to carry out an 'environmental overdraft' within their own countries by drawing imperialistically on natural resources from abroad. (Clarke and Foster, 2009, 313)

The next two sections outline how the GVC world is founded upon an expanding, highly exploited global laboring class, and the commodification/despotation of nature—both on historically unprecedented scales.

## Constructing the GVC World 1: Capital-Labor Dynamics

The GVC world emerged out of the global economic crisis of the 1970s. Drawing upon already existing, and fast-evolving new technologies—from container ships to emergent ICT systems and incorporating just-in-time production methods—transnational corporations drove industry into new, formerly agricultural, zones of the world economy. Already by the 1970's more prescient intellectuals had noticed the emergence of a New International Division of labor (NIDL) (Fröbel et al., 1978). The NIDL denoted the reorganization of industry—from nationally-organized fordism

to increasingly internationally organized just-in time principles. It also entailed, and was predicated upon, the restructuring of class power (Harvey, 2007). Prior class compromises (where they existed) between capital and labor were replaced by an increased domination of capital over labor.

The proliferation of GVCs occurred in tandem with, and based upon, the expansion of the world's laboring class. Richard Freeman (2007) noted that following the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the global expansion of neoliberalism, Russian, Chinese and Indian workers were integrated into the global economy, increasing "the size of the global labor pool from approximately 1.46 billion workers to 2.93 billion workers" (ibid., 1). By 2017 the global labor pool expanded by another 500 million (ILO, 2017, 5). As Freeman (2007) noted the impact of these dynamics of labor integration were to reduce greatly the capital to labor ratio, shifting "the global balance of power to capital."

But Freeman's geographical focus is only one part of the story. Equally important are processes of social change across the global south, including industrial re-structuring under structural adjustment programs, agricultural modernization, land grabs, and urbanization. Workers in countries that implemented IMF restructuring agreements were 60 per cent less likely to be in a trade union after the program (Martin and Brady, 2007, 574). Since the late 1970s about 1 billion people have left their (often rural) homes to live and try to find some form of work elsewhere. Consequently, around one in three workers around the world live in places different to where they were born (Delgado Wise and Veltmeyer, 2016).

The percentage of the world's industrial labor force located in *less developed regions* expanded from 34 percent in 1950, to 53 per cent in 1980 (ILO 2008), to 79 percent in 2010 (Smith, 2016, 103). The number of laborers working in export-orientated industries quadrupled between 1980 and 2003 (IMF 2007, 162). As Kizu et al. note:

453 million people were employed in GSCs [global supply chains] in 2013, compared with 296 million in 1995, in the 40 countries for which estimates are available [...] Emerging economies drive most of the overall increase in GSC-related jobs, and contributed to an estimated 116 million more jobs as of 1995. (Kizu et al., 2016, 8)

The establishment of export processing zones (EPZ's) and Free Trade Areas (FTAs)—and the extension of their norms across national economies, represents the soil in which the GVC world has been cultivated. EPZ's and FTAs allow foreign capital to operate under relatively unconstrained conditions, including, for example, import-export tax exemptions and access to cheap (often non-unionized) labor. The number of EPZ's increased from 79 in 25 countries in 1975 to over 3,500 in 130 countries by 2006, and by the later date employed an estimated 66 million workers (Engman et al., 2007).

At the heart of this transformation has been the integration into GVC employment of formerly rural dwellers in China, managed through its apartheid-like *hukou* (household registration) system (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). As Kam Wing Chan notes:

China's dominance in manufacturing has made it a major player in the global economy. This China success story is closely intertwined with the migration story [...] The last three decades have witnessed the world's "Great Migration"—an estimated 200–250 million rural residents have moved to cities and towns within China [...] through the special institutional design of the *hukou* system, China has also managed to turn this vast number of rural-urban migrants into the largest army of cheap industrial labor the world has ever seen. (Chan, 2012, 187f.)

GVC firms have deployed a range of strategies to gender, in order to cheapen labor. On the one hand, women workers are particularly favored employees because of their supposed "nimble fingers," "docility," acceptance of harsh work discipline, and disinclination to join trade unions (Elson and Pearson, 1981). However, in his analysis of Mexican *maquiladora* auto production, Leslie Sklair observed how these gender dynamics are changeable, and represent a significant downward lever upon laboring classes as a whole:

The image of the "ideal" woman worker [...] for TNC employment around the world is the image [...] of the "ideal" worker, per se [...] Docile, undemanding, nimble-fingered, non-union, and unmilitant workers will be offered the jobs on the global assembly lines, while aggressive, demanding, clumsy, union, and militant workers will not [However] once the image of the "ideal" worker is institutionalized and accepted by the working class [...] the need to employ women in preference to men diminishes, and job opportunities for docile, undemanding, nimble-fingered, non-union and unmilitant men open up. (Sklair, 2012, 172f.)

One of the defining features of GVC industries is the super exploitation of labor—payment to workers of below subsistence wages (see Table 1 for examples from the global garment sector).

**Table 1: Legal minimum wage vs living wage: Eastern Europe and Asian garment sectors compared**

Eastern Europe (including Turkey)	Minimum wage as % of living wage	Asia	Minimum wage as % of living wage
Ukraine	14%	India	26%
Moldova	19%	China	46%
Georgia	10%	Bangladesh	19%
BiH	25%	Cambodia	21%
Macedonia	14%	Malaysia	54%
Bulgaria	14%	Sri Lanka	19%
Croatia	36%	Indonesia	31%

Source: Clean Clothes Campaign (2014, 34).

..

China's rise as the electrics contract manufacturing workshop of the world is a quintessential case of such capital-labor relations:

The wage and employment system is designed to extract extensive overtime work. The base wage, usually near the local legal minimum wage, is low and provides not more than 50% of workers' regular incomes. Workers achieve the larger part of their wages through extensive overtime work and bonuses for personal performance and disciplined behavior. Workers are housed in factory dormitories and eat in canteens, usually at very low cost or free. The dormitory regime has become the hallmark of this system; it plays a central role in maintaining social control and stability in the factories. (Lüthje and Butollo, 2017, 224)

Alongside the (super) exploitation of labor, the GVC world's expansion has been predicated upon the commodification and despoliation of nature.

## Constructing the GVC World 2: Capital-Environment Dynamics

The GVC World has been predicated upon a vast transformation, through commodification and despoliation, of nature. In fact, “the history of global value chains in capitalism is a history of enterprises appropriating and transforming nature at ever-increasing scale and pace” (Baglioni et al., 2017, 316). Hyperspecialization through GVCs has intensified these dynamics, and is recognized to have done so, even by ardent supporters of the GVC mode of capital accumulation. A World Trade Organization and Asian Development Bank report recognizes how:

GVCs can lead to rising GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions through four main channels. First, GVCs are associated with greater distance between regions in the distribution network, and greater distances translate into higher GHG emissions from transportation [...]. Second, participating in GVCs further accelerates the growth of the global energy footprint, in which stronger backward linkages can increase energy use [...] Third, international carbon leakage—production moving to countries with less stringent climate measures—leads to the burden-shifting of emissions and threatens climate mitigation targets. And fourth, the cost-benefit of GVCs has resulted in an abundance of production and excessive waste in products, including electronics, plastics, and food. (Xing et al., 2021, 144)

The report also notes how “about 30% of threats to global species are driven by international trade in commodities, including coffee, tea, and sugar, and textiles and other manufactured items” (ibid.).

Fossil fuels are essential enablers of hyper-specialized production and trade, and has contributed directly to the rise of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions—from 22 billion tons in 1990 to over 36 billions tons by the 2019s.<sup>2</sup> The World Bank’s (2020) report also acknowledges the catastrophic effects of hyperspecialization upon the environment:

Parts and components are shipped to a country only to be shipped out after assembly [...] directly contributing to climate change [...] In 2016, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from international shipping were about 2.0 percent of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions [...] Under business-as-usual conditions, these emissions are projected to increase by 50–250 percent by 2050. (World Bank, 2020, 121)

Around 90% of the clothes, toys and technological gadgets that stock retailers’ shelves the world over are shipped to their destinations. However:

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2 Source: <https://ourworldindata.org/co2-emissions>.

It has been estimated that just one of these container ships, the length of around six football pitches, can produce the same amount of pollution as 50 million cars. The emissions from 15 of these mega-ships match those from all the cars in the world. And if the shipping industry were a country, it would be ranked between Germany and Japan as the sixth-largest contributor to global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. (Piesing, 2018)

Hyperspecialization has increased industrial requirements for “traditional” metals such as iron ore, and “rare earth” metals. The price of this demand is, as Healy et al. note, that “[e]nergy extraction often entails the physical displacement of populations or the ‘slow violence’ of landscape destruction, water contamination and livelihood disruption” (2019, 220).

There has been a boom in the production of basic metal production since the establishment of the GVC world. For example, between 1990 and 2013, Iron Ore production increased from 951 million to 2.23 billion metric tons.<sup>3</sup> It is the basis of industrial steel, and its import (and also production) by China has fueled the latter’s transformation into the workshop of the world (Rolf, 2021). In Brazil, for example, Iron Ore extraction more than doubled between 2000 and 2020 through intensification of extraction in existing locations and by establishing new zones of extraction. Intensification occurred in traditional mines, while new mines were established primary in the states of Minas Gerais, Bahia and Piauí. The socio-environmental costs of this mining was illuminated horrifically when two tailings dams (where waste from metal extraction is stored) collapsed in 2015 and 2019 respectively (ibid.). As Salvador et al. note:

[A]t 700 m in length and 86 m in height, Brumadinho’s dam was used by the company Vale (2019) to store waste produced during the enrichment of iron ore. Its failure dumped much of the 12 million m<sup>3</sup> waste into the surrounding landscape, killing hundreds of people (259 dead and 14 missing) [...] Immediately after the disaster, water contamination spread over 271 km downstream, up to the Retiro Baixo Hydroelectric Plant. (Salvador et al., 2020, 138)

Rare earth metals, such as Neodymium and Yttrium, are core components of high technologies including the quintessential products of the GVC world—computers and mobile phones. In 2017 global demand for rare-earth metals stood at 156,476 metric tons, and is forecast to rise to 204,678 and 315,000 metric tons by 2025 and 2030 respectively.<sup>4</sup> Rare earth metals often contain radioactive

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3 Source: <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/metal-production-long-term> Accessed March 10, 2022.

4 Source: Statista, 2022; <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1114638/global-rare-earth-oxide-demand/#statisticContainer>.

**Table 2: Current impacts of food production on nature**

52% of agricultural land is degraded
Agriculture accounts for 70% of freshwater use
Agriculture is responsible for 80% of global deforestation
Food systems release 29% of green house gasses into the air
Drivers linked to food production cause 70% of terrestrial biodiversity loss
Drivers linked to food production cause 50% of freshwater biodiversity loss

Source: Adapted from *Global Land Outlook 2* (UNCCD, 2022, 5).

materials, like thorium. Separating out these materials from the metals requires the use of vast quantities of carcinogenic chemicals including hydrochloric acid, ammonia and various sulphates. The production of one ton of rare earth metals generates up to 2,000 tons of toxic waste. Air pollution, soil acidification, radioactive discharges into local water sources and, surface vegetation loss are typically associated with rare-earth metal production (Kaiman, 2014).

Workers in rare earth mining are exposed to the above noted chemicals, as well as dust and metal particles and subject to the risk of ignition and explosions. They often suffer skin irritations, and toxic exposure to their cardiovascular, nervous and respiratory systems. Workers who are exposed to rare earth metals in the production process over the long-term are prone to suffer from pneumoconiosis and pulmonary fibrosis (Shin et al., 2019).

The global food system is increasingly hyperspecialized and organized through GVCs and is increasing its deleterious environmental impact (Table 2). Industrialized agriculture relies on a quadruple subsidy regime—of cheap labor, cheap nature, fossil fuel subsidies, and direct state subsidies (Selwyn, 2021).

The Food and Agricultural Organization (Tubiello et al., 2022) shows how hyperspecialization—occurring through fertilizer manufacture and trade, the processing, packaging, transport and retail of food products—is driving up GHG emissions in the food sector. Between 1990 and 2019 “agri-food system emissions increased in total by 17%, largely driven by a doubling of emissions from pre- and post-production processes” (ibid., 1795). The most intense increase in agri-food systems emissions occurred in the most industrialized systems of Europe and North America (ibid., 1804).

The industrial grain-oilseed-livestock complex is founded upon a vast expansion of land, water and fossil fuel use under the domination of a few mega-TNCs (Weis,



2013). For example, between the 1990, 2000, and 2018 global soy production has increased from 108 to 161 to 348 million metric tons. The land required for such production is immense. In 2016 in Argentina alone over 32 million hectares—an area almost 8 times the size of Switzerland—were dedicated to grain production, of which 19.5 million hectares were planed under Soy (Bernhold, 2019, 134). The vast majority Soy is processed into animal feed, in turn supporting the exponential growth of GHG-intensive meat production and trade. The latter increased between 1990 and 2018 from 176 to 341 million tons.<sup>5</sup>

The extent of fossil fuel use and land degradation through mining and industrial agriculture reflect not just capitalism's metabolic rift from the natural environment, but are integral to the dynamics of hyperspecialization through GVCs. To what extent has the recent COVID-19 pandemic given GVC proponents pause for thought, and/or opened up new avenues for challenging the GVC world?

## Social Change: Within, Against, and Beyond the GVC World

As the COVID-19 pandemic expanded across the world in early 2020, it generated the “first global supply chain crisis” (Feltri, 2020). These crises dynamics have been exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine (through restrictions on oil, gas and fertilizer sales from Russia and reduced wheat production in Ukraine). The mainstream response has been to call for greater supply chain resilience. In a widely cited report, the McKinsey Global Institute (2020) provides a generic list of actions that firms can undertake to enhance their resilience. These include strengthening risk-management, reshoring production, reducing product complexity, building capacity to flexibilize production across myriad sites, improving supply chain transparency, and building redundancy into the supply chains (by, for example, using multiple suppliers for each part, maintaining low capacity utilization and holding extra inventory).

What is noteworthy about calls to enhance supply chain resilience is their relative silence on labor exploitation and environmental degradation in GVCs (see Gereffi et al., 2022, Phillips et al., 2021). They do not make any significant recommendations for compensating workers for their losses (in wages and worsened working conditions and livelihoods) during the pandemic. Nor do they seek methods to repair the environmental damage generated by the GVC world. Rather, and reinforcing the mainstream GVC narrative, the literature is founded on a tacit (untheorized) assumption that what is good for GVC resilience is good for workers, and a further claim that new technologies can “green” GVCs. Given, however, that heightened labor exploitation and the commodification/despotation of nature are core supports

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5 Source: <https://ourworldindata.org/meat-production>.

of the GVC world, it would be more intellectually sincere to begin discussing how best to fundamentally transform, if not transcend the GVC world altogether.

There are some grounds for optimism for a challenge to the GVC mode of capital accumulation. In April 2022, workers at Amazon's Staten Island warehouse became the first to successfully unionize in the face of the company's resistance. Labor researcher Hamilton Nolan explains how:

Amazon [...] is in the process of changing the service sector-dominated economy that has characterized America since the 90s into an on-demand online shopping-based economy in which Amazon itself becomes a sort of utility of the retail industry, enabled by a coast-to-coast network of warehouses staffed by low-paid workers with little power over their own destinies [...] Amazon is now transforming the American workplace [...] and a failure to organize there would lead to an even more dramatic erosion of the idea that hard work in this country should provide a livable wage and economic mobility. (Nolan, 2022)

More encouragingly still, "incidences of protest are expanding in absolute numbers as industrial production shifts to the Global South [...] the struggles are in large and small factories that have directly disrupted global supply chains essential to the production and distribution of goods and services in advanced economies" (Ness, 2021, 1). In response to the environmentally degrading dynamics upon which the GVC mode of capital accumulation is predicated there have emerged what Joan Martinez-Alier (2003) calls *The Environmentalism of the Poor*. Indigenous communities and, increasingly, trade unions and laboring class organizations are mobilizing in defense of the environment (Hampton, 2018).

A core demand by workers in GVC firms is for a living wage, defined by the global wage coalition as:

[T]he remuneration received for a standard workweek by a worker in a particular place sufficient to afford a decent standard of living for the worker and her or his family. Elements of a decent standard of living include food, water, housing, education, health care, transportation, clothing, and other essential needs including provision for unexpected events. (Global Living Wage Coalition, 2022)

Establishing a living wage for workers would represent a tangible human developmental achievement for hundreds of millions of workers across the globe, but it would also strike at the heart of a GVC world based on extreme rates of labor exploitation and physical degradation. At the heart of the campaign for a living wage is a notion that a minimum amount of free time is a necessary human right—thus precluding the elongation of the working day. It also extends beyond the productive sphere to incorporate considerations about the reproductive sphere.

[I]ncome-poverty generally translates into time-poverty for women. Therefore, food basket estimates should not rely on the lowest possible prices, but allow for some margin [so as not to assume that women will sacrifice their time in order to purchase the cheapest food]. Secondly, women often engage in care work beyond their nuclear family, taking care of parents, the extended family and distant relatives: they find themselves as active carers in a much larger family network, facing high societal expectations. Therefore, the definition of family must be broadened beyond that of the immediate household. Thirdly, if two adults per household are engaged in paid work, another person is required to take on the unpaid care work and household duties. To prevent this becoming an additional burden on the women workers or girls in a family, in the worst case preventing them from going to school or enjoying a solid higher education, it is essential that a living wage can support an additional adult to do the unpaid care work. (Global Living Wage Coalition, 2022)

A separate, but related, set of struggles in defense of the environment are being waged by a broader range of organizations. The school students strike, anti-fracking campaigns, Just Stop Oil in the UK, forest occupations in Germany in opposition to the expansion of coal mining, indigenous movements against pipe-line expansion in North America, all highlight the destructive effects of, and opposition to, contemporary capitalism's reliance upon environmental commodification and destruction. In their analysis of 649 cases of resistance movements to fossil fuel and low carbon energy projects, Temper et al. (2020,1) find that “[p]lace-based resistance movements are succeeding in curbing both fossil-fuel and low-carbon energy projects. Over a quarter of projects encountering social resistance have been canceled, suspended or delayed.” Such mobilizations “point the way towards responding to the climate crisis while tackling underlying societal problems such as racism, gender inequality, and colonial and class-based patterns of exploitation and historical injustices” (ibid., 16). These struggles—for a living wage and in defense of the environment—may represent seeds from which larger-scale movements grow that are able to challenge the GVC mode of capitalism.

## Conclusions

Capitalism's inner tendencies are towards the concentration of capital, heightened labor exploitation, and the commodification/despotation of the environment. While mainstream literature portrays GVCs positively, this chapter argues that publications of the World Bank and WTO illuminate trends towards capital concentration, wage repression to the benefit of capital, and environmental destruction.

While it is virtually impossible to imagine a GVC world founded upon living wages for its workers and a genuinely sustainable treatment of the earth's environment, it is eminently easy to imagine a GVC world of deepening labor exploitation

and increasingly intense environmental collapse. The latter scenario is an expanding contemporary reality across the globe.

The movements mentioned in section five—those toiling for a gender-sensitive living wage and for the protection of the environment—illuminate potential alter-actions and organizations to the GVC world. They may represent seeds from which larger-scale movements emerge that are able to challenge the GVC mode of capitalism. Whether or not they succeed is an open question. So too, is the potential for their struggles to spill over into a more sustained movement against not just the GVC world, but against capitalism itself.

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# Chains of Dependency: Changing Importation Practices in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Lesley Nicole Braun

The reliance on imported products has rendered many sub-Saharan African countries like the DRC vulnerable to global disruptions such as supply chain bottlenecks that have been engendered and made visible by COVID-19 pandemic dislocations. New questions continue to emerge with regards to the dynamics of transnational dimensions of trade, as a result of deepening Sino-African relations. Transnational trade is partly dependent on the geographic mobility of the individuals who travel abroad to select goods to be packed into cargo containers or suitcases to be transported to the DRC. With the COVID-19 pandemic producing global disruptions in supply chains of all manner, countries such as the DRC—where it is individual traders themselves who manage import logistics—are confronting pointed challenges with regards to the way in which geographic immobility has stymied the flow of goods into the country. Through which means do goods continue to flow into the DRC? Who now stands to benefit from import to Congo? Through an examination of the gendered geographies of supply chains—as they relate to transnational trade—as well as local social networks, this chapter’s empirical findings bring together the dialectical oscillations of global and local, and formal and informal into an analytical theoretical framework.

## Introduction

Global supply chains emerged from the doldrums of logistics to become a topic of mainstream fascination in March 2021 when images of the container ship *Ever Given* lodged in the Suez Canal began circulating in popular media. Roughly a year later, consumers around the world felt the COVID-19 pandemic’s effects as shortages in all manner of goods began to materialize. Shipping containers themselves proved to be scarce—demand exceeded supply as ports internationally contended with international logistical obstructions. Many containers were diverted away from Africa, going instead to countries that could afford the consequent price increases.

As a concept, globalization is often conceived of as a network of flows crisscrossing the globe: resources, capital, manufactured goods, but also of technologies, ideas and lifestyle choices. While often touted—at least since the 1990s—as a system destined to benefit all peoples of all countries, albeit at uneven paces, this narrative’s legitimacy has not been fully adopted by everyone caught in its drift. The crack in the ideological armor of a seeming universally-beneficial global order, with its ultimate aim of total economic interdependence, is especially revealing when considering countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where upheavals in commodity markets can make exacerbate the disruptive forces across the rest of the world.

Like many countries with little to no domestic productive capacities for basic manufactured goods, this central African country is a good example of one such “participating” nation of globalization which has consistently paid its high costs without reaping equivalent rewards, thereby creating disparity as well as vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations. This is achieved by entrenching the DRC’s dependency on richer nations. Globalization, when considered from the perspective of one participating nation, can be conceived of as a two-way flow. For this country, the inner viscera of technologies—rare metals such as cobalt, coltan, and tungsten—are extracted from the country while the final realizations of these commodity forms flood back in. These bi-directional flows are sometimes aligned and sometimes in opposition, while occasionally such alignments and oppositions occur simultaneously. What is significant about this imbalance that’s inscribed into the heart of globalization despite its superficial rhetoric of slowly bringing about a more balanced and equitable world is that countries like the DRC do not have the autonomy to be flexible with how much they strive to be plugged into globalization—that is, even the option to consider “deglobalization” policies is a luxury only afforded to the wealthy nations in this world community of different but “equal” countries.

The DRC struggles to provide adequate social security, infrastructure and health care to its estimated ninety million inhabitants, the majority of whom live on less than two dollars a day. As in many African countries, to offset the threat of inflation, the DRC’s economy is unofficially pegged to the US dollar and ranks as one of Africa’s most highly dollarized nations (De Herdt, 2002; Raheem and Asongo, 2018). The dollar is used in most major business contracts, the majority of transactions and bank accounts, and is accepted by shopkeepers and in cash machines. Mining deals between the government and Chinese companies are also transacted in US dollars as recent corruption scandals have revealed, though it will be curious

to observe if this will eventually change given the evolving geopolitics spurred by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.<sup>1</sup>

Regardless of the lack of industry in the DRC,<sup>2</sup> the consumer base for imported manufactured goods is massive, and therefore the dependency is stronger. Given this dependency on imports—such as garments, electronics, household items, medical and construction equipment—there is an acute awareness among Congolese people of the oscillating rhythms of trade connected to global supply chains. This is not only due to consumer demand, but also because many people are embedded in some aspect of trading and local supply chains. The increasing presence of China, with their supply of affordable manufactured products, has also enabled more people in the DRC to participate not only as global consumers, but also as transnational traders and logistics agents. This chapter considers some of the tensions that have emerged from contemporary trading arrangements and consumer culture, highlighting the experiences of Congolese traders particularly during times of rupture in the globalized trading network.

The dependency school, also referred to as dependency theory, has striven to grasp economic development in a particular geographic context through an understanding of global power relations as they relate to capitalism. Seminal dependency theorists like Walter Rodney (1972), Samir Amin (1972), and Patrick McGowan (1976) have written about several African contexts that struggle with their embeddedness amid the global system and the ways in which economic growth has been stymied by both internal and external forces, providing an alternative approach to the unilinear growth models. These scholars, in one way or another, advocated for a delinking from capitalist globalization and favored protectionist policies that would help “develop” and “modernize” newly decolonized countries. Early dependency theory from the 1960s and 70s has been since critiqued for being overly reductive, namely in its proclivity to divide up the world into economic tiers of rich and poor.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, it is useful in examining the matrices of power that inform economic practice on varying scales, including internal national dynamics such as patron-client networks.<sup>4</sup>

Rather than merely describe the totality of global power relations as they relate to commerce and trade in the DRC, this chapter provides insights into the ways in

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1 For more about the most recent public scandal see: <https://www.publiceye.ch/de/themen/korruption/congo-hold-up>.

2 I use the terms “Democratic Republic of Congo,” “DRC,” “DR Congo,” and “Congo” interchangeably unless it concerns the period of 1965–96 when the country was officially called Zaire.

3 Nor does dependency theory account for nations like China, once considered a poor country, now a global superpower.

4 Likewise, Gabriel Palma (1978, 898), argues for an approach that accounts for “the interplay between internal and external structures.”

which people acknowledge and understand their own positions as agents on the global stage. This has been partly motivated by attempting to avoid the “masculine theory” that tends to focus on the macro and the grand narrative, one that often eclipses the lives of working people, particularly women (Lutz, 1995). Following Carla Freeman’s contention that the dichotomies of the local/global, production/consumption, and the formal/informal demand more of a dialectical engagement (Freeman, 2001, 1009), this chapter highlights how Congolese women involved in transnational trade directly form part of global processes.

The findings presented here are based on extensive multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork carried out in both the DRC’s capital city of Kinshasa; Guangzhou, China; and Istanbul, Turkey between 2017 and 2022.<sup>5</sup> This triangulation of cities represents a constellation of trading hubs visited by African commerce people. This chapter’s conclusions are mainly culled from extensive in-person interviews with Congolese traders, local merchants and shopkeepers, middlemen working in logistics agencies, government officials, and customs agents. Several trips were made to China in the early months of 2020. With the onset of the pandemic, as many African traders had to pivot their commerce to the UAE and Turkey, I shifted to conducting interviews with traders and logistics agents in Istanbul. This research is complemented by longstanding fieldwork conducted in Kinshasa, DRC with a recent 4-month trip between October and December 2021. There, interviews were also carried out at the port city of Matadi (Figure 3), where over two hundred shipping containers arrive daily. The inquiry aimed to reveal how people themselves understand and experience change and the associated ambiguity shaped by new commodities.

I will offer a fragment of the historical conditions that have contributed to the DRC’s dependency on imported products beginning with the colonial period. Rhythms of change, first introduced during the colonial period, can be understood through an iconic folkloric siren called *Mami Wata*. Circulated by people encountering one another through global trade, this siren provides a useful framework for considering the temporal and spatial networks of capitalism, as well as its dislocations.

This chapter considers the ways in which generations of foreigners in search of new opportunities have been imbricated in the region’s economic landscape, one that has gone through waves of national programs premised on encouraging local capitalism (*capitalisme indigène*). It is against this background that Congolese traders continue to participate as arbiters of transnational trade. Finally, based on a discussion on ethnographic work, I will point to how the dependence on imported products has rendered many sub-Saharan African countries like the DRC vulnerable to global disruptions, such as those linked to the COVID-19 pandemic.


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5 I have been conducting research in Kinshasa, DRC since 2009.

## Congo's Trade Orientations Over Time

The Democratic Republic of Congo, a geographic region in the center of the African continent, is roughly the size of Western Europe. It is not entirely landlocked since the Congo River, the world's deepest, flows across this Central African country in the shape of a long clock-like arc, emptying out into the Atlantic Ocean (Figure 1).


Figure 1: Map of Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) waterways



Source: Wikipedia.

Not far from the river's mouth lies Boma, a trading outpost established by Europeans in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century when the region was governed by the Kongo Kingdom. There, enslaved Africans were loaded onto ships to be taken to the New World. Boma was the capital of the Congo Free State between 1886–1923 after King Leopold annexed it as his personal territory at the Berlin Conference in 1885. Matadi is another historic trading post located 75 kilometers upstream from Boma. This city was inaugurated by Sir Henry Morton Stanley in 1879 and built by African indentured workers. It was established partly because the river cannot be navigated further into the interior due to monumental rapids. The creation of the Matadi seaport soon

**Figure 2: Postcard of Port at Matadi with train station, tracks, locomotive, 1918**



Source: Photo by author.

**Figure 3: Port in Matadi, DRC, 2021**



Source: Photo by author.

gave way to the first rail system in the Congo, built with the assistance of Chinese laborers between 1901 and 1906 (Shirambe, 2020, 82). This railway ushered in an era of unimaginable extractive exploitation of people and resources, particularly rubber. Today, Boma and Matadi continue to be crucial to the region's import/export activities, linking the rest of the country to the Atlantic Ocean (Figures 2, 3).

Ships sailing between Antwerp and Boma bore ledgers that detailed the Congo Free State's brutal human exploitation. One shipping clerk, Emond Morel, noted that cargo ships arrived in Belgium replete with copious amounts of ivory and rubber, but returned to the Congo containing nothing but ammunition. This dubious import/export rhythm, characterized by the blatantly contrasting cargo, exposed King Leopold's genocidal pilfering and he was soon pressured by international powers to relinquish control of his private territory and establish an official colony to "save" people rather than merely exploit them. In 1908, the Belgian parliament annexed the region and renamed it the Belgian Congo, making Boma the administrative capital. This move marked the entrance of multinational companies to the colony. In 1910, for example, concessions were granted to Unilever as well as to other smaller agricultural industries (MacGaffey, 1986, 32). Many of these companies continued to maintain their businesses well into the postcolonial period.

## Imported Goods and Consumer Dreams

Between 1908 and 1945, Léopoldville was essentially a labor depot of African men referred to as HAV, or *hommes adultes valides* (able-bodied adult males), who were brought there on a temporary basis for mining and other industrial activities.<sup>6</sup> This ascribed label pointed to the ways in which men were conceived of as units of work, but also of sources consumption (Jewsiewicki, 2008; Vellut, 2017). Urban centers like Léopoldville grew in tandem with the arrival of all manner of imports. "Through force or fancy, rural Africans flocked to these new capitals to do the bidding of Europeans and make what they hoped would be a better life for themselves" (Stewart 2000, 4). European imports flooded in to be sold to a population primed for a new lifestyle based on consumerist consumption. The promotion of European bourgeois values were partly executed in and through imported consumer goods such as clothing, foodstuffs, bicycles and radios (Jewsiewicki, 1983, 3f.). The growth and integration of the local colonial economy into the global economic system was asserted through the introduction of new consumerist desires thereby masking the externally forced societal changes as being partly the wishes of locals.

During the 1940s and 50s, as foreign products flowed into the region, images of a mythical siren known as *Mami Wata* appeared widely throughout newly urbanized

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6 During this period, women, including the wives of European administrators, were forbidden to live in the colonial city. It was only after World War II that African women, particularly married women, were officially allowed to reside there (Hunt, 2001).




Figure 4: Painting of *Mami Wata* by Abdal 22, 1989



Source: Collection RMCA Tervuren, HO.0.1.3951; photo RMCA Tervuren. All rights reserved.

Figure 5: A painting from c. 1950 of *Mami Wata* and a snake coiled around her body



Source: Collection RMCA Tervuren; photo RMCA Tervuren Kayembe F., *Mami Wata*. All rights reserved.

centers on murals and in popular painting (Fabian, 1996). Also known as “mother of water,” this folkloric motif circulates throughout the African continent and its diasporas (Drewal, 1988). Drawn from many influences, including European, Indian and African, *Mami Wata’s* physical form is itself a hybrid. She is an amalgam of disparate elements from different sources, one that is continuously being reshaped. Just as her image and meaning migrate through time, space and cultures, the idea of migration itself is also linked to the rhythms of import and export. For instance, there are some connections to be made between *Mami Wata* and figureheads, the female sculptures that featured as bow ornamentation on sailing ships in past centuries.

This water-born creature, depicted as an irresistible temptress, is known to dwell in the mighty Congo River and stalk its shores. As paintings of her coincided with a time that promised mass consumption, it can hardly be coincidental that her traditional hunting grounds are where foreign ships historically came to dock and unload their various goods, only to soon part again bearing away the local riches torn out of the body of the land and sea. Bearing the imprint of the colonial encounter and the consumer goods it brought with it, paintings of *Mami Wata* often featured her donning a watch, which, as a relatively expensive manufactured good, was a potent symbol of aspirational luxury during the colonial period (Figures 4, 5).

Following what many Congolese people claim about this siren’s dangerous potency, *Mami Wata* induces excitements and anxieties related to commodity consumption and the global capitalist mode of production and distribution. In a moralistic fashion, *Mami Wata* stories often depict men who are seduced by modern material consumption and are consequently led to their own destruction. This siren became an ambiguous figure of seduction and ruin, as well as a warning against a culture of immediate gratification of imported manufactured desires, and the societal upheaval that consumerism brought (first through colonialism and later via its successor, global trade). *Mami Wata* becomes a leitmotif to animate this chapter as she swims the passage of time and is representative of hybridity and the forces of global encounters, but simultaneously of the social anxieties these forces stir up and circulate among Congolese people.

## Foreign Traders and Nationalization Projects

Water is *Mami Wata’s* milieu, pointing to the ways in which fluid mobility is poly-directional and can adapt its form to fit into any shape or travel through any channel. She is never situated statically—rather, she exists in a continuous state of passage, slithering between a broad network of people and places. She flows through the waterways where trade occurs overhead at the surface and foreign traders continue oblivious to the dark forces just below. The “otherness” captured in *Mami Wata’s* pictorial depictions—her gender, beauty, and exoticness—is reflective of the various

historic waves of foreign merchants and clerics arriving in the region. The Kongo Kingdom had been maintaining its own vast regional trading networks at the time when the Portuguese were recorded as the first Europeans to arrive in Central Africa in the late 15th century. The Belgians would only later arrive at the turn of the 19th Century, drawing the region into a larger matrix of European connections, and by extension, vacillating competing foreign interests.

In addition to the Portuguese and Belgians, Greek migrants began to settle in the Congo in the beginning of the 20th century.<sup>7</sup> They opened restaurants and shops where they sold imports from Europe, but also worked as sub-contractors in the Belgian mining industry, or as laborers in railway construction. An Indian community began to grow as well, coming to prominence in the 1970s as shopkeepers selling things like textiles and jewelry.<sup>8</sup> It was during this time that *Mami Wata* assumed Indian features; she began to be portrayed in paintings and murals as fair-skinned with long flowing black hair. Writing about the ways in which Indian material culture impacted visual representations of *Mami Wata* in Africa, Henry Drewal offers, “the popularity of the snake charmer lithograph and the presence of Indian merchants (and films) in West Africa led to a growing fascination with Indian prints of Hindu gods and goddesses” (2008, 71).

The Congo gained its independence from Belgium in 1960, but it was only in 1965—a few years after Patrice Lumumba was assassinated—when Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime began to govern this vast country. Lumumba suffered the consequences of non-alignment during a time when the US offered no such way out of the cold war polarity. The DRC became a stage of cold war ideology which was supported by “democratic” and capitalist global powers all too ready to sacrifice the Congolese people to their material struggle against the East.

Mobutu changed the country’s ownership structure of key economic assets in order to limit its dependency on the former colonial power, Belgium, whose interests had remained largely dominant across all sectors. Greeks heavily involved in commerce and importation saw their businesses take a heavy blow when the Mobutu government nationalized the economy in 1973 under a program referred to as “Zairization,” a moniker taken from the country’s new name: Zaire. Approximately 2,000 Greek-owned commercial businesses were expropriated and transferred to Congolese. This prompted many other foreign business owners to take flight, leaving shortages in basic foodstuff.<sup>9</sup>

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7 Many fled the civil war in Greece. Later, between 1961–1968 several thousand additional Greeks arrived to the newly independent country.

8 V.S. Naipaul’s book *A Bend in a River* chronicles the life of an Indian East African who set up a shop in an abandoned town in Central Africa.

9 The call for protectionist measures to indigenize economies is a recurrent pattern of postcolonial African societies—one only need to think of Idi Amin’s expulsion of Asian minorities from Uganda.

Zaire declared itself to be in a state of economic “crisis” in the late 1970s. Though the region has since been characterized as being in a constant state of crisis, both economically and politically, many scholars have analyzed what this “crisis” reveals about the inner-workings of this region (Koptoff, 1987; Roitman, 2014). It was during the 1970s and 80s that many individuals, faced with grim economic circumstances, circumvented official state channels by engaging in “informal” transnational trade (Vwakyankazi, 1982). The informal economy, or a popular economy, accounts for over fifty percent of the GDP of African countries (cf. Charmes, 2000), rendering it not so much a shadow of the formal economy, but rather a coexisting one that drives economic growth. Profits from this informal trade were often used to finance public services that the state failed to survive. The contours of what was considered “official” and “unofficial” trading activity became nebulous and overlapping. For instance, state officials also often worked as smugglers, transporting goods into the country without declaring them. This type of activity was unofficially sanctioned by what has been referred to as *la débrouillardise* (resourcefulness as a lifestyle for getting by on a day-by-day basis).<sup>10</sup> *Débrouillardise* has penetrated all levels of society, becoming part of the people’s habitus where they find themselves in persistent modes of improvisation (Callaghy, 1984). The temporality of capitalism and the larger structuring global forces are indeed as much reflected in the vicissitudes of informal economies shaped by people as they are recorded by official transnational data of whole economies. And while most globalization analysis focuses on official data and macro-economic activity, this chapter’s purpose is to highlight the role such informal economies play in the global economic order.

The nationalist policies affiliated with Zairization partly reflected Mobutu’s political ties with China and North Korea.<sup>11</sup> This nationalist ethos was designed with the intention of promoting an indigenous style of capitalism to counterbalance Western influence and lingering vestiges of colonialism (MacGaffey, 1986). In addition to the nationalization of land, which implied that all businesses such as plantations, cattle and poultry farms, fisheries and quarries become state properties, it was decreed that petty trade could be carried out exclusively by Congolese nationals.

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10 *Débrouillardise* has deep-seated connotations that go back to the Mobutu era, when the president himself allegedly commanded his army and citizens to “débrouillez-vous” or “fend for yourselves”—a statement that would become infamously dubbed by the locals as “article 15” (De Herdt and Marysse, 1996; Ayimpam, 2014a). Article 15 also implies a legitimization of illegal or informal activity, perhaps stemming from the fact that the official constitution only has 14 articles, thereby making article number 15 unofficial.

11 Between 1970 and 1990, China provided Mobutu’s government with technical and financial aid, as well as a sports stadium. In the 1970s, Mobutu was engaged in extensive diplomatic relations with China. The People’s Palace, or *Palais du Peuple*, which houses the National Assembly and the Senate in Kinshasa was completed in 1979 with the assistance from the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese also funded the construction of the sports stadium called the *Stade des Martyrs* which was finished in 1993.

Figure 6: One million Zaires, printed in 1992, reflects the country's then hyperinflation



Source: Photo by author.

Not necessarily as a direct result of these policies, Congolese entrepreneurs flourished in cities like Kisangani (formerly known Stanleyville in the Belgian Congo) and reproduced themselves as a local bourgeois class. Thus, as Mobutu slashed colonial dependencies, he ushered in new ones on multinationals, as well as on foreign “aid” from both the US and the USSR.

During Mobutu’s reign, there was a brief period from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s when confidence in the domestic currency was at a peak. In 1967, the franc became the zaïre. Its value was fixed at a rate of 1 zaïre = US\$2 (Walker, 2017, 291), which benefited consumers of international products. However, hyperinflation in the 1990s gave way to a reliance on the US dollar.<sup>12</sup> As a result, a new money-changing industry emerged. At every major corner in urban centers such as Kinshasa, there are money changers (called *cambistes*)—many of whom are women—converting USDs into Congolese francs (see Figure 6).

<sup>12</sup> Reaching as high as 10,000 percent in 1994 (Beaugrand, 1997).

Figures 7, 8: Money changers called *mama cambistes* converted dollars to Congolese francs, 2021 (left); a cotton printed textile, made in China, depicting various currencies (right); 2021, Kinshasa's Zandu market



Source: Photos by author.

## Kabila and the Arrival of the Chinese

The ongoing war in the eastern part of Congo, which began in the mid 1990s, contributed to the near-complete collapse of domestic agricultural and industrial production. As a result, imports became a monopoly game between a few large foreign operators organized by sector and product. Subsequent to the overthrow of Mobutu's 32-year regime in 1996, Lebanese merchants began to settle in the DRC, often by way of other African countries.<sup>13</sup> Much like the Greeks that came before them, Lebanese merchants had intentions of growing businesses reliant on impor-

13 Many members from this Lebanese diaspora left Lebanon during its civil war.

tation. Companies like Socimex became the largest importer of cars. The massive glut of affordable foreign-manufactured vehicles meant that city boulevards had to be widened—an infrastructural project that came to be led and funded by the Chinese government.

The Chinese also began arriving *en masse* under President Joseph Kabila who maintained ambitious plans to modernize the country. One massive infrastructural program that has come to characterize his presidency, dubbed *les cinq chantiers* or, “the five public works,” could not have been realized without the help of Chinese investment. The Chinese dedicated 9 billion USD to this program in exchange for titles to various copper and cobalt mines. Subsequent to the inauguration of this large-scale project, the presence of Chinese engineers, road workers, doctors, and shopkeepers grew more visible throughout the country.<sup>14</sup>

Regarding day-to-day foodstuffs, a growth of new small-scale supermarkets began in the late-2000s, selling items imported from abroad. As a result, Indian, Pakistani, Nigerian and South African communities formed in urban cities, especially in Kinshasa. These shops created new supply chains with wholesalers from the supplier countries. During this post-war transition period (2003–2006), new political alliances formed between the government and foreigners who engendered new migrant trade networks specializing in specific products or value chains (Segatti, 2015).

Small Chinese shops selling items like needles and thread sprang up all over the country during this period. In 2008, approximately 1,000 officially registered Chinese people were working in Kinshasa as shopkeepers in a concentrated area near the capital city’s *Grande Marché*, or central market (Janssen, 2012; Vircoulon, 2010). It is currently difficult, if not impossible to know exactly how large the Chinese community in Kinshasa is, but it was estimated that in 2010 there were anywhere between 10,000–50,000 Chinese people working in the DRC.<sup>15</sup> Cheap imported goods made in China and sold in Chinese-owned shops are pejoratively referred to as *la chinoiserie*, a local term which denotes ‘made-in-China’ with connotations of tawdry quality. While the abundance of affordable Chinese products allows for more Congolese to participate in consumer culture, many people are discontent with this poor product quality. In fact, poorly constructed buildings and roads are also referred to as *chinoiserie*. In 2011, Congolese merchants, increasingly growing resentful of the privileging of foreign merchants engaged in petty trade, coordinated protest action to put pressure on the government to protect local busi-

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14 Though China had ambitions to expand their *Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)* in the DRC, it was not until January 2021, that they officially signed an agreement between Beijing and Kinshasa.

15 Figures are difficult to come by in the DRC. For instance, the most recent census taken was in 1981, and it is only estimated between 12 and 14 million people reside in the capital city.

ness interests.<sup>16</sup> Chinese-owned shops nevertheless continue to be well-positioned with regards to logistical chains as they maintain connections to wholesale dealers in China as well as shipping companies on the African continent.

Monopolies over retail chains began to coalesce across the country during President Kabila's modernization campaign in the mid 2000s. This was partly accomplished because small entrepreneurs are generally linked to the larger importers and wholesalers through family or ethnic ties. Take for instance Congo Futur, a company owned and operated by three Lebanese brothers who run businesses across West Africa.<sup>17</sup> Congo Futur controls most markets across the country, distributing cheap basic foods like canned fish, powdered milk and candy. In addition to rain forestry concessions granted to Congo Futur by the government,<sup>18</sup> this family-operated conglomerate maintains their own designated section at the now semi-privatized port of Matadi. They were also involved in a scandal exposed in 2021 referred to as the Congo Hold Up, considered to be the largest instance of corruption from the African continent to date.<sup>19</sup>

The road connecting Matadi's port to the capital city, rebuilt with Chinese investment in 2019 in the midst of China's New Belt and Road Initiative, is a crucial passage through which cargo must travel as there is no functioning train. Hundreds of trucks loaded with food imports make the journey to Kinshasa daily, paying its tolls and winding through each twist and turn—sometimes the trucks' colorful cargo appears to the distant eye as a long train (Figure 9). Despite the new construction, the narrow road offers only one lane in each direction, creating major bottlenecks, especially in the event of accidents which occur almost daily.

In 2020, the port of Matadi recorded a monthly arrival of approximately 17,000 shipping containers. Officially, 60% of the DRC's GDP (49.87 USD Billion) is made up of imports, making it an import-based economy. Most Congolese government officials are periodically involved in importation, and it is not uncommon for professionals like teachers and doctors to participate as a means of supplementing their incomes. Further, though customs agents are not permitted to import shipping containers themselves, they nevertheless circumnavigate the laws, and by extension

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16 During periods of intense political tension, Chinese and Indian-owned shops are sometimes burned and looted.

17 Congo Futur has been on the United States sanctions list since 2009 because of money laundering activities adding up to billions of dollars, as well as for connections with Hezbollah. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/world/middleeast/kassim-tajideen-released.html>.

18 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-democratic-hezbollah-idUSBRE82F0TT20120316>.

19 The Congo Hold Up exposed how one commercial bank was used to plunder the country's public funds and natural resources, largely for the enrichment of former President Joseph Kabila's inner circle. For more about the Congo Hold Up scandal see: <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211126-congo-hold-up-congo-futur-un-empire-sous-sanctions>.



Figure 9: Traffic jams along road from Matadi to Kinshasa, 2021



Source: Photo by author.

importation duties, by involving family members in the business. One recent public scandal involving the importation of sacks of cement suggests an overreliance on foreign imports, abetted by governmental contracts in the DRC.<sup>20</sup> Since cement is easily produced by local factories, stories of scandals such as these are particularly frustrating for Congolese groups advocating for good governance that would prevent local industry from being undercut. Cases of corruption also become political fodder for people searching for opportunities to blame foreign business operations for destroying local economies.

## Congo Connects to the World Digitally

As of 2022, DP World, the world's leading provider of smart logistics based in Dubai, has begun building the DRC's first deep sea port in the coastal city of Banana located on a long piece of land that separates the Congo River from the Atlantic Ocean. It is developing a 600-meter quay with an 18m draft, capable of handling the largest vessels in operation. It is being built with the intention of attracting more direct calls from larger vessels traveling from Asia which will enhance the country's access to international markets and global supply chains. Further, the government claims that this port will provide significant cost and time savings that proposes to boost the country's trade.

To better assess the implications of such foreign-led infrastructure projects, it is imperative to re-center capitalist relations of influence, power and dependency into any discussion of economic interconnectivity. Dependency theories are helpful because their approach is "a framework that focuses on the constraints on capitalist development arising from the economic power of industrialized nations and foreign multinational corporations" (Cooper, 1981, 10). In other words, the benefits and costs of such projects cannot be measured solely through materialist understandings of supply, demand and scarcity, but also through a social understanding of inequality, autonomy and freedom, as well as through the lens of "otherness," as these imbalanced power dynamics comprise different peoples from different parts of the globe. Amidst such issues of trade, the *Mami Wata* siren—a symbol of hybridity and harbinger of otherness—continues to surface, serving as an ambiguous warning bound up in the pursuit of material wealth, whether on the individual or national level. The following section will return to this siren to examine what she currently reveals about the seduction and anxieties associated with the modern world and all its promises of new things and material wealth, and more specifically, how an exoticized and sometimes maligned idea of otherness influences how people relate to these social phenomena.

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<sup>20</sup> <https://www.africanews.com/2016/05/31/drc-s-lukala-cement-to-close-down-due-to-unfair-competition/>.

Let us now consider a *Mami Wata* viral video that circulated in the city of Kinshasa in 2012. While this story has been unpacked in greater detail elsewhere (Braun, 2015), it is relevant to discussions about Chinese-led infrastructure projects in the DRC, as well as to how conceptions of “the foreign” have changed in Congo. The video, shared through peoples phones, showed a grotesque sea-creature with a gnarled and shriveled body surrounded by foreign men in a large room. According to the backstory story, *Mami Wata* had been apprehended by Chinese engineers who were installing underwater fiber optic internet cables in the Congo River—literally, connecting the DRC via new technologies to the global virtual world. The video was presented as news, with journalists describing and commenting on *Mami Wata’s* disturbing appearance. During a popular round table discussion on the national television station RTNC, several panelists analyzed the *Mami Wata* viral video and encouraged viewers to call in and offer commentary (it should be mentioned that not everyone believed that this was a real story, as made evident in online comments). Since *Mami Wata* is thought to be elusive, never leaving behind any material proof of her body, the idea that she was rumored to be discovered by Chinese engineers confirmed for many people just how powerful the Chinese are.<sup>21</sup> Her mutilation can also be read, taking some interpretive liberties, as a symbol of the physical environment after suffering the ravages of industrial resource extraction. This disfigurement is also evident in the transformation of the city’s former proud moniker of “Kin la belle” (Kinshasa the beautiful) which has now morphed into “Kin la poubelle” (Kinshasa the garbage). In her monstrous form, we are presented again with an anxiety over change, modernization and the consumption of global commodities foisted on the people.

## Congolese Traders and Transnational Sojourns

We should not overlook the experiences of many Congolese who have been involved in all manner of trade throughout the country’s many transformations. For example, during Congo’s economic downturn in the late 1980s, which was marked by currency overvaluation, people were driven to search for income alternatives outside the formal system. Here, the uncertainty created partly by the protracted war in the east left traders in a state of precarity, unable to make longer-term investments and business plans. It was during this time that Congolese women increased their presence in trade, particularly between neighboring Brazzaville and Kinshasa, becoming integral players in transborder trade. Women traders took advantage of the cheaply produced Asian textiles available across the Congo River in Brazzaville (Ayimpam, 2014b). Some traders purchased wholesale goods to sell in their shops,

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21 Huawei, a Chinese telecom giant, is positioning itself to be the world’s leader in 5G technology markets. It aspires to introduce this infrastructure all over the African continent, further embedding its presence and influence there.

but most would conduct business informally, out of their homes to their social network of customers. The divisions are not solely between formal shop sellers and informal home sellers, but also between scale—there are indeed several categories of traders, and what goods they import reflects the amount of financial capital they have access to. For instance, one trader might regularly fill entire Matadi-bound shipping containers with furniture and construction material, while others pack large bags with cheap sandals that they physically bring home with them to resell for five times the wholesale price.

The DRC has some of the highest import taxes in the world: In 2016, one 40-foot container cost approximately 17,000 USD in taxes (depending on the items) and shipping costs. As a result, many traders opt for what is known as *groupage*, or a system of sharing one container. This system requires additional cooperation, rendering this way of conducting business different from the more fully marketized societies of the global North. Social networks in the DRC are vital to survival in this informal economy, and this reinforces the notion of “people as infrastructure,” a phenomenon common in countries with a dearth in capital infrastructural investment.

In contrast to West Africa where women have a long history of trading in the region and abroad, transnational trade for central Africans is a more recent development (Sylvanus, 2008). In West Africa, women traders are referred to as *Nana Benz*—loosely meaning Mercedes Benz Mothers, referencing a mix of their womanhood with their connections to international goods. Congolese traders were given this name in the 1980s when trade to and from West Africa was booming. Nina Sylvanus’ (2013) research describes how Togo’s *Nanas Benz* rose to financial independence through the importation of Chinese-manufactured textiles, as well as how these goods created a stigma for those who imported them. As Chinese imported textiles are of a lower quality compared with those previously produced in the Netherlands or Togo, they are cheaper and are therefore the only imports most people can only afford. Consequently, traders in Chinese imports are perceived as being complicit with malevolent global forces responsible for the stymied local industry (ibid.). The secondhand clothing economy has also contributed to replacing domestic garment industries in many African nations.<sup>22</sup> It is quite revealing, then, that these women traders are sometimes also referred to as sirens in that they are harbingers of exciting new things that may seem wonderful on the surface, but that nevertheless carry a danger.

The Congolese diaspora in Europe has historically been vital to trading networks. MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga’s (2000) research on transnational commercial activities highlights the ways in which people who were otherwise marginalized

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22 Writing in the context of Zambia during the mid 1990s, Karen Tranberg Hansen (2000) has mapped the worldwide circuit of used clothing in the region. Fast fashion has accelerated the rate of used clothing flows to Africa, and garments often end up in garbage dumps, or burned.

from formal avenues of work carved out a space within the informal economy by forging trading networks between Congo and Paris. There is even a designated word in Lingala, one of Congo's official languages, to refer to individuals who have traveled to Europe: *milikiste* (Gondola, 1999). In the 1980s, members of the Congolese diaspora living in Europe began importing items like clothing and household appliances to the Congo. Congolese people with family members in Europe would also often travel on buying trips, filling up shipping containers to be sent to Matadi. However, patterns of trade changed in the 1990s when visas to Europe became more difficult to come by. People instead turned to South Africa and Angola to purchase consumer products.

Later in the 2000s, once direct flights connecting Kinshasa to Dubai and Turkey were introduced by companies like Turkish Airlines, Kenya Air, and Ethiopian Airlines, intrepid entrepreneurs ventured out independently in search of their own wholesaler connections. This contributed to the reorienting of supply chains away from Europe toward a constellation of global southern countries to the African continent. China became a popular destination because of accessible business visas, as well as affordable direct flights to Guangzhou with generous baggage allowances. In 2010, Kinshasa experienced a burgeoning of *mama ya Guangzhou*, another colloquial name given to traders traveling to China. Trips to China became even more accessible because of strengthened political relations between the two countries, especially during Kabila's "five public works program" mentioned earlier.

In many ways, cheaply produced imports from China have enabled more Africans to participate in global consumerism. The massive market base in Africa enriches Chinese factories but also those African traders, many of whom are women involved in bringing merchandise to local markets. In the decade between 2010 and 2019, the number of *mama ya Guangzhou* swelled to become a social class unto themselves. Many women reached a position where they accumulated enough wealth to support their extended families through their businesses. Partly due to this new female financial empowerment achieved through access to Chinese wholesale markets, there has been an increase in local negative perceptions about traders working in China. Popular television shows depicted women as exploiting their customers and overcharging them for *chinoiseries* (Braun, 2019). This perhaps points to longer histories of distrust over women's economic activities that have the potential of granting them financial independence and the possibility of operating outside of patriarchal structures. Gracia Clark's extensive work on market women in Ghana during the country's neoliberal structural adjustment period points to market women being likened to greedy "human vampire bats" (Clark, 2001, 297), a symbolic relative of other blood-sucking or otherwise destructive feminine figures, much like *Mami Wata*.

Globalization from below, or what Mathews and Yang (2012) call "low-end globalization," consists of circuits of trade independent from, or indirectly linked to, large multinational corporations, this stands in contrast to colonial dependencies

Figures 10, 11: A woman packing her goods outside a wholesale shop in Guangzhou, China, 2016 (left); an air cargo company located in the lobby of the Hotel in Guangzhou, China, 2019 (right)



Source: Photos by author.

between colony and colonizer whose relationships were more explicitly uneven, namely that the Chinese-African relationship is part of a new “global southern region” of codependency. Congolese transnational traders, especially women, are central within this schema, and they reveal the gendered dimensions of South-South business arrangements. For example, wholesale merchants in China are often Chinese migrant women from rural areas who form part of what is referred to as the “floating population.” It is in this context that African and Chinese migrant women encounter each other in the marketplace and in warehouses.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, many traders, depending on the resources available to them, made several trips to China each year. Here, trading rhythms were structured around flights and shipping schedules, and traders ensured the success of their trips through elaborate chains of people who facilitated the associated bureaucratic administrative processes, as well as the under-the-table dealings often necessary.

## Disrupted Rhythms from COVID-19

Temporary trade restrictions and shortages of goods beginning in 2020 serve as reminders that the multiple and overlapping dependencies in the production strategies and supply chains of global firms have been built upon too much “just-in-time” precarious networks, and with little expense paid to “just in case.” The reliance on imported products, crucial among them construction materials, pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, renders many African countries like the DRC vulnerable to global disruptions such as those produced by the pandemic. Inflationary pressures on materials and fuel are rendering goods more expensive in the DRC—a trend that is expected to persist. Since 2020, shipping containers have nearly doubled in price due to pandemic disruptions and the rising cost of fuel. Air cargo is also costly—in March 2022 it was between 12 USD and 16 USD per kilo—and only those traders with good connections to airport officials are in positions of making a profit from goods transported by plane. Further, increasing environmental regulations in China have put pressure on many factories, causing production disruptions of a different kind.

African brokers in China, working either independently or with logistics agencies, have been instrumental in keeping imports flowing into the country. With China closing its borders during the pandemic, African traders based on the continent found themselves unable to travel abroad for business. Another obstacle that has been exasperated involves money transfers to China, as these are not possible without a Chinese bank account—something the Chinese government has strategically enforced due partly as a measure to ensure local middlemen maintain some level of control, and more broadly as an effect of China’s global policies of being “open” albeit with severe rules, restrictions and surveillance (one might say, “Globalization with Chinese characteristics”). Business has been further complicated between Congolese traders and wholesalers, given that most traders do not have WeChat (a Chinese multi-purpose messaging, social media and mobile payment app) accounts linked to a bank account. While these pandemic disruptions left a whole class of traders paralyzed, many individuals nevertheless improvised supply chain logistics to accommodate the new economic landscape. Examples of ways of coping with these barriers are the inventive strategies utilized by individuals who have experience living and working in China.

Consider for instance one young woman named Martine. At 32 years of age, Martine has completed a business degree from a Chinese university and has spent over six years in Guangzhou. She is also functionally fluent in Mandarin. Forced to return to Kinshasa because of an overstayed visa, Martine has found a temporary mode of employment for herself during these pandemic years. As she has access to a large network of traders and shopkeepers who regularly order merchandise from wholesale dealers in China but who do not have the means to transfer the funds,

Martine searches for Chinese people in various locations throughout the city—in shops owned by Chinese and in casinos which many Chinese workers frequent during their leisure time—through which he can send money to China. When she identifies willing Chinese individuals who will make the transfer, she hands over the money (in USD) and then takes a photo of the WeChat transfer in real time. The money is subsequently transferred directly to the wholesaler's account, and the order can be fulfilled and then sent by boat. While this is a functioning work around for some, most traders would still rather supervise these orders in person so that there is no room for error, or worse, getting scammed, a possibility which may also be partly the cause of mistrust toward Chinese wholesalers, Chinese people, and foreigner enterprise in general. This points to the importance of ICT in global trade, where platforms of communication and money-transferring are still owned and operated on the national level despite becoming necessary tools for international traders—connecting to the world simultaneously drives ever new and deeper dependencies whose chains can be physical as well as virtual.

## Conclusions

While the rhythms of trade and migration have been affected by the pandemic, African traders have continued traveling abroad in the search of goods to import (although this may be changing given the inflationary costs of travel). China is no longer the only destination on the map as Dubai and Turkey are now more common destinations for wholesale trade. One West African proverb perhaps best illustrates the importance of maintaining an ethos of adaptability: “When the rhythm of the song changes, so does the dance.”

Transnational trade as a mode of labor is considered by the Congolese state to be part of the “informal economy” and slips past indicators like the GDP, rendering many there invisible, along with their struggles. Women have generally been at the forefront of carving out informal work, which also makes them the first and hardest hit when economic downturns take their toll on these unregulated and unprotected sectors of labor. Women nevertheless continue to be agents of our global order by actively creating a new class of entrepreneurs which one day, hopefully, society will recognize for its legitimacy and necessity.

As for the general consumer base of the DRC, it should be understood within a larger framework of predation of resources that has led to certain economic dependencies, both material as well as social. But unlike past theories of dependency which reduced the involved countries into rich and poor, or developed and developing, today we see dependencies on foreign imports manufactured in global Southern contexts, with Western countries stepping back to play the role of arbiters, middlemen and financiers. As the case with African transnational traders shows, material trade depends on logistics made possible through networks of people.



Congolese citizens recapture a piece of the revolving signs and codes from circulating commodities for their own narratives and politics. Through oral histories, rumors, and visual depictions of the past and present, people attempt to express their relationships to the ambient and sometimes ineffable complexities of globalization. As part of the Congolese collective imagination, *Mami Wata* reveals the excitations and anxieties brought about by promises of material wealth as embodied in new commodities, as well as the modernization which comes with unbridled growth. In other words, she is a figure who swims across the globally interconnected world, engendering new encounters wherever she may feel forced to surface.

Chains bind people, but they also connect them, and the semiotic chains which form the basis of social relationships are constantly in flux. It is thus not unexpected that those who seem most bound by such chains—women, informal workers, migrants—are also the ones who first feel their movements and whose *débrouillardise* tactics of survival foreshadow larger global trends to come. Despite ideological maneuvers and legal restrictions by nation-states to protect their own interests, the circulation of goods, ideas and people always finds a way.

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# **Is the World Economy “Deglobalizing”? The Shifting Economic Geography of Foreign Investment (FDI) Networks and Its Impact on Economic Growth, 2009–2017**

Jeffrey Kentor and Rob Clark

This chapter addresses the questions of whether the world economy is “deglobalizing” and whether these changes are uniform across economic regions. We examine these questions in terms of globalization of investment, as represented by foreign direct investment (FDI), which is one of the largest and fastest growing components of the global economy. Following previous work in this area we utilize a social network framework. Previous research on economic deglobalization has taken a spatial geography perspective. We frame this question instead in terms of economic boundaries, and group countries by level of income. We chart the number and network density of FDI ties both within and across these economic zones for 2009 and 2017, using data from the IMF (2019). We use the term “regionalized globalization” to distinguish FDI ties within economic regions from ties across these regions. We find that the global economy as a whole has “deglobalized” in terms of the overall number and density of FDI linkages over this period. However, these overall findings obscure substantial differences across economic regions. Higher income countries decline in the total number of FDI ties, the density of their FDI networks, and the regionalization of these ties. Conversely, lower income countries increase in the overall number of FDI ties, network density and regionalization. We conclude by examining the extent to which the impact of these global FDI networks on economic growth is mediated by the economic regionalism.

## **Introduction**

This chapter examines the changes in economic globalization in the world economy from 2009 to 2017, and the impact of these changes on economic development. We focus on one key aspect of global economic integration, the globalization of invest-

ment, as operationalized by foreign direct investment (FDI). With more than 60,000 international firms directing almost one million foreign affiliates worldwide in 2000, FDI continues to expand more rapidly than other aspects of the global economy, including GDP and trade (Clark and Kentor, 2022). Following previous work on globalization, we take a social network perspective (Kim and Shin, 2002). We examine two aspects of FDI networks; the total number of FDI ties and the density of these networks. Next, we examine whether these overall changes in the global FDI network are uniform, or vary regionally. Previous studies of deglobalization have focused on economic relationships across geographic regions. We take a different perspective. Traditional world-systems theorists argue that global economic relationships developed primarily across economic regions of the world economy, enabling wealthy “core” countries of the world economy to extract profits from less developed “semi-peripheral” and “peripheral” countries (Wallerstein, 1974; Chase-Dunn, 1975; Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995). Therefore, rather than grouping countries by their spatial proximity, we group countries in terms of their level of development, using the World Bank’s categories of High, Upper Middle, Lower Middle, and Low Income (see Appendix 1 for a list of countries in each category). We chart the number and network density of FDI ties both within and across these economic regions for 2009 and 2017, using data from the IMF (2019). We use the term “regionalized globalization” to distinguish FDI ties within regions from ties across these regions. We find that there is an overall “deglobalization” of the world economy between 2009 and 2017. However, this overall reduction in global FDI activity obscures significant differences across economic regions. Higher income countries decline in the total number of FDI ties, the density of their FDI networks, and the regionalization of these ties. Conversely, lower income countries increase in the overall number of FDI ties, network density and regionalization. We conclude our analysis in Part 2 by examining to what extent the impact of these global FDI networks on economic growth is mediated by the economic regionalism developed in Part 1 of our analysis. We find that lower income countries accrue the greatest benefit from outward centrality in the global FDI network.

## Is the World Deglobalizing?

The first step in addressing this question is to determine the meaning of “globalization.” Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann (2006) identify more than one hundred definitions of this term. Some scholars of globalization, including Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann, construct broad, all-encompassing definitions:

Globalization is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities. (Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann, 2006, 5)

While this broad type of definition may indeed provide a comprehensive description of the entire scope of globalization, it is an unwieldy framework for empirical study. We adopt the more focused definitions of Bello (1997), Tilly (1995) and Chase-Dunn et al. (2000) who all define globalization in terms of the relative accelerated expansion and density of international exchange networks compared with domestic economic activity. Following Kim and Shin (2002), we empirically define globalization as the number and density of economic linkages between countries.

While there has been much discussion of deglobalization in the literature, there remains a paucity of empirical research on this topic. Previous empirical research on economic deglobalization has focused on the globalization of trade. Chase-Dunn et al. (2000) identify three waves of trade globalization with a long-term upward trend between 1795 and 1995. Kim and Shin (2002) report increased globalization of trade networks from 1959 to 1996 in terms of the number of trade ties and trade density, along with overall network decentralization over time. Recently, Kim et al. (2020) find a trend of deglobalization from 2009–2017 in terms of imports as a percent of GDP.

### **The global FDI network**

As noted above, we examine one aspect of economic globalization, that of foreign direct investment (FDI) networks. FDI refers to a long-term relationship between two enterprises residing in different economies, with the parent enterprise owning 10% or more voting power in the affiliate enterprise. The impact of FDI on various aspects the global economy has been the subject of a wide range of studies for nearly five decades (Chase-Dunn, 1975; Dixon and Boswell, 1996a, 1996b; Kentor, 1998; de Soysa and Oneal, 1999; Kentor and Boswell, 2003; Curwin and Mahutga, 2014). We follow current research on FDI, and take a social network perspective to these relationships (Bandelj and Mahutga, 2013; Damgaard and Elkjaer, 2017; Clark and Kentor, 2022).

### **Is the global FDI network deglobalizing?**

We examine two aspects of the global FDI network; the total number of linkages and the density of these networks between 2009 and 2017. Data are taken from the IMF's *Coordinated Direct Investment Survey* (IMF, 2019). We are interested in the number of dichotomous FDI ties (rather than the value of these ties) between countries, which reflects the extent of connections, or integration, of the world economy. Density is the number of actual ties in a network divided by the total number of possible ties, and reflects the interconnectedness, or “cohesiveness” of a network (Blau, 1977). A density of 1.0 indicates that all countries or “nodes” are connected to all other nodes, and a score of 0.0 would indicate that there are no links between any countries.

## Results

First, we examine changes in the total number of FDI ties between 2009 and 2017, as presented in Table 1.1. There is an overall 9% decline in the number of FDI ties in the entire system (4847 to 4339) over this period. Next, we examine changes in network density (see Table 1.2). We find that network densities decline from .105 in 2009 to .094 in 2017. Both declines support a thesis of overall “deglobalization” in the world economy.

### Regionalized globalization

The next step in our analyses was to examine shifts in the geography of these global FDI ties. Are countries more likely to develop these relationships with countries in close geographic proximity? To assess this, we grouped countries in terms of the World Bank’s five geographic regions. We found little change in the geography of FDI ties within and across these spatial regions between 2009 and 2017. So we decided to take a different perspective and examine changes in these global ties by economic region instead of geographic region, using the World Bank classification of High, Middle High, Middle Low and Low Income countries. Interesting findings emerge from this novel economic framework. These results are presented in Table 2.

Three findings stand out. First, the total number of FDI ties across economic regions has remained nearly static over this period, with 2615 ties in 2007 and 2596 ties in 2017. However, the percentage of inter-region ties to total ties has grown from 54% in 2009 to 60% in 2017. This expansion of inter-region ties is not uniform. The total number of FDI ties across regions decreased for high and upper middle income countries and increased for lower middle and low income countries. On a relative basis, though, these conclusions are reversed. The percentage of FDI ties between regions to total ties for high income countries grew from 50.5% percent to nearly 59%, while the percentage of low income countries’ ties declined from 65.7% to 60.6% over this period.

To summarize the first part of our analysis, we find that there has been an overall reduction in global FDI networks between 2009 and 2017. However, we also find that these changes vary significantly by economic region. We now move to the second part of our analysis, which examines the impact of these shifts in in the economic geography of global FDI networks on economic development.

Table 1: FDI ties within and between economic regions, 2009–2017

1.1 Number of FDI ties within and between economic regions, 2009–2017															
Country income level	High income			Upper middle			Lower middle			Low income			Total		
	2009	2017	2017/2009	2009	2017	2017/2009	2009	2017	2017/2009	2009	2017	2017/2009	2009	2017	2017/2009
High income	1493	892	0.62	998	644	0.65	432	390	0.9	37	242	6.54	2906	2168	0.746
Upper middle	464	398	0.86	457	313	0.68	144	182	1.26	15	109	7.27	1080	1002	0.927
Lower middle	261	277	1.06	291	237	0.81	96	119	1.24	15	87	5.8	663	720	1.086
Low income	68	177	2.6	97	137	1.41	28	80	2.86	5	55	11	198	449	2.27
total													4847	4339	0.896
1.2 Density of FDI ties within and between economic regions, 2009–2017															
Country income level	High income			Upper middle			Lower middle			Low income					
	2009	2017	2017/2009	2009	2017	2017/2009	2009	2017	2017/2009	2009	2017	2017/2009	2009	2017	2017/2009
High income	0.246	0.152	0.62	0.231	0.149	0.64	0.102	0.092	0.9	0.018	0.116	6.44			
Upper middle	0.108	0.092	0.85	0.148	0.102	0.69	0.047	0.059	1.25	0.01	0.072	7.2			
Lower middle	0.062	0.065	1.05	0.094	0.077	0.82	0.032	0.04	1.25	0.01	0.059	5.9			
Low income	0.033	0.085	2.58	0.064	0.091	1.42	0.019	0.054	2.84	0.007	0.078	11.14			

Source: Authors.



**Table 2: Number of FDI ties within and between economic regions 2009–2017**

Country income level	2009			2017		
	Total ties	Ties across zones	% across zones	Total ties	Ties across zones	% across zones
High income	2906	1467	50.5%	2168	1277	58.9%
Upper middle	1080	616	57.0%	1002	604	60.3%
Lower middle	663	402	60.6%	720	443	61.5%
Low income	198	130	65.7%	449	272	60.6%
Total ties	4847	2615	54.0%	4339	2596	60.0%
<i>Source:</i> Authors.						

## Regionalized Globalization and Economic Growth

This part of our analysis extends the long-term debate on the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth. The initial research question posed by Chase-Dunn (1975) asked whether FDI, framed as foreign capital penetration, has a positive or negative effect on economic growth in receiving (generally less developed) countries. Chase-Dunn found that his measure of FDI, debits on investment income, had a negative effect on economic growth. This finding generated a large number of follow-up empirical studies on this question. These findings were mixed, with some supporting Chase-Dunn's negative effects (Dixon and Boswell, 1996a, 1996b; Kentor, 1998) and others reporting positive effects (de Soysa and Oneal, 1999; Firebaugh, 1992, 1996). Subsequent research examined various aspects of FDI on economic growth, including temporal impacts (Kentor, 1998), geographic dimensions (Curwin and Mahutga, 2014), the structure of FDI (Kentor and Boswell, 2003), the environment (Kentor and Grimes, 1996) health and well-being (Wimberly 1990; Wimberly and Bellows, 1992; Labonté, 2019), and the physical location of foreign subsidiaries (Kentor and Jorgenson, 2010).

We follow recent work on the impact of FDI on economic growth that utilizes a social network perspective, which allows us to explore these FDI relationships in its entirety, rather than the sum of individual bilateral relationships (Bandelj

and Mahutga, 2013; Coe et al., 2010; Coe and Yeung, 2015; Lloyd, Mahutga, and De Leeuw, 2009; Mahutga, 2006; Mahutga and Smith, 2011; Neilson, Pritchard and Yeung, 2017; Jorgenson et al., 2022). Most recently, Clark and Kentor (2022) examine the network structure of FDI and the impact of network centrality on economic growth in both receiving (inward centrality) and investing (outward centrality) countries. Clark and Kentor (2022) find that inward and outward centrality had independent positive effects on economic growth. In this chapter, we ask whether these positive effects of inward and outward FDI centrality are uniform across countries, or mediated by a country's economic zone as identified in Part 1 of our analysis.

## Data and methods

*The FDI network.* Foreign investment refers to a long-term relationship between two enterprises residing in different economies, with the parent enterprise (or investor) owning 10% or more voting power in the affiliate enterprise. To construct our network measures of FDI, we use the IMF's *Coordinated Direct Investment Survey* (IMF 2019), covering the period 2009 to 2017. FDI data are typically reported in either stock or flow format. Flows refer to new investment and consist of three components: equity capital, reinvested earnings, and intra-company loans. Data are reported on a net basis, with negative flows indicating that at least one of the three components is negative and not offset by positive amounts of the other components (i.e., "reverse investment" or "disinvestment"). Stock, meanwhile, refers to the accumulation of investment over time and is calculated as the share of capital and reserves (including profits) attributable to the parent enterprise plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise. We constructed our network using valued stock data (both incoming and outgoing) in order to capture each country's overall investment position abroad. Following prior work (Clark and Beckfield 2009; Clark and Mahutga 2013), we logged all values to reduce skew and use a minimum cutoff of \$1 million (U.S.).

*FDI centrality.* Theoretically, networks that resemble a core/periphery structure feature a set of integrated actors who share ties with all others, along with a set of peripheral actors who only share ties with the center and are isolated from one another. In the present analysis, we use the continuous coreness procedure available in UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002) to calculate a state's structural location in the global FDI network. Scores range from 0 to 1, with larger values indicating closer proximity to the center (scores are normalized so that the sum of their squares is equal to 1). Scores are generated using the MINRES (minimum residual) method. MINRES seeks a vector  $C$  (whose values indicate the coreness of each node) that minimizes the off-diagonal sums of squared differences between the observed matrix and the pattern matrix, the latter of which is approximated by the product of the vector and its transpose (i.e.,  $C_i C_j$ ). Overall, coreness scores are a

positive function of (1) the number of associations one has, (2) the strength of each tie, and (3) the centrality of one's partners. The combination of these factors in our coreness measure represents a significant advantage over degree centrality, which weights all partners equally, because we suspect that technology transfers will be maximized through partnerships with central actors who have greater access to the global stock of accumulated knowledge.

We also prefer the coreness procedure over eigenvector centrality. While both measures consider partner centrality, eigenvector centrality is limited by its inability to handle asymmetric data. Because the FDI network is asymmetrical (i.e., the volume of investment from country<sub>*i*</sub> to country<sub>*j*</sub> may not equal the volume of investment from country<sub>*j*</sub> to country<sub>*i*</sub>), states may occupy different structural positions with respect to incoming and outgoing foreign investment. Importantly, the continuous coreness procedure calculates only one type of centrality from the original matrix, as ties are attributed to country<sub>*i*</sub> (the country corresponding to the row of the cell with the tie), rather than country<sub>*j*</sub> (the country corresponding to the column of the cell with the tie). Thus, with asymmetrical flows,  $C_i C_j$  is designed to minimize the row residuals. Consequently, we transpose the original matrix in order to generate both in-centrality and out-centrality scores for the global FDI network.

*Dependent variable.* In the present analysis, we examine the effect of FDI centrality on economic growth, which we measure with each country's gross domestic product per capita (GDP PC) based on purchasing power parity. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. Data come from the World Bank (2019).

*Control variables.* In the present analysis, we interact FDI centrality with each country's income region (high income, upper middle income, lower middle income, and low income), with low income serving as the excluded reference category. We use the World Bank's official classification.<sup>1</sup> We then examine this joint effect on economic growth net of standard predictors found in the literature. First, we include inward and outward volume of foreign investment (FDI stock/GDP), as well as inward and outward versions of the investment rate (FDI flow/FDI stock). Our stock and flow measures come from UNCTAD (2019). We also include each country's trade openness, which refers to the sum of exports and imports of goods and services, calculated as a share of GDP. We also control for conventional growth predictors, including domestic investment (gross capital formation/GDP), formal education (tertiary school enrollment), industrial employment (as a percent of total employment), and labor force participation (proportion of the population between the ages of 15 and 64 that is economically active). Data for these variables come

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1 <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>.

from the World Bank (2019). To reduce skew in our data, we logged GDP PC, all FDI variables (centrality, stock, and the investment rate), and trade openness.

### Data analysis

Our models feature 1,491 observations across 137 countries between 2009 and 2017. Thus, our dataset contains multiple observations for different countries across time. Such a panel structure allows us to use estimation techniques that deal with potential heterogeneity bias (the problem of unmeasured time-invariant variables), which can seriously affect OLS (ordinary least squares) coefficient estimates. The fixed effects model represents one strategy designed to correct for heterogeneity bias by specifying the unmeasured time-invariant factors as country-specific intercepts (Greene 2008). Thus, fixed effects models hold constant the average effect of each state, thereby restricting attention to longitudinal variation in the data.

$$(y_{it} - \bar{y}_i) = (x_{it} - \bar{x}_i)\beta + (\varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i) \tag{1}$$

where  $y_{it}$  is GDP PC for country  $i$  at time  $t$ ,  $\bar{y}_i$  is the average GDP PC for country  $i$  across the sample period,  $x_{it}$  represents the independent variables for country  $i$  at time  $t$ ,  $\bar{x}_i$  represents the average value for each independent variable for country  $i$  across the sample period,  $\beta$  is the vector of regression coefficients,  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is the error term for country  $i$  at time  $t$ , and  $\bar{\varepsilon}_i$  is the average error term for country  $i$  across time. We cluster on states in all models in order to correct for serial correlation (indicated by a Wald test of our models) and heteroscedasticity (indicated by a modified Wald test of our models). Past work suggests that contemporaneous FDI has a greater effect on economic growth than past FDI (Iamsiraroj and Ulubasoglu, 2015). Therefore, we do not introduce a lag structure to our models. In the models presented below, we include temporal fixed effects with a series of dummy variables representing each year in the sample period. Thus, we are modeling two-way fixed effects, correcting for unobserved heterogeneity that is both time-invariant within countries, as well as cross-sectionally invariant within years.

### Results

Our primary analysis investigates the effect of both forms of FDI centrality on economic growth, as moderated by each country’s income region (high income is the excluded reference category). Table 3 presents our main results, featuring inward FDI in model 1, outward FDI in model 2, and both measures of centrality in model 3. Next, we replicate models 1–3 by adding interaction terms for income status in models 4–6. Across all six models, domestic investment and industrial employment positively affect economic growth, as expected. By contrast, trade openness is negatively associated with growth, while formal schooling and labor force participation

**Table 3: Two-way fixed effects regression of GDP p.c. (PPP), 2009–2017**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FDI centrality (in)	1.086** (.325)		.801* (.312)	-3.110 (2.583)		-3.457 (2.432)
FDI stock (in)	-.022 (.019)		-.042 (.025)	-.019 (.019)		-.035 (.022)
FDI rate (in)	-.748 (.728)		-.587 (.655)	-.833 (.740)		-.543 (.615)
FDI centrality (out)		2.242** (.635)	1.879** (.634)		12.595** (3.861)	15.716*** (3.741)
FDI stock (out)		-.002 (.017)	.016 (.016)		-.002 (.016)	.014 (.016)
FDI rate (out)		-.009 (.030)	-.028 (.031)		-.008 (.027)	-.081 (.042)
Trade openness	-.078 (.043)	-.089* (.040)	-.074 (.042)	-.069 (.042)	-.075 (.041)	-.049 (.042)
Domestic investment	.003** (.001)	.003* (.001)	.003** (.001)	.003** (.001)	.002* (.001)	.003** (.001)
Formal education	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
Industrial employment	.030*** (.004)	.029*** (.004)	.028*** (.004)	.029*** (.004)	.028*** (.004)	.027*** (.004)
Labor force participation	.007 (.005)	.005 (.005)	.005 (.005)	.007 (.005)	.005 (.004)	.006 (.004)
FDI centrality (in) x high				3.886 (2.610)		3.896 (2.457)

FDI centrality (in) x upper middle				4.901 (2.619)		4.847* (2.444)
FDI centrality (in) x lower middle				4.886 (2.649)		5.315* (2.555)
FDI centrality (out) x high					-11.041** (3.950)	-14.331*** (3.819)
FDI centrality (out) x upper middle					-7.047 (4.483)	-10.965** (4.165)
FDI centrality (out) x lower middle					-10.454* (4.267)	-14.712*** (4.045)
Observations	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491
States	137	137	137	137	137	137
R <sup>2</sup> within	.715	.720	.731	.719	.731	.745
<p>* <math>p &lt; .05</math>    ** <math>p &lt; .01</math>    *** <math>p &lt; .001</math> (two-tailed tests)  <i>Note:</i> Each cell reports the unstandardized coefficient, with the robust standard error in parentheses. All models correct for first-order autocorrelation and include two-way fixed effects (not shown to preserve space). <i>Source:</i> Authors.</p>						

exhibit weak effects. Turning to our primary predictors, FDI in-centrality and out-centrality are positively and significantly associated with GDP PC in models 1–3, while the conventional stock and rate measures of inward FDI are negatively and/or weakly associated with growth in these models. Note that both inward and outward measures of FDI centrality remain significantly associated with economic growth even when they are estimated simultaneously in model 3. However, models 4 and 6 show that the positive effect of FDI in-centrality does not extend to low-income countries. In fact, the main effect of inward centrality in both models is actually negative (-3.110 and -3.457, respectively). As the interaction terms reveal in these models, the positive effect of FDI in-centrality is driven by the other three income groups, and is most pronounced among middle income countries. By contrast, models 5 and 6 reveal that the positive effect of FDI out-centrality is significantly *enhanced* among low income states, and that this group of states is clearly driving out-centrality’s overall effect. In fact, the benefits of outward centrality practically disappear among high and middle income countries. Thus, we conclude that poor

nations benefit far more from elevating their network centrality in outward investment than they do from becoming more centrally integrated in inward investment.

## Discussion and Conclusions

The initial motivation for this research was to address the question “Is the world economy deglobalizing?” This inquiry led us down several paths. The first hurdle was to define what is meant by the term “globalization.” We frame this question in terms of economic globalization, focusing on global FDI networks. Our initial finding is that the world economy has indeed “deglobalized” between 2009 and 2017, in terms of the total number and density of global FDI dichotomous linkages. What is driving this overall decline? We agree with those who argue that these global trade declines are caused by changes in the international geopolitical arena. Ripsman (2021) argues that the prior expansion and current decline in globalization are primarily the result, rather than the cause, of changing dynamics in Great Power relationships, specifically the rise and decline of US hegemony and concomitant rise of China. As U.S. dominance on the global political and military stage declines, China and Russia in particular find opportunities to challenge U.S. interests around the world. In a similar vein, Arase (2020) describes this deglobalization process as a shift from a unipolar to a bipolar international political structure that began with the global financial collapse in 2008. This bipolarity leads to a bifurcation and overall decline of international trade networks. García-Herrero (2019) characterizes this process as *deglobalization from above and below*. She suggests that the decline of globalization from above refers to the increasing tension between the US and China, as well as protectionist actions by other countries such as Japan that reshape trade networks. Deglobalization from below refers to a reduction in international commerce driven by the internal conflicts within countries by those who perceive globalization as negatively impacting their lives.

The second issue was to explore if this global downward trend was uniform or varied across regions. This led us to re-conceptualize how to best organize the structure of the global economy. We found that the traditional method of grouping countries in terms of their spatial geography was not very productive, so we instead organized countries in terms of their economic geography. This new framework illuminated many new and significant shifts in the global FDI network. We find that higher income countries decline in the total number of FDI ties, the density of their FDI networks, and the regionalization of these ties, while lower income countries increase in the overall number of FDI ties, network density and regionalization. These findings suggest that less developed countries are becoming integrated in the world economy and are primarily doing so by forming investment relations with other less developed countries. Conversely, the composition of FDI ties among more advanced nations has shifted to include a greater number of less developed countries, but with an overall net loss of investment ties.

These variations across economic regions led us to consider an additional question—does the impact of FDI networks on economic growth also vary across these economic regions? In a word, yes. We find that lower income countries benefit the most from outward centrality in the global FDI network. Conversely, inward centrality is not beneficial for the economies of these lower income countries.

These results lead us to a final question that we intend to address in a subsequent paper: do FDI linkages within and across regions have differential effects on economic growth, and do these relationships vary by region?

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## Appendix 1: World Bank Income Classifications

<b>Low-Income Economies (\$1,045 or less) [27]</b>
Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, Burkina Faso, Dem. People's Rep Korea, South Sudan, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Central Afr Republic, Madagascar, Syrian Arab Republic, Chad, Malawi, Togo, Dem. Rep Congo, Mali, Uganda, Eritrea, Mozambique, Rep. Yemen, Ethiopia, Niger, Gambia, Rwanda, Guinea, Sierra Leone
<b>Lower-Middle Income Economies (\$1,046 to \$4,095) [55]</b>
Angola, Honduras, Philippines, Algeria, India, Samoa, Indonesia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Belize, Islamic Rep. Iran, Senegal, Benin, Kenya, Solomon Islands, Bhutan, Kiribati, Sri Lanka, Bolivia, Kyrgyz Republic, Tanzania, Cabo Verde, Lao PDR, Tajikistan, Cambodia, Lesotho, Timor-Leste, Cameroon, Mauritania, Tunisia, Comoros, Fed. Sts. Micronesia, Ukraine, Rep. Congo, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco, Vanuatu, Djibouti, Myanmar, Vietnam, Arab Rep. Egypt, Nepal, West Bank and Gaza, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Zambia, Eswatini, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Pakistan, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh

### Upper-Middle Income Economies (\$4,096 to \$12,695) [55]

Albania, Gabon, Namibia, American Samoa, Georgia, North Macedonia, Grenada, Panama, Armenia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Azerbaijan, Guyana, Peru, Belarus, Iraq, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jamaica, Russian Federation, Botswana, Jordan, Serbia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Bulgaria, Kosovo, St. Lucia, China, Lebanon, St. Vincent/Grenadines, Colombia, Libya, Suriname, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Thailand, Cuba, Maldives, Tonga, Dominica, Marshall Islands, Turkey, Dominican Republic, Mauritius, Turkmenistan, Equatorial Guinea, Mexico, Tuvalu, Ecuador, Moldova, Fiji, Montenegro, Argentina

### High Income Economies (\$12,696 or more) [80]

Andorra, Greece, Poland, Antigua and Barbuda, Greenland, Portugal, Aruba, Guam, Puerto Rico, Australia, Hong Kong SAR China, Qatar, Austria, Hungary, San Marino, The Bahamas, Iceland, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Ireland, Seychelles, Barbados, Isle of Man, Singapore, Belgium, Israel, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), Bermuda, Italy, Slovak Republic, British Virgin Islands, Japan, Slovenia, Brunei Darussalam, Rep. Korea, Spain, Canada, Kuwait, St. Kitts and Nevis, Cayman Islands, Latvia, St. Martin (French part), Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Sweden, Chile, Lithuania, Switzerland, Croatia, Luxembourg, Taiwan China, Curaçao, Trinidad and Tobago, Cyprus, Malta, Turks and Caicos Islands, Czech Republic, Monaco, United Arab Emirates, Denmark, Nauru, United Kingdom, Estonia, Netherlands, United States, Faroe Islands, New Caledonia, Uruguay, Finland, New Zealand, Virgin Islands (U.S.), France, N. Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Norway, Germany, Oman, Gibraltar, Palau, Macao SAR China

*Source:* World Bank, 2019.



# The New Geography of Global Inequality and the Evolution of the World City System Since 1993

Helge Marahrens and Arthur S. Alderson

How is the global urban hierarchy changing in the current era? Has the distribution of power and prestige of cities in the inter-city system shifted in a way that cuts across long standing North-South and East-West divides in the world system? Prior research, focused on the period from 1981–2007, found that the inter-city system has indeed been in the midst of substantial restructuring. However, change occurred in a way that concentrated power in a small number of cities and reproduced and magnified pre-existing patterns of global inequality. In this chapter, we revisit this foundational question defining research on the world city system and its relationship to global inequality, using data on the headquarter and branch locations of the world's largest multinationals from 1993 to 2020. Our aim is both to update earlier analyses to take developments since 2007 into account and to build additional confidence in the inferences drawn in prior research which relied on repeated cross-sections of firms/cities. Using new data we have collected that tracks the location decisions of the world's largest firms over nearly three decades, we construct a panel containing information for each year on the point centrality of the thousands of cities linked together by such firms. We use network methods to describe changes to the overall network and linear mixed models to trace the power and prestige of cities by world-system position and region. In this fashion, we describe the emerging geography of global inequality at the sub-national level.

## Introduction

The most recent round of globalization reoriented theory and research in a number of social scientific disciplines. Research on the place and role of cities in the production and reproduction of global inequality has been no exception. Landmark work on “world” or “global” cities by Friedmann (1986) and Sassen (1991) produced in the early stages of the current round of globalization provided the foundation for a new interdisciplinary field devoted to investigating change in the global network of

cities in the context of globalization and the implications of this for the well-being of the residents of cities around the world. As is the case with work on other aspects of globalization (e.g., Burbach and Robinson, 1999), research in this field has often been motivated by the idea that globalization represents an epochal change, a shift in the basic structure of opportunity and constraint that shapes inequalities between cities, regions, and, ultimately, nation-states. Such a shift can reasonably be expected to create openings for city mobility that were effectively closed off in the global political economy of the immediate post-WWII period.

Recently, scholars have begun to talk about deglobalization, a retrenchment signaling a reversal of trends toward increasing global integration and interdependence. In terms of economic globalization, deglobalization implies a turn away from the rising international flows of people, trade, and investment that have marked the period since the late 1970s. Such retrenchment would not be historically novel, as earlier waves of globalization have regularly crested then receded, as in the dramatic reversal of the globalization trend of 1870–1914 after WWI (Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer, 2000; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003). Scholars in various disciplines have begun to investigate deglobalization—see, for instance, James (2018) on international trade, investment, and related policy change, Lebang and Peters (2022) on migration, and Abdal and Ferreira (2021) on the world-system as a whole—and the weight of the evidence appears to support the idea of at least a stall in such trends following the 2008 financial crisis. Given the extent to which the phenomenon of globalization has informed theory and research on cities, deglobalization presents a new challenge to our understanding of the place and role of cities in global inequality.

In this chapter we revisit one of the central questions motivating research on the world city system; namely, how is inequality between cities changing in the current era (i.e., in the context of globalizing and deglobalizing tendencies in the world economy)? Is the distribution of power and prestige in the world city system shifting in a fashion that is bridging long-standing North-South and East-West divides in the world system? Or do phenomena such as the “rise of China” and the decline of the “rustbelt” in the Global North conceal an underlying stability in the global urban hierarchy, and thus continuing concentration of the locus of command, control, and decision-making in the world economy?

## **The World City System and Global Inequality: Hypotheses and Evidence**

Research on the world city system has been guided by the fundamental sociological insight that relations between cities shape their identities and what occurs within them (e.g., Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991; Knox and Taylor, 1995). Put differently, New York City is not a “world city” because of its individual attributes alone, rather

it is a world city because of the role it plays as a center of economic decision-making, defining the environment in which other cities operate in the world economy. Similarly, Lima is not a satellite of global metropolises such as New York because of its individual attributes alone, rather it is a satellite because of the role that it plays as a way-point facilitating the export of raw and finished goods to other locations in the inter-city system, the terms of its integration into and continuing role in the system being heavily defined by decisions made in cities like New York. Such relations between cities generate a global hierarchy of cities in which some are advantaged owing to their position within it and others are disadvantaged.

With that basic idea fixed, a key question becomes that of how to think about the effects of the round of globalization beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s on a global urban hierarchy that had been defined by these sorts of colonial and neo-colonial, metropole-satellite relations. Friedmann (1986) and Sassen (1991) provided influential answers to this question that were consistent with a broader sense emerging among some scholars that globalization represented an epochal shift, a transition, in Burbach and Robinson's (1999, 10) terms, "from the nation-state phase of world capitalism to a new transnational phase." Globalization, their work suggests, means that cities are meaningfully disengaging from local political geography while, at the same time, their fates are becoming increasingly tied to their position in transnational networks of investment and trade. In other words, the fortunes of New York City and Lima are becoming progressively less tied to that of their traditional hinterlands and more tied to decisions made in cities thousands of miles away.

What does the simultaneous disembedding from the local and reembedding in the global that Friedmann (1986) and Sassen (1991) describe imply for mobility in the global urban hierarchy? In other work (e.g., Friedmann, 1995; Sassen, 1994) it is clear that—contra other quasi-millennarian accounts of globalization from the 1990s—both view globalization as an implusive phenomenon, meaning that rather than "flattening" the world, globalization is expected to further centralize decision-making in a few sites, the "world" or "global" cities. As such, there is no expectation that a Lima would eclipse a New York, London, Paris or Tokyo in the near term. However, their accounts of the world city system do suggest openings for mobility.

Friedmann (1995, 23) describes the network of cities as forming a fluid hierarchy. In his view, "the world economy is too volatile to allow us to fix a stable hierarchy for any but relatively short stretches of time." This fluid, volatile situation is defined by "an ongoing competitive struggle for position in the global network of capitalist cities and the inherent instability of this system" (Friedmann, 1995, 36). In such a system, one can reasonably expect to observe cities rising and falling in status over time. The more a city can become a locus of decision making—capturing some of the "command" functions of the world economy—the more its standing will rise, and globalization may be creating opportunities for cities outside of the Global North to do so. Sassen's (1994, 7) argument is broadly similar: "global cities are (1)



command points in the organization of the world economy, (2) key locations and marketplaces for the leading industries of the current period...and (3) major sites of production, including the production of innovations....” In the current era, cities “must inevitably engage each other in fulfilling their functions, as the new forms of growth in these cities partly result from the proliferation of inter-urban networks.” We can account for “the fact that some places in even the richest countries are becoming poorer, or that a global city in a developing country can become richer,” as an outcome of engagement in these networks (Sassen, 1994, 7). For both Friedmann and Sassen, then, position in the space of global flows is increasingly coming to define the fortunes of cities around the world and, as these “new geographies of centrality” (Sassen, 1994, 8) develop, they may do so in a way that is orthogonal to the “old” geography reflecting the global order established earlier in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

These ideas have been pursued in a large body of interdisciplinary research (Chakravarty et al., 2021). Most relevant to the questions we address in this chapter is work that has emerged from efforts to collect *relational data* on cities and to analyze such *data as networks*. Such data have been used, for instance, to derive theoretically defensible world city league tables (e.g., Taylor, 2020), the aim being to identify those cities that sit at the top of the global urban hierarchy and to examine how that is changing over time. Based on such research, the general outlines of developments in the very center of the world city network are fairly clear: it appears that decision making continues to be centralized in a relatively small number of cities located in the Global North (Alderson et al., 2010; Derudder and Taylor, 2018), but there is also evidence, for example, for the rise of Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai in such rankings (Derudder and Taylor, 2020).

In a series of papers, Alderson and colleagues extended the focus of such work from the examination of the center of the world city network (i.e., those cities at the top of the global urban hierarchy) to the thousands of cities around the world that are knit together by the location decisions of multinational firms (many of which, of course, are based in cities in the center of the network). Using cross-sectional data on the headquarter and branch locations of the 500 largest firms in the world in 2000 (Alderson and Beckfield, 2004), then 1981 and 2000 (Alderson and Beckfield, 2007), they found that the position of cities in the global urban hierarchy in each period largely matched on to the position of the countries in which they were located in the post-WWII world system; that is, cities located in countries in the core of the world system in the immediate post-war era were generally more powerful and prestigious than cities located in the semi-periphery which, in turn, were more powerful and prestigious than cities located in the periphery. Introducing an additional wave of cross-sectional data for 2007, they later examined *change* in network centrality across the 1981–2007 period (Alderson et al., 2010). Substantively, the results were very similar. Cities located outside of the core of the world economy moving into the contemporary period were not, on average, moving into more central positions relative to cities located in the core. Extending the focus to world region,

they likewise found that cities in different regions outside of the Global North were not generally growing more powerful or prestigious relative to cities located in the Global North.

Results from this line of research suggest that, while the world city system exhibits all of the churn and restructuring over time anticipated in Friedmann and Sassen's accounts (e.g., the rise and fall of individual cities), there is little evidence for the idea of a general overtaking of the "old" geography of centrality by the "new." Plainly stated, given knowledge of a city's world system position in the immediate post-war period, one can do just about as good a job of predicting its centrality in 2007 as one can in 2000 or in 1981.

While this line of research represents the most elaborate conducted to date, it nonetheless suffers from some limitations. The most critical for our purposes is that the analyses of Alderson and colleagues are based on repeated cross-sections. While there is certainly overlap, for instance, between the roster of the world's 500 largest firms in 1981 and 2007, it is far from perfect. This means that the measures of network power and prestige that Alderson and colleagues calculate for 1981, 2000, and 2007 are not based on the location decisions of the same set of firms. Change in the centrality of a given city over time thus represents an indeterminate mix of real change in that city's centrality and change in the set of firms used to calculate that centrality in each period. This makes such data strictly inappropriate for longitudinal analysis. In addition to extending these earlier analyses to take developments since 2007 into account—addressing the issue of the consequences of potential deglobalization after the 2008 economic crisis—a central aim of this chapter is therefore to address this limitation of prior work, using longitudinal data for a constant set of the world's largest firms.

## Data and Methods


To assess how the global urban hierarchy is changing in the context of globalization and deglobalization, we trace the location decisions of 783 Multinational Corporations (MNCs)<sup>1</sup> from 1993 to 2020.<sup>2</sup> In theory, the world city system represents a multi-relational network of cities (i.e., one where cities connect economically, politically, and socially to one another). In practice however, city-to-city connections are difficult to trace. Most published research, including the current study, focus on economic relations and the way in which MNCs connect cities worldwide.

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1 The complete list of companies can be found at <https://github.com/hmarahre>.

2 Given the network methods described below, not all companies contribute to the city network in all years. Companies with only headquarters and no subsidiaries do not contribute city-to-city edges. That said, the number of companies contributing to the network varies only slightly by year.

**Figure 1: Combined revenues of 783 high revenue companies compared to that of the *Global 500* and the combined GDP of the world's societies, 1993–2020**




Source: Authors.

Using Alderson and Beckfield's (2004) methodology, we connect headquarter locations to each subsidiary and aggregate across cities. In total, this results in a directed city-to-city network containing 7,530 cities. Below, we describe the company sample, methodology, and city network in more detail. In general, we trace changes to the global urban hierarchy over 28 years using several different measures of centrality.

Our company sample is comparable, but not identical, to the *Fortune* magazine's list of the world's 500 largest firms, the *Fortune Global 500*. While many of the high-revenue companies that make our sample (HRCs) also appear in the *Global 500*, they represent a more stable set that exists in every year of the LexisNexis Corporate Affiliations (LNCA) database (1993–2020). In other words, our sample excludes companies like Enron, which went bankrupt in 2001, and Facebook, which was founded in 2004. Among the companies that exist over the entire 28-year span of the LNCA database, we selected those with at least one year of revenue above \$7.8

**Figure 2: Total number of new subsidiaries added (all location changes) and total number of new subsidiaries added in new countries (foreign country location changes) by 783 high revenue companies, 1994–2020**



Source: Authors.

billion.<sup>3</sup> Given these criteria, HRCs represent only a small portion of companies in the LNCA database. However, their economic impact is substantial.

Figure 1 compares the combined revenues of our 783 HRCs to that of the Global 500 and to the combined GDP of all societies between 1993 and 2020. As one can note, the revenues of the HRCs in our analysis are equivalent to a considerable proportion of total world economic activity, amounting, crudely, to around 40% of total world GDP in most years. While this proportion declines in later years, it is notable that their combined revenues increase across the sample period and that the revenue of the HRCs in our data are more volatile at points than the revenue of the

<sup>3</sup> The lowest revenue of any company in the *Fortune Global 500* in the period under study is \$7.8 billion.


Global 500, with notable peaks in 2003 and 2006 and declines in 2007 and 2020 relative to the Global 500.

Most HRCs have their headquarters in the US or in Europe (77%). Given their success, it is unsurprising that they are large (42 locations on average) and expanding. Over the 28-year span, these firms added a net total of almost 38,000 locations. Figure 2 shows that in most years, with the obvious exception of the 2003–2005 and 2016–2017 periods, HRCs generally added new subsidiaries each year (i.e., “all location changes” in Figure 2). It is also notable that these firms generally added subsidiaries in foreign (for them) countries in each year (“foreign country location changes”), and that, 2016 excepted, they continued to do so after the 2008 crisis. Indeed, 2011 and 2012 were banner years for the globalization of the operations of these large firms: they added thousands of new subsidiaries, and many of those were in new countries. Closely examining the data behind Figure 2, we note that the 2002 peak in location change can be largely attributed to US-based HRCs expanding within the US, while the 2011–2012 peak in location change are driven by US, Japanese, German, and French companies expanding outside their country borders.

Figure 3 disaggregates all location changes into expansion and contraction to reveal the degree to which the net location change reported in Figure 2 conceals bi-directional change, where some companies are expanding while others are contracting. For the most part, the location decisions of the HRCs move together over time. The peak years (2002, 2011–2013) are not offset by substantial contraction, and the valley years between 2003–2005 show few companies expanding. Figure 3 also reveals that during any given year, about 350 or 45% of companies maintain their number of locations (no changes). This is to say that while there are no major expansion/contraction offsets, HRCs vary substantially in how many locations they add or subtract. Table 1 shows that the year-to-year location change has an extremely large standard deviation, indicating that some companies add/subtract a lot of locations while others simply maintain their locations from previous years. Having introduced our sample of firms, we next turn to describe how the company trees from the LNCA database are used to produce the city-to-city network.

The HRCs form the basis of the city-to-city network we analyze. Using Alderson and Beckfield’s (2004) methodology, we connect headquarter locations to each subsidiary and aggregate across cities. In total, this results in a directed city-to-city network with 7,530 nodes. The question is, what makes a city powerful? Based on exchange theory, network scholars have argued that power indicates an advantageous position with regard to network flow and resources (Neal and Neal, 2011). In this sense, cities with high outdegree (i.e., cities that send more ties than others) are at an advantage because they have demonstrably captured more of the control functions of the world economy. Closeness and betweenness also indicate advantageous positions because information and resources pass through cities with high values on

Figure 3: Disaggregating location changes of 783 high revenue companies, 1994–2020



Source: Authors.

each.<sup>4</sup> Closeness measures the inverse average distance of a node to all other nodes in the network. Cities with higher values can reach other cities more quickly/with fewer intermediaries and gain power through their relative proximity. Betweenness assigns high values to nodes which sit on the shortest path of many pairs of nodes in the network and thus occupy gateway points for information and resources flowing elsewhere. Alderson and Beckfield (2004) add indegree (i.e., the number of ties received) as a measure of prestige. Cities selected more often as subsidiary locations are not necessarily sites of decision

<sup>4</sup> Closeness and Betweenness are calculated based on a dichotomized, symmetric version of the adjacency matrix. This is done so because, practically, valued edges could result in values larger than 1 and, theoretically, because directionality should not be taken into account.

**Table 1: Company sample (N=783)**

Company size	Mean number of locations	42
	Standard deviation	49
Headquarter location	% Headquarter in US	60
	% Headquarter in EU*	17
Overall location change	Expand	+84,557
	Contract	-46,630
Location change from year to year	Mean	1.73
	Standard deviation	23.29
<i>Note:</i> *EU member states in ca. 2014, i.e. prior to Brexit. <i>Source:</i> Authors.		

making, but they are prestigious in the straightforward sense that they have been chosen over other cities as sites of production in the world economy.

In addition to outdegree, closeness, betweenness, and indegree—the network centrality measures employed in the research by Alderson and colleagues discussed above—we also examine Neal’s (2011) measure of recursive power and centrality. Neal argues that the classic Freeman (1979) centrality measures used in earlier work are imperfect measures of power, which he suggests requires asymmetric exchange. In this sense, a powerful city is one that is itself central, but connected to isolated others. He defines recursive power as:

$$RP_i = \sum_j \frac{R_{ij}}{DC_j} \quad (1)$$

where  $R_{ij}$  is the strength of connection between city  $i$  and  $j$  and  $DC_j$  the degree centrality of node  $j$ . For example, a city whose connections to its three neighbors represent the entirety of each of the neighbors’ connections has a recursive power score of three. Recursive centrality is similar to eigenvector centrality in that nodes become central when they are connected to central others:

$$RC_i = \sum_j R_{ij} \times DC_j \quad (2)$$

Notice that this measure leads to extremely large values for members of ‘rich clubs’ i.e., central cities connected to other central cities. We thus extend earlier analyses to consider recursive power (1) and recursive centrality (2).

As mentioned above, the final network connects 7,530 cities. We use the *Atlas of the Human Planet’s Functional Urban Areas* (FUA; Schiavina et al., 2019a) data to aggregate the roughly 17,400 unique locations from the Corporate Affiliations

**Table 2: Cities in the network by region and world-system position**

		N	Population, log10	SD
Overall		7530	3.91*	1.33
Region	North America	3378	3.51	1.03
	Europe & Central Asia	2892	3.99	1.18
	East Asia & Pacific	655	4.76	1.68
	Latin America & Caribbean	332	4.88	1.61
	Sub-Saharan Africa	115	5.27	1.47
	Middle East & North Africa	80	5.34	1.92
	South Asia	78	5.51	1.13
World-system position	Core	5774	3.69	1.12
	Semi-Periphery	962	4.97	1.51
	Periphery	794	4.44	1.55
<i>Note:</i> * Mean. <i>Source:</i> Authors.				

database. The *Atlas of the Human Planet* sets city limits worldwide and distinguishes multiple types of settlement. For example, urban centers have at least 50,000 inhabitants and a density of 1,500 inhabitants per square kilometer of land or at least 50% built-up. FUAs start with urban cores and extend them to commuter areas. For example, Chicago's urban core extends from Highland Park in the North, to Naperville and Aurora in the West, and Gary (IN) in the South East. Its FUA includes the neighboring urban cores of Crystal Lake, Elgin, St. Charles and Joliet as well as surrounding towns, suburbs, and villages such as Vernon Hills in the North, Leland in the West, and Valparaiso in the South East. For company locations outside of FUAs we use smaller settlements from the Settlement Model Grid data (Pesaresi et al., 2019), which we enhanced with 2015 population estimates (Schiavina et al., 2019b). In cases where no contiguous area existed, a 1x1 km grid cell counts as the relevant city limit. To tidy up the data, create the network, and aggregate cities into FUAs, we used *Python 3* (Van Rossum & Drake, 2009). The linear mixed models (described below) and figures were produced in the R statistics language (R Core Team, 2021).

Table 2 summarizes city size by region and world system position. As one can note, there are large differences in the number of cities that each world region (defined below) contributes to the world city network. For example, 83% of the cities in our data are located in North America and Europe & Central Asia. In contrast, just 2% of the cities in our data are located in the Middle East & North Africa and South Asia. There are also large differences in the average size (population) of cities



in different regions. The average city in the network of cities we examine has around 8,100 inhabitants ( $= 10^{3.91}$ ). Cities in North America and Europe & Central Asia are quite small by comparison to cities in other world regions, by an order of magnitude or more (i.e., greater than a one-unit difference in the  $\log_{10}$  of population). For instance, the average population of cities in these two world regions (around 5,400 inhabitants) is much smaller the average population of cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East & North Africa, and South Asia (around 228,000 inhabitants). One can also note that there are differences in the number of cities that each world-system position (defined below) contributes to the world city network (i.e., 74% of cities in our data are located in core countries) and cities in the core are on average much smaller (around 4,900 inhabitants) compared to cities in the semi-periphery and periphery (around 54,000 inhabitants). The probability that cities in different world regions and world-system positions appear in our data is thus heavily shaped by population. To account for the fact that the size threshold for inclusion in the system is so much larger for cities outside of the Global North, we adjust for population in all models estimated below.

Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we relate scores on centrality measures between different years to determine how well city rankings can be predicted from prior years. Going back to Friedmann's sense of an 'inherent instability' in the system, we ask, for instance, how well does a city's ranking on indegree in 1993 predict its ranking in 2020? Second, we consider the trend in inequality in each measure. Behind the year-to-year churn in the larger network, Friedmann and Sassen expect that inequality will tend to grow over time, as already powerful cities grow even more powerful. We examine this in terms of change in the coefficient of variation (COV) over the 28-year period under investigation. Third—in the centerpiece of our analysis—we examine the extent to which change in power and prestige in the world city system cuts across the world-system position of the countries in which cities were located moving into the current round of globalization (i.e., core, semi-periphery, or periphery) and the world region in which they are located, looking, for instance, for the "rise of Asia" over time.

Our measure of world-system position reflects the structure of the world-system as it existed in first few decades of the post-WWII period (Snyder and Kick, 1979; Bollen and Appold, 1993).<sup>5</sup> There have of course been major shifts in the configuration of national economic power since that time and, in this sense, our search for "new geographies" is conservative as we look for evidence of a "new" map in

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5 Snyder and Kick's (1979) definition of core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral societies in the world-system is derived from the structural equivalence blockmodeling of four relations: trade (between 1963 and 1967), military interventions (between 1948 and 1967), diplomatic relations (circa 1963 or 1964), and treaties (in effect during the 1946–1965 period). Bollen (1983) and Bollen and Appold (1993) later reclassified a small subset of cases, and we employ their revised classification.

reference to an “old” map defined by US hegemony and the global power of the U.S. and Western Europe after WWII. For world region, we rely on the World Bank’s division of the world into seven geographic regions: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. To describe change over time, we estimate mixed effects models with fixed effects for year and random effects for city. This takes the general form:

$$\text{Centrality}_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log_{10}(\text{Population})_j + \beta_2 \text{Year}_2 + \dots + \beta_i \text{Year}_i + \beta_3 \text{WSP/Region}_2 + \dots + \beta_i \text{WSP/Region}_k + \beta_4 (\text{Year} * \text{WSP/Region}_k) + u_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where  $i = 1, \dots, 28$  years,  $j = 1, \dots, 7530$  cities, and  $k = 1, \dots, 3$  world-system positions or  $1, \dots, 7$  world regions. We thus regress city centrality measured in 210,840 city-years on population,  $i-1$  year indicators,  $k-1$  world-system position or world region indicators, and the interaction of year and world-system position/region, specifying a random intercept for each city,  $u_j$ . In this fashion we can accurately describe change in the average centrality of cities in each world-system position/region over the 1993–2020 period.


## Results

### How extensively has the global urban hierarchy been altered since 1993?

How stable is the global urban hierarchy in the current era? To answer this question, we calculate the mean spearman rank-order correlation between city centralities at different lags (i.e., 1-year through the maximum of 27-year). Figure 4 shows the mean spearman correlations ( $\bar{\rho}$ ) at increasing lags between years. Given a particular lag—say  $t = 5$  years— $\bar{\rho}$  describes how much an earlier year’s ranking correlates with that ranking 5 years later. We use the mean spearman correlation for all combination of years that satisfy a particular lag  $t$ . For example, at a 1-year lag we average over all spearman correlations between subsequent years (i.e., the average of the spearman correlations of 1993 and 1994, 1994 and 1995, through to the spearman correlation between 2019 and 2020).

As one might expect, short lags allow for high predictability (e.g., a city’s ranking at  $t-1$  is highly correlated with its ranking at  $t$ ). However, this predictability quickly attenuates for most measures of centrality. Closeness, Indegree, Recursive Power, and Recursive Centrality all start with high mean spearman correlations at the shortest lag ( $\bar{\rho} = 0.92$ ) but fall off quickly. After just 10 years, our ability to use one ranking (e.g., from 1995) to predict the ranking 10-years later (2005) is seriously impaired, with an average spearman correlation of just 0.5. This attenuation moderates but does not plateau or reverse over the sample range. At the maximum gap of 27 years, which

Figure 4: Predictability of rank in the world city system: Spearman rank-order correlation between measures of centrality at different lags




Source: Authors.

is simply the correlation between 1993 and 2020, the average correlation between a city's rank in 1993 and in 2020 falls to around  $\bar{\rho} = 0.3$ . Note that, given our focus on a constant set of firms, the extent of change in outdegree is constrained in a way that change in other measures is not. While cities that host headquarters can send more or less ties over time—potentially generating unpredictability in outdegree at different lags—cities that do *not* host headquarters at  $t$ —the vast majority in our sample—can only send ties at  $t + 1, \dots, n$  if a firm in the sample relocates its headquarters to that city at some point in the period under study. Less than 6% of the firms in our sample relocate headquarters to a city that previously sent no ties, thus the greater predictability of outdegree relative to other measures in Figure 4 is a function of the fact that most cities in most years send no ties to others (i.e., have zero outdegree).

These results support and reinforce earlier results from Alderson et al. (2010), indicating that the world-city system is experiencing substantial restructuring. Spearman correlations of 0.3 to 0.5 indicate a fluid hierarchy, where cities rise and fall within a few decades. However, we should also note that Outdegree and Betweenness show more stability than the other centrality measures. While the stability of outdegree is attributable to our analytic strategy of using a constant set

Figure 5: Inequality in the world city system: Trend in the coefficient of variation (COV) of each measure of centrality, 1993–2020



Source: Authors.

of firms—firms which rarely change headquarter locations—the reasons for the relative stability of betweenness are not obvious. Compared to the four centrality measures discussed above, its mean spearman correlation falls off less sharply and ends up at around  $\bar{\rho} = 0.6$ . This suggests that the shortest paths traverse some of the same cities in 2020 as was the case in 1993. Nonetheless, its relative stability should not distract from the fact that  $\bar{\rho} = 0.6$  is also consistent with the idea of a fluid hierarchy or a system in the midst of restructuring.

### Have power and prestige grown more concentrated since 1993?

A related question regarding the dynamics of the world-city system is whether inequality in power and prestige is growing over time. As mentioned above, Friedmann and Sassen, argue that power is growing more concentrated, concentrated in the world/global cities. The empirical evidence on this question to date is mixed. Using air traffic data, Mahutga et al. (2010) find that degree inequality slightly dropped in later years (i.e., a convergence of degrees). In contrast, Alderson et al.'s studies found the opposite: rising inequality in most measures of centrality they examined.


One possibility that Mahutga et al. (2010) suggest, is that their findings are driven by tourist rather than business traffic (i.e., when tourists explore far-off destinations as travel becomes cheaper, degree inequality may decrease even though business relations grow more unequal).

Figure 5 displays the trend in the coefficient of variation of each measure of centrality. The coefficient of variation (COV) is calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, thus smaller values indicate less dispersion. The COV has, for instance, regularly been used as a measure of inequality in studies of cross-national convergence (i.e., of whether the distribution of GDP across societies is more equal over time). Writ large, the results are quite interesting, suggesting either relative stability (betweenness) or declines in inequality (recursive centrality, indegree, and closeness) between 1993 and 2020 by most measures. Outdegree and recursive power, in contrast, are more unequally distributed by 2020 than it in 1993, but not dramatically so. Also, one can note that there are local peaks in the COV between 2002–2004 and in 2013 for outdegree, betweenness, and recursive power (which moderate in the years that directly follow). These peaks follow closely on the heels of the company expansion patterns discussed above (Figure 2), a 2002 peak in location change largely attributable to US-based HRCs expanding within the US and a 2011–2012 peak in location change driven by the international expansion of US, Japanese, German, and French firms. The general picture that emerges is one of pronounced, yet stable, levels of inequality in the distribution of power and prestige in the world city system.

### **Is the world city system evolving to cut across earlier patterns of global inequality?**

As the previous two sections show, there is considerable change in the world-city system and high inequality persists over time. The main question of this chapter whether these trends coincide with the emergence of “new geographies of centrality” that are growing orthogonal to traditional global divides. As mentioned previously, we use linear mixed models to describe the average city centrality trends by world system position and region. Figures 6 and 7 summarize these results. We begin with the trends by world system position, which describe the “old geography of centrality” by joining cities to the world-system position of the countries in which they were located in the immediate post-war period. Following Friedmann and Sassen, we would expect that city centrality would be more structured by world-system position in 1993 than in later years. For example, if world/global cities are emerging in semi-peripheral and peripheral countries, the gap between core and non-core will shrink over time. Alternatively, if the average difference in the centrality of cities located in core countries and in non-core countries is stable, or even growing over time, we would conclude that the “new geographies of centrality” described by Friedmann and Sassen are largely reproductions of the “old.”

**Figure 6: Linear predictions from the regression of city centrality on world-system position**



Source: Authors.

Figure 6 presents the results of the mixed effects regressions of the six centrality measures on world-system position. Estimates for the average city located in a core country in a given year are in green, in blue for cities located in semi-peripheral countries, and red for cities of the periphery. To illustrate their interpretation: the estimates for outdegree in 1993 (upper-left panel of Figure 6) mean that, on average, cities located core countries sent about 10 more ties to other cities than cities in the semi-periphery and about 15 more ties than the average peripheral city. Likewise, cities located in semi-peripheral countries sent about 5 more ties to other cities than cities in the periphery. The results for outdegree, betweenness, and recursive power lend no support to the idea that the distribution of power in the world city system

is evolving in a way that cuts across the political-economic order of the immediate post-war period. The average difference in betweenness between cities located in the three zones is basically stable, with core cities notably more between than semi-peripheral or peripheral cities. Results for outdegree and recursive power indicate a widening of the core/semi-periphery, as well as the core/periphery, gap as core cities grew even more powerful in these terms after 2010.<sup>6</sup> To be clear, the increase in outdegree is a function of the company expansion during these years, but the increase in recursive power further indicates that central cities are sending ties to less central or even previously isolated cities.

The picture is complicated, however, by findings for the other three centrality measures. There is a pronounced gap between core, semi-periphery, and periphery in terms of closeness in 1993, but all three regions begin to converge in a very pronounced fashion after 2010. By 2020, the average city located in a peripheral country is no more distant from others in the network than is the average city located in a core country. Regarding recursive centrality, where cities gain in centrality when they connect to central others, the gap between semi-periphery and core shrinks after 2010, while the distances between periphery and both other zones increase. Finally, results for indegree—our measure of prestige—indicates convergence over time. In 1993, the average core city received about five more ties from other cities in the network than did the average semi-peripheral city, and about 10 more ties than the average city located in a peripheral country. By 2020, the prestige of both non-core regions, especially the semi-periphery, had increased relative to that of the core, and the average city located in a peripheral country received about 8 less ties from other cities than the average core city.


Overall, our findings for city centrality by world-system position are mixed. The most convincing evidence for “new geographies of centrality” come from closeness, which shows full convergence of all three zones and indegree, which takes all edge strength into account, and still finds a small convergence between core and semi-periphery. However, many of the control functions of the world-city system, as measured by Outdegree, Betweenness, and Recursive Power, remain in cities located in core nations, where some cities even consolidate their power over time.

Figure 7 presents the results of the mixed effects regressions of the six centrality measures on world region. To illustrate their interpretation: the estimates for outdegree in 1993 (upper-left panel of Figure 7) mean that, on average, cities located North America (colored dark green) sent about 20 more ties to other cities than cities in

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6 The linear predictions for peripheral cities are negative on some measures because our sample data includes many very large peripheral cities with minimal network power, while comparably small cities located in core countries—such as Stockholm—are very central to the world city network. While the adjustment in the model for population affects the estimates in this fashion, it does not affect the overall dynamics of the estimated trends (e.g., the divergence of cities located core countries from the non-core on outdegree is pronounced whether or not we adjust for population).

Figure 7: Linear predictions from the regression of city centrality on world region



Source: Authors.

Sub-Saharan Africa (light green), South Asia (brown) or the Middle East & North Africa (pink). Likewise, cities located in Europe & Central Asia sent about 15 more ties on average to other cities than cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, or the Middle East & North Africa.

In this part of the analysis, we expect that two regions—North America and Europe & Central Asia—will remain the most central by the range of measures we consider. However, other regions, especially East Asia & Pacific might be expected to converge on the West, especially given China’s integration into the world economy over the period under study. An even deeper global restructuring—a world in which place truly “no longer matters”—would be evidenced in the convergence of regions such Latin America & Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The theoretical implications of our results are broadly similar to what we observed with world-system position, with the important exception of the East Asia



& Pacific region. In terms of outdegree, betweenness, and recursive power, cities located in North America and Europe & Central Asia were more powerful than cities in other world regions in 1993, and they were more powerful than cities in other world regions in 2020. Indeed, we effectively see no estimated change in these measures in the Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin American & Caribbean, or South Asia across the entire period under investigation. The experience of East Asia & Pacific is a notable exception. Relative to 1993, cities in this region had, on average, converged on North America and Europe & Central Asia. This is most pronounced in the case of outdegree, where, by 2020, cities in the East Asia & Pacific region were sending more ties (i.e., had slightly higher average outdegree) to other cities in the system than cities in the Europe and Central Asia region.<sup>7</sup> For recursive power, the East Asia & Pacific region makes gains after 2010, but they are roughly similar to the gains made by Europe & Central Asia during the same period. That is, both regions converge somewhat on North America, but overall cities in all regions are arrayed the same in 2020 as they were in 1993.

The picture is again complicated by our results for the other three centrality measures. In terms of closeness, we see the same convergence as in world-system position, where cities located in all regions grow more proximate to one another on average and, by 2020, for example, the estimated gap in closeness between cities in Europe & Central Asia and South Asia had closed by around 50%. One of the strongest patterns in all plots can be seen in recursive centrality, where the East Asia & Pacific region sees a steep incline in 2010 and 2019 that is unparalleled by any other region, and which catapults it from third place in earlier years to the unrivaled pole position at the end of the time span. Here, the comparison to recursive power is insightful: cities from the East Asia & Pacific region most likely forged new connections with highly connected cities which increases their recursive centrality but not their recursive power. Finally, turning to the results for indegree, we find evidence of a general convergence in terms of prestige: where the average city located in North America received about 15 more ties than the average city in South Asia or Middle East & North Africa in 1993, North American cities received only about 10 more ties than cities in South Asia or the Middle East & North Africa by 2020. There is also notable evidence of a reshuffling of the global regional prestige order. By 2020, cities in the East Asia & Pacific region were receiving more ties than cities in North America or Europe & Central Asia, and cities in South Asia and the Middle East & North Africa had grown more prestigious relative to cities in Sub-Saharan Africa by that time as well.

Summing up, the development of city centrality by region documents the rise of the East Asia & Pacific region, which makes moderate gains in power and extreme

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7 How is it possible that the East Asia & Pacific region converges on North America and Europe in terms of outdegree while no such trend is observable by world-system position? This is driven by the activities of firms located in core countries in the region, especially Japanese companies that have increasingly globalized operations.

gains in prestige. In this regard, we can see clear evidence of an emerging new geography of inequality, but it should also be noted that changes in the other world regions are more modest. Cities in North America and Europe & Central Asia remain central to the world city system, and regions like Latin America & Caribbean, which had the potential to cut across old divides are effectively “stuck in place.”

## Conclusions

In this chapter, we investigated if and how the global urban hierarchy has changed since 1993. Leading theorists of the world city system such as Friedmann and Sassen describe a dynamic inter-city system with the potential for cities to cut across traditional divides. And indeed, we find that the world-city system is undergoing major change. Overall, we see a substantial “reshuffling of the deck,” where the rank of a city in 1993 on most measures of centrality is not highly correlated with its rank three decades later. Friedmann and Sassen also expect inequality to increase as power is further concentrated in the world or global cities as the world city system develops. Here, the evidence is more equivocal: While inequality in the distribution of centrality is high by many measures, such inequality measurably increased only in the distribution of outdegree and recursive power. Inequality in other measures of power—recursive centrality and closeness—declined over the period, as did inequality in prestige as measured by indegree.

On the central question of this chapter, whether the development of the world city system reflects the emergence of “new geographies of inequality,” the evidence is also mixed, but, overall, the “new” reflects the “old” quite closely. We conducted what we view as a conservative test in which we regress the centrality of cities in the current era on the world-system position of the countries in which they were located more than a half century earlier. We find that on half of our measures—those which arguably most directly reflect the capture of decision-making functions in the world economy (outdegree, betweenness, and recursive power), 2020 differed only from 1993 in that cities located in core societies were sending more ties and had more recursive power by the end of the period than they did entering into it. While the world has grown “closer,” with core, semi-periphery, and periphery practically indistinguishable at the end of the period, gains in closeness may be especially easy to achieve. Watts and Strogatz (1998) small world model shows that shortest path distances decline much faster than expected when nodes are randomly rewired. In the world city system, assuming that local subgraphs are already connected to local clusters, a single long-distance connection can decrease the distance between many cities. Convergence in other senses of centrality is more difficult to obtain. In this light, the convergence between core and semi-periphery on prestige is also notable. However, as the results of our analysis of region indicate, this convergence is largely attributable to the rise of the East Asia & Pacific region. Regarding region itself, the most remarkable—if anticipated—finding is the convergence of the East Asia

& Pacific region. For much of the rest of the world—Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin American & Caribbean, and South Asia—regional inequalities in the world city system are at least as pronounced by 2020 as they were in 1993, with the exception that the geodesic distance between cities in all regions has declined (i.e., rising closeness).

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# The Globalization of Production and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Capitalist Democracies: Retrenchment and Convergence Revisited

Anthony J. Roberts and Matthew C. Mahutga

The impact of globalization on the retrenchment of corporatist industrial relations and convergence toward neoliberal capital-labor relations in advanced capitalist democracies remains heavily debated. However, few studies empirically investigate the long-run and isomorphic effects of globalization on industrial relations and whether the configuration of national institutions condition these effects. Accordingly, we examine the effects of globalization on wage bargaining in a panel sample of 22 advanced capitalist countries from 1965 to 2015. We find the degree of corporatist wage bargaining is declining across advanced capitalist countries and wage bargaining systems are converging. However, the rate of convergence varies across the *Varieties of Capitalism* among advanced capitalist countries. Most importantly, we find the rate of convergence is conditioned by the globalization of production and these conditional effects are amplified in liberal market economies compared to coordinated and mixed market economies. Therefore, persisting diversity in industrial relations *between* the *Varieties of Capitalism* is in part a function of the larger isomorphic effects of globalization on wage bargaining *within* liberal market economies.

## Introduction

Over the last three decades, the persistence of cross-national diversity in industrial relations across advanced capitalist countries during a period of intensive globalization remains one of the more contested issues in the international and comparative political economy literatures (e.g. Lash and Urry, 1987; Kenworthy, 1997; Howell, 2003; Glyn, 2006; Streeck, 2010; Thelen, 2014; Baccaro and Howell, 2017). At the center of this ongoing debate is the question of whether the globalization of production induced the retrenchment of corporatist industrial relations and a cross-national convergence toward a neoliberal model of industrial relations in advanced capitalist countries. Some argue the globalization of production empowered firms

to exit long-standing patterns of cooperation and coordination with labor organizations to promote greater labor market flexibility and lower wage rates for international competitiveness in manufacturing (Hay, 2008; also see Baccaro and Howell, 2011; Simmons et al., 2008; Kapstein, 1996; Katz and Darbishire, 2002; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Reich, 1991; Sassen, 1996). However, others contend the path dependent nature of national institutions minimized the isomorphic pressures of globalization and, in fact, produced greater cross-national diversity in industrial relations with institutional experimentation (Campbell, 2004; Kristensen and Morgan, 2012; Iversen and Soskice, 2009; Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Martin and Swank, 2012).

A key distinction in the industrial relation systems of advanced capitalist countries is corporatist wage bargaining—the degree to which wage rates are negotiated by powerful corporate groups representing the interests of labor, business, and the government (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988, 13–15; Molina and Rhodes, 2002). At one extreme are decentralized and fragmented wage bargaining systems where rates are primarily negotiated between individual firms and employees as seen in countries like the United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand. At the other extreme are highly centralized and institutionalized wage bargaining systems defined by negotiations between powerful national trade union confederations and employer federations over formal wage agreements at the industry- or sector-level in direct consultation with government agencies as seen in Nordic countries. The present study systematically examining whether the globalization of production induced a transition and convergence toward decentralized and market coordinated wage bargaining across advanced capitalist countries since the 1960s.

Accordingly, this study makes three important contributions to the extant literatures on the global and comparative political economy of industrial relations. First, the present study offers a new theoretical perspective on the effects of globalization on industrial relations. The debate over the effects of globalization on industrial relations is potentially resolved by drawing attention to the canonical distinction between liberal (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME) from the Varieties of Capitalist (VoC) perspective (Hall and Soskice, 2001). We contend LMEs should be more susceptible to the competitive and isomorphic effects of globalization because of the high degree of market coordination between capital and labor in these economies.

Second, we fill an empirical gap in the extant literature by conducting a systematic and comparative analysis of the effect of globalization on corporatist-wage setting in advanced capitalist countries. Despite an expansive literature on the effect of economic globalization on labor standards in less-developed countries (Mosely, 2011; Neumayer and de Soysa, 2006), tax rates (Oates, 2001; Campbell, 2004; Swank and Steinmo, 2002) and welfare spending in more affluent countries (Brady, et al., 2005; Schmitt and Starke, 2011; Navarro et al., 2004), few studies systematically examine how the globalization of production affects corporatist industrial relations in

advanced capitalist countries (Traxler et al., 2001; Mills et al., 2008; McBride and Williams, 2001). This type of analysis is needed in the empirical literature given the longstanding debate over the effect of globalization on industrial relations in advanced capitalist countries.


Third, we contribute to the empirical literature by utilizing a methodological framework to simultaneously estimate the effect of globalization on the degree of corporatist wage-setting in countries and the rate of the convergence in wage-setting across countries (Plumper and Schneider, 2009; Schmitt and Starke, 2011). Additionally, this methodology provides the ability to detect *club convergence* to determine whether LMEs and CMEs converge at differing rates and whether this convergence is induced by global and/or national forces. Accordingly, we empirically evaluate both the long-run and isomorphic effects of global production on corporatist wage-setting in 22 advanced capitalist countries from 1965 to 2015. The results show indicators of global production are associated with the further retrenchment and convergence in wage bargaining among LMEs while shifts in union density and leftist party strength account for the decline of corporatist wage bargaining and convergence among CMEs.

## **The Decline of Corporatist Wage Bargaining in Advanced Capitalist Countries**

Corporatist industrial relations refers to the continuous and structured participation of major interest groups (e.g. employer associations, unions, and government agencies) in developing and implementing labor policies and setting wage rates (Schmitter, 1974; Williamson, 1985). In classifying national industrial relation systems, it is useful to think of corporatism as a continuum (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991; Crouch, 1983; Martin, 1983). On one end of the continuum is liberal and market-oriented pluralism where interest groups are directly engaged in market competition with little to no government involvement in negotiations over standards and wages. Industrial relations in the United States are a prime example of this end of the corporatist continuum. On the other end of the continuum is regulated and institutionalized corporatism where interest groups actively negotiate policy, standards, and wage rates with state agencies acting as a mediator in these negotiations. Industrial relations in Nordic countries are a prime example of the highest end of the continuum. Based on this conceptualization, the degree of corporatism in industrial relations is primarily determined by the involvement of the state; the asymmetry in bargaining power between interest groups; and reforms of formal employer and union groups (Molina and Rhodes, 2002, 316–318). In studying wage bargaining, we utilize this conceptualization to understand changes in the degree of corporatism in wage-setting among interest groups in advanced capitalist countries.



**Figure 1: Locally weighted trend in corporatist wage-setting in 22 OECD countries, 1960–2015**



Data source: Visser (2020).

Drawing from the basic framework of corporatism, we measure the degree to which wages are determined by *economic tripartite corporatism*—an institutionalized social partnership between the interests of capital and labor where collective bargaining at the industry-, sector-, or national-level occurs between these interest groups and is mediated by the government. Specifically, we construct an index of corporatist wage setting based on three indicators: (1) the level of wage bargaining; (2) the degree of wage coordination; and (3) the role of the government in wage bargaining. This index provides a useful metric for identifying wage bargaining in advanced capitalist economies along the corporatist continuum.<sup>1</sup>

Figure 1 shows the locally weighted trend of average corporatist wage bargaining in 22 advanced capitalist countries over the last five decades. The degree of corporatist wage bargaining initially expanded between 1960 and 1980 with the con-

<sup>1</sup> Prior studies have developed similar indices for measuring corporatism in industrial relations (e.g. Jahn, 2016). Our index of *corporatist wage bargaining* shows a high consistency with other corporatist measures.

solidation of the post-war capital-labor accord in advanced economies. However, this trend reversed in the post-1980 era with the collapse of the post-war capital-labor accord. As a result, the degree of corporatist wage bargaining precipitously declined between the mid-1980s and 2015. This trend calls into question the endurance of corporatist wage-setting especially in context of intensifying globalization and the enactment of neoliberal reforms in advanced capitalist countries (Grahl and Teague, 1997; Baccaro and Howell, 2011; 2017; Hassel, 1999). However, this *average* trend in Figure 1 obfuscates substantial cross-national variation in wage bargaining between advanced capitalist countries. For example, while the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries certainly experienced a breakdown in the post-war capital-labor accord (Nilsson, 1996), the persistence of coordinated wage bargaining and shared governance institutions, as well as the establishment of new social pacts during the 1980s, points toward the continuation of corporatist industrial relations and wage bargaining in the political economy of Nordic and Continental Europe.


Table 1 accounts for this cross-national heterogeneity in corporatist wage bargaining by showing the periodic scores of the three dimensions of wage bargaining for advanced capitalist countries in 1975 and 2010. On average, scoring across all three dimensions declined among advanced capitalist economies over this period. However, the rate of decline substantially varied across countries. Here, we differentiate between two ideal types based on the VoC perspective: liberal market and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Liberal market economies (LME) are primarily defined by market coordinated relations between economic actors. In contrast, coordinated market economies (CME) are primarily defined by a reliance on formal institutions to regulate and coordinate relations between economic actors. According to Table 1, wage bargaining in LMEs uniformly became increasingly fragmented and decentralized with decreasing involvement from government agencies. On average in LMEs, wage bargaining occurs at the establishment-level which is not patterned across other establishments or industries and the government is not involved in setting wage rates.

In contrast, CME and mixed economies exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity in the level of bargaining, degree of wage coordination, and government involvement. On average in CMEs and mixed economies, wage bargaining occurs at industry- or sectoral-level which is patterned across other sectors and industries and wage rates are set with consultation from government agencies. However, despite the general persistence of corporatist wage-setting in CMEs and mixed economies, we find a noticeable decline in each dimension for most CMEs and mixed economies. Therefore, while Table 1 suggests a general decline in corporatist wage bargaining, the pattern is more pronounced among LMEs. This raises the general question of what is driving this market-oriented reform of wage bargaining in advanced capitalist countries.

**Table 1: Institutional dimensions of corporatist wage-setting, 1975–2010**

	Bargaining level			Wage coordination			Government involvement		
	1975	2010	Δ	1975	2010	Δ	1975	2010	Δ
<b>Overall mean</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>-0.7</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>-0.6</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>-0.6</b>
<b>Liberal Market Economies</b>									
Australia	3	2	-1	3	2	-1	3	2	-1
Canada	2	1	-1	1	1	0	1	1	0
Ireland	4	1	-3	4	1	-3	1	1	0
New Zealand	4	1	-3	5	1	-4	5	1	-4
United Kingdom	4	1	-3	4	1	-3	4	1	-3
United States	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	1	-1
<b>LME mean</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>-1.8</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>-1.8</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>-1.5</b>
<b>Coordinated &amp; Mixed Market Economies</b>									
Austria	4	3	-1	5	4	-1	2	2	0
Belgium	4	5	1	4	5	1	2	5	3
Denmark	3	3	0	5	4	-1	3	2	-1
Finland	4	3	-1	4	3	-1	4	3	-1
France	2	3	1	2	2	0	3	3	0
Germany	3	3	0	4	4	0	2	1	-1
Greece	5	5	0	3	3	0	5	3	-2
Italy	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1
Japan	1	1	0	4	4	0	1	1	0
Luxembourg	2	2	0	2	4	2	3	3	0
Netherlands	4	3	-1	3	4	1	3	3	0
Norway	4	3	-1	5	4	-1	4	2	-2
Portugal	3	3	0	2	2	0	3	3	0
Spain	5	3	-2	4	3	-1	4	3	-1
Sweden	5	3	-2	5	4	-1	2	1	-1
Switzerland	3	3	0	4	3	-1	1	1	0
<b>CME mean</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>-0.3</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>-0.4</b>
<p><i>Notes:</i> Bargaining level (1=local or company level; 2=sectoral or industry with local or company; 3=sectoral or industry; 4=national or central with additional sectoral/industry; 5=national or central level). Wage coordination (1=fragmented bargaining; 2=mixed industry and firm-level; 3=industry bargaining with no pattern; 4=mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining with pattern; 5=economy-wide bargaining). Government involvement (1= no involvement; 2=government is involved through consultation and information exchange; 3=indirect government involvement through policy; 4=direct government in wage bargaining; 5=government imposes private sector wage settlements). LME = Liberal market economy; CME = Coordinated market economy. <i>Data source:</i> Visser (2020).</p>									

**Figure 2: Locally weighted time trends in Southern manufacturing imports and outward foreign direct investment in 22 OECD countries, 1960–2015**



*Data source:* Comparative Welfare States Dataset (2020)..

## Globalization and Corporatist Wage Bargaining

Figure 2 shows the intensification of global production based on average trends in manufacturing imports from the Global South and outward foreign direct investment (FDI). According to Figure 2, the locally weighted average in manufacturing imports and outward FDI in 22 advanced economies dramatically increased from 1970 to 2015. The average values of manufacturing imports and outward FDI flow were less than 1 percent of total gross domestic product in 1970. However, by 2015, the average values of manufacturing imports and outward FDI flow were over 10 percent of total gross domestic product. This exponential growth in manufacturing imports and outward FDI signify an abrupt transition toward globalized manufacturing.

Debate over the role of globalization in the transformation of wage bargaining in advanced capitalist countries persists in the international and comparative political

economy literatures. On one hand, skeptics of the neoliberal transformation of wage bargaining contend national institutions are *path dependent* and change is driven primarily by endogenous shifts in the alignment of interests amongst national actors (Martin and Swank, 2012; Martin and Ross, 1999; Thelen, 2012, 2014). More specifically, national institutions provide economic actors with formal and informal prescriptions, resources, cognitive frames, and policy scripts which are independent of global economic forces (Steinmo et al., 1992; Pierson, 2004). Thus, actors in national institutions ameliorate competitive pressures arising from globalization by experimenting within the bounded structure of these institutions (Kristensen and Morgan, 2012; Scruggs and Lange, 2002; Campbell, 2004; Swank, 1998; Stopford, 1997). Instead, institutional changes are primarily dictated by national politics and the realignment of local interests so that responses to global competitive pressures are as diverse as institutional arrangements across countries (Pierson, 2004; Hall and Thelen, 2009; Thelen, 2012, 2014).

Consistent with this skeptical view, evidence for effect of globalization on national economic institutions is somewhat inconclusive. For example, Campbell (2004) shows tax structures are largely unaffected by globalization. Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser (2005) finds economic globalization has no consistent effect on the level and trajectory of welfare spending, which is also supported by previous studies on the welfare state (Fligstein, 2001; Atkinson, 2002; Kittel and Winner, 2005). And Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel (2001) show globalization has little observable effect on corporatist wage bargaining. In fact, Mills and collaborators (2008) show a stability in wage coordination across advanced capitalist countries, but notes “there was a hint of convergence in social-democratic regimes over time, with a slight erosion since the 1980s” (586). Based on inconclusive evidence in the empirical literature and the persisting skepticism over the impact of globalization on national institutions in advanced capitalist countries, we may expect the following:

H0: The globalization of production is not associated with corporatist wage bargaining in advanced capitalist countries.

Other scholars contend the neoliberal transformation of wage bargaining began with the globalization of production in the 1980s where states enacted liberal policies to ease to the competitive pressures faced by domestic manufacturing firms (Simmons et al., 2008). In context of wage bargaining, the global mobility of capital empowered employers with a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis labor by fragmenting the internal labor forces and making it increasingly difficult for labor to organize itself in the production process (Ietto-Gillies, 1992; Kapstein, 1996; Katz and Darbishire, 2002; Alderson, 1999; 2004). And since firms in advanced capitalist countries are increasingly occupying lead positions in global production networks (GPN), they able to offshore and outsource production to circumvent organized labor in instituting neoliberal reforms to wage-setting. As a result of the global mobil-

ity of capital and the integration of firms into GPNs advanced capitalist economies experience significant de-industrialization, which further undermined the bargaining power of organized labor (Alderson, 1999; Kollmeyer, 2009; Western, 1995; Lee, 2005). This growing asymmetry of bargaining power between capital and labor facilitated the liberalization of labor markets in advanced capitalist countries.

In short, the globalization of production may have re-aligned the interests and incentives of leading manufacturing firms and governments in advanced capitalist countries toward flexible labor markets where wage rates are dictated by global market forces instead of institutionalized bargaining between capital and labor. From this perspective, corporatist wage bargaining is reframed as an “institutional rigidity” which weakens the competitive position of national firms in advanced economies by increasing their relative labor costs and constraining managerial prerogative (Blau and Kahn, 2002). At the same time, organized labor has been unable to effectively resist the ongoing erosion of corporatist wage-setting institutions given its declining power in national economies and politics (Harvey, 2005; Sassen, 1996; Standing, 1999). Therefore, the globalization of production may have induced both Northern states and firms to dismantle institutional rigidities in labor markets while also undermining the ability of organized labor to resist these changes (Howell, 2003; Glyn, 2006; Streeck, 2010). Accordingly, we may expect the following:

H1: The globalization of production is negatively associated with corporatist wage bargaining in advanced capitalist countries.

### **A cross-national convergence in wage bargaining?**

A key point of contention is whether the competitive pressures of global manufacturing induced a cross-national convergence in wage bargaining among advanced capitalist countries. Specifically, whether global economic competition between manufacturing firms in the Global North and South induced a convergence toward decentralized and fragmented wage bargaining. Flexible labor regimes in less-developed countries provide a cost advantage to Southern firms, which incentivizes Northern firms to push for flexibility in their local labor markets (Kapstein, 1996; Katz and Darbishire, 2002; Standing, 1999). As a result, the integration of Southern firms into global production networks may push Northern firms to advocate for neoliberal reforms in wage-setting and alter production strategies for global competition. Additionally, employment and income challenges attributed to industrial offshoring and outsourcing sensitize national governments to concerns over the rigidity and performance of local labor markets in advanced capitalist countries. This realignment of state and firm interests toward flexible labor markets at home should facilitate a disengagement from corporatist wage-setting and the adoption of decentralized and fragmented wage bargaining. At the same time, the globalization of production erodes the bargaining power of labor in the Global North and its abil-

ity to resist this neoliberal transformation in industrial relations (Vachon, Wallace, and Hyde, 2016; Martin and Ross, 1999). Thus, global competition and the increasing power asymmetry between labor and capital may cause a uniform erosion of corporatist wage-setting in advanced capitalist countries.

Interestingly, prior studies suggest a degree of convergence in industrial relations among advanced capitalist countries. For example, Traxler (2004) and Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel (2001) observe a transition in the structure of corporatist wage bargaining from “classical” or highly centralized and encompassing corporatism, to “lean” or decentralized and configurational corporatism. And Baccaro and Howell (2011; 2017) marshal evidence from comparative case studies and descriptive statistics to argue for an overall neoliberal convergence in industrial relations among advanced capitalist countries. Based on these theoretical arguments and prior evidence of liberalization in industrial relations, we may expect the following:

H2: The rate of convergence in corporatist wage bargaining amongst advanced capitalist countries is conditioned by the globalization of production.

## Varieties of Capitalism, Globalization, and Wage Bargaining

We intervene in the ongoing debate over the effects of globalization on wage bargaining in advanced capitalist countries by extending on the *Varieties of Liberalization* (VoL) perspective (Thelen, 2012; 2014). Based on the *Varieties of Capitalism* perspective, Thelen (2014) differentiates between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). Broadly, industrial relation systems in LMEs are characterized by decentralized and fragmented arrangements between adversarial interest groups while these systems in CMEs are characterized by centralized and coordinated arrangements based on a social partnership between interest groups (Thelen, 2014, 4). And according to the VoL, institutional change in advanced capitalist countries is contingent on the broader institutional arrangements of national economies and endogenous shifts in political coalitions induce different trajectories of liberalization (Thelen, 2014, 15f.). However, we contend the liberalizing effect of the globalization of production on wage bargaining is contingent on the broader institutional arrangements in which industrial relations take place. We argue the globalization of production differentially affects wage bargaining in CME and LME where the adverse effect of the globalization of production on corporatist wage bargaining is more pronounced in LMEs compared to CMEs.

The critical distinction in industrial relations between LMEs and CMEs is the degree to which corporatist arrangements between capital and labor complement other institutions and produce optimal returns for domestic firms (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). In CMEs, firms are highly dependent on institutions for coordinating strategic interactions between firms, organized labor, and other economic

actors (Hall and Soskice, 2001, 8f.). As a result, these firms obtain a competitive advantage by continuously improving the production process through a long-term investment in labor. And social partnerships between powerful employer associations and strong trade union confederations are key to this long-term strategy by minimizing employment turnover through maximizing firm commitment to labor. In sum, since the competitive advantage of firms in CMEs depends upon corporatist industrial relations, they should be less likely to respond to international competition from the globalization of production by divesting from corporatist wage-setting arrangements.

In contrast, firms in LMEs favor flexible and weak ties to labor since relations between capital and labor are coordinated through market mechanisms. Firms in LMEs tend to adjust to competitive pressures by exploiting flexible labor markets where wages and employment levels change in accordance with changes in global demand. Because the competitive equilibrium in LMEs pre-supposes a high degree of labor market flexibility, firms should be more likely to respond to international competition by disengaging from any corporatist arrangements and demanding greater labor deregulation. This theorization is consistent with observations from Table 1 showing the significant decline in corporatist wage-setting among LMEs between 1975 and 2010. Based on these arguments and initial observation, we may expect the following:

H3: The negative association between the globalization of production and corporatist wage-setting is amplified in liberal market economies compared to coordinated and mixed market economies.

*VoC and club convergence in wage bargaining?* The above arguments linking the globalization of production to corporatist wage bargaining presupposes a homogeneous neoliberal transformation across advanced capitalist countries. More broadly, this theorization suggests an “absolute convergence” in corporatist wage bargaining, which refers to a situation in which all countries are adopting a common model of decentralized and fragmented wage bargaining. However, as we outline above, economic actors in LMEs and CMEs may respond to the isomorphic pressures of global production differently. We contend the isomorphic pressures from the globalization of production depend on the institutional arrangements of national economies. As a result, we expect “club convergence,” where LMEs and CMEs converge differently based on exogenous and endogenous conditions.

Thelen’s (2012; 2014) typology of liberalization in advanced capitalist countries is a useful framework for explaining this potential divergence in institutional change. The trajectory of industrial relations in LMEs is characterized as “deregulatory liberalization,” which “involves an active (political) dismantling of coordinating capacities” (Thelen, 2012, 147). However, while Thelen (2014) primarily contends this liberalization trajectory is the induced by shifts in broad political coalitions, we




argue the globalization of production induces a neoliberal convergence in wage bargaining among LMEs. Since firms in LMEs view commitments to wage bargaining and rigid work rules as barriers to competitiveness, they readily advocate for greater labor market flexibility especially in determining wage bargaining. Additionally, since these firms are dependent on markets to coordinate production and investment, they are more susceptible to isomorphic pressures of international competition from the globalization of production. Thus, employer associations and independent firms in LMEs manage these competitive pressures of global production by disengaging from cooperative and coordinated wage bargaining and campaigning for the liberalization of labor markets (Thelen, 2014, 39–43).

In CMEs, the trajectory of liberalizations follows two paths: dualization and embedded flexibilization. The liberalization of industrial relations in Continental European countries, are characterized as dualization in which a process of “institutional drift” maintains traditional corporatist arrangements for the historical political base of “labor market insiders” (i.e. the industrial core of the labor force) “even as an unorganized and unregulated periphery is allowed to grow” as an unprotected segment of “labor-market outsiders” (Thelen, 2012, 147). The trajectory of liberalization in Nordic countries is characterized as embedded flexibilization which refers to the enactment of neoliberal reform of labor market policies, but the persistence of “social programs designed to ease the adaptation of society, especially its weaker segments, to changes in the market (flexicurity)” (Ibid). Thus, in dualization, the degree of corporatist wage bargaining, *per se*, changes little, but the proportion of the workforce who benefits from these industrial relations declines. In embedded flexibilization, the degree of corporatist wage-setting declines, but the economic impacts of these changes are offset with social programs. Overall, both processes of liberalization suggest the isomorphic effects of globalization are somewhat mitigated in CMEs.

Figure 3 illustrates the *club convergence* in corporatist wage bargaining in advanced capitalist countries by showing the coefficient of variation for each of the three dimensions of corporatist wage bargaining. According to Figure 3, the coefficient of variation for each of these indicators remained relatively the same between 1960 and 2015 which suggests a persistence in cross-national heterogeneity in corporatist wage-setting. However, when examining heterogeneity in wage-setting within LMEs and CMEs, we note a degree of convergence among these countries. We find the degree of heterogeneity initially increased in LMEs between 1960 and the late 1990s, but rapidly declined in the 2000s. This convergence in corporatist wage bargaining is consistent with the descriptive evidence presented in Table 1 showing an overall decline in each dimension among LMEs. In contrast, the dimensions of corporatist wage bargaining in CMEs have converged at a lower rate since

**Figure 3: Variation in dimensions of corporatist wage-setting in liberal, coordinated, and mixed market economies, 1960–2015**



Data source: Visser (2020).

1960. This is consistent with the descriptive evidence in Table 1 which shows a degree heterogeneity in each dimension of corporatist wage bargaining. Therefore, we may expect the following:

H4: The conditional effect of the globalization of production on the rate of convergence in corporatist wage bargaining is stronger in liberal market economies compared to coordinated and mixed economies.

## Data and Measurement

We utilize an unbalanced panel data on 22 OECD countries from 1965 to 2015 to test the research hypotheses described above.<sup>2</sup> Countries in the sample were selected according to their representation of liberal, coordinated, and mixed market economies and level of development (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Thelen, 2014; Bacarro and Howell, 2017). The period of observation was determined to the long-run and convergent effects of the covariates on corporatist wage bargaining. This period of observation covers important periods of global and national economic expansion and contraction as well as the formation, expansion, and consolidation of global production networks (Mahutga et al., 2017). In total, the sample contains 891 country-year observations based on the availability of data for the main outcome and covariates in the analysis.

*Corporatist wage bargaining.* The main outcome of the study is a normalized index of corporatist wage bargaining based on three common indicators of wage bargaining from prior studies on corporatism in industrial relations in advanced capitalist countries (Jahn, 2016; Bacarro and Howell, 2011, 2017; Thelen, 2012, 2014). The three index items are the following: (1) the coordination and patterning of wage bargaining across industries; (2) the level of wage bargaining between employer and union confederations; and (3) the role of the government in the wage-setting process.<sup>3</sup> Wage bargaining coordination is measured with Kenworthy's (2001) 5-point ordinal scale, where higher values indicate centralized wage bargaining based on industry- or sector-level agreements which are patterned across the economy. The level of wage bargaining is measured with a 5-point ordinal scale, where high values indicate the predominant level of bargaining occurring at the sectoral or national level. The role of government in wage bargaining is measure with an updated version of Hassel's (2005) 5-category index, where higher values indicate the govern-

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2 Our sample includes the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

3 Kenworthy (2001, 79) developed a wage coordination index designed to *predict* the degree of wage coordination based on the structure of wage-setting (e.g. centralization) and the role of government in the process. The main problem with this index is the conflation of the structural and behavioral dimension in the *hypothetical* degree of coordination. By developing a composite index of wage-setting based on Kenworthy's wage coordination index and the direct measures of government involvement and wage centralization, we are able to parse out the contribution of wage centralization and government involvement in the wage-setting process. Moreover, a composite index of wage-setting may reduce the degree of measurement error in Kenworthy's wage coordination index by accounting for the level of wage centralization and government involvement in wage-setting rather than assuming coordination, centralization, and government involvement follows a singular pattern or rank.

ment directly participates in wage-setting processes by imposing private sector wage settlements or placing ceiling on bargaining agreements. Data on each indicator is drawn from the *ICTWSS* database (Visser, 2020).

An exploratory factor analysis of the three indicators yielded a single factor solution ( $\lambda_1 = 1.76$ ;  $\lambda_2 = -.04$ ) with each indicator showing a factor loading greater than .40. Additionally, the index showed a high degree of inter-item reliability ( $\alpha = .82$ ). The index is normalized to measure corporatist wage bargaining from 0 (indicating completely decentralized and fragmented bargaining at the individual employer-employee level with no involvement from government agencies) to 100 (highly centralized and coordinated bargaining at the national- or sectoral-level with direct involvement from government agencies). In the sample, countries range from a score of 0 (e.g. United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada in late 2000s) to 99.98 (e.g. Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark in the 1970s).

*The globalization of production* for advanced capitalist countries is measured with two common indicators from the literature: southern import penetration and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) (e.g. Mahutga et al., 2017; Mosley, 2011; Kollmeyer, 2009; Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Wood, 1994). Southern import penetration indicates the degree of international competition with manufacturers in less-developed countries and is measured as the total value of manufacturing imports from non-OECD countries as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Outward foreign direct investment flows indicate the total capital outflow from advanced capitalist countries and is measured as the total value of fixed investment in foreign establishments as percentage of GDP. Data on both indicators is drawn from the *Comparative Welfare States* dataset (Brady et al., 2020).

*Institutional globalization.* We control for the degree of integration in global institutions when estimating the effects of global production given the prominence of this perspective in the literature (e.g. Meyer et al., 1997; Cao, 2009, 2012; Cole, 2013; Standing, 2008). Specifically, we control for the following indicators of institutional globalization: (1) total memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and (2) the number of years since ratifying the ILO Convention on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (No. 98). The first indicator of global institutional integration measures the density of associational ties using total country membership in IGOs. Data on IGO memberships is drawn from the *Correlates of War* database (Pevenhouse et al., 2020). The second indicator measures a national commitment to global norms of collective bargaining and organizing. This indicator is measured the cumulative number of years since ratifying ILO Convention No. 98. Data on the year of ratification is drawn from the *ILOLEX* database (ILO 2020).

*Power resources and macroeconomic context.* We include the following macroeconomic and power resource controls in the analysis: (1) the size of the industrial labor force; (2) the unemployment rate; (3) economic development; (4) strength of the leftist parties; and (5) union density. The *size of the industrial labor force* is measured as the percentage of the total labor force employed in manufacturing sectors.

The *unemployment rate* is measured as the percentage of the economically active population who are currently unemployed and seeking employment. *Economic development* is measured as GDP per capita. Data on labor force statistics and GDP per capita is drawn from the *World Development* database (World Bank, 2020). In addition to macroeconomic controls, we include indicators more closely associated with the organization of labor interest and the strength of labor-friendly parties. *Strength of leftist parties* is measured as the cumulative number of seats held by leftist parties. Data on the strength of leftist parties is drawn from the *Comparative Welfare States* database. To control for the strength of worker organizations, we measure *union density* or the percentage of waged and salaried workers who are members of a local union. Data on union density is drawn from the *ICTWSS* database (Visser, 2020).

## Analytical Strategy

The main empirical objective of the present analysis is to measure the long-run and convergent effects of production globalization on corporatist wage bargaining among advanced capitalist countries. The long-run effect of production globalization on retrenchment is measured with an error-correction model (ECM) which simultaneously estimates the short- and long-run effects of covariates on an outcome while controlling for time invariant heterogeneity (Hausman, 1978; Finkel, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008, 382). This model specification is noted in the following equation:

$$\Delta y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 y_{it-1} + \beta_1 \Delta x_{it-1} + \beta_2 x_{it-1} + u_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

In equation 1,  $\Delta y$  is the annual change in corporatist wage bargaining in country  $i$  at year  $t$ ,  $x$  is a 1 by  $k$  matrix of covariates in levels,  $\Delta x$  is a 1 by  $k$  matrix of the covariates in lagged first differences,  $\alpha$  is the fixed intercept of the model,  $u_i$  is country-specific deviation, and  $\epsilon$  is the country-year residual, the latter assumed i.i.d. In equation 1,  $\beta_0$  captures the rate of convergence in  $y$ ,  $\beta_1$  captures the short-term effect of a year-on-year increase in  $x$  on  $y$ , and  $\beta_2$  captures longer term effects of the level of  $x$  on  $y$ . The appropriateness of the ECM for the data at hand can be determined by evaluating the rule that  $-1 < \beta_0 < 0$ , and that  $\beta_0$  is significantly different from zero. In the analysis that follows, we are particularly interested in the long-run effects, which also depend on the degree of inertia in  $y$ . Accordingly, the long-run effect of a covariate ( $X$ ) on corporatist wage bargaining is computed with the following equation:

$$\beta = \beta_2 / (1 - \beta_0) \quad (2)$$

The analytical strategy for measuring the conditional convergence in corporatist wage-setting from the globalization of production is less straightforward. Prior studies generally measure convergence through descriptive comparisons of countries along relevant indicators, theoretically informed comparative case studies, or an assessment of “sigma convergence” across countries in relevant indicators (e.g. Thelen, 2014; Kenworthy, 1997, 2003; Murillo, 2002; van Waarden and Drahos, 2002; Baccaro and Howell, 2011). Here, “sigma convergence” refers to a decline in

cross-national diversity, and is typically assessed by comparing cross-national ratio measures of variation (e.g. the coefficient of variation, the Gini coefficient, the deviation of logs, etc.). We utilize both approaches from prior studies for the descriptive evidence in Table 1 and Figure 3 above. While these approaches may yield valuable information, recent research suggests that sigma convergence can yield “false negatives,” where convergence occurs in the absence of concordant changes in ratio measures of variation (Plumper and Schneider, 2009).

As a point of departure, we utilize ECMs to measure the conditional convergence in corporatist wage bargaining among advanced capitalist countries from the globalization of production and other covariates. Specifically, we analyze the degree of “beta-convergence,” which has two distinct advantages. First, beta-convergence does not lead to “false negatives” (Schmitt and Starke, 2011). Second, our modeling approach allows us to test our hypotheses directly by modeling the specific mechanisms of club and conditional convergence hypothesized above (Plumper and Schneider, 2009).

To test our hypotheses on club convergence in corporatist wage bargaining, we specify our models with an interaction term between the lagged levels of the dependent variable and an indicator for liberal market economy. To test our hypotheses on conditional convergence in corporatist wage bargaining, we specify our models with an interaction term between the lagged dependent variable and a covariate. To illustrate, consider the specification in equations 3a and 3b:

$$\Delta y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 y_{it-1} + \beta_1 w_i + \beta_2 x_{it-1} + \beta_3 \Delta x_{it-1} + \beta_4 y_{it-1} * w_i + u_i + \epsilon_{it} \tag{3a}$$

$$\Delta y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 y_{it-1} + \beta_1 w_i + \beta_2 x_{it-1} + \beta_3 \Delta x_{it-1} + \beta_4 y_{it-1} * x_{it-1} + u_i + \epsilon_{it} \tag{3b}$$

In equations 3a and 3b,  $\Delta y_{it}$  denotes the change in the corporatist wage bargaining index in country  $i$  at time  $t$ ;  $\alpha$  is the general intercept;  $y_{it-1}$  is the lagged-level of the corporatist wage-setting index;  $w_i$  is an indicator for whether the country is a liberal market economy;  $x_{it-1}$  is the lagged level of the covariate of interest; and  $\Delta x_{it-1}$  is the lagged change in the covariate of interest. In equation 3a,  $y_{it-1} * w_i$  is the interaction between lagged-level of corporatist wage bargaining and an indicator of LME. In equation 3b,  $y_{it-1} * x_{it-1}$  is the interaction between a covariate and the lagged-level of corporatist wage-setting. Club convergence in VoC is present if  $\beta_4 \neq 0$  in equation 3a. And conditional convergence is present if  $\beta_4 \neq 0$  in equation 3b. We estimate the model in equation 3b in the overall VoC sample, a subsample of liberal market economies, and a subsample of coordinated and mixed market economies. Statistically, we test the coefficient difference between the LME and the CME and mixed economies subsamples using a z-test of equivalency (Clogg, et al., 1995; Paternoster et al., 1998). This provides evidence of whether the globalization of production conditions the convergence in corporatist wage bargaining differently in LMEs as described in Hypothesis 4.

We estimate the long-run effects of the covariates on the *conditional rate of convergence in corporatist wage-setting*. This is given by:

$$\beta = (\beta_2 + \beta_4) / (1 - \beta_0) \tag{4}$$

Panel-corrected standard errors are utilized in the hypothesis tests of the coefficients. PCSE account for the non-spherical residuals in panel data caused by the contemporaneous correlation across the units and unit level heteroskedasticity (Beck and Katz, 1995).

## Results

Table 2 presents the estimated annual rate of absolute convergence in corporatist wage bargaining across the VoC. These estimates were derived from a simple ECM containing only the lagged-level of the dependent variable. Unsurprisingly, compared to the estimates in Table 2, estimates from the variance method presented in Figure 3 under-estimated the rate of convergence in CME and mixed economies compared to LMEs. Based on the modeling approach to convergence, CMEs and mixed economies are converging at a faster rate than LMEs. This provides evidence of club convergence across the VoC.

**Table 2: Annual rate of convergence in corporatist wage-setting**

	All VoC	LME	CME & mixed	VoC difference
Observed annual rate	0.67 %	0.54 %	1.22 %	-0.68 %
Pre-1990 annual rate	1.28 %	0.75 %	2.52 %	-1.77 %
Post-1990 annual rate	2.21 %	2.08 %	4.47 %	-2.39 %

*Source:* Authors.

Additionally, we find the rate of convergence in LMEs and CMEs accelerated in the post-1990s era. We contend this accelerated rate in LMEs was induced by the consolidation of global production networks at the intensification of manufacturing imports and capital mobility. Additionally, the accelerated rate in convergence among in CMEs and mixed economies could be induced by more recent shifts in the coalitions between unions, political parties, and industrial labors since the 1990s (Thelen, 2014). Overall, the estimates in Table 2 provide initial support for the cross-national convergence in wage bargaining. However, it is unclear what is driving this convergence. Therefore, the next step in the analysis is to examine which covariates are associated with the long-run decline in corporatist wage bargaining and which of these covariates conditions the rate of convergence.

Table 3 reports estimates of the ECMs of corporatist wage bargaining in the full sample of VoC and subsamples of VoCs. Models 1 and 2 estimate the effects of the covariates on corporatist wage bargaining in the full sample of 22 advanced capitalist countries. Models 3 and 4 estimate these effects in a subsample of liberal market economies (LME). And Models 5 and 6 estimates these effects in a subsample of coordinated and mixed market economies (CME &

Mixed). As described above, these models are utilized to estimate the long-run and convergent effects of the covariates in the full sample and VoC subsamples.

According to Models 1 and 2, the lagged-level of manufacturing imports from Southern countries exerts a negative effect on corporatist wage-setting. Surprisingly, the lagged level of outward FDI exhibited not significant effect on corporatist wage bargaining in advanced capitalist countries. Unsurprisingly, we find the lagged level of union density exhibits a positive association with corporatist wage bargaining and liberal market economies show a lower average in corporatist wage bargaining compared to coordinated and mixed market economies. Most importantly, the estimates in Models 1 and 2 supports the first hypothesis on the association between globalization and corporatist wage bargaining.

According to Models 3 and 4, the lagged level of manufacturing imports from Southern countries exerts a negative effect on corporatist wage bargaining in LMEs. And similar to Model 2, we find the lagged-level of union density exerts a significant and positive effect on wage-setting in LMEs. However, we do not find leftist party strength and the size of the industrial labor force affect corporatist wage bargaining. This suggests shifts in the coalitions between political parties and organized labor in LMEs may not be responsible for the liberalization of wage bargaining which runs counter to the expectations of the Varieties of Liberalization perspective.

According to Models 5 and 6, the lagged level of manufacturing imports from Southern countries exerts a negative effect on corporatist wage bargaining in coordinated and mixed market economies. Similar to LMEs, we also find the lagged level of union density exerts a positive effect on corporatist wage bargaining in CME and mixed economies. In contrast, we find the lagged level of economic development exerts positive effect on corporatist wage bargaining in CME and mixed economies. However, we find short term economic growth and short-term changes in the unemployment rate may effectively reduce corporatist wage bargaining.

Surprisingly, we find the cumulative years since ratifying ILO Convention No. 90 exhibits a negative effect on corporatist wage bargaining in CMEs and mixed economies after controlling for power resources and the macroeconomic context. This suggests there may be a degree of decoupling between international commitments and national practices in CME and mixed economies. Additionally, we find short-term changes in the strength of leftist parties exerts a significant and negative effect on corporatist wage bargaining which suggests shifts in political coalitions in CMEs and mixed economies may affect corporatist wage bargaining. However, it is unclear at this stage whether these covariates exert an effect on the long-run equilibrium of corporatist wage bargaining.



**Table 3: Error correction models of corporatist wage-setting**

	All VoC		LME		CME & mixed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corporatism <sub>t-1</sub>	-.259*** (.032)	-.300*** (.038)	-.137** (.051)	-.249** (.087)	-.374*** (.043)	-.475*** (.050)
<b>Globalization of production</b>						
Southern imports <sub>t-1</sub>	-.270*** (.082)	-.170* (.083)	-.187* (.093)	-.253* (.124)	-.371*** (.101)	-.220* (.094)
Δ Southern imports <sub>t-1</sub>	.355 (.542)	.217 (.529)	.735 (1.691)	-1.229 (1.775)	.305 (.553)	.133 (.506)
Outward FDI <sub>t-1</sub>	.070 (.085)	.046 (.083)	-.0006 (.081)	-.142 (.096)	.135 (.106)	.063 (.104)
Δ Outward FDI <sub>t-1</sub>	.020 (.107)	.034 (.106)	-.024 (.103)	.059 (.111)	.0042 (.135)	.044 (.127)
<b>Institutional globalization</b>						
Years since ILO ratification <sub>t-1</sub>	.003 (.044)	-.074 (.066)	.005 (.163)	.091 (.187)	-.028 (.046)	-.237** (.082)
Δ Years since ILO ratification <sub>t-1</sub>	5.018** (1.687)	5.220** (1.873)	4.032 (3.486)	4.710 (4.500)	1.837 (2.582)	-1.177 (2.940)
IGO membership <sub>t-1</sub>	-.058 (.038)	-.0099 (.058)	-.077 (.075)	.039 (.156)	.001 (.048)	.011 (.064)
Δ IGO membership <sub>t-1</sub>	.544+ (.293)	.430 (.288)	.881* (.382)	.471 (.379)	.507 (.350)	.422 (.333)
<b>Power resources</b>						
Union density <sub>t-1</sub>		.175*** (.044)		.348* (.167)		.216*** (.050)
Δ Union density <sub>t-1</sub>		-.160 (.327)		-.017 (.864)		-.044 (.380)
Strength of leftist party <sub>t-1</sub>		-.060 (.090)		-.197 (.206)		-.020 (.110)
Δ Strength of leftist party <sub>t-1</sub>		3.404+ (1.756)		4.164 (2.626)		5.673** (2.127)
<b>Macroeconomic context</b>						
GDP per capita (log) <sub>t-1</sub>		4.412 (7.873)		14.730 (20.650)		22.000* (9.859)
Δ GDP per capita (log) <sub>t-1</sub>		-64.360 (53.180)		46.410 (84.800)		-113.100+ (57.760)
Unemployment rate <sub>t-1</sub>		.142 (.182)		-.281 (.735)		.115 (.200)

$\Delta$ Unemployment rate <sub>t-1</sub>		-1.831* (.764)		-.179 (1.684)		-1.629+ (.858)
Size of industrial labor force <sub>t-1</sub>		.094 (.139)		.396 (.325)		.117 (.146)
$\Delta$ Industrial labor force <sub>t-1</sub>		-.657 (.601)		1.683 (1.592)		-.614 (.728)
Liberal Market Economy	-7.537*** (1.626)	-8.068*** (1.538)				
Constant	15.650*** (3.739)	-14.320 (36.680)	6.420 (5.924)	-84.460 (91.970)	21.220*** (5.260)	-75.760+ (43.680)
R-squared	.139	.169	.082	.140	.198	.258
Observations	888	888	274	274	614	614
Countries	22	22	6	6	16	16
<p>+ <math>p &lt; .10</math>   * <math>p &lt; .05</math>   ** <math>p &lt; .01</math>   *** <math>p &lt; .001</math>.  Notes: VoC = Varieties of Capitalism; LME = Liberal Market Economy; CME = Coordinated Market Economy.  Panel-Corrected standard errors in parentheses. <i>Source:</i> Authors.</p>						

The estimates from the ECMs in Table 4 are primarily used to measure the degree of long-run retrenchment and conditional convergence in corporatist wage bargaining from the globalization of production and other covariates in the model. Table 4 presents estimates of the long-run effect of each covariate on the level of corporatist wage bargaining in the full sample of VoC and VoC subsets. Additionally, the long-run effects in each subset are compared and tested to determine whether these effects differ across the national institutional arrangements of liberal, coordinated, and mixed market economies.

In the full sample of VoC, manufacturing imports from Southern countries exerts a negative long-run effect on the degree of corporatist wage bargaining. This finding further supports the first hypothesis on the negative association between globalization and corporatist wage bargaining. We find the size of the long-run effect of Southern imports is greater in LME compared to CME and mixed economies, but the effect difference is not statistically significant from zero. This finding fails to support the second hypothesis on the amplified long-run effect of production globalization on corporatist wage bargaining in LMEs compared to CME and mixed economies.

We also find union density exerts a positive long-run effect on corporatist wage bargaining in LMEs, CMEs, and mixed economies. We find the size of this effect is greater in LMEs compared to other economies, but the effect difference is not statistically significant. Surprisingly, we do not find evidence for long-run effects of the other covariates on corporatist wage bargaining in LMEs or CMEs and mixed economies.

**Table 4: Long-run effects of covariates on the level of corporatist wage-setting**

	All VoC	LME	CME & mixed	VoC difference
Southern imports	-.131* (.064)	-.203*** (.014)	-.149*** (.024)	-.054* (.028)
Outward FDI	.036 (.064)	-.114+ (.074)	.043 (.071)	-.157+ (.103)
IGO memberships	-.007 (.045)	.073 (.148)	.007 (.044)	.025 (.133)
ILO ratification	-.057 (.051)	.187 .093	-.160*** (.054)	.233+ (.158)
Union density	.135*** (.032)	.279** (.117)	.146*** (.032)	.133 (.121)
Strength of leftist party	-.046 (.069)	-.158 (.160)	-.014 (.075)	-.144 (.177)
GDP per capita (log)	3.394 (6.053)	11.794 (16.372)	14.916** (6.513)	-3.122 (17.620)
Unemployment rate	.110 (.140)	-.225 (.581)	.078 (.136)	-.303 (.597)
Size of industrial labor force	.073 (.107)	.317 (.261)	.079 (.098)	.238 (.279)

+  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .  
*Notes:* VoC = Varieties of Capitalism; LME = liberal market economy; CME = coordinated market economy. IGO = intergovernmental organization; ILO = International Labour Organization; FDI = foreign direct investment. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Estimates derived from Equation 2. Each effect is estimated in a separate model to reduce multicollinearity. All of the models include the covariates listed in Table 3. Difference in coefficients based on Z-Test (Clogg et al., 1995; Paternoster et al., 1998). *Source:* Authors.

Overall, estimates in Table 4 suggest the long-run equilibrium of corporatist wage bargaining is contingent on the degree of manufacturing competition with the Global South and the strength of organized labor. Accordingly, the retrenchment of corporatist wage bargaining seems to be attributable to the decline of unions and the increasing competition between Northern and Southern manufacturing firms. Both findings provide useful insight into the underlying conditions inducing the transition to a neoliberal model of wage-setting and the homogeneity of these processes across the VoC.

Table 5 presents the long-run effects of covariates on the rate of convergence in corporatist wage bargaining across the VoC. The estimated effect is derived from the interaction model described in equation 3b. According to the estimates in Table 5, manufacturing imports from Southern countries exert a long-run effect on the downward rate of convergence in corporatist wage bargaining in the full VoC

**Table 5: The long-run effects of covariates on the rate of convergence in corporatist wage-bargaining**

	All VoC	LME	CME & mixed	VoC difference
Southern imports	-.123* (.063)	-.550*** (.171)	-.149* (.062)	-.401* (.182)
Outward FDI	.107 (.074)	-.169* (.072)	.357** (.151)	-.526*** (.167)
IGO memberships	.142 (.094)	-.063 (.103)	.729 (.408)	-.792 (.421)
ILO ratification	.075 (.066)	.074 (.179)	-.103 (.107)	.177 (.209)
Union density	.790*** .143	.397* (.201)	.641*** (.163)	-.244 (.259)
Strength of leftist party	.496*** (.113)	-.146 (.176)	.993*** (.186)	-1.139*** (.256)
GDP per capita (log)	-37.416 (30.359)	9.605 (17.986)	-25.581*** (4.447)	35.186* (18.528)
Unemployment rate	.228 (.345)	-.251 (.611)	.586 (.416)	-.837 .739
Size of industrial labor force	-.038 (.179)	.406 (.378)	-.424*** (.143)	.830* (.404)
Countries	22	6	16	
Observations	888	274	614	
<p>* <math>p &lt; .05</math>    ** <math>p &lt; .01</math>    *** <math>p &lt; .001</math>.  Notes: VoC = Varieties of Capitalism; LME = liberal market economy; CME = coordinated market economy. IGO = intergovernmental organization; ILO = International Labour Organization; FDI = foreign direct investment. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of the effects derived from Equation 4. Each effect is estimated in a separate model to reduce multicollinearity. All of the models include the covariates listed in Table 3. Difference in coefficients based on Z-Test (Clogg et al., 1995; Paternoster et al., 1998). <i>Source:</i> Authors.</p>				

sample. This finding supports Hypothesis 3. Additionally, we find both union density and strength of leftist parties exerts long-run effects on the upward rate of convergence in corporatist wage bargaining in the full VoC sample. This finding supports the Varieties of Liberalization perspective on the effect of shifting coalitions on industrial relations across the VoC.

Most importantly, we find the indicators of production globalization exhibit differential long-run effects on the rates of convergence across the VoC. In LMEs, both southern imports and outward FDI exert a long-run effect on the downward rate of convergence in corporatist wage bargaining. We find the size of the long-run effect of southern imports is statistically greater in LMEs compared to CMEs and mixed economies. Moreover, while outward FDI accelerated the long-run downward

convergence in corporatist wage bargaining in LMEs, outward FDI accelerated the long-run upward convergence in corporatist wage bargaining in CMEs and mixed economies. This contrasting effect of FDI explains the null finding in the full VoC sample. These findings provide support for the fourth hypothesis on the greater convergent effect of globalization in LMEs compared to CMEs and mixed economies.

Union density exerts a long-run effect on the upward convergence rate across the VoC. Even though the effect is stronger in CMEs, we find the difference in effect size to be statistically insignificant from zero. Additionally, we find strength of leftist parties exerts a long-run effect on the upward convergence in corporatist wage bargaining in CMEs but find no convergent effect in LMEs. These findings suggest the Varieties of Liberalization perspective may better explain the liberalization of industrial relations in CMEs and mixed economies than the liberalization of industrial relations in LMEs.

## Discussion and Conclusion

The impact of globalization on national institutional change over the last forty years has been a central debate in the international and comparative political economy literature on advanced capitalist countries. As corporatist industrial relations occupy an analytical space in contradistinction to the neoliberal forces of globalization, understanding how the globalization of production changed corporatist wage bargaining can help us to better understand how globalization reshapes national institutions more generally. Accordingly, the present study empirically adjudicated this ongoing debate over globalization and institutional change by examining how the globalization of production contributed to the long-run retrenchment and convergence in corporatist wage bargaining.

Proponents of the “hyper-globalization thesis” of institutional change contend economic globalization fundamentally pushes the preferences and strategies of firms toward flexible labor-market policies and anti-unionism (Simmons et al., 2008; Sassen, 1996; Alderson, 1999; Kollmeyer, 2009). Therefore, we would expect to observe the retrenchment of corporatist wage bargaining that is proportional to the degree of globalized production, and thereby a convergence toward a neoliberal model of wage-setting (Hay, 2008). In contrast, critics of this perspective are skeptical over the effect of globalization on corporatist industrial relations and other institutional features of nation states. This skeptical perspective largely stems from perhaps an equally “hyper” version of institutionalism, in which institutional change is both uncommon and typically derives from endogenous shifts in the alignment of interests amongst national actors—national institutions beget national institutional change (Campbell, 2004; Kristensen and Morgan, 2012; Iversen and Soskice, 2009; Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Martin and Swank, 2012). Thus, in contrast to the hyper-globalization thesis, these scholars envision a diversity of responses to global competitive pressures equal to the diversity of institutional arrangements across

countries, and therefore no systematic relationship between globalization and institutional change.

The present study is one of the first to offer evidence of a decidedly middle ground between these contending perspectives. We find the globalization of production exerts systematic effects on corporatist wage bargaining, but these effects vary according to national institutional configuration defined in the Varieties of Capitalist and Varieties of Liberalization perspectives. Specifically, we find the effects of globalization on wage bargaining are more pronounced in liberal market economies where market coordination plays a predominant role in industrial relations historically. In these countries, we find the globalization of production reduces the already low degree of corporatist wage bargaining and increases the short-run and long-run rate of convergence toward neoliberal wage-setting. However, we also find the globalization of production induces a degree of retrenchment in corporatist wage bargaining in CME and mixed economies and accelerates a convergence toward neoliberal reform of wage-setting, but at a lower rate than observed in LMEs. For CMEs and mixed economies, we find the Varieties of Liberalization better explains retrenchment and convergence in wage bargaining. Therefore, while we find a degree of convergence in corporatist wage bargaining across VoC, our middle ground approach demonstrates this convergence is contingent on both the endogenous forces of changing political-economic coalitions and the exogenous forces of globalization.

The present study also demonstrates the utility of a new approach for investigating institutional retrenchment and convergence. Prior studies on institutional change primarily utilize methodologies which may not detect the nuanced trajectories or conditions associated with cross-national convergence and retrenchment. We extend on these studies utilizing a regression modeling to simultaneously estimate the long-run effect of globalization on the degree of corporatist wage bargaining in countries and the rate of the convergence in wage bargaining across countries. Accordingly, we provide novel evidence on the long-run and isomorphic effects of the globalization of production on corporatist wage-setting institutions. Thus, this study shows the importance of new methodologies for resolving longstanding debates over the nature of institutional diversity among advanced capitalist countries.

Findings in the present study also points to additional questions. Future work should endeavor to understand the forces behind the faster rate of convergence amongst coordinated and mixed market economies observed here, given that the globalization of production plays a lesser role in inducing a downward convergence. Thelen's (2014) perspective on *Varieties of Liberalization* takes us some of the way. Here, the dualist transition in continental European countries is contrasted with the embedded flexibilization of Scandinavian countries, who now score closer to continental European countries on indicators of corporatism (see Table 1). But, while this is a compelling description of the *content* of the institutional changes underlying the more rapid rate of convergence among CMEs, it does not provide an explana-

tion for why some countries opt for dualism and other opt for embedded flexibilization. Uncovering the contributing factors predicting a transition toward labor market dualism or embedded flexibilization—the role of particular welfare regimes, the incorporation of women into the labor force, the expansion of the service sector, etc.—thus remains a critical task for future research.

Overall, the present study shows the globalization of production has affected corporatist industrial relations in advanced capitalist countries and the longstanding debate over this relationship requires integrating theoretical perspectives to develop more nuanced theories of globalization and institutional change. Findings from the present point toward the importance of accounting for both exogenous and endogenous forces of institutional change to better understand contemporary political economy in advanced capitalist countries. The integrative approach and methodological framework of the present study will help elucidate and clarify a number of longstanding questions and debates in the comparative and international political economy literatures.

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**PART III:**

**Social Structures and Cleavages,  
Social and Political Mobilization  
and Participation  
in a Deglobalizing World Society**



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# Transnationalization and Perceptions of Winners of Globalization: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Germany

Rasmus Ollroge

Theorists of globalization have, for a long time, argued that a global system of political and economic integration does not amount to a global society without social transnationalization, i.e., individuals' beliefs, identities, and practices becoming oriented beyond their national society. I propose a new approach for researching the progression of social transnationalization by analyzing how people perceive the winners of globalization. This approach accounts for, on the one hand, people's social identities and biases, and, on the other hand, for the fact that social transnationalization has become politicized due to the formation of a cleavage between winners and losers of globalization. I use data from a conjoint experiment in Germany (n=4955), in which respondents categorize presented profiles as in-group or out-group members based on how transnational the profiles' characteristics are. Results show that the winners of globalization are overwhelmingly perceived as an out-group by the majority of the German population, with only people on the left and under the age of thirty-five having positive perceptions. The findings suggest that even as people's lives are objectively becoming more transnationalized, most people remain skeptical about transnationalization, making the emergence of a global society unlikely.

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has seen a substantial rise in the global interconnectedness of national societies, prompting the rise of social theories about the emergence of a global society. Yet economic and political global integration alone without social transnationalization, which is the extent to which individuals' life-

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worlds are becoming more oriented beyond the nation state (Mau, 2010), are not sufficient for the emergence of a true society at the global level. While research on the transnationalization of individuals' behaviors, identities and beliefs shows some signs of increasing social transnationalization, the extent to which individuals' lives are oriented transnationally or towards the national society is fundamentally determined by factors like class, education, and elite status. Moreover, in the past two decades, the divide on this issue between the upper and the lower strata of societies has become politicized, which in many societies led to the formation of a cleavage between winners and losers of globalization.<sup>2</sup>

In my study, I combine research on the globalization cleavage and social transnationalization by analyzing perceptions of the winners of globalization as an indicator for how far social transnationalization has progressed. The winners of globalization can be seen as the social group within a national society, whose members' lifeworlds have been transnationalized the most. How they are perceived by the rest of their society measures how people subjectively feel about processes of transnationalization. If the majority of the population has a positive evaluation of transnationalization, they should feel close to persons with highly transnational characteristics and have positive perceptions of them. If, however, most people are still predominantly nationally oriented, they should perceive winners of globalization negatively and as an out-group. Measuring these in-group and out-group perceptions goes beyond objective measures of social transnationalization, and accounts for people's social identities and biases, as well as for the politicization of transnationalization in recent decades.

To measure these perceptions, I conduct a conjoint experiment with a sample of the German population. Germany is a most-likely case for finding broad support for social transnationalization, as the country has been for decades among the most globalized countries in the world. In the experiment, respondents evaluate profiles of persons that are described by how transnational their social characteristics are. The chapter is structured as follows: In the first section, I develop the theoretical frame by integrating cleavage theory and research on social transnationalization. I describe how theories of in-group and out-group categorization can be applied to cleavage theory and what characterizes the winners of globalization. Second, in the data and methods section, I describe the conjoint experiment and the survey in which it was conducted. The third section presents the results, which show an overall negative perception of people with transnational characteristics. The impli-

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2 Throughout this chapter, I mostly use the terms "globalization cleavage," or "cleavage between winners and losers of globalization." Parts of the cleavage literature uses different terms for describing the cleavage, for example "integration/demarcation" (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008), "cosmopolitanism/communitarianism" (De Wilde et al., 2019), or "transnational cleavage" (Hooghe and Marks, 2018).

cations of the findings for the progression of transnationalization are discussed in the last section.

## Theory

### Social transnationalization and the globalization cleavage

The second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw a substantial rise in the global interconnectedness of national societies. For example, the *KOF Index of Globalization* shows an increase by sixty-two percentage points in the average level of globalization in the world from 1970 to 2019 (Gygli et al., 2019). Social theorists in various traditions have argued that national societies around the world are *de facto* integrated into a common global system (Burton, 1972; Meyer et al., 1997; Buzan, 2004). Similarly, theorists of globalization have argued that the borders of nation states increasingly lose their structuring power over different societal domains. Slowly but surely, the organization of modern societies as nation states, which has been the dominant societal organizing principle since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, is being transformed into some form of global society (Beck, 1999; Castells, 2000).

A common critique of these depictions of the emergence of a global society is that any meaningful concept of such a society can not only be based on increased economic interconnectedness between national societies or on the emergence of global governance institutions, but crucially must include the social and cultural integration of individuals into such a global society. While both dimensions, the global integration of economic and political systems of nation states and the social and cultural integration of people into a global societal system are related, one cannot speak of the real emergence of a global society without this global level being an important reference point for people's everyday lives, behaviors, and beliefs (Beck, 2000).

In turn, over the past two decades, a wide research field has focused on analyzing the extent to which the lifeworlds of individuals in national societies are becoming more transnational, with some evidence pointing in this direction (Fligstein, 2010; Mau, 2010; Medrano, 2010; Favell, 2011). For example, people move and communicate much more frequently across national borders, resulting in increased numbers of interactions and relationships with people from other countries (Mau, 2010; Levy et al., 2013). There is a rise in the number of people who identify with larger communities beyond the nation state, in the form of regional or global social identities (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Fligstein, 2010). There is the emergence of a world culture in the form of the global diffusion of ideas, symbols, and cultural products (Lizardo, 2008). In turn, global consumption patterns of material and cultural products have converged and a coherent set of lifestyle habits centered around openness towards foreign cultures has emerged (Prieur and Savage, 2013; Rössel and Schroedter, 2015).

Yet there are also findings that point in the opposite direction and that seem to suggest, that national societies still determine fundamental aspects of people's lives. For one, most of the described forms of social transnationalization seem to mostly take place in the center and not in the periphery of the world system, especially in the highly globalized countries of Western Europe and North America (Dreher et al., 2008). While it seems logical that transnationalization processes are more likely to take place under more globalized contexts, it does make the likelihood of a truly global society less likely. But even in highly globalized countries, like those in Western Europe, many important societal domains remain determined by the nation state, such as the public sphere (Risse, 2010) or the social structure, i.e. the distribution of valuable social positions and resources (Best et al., 2012). Lastly, even though some people tend to develop forms of transnational social identities, attachments to the nation state also seem to persist at high levels (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Risse, 2010).

Most importantly, most forms of social transnationalization tend to be unequally distributed within societies. Traveling, studying, or working abroad (Mau, 2010; Medrano, 2010; Gerhards and Hans, 2013), having transnational interactions and relationships (Mau, 2010; de Valk and Medrano, 2014), and having access to and consuming foreign cultural products (Rössel and Schroedter, 2015; Katz-Gerro, 2017) is more likely for people from the upper social strata of societies. Having a transnational orientation is often a phenomenon among the elite (Strijbis et al., 2019), the highly educated, and people from higher social classes (Calhoun, 2002; Roudometof, 2005).

At the same time, there is growing evidence of a backlash against globalization (Walter, 2021), the most notable expressions of which are the rise of the populist right (Rodrik, 2021), the election of Donald Trump and the United Kingdom's vote to leave the European Union, all of which were disproportionately supported by people from the lower social strata. Some scholars interpreted this backlash to not only be directed at certain pro-globalization policies, but against the increasingly transnationally oriented elites themselves, thereby politicizing the gap between nationally and transnationally oriented members of national societies (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Reckwitz, 2020).

The most common approach in the past two decades for researching this divide has been cleavage theory (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008, 2012; Bornschier, 2010; Teney et al., 2014; Hooghe and Marks, 2018; De Wilde et al., 2019). According to cleavage theory, globalization is fundamentally transforming modern societies with unequally distributed gains within national societies, thereby creating a structural antagonism between new groups of winners and losers of life chances due to globalization. These groups tend to develop collective social identities, coherent political preferences of more, respectively less, international integration, and find political representation in the parties of the new left and the populist right.

## A new approach for measuring social transnationalization

The perspective of cleavage theory can be helpful for researching social transnationalization, especially for analyzing how far it has progressed in the population of a national society. Typically, the extent of social transnationalization is measured via two approaches. Researchers use *objective indicators*, such as rates of communication or travel across national borders, relationships with foreign nationals, or consumption of foreign cultural products (Mau, 2010). While these indicators give an impression of how the lifeworlds of national citizens are being transformed, they do not measure citizens' subjective perceptions and evaluations of these processes.

For that, researchers rely on *subjective indicators*, such as identifying with some form of transnational community (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009), solidarity with citizens of other countries (Gerhards et al., 2019), or attitudes towards globalization (Mader et al., 2020). Subjective indicators give an impression of how individuals perceive and evaluate transnationalization. However, they do not account for the fact that globalization has become politicized over the past two decades, due to the emergence of a cleavage between winners and losers of globalization and the resulting societal polarization between these groups. While a person can see globalization as a net positive or have positive attitudes towards the European Union or immigration, he or she might still have a negative perception of the winners of globalization or the cosmopolitan elite. Thus, persons can hold some positive views towards aspects of transnationalization, while at the same time not wanting to be and live like the people, whose lives have been transnationalized the most.

In my study, I propose a third approach, which measures how people perceive the winners of globalization, i.e., others with transnationalized social characteristics. In this approach, perceptions and evaluations of the process of transnationalization itself are substituted by perceptions of the social group that represents that social process. As described in the following section, perceptions of other people are tied to a person's own social identity as well as to the stereotypes and in-group/out-group differentiations that a person uses for categorizing others. Moreover, perceptions of others are tied to the social positions and group affiliations of both the perceiving and the perceived person. The approach thus considers that attitudes towards transnationalization are informed by a person's position along the globalization cleavage. Following cleavage theory, some people with very transnational orientations and social characteristics form a social group at one pole of the divide, with others having more national orientations on the opposite pole. Yet even in highly globalized countries, the majority of the population will fall somewhere in the middle between these two extremes. How the winners are perceived by the majority of the population will thus give an indication of which of the two groups they feel closer to, which, in turn, suggests their fundamental evaluation of the processes of transnationalization. But for that we need to first understand how people

in general perceive, categorize, and evaluate others and how they would draw the conclusion that someone is a winner of globalization.

### **In-group and out-group categorization within the globalization-cleavage**

A person's social characteristics are an expression of their underlying position in society. This theoretical argument was made by Pierre Bourdieu, who argued that a person's lifestyle habits as well as their beliefs and behaviors are expression of the person's underlying social class position (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986). As people are part of a salient social group, for example a social class, they incorporate the group's habitus and, in turn, develop collectively shared behaviors, lifestyle practices, and political preferences.

The more typical a specific social characteristic is for the members of a certain social group, the more that characteristic becomes a salient signal to others of belonging to that group. People use others' discernable social characteristics to socially categorize them as belonging to a certain social group, and for evaluating whether that person belong to an in-group or an out-group (Wittenbrink et al., 1998; Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000; Tarrant et al., 2001). Having similar social characteristics leads to perceiving the other person as a member of the in-group, and subsequently to having positive associations about them and treating them favorably (Tajfel, 1974), which is why sharing similar social characteristics fosters the establishment of social networks (McPherson et al., 2001; Lizardo, 2006). Categorizing another person as a member of an out-group because the person's characteristics are different from one's own leads to negative perceptions, evaluations, and treatments, which is why social characteristics like lifestyle characteristics are used for socially excluding others and drawing social boundaries between groups (Lamont and Lareau, 1988; Lamont and Molnár, 2002).

How does this apply to cleavage and the globalization cleavage? According to cleavage theory, globalization leads to the formation of salient social groups of winners and losers of globalization. The members of these groups share common social characteristics. The winners of globalization are the social group within a national society whose social characteristics have been transnationalized the most. As the cleavage becomes more salient, the more people will identify transnational characteristics as signals of belonging to the winners of globalization. The group already uses their group characteristics as signals for distinguishing themselves from the rest of the population (Ollroge and Sawert, 2022), but the signals will also be recognized as such by the wider population, the more salient the cleavage becomes. When perceiving someone with these characteristics, people interpret them as signals of belonging to the winners of globalization and socially categorize them accordingly. Then, based on their own social position along the cleavage, their shared social identity with either cleavage group, and their feelings of closeness towards

the respective groups, they categorize the person as belonging to the in-group or out-group.

### **The salient characteristics of the winners of globalization**

What are the salient characteristics of the winners of globalization that have become social signals of group affiliation? Following cleavage theory, group members share common characteristics along the three dimensions of a cleavage: social-structural, socio-cultural, and political. Compared to other traditional societal cleavages (e.g., class, religion), there is not one single but multiple social-structural characteristics differentiating winners and losers of globalization. Two of the most commonly described are education and locality (Bornschieer, 2018; Hooghe and Marks, 2018). People with higher levels of education, especially tertiary degrees, tend to, on the hand, have more material gains from economic globalization (e.g., better labor market positions and higher wages) (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Rodrik, 2018), and, on the other hand, possess higher levels of transnational human capital, which enables acting beyond the nation state, for example in the form of travelling to and living in other countries, interacting with foreign nationals, and consuming foreign cultural products (Gerhards et al., 2017). Concerning locality, living in urban areas and especially in metropolitan centers is typical for winners of globalization, as these urban centers provide a combination of career and lifestyle opportunities that, together with the often substantial numbers of foreign nationals living in these cities, create cosmopolitan cities and neighborhoods (Florida, 2002; Favell, 2011; Reckwitz, 2020). Most importantly, both urbanity and high levels of education are not only typical characteristics of the winners of globalization, but have symbolic significance as they have become parts of the social identity of the group (Stubager, 2009; Bornschieer et al., 2021).

Concerning the socio-cultural dimension of the cleavage, typical characteristics of the winners of globalization are closely related to components of socio-cultural globalization: foreign experiences, consumption of foreign cultural products, and the transnationalization of social identities. First, as a result of globalization, individuals with the ability to act beyond the nation state gain opportunities for foreign experiences, for example in the form of studying or working abroad (Mau, 2010; Medrano, 2010; Gerhards and Hans, 2013). Second, an increase in the availability of foreign cultural products is met by the emergence of new lifestyle habits within the upper strata of societies, that revolve around openness to foreign cultures and that for reasons of authenticity can include the consumption of foreign cultural products in their original language (Prieur and Savage, 2013; Rössel and Schroedter, 2015; Katz-Gerro, 2017). Third, a key feature of social transnationalization is the emergence of transnational social identities, for example in the form of attachment to socio-political communities like Europe (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Fligstein,

2010; Risse, 2010), which is an important part of the identity of the winners of globalization (Teney et al., 2014).

Lastly, concerning the political dimension, processes of globalization over the last decades have brought new issues on the political agenda of national societies, such as international trade, immigration, and international organization like the European Union. The winners of globalization have adopted a coherent set of political attitudes in favor of more international societal integration in the form of low tariffs on international trade, low barriers for immigration, and support for the European Union (Kriesi et al., 2006; Weßels and Strijbis, 2019; Mader et al., 2020). These preferences tend to be disproportionately held by people from the upper strata of societies (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006, 2007) and do not only represent direct political interests but also function as a way of drawing distinction to the rest of the population (Strijbis et al., 2019).

## Data and Methods

To answer the research question about how winners of globalization are perceived, I conducted a survey experiment in an online survey in Germany.<sup>3</sup> Germany was selected as a case, as its history over the past five decades of being among the most globalized countries in the world (Gygli et al., 2019) makes it a most likely case of finding broad support for transnationalization. At the same time, similar patterns as in other Western European countries concerning the formation of a globalization cleavage can be seen in Germany. Gains from economic globalization (Dauth et al. 2014, 2021) and transnational activities (Mau, 2010; Gerhards et al., 2017) are unequally distributed in the population. Globalization is an extremely salient political issue (Mader et al., 2020), with attitudes towards globalization being divided along class and education lines (Teney and Helbling, 2014). Moreover, salient group identities have formed on both sides of the cleavage (Steiner et al., 2021) and winners and losers of globalization have considerable distrust and resentment for the opposite group (Helbling and Jungkunz, 2020).

The target population of the online survey were people living in private households between the age of eighteen and seventy-five. Respondents were quota sampled from an online access panel in order to make the sample match the German population on the key socio-demographic variables gender, age, level of education, and federal state. The survey was conducted in November of 2021 and respondents received a small incentive for participation from the survey company.

The core of the survey was a conjoint experiment, which is a form of a factorial vignette experiment. In a classical vignette survey experiment, respondents are

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<sup>3</sup> The experiment was approved by the ethics committee of the Freie Universität Berlin. A pre-registration of the experiment can be found under <https://osf.io/4j8hr>.

presented with a hypothetical situation of which a characteristic is varied randomly across subgroups of respondents. In a factorial experimental design, not one but multiple treatments can be administered at the same time, which allows for identifying multiple treatment effects and their interactions (Auspurg and Hintz, 2015). An increasingly popular variant of the factorial design is a conjoint experiment, in which respondents are presented with an evaluative choice between two profiles, which, for example, can be descriptions of products, policies, or political candidates. The profiles are described with multiple characteristics, which are assigned by randomly allocating the levels of the same set of treatment variables to both profiles. The treatment effects on the respondents' choice between the profiles is the change in a profile's probability of being chosen by the respondent from when a treatment characteristic is absent to when it is present (Hainmueller et. al., 2014).<sup>4</sup> Conjoint experiments have seen a rise in popularity in the social sciences over the past decade, as they are able to measure people's complex preferences while at the same time having high levels of both internal and external validity (Hainmueller et. al., 2015). Among other things, the design is ideal to analyze people's perceptions and evaluations of others.

In this conjoint experiment, respondents were presented with the profiles of two persons, which were described by eight treatment variables that contain the group characteristics of the winners of globalization in the form of transnational characteristics, as well as opposing national characteristics, which are displayed in Table 1. The levels of the treatments were randomly assigned to each profile.<sup>5</sup>

Subsequently to the presentation of the two profiles, the respondents were presented with two choice items that aim at measuring the respondents' evaluations of the presented persons as belonging to the in-group or out-group.<sup>6</sup> Two common indicators of whether a person sees someone else as belonging to the in-group is whether they trust the other person and assume the other person has similar goals and values. Correspondingly, the first of the two choice items asked about trust ("Which of the two persons do you think can generally be trusted more?") and the

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4 See Hainmueller et al. (2014) for a detailed description of the methodology and the assumption underlying the estimation of the treatment effects.

5 The only restrictions of the randomization were that the two profiles within a choice task differ from one another in at least one attribute, and that between two choice tasks within the same respondent, the profile pairs differ from one another in at least one attribute. The order of the treatments describing the profiles was randomized for each respondent but kept fixed across all choice tasks.

6 The order of the two outcome measures was randomized for each respondent but kept fixed across all choice tasks.



**Table 1: Treatment variables**

	<b>Transnational</b>	<b>National</b>
<b>Foreign experiences (working abroad)</b>	has already worked abroad for a longer period of time	has never worked abroad
<b>Foreign culture (consumption in original language)</b>	prefers to consume foreign films & books in the original language	prefers to consume foreign films & books in German translation
<b>Transnational identity (European/German identity)</b>	feels more attached to Europe than to Germany	feels more attached to Germany than to Europe
<b>Attitudes on economic globalization (international trade)</b>	believes that there should be fewer restrictions on international trade	believes that there should be more restrictions on international trade
<b>Attitudes on political globalization (European Union)</b>	believes that the European Union should have more influence	believes that the European Union should have less influence
<b>Attitudes on socio-cultural globalization (immigration)</b>	believes that it should be easier to immigrate to Germany	believes that it should be harder to immigrate to Germany
<b>Education (tertiary degree)</b>	holds a university degree	does not hold a university degree
<b>Locality (urban/rural)<sup>7</sup></b>	lives in a big city	lives in the countryside or in a village
<i>Source:</i> Author.		

7 The "locality" treatment is the only variable which contains a third category, which constitutes a middle category between the "transnational" and the "national" category: "lives in a small or medium-sized town."

second item asked about common values (“Which of the two persons do you think is more likely to have the same values and goals as you?”).<sup>8</sup>

Each respondent was presented with six of these choice tasks, resulting in twelve evaluated profiles per respondent, which produced a data structure with 59460 evaluated profiles within 4955 respondents. The data will be analyzed as follows: first, to analyze how the winners of globalization are perceived in the German population, the individual treatment effects of the eight variables on the respective choice items will be estimated using logistic regression models.<sup>9</sup> This will already give an impression not only of how individual characteristics are perceived but also of how the winners are perceived overall. To answer the latter question more substantially, in a second step the eight treatment variables will be combined into a single variable, indicating the total number of transnationalized characteristics of the presented profiles, to estimate the overall effect on the respondents’ evaluations. Third, to analyze how perceptions of the winners of globalization differ within the German population, the combined treatment variable will be interacted with characteristics of the respondents, testing for a moderation of the treatment effect by the respondents’ characteristics education, locality, age, left-right placement, subjective standard of living, and living in West or East Germany.

## Results

### Perceptions of individual characteristics

The first set of results shows the effects of the group characteristics of the winners of globalization on the perception of trustworthiness and sharing similar values. Figure 1 shows the results from two logistic regression models of the two choice items as the respective dependent variables regressed on the eight treatment variables. The strengths of the effects are expressed as average marginal effects, which show the change in the probability of a profile being chosen when the transnational category of a treatment variable is displayed to when the national category is displayed. For example, the respondents are on average 3.2 percentage points less likely to trust a person who lives in a big city compared to a person living in a rural area.


Overall, most of the transnational characteristics have a negative effect on perceptions of trustworthiness and sharing common values, indicating that persons with transnational characteristics tend to be seen as members of an out-group to the average respondent. Living in a big city, consuming foreign cultural products

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8 The experiment and the rest of the questionnaire was in German. Items have been translated for their depiction in this chapter.

9 All regression models used in this chapter include clustered standard errors at the respondent level and post-stratification weights on age, gender, education, and federal state.

Figure 1: Perceptions of the characteristics of the winners of globalization



Note: Average marginal effects from logistic regression models with 95% CIs. Source: Author.

in their original language, having a European identity, as well as being in favor of immigration and the EU evoke negative evaluations. While living in a big city has a negative effect on in-group perceptions, living in a medium sized town has no different effect than living in a rural area, indicating that symbolically, middle-sized towns are on the “rural” side of the “urban-rural” divide. Notably, attitudes towards trade have no effect on in-group perceptions, contrary to the other two sets of globalization attitudes.

Contrary to the described pattern of the other treatments, having worked abroad and having a tertiary education have positive effects on in-group perceptions, at least when it comes to trust. The effects on similar values are statistically not significant for both variables. It could be the case that having worked in another country and having a tertiary education are not primarily understood as signals of transnationalization but as signals of competence and high status. This would also explain why the effects are stronger on trust than on sharing similar values, as high-

status persons are often perceived as trustworthy, even if they are not belonging to the in-group (Cuddy et al., 2008).

In general, it seems as if the group signals of the winners of globalization tend to have more negative effects on perceptions of trustworthiness and sharing similar values. Differences in the effects of the different variables can to some degree be explained, but also show that there is a substantial difference in the salience of the group signals of the winners of globalization. Yet the individual effects do not necessarily give us a full picture of how winners of globalization are perceived overall, as they do not consider the other characteristics of the presented person. While the individual effects point in the direction that the characteristics of the winners of globalization tend to illicit negative reactions, if we want to know how the winners of globalization are perceived overall, we need to look at how persons are perceived depending on how many of their characteristics are transnational.


### **Overall perceptions of the winners of globalization**

In order to analyze how the winners of globalization are perceived overall, I construct a new variable out of the eight treatments that indicates the number of transnational characteristics of each presented profile, which ranges from 0 to 8.<sup>10</sup> Figure 2 shows the result of a logistic regression of the perception of similar values as the dependent variable on the newly constructed treatment variable.<sup>11</sup> The graph shows the predicted probabilities of a profile being chosen as having similar values depending on how transnational the characteristics of the profile are. For example, a profile with no transnational characteristics has a 63.5% probability of being selected as having similar values, while a profile with eight transnational characteristics has a predicted probability of 37.4%. The decreasing line shows that, on average, the more transnational the characteristics of a profile, the less likely are respondents to assume that the person has similar values, i.e., to categorize the person as a member of their in-group.

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10 For the treatment “place of residence (urban/rural),” which has three levels, the transnational characteristic was given the value of 1, the middle category was given the value of 0.5 and the national category was given the value of 0, which result in the overall indicator ranging from 0 to 8 with 16 intervals of 0.5.

11 The effect of the overall number of transnational characteristics on the perception of trustworthiness shows the identical pattern.

**Figure 2: Overall perceptions of winners of globalization**


*Note:* Predicted probabilities of perceiving similar values based on the number of transnational treatments. Results from logistic regression models. *Source:* Author.

### Variations in the perceptions of the winners of globalization

The previous sets of results have shown overall negative perceptions of the winners of globalization. These results are based on average effects and thus on the average perception within the German population. However, it seems likely that there is heterogeneity in the perceptions of the winners of globalization, as, on the one hand, a person's own social position along the globalization cleavage determines whether he or she leans more in the direction of one of the end-poles of the cleavage or the other. On the other hand, how people perceive the winners of globalization might be related to where they are positioned on other societal divides within Germany, as the formation of a relatively new cleavage like the globalization cleavage crucially depends on the existing divides within a country (Kriesi et al., 2006; Mader et al., 2020). Another way of asking this is whether, in contrast to the overwhelmingly negative perceptions seen so far in the results, there are people who perceive the winners of globalization in a positive way.

To analyze this question, the combined treatment variable will be interacted with the respondents' characteristics, to see whether they moderate the treatment

Figure 3: Interactions with respondent-characteristics



Note: Predicted probabilities of perceiving similar values for different groups of respondents based on the number of transnational treatments. Results from logistic regression models. Source: Author.

effect on the choice items. The first set of respondent characteristics is supposed to measure their position on the globalization cleavage. I use three socio-demographic variables that have been shown to influence the extent to which a person engages in transnational activities or holds pro-globalization attitudes: the education level, the place of locality, and age. The second set of respondent characteristics is related to other societal divides, namely between people with left- and right-leaning political views, between people with high and low levels of wealth, and between the old (west) and new (east) federal states of Germany. While it is an open question how these divides relate to the new globalization-cleavage, my cautious expectations are that people with left-leaning political views, wealthy persons, and people from the west of Germany tend to have a more positive perception of the winners of globalization.

Figure 3 shows the results of six logistic regression models with interaction effects between the combined treatment variable and the respective characteristics of the respondents on the perception of sharing similar values. Each graph shows the predicted probability of a profile being chosen as having similar values on the y-axis. The x-axis shows the number of transnational characteristics of the presented pro-

files. The different lines indicate the different categories of the respective respondent characteristics. Overall, the graphs show how the perceptions of the profiles change for different groups of respondents depending on the number of transnational characteristics of the profiles.

For example, the first panel of Figure 3 shows the interaction with the respondents' level of education. It shows that persons with low (lower secondary) or medium (upper secondary, non-tertiary) levels of education have strong positive perceptions of persons with few transnational characteristics. Their perceptions become substantially more negative with every additional transnational characteristic, resulting in quite low levels of perceptions of similar values for persons with many transnational characteristics. For persons with university degrees, there is no difference in the evaluation of the profiles between profiles with few and many transnational characteristics. The second panel shows the interaction with the respondents' subjective description of their place of locality. It shows negative effects for all three categories, although the strongest negative effect is for people living in rural areas, followed by people from medium-sized towns, and the least negative is for people from urban areas. Notably, while urbanity and tertiary education are commonly found as reliable predictors for being a winner of globalization, both do not have positive interaction effects, meaning that both groups of respondents do not perceive winners of globalization positively. Age, on the other hand, the third structural characteristic, shows a different pattern. The third panel shows a stark generational divide between people younger than thirty-five and the rest of the population. While people thirty-five and older lean more towards persons with fewer transnational characteristics, younger people perceive persons more as the in-group, the more transnational their characteristics are.

Concerning the second set of respondent characteristics, we can see a similar pattern regarding the effects of the respondents' self-placement on the political left-right dimension. Left-leaning persons have more positive perceptions of persons with transnational characteristics, in contrast to persons in the political middle and right-leaning persons. Lastly, on the remaining two characteristics, there are no substantial differences in the effects depending on the respondents' wealth or whether they live in West and East Germany. Overall, these results confirm the picture of the broad existence of negative perceptions of the winners of globalization within the German population. Expectations about people with high levels of education, living in urban areas, being wealthy, and living in West Germany having positive perceptions are not supported. The only two groups with positive evaluations of the winners of globalization are people under the age of thirty-five and people who describe themselves as politically left.

## Discussion

In my study, I explored a new approach for researching social transnationalization that measures people's perceptions of the winners of globalization as a proxy for their underlying evaluation of the transnationalization of their lifeworlds. This approach takes into account that transnationalization has become a polarized political issue as a result of the emergence of a cleavage between winners and losers of globalization and that people's attitudes towards transnationalization are tied to their cleavage-based group identities and stereotypes. How people perceive the winners of globalization, whether they see them as members of the in-group or an out-group, gives an impression of their underlying views of transnationalization. The empirical analysis consisted of a conjoint experiment based on an online sample of the German population, in which respondents categorized fictitious persons as in-group or out-group members, that were described in terms of the degree of the transnationalization of their social characteristics,

The analysis of the experiment produced three sets of results. The *first* results came from looking at the perceptions of specific transnational characteristics related to the winners of globalization. Most of these characteristics elicited negative responses, resulting in out-group categorizations of profiles with these characteristics by the respondents. The strongest negative perception was measured concerning positive attitudes towards immigration. However, there were some characteristics that elicited more positive responses, like having a high level of education, and having worked abroad. These positive responses might be the result of these characteristics being understood as general signals of high status that go beyond a specific connotation with the globalization divide.

*Second*, going beyond individual characteristics and looking on how people are generally perceived depending on the number of transnational characteristics, the results show that higher numbers of transnational characteristics lead to being perceived as an out-group member. Moreover, the differences in the perceptions between persons with few and many transnational characteristics are quite stark.

*Third*, the results show some heterogeneity in the perceptions of winners of globalization in the German population, with people on the political left and people under the age of thirty-five having positive perceptions. Curiously, other characteristics that have been shown by other studies to be correlated with transnational orientations, such as a high level of education or living in an urban area, are not related to having positive perceptions of the winners of globalization. One explanation for this could be that while a majority of persons living in urban centers or having high levels of education have relatively transnationalized lifeworlds and positive attitudes towards globalization, not every person within these categories identifies as a winner of globalization and regards other winners as an in-group. In other words, the lack of positive perceptions of the winners of globalization by these categories of



people might be a feature of the applied approach of measuring social transnationalization, as it focuses more on people's social identities and biases.

What do these findings tell us about the progression of social transnationalization? For one, large swaths of the population of Germany remain skeptical about the transnationalization of their society. While transnationalization progresses, they do not want to be and live like the people who are on the forefront of these developments. As these results come from Germany, one of the countries with the highest degree of globalization, it stands to reason that perceptions of transnationalization are at a similar or even more negative level in less globalized countries. Moreover, the results show how transnationalization processes have become increasingly contentious, as individuals' evaluations of transnationalization are influenced by a desire to distinguish themselves from the winners of globalization. As such, it is evidence of the growing polarization of national societies around the issues of globalization and transnationalization. Overall, the findings indicate that with most individuals remaining oriented towards their national society, social transnationalization and the formation of a global society is still far from being reached.

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# Has Global Semiperiphery Ended in the Era of Deglobalization? Transforming Epicenter of Antisystemic Movements in the Global South

Chungse Jung

This chapter explores how the centerpiece of popular protests in the Global South changed according to the transforming zones of the capitalist world-economy. According to the dataset of protest events spanning 43 countries/regions in the Global South in *The New York Times* from 1870 to 2016, popular protests during the long 20<sup>th</sup> century mainly occurred in the semiperipheral countries and regions (*core-contenders* and *upper-tier semiperiphery*). That is, the semiperiphery had been a powerhouse of antisystemic dynamics and had functioned as a revolutionary space rather than a *stabilizer* of the world-economy. In particular, the *upper-tier semiperiphery* took a central place during the first two protest waves: the 1930s and the long 1950s, and the *core-contenders* dominated the third protest wave in the 1980s. However, popular protests of the semiperiphery *absolutely* and then *relatively* began to decline in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century alongside an overall decline in popular protests of the Global South. Popular protests in the periphery (*strong periphery* and *weak periphery*) drastically rose from the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. After the *bifurcation* of the pattern of antisystemic struggles between semiperiphery and periphery, the global epicenter center of counter-hegemonic forces has thus shifted from the *core-contenders* to the *strong periphery*. This outcome demonstrates that the *strong periphery* has emerged as a revolutionary space in the era of deglobalization.

## Introduction

From a long historical perspective, we observe long waves of global integration and disintegration: on the one hand, phases of accelerated globalization, such as two periods of emerging liberalism before 1914 and neoliberalism after 1989 as well as the era of developmentalism during the 1970s; On the other hand, phases of deglobalization, for example, the interwar period between 1914 and 1945 or the early 21<sup>st</sup> century in the aftermath the global financial and economic crisis of 2008. The changing world-historical structure of the capitalist world-economy such as global

integration and disintegration as well as (re)configuration and (re)fragmentation of the global economy has played an important role in emerging antisystemic struggles against the dominant capitalist system of oppression and inequality and for seeking alternative routes of a more democratic and egalitarian direction of the capitalist world-economy. The world-historical structure of the social movement is driven by the foundational logic of the world-system, defined by political and economic inequalities across countries and regions. In particular, the Global South—Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the European periphery—has been epicenters of various processes of the global disintegration and regional fragmentation of world-economy and diverse emancipatory struggles against economic, political, and social orders of global hegemonic powers.

The analysis of *antisystemic movements* points to the significance of how a country and region's position in the world-economy shapes movement dynamics. Arrighi et al. (1989, 35) said that "each antisystemic movement is located in political and economic processes shaped by the particular and different contexts and by the different positions in the world-system of the locales in which they arise and work themselves out." This perspective sheds light on the world-historical occurrences of social movements and their relations to the structure of the world-economy. The structure of the world-economy is responsible for the similarity of antisystemic movements across countries and regions because it helps to create transnational opportunities and structural affinities and facilitates the diffusion processes.

This chapter explores the world-historical activities of popular protests in the Global South according to the transforming zones of the capitalist world-economy. By using the dataset of protest events spanning forty-three countries/regions in the Global South compiled from *The New York Times* between 1870 and 2016 (see Jung, 2020a), I will attempt to explore the relationship between the world-historical occurrences of social movements in the Global South and the structure of the capitalist world-economy. In particular, in order to assess the forces of its antisystemic activities within the structure of the world-system, I will examine the political function of the semiperiphery, whether as a *stabilizer* or as a *revolutionary space*. I will then search for how to transit the epicenter of antisystemic movements in the capitalist world-economy over the long 20<sup>th</sup> century, as well as the *bifurcation* dynamics between the semiperiphery and the periphery in the trajectory of resistance after the late 1990s and the early 2000s.

## The Structure of the World-Economy in Transition

### Semiperiphery of the capitalist world-economy

Wallerstein's approach to the structure of the world-economy is based on a system-wide axial division of labor characterized by the three zones, *core-semiperiphery-*

*periphery*, and each zone plays a specific role within the system (see Wallerstein, 2004). The identification of three broad zones is a key contribution of world-systems analysis to understanding the structure and dynamics of the modern capitalist world-economy. As Wallerstein (2004, 17) asserted, “core-periphery is a relational concept, not a pair of terms that are reified, that is, have separate essential meanings.” Countries and regions in the capitalist world-economy have historically clustered along a continuum between the core and the periphery. However, the ambiguity is compounded by the fact that the term “semiperiphery” is sometimes used to suggest an intermediate function in its hierarchical position and its relational role in the capitalist world-economy.<sup>1</sup> Terlouw (2002, 6) criticized this: “they all found the semiperiphery they were looking for, but they differed widely in which states they identified as semiperipheral.” Thus, the historical trimodal framework of the capitalist world-economy has been challenged by both epistemological studies (see Taylor, 1987) and empirical studies on the world-systems perspective (see Babones, 2005; Babones, 2009; Karataşlı, 2017; Mahutga, 2006; Nemeth and Smith, 1985).<sup>2</sup> In particular, Karataşlı (2017, 167) has asserted that the number and size of existing clusters have transformed over time and this provides crucial information about the structure of the capitalist world-economy. As a result, it might be proposed that the long-lasting concept of the core-semiperiphery-periphery is fading since the semiperiphery is empirically “obsolescent,” “malfunctioning,” or “disappearing” (see Lee, 2009; for zonal volatility of the world-economy, see Pasciuti and Payne, 2017).

The logic of the semiperiphery goes beyond the intermediate functions of the system-wide division of labor in the capitalist world-economy. It plays a *political* role in the structure of the world-system (Wallerstein, 1985, 34; Wallerstein, 2004, 97). According to Straussfogel (1997, 120), the core-periphery relation creates the framework for a structural typology of political states within the world-economy, and “economic polarization is paralleled by a political polarization of strong versus weak states.” That is, as Wallerstein (2004, 97) said, “we can talk of semiperipheral countries, and we find they have a *specific kind of politics* and play a *particular role* in the functioning of the world-system.” In particular, Wallerstein (1979, 69) argued that the existence of the semiperiphery is essential to the stability of the capital-

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1 There is a relatively clear definition of semiperiphery from Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993, 865f.). Chase-Dunn and Hall defined the semiperiphery as: a region may be one that mixes both core and peripheral forms of organization; a region may be spatially located between the core and peripheral regions; a region may carry out mediating activities between core and peripheral areas; an area may be one in which institutional features are in some way intermediate between those forms found in core and periphery.

2 Babones (2005; 2009) found that the distribution of the world population from 1975 to 2000 has shown the existence of three clusters, while the semiperiphery, in all these decades, has the lowest proportion among the three zones. Otherwise, according to the empirical studies of Mahutga (2006), Nemeth and Smith (1985), and Karataşlı (2017), the three broad zones of the capitalist world-economy can be broken down into four or even more clusters.



ist world-economy because it creates a buffer zone that prevents an acute struggle between the core and the periphery. In considering the positional attribution of the semiperiphery in the core-periphery structure, the political function of the semiperiphery is to *stabilize* the world-system by concentrating deviant political forms in an intermediate position and to depolarize the core's exploitation of the periphery (Wallerstein 1985, 39). For example, Chase-Dunn (1988, 1990, 1998) asserted that the semiperiphery has been an exceptionally *fertile* ground for antisystemic and transformative actions because semiperipheral countries and regions are the weakest links in the capitalist world-economy. Bergesen (1992, 409f.) argued, moreover, that dramatic changes and rebellions are more likely in the semiperipheral regions where the resources for both popular and state mobilization are more substantial, thus promoting rebellion and repression. Martin (1990, 9f.) also claimed that the rising tide of political struggles and social, labor, nationalist, and antisystemic movements have erupted primarily in semiperipheral countries and regions.


### Periodization of changing the structure of the world-economy

The foremost task in determining the importance of the semiperiphery in antisystemic movement activities is to examine which countries/regions of the world-economy are constituent to the semiperiphery and periphery of the capitalist world-economy and how these shifted over time. To this end, I utilized the classification of the latest network analyses, using global trade data and the international division of labor in the world-economy (see Lloyd et al., 2009; Mahutga and Smith, 2011).<sup>3</sup> In order to identify a more detailed periodization of the fast-changing structure of the world-economy in the long 20<sup>th</sup> century. I used two key economic indicators to represent the growth of the global economy: the *Global Trade Openness Index* and World real GDP per capita from 1870 to 2016. There were three long marches of globalization: 1870 to 1913; 1945 to 1974; and 1986 to 2008 (see Figure 1). The first globalization of the long 20<sup>th</sup> century triggered the expansion of colonialism and ended with the First World War. The second globalization started after the Second World War and ended with the First Oil Crisis. The third globalization began with the emergence of neoliberalism in the mid-1980s and ended with the 2008 global financial crisis.

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3 Mahutga (2006) developed the relational equivalence model and included more county data at multiple time points to capture the entire picture of the world commodity trade network (for a similar approach, see Van Rossem, 1996). Mahutga and Smith (2011) thus suggested six clusters—*core*, *core-contenders*, *upper-tier semiperiphery*, *strong periphery*, *weak periphery*, and *weakest periphery*—to assess the capacity of each group in the capitalist world-economy.

**Figure 1: World GDP per capita and *Global Trade Openness Index*, 1870–2016**



*Note:* Trade openness is measured as the sum of exports and imports in goods and services as a share of GDP (in percent). A higher index value means a higher influence of trade transitions on global economic activity (Ortiz-Ospina et al., 2019). World GDP per capita is a world-averaged real gross domestic product per capita converted in the 1990 U.S. dollar with multiple benchmarks (Bolt et al., 2018). *Source:* Author.

Over the long 20<sup>th</sup> century, the global economy has experienced constant economic growth and economic growth has been accompanied by an expansion of the openness of global trade (see Frankel and Romer, 1999). At the global level, there was a correlation between economic growth and global trade: higher rates of GDP per capita growth tended to correspond to higher rates of growth in trade openness—the overall correlation coefficient is .89 between 1870 and 2016. The correlation was more remarkable in the second half of the long 20<sup>th</sup> century (correlation coefficient is .96 between 1951 and 2016) when compared to the first half (correlation coefficient is -.62 between 1870 and 1950).

Next, I used cluster analysis of two historical variables to find the optimal number of periodizations. The outcome of cluster analysis showed that six temporal clusters seem quantitatively meaningful (for more statistical results, see Jung 2020a, 118f.). The six clusters of periodization—1870–1920, 1921–1950, 1951–1972, 1973–94, 1995–2004, and 2005–2016—likely reflect dynamic transitions in the structure of the capitalist world-economy between 1870 and 2016. Applying the classification of countries/regions in the world-economy by network analyses (see Lloyd et al., 2009;

Mahutga and Smith, 2011), I finally composed a *heuristic* classification of forty-three countries/regions in the Global South (see Table 1).

Overall, the three-tiered hierarchical structure remained largely stable over the long 20<sup>th</sup> century (for the recent discussion, see Dunaway and Clelland, 2017), while some individual countries/regions changed their position in the structure of the capitalist world-economy. During the period of “the short twentieth century” (Hobsbawm, 1996), the capitalist world-system expanded and incorporated new territories for capital accumulation and the global relocation of capital by developing new geographical centers for production and trade. Here, three major transformation dynamics could be observed in the Global South over the long 20<sup>th</sup> century (see Figure 2). The first major path was the upward mobility from the strong periphery to the upper-tier semiperiphery (Egypt, Indonesia, South Korea, Morocco, the Philippines, Syria, and Thailand) between the periods, 1921–1950 and 1951–1972. The second major path was upward mobility from the upper-tier semiperiphery to the core-contenders *within* the zone of the semiperiphery (Argentina, Brazil, China, South Korea, and South Africa) between the periods 1951–1972 and 1973–1994. And last, the third major path was the downward mobility from the upper-tier semiperiphery to the strong periphery (Colombia, Cuba, Iraq, Kenya, Morocco, Syria, and Ukraine) between the periods of 1973–1994 and 1995–2004. In the transition from developmentalism to neoliberalism, the transformation dynamics reversed from upward to downward mobility in which a large section of the semiperiphery dropped into the periphery due to the structural crisis of capitalism.

As a result, the Global South has experienced a divergence from the key intermediate zone, the upper-tier semiperiphery, to the core-contenders or the strong periphery in the capitalist world-economy during the end of the long 20<sup>th</sup> century. In particular, countries/regions of the core-contenders such as China, India, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey have achieved faster economic growth and have drastically increased their economic properties and influence relative to the global economy than any other countries/regions in the Global South over the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and early 21<sup>st</sup> century. The polarization of income levels among the zones of the world-economy in the Global South started in the mid-1970s and has accelerated since the mid-1990s (see Figure 3). The rapid divergence of income levels among the zones of the world-economy and, especially, the rise of the core-contenders group in the Global South have led *paradoxically* to an *overall* decrease in global inequality during the period since 1990. The average decrease in global inequality between-country is mainly due to the remarkable economic growth of China and India, which have the two largest populations and have experienced rapid economic development over the past several decades (see Firebaugh and Goesling, 2004; Hung and Kucinskas, 2001).


**Table 1: Classification of countries/regions in the semiperiphery and the periphery, 1870–2016**

	1870–1920	1921–1950	1951–1972	1973–1994	1995–2004	2005–2016
<b><i>Semiperiphery</i></b>						
Core- conten- ders	Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic), Hungary, Poland, Soviet Union (Russia), Yugoslavia (Serbia) (5)	Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic), Hong Kong, Hungary, Poland, Soviet Union (Russia), Yugoslavia (Serbia) (6)	Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic), Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Poland, Soviet Union (Russia), Yugoslavia (Serbia) (7)	Argentina, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic), Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Iraq, South Korea, Poland, Soviet Union (Russia), South Africa, Yugoslavia (Serbia) (13)	Argentina, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, South Korea, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, Thailand (14)	Argentina, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, South Korea, Mexico, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Thailand (14)
Upper- tier semi- periphery	Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Hong Kong, India, Mexico, Pakistan (India), Romania, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine (12)	Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Cuba, India, Mexico, Pakistan (India), Romania, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine (13)	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Romania, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine (13)	Bulgaria, Chile, Indonesia, Philippines, Romania, Turkey, Vietnam (7)	Bulgaria, Chile, Indonesia, Philippines, Romania, Turkey, Vietnam (7)	Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Philippines, Romania, Serbia, Vietnam (8)
<b><i>Periphery</i></b>						
Strong periphery	Algeria, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Lebanon, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Venezuela (18)	Algeria, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Lebanon, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Venezuela (17)	Algeria, Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Peru, Tunisia, Venezuela (12)	Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey (10)	Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela (16)	Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru, Sudan, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela (16)
Weak periphery	DR Congo, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Myanmar, Palestine, Sudan, Vietnam (8)	DR Congo, Kenya, Libya, Myanmar, Palestine, Sudan, Vietnam (7)	DR Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, Palestine, Venezuela, Vietnam (7)	Algeria, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, Nicaragua, Palestine (6)	Algeria, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, Nicaragua, Palestine (6)	DR Congo, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Palestine, Syria (5)

**Table 1 (cont.)**


*Notes:* For the period, 1951–1972, 1973–1994, and 1995–2004, this analysis used the classifications of Lloyd et al. (2009) and Mahutga and Smith (2011). There is *no* study of the classification before 1960 using network analysis. For the classification of the two periods, 1870–1920 and 1921–1950, this analysis primarily utilized the classification of 1951–1972 with some adjustments that considered changes in the individual country/region's situation within the world-economy such as colonialization/independence; rapid economic development/industrialization; civil war; and/or revolution. In particular, in the transition between 1870–1920 and 1921–1950, Hong Kong's position from the upper-tier semiperiphery to the core-contenders changed since Hong Kong was a major trading port of the British Empire in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. This analysis also adjusted Chile and Cuba's position from the strong periphery to the upper-tier semiperiphery since both countries started industrialization in the 1920s, as well as Iraq's shift from the weak periphery to the strong periphery since Iraq was incorporated into one of the key regions in the British Empire after the First World War. During the transition between 1921–1950 and 1951–1972, this analysis made a change in India's position from the upper-tier semiperiphery to the core-contenders since India started rapid industrialization in the 1950s after independence. In the same period, since a large group of countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, South Korea, Indonesia, Morocco, the Philippines, Syria, and Thailand started to industrialize in the 1950s and the early 1960s, this analysis raised their positions from the strong periphery to the upper-tier semiperiphery. This analysis also changed Kenya's position from the weak periphery to the strong periphery since Kenya experienced fast economic growth after independence. This analysis, otherwise, adjusted Chile's position from the upper-tier semiperiphery to the strong periphery. Chile's economic growth stagnated from 1940 to 1970 because of strong economic protectionism and political instability. Between 2005 and 2016, this analysis primarily utilized the classification of 1995–2004 with some adjustments by considering changes in the individual country/region's situation within the world-economy such as rapid economic development or civil war. In particular, during the transition between 1995–2004 and 2005–16, this analysis moved Turkey up from the upper-tier semiperiphery to the core-contenders because of its rapid economic growth in the 2000s. Three countries also changed their positions: Colombia from the strong periphery to the upper-tier semiperiphery and Algeria and Libya from the weak periphery to the strong periphery since these countries achieved rapid economic growth in the 2000s. Otherwise, Serbia (former Yugoslavia) moved down from the core-contenders following Serbia's loss of economic power in the Balkans. Syria also moved down from the strong periphery to the weak periphery because of the lasting and severe civil war. *Source:* Author.

**Figure 2: Number of country/region in zone of the world-economy, 1870–2016**



Source: Author.

**Figure 3: Income level by zone of the world-economy, 1870–2016**



Data source: GDP per Capita (2011 US Dollar) from *Maddison Project Database* (Bolt et al., 2018). Source: Author.

## Protest Waves and Diversification of the Global South

In order to map out the world-historical activities of popular protest in the Global South, I use the dataset of protest events spanning forth-three countries and regions in the global compiled from *The New York Times* between 1870 and 2016 (for a brief description of the dataset and country/region list, see Table 2; for more information about the dataset, see Jung, 2020a, appendix A). Since *The New York Times* provides the greatest coverage of protest events in the Global South, for the covered period the dataset mostly includes reports of major revolutions, rebellions, revolts, civil strife, insurrections, insurgencies, uprisings, and turmoil including riots and demonstrations in the Global South.<sup>4</sup> Although the frequency of protest events in the dataset is not an *actual* population of protest events in the Global South, it is at least a highly representative sample of protests approximately parallel to the overall picture of popular protest in the Global South.

### Semiperiphery in antisystemic movements

The compiled world-historical activities of popular protest in the Global South show dynamic fluctuation in both semiperiphery and periphery over the long 20<sup>th</sup> century (see Figure 4). One of the immediate findings in plotting protest events is the identification of four greater temporal clusters of popular protests. The first protest wave began in the late 1920s and lasted into the 1930s. The second protest wave, for the emancipation of colonized countries and regions after the Second World War, began in 1946, reached its peak in the late 1950s, and lasted until the mid-1960s. The third protest wave unfolded across the 1980s. Finally, the fourth protest wave arose in the early 2010s. Empirical investigations also reveal that between 1870 and 2016 popular protest events mainly occurred in the semiperipheral countries/regions, 66.7 percent, rather than in the peripheral regions, 33.3 percent (see Table 3 and Figure 5). This means that the political role of the semiperiphery within the structure of the world-system has been most likely a *revolutionary space*. This claim can be more clearly discerned when the data for the zone of the world-economy of the top countries/regions in popular protests have been searched (see Table 4). Major countries/regions of popular protests have been located in the zone of the semiperiphery.

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4 We should note that investigating protest events particularly in the Global South on the scope of coverage in the global datasets relying exclusively on reporting in English-language newspapers is not constant across countries and times (see Herkenrath and Knoll, 2011). We should also need to clarify the *historically embedded U.S.-centric selection bias* of *The New York Times*. In particular, we should heed that *The New York Times* includes pro/anti-US bias: coverage tends to focus on the interests of and conflicts with the United States. This tends to lead to an overreporting of critical allies and enemies of the United States (see Lichbach, 1984).

**Table 2: Brief description of the dataset**


Dataset <i>World-Historical Protest Events in the Global South</i>	
Period of analysis	January 1, 1870–December 31, 2016
Newspaper database	ProQuest Historical Newspapers <i>The New York Times</i>
Number of protest events	20,529
Country/region (43)	Asia (10): China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam The Middle East and North Africa (11): Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey Africa (5): Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Sudan Eastern Europe (8): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine Latin America (9): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela
<i>Source:</i> Author.	

**Table 3: Statistical description of protest events by zone of the world-economy, 1870–2016**

Zone of the world-economy		Rate (%)	Peak year
Semiperiphery		66.7	1930
Periphery		33.3	2011
Semiperiphery	Core-contenders	22.9	1905
	Upper-tier semiperiphery	43.9	1930
Periphery	Strong periphery	24.4	2011
	Weak periphery	8.8	1964
<i>Source:</i> Author.			



Figure 4: Protest events by zone of the world-economy, 1870-2016




Source: Author.

**Table 4: Top countries/regions in protest events and zone of the world-economy, 1870–2016**

Country/region	Rate (%)	Region	Zone of the world-economy
Mexico	10.0	Latin America	Semiperiphery
China	8.9	Asia	Semiperiphery
India	7.6	Asia	Semiperiphery
Cuba	5.7	Latin America	Periphery-Semiperiphery-Periphery
Argentina	4.9	Latin America	Semiperiphery
Poland	3.9	Eastern Europe	Semiperiphery
Russia	3.8	Eastern Europe	Semiperiphery
Brazil	3.8	Latin America	Semiperiphery
South Africa	3.6	Africa	Semiperiphery
Philippines	2.6	Asia	Periphery-Semiperiphery
South Korea	2.6	Asia	Periphery-Semiperiphery
Chile	2.5	Latin America	Periphery-Semiperiphery
<i>Source:</i> Author.			

In particular, the upper-tier semiperiphery took a central place during the first two protest waves, the 1930s (1927–1937) and the long 1950s (1946–1966), and the core-contenders dominated the third protest wave of the 1980s (1979–1990) (see Figure 6). The analysis of popular protest provides a clear picture of how to relate the upward mobility of the countries and regions in the capitalist world-economy and their antisystemic activities, particularly in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. There are two massive upward mobilities in the period 1951–1972 and the period 1973–1994. These two upward mobilities are connected to two great protest waves of the semiperiphery in the long 1950s and the 1980s.

In contrast, popular protests in the semiperiphery *absolutely* and then *relatively* began to decline in the late 20<sup>th</sup>/early 21<sup>st</sup> century, alongside the overall decline of popular protests in the Global South (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). Between 1995 and 2016, the income levels of the core-contenders and upper-tier semiperiphery compared to the world average increased from 123.1 to 147.5 and 71.6 to 81.5, respectively (see Figure 3). In particular, the growth rate in the income level of the core-contenders over the last 22 years is three times greater than the rate over the past 125 years, from 1870 to 1994. On the contrary, between the two protest waves of the 1980s and the early 2010s (2011–2014), the frequencies of protest events in the core-contenders and the upper-tier semiperiphery drastically decreased (see Figure 7). Adopting a traditional understanding of class politics, this seems likely—people with higher incomes became more conservative—during a period of crisis in

**Figure 5: Share of the protest events by zone of the world-economy, 1870–2016**

Source: Author.

U.S. hegemony (Lipset, 1960; Butler and Stokes, 1974). Otherwise, it barely worked for the past one hundred years in the capitalist world-economy. In sum, this trend shows that the political property of the semiperiphery in the world-economy might have become *obsolescent* in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and early 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### Rise of the periphery in antisystemic movements


Different experiences of development and globalization in the Global South led to the *bifurcation* of a pattern of protest waves between the semiperiphery and the periphery in the period of transition to neoliberalism from 1995 to 2004. One of the notable trends in the world-historical activities of popular protest for the long 20<sup>th</sup> century is the rise of the periphery at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Protest events in the strong periphery and the weak periphery have increased since the early 2000s and in the early 2010s respectively (see Figure 7). The world-historical pattern of popular protest between the semiperiphery and the periphery bears a strong resemblance to the period of the *short* 20<sup>th</sup> century from 1921 to 1994: the correlation coefficient is .46. However, in the period from 1995 to 2016, this pattern has flipped: the correlation coefficient is -.14 (see Table 5).

**Table 5: Correlation of the protest events between the semiperiphery and the periphery, 1870–2016**

1870–1920	1921–1950	1951–1972	1973–1994	1995–2004	2005–2016	1870–2016
.10	.50	.70	.18	-.51	.13	.49

Source: Author.

**Figure 6: Share of diversified zone of the world-economy in the protest events by the protest waves**



Source: Author.

Therefore, the fragmented experiences of hegemonic projects have influenced the emergence of anti-statist currents of popular politics in the peripheral regions since the early 2000s and the frequency of protest events in the periphery finally began exceeding the semiperiphery from the early 2010s (see Figure 6 and Figure 7).

This trend is even more evident when searching for a more diversified categorization of the world-economy. Empirical investigation suggests that in the periphery, the strong periphery was the fastest-growing during the period of the last protest wave (see Figure 7). Since 2005, the center stage of antisystemic dynamics in the capitalist world-economy has shifted from the core-contenders to the strong periphery. Between the two protest waves of the 1980s and the early 2010s, the share of protest events in the strong periphery and the weak periphery increased from 22.8 percent to 48.5 percent and from only 8.3 percent to 24.0 percent, respectively (see Figure 6). This outcome finds that countries and regions in the global periphery lead the protest wave of the early 2010s and emerged as a revolutionary space as they

Figure 7: Protest events of diversified zone in the world-economy, 1870–2016





Figure 7 (cont.)



Source: Author.

they increased their political property in antisystemic struggles during the time of the U.S. hegemonic crisis.


The current convergence of U.S. hegemonic decline and intensified integration of the global periphery into the world-economy can explain why widespread popular protests continue in the peripheral countries and regions of the world-economy. Since globalization has accelerated, global production and commodity chains have been characterized by a dynamic of polarization in which those parts of the production process that are based in the periphery tend to be low-cost and lower-value production, whereas advanced semiperipheral regions attract global foreign direct investment that has only reached a few emerging countries and regions (Kiely, 2007). This new structure of the capitalist world-economy has reinforced the subordinate position of the periphery in the world-economy. Between 1995 and 2016, income levels in the strong periphery and the weak periphery decreased in relation to the world average from 59.1 to 55.6 and 35.0 to 31.2 (see Figure 3). The weak periphery experienced a historic low in the absolute value of its income level in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Economic inequality between the periphery and other zones of the capitalist world-economy has increased. As a result, the deterioration of U.S. hegemony has diminished its ability to prevent or control popular protests and struggles in the periphery. Two more decades of economic stagnation and increasing economic inequality have fomented new conditions for antisystemic *populism* and struggles for *deglobalization* among peoples in the global periphery. With increasing integration into the world-economy, global factors have influenced local politics on the global periphery.

## Antisystemic Movements in Perspective

The capitalist world-economy has seen a rapid divergence in periods of developmentalism and globalization. Inequality within countries of the core and the periphery and inequality among countries and regions in the Global South have increased, especially, during the period of global hegemonic crisis. Martin (2008, 1) earlier asserted that for “at least several hundred years there have been successive waves of movements that have attacked and destabilized the capitalist world-economy, its hegemonic powers, and dominant geo-cultures, and yet at the same time, have come to provide legitimacy and the foundation for a new ordering of accumulation and political rule on a world scale.” Overlooking the antisystemic movements in the *longue durée*, they have expanded globally and throughout different countries and regions in the global South (see Figure 8; see also Jung, 2020b). They have articulated solid relations and formed a global response to the capitalist world-system. However, the strength and persistence of antisystemic movements in the Global South have overall *weakened* and *declined* over the second half of the long 20<sup>th</sup> century. Based on the empirical findings, this analysis could pose the following question: how did protest waves transform the dominant capitalist world-economy.

We are witnessing that there is a growing possibility of an end to capitalist globalization as we know it. Centrist (neo-)liberalism as an ideology has run out of life, and globalism is now being adjusted to what we called “deglobalization” as a result of broader geopolitical and geo-economic changes (see Bello, 2013, 273ff.). We are currently facing another period of rising outrage and discontent. According to Wallerstein’s expectation (2005, 1277), the next protest wave will not magically solve the intermediate dilemmas of the existing capitalist world-economy. Here is our dilemma in antisystemic movements in perspective: the global epicenter center of counter-hegemonic forces has moved from the global semiperiphery to the global periphery. The *strong periphery* has emerged as a revolutionary space in the era of deglobalization. Simultaneously, social struggles in the Global South have been transitioning from *globalized* to more *deglobalized* issues over the past decade which is what I want to call “the global regionalization of antisystemic movements.”

**Figure 8: Share of protest events by group of countries in the most frequent protest events, 1870–2016**



Notes: Top 3 countries are Mexico, China, and India. Big 6 countries are Cuba, Poland, Russia, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. Small 34 countries are the rest of 34 out of 43 countries in the dataset (for more detailed information, see Jung, 2020a, Appendix C). Source: Author.

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# Deglobalizing Patterns of Youth Political Engagement in Countries with Varying Democratic and Egalitarian Profiles

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While the youth can be a channel of political and social change, there have been accounts of youth ambivalence toward politics. Using the logic of convergence of world society and world systems, this research examines whether a globalizing trend of youth political engagement thrives in democratic cultures. Cluster analyses of more than 30 countries in 2004 and 2014 were conducted with youth political disengagement and distrust as clustering variables (from the *Citizenship* surveys of the International Social Survey Program) along with country statistics. For both 2004 and 2014, Cluster A is composed of core countries with democratic cultures; the youth exhibit high levels of political trust and engagement. Clusters B1 and B2 are composed of semi-periphery and periphery countries; compared to Cluster A, these clusters have less favorable country conditions and the youth are more politically disengaged. Cluster B1 youth are politically distrustful, while Cluster B2 youth are politically ambivalent. Instead of a clear convergence across countries, there are co-existing societies of politically engaged and disengaged youth. To be agentic actors, the youth will need to be politically socialized in accordance with country conditions.

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Positive social change is sustained by politically engaged citizens who vote government leaders in office, influence policy and legislation, and join civic initiatives (Weiss, 2020). The youth sector is pivotal in the spread of social and political ideas even as they are still being integrated in their nation's civic and political life. In par-

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ticular, emerging adults (ages 18 to 25) are fitting to study: although they have not yet attained political role stability, their growing competence and inclination toward explorations motivate them to be politically engaged (Arnett, 2002; Coe and Vandergrift, 2005; Ho et al., 2015). Yet, a substantial number has been disengaged, seeing politics as irrelevant to their lives (Farthing, 2010).

Political disengagement may arise from distrust in the effectivity of political discourse to lead to desired outcomes (Henn et al., 2005) and in the competence and integrity of political leaders and institutions (Coe and Vandergrift, 2005; Dermody and Hanmer-Lloyd, 2005). Indeed, political trust forms the crux of engagement. A people trusting of government affirms its legitimacy, supports its policies, and is more inclined toward participation (Eder and Katsanidou, 2015), but a people distrustful of government tends to be less politically active and less interested in elections and partisan politics (Snell, 2010).

## The Contexts of Youth Political Engagement and Political Trust

Social, economic, and cultural contexts are the backdrop of politics; they determine which sectors will be politically engaged in or excluded from political discourse and action. This chapter examines democracy and egalitarianism as the context of political engagement. It also examines country conditions that support democracy and egalitarianism, namely, good government functioning and economic development and equality. Individualism, a cultural variable supportive of youth's autonomy and activity, also is examined.

*Democratic political culture and egalitarianism (power distance).* When a government protects and cultivates its democracy (Chistensen and Læg Reid, 2003), its citizens trust the actors and institutions within it and, consequently, are propelled to participate in political processes (Warren, 2009; Eder and Katsanidou, 2015). Young people are more likely to be politically engaged if their government upholds the significance of the electoral process, promotes free political will, and organizes groups toward common goals (Cammaerts et al., 2014). For instance, European youth who trust in their country's democracy are reported to participate in social mobilization leading to desired political outputs (Kiisel et al., 2015).

Youth political engagement thrives in a society where people from all social groups have political rights and can influence political and governing processes (Sigman and Lindberg, 2019). Egalitarianism is not only a quality of government and civil society but also of the country's culture. The cultural dimension of large power distance, or the widespread acceptance and approval of power disparities, is associated with social inequality and undemocratic processes (Hofstede, 2001). Although power distance is a general cultural trait, its analog in the sociopolitical realm has been empirically established (Schwartz et al., 2010; Hofstede, 2011).

Although youth can be critical of government, many are still determined to take part in the democratic process (Bruter and Harrison, 2009), especially in a socially inclusive society (Council of Europe, 2003). When there is little power differential between sectors in society, it is easier for young people to be heard and to participate in different ways (Cammaerts et al., 2014). They empower themselves by banking on their skills and trusting in their decisions; they become less apathetic and take responsibility for their lives and those of others (Larson et al., 2005; Wong et al., 2010). In contrast, citizens from a less egalitarian society, experiencing distress due to their disadvantaged positions, would tend to abstain from political participation (Lancee and de Werfhorst, 2011).

*Good government functioning.* A government that functions well acts in accordance with its roles of protecting civil liberties, enforcing the law, and building up the economy (Sharma, 2007). With their capacity and eagerness to access information, young people can readily know when their government is prioritizing interests that conflict with those of the citizenry. Youth's increasing awareness of government's incompetence and dishonesty often leads to their political distrust and disengagement (Coe and Vandergrift, 2005; Dermody and Hanmer-Lloyd, 2005). In the United Kingdom, for instance, young people's distrust in public figures and institutions is apparent in their cynical attitude toward government and their lack of desire to exercise suffrage (Dermody and Hanmer-Lloyd, 2011).

Because many young people have the capacity to critically evaluate political figures (Cook, 1985), they can gauge when discourse between government leaders and the people has become futile (Henn et al., 2005), leading them to politically disengage. Young people from developed countries have leaned toward non-participation in political activities when they experience that the older populace or officials have become politically distant from them (Cammaerts et al., 2014).

*Economic development and equality.* With an abundant economy, people feel politically empowered and are more willing to support their country's democracy (Nayyar, 2015). Young people are enthused to be politically engaged by economic development in their country. For example, youth political activism and participation increased when Estonia, after shifting from Soviet rule to membership in the European Union, had attained positive economic changes (Allaste and Cairns, 2016). Once a country's economy flourishes, its citizens, including the youth, become more invested in the social realities and developments around them (Nayyar, 2015).

In contrast, economic instability and inequality engender citizens' political distrust and disengagement, specially of those who are disadvantaged (Costa and Kahn, 2003; Uslander and Brown, 2005; McDonald, 2015). Poor citizens have been shown to refrain from participating in the electoral process; they feel that economic inequality creates a political system that is biased toward the wealthy and that ignores their concerns (Solt, 2008). Youth political engagement is also compromised by a poor economy. In Pakistan, youth are disengaged because of increasing pov-

erty, high unemployment rate, and economic instability (Hafeez and Fasih, 2018). During the socio-economic crisis in Spain, a substantial number of youth have become distrustful of government and abstained from voting (Jover et al., 2014).

*Individualism.* The cultural trait of individualism refers to expectations and norms that place greater importance on the individual over the group (Hofstede, 2001). Peoples who put premium on individualism, such as those in Northern Europe, Western Europe, and North America (Triandis, 1989), are focused on their aims and are not inhibited by what other members of society think and feel (Triandis, 2001). Thus, emerging adults will find individualistic cultures compatible with and supportive of their qualities of autonomy and independence and their activities of self-explorations (Arnett, 2000).

Individualism may lead youth to be politically engaged for the good of society and of others. Included in young people's desire to self-explore is the desire to engage in political practices reflective not so much of traditional political self-serving as they are of placing the welfare of others at the forefront (Suchowerska, 2013). For instance, in Australia (which is high on individualism), youth are not keen to participate in conventional politics because they feel that they are unheard; while many of them are not part of protest cultures, they are keen to do what they can, in the way they wish, to address political and social concerns (Harris et al., 2010).

## The Contexts of Political Disengagement Within World Society

Political, economic, and cultural contexts vary across countries; and youth's levels of political distrust and disengagement would vary, too, to the extent that they are influenced by these contexts. The contexts of democracy, economic development, and individualism, however, have had a global reach or influence, having been endorsed or attained by many countries (Herkenrath et al., 2005). This chapter uses world society and world systems as frameworks in examining integration versus differentiation of countries along these contexts.

*Integration and differentiation of world society.* World society is comprised of institutions, cultures, mindset, and principles that, on a worldwide scale, shape peoples' thinking and acting (Heintz, 1982). With such global extent of influence, the world is headed in the direction of *integration* of countries toward one society (i.e., world society). There are, however, stable, substantive variations in the world's social systems so that world society is not definitively geared toward integration but rather fluctuates between integration and *differentiation* (Albert, 2016).

For Heintz (1982), world society has no common culture or identity; rather, there is heterogeneity (i.e., differentiation) as countries maintain their own identities. Nevertheless, Heintz (1982) claims that "a meaningful world society can only result from a commonly shared knowledge revealing action spaces and making people true participants in this society" (20). As does Heintz's model of world so-

ciety, Meyer's (2010) world polity theory sees world society becoming integrated through institutions and values that are "diffused" across societies (Ziltener, 2021). For Meyer, the world is an integrated system, a "singular polity," contextualized in a culture, providing social actors with the norms and goals to form their identities and to structure their behaviors (McNeely, 2012). The idea of integration underscored in Meyer's world polity approach reflects Bull's initial conceptualization of world society within the English School tradition: "by a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built" (as cited in Williams, 2014, 130).

*Integration and differentiation within globalization.* Globalization, in its contemporary specific usage, refers to the "the growing interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and services, technology, and flows of investment, people, and information" (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2022, 1). While the current research does not document nor analyze the interdependence and exchange between countries, it nevertheless aims to present evidence of "universalization" (Scholte, 2002, 8), or of events or phenomena spreading worldwide. To the extent that the objects of this study, democracy and egalitarianism, have strong Western roots (Anderson et al., 2014; Black, 1997), then this universalization also is "Westernization" (Scholte, 2002, 12), with Western cultures and processes taking over countries' traditional or local processes (Scholte, 2002).

Such universalization and Westernization are referred to in the preceding section of this chapter as "integration." The formation of a socially integrated world society is facilitated by the diffusion of cultural practices and institutions and the reduction of socioeconomic disparities (Herkenrath et al., 2005), giving way to more vital human interconnectedness and cooperation (Pieterse, 2000). Nevertheless, globalization is not always and intrinsically tantamount to cultural homogenization (Scholte, 2002). In politics, specifically, globalization involves contesting and competing interests and values (Scholte, 2002). The critical theories of globalization, which include the world systems theory, perceive the world as divided by inflexible economic divisions that affect how globalization operates locally (Pope and Meyer, 2016). The deglobalizing trends within the world system are referred to in the preceding section of the chapter as "differentiation." In gist, the contrast between integration and differentiation in world society and world systems are pertinent to the contemporary issue of globalization.

*The core, periphery, and semi-periphery countries of world systems theory.* The world society's movements toward integration and differentiation are also present in the world systems theory's classification of countries into core, periphery, and semi-periphery (Wallerstein, 1997). While Heintz's and Meyer's sense of differentiation applies to "society" and "culture," respectively, the world systems theory's sense



of differentiation applies to a worldwide economic order with capitalism playing a central role (Wittman, 2018).

In gist, *core* countries have a flourishing manufacturing and labor market, technology-driven agriculture, and an influx of capital investment. The *periphery* countries provide the primary goods to core countries but pay the price of poor labor practices, lack of technological innovation, and a deficit in capitalization. The *semi-periphery* countries have both the attributes of the core and the peripheries; they convert raw goods from the peripheries into finished products but continue to depend on core countries for investment (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995; Kick et al., 2000). The core countries are in a position to maintain theirs and the peripheries' and semi-peripheries' "roles" and thus control the pace of progress, creating uneven development between countries so that peripheries have not developed as fast and as well as the core has done in the past (Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995).

The dynamics between the core, periphery, semi-periphery countries are not only in the economic order, but also in the political order. The core's economic success has made some periphery and semi-periphery countries receptive to establishing forms of government similar to the core's (Torfason and Ingram, 2010). Some integration is achieved between the political systems of the core, the peripheries, and the semi-peripheries. This integration takes the form of "global democratization," where less developed countries adopt developed countries' policy and institutional features, including those pertaining to human rights, environmentalism, and, significantly, democracy (Kick et al., 2000; Clark, 2013).

This integration of political systems may have been overestimated, however, and the differentiation underestimated (Clark and Beckfield, 2009; Clark, 2013). Despite the global diffusion of democratic ideals, there continues to be differentiation in the experiences of the core and the peripheries. As regards the peripheries: due to a low economic standing and partly due to the influence of foreign entities, they have limited their capacity to sustain democratic structures and political participation, maintain social inequality, and resolve internal conflicts and instability (Amin, 1987). As regards the core: due to the mediating factors of economic and industrial growth, they continue to experience democratic progress and modest income inequality (Clark, 2013).

## The Objectives of the Current Research

This chapter examines the integration of countries toward democracy and egalitarianism *vis-à-vis* their differentiation to include non-democratic and non-egalitarian systems. We examine whether integration along democratic and egalitarian lines translates to the integration of the world's youth toward political engagement and trust, or whether differentiation between more or less democratic and egalitarian lines translate to differentiation between countries with politically engaged and disengaged youths. In other words, is integration or differentiation in countries' demo-

cratic and egalitarian cultures accompanied by integration or differentiation in the countries' youth politician engagement? While youth political engagement and trust are here conceptualized as supported primarily by democracy and egalitarianism, other contextual factors come into play, sustaining democracy and egalitarianism. Thus, in this study, countries' integration and differentiation are examined along multiple contextual factors.

We use cluster analysis as the analytical tool. In cluster analysis, countries belonging to the same cluster are homogeneous in the contexts and levels of youth political engagement and trust. Integration would be indicated, for example, by having one much larger cluster amidst smaller clusters; the profile of the large cluster suggests a burgeoning shared world culture and what it is like. Differentiation would be indicated, for example, by two comparably large clusters; the profiles of these clusters suggest co-existing cultures and what these cultures are like.

## Samples and Variables

### Countries and countries' statistics

Countries included in the analyses were the participating countries in the *Citizenship I* (year 2004) and *Citizenship II* (year 2014) survey modules of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP; GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences, 2012, 2016; ISSP Research Group, 2012, 2016). One country each from *Citizenship I* and *Citizenship II* was excluded in the absence of statistics in Hofstede's (2018) power distance and individualism.

The data were from thirty-seven and thirty-three countries, respectively, for 2004 and 2014. There were twenty-eight countries included in both years; nine countries included in 2004 only; five countries included in 2014 only. Of all countries analyzed, twenty-six are in Europe; six are in East Asia and the Pacific; five are in Latin America; two are in North America; and one each is in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia.

Country statistics and their sources are described below. The list of countries along with the country statistics are in the supplementary materials [bit.ly/WSAppendixA](http://bit.ly/WSAppendixA) for 2004 and [bit.ly/WSAppendixB](http://bit.ly/WSAppendixB) for 2014.

*Democratic political culture and government functioning* are components of the Economist Intelligence Unit's *Index of Democracy* in 2008 (closest year to 2004 with available data) and 2014. A ten-point scale was based on experts' assessment and public opinion surveys. Functioning of government (fourteen items) refers to free elections; legislative's supremacy; checks and balances, government accountability, and transparency; lack of undue influence on the government by the military, foreign powers, special groups; government authority over all territories; implementation of policy; perception of free choice; and public confidence in government and parties. Democratic political culture (eight items) refers to available processes to

achieve consensus; preference for a strong leader bypassing parliament and elections, for military rule, for rule by technocrats (reverse-scored); perception that public order is hard to maintain in democracies (reverse-scored); belief that democracy benefits the economy; popular support for democracy; and separation of church and state.

*Power distance and individualism* country statistics were obtained from Hofstede (2018). Using theory and factor analyses, Hofstede (1984, 2001) derived cultural dimensions, which includes power distance and individualism. The scores on these cultural dimensions were derived from an international survey involving more than 100,000 IBM® employees (Hofstede, 2001). Hofstede's country scores on individualism and power distance correlated positively with scores obtained from other instrumentation (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness, 2004; Schimmack et al., 2005). Hofstede's country scores on these dimensions have been used in various country-level analyses (e.g., Robert et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2005; Matsumoto et al., 2008). As cultural variables, power distance and individualism maintain stable scores through a large span of years (Hofstede, 1984, 2001); the same statistics are thus used for 2004 and 2014.

*Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita* is used as measure of economic development. GDP is in current United States dollars and was obtained for 2004 and 2014 from the World Bank (2018), except for Taiwan's that was obtained from its Statistics Bureau website (n.d.). *Gini index* is used as measure of income or wealth inequality. Gini indices for 2004 and 2014 were obtained from the World Bank (2018). Gini indices not in the World Bank source were obtained elsewhere: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, n.d.) for Japan; New Zealand Ministry of Social Development (Perry, 2017) for New Zealand; the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data (FRED; n.d.) for Poland; the Nation Master (n.d.) for Taiwan; FRED (n.d.) and the Philippine Statistical Association (2017), respectively, for 2004 and 2014, for the Philippines.

### Survey respondents and measures of political disengagement and political distrust

Data from eighteen- to twenty-five-year-old respondents of ISSP's *Citizenship I* (2004) and *Citizenship II* (2014) were analyzed. Only respondents with data on at least half of the items of the political disengagement and political distrust scales were included in the analysis. With this exclusion criterion, two percent of *Citizenship I* respondents were excluded (6,710 respondents retained); two percent of *Citizenship II* respondents were excluded (5,507 respondents retained).

For *Citizenship I*, the means across countries are: 181.34 for country sample size ( $SD = 106.68$ ); 52.92 percent females ( $SD = 6.90$ ); 29.64 percent with education beyond secondary school ( $SD = 21.27$ ); 46.49 percent currently employed ( $SD = 13.86$ ).

For *Citizenship II*, the means across countries are: 166.91 for country sample size ( $SD = 92.35$ ); 50.98 percent females ( $SD = 7.35$ ); 32.54 percent with education beyond secondary school ( $SD = 20.18$ ); 46.10 currently employed ( $SD = 17.72$ ).

The item descriptions below were based on the ISSP's questionnaire documentation (ISSP, 2004, 2014). Responses were harmonized or transposed whenever response labels or number of response choices differed across years or across items in a subscale.

Items measuring *political disengagement* were scored in the direction of higher scores reflecting greater disengagement. The subscales are (a) engaging in discourse (contacting public officials and the media; expressing one's political views on the internet; discussing and persuading others about politics); (b) engaging in advocacies (signing a petition; boycotting products for reasons of politics, ethics, or the environment; attending a demonstration, political meeting, or rally; donating or raising money for social or causes); (c) understanding of political issues (understanding of the country's political issues; being better informed politically than others; personal interest in politics).

For items pertaining to engaging in discourse and engaging in advocacies, participants indicated whether they have done the activity in a distant or recent past; if they have not, whether they might do or never do it; if they have, how frequently have they done it. For understanding of political issues, participants indicated their extent of agreement to the item. All responses were coded on a five-point-scale and item scores within each subscale were averaged; subscales' averages were averaged to obtain the political disengagement score. The internal consistency reliability coefficients Cronbach  $\alpha$ s for discourse, advocacy, and understanding of issues are .71 (five items), .75 (five items), and .53 (three items), respectively. The Cronbach  $\alpha$  for all the items is .84.

Items measuring *political distrust* were scored in the direction of higher scores reflecting greater distrust. The subscales are (a) perception that government listens to people (people have a say on government activities; government cares about what people think; legislature addresses demands); (b) evaluation of elections (honest counting and reporting of votes); (c) quality of public service (committed public service; lack of corruption); (d) perception of politicians (trustworthy; no personal motives). Participants indicated their extent of agreement to an item, or the likelihood of an event (e.g., politicians will attend to concerns), or degree of honesty or fairness (for elections), or degree of commitment or involvement in corruption (for politicians). All responses were coded on a five-point-scale and item scores within each subscale were averaged; subscales' averages were averaged to obtain the political disengagement score. The Cronbach  $\alpha$ s for perception of government listening, evaluation of elections, quality of public service, and perception of politicians are, respectively, .54 (three items), .66 (two items), .43 (two items), .40 (two items). The Cronbach  $\alpha$  for all the items is .67.

## Results

Cluster analyses with countries as objects were done separately for 2004 and 2014 (see supplementary materials [bit.ly/WSAppendixA](http://bit.ly/WSAppendixA) for the 2004 data and [bit.ly/WSAppendixB](http://bit.ly/WSAppendixB) for the 2014 data). The clustering variables were political disengagement, political distrust, democratic political culture, power distance, government functioning, GDP, Gini index, and individualism. All variables were transformed to *z*-scores (i.e., standardized scores) prior to cluster analyses. Euclidean distance is used as the measure of distance between objects and cluster centers.

The dendrograms resulting from the hierarchical cluster analyses of the 2004 and 2014 data both show a marked increase in linkage distance going from the three-cluster to the two-cluster solutions, indicating that the three-cluster solution is better than the two-cluster solution. With only two clusters, countries in the same cluster are heterogeneous (i.e., far from the cluster center), making cluster characterization more difficult compared to when countries in the same cluster are homogeneous. The increases in linkage distance from the five- to the four-cluster solution, and from the four- to the three-cluster solution are not substantial.

To determine which cluster solution is optimal, three-, four-, and five-means cluster analyses were conducted. For both 2004 and 2014, the four-cluster solution has the largest mean distance between clusters (more distinct clusters) followed by the three-cluster solution; the five-cluster solution has the smallest mean distance between clusters (less distinct clusters). Compared to the four-cluster solution, the three-cluster solution gives a similar but more parsimonious interpretation. First, the country composition of larger clusters is the same for the three- and four-cluster solutions (for both 2004 and 2014, with the exception of one country switching clusters in 2004). Second, the four-cluster solution simply splits into two clusters the smallest cluster in the three-cluster solution. This splitting does not appear critical to the substantive interpretation of the clusters; furthermore, the decrease in cluster heterogeneity from the three- to the four-cluster solution is diminished compared to the decrease from the two- to the three-cluster solution. With the three-cluster solution, the countries' distances from their cluster's center are acceptable, with an average of .60 and .62, respectively, for 2004 and 2014.

Thus, we regard the three-cluster solution as optimal and parsimonious compared to the four-, and five-cluster solutions. Reported below is the solution of the three-means cluster analysis. The three clusters are here called Clusters A, B1, and B2.

**Table 1: Cluster membership for 2004 and 2014**

Country	Year 2004 distance from cluster center	Year 2014 distance from cluster center	Country	Year 2004 distance from cluster center	Year 2014 distance from cluster center	Country	Year 2004 distance from cluster center	Year 2014 distance from cluster center
<b>Cluster A</b>								
Australia	0.33 <sup>2</sup>	0.43 <sup>4</sup>	Bulgaria	0.80	<i>not in 2014</i>	Brazil	0.64 <sup>2</sup>	<i>not in 2014</i>
Austria	0.53	0.58	Chile	<i>in Cluster B2</i>	0.88	Chile	0.74 <sup>5</sup>	<i>in Cluster B1</i>
Belgium	0.59	0.64	Croatia	<i>not in 2004</i>	0.59	Mexico	0.31 <sup>1</sup>	<i>not in 2014</i>
Canada	0.39	<i>not in 2014</i>	Czech Republic	0.51 <sup>3</sup>	0.45 <sup>1</sup>	Philippines	0.72 <sup>4</sup>	0.55 <sup>2</sup>
Denmark	0.80	0.46 <sup>5</sup>	Hungary	0.81	0.91	Russia	1.07	0.84 <sup>4</sup>
Finland	0.44	0.37 <sup>2</sup>	India	<i>not in 2004</i>	0.84	South Africa	1.08	1.20 <sup>5</sup>
France	0.70	0.73	Japan	0.71	0.59	Turkey	<i>not in 2004</i>	0.37 <sup>1</sup>
Germany	0.40	0.24 <sup>1</sup>	Latvia	0.69	<i>not in 2014</i>	Venezuela	0.64 <sup>3</sup>	0.53 <sup>2</sup>
Great Britain	0.38 <sup>4</sup>	0.52	Lithuania	<i>not in 2004</i>	0.54			
Iceland	<i>not in 2004</i>	0.48	Poland	0.50 <sup>2</sup>	0.47 <sup>2</sup>			
Ireland	0.31 <sup>1</sup>	<i>not in 2014</i>	Portugal	0.72	<i>not in 2014</i>			
Israel	0.82	0.86	Slovakia	0.77	0.76			
Netherlands	0.38 <sup>5</sup>	0.41 <sup>3</sup>	Slovenia	0.48 <sup>1</sup>	0.58 <sup>5</sup>			
New Zealand	0.37 <sup>3</sup>	<i>not in 2014</i>	South Korea	0.53 <sup>4</sup>	0.56 <sup>4</sup>			
Norway	0.52	0.84	Spain	0.65	0.70			
Sweden	0.42	0.56	Taiwan	0.60 <sup>5</sup>	0.61			
Switzerland	0.49	0.68	Uruguay	0.69	<i>not in 2014</i>			
United States	0.52	0.68						

*Note:* Distance is in Euclidean distance. Superscripted numbers above a distance indicate that the country is the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, ..., 5<sup>th</sup> closest to the cluster center.. *Source:* Authors.

## Cluster membership

Listed in Table 1 are the countries in each cluster and each country's distance from the cluster center. Countries that participated in both 2004 and 2014 surveys belonged to the same cluster in both years, with the exception of one country.

Cluster A countries are classified as core countries by Babones (2005). All Cluster B1 countries are classified as semi-periphery countries either by Babones (2005), Chase-Dunn et al., (2000), Roncevic (2002), or Wallerstein (1997); the exceptions are Japan, which is a core country (Babones, 2005), and Croatia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which are periphery countries (Chase-Dunn et al., 2000). All Cluster B2 countries are semi-periphery countries, as classified by at least one of the indicated sources; the exceptions are the Philippines and Russia, which are periphery countries (Chase-Dunn et al., 2000; Babones, 2005).

Cluster A countries are mostly from Western Europe and the Scandinavia; Austria and Germany are also in Cluster A. These countries comprise 12 of the 17 Cluster A countries in 2004, and 12 of the 15 Cluster A countries in 2014.<sup>2</sup> Cluster B1 countries are mostly from Eastern, Central, and Northern Europe; Spain and Portugal are also in Cluster B1. These countries comprise 9 of the 13 Cluster B1 countries in 2004, and 8 of the 15 Cluster B1 countries in 2014.<sup>3</sup> Cluster B2 is the smallest cluster with the most number of countries coming from Latin America: Venezuela for 2004 and 2014; Brazil and Mexico for 2004 (non-participating in 2014); and also Chile for 2004 (in Cluster B1 in 2014).<sup>4</sup>

## Cluster comparisons

For 2004, the Euclidean distance between A and B1 is 1.26; the distance between A and B2 is 1.76; and the distance between B1 and B2 is .91. For 2014, the Euclidean distance between A and B1 is 1.23; the distance between A and B3 is 3.26; and the distance between B1 and B2 is .87. Thus, for both 2004 and 2014, Clusters B1 and B2 are closest to each other and farther away from Cluster A. Also, Cluster B1 is closer to Cluster A than is Cluster B2.

Shown in Table 2 are the cluster means of the different variables for 2004 and 2014 and the results of the one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and planned

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2 The non-European countries in Cluster A are Australia, Israel, and the United States for both 2004 and 2014, and Canada and New Zealand in 2004 only (non-participating in 2014).

3 The non-European countries in Cluster B1 are Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan for 2004 and 2014, Uruguay for 2004 (non-participating in 2014), India for 2014 (non-participating in 2004), and Chile for 2014 (in Cluster B2 for 2004).

4 The other clusters in B2 are the Philippines, Russia, and South Africa for both 2004 and 2014.



Table 2: Cluster means of the clustering variables for 2004 and 2014

Variable	Cluster A	Cluster B1	Cluster B2	F <sup>a</sup>	Effect size <sup>a</sup>	Planned comparison A vs. Average of B1 and B2 <sup>b</sup>	Planned comparison B1 vs. B2 <sup>b</sup>
<b>Year 2004</b>							
Political disengagement	-0.86	0.71	0.77	31.55	0.65	different	not significant
Political distrust	-0.74	0.92	0.09	22.50	0.57	different	different
Democratic political culture	0.75	-0.26	-1.34	30.87	0.64	different	different
Power distance	-0.79	0.46	1.06	24.33	0.59	different	not significant
Individualism	0.78	-0.51	-0.94	21.09	0.55	different	not significant
Government functioning	0.67	-0.38	-0.92	12.66	0.43	different	<i>not significant</i>
GDP per capita	0.90	-0.57	-1.14	50.63	0.75	different	<i>different</i>
Gini index	-0.42	-0.31	1.58	25.87	0.60	different	different
<b>Year 2014</b>							
Political disengagement	-0.78	0.55	0.89	16.97	0.53	different	not significant
Political distrust	-0.73	0.84	0.01	17.48	0.54	different	different
Democratic political culture	0.81	-0.40	-1.40	32.45	0.68	different	different
Power distance	-0.77	0.49	1.06	18.50	0.55	different	not significant
Individualism	0.74	-0.53	-0.85	14.27	0.49	different	not significant
Government functioning	0.65	-0.21	-1.41	16.71	0.53	different	different
GDP per capita	0.92	-0.65	-1.05	42.78	0.74	different	<i>not significant</i>
Gini index	-0.37	-0.19	1.58	13.25	0.47	different	different


Notes: <sup>a</sup> These are the F-ratio and effect sizes on the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing the three clusters along the variables. *F* (2, 44) for 2004. *F* (2,30) for 2014. All *F* tests are significant, *p* < .05. <sup>b</sup> "Different" means the two means compared are significantly different based on planned comparison *t*-test (*p* < .01). "Not significant" means the two means compared are not significantly different, *p* > .05. Italicized results of planned comparisons indicate different results for 2004 and 2014; otherwise, results are the same between the years. Means are standardized scores with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Source: Authors.



Figures 1a–c: Cluster means of the clustering variables averaged between 2004 and 2014



**Figures 1a–c (cont.)**



*Source:* Authors.

comparisons tests. The ANOVAs show that the three clusters differ significantly along all the clustering variables; effect sizes range from .43 to .75 for 2004 and from .49 to .74 for 2014.

Since Cluster A is farther from Clusters B1 and B2 and Clusters B1 and B2 are closer to each other, we conducted the following comparison tests for each clustering variable: first, we compared the Cluster A mean to the average of the Clusters B1 and B2 means. Next, we compared the Cluster B1 and Cluster B2 means.

The results are tabulated in Table 2. Because the results of the comparison tests show the same pattern for 2004 and 2014, we averaged the cluster means on each variable across the two years; it is these averages that we graphed for easier visual comparisons of the clusters (see Figure 1).

The youth in Cluster A are less politically disengaged and less politically distrustful (negative z-score mean) than those in Clusters B1 and B2 (Figure 1a). Compared to B1 and B2, Cluster A has a stronger democratic political culture, a smaller power distance, and a more individualist culture (Figure 1b). Cluster A also has better government functioning, higher GDP per capita, and lower Gini index (Figure 1c).

While the youth in Clusters B1 and B2 are comparably politically disengaged (i.e., positive z-scores; no significant difference), Cluster B1 youth are significantly

more distrustful (positive z-score) than Cluster B2 youth (positive but close to zero z-score; Figure 1a). B1 has a stronger democratic political culture than B2, but is comparable to B2 in power distance and individualism (Figure 1b). As shown in Figure 1c: government functioning in B1 is at least comparable to B2 (no difference in 2004 and better in 2014); GDP per capita of B1 is at least comparable to B2 (better in 2004 and no difference in 2014); and B1 has a lower Gini index than B2.

## Discussion

### Democratizing versus dedemocratizing contexts of youth political engagement

This chapter concerns the contexts of political engagement and trust: a democratic political culture and egalitarianism, contexts supportive of democracy (good government functioning, economic development and equality), and a context supportive of youth political engagement (individualism).

Results of cluster analysis show two comparably large clusters (Clusters A and B1) and a smaller cluster (Cluster B2), which is only about 30 percent the size of the larger clusters. Based on cluster distances, Clusters B1 and B2 are more similar to each other and differ much more from Cluster A.

The relatively larger size of Cluster A (at least compared to Cluster B2) suggests a point of integration among countries where a politically engaged and trusting youth sector is situated in a thriving sociopolitical culture. That this point of integration has a democratic culture side by side an individualist culture suggests that free, co-equal citizens are an apt and effective foci for building a culture of political engagement.

The differentiation of Cluster A from Clusters B1 and B2 is a differentiation between countries with strong versus volatile democracies. This differentiation suggests a tension in world systems between a globalization of democracy (characteristic of Cluster A) versus a deglobalization characterized by dedemocratization (the splintering of countries into Clusters B1 and B2). Part of the dedemocratizing trend in Clusters B1 and B2 is the youth's high levels of political disengagement, making the youth vulnerable to social exclusion specially given these clusters' unfavorable political and economic conditions.

The youth's high levels of political disengagement in Clusters B1 and B2 are consistent with other reports around the time of the survey. Youth political engagement has declined in countries where, historically, free political discourse has not thrived, such as in post-communist Eastern European countries (Haerpfer et al., 2002). Bulgarian students, critical of their government, have generally preferred to emigrate (Ādnanes, 2004). Croatian university students have been open to political participation and accepting of democratic processes, but have shown distrust of political institutions (Gvozdanović, 2010). More and more Indian youth are becoming disinclined toward political action (Banerjee, 2013). Likewise, there is a growing

political indifference among Japanese youth, a number of whom have withdrawn from political participation (Tsukada, 2015).

### **Dedemocratization as a differentiating trend of youth political disengagement**

Differentiation may occur not only across the core, peripheries, and semi-peripheries, but also within a category (Herkenrath et al., 2005). The differentiation of Cluster A from Clusters B1 and B2 is a differentiation between the core (A) and the semi-peripheries (B1 and B2). On the other hand, the differentiation between Clusters B1 and B2 is a differentiation within the semi-peripheries. Amin (1987) also notes a similar differentiation within the semi-peripheries: the upper semi-periphery composed of former socialist countries that are in the process of fully adopting democratic systems and the lower semi-periphery that approximates the conditions of the peripheries (e.g., weak democratic procedures, imposition of arbitrary sanctions).

The smaller Cluster B2 appears to be a “breakaway” from B1. B2 comprises countries that have been experiencing political upheavals or unrest (including during the time of the surveys).<sup>5</sup> Indeed, compared to B1, B2 has a weaker democratic political culture and greater economic inequality. Interestingly, even with B2’s less favorable political-economic conditions compared to B1, the B2 youth were not any more politically disengaged. There are no definitive indications from the data, but the comparable levels of disengagement of B1 and B2 youth may be due to the clusters’ being both high on power distance and low on individualism. The social disparity between those who hold power and authority and those who do not may have disinclined the youth from political participation, while society’s lesser preference for individual over the collective may have demotivated the youth from openly expressing their political stance and actively assuming a political advocacy.

Interestingly, even as B2 has worse context conditions than B1, it is the B1 youth who are more politically distrustful, whereas the B2 youth show no elevated levels of either trust or distrust. This result is contrary to literature suggesting that worse political-economic conditions, and politicians’ lack of honesty, accountability, and responsiveness actually lead to greater distrust (White et al., 2000). Possibly, the political distrust of B1’s youth is reflective of their poor performance evaluation of government that carries with it a strong moral judgment (Bertsou, 2019). Given the more open democratic political culture of B1 compared to B2, the B1 youth are more inclined to think about and express their evaluation and judgment but, seemingly, not enough to motivate them to political engagement. On the other hand, the political indifference of B2’s youth may be born out of fear, anxiety, and despair over their country’s dismal political and economic conditions. It may even be a brand of political distrust that is self-alienating in nature, arising from the youth’s perception

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5 Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela.

of intensifying conflict between citizens' interests and the political system's interests (Bertsou, 2019).

Bertsou's (2019) treatise on political distrust refers to two opposing effects of orienting citizens toward political action or impeding their cooperation with government. The particularities of a cluster's context could be harnessed to encourage in youth effective and positive political action.

*Cluster B1 youth profile: Toward political engagement of politically distrusting youth.* The combined elevated levels of disengagement and distrust in Cluster B1's youth point to scenarios where distrust constrains engagement. In nations transitioning to democracies (including those in B1), youth's inclusion in formal political processes can be critical in sustaining a democratic culture, even in overturning processes inimical to it (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, n. d.). Youth who have led political protests are reported to be increasingly distrustful of political processes (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, n. d.) and their consequent political exclusion, whether self- or other-initiated, would not be supportive of democratization.

Even with their elevated levels of political distrust, Cluster B1's youth can be formed to work toward greater political engagement. High levels of political distrust reflect a wide gap between the citizens' expectations regarding democracy and the state's democratic processes; it is precisely this gap that would trigger change toward democratization (Brinks and Coppedge, 2001). A disengaged youth sector in B1 would undermine the progress made toward democratization, but with B1's culture being relatively more supportive of democracy, political discourses involving the youth can be initiated and supported by both government and the citizenry alike (Asen, 2004).

*Cluster B2 youth profile: Toward political engagement of politically indifferent youth.* Cluster B2 youth's political indifference may signify their frustration over a country's political processes. Given B2's relatively weaker democratic and egalitarian profile, youth's political indifference possibly signifies more a sense of despair over their country's sociopolitical and economic instability than it signifies their disinclination toward politics. Nevertheless, youth generally are invested in their future and are motivated and have the capacities to explore novel options (Arnett, 2002); thus, they are likely to be enthused by less formal and less mainstream forms of political engagement. Working around the constraints of a less democratic and less egalitarian culture, the B2 citizenry in partnership with the youth will need to take diverse and novel initiatives toward social change.

These initiatives and movements are critical work in Cluster B2 for it is not readily seen (either from this study's data or from literature) whether Cluster B2 youth's political indifference would lead to engagement or disengagement. As Chile was transitioning to democracy, the youth have worked toward greater social equality (Martínez et al., 2012). Venezuelan youth have demanded for social justice and good governance (Fernandez, 2014). But there also have been accounts of political disengagement. Turkish youth have not been as politically involved as they feel that

limited attention has been given them by both government and civil society (Sener, 2014). Filipino youths are discouraged from political involvement as political leadership is mostly assumed by the elites who have widespread political patronages (Velasco, n.d.).

### **A country's cluster membership *vis-à-vis* the country's social and political milieu**

The different clusters characterized in this chapter provide insights on the social and political milieu of youth political engagement. While these insights pertain to the countries included in the cluster analysis, they may also apply to countries having profiles similar to the clusters. Countries within a cluster are not entirely homogeneous, however, and there are those stand out as different from the cluster's profile. Further examination of these countries would reveal other social-political factors that contribute to either an integration toward democracy and youth political engagement, or a differentiation away from these.

For instance, despite Japan being a core, economically advanced country (Babones, 2005), cluster analyses showed that it falls in the same category as the semi-periphery, less economically advanced countries (Cluster B1, for 2004 and 2014). Japan, however, has a cultural and belief system that gives premium to collectivism, rather than individualism, and to conformity, which is widely practiced in countries with large power distance (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Indeed, Cluster B1 includes Asian countries (India, South Korea, and Taiwan) that also are collectivist and maintain a large power distance. In addition, another reason why Japan was not included in the cluster of core countries (Cluster A) is its less favorable economic conditions when survey data were collected. From the early 1990s up to 2014, Japan has been experiencing a long-term economic recession coined as Japan's Lost Decades (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2015). These context conditions that Japan shares with the Cluster B1 countries could also explain Japanese youth's political disengagement.

Cluster analyses conducted on survey years a decade apart show that while most countries remain in the same cluster across time, there are countries that have changed clusters. From 2004 to 2014, for example, Chile, has moved from Cluster B2 to B1. The political indifference of Chile's youth in 2004 can be attributed to the carry-over effect of the previous dictatorship that was in place from 1973–1990. Although Pinochet was stripped off his presidency, he remained in power as a senator and as the army's commander-in-chief (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2017). Thus, despite the changeover in political leadership that may have inclined the Chilean youth toward political engagement, they may still not have, by the year 2004, full confidence in their government. For example, although there have been transformations in Chile such as enacting laws supportive of people's rights and welfare (e.g., anti-discrimination), other social-political developments (e.g., Chile's

tension with Peru and Bolivia, trade unions' dissent against government policies, and problems in the fields of labor and education) may have led the youth of Chile to not be fully trusting of their government's policies and initiatives (BBC, 2017). By survey year 2014, however, Chile's change in cluster membership from B2 to B1 indicates an improvement in country context conditions and of youth's transitioning from political indifference to distrust.

Observing changes in cluster composition across the years provides a way of tracking countries' political, economic, and social transformations. The improved quality of life due to economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe around 2014 is a good example. Specifically, Poland and Slovakia have experienced a sevenfold economic growth, while Latvia, Lithuania, and Czech Republic have experienced a fivefold growth, aside from maintaining a favorable Gini coefficient (Walker, 2019). It would be of interest to examine further how countries' altered circumstances, whether good or ill, influence youth's levels of political disengagement and distrust.

## Conclusion: The Youth as Actors in World Society

The youth are rightfully a part of world society's and world systems' actors, composed of individuals, organizations, and states that exhibit rationality, autonomy, and competence or, in a word, the capacity and will toward political action (Meyer, 2010; Downey et al., 2020).

Still, actors are not impervious to their social, political, and economic contexts. As is the premise of the current research, actors' thinking and actions are shaped by the conditions and systems they find themselves in (Meyer, 2010; McNeely, 2012). The shaping of actors' thinking and actions by their social and cultural contexts is what Vygotskian theory (Kozulin, 1986; Rogoff, 2008) and the cultural-historical activity theory (Somekh and Nissen, 2011) refer to as "activities." An activity reflects the dynamic interplay of actors and the sociocultural materials and relations where the activity is staged (Rogoff, 2008). In the case of democratization activities, nation-states as actors interact within international contexts; individual citizens as actors engage or act within their nation-states (Elkin, 2011).

Vygotskian and cultural-historical activity theories are external to world society and world systems theories, but their respective notions of "activities" and "actors" inform each other. Germane to an activity is the shaping of human agency, or the capacity to direct oneself and to focus toward a goal (Lantolf, 2000; Stetsenko and Arievitch, 2004). Agency does not develop naturally in the actor without any form of intervention; rather, culture and society construct and generate agency (or may even constrain or regress agency). What is thus *a priori* are these externals (Daniels, 2004).

The results of the current study show how well-differentiated political, social, cultural, and economic contexts are associated with well-differentiated patterns of youth political behaviors. The mechanisms and processes to encourage youth politi-

cal engagement should be fitting to the context. The agentic actor in egalitarian, developed, and individualist cultures will have a different experience from the agentic actor in less egalitarian, less developed, non-individualist cultures.

Still another compelling issue to show that activities need to be customized to the actors' context has to do with the relationship between agency of persons and the individualism of cultures. In this chapter, we include individualism as a context of youth political engagement as it inclines the person toward self-expression and agentic action. Aside from being a quality of a country's culture, individualism also is a quality of modern-day youth. Given youth's individualism, political action must be flexible so as to reflect the nuances of youth's individualized lived experiences (Suchowerska, 2013).

While not discounting the theorized precedence of contexts over actors in developing agency, contexts and actors are thought to co-evolve in a unified activity system (Cole and Engeström, 1993; Stetsenko and Arieivitch, 2004) that is "constitutive of human social life, interpenetrating and influencing each other, while never becoming completely detached from each other" (Stetsenko and Arieivitch, 2004, 67). The bidirectional influences between societal contexts and citizens are in fact acknowledged in politics (DeBardeleben and Pammett, 2009).

The bidirectional dynamics between contexts and actors of course means that actors influence contexts. Politically engaged youth are agentic actors who shape world society and systems within the particularities of their immediate worlds. The youth are critical drivers of political cultures and the nature and extent of their influence still are to be determined as they engage themselves, at present and throughout their adult years, in sociopolitical processes.

The objective and approach of the current study do not cover the mechanisms or processes by which politically agentic and engaged youth direct activities and manage their contexts. The results, however, point to some particular confluences of politics, economy, and culture that the agentic, acting youth would find harder to manage than others. Still, there are no contrary indications that the youth cannot play a critical role in the spread of political ideas and actions in either direction of an integrating, globalizing or a differentiating, deglobalizing world society.

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# **The Intensification/Expansion of the Neoliberal Agenda and Resistance in the Philippine Context: Implications for a Movement Towards Deglobalization**

Ligaya Lindio-McGovern

This chapter argues that what is happening is less of deglobalization but more of an intensification of the neoliberal project of expanding capitalism globally along with a growing resistance against it. Using the neoliberal nation-state of the Global South as a unit of analysis, it examines the various manifestations of that neoliberal project in the Philippine context and how they are being contested by various movement organizations. The way these movement organizations frame their issues as they struggle provide insights in thinking about deglobalization as an emerging concept on how a more just and more equal world society could be shaped. The movement towards deglobalization must (a) control the extractivist expansion of transnational corporations as the instruments of modern imperialism to protect the environment, ensure food security, defend the Indigenous People's ancestral lands and promote their rights; (b) respect the economic sovereignty and territorial sovereign rights of nations as a basis for regional cooperation for peace; (c) humanize and protect the dignity of labor through job security; (d) promote development policies that create jobs in the local economy instead of exporting labor with devastating social costs, (e) transform bureaucrat capitalism to narrow the gap between the rich and poor, the corporate elite and the working class; and (f) halt the structural adjustment policies of development loan institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, that promote more the interest of transnational capital while draining the economies of the Global South.

## **Introduction**

There is an emerging debate around the question: Is deglobalization indeed occurring or is there an intensification/expansion of forces that maintain neoliberal

globalization? In this debate there is yet little critical questioning of global capitalism as the economic project of neoliberalism. Therefore, there is still a need for a more critical conceptualization of deglobalization. The mainstream discussion is also concentrated on the Global North, lacking attention to the experience of the Global South. This chapter attempts to contribute to filling this gap by focusing on the experience of the Philippines as a neoliberal nation-state in the Global South. It argues that instead of deglobalization, the neoliberal agenda of expanding capitalism globally is intensifying. However, as this intensification ravaged the world economy/ecology and exacerbates inequalities resistance from below is growing. The change agenda of these movements provide insights on what a deglobalized world would look like. Deglobalization in this chapter is conceived as a movement away from the neoliberal path towards a more equal, non-capitalist, regulated, and people-oriented social economy—from economic relations that dehumanize labor and degrade the environment. They call upon the state to take a more active role in transforming the economy. Deglobalization can be articulated in varying ways as nation-states and social movement organizations tackle the historical, social, cultural, economic, and political contexts in which they operate. But there are common areas of concerns where international solidarity networks can forge a global challenge to the neoliberal machine towards a more deglobalized world society.

## Methodology and Analytical Framework

To analyze the complex dynamics of neoliberalism and the resistance it engenders, I use the neoliberal nation-state as a unit of analysis because it provides the power-center in which the transnational forces of the neoliberal ideology get localized and particularized.

The Philippines, as a neoliberal nation-state in the Global South, offers a good case study to examine the manifestations of the intensification/expansion of global capitalism as the economic project of neoliberalism. As capitalism expands globally, it acquires new lands and dispossess others, controls labor, and weakens states' sovereign control over its resources, while strengthening it to repress or subvert people's resistance. The persistence of these contentious movements in challenging the power and hegemony of transnational capital and the militarized state that defends it, can teach lessons towards building a deglobalization movement fought on the local-national-global scales.

For sources of information, I utilized primary and secondary data. For primary data I used information I gathered during my fieldwork in the Philippines in Fall 2017 made possible by a Fulbright Research Award. I interviewed indigenous people (*Lumads*) from Mindanao who were affected by corporate mining, who at that time were temporarily residing in a camp site in the University of the Philippines as they were participating in a *Lakbayan* (caravan) repertoire of protest actions against

the state and corporate violence in their territories. I also visited the mining site of OceanaGold Philippines (an Australian-Canadian transnational mining corporation) in the remote village of Didipio, in Kasibu municipality, in the province of Nueva Vizcaya. I interviewed indigenous people and other members of the community who were/are affected by the entry and operations of OceanaGold in their area. I participated in the protest activities of the movement organizations that gave me a sense of their change agenda and demands. I did content analysis of their organizational documents I could gather. After I left the field, I continued connections with the people and organizations I met during my fieldwork. Through continuing participation in the Philippine movement in the United States that establishes connections with the movement organizations in the Philippines, I am also able to gain knowledge about the on-going situation in the Philippines after I left the field. For secondary data, I used information from a continuing review of literature relevant to my study.

## **Manifestations of Intensification and Expansion of Global Capitalism and Its Contestation as a Neoliberal Project in the Philippine Context**

The Philippine experience manifests several patterns of the intensification of the neoliberal project of expanding capitalism globally. Among these are: (a) the extractivist expansion of transnational corporate mining, (b) the growing Chinese capitalist presence in the Philippine economy and intrusion on Philippine territorial sovereignty over the West Philippine Sea, (c) the contractualization of labor for the interest of transnational capital, (d) the labor export policy to feed the global market, (e) a semi-feudal economy co-existing with capitalism, (f) the consolidation of a bureaucrat capitalist class allied to transnational capital, (g) policies of foreign financial institutions favoring transnational corporate interest. The following sections elaborate on each of these instances and draw specific implications for conceptualizing about deglobalization from below and for shaping a movement towards a deglobalized world system where the Global South has a voice.

### **The extractivist expansion of transnational corporate mining**

In the later phase of neoliberal globalization, as transnational corporations respond to the crisis of production,<sup>1</sup> they increase investments in the extractive industries, such as mining, since they see it as more profitable. The Philippine facilitated the

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1 The crisis of production refers to situation in capitalist economy where the production of manufactured goods is seen as no longer as profitable because the market is now saturated due to a lot of people unable to buy these goods. Decline or freeze in wages partly contributes to this crisis—which is in some sense one of the contradictions in capitalist relations of production.

less-restricted entry of transnational corporations into its mining industry through the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (PMA). Among the countries with mining operations in the Philippines include Australia with the highest number of hectares (74,759), followed by China (63,194), followed by the USA (43,017), and New Zealand with 979 hectares.<sup>2</sup> The PMA embeds the neoliberal policy of economic liberalization that promotes the mobility of transnational capital. The PMA was a legislative response to the pressures of transnational corporations to “allow one hundred percent foreign control of the mining industry” (Tujan and Guzman, 2002,75). Transnational mining corporations are allowed to take the extracted raw minerals hundred percent out of the country without corresponding provisions to require them to create manufacturing industries that will produce goods out of these extracted minerals so that mining leads to the industrial development of the Philippines. By making their investment in mining mainly extractive, transnational mining corporations can conveniently leave the country without rehabilitation of the damaged environment resulting from their operations. It is a profitable practice of transnational corporations to leave one area after they have extracted the minerals and look for another area where they can again extract. Therefore, the PMA brought the Philippines into the circuit of transnational corporate extractivism that diminishes or takes away people’s control of their resources consequently stunting their own development. Instead, it is transnational corporations’ interest that is being disproportionately advanced. This scenario suggests to the conceptualization of deglobalization: deglobalization in Philippine context should limit and regulate transnational corporations so that Philippine patrimony or resource sovereignty—a legitimate collective national right—is protected.

The Indigenous People are the ones who are most affected by the extractivist ventures of the transnational corporations. Most of the mining operations take place in Indigenous ancestral lands resulting in their land dispossession, thus violating their right to ancestral lands that the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People has enshrined. According to Pya Mcliing, the National Coordinator of KATRIBU (the national alliance of indigenous people), seventy-two percent of the total land area of the 229 approved mining applications are in ancestral lands.<sup>3</sup> This current dispossession of the Indigenous People of their ancestral lands is a continuation of their historical experience of colonialism that pushed them out of their lands, consequently forcing them to eke out for their survival further into the hinterlands. Their current land dispossession brings out the notion of what I call *the last fron-*

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2 Numbers quoted from Pya Macliing’s PowerPoint presentation, “Indigenous People’s Situation and Continuing Struggle: A Quest for a Just and Lasting Peace,” on November 16, 2017, Quezon City, Philippines.

3 From Pya Mcliing’s PowerPoint conference presentation, “Indigenous People’s Situation and Continuing Struggle: A Quest for a Just and Lasting Peace,” on November 16, 2017, Quezon City, Philippines.

tier of capitalist imperialism, because of the historical fact that capitalism in the Philippines was introduced through colonial expansionism (initially by Spain and later by the United States). This transformed the precolonial non-capitalist relations of production and communal land ownership of many of the indigenous people (Constantino, 1975). My notion of the “last frontier of capitalist imperialism” is akin to the concept of modern imperialism of David Harvey (2007, 178) where transnational corporations play significant role in the dynamics of “accumulation by dispossession.” While transnational corporations accumulate gargantuan profits, the indigenous people are impoverished as they lose their lands on which they make a living. They are dispossessed not only materially but also politically since they also lose many of their basic rights as Indigenous People. For the Indigenous People “land is life” as their basic right to life is closely linked to land. So, their staunch defense of their land is a matter of survival. But their opposition to mining and defense of their land is met with repressive actions from state forces—which illustrates the notion of what I call *the militarization of transnational capital*. The interview narratives I gathered reveal that militarization of their area usually precedes the entry of transnational mining corporations to contain collective opposition, intimidate, and divide the community. In many instances armed paramilitary forces, known as the *Alamara*, enter the area and their violence result in forced evacuations of indigenous communities with consequent loss of livelihood and uprooting of their community life, unity, and culture. Mining corporations also hire security forces (as allowed by the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 which uses the term “investment defense force”), which in many cases—according to an observation of a woman leader of Indigenous People’s organization—are “composed of former military men who function as the private armies of the mining corporations who pay their salaries.” She further cites twelve indigenous women leaders who were extra-judicially killed due to mining opposition.<sup>4</sup> However, the Indigenous People have persisted in organizing to assert their collective power in defending their ancestral land and other rights. One such organization is the KATRIBU (*Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamayan ng Pilipinas* or Alliance of Indigenous People and Organizations in the Philippines), a national alliance of indigenous people’s organizations across the country, which started in 1980 and persists to this day. Indigenous women have also organized as they also feel the brunt of land dispossession with the consequent destruction of their subsistence, resulting in increased poverty that negatively impact on their social reproductive roles. An example of such women’s organization is the BAI Indigenous Women’s Network, a national alliance of indigenous women’s organizations at various levels across the nation. At the forefront of the struggle for land rights and self-determination of the indigenous communities, their militant resistance along with their male counterpart awakens insights of what deglobalization in the Philippine context

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4 Based on my personal interview with her on August 7, 2017 in the Philippines.

should not again forget: (a) to give voice to the long-muffled demands of the indigenous people in development policy and projects, (b) learn from their concept of land, social development, indigenous sovereignty, women's rights, and economic-cultural-political social justice. How to translate these insights into political democratic governance and corporate responsibility in shaping a deglobalized world is a challenge that must not be ignored as it involves the survival of a segment of the Philippine population. This will uphold their fundamental right to life enshrined in the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples.

Another issue the Indigenous People (and other environmental defenders) have raised is how large-scale corporate mining damages the environment. Open-pit mining that is allowed in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is extremely destructive to the environment. It depletes water resources in the community, pollutes the air, water, land, and rivers, harming people's health and detrimentally impact food production which in turn affects food security. My observation of a mining site of OceanaGold attests to this fact. An elderly indigenous male resident poignantly said: "Water is gold!"—to express his concern about the water pollution from the mine that added hardship to their everyday lives since now they must purchase water miles away from their village because he had observed that after the arrival of the mine the springs from which they source drinkable water have dried up.<sup>5</sup> Water, food, air are basic human needs that cannot be made subservient to corporate profit. Indeed, environmental sustainability is an issue of humanity's survival. Thus, protection of the environment is one of the issues that united the people's organizations in the community—such as SAPAKKMI (*Samahang Pangkarapatan ng Katutubong Magsasaka at Manggagawa Inc.* or Association for the Rights of Indigenous Peasants and Workers—which lately renamed to DICEO or Didipio Indigenous Concern Environmental Organization), ANNVIK (*Alyansa ng Nagkakaisang Novo Vizcayano para sa Kalikasan* or Alliance of United Nueva Viscayans for the Environment), and DESEMA (Didipio Earth Savers Movement)—to form a broad alliance to collectively oppose the mine. They organized human barricade to disrupt mine operations, but the police dispersed them. They sent a delegation to the Office of the Philippine president, but eventually in 2021 President Rodrigo Duterte lifted the ban on open-pit mining that was put in place by the former secretary of DENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Gina Lopez, whom he did not reappoint because of her stance on corporate mining. The people's resistance calls for addressing environmental sustainability and climate change as an important component in conceptualizing deglobalization in the age of the Anthropocene. Economic development can be designed so that it does not clash

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5 From my personal interview with him on August 20, 2017, during my fieldwork in Didipio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines.

with environmental sustainability which serves as a greenhouse for food security which in turn protects people's health and general well-being.

### **The growing Chinese capitalist presence in the Philippine economy and contention over the West Philippine Sea**

China's growing capitalist presence in the Philippine economy—in addition to the presence of the American, Japanese, and other foreign entities—brings the Philippines deeper into the orbit of global capitalism. China's capitalist goal is not contained within its borders. It aims to expand globally. One can see its growing presence not only in Asia, but also in Africa, Latin America, Europe and in North America. Through its economic expansion, China can gain global power. Thus, the growing Chinese capitalist class in the Philippines is gaining greater control both of medium and large-scale enterprises.

China challenges Philippine sovereignty as shown in its aggressive posture on the West Philippine Sea (WPS). It rejected the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2016 that the Philippines, not China, has the legitimate sovereign rights over the West Philippine Sea and China's claims and intrusion in the West Philippine Sea is unlawful. The PCA is one of the accepted bodies of arbitration under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which is an international treaty that defines countries' rights and obligations over the world's seas and the natural resources therein. Joan B. Agbisit (2020, 4) of the Philippine Social Science Council clearly explains:

Under the UNCLOS, it is the coastal state that has legal rights to and jurisprudence over an adjacent body of water. The UNCLOS, in particular, recognizes the sovereign rights of a coastal state over an area extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline—what it calls the exclusive economic zone. This means that the coastal state can explore and exploit, conserve, and manage the natural resources within the zone.

UNCLOS Article 56 also gives the coastal state “jurisdiction with regard to the (i) establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, (ii) marine scientific research; (iii) protection and preservation of the marine environment.” UNCLOS Article 77 further guarantees sovereign rights to the extended continental shelf of the coastal state, which if the latter chooses not to exploit its natural resources, that “no one may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State” (ibid., 4). Former Justice Carpio also clarified that “sovereign rights mean supreme rights” (ibid., 5). That means they are “superior to the rights of other states,” and “extinguishes all historic rights and claims by other states in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal state” (ibid., 5). Given the clarity of these statutes the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that there is no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources of the West Philippine Sea areas that fall within the



nine-dash line. Furthermore, the PCA said that “China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands, (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone” (Santos, 2016, 2).

Although clearly the Scarborough Shoal (or Panatag Shoal) is inside the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone in the West Philippine Sea, China further asserts a sweeping claim of almost the entire China Sea other than the West Philippine Sea (Ramos, 2022). In fact, lately on March 29, 2022, *Inquirer.net* news reported that the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson inaccurately stated that the Scarborough Shoal is China’s “inherent territory,” and that the Philippines should “avoid interfering” with its patrol in the area (Ramos, 2022, 1). The statement was in response to the question he was asked about a Chinese Coast Guard ship—the fourth incident in 2022—dangerously maneuvering at close distance to the Philippine Coast Guard ship, violating the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (Ramos, 2022).

According to Professor Jay Batongbacal, a maritime expert and professor of Law at the University of the Philippines, there is economic loss and national security issue in the West Philippine Sea dispute.<sup>6</sup> The national security issue, he says, is the loss of natural resources, natural resource rights, and sustainability of resources—that can impact on the Philippines’ food security. China’s overfishing may have caused the decrease of Filipino fishermen’s catch, and Filipino fishermen are precluded from fishing in the exclusive economic zone by Chinese big vessels or Chinese Coast Guards. Filipino fishermen, Batongbacal says, must now buy fish, even the *galung-gong* (the cheapest fish) for their consumption.

There is also the issue of environmental sustainability tied to food security: China’s island-building activities also damage the surrounding marine environment, destroying the reefs for the breeding of diverse fish species. According to scientists, the destruction of reefs in the Spratly Islands has far-reaching impact because the eggs and larvae that are produced there not only replenish the fish stocks within the Philippine area but also travel and replenish the fish communities in the waters of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Agbisit, 2020). As well, there is energy resource in the West Philippine Sea—“as much as 5.4 billion barrels of oil and 55.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas” (Agbisit, 2020, 6)—which the Philippines stands to lose in addition to losing eighty percent of its exclusive economic zone and hundred percent of its extended continental shelf—if the dispute remains unsettled and China continues to defy the UNCLOS.

Other than the legal recourse to an international body to the territorial dispute, the people on the ground have created mass movements and staged street demonstrations and rallies to express their concerns about the West Philippine Sea and

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6 YouTube video, <https://youtube.com/watch?v=aOwrGjUXyg> (accessed April 5, 2022).

their desire to assert the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. They carried streamers that said, “Atin ang West Philippine Sea” (The West Philippine Sea is Ours); “China Out of the West Philippine Sea,” “Ipaglaban ang ating soberenya” (“Fight for our sovereignty”). Philippine movements abroad, in solidarity with the movement in the Philippines, have also raised concerns over the West Philippine Sea, Philippine sovereignty, and China’s unlawful encroachment.

The scenario above incites the question: What kind of regional interstate relations should exist in a deglobalized world system? Should it be based on dominance, control, bullying, or disregard for international laws, UN Law of the Sea, treaties, or agreements? Or could the conceptualization of deglobalization re-imagine a world wherein regional cooperation, mutual respect, sovereignty of nations are the norms? This latter question comes forth more clearly since the issue of protecting the global commons (protected under UNCLOS) arises. China (other than infringing on the West Philippine Sea) is also claiming ownership of the high seas that is part of the global commons that cannot be subjected to claims by other states (Agbisit, 2020). This dispute teaches a lesson in conceptualizing deglobalization. A deglobalized world system must respect nation-states’ sovereignty, international laws, treaties, and agreements. It must respect territorial integrity of nation-states as the foundation for mutual regional cooperation for world peace. It must interlink food security and environmental sustainability in policy. Can the conceptualization of deglobalization re-imagine a world where there are no empires that disrespect sovereign rights, create unequal relations among nations, and structures power-systems of domination-oppression-exploitation both within the nation-states and in the world system? If empires are human creations, a world without empires is just as possible. Shaping that possibility can begin with thought processes that can translate into international policies and structures of regional and global governance. The World Society Foundation’s conference on deglobalization, a concept that is still developing, is an example of such thought processes. A world without empires can prevent wars since, as historical footprints show, empire building and competition among empires create wars.

### **The contractualization of labor to maximize profit for transnational/local capital**

The global mobility of transnational capital depends on availability of cheap labor to garner maximum profits. Transnational capital needs the cooperation of the neoliberal nation-states to make local labor flexible and cheap. The Philippines’ labor contractualization (D.O. 174) does just that. It is popularly known as the “5-5-5” or “ENDO” (“end-of-contract”) because many companies hire workers repeatedly for temporary work, usually for five (5) months, then rehired for another five months. There are cases where workers are placed under this kind of temporary arrangement for some years without becoming permanent. Even those who may be hired

for regular work are usually terminated after the fifth month to avoid their being permanently employed after the sixth-month probationary period. The practice has become a cost-cutting measure for companies since temporary workers also lose benefits made available to regular workers. According to Professor Mark Anthony Abenir (2019) of the University of Santo Tomas Manila—citing the 2015 Integrated Survey of Labor and Employment of the Philippine Statistics Authority—there are approximately seven million Filipino workers who are in this precarious employment conditions in the country.

Past President Duterte promised during election campaigns that he would end labor contractualization, but he never did it in all his six-year term. Under the Marcos Jr's regime, labor contractualization is expected to continue as enticement for increased foreign investments as his major neoliberal economic policy. The labor movement in the Philippines, led by the KMU (Kilusang Mayo Uno, May First Movement) has taken the issue of ending labor contractualization as a unifying goal for labor organizing and alliance building. Workers have expressed their woes that labor contractualization has brought into their lives during public rallies and demonstrations. Valuing the human dignity of workers and respecting their rights are themes that reverberate in their demands for employment security and decent livelihood. In conceptualizing deglobalization and translating it into policy and practice in Philippine context, the decommodification of labor must be a central component. Labor must not be treated as a disposable commodity. Humanizing labor must be made integral to conceptualizing and concretizing the socio-economic functions of the nation-states. It should not be made subservient to profit. Such endeavor would require implementing models of economic development that breaks the capitalist tendency to commodify labor.

### **The continuing Philippine labor export: Cheap migrant work in the global labor market**

The continuing Philippine labor export program links overseas migrant Filipino workers directly to the capitalist global labor market that constantly cheapens labor both in the core and in the peripheries of the world system. The survival of capitalism in the core economies requires the making of migrant work cheap, controllable, flexible, and disposable.

Export labor concentrates in the service sector, predominated by women who do social reproductive work. Social reproductive work done in the household is the “intimate other” (Ally, 2012, 15) of productive work done outside the home; they are two sides of the same coin. Social reproductive work sustains capitalism as it socializes the next generation of workers and maintains households where workers and employers get rested and rejuvenated after work. That migrant Filipino women concentrate in the low-wage social reproductive work in the core host countries means that they are the ones who are shouldering the cost of social reproduction that

otherwise should be subsidized by capitalist enterprises in the formal sector of the economy. Not only are they paid the lowest in the wage structure of the national and global economy, but they are also accorded the lowest prestige, little respect, and sometimes even become victims of physical, verbal, and emotional abuse. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many of them were abandoned by their employers and were placed in extremely difficult situation. Thus, domestic work done mostly by migrant women from poorer countries, like the Philippines, stratifies the capitalist global labor market based on gender, class, ethnicity, race, and national origin.<sup>7</sup>

Migrant workers have organized to address their problems as migrants and as workers. They formed the Migrante International, a migrants' movement organization with chapters in different countries, that provided a network to share their experiences and problems and identify actions for social justice. During the pandemic Migrante International organized webinars that brought public awareness about the situation of overseas migrant workers. Their different forms of resistance reveal narratives that frame demands for policy change in Philippine development. They call on the Philippine government to create jobs at home so that they do not have to migrate for work to support their families. They demand to end the Philippine labor export program, which in their view, facilitates forced migration and "commodifies" labor. They ask the Philippine government to be more involved in protecting their rights as migrant workers in the host countries, and to be more involved in responding to their problems. What implications do all these demands have in conceptualizing deglobalization in Philippine context?

In conceptualizing deglobalization and its policy translation in Philippine context, the labor export program must be seriously re-evaluated. Although considered a temporary measure of alleviating unemployment in the Philippines, labor exporting seems to be becoming a permanent development policy. The deglobalization agenda must include a redefinition of a development ideology that could better guide an economic transformation that will generate more jobs in the Philippines, instead of exporting workers that gives away the human resource needed for sustainable long-term development.

### **The maintenance of a semi-feudal economy co-existing with capitalism and transnational corporate interest**

The co-existence of a semi-feudal economy with capitalism perpetuates, as well, the neoliberal project in the Philippines. The semi-feudal component of the Philippine economy comprises the existence of a small landlord class who owns large tracts of land and landless peasants who work on the landlords' agricultural lands and get

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7 For more in-depth study of Filipino migrant domestic workers in the context of neoliberal globalization cf. Lindio-McGovern, 2012, examining the Filipino migrant domestic workers' experience of neoliberal globalization in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Vancouver, Rome, and Chicago.

paid by crop-sharing or daily wage. Jose Maria Sison, pen-named Amado Guerero (1971), has brought attention to this important issue early in his writings that proposed genuine land reform and agrarian change, but such significant fundamental social transformation has yet to occur. Landlessness of peasants is one of the root causes of their poverty and exploitation, especially in the rural areas since crop-sharing or low wage is inadequate to meet their daily basic needs.

The semi-feudal economy supports capitalism in the Philippines. For example, landless workers who are not absorbed into the landlord's farm, work as low-waged agricultural workers in the agribusiness of transnational corporations. Agribusiness in the Philippines is dominated by transnational corporations that produce for the global market than the local market, which siphons out local resources which then contributes to price increase of goods in the domestic market. For example, while agribusiness transnational corporations in the Philippines export pineapple, banana, mango, coconut products (such as copra and coconut oil), palm oil, and sugar the prices of these goods have become hardly affordable to local consumers who often sigh about the inflated price of goods, including rice, vegetables, and fish that are normally the staple food of Filipinos. Apparently, there are instances when the price of some agricultural products is manipulated so that it does not decrease too low. For example, the practice of "chop-down operations"—the "killing of banana plants before they actually bear fruit"—is done by agribusiness transnational corporations in their corporate banana plantations to regulate the flow of bananas into the market to control its price (David, 1982, 394).

Growth in the number of agribusiness transnational corporations and its monopoly expansion and dominance in agribusiness is partly engineered by the Philippine neoliberal state (Hawes, 1984). The neoliberal policy of economic liberalization gives transnational capital freer rein in the commercialization of agriculture and food production. Rene E. Ofreneo (1981, 27) writes:

The list of transnational as well as local agribusiness firms operating in the Philippines is endless. All the big corporations are in agribusiness one way or the other [...] The biggest and most entrenched agribusiness interests, however, are owned by foreign corporations. All the major agribusiness transnationals in the world are now in the country—Castle and Cooke, Del Monte, Guthrie, Kings Ranch, United Brands, Unilever, Cargill, Firestone, Goodrich, and the like.

What is happening therefore, Ofreneo argues, is "dependent capitalist development," a nature of development that is dependent on foreign monopoly capital—which for the "rural masses can only mean continuing poverty and underdevelopment" (ibid., 29).

The persistent poverty among the rural masses provided a context for the emergence of the KMP (*Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas* or Peasant Movement of the Philippines), including the Amihan (the National Federation of Peasant Women's

Organizations). These movements advocate for genuine land reform that will distribute land to the landless peasants for free since in their view they have already paid for these lands with their long years of underpaid work (Lindio-McGovern, 1997). They have identified semi-feudal economy and monopoly capitalism as among the root causes of poverty, especially among landless peasants. They have raised the issue of agricultural workers' low wages and cash crop production of transnational agribusiness that diverts food production from responding to domestic needs and undermines food security and sovereignty. However, amid this resistance, the Philippine neoliberal state—as an authoritarian state—uses military repression and counterinsurgency to suppress fundamental change in the economic system with painful consequence of rampant human rights violations, including extra-judicial killings of human rights defenders and social movement activists.

This scenario again has lessons to teach thinkers/policy makers of deglobalization. In the Philippine context deglobalization must radically address the control and ruling power of transnational corporations in shaping the nature and ideology of development of its political economy. The conceptualization must critically disentangle the matrix of power and mechanisms that entrenches monopoly capitalism's local and transnational bureaucracies that rationalize its embeddedness in Philippine economic/political culture. At this juncture, Walden Bello's (2013) notion of deglobalization as a "retreat from global production structures" (Manzella, 2013, 2) towards an emphasis on the domestic market is aptly pertinent.

### **The consolidation of a bureaucrat capitalist class allied to transnational capital**

The maintenance of a bureaucrat capitalist class allied to transnational capital plays a significant role in embedding and perpetuating global capitalism in Philippine development. The bureaucrat capitalist class refers to the small class of capitalists who have political power on policy decisions because of their close ties with top government officials, such as the president. Already wealthy to begin with, their economic and political power grew when they gained monopoly control of certain sectors of the economy or industry, consequently booting out small industries of petty Filipino capitalists. Some members of the bureaucrat capitalist class even hold directly political positions, like a Congressman, Senator, or member of the Executive Cabinet. If the transnational capitalist class becomes the locus of transnational corporate practices of global capitalism (Sklair, 2002), the bureaucrat capitalist class in Philippine context becomes the locus of the hegemony of local-global capitalist practices. This partnership was even legitimized in the Philippine Constitution provision which states that local corporations should have sixty percent and for transnational corporations forty percent share of capital. If this provision is amended to one hundred percent foreign ownership, it can further cement the dominant control of transnational corporations on the Philippine economy.

Bureaucrat capitalism is one of the root causes of the big gap between the rich and the poor in the Philippines. That is why the national liberation movement, led by the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDF), aims at changing this kind of class structure through their proposed Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms (CASER). They have persistently pushed the CASER through the Peace Talks with the Philippine government (NDF Reciprocal Committee on Social and Economic Reforms, 2018). In conceptualizing and implementing the deglobalization agenda in Philippine context, the setting up of mechanisms that will transform this kind of class structure must be a major component. The CASER could be a good starting platform to begin. It is a well-crafted proposal that was designed with participation from various sectors and oriented to uplift the marginalized sectors of Philippine society—the peasants, workers, migrants, women, youth, urban poor, indigenous people.

### **Foreign financial institutions' structural adjustment policies and transnational corporate interest**

Structural adjustment policies (SAPs) of the international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), that lend development loans, open the borrowing countries' economies to greater transnational corporate control, tying them to global capitalism. The SAPs tied to their loans include neoliberal policies that benefit more the interest of transnational corporations: (1) liberalization that lifts restrictions to transnational corporations' mobility into the country, (2) privatization that promote private enterprises, foreign capital penetration of state-controlled sectors, and elimination of public subsidies for social services, (3) wage freezes for the maximum profitability for transnational capital, and (4) political stability for transnational capital to be free from labor unrest (Lindio-McGovern, 2011; Bello, 2004).

As borrowing countries get into the debt trap—wherein they keep borrowing to be able to pay their loans—they get entrenched into the dynamics of global capitalism that exploits underdevelopment to maintain itself. This is the case of the Philippines—it keeps borrowing to be able to pay the debt servicing of its loans. Statistics showed that in 2021 the Philippine outstanding debt racked up to P11.73 trillion (\$230 billion), a growth of twenty percent from the 2020's P9.8 trillion (Rubio, 2022). In February 1, 2022, the Philippine Bureau of Treasury showed that the latest debt level accounted for 60.5% of the GDP (gross domestic product) (*ibid.*).

This is how the hegemony of monopoly capitalism is maintained: by creating a world system where the development of the core wealthier countries is sustained by the underdevelopment of the periphery. In fact, the USA has the highest vote in the IMF, giving it greater influence in its policies. Finance capitalism—making profits by lending money—apparently operates in the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the World Bank.

Thus, the IMF/World Bank has become a target of resistance by the anti-globalization movement, including the women's movement. For example, GABRIELA Philippines, that is leading the women's movement in the Philippines, has taken an anti-globalization stance, and has conducted consciousness-raising sessions among grassroots women, such as peasant women, urban poor women, women workers. It has addressed the politics of militarization, as well, that defends the neoliberal development agenda (Lindio-McGovern, 2019).

The concept of deglobalization and its actualization in Philippine context must address the stranglehold of the structural adjustment policies of international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. Loan aid to developing countries should not stunt their development. To do so, it should be delinked from the interest of global capitalism.

## **Success and Failures of Movements as Indicators of the Resiliency of Neoliberal Structures and Collective Response to Challenges**

Although the movement organizations above have been quite successful in bringing together the different sectors of Philippine society through the formation of sectoral movement organizations, they continue to face challenges as neoliberalism strangles the Philippine political economy. As the ruling regime employs divide-and-rule tactics to weaken the potential power of movements, the resilience of these interconnected groups must be considered a success. There were both success and failures in the past that push these movements to persist. For example, the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the West Philippine Sea in favor of the Philippines was a product of the people's movements' efforts to bring it to a formal legal struggle while combining it with mass actions on the streets. This ruling provided a good rationale that is often used as a legal justification for their resistance. But their celebratory mood was tempered when former President Duterte trashed it and compromised Philippine sovereign rights. The gap between his official response and the people's will emboldened the movement to continue its struggle. Therefore, it can be argued that, indeed, movements persist when the structures they aim to change stay intact. As long as the neoliberal agenda is pushed and hurt people, resistance can persist as well.

Another recent formation that brought together various organizations, including the ones already mentioned, is the Movement Against Tyranny (MAT) on August 28, 2017, to oppose the military atrocities and human rights violations under the Duterte regime.<sup>8</sup> A notable achievement of this movement three weeks after

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8 I had the opportunity to be personally present during this founding assembly where I saw members and leaders of the organizations I have cited in this chapter; see also Lindio-McGovern, 2021.



its founding was its successful mobilization of about 10,000 people to assemble in Luneta Park in Manila to expose and resist the then growing fascist rule of Duterte. MAT also inspired the recent formation of the Malaya Movement in the US and Canada to support the struggle for human rights and democracy in the Philippines.<sup>9</sup>

The Philippine movement becomes a paradox of resistance-success-failure-persistence. But this paradox becomes the crucible for change that can alter neoliberal policies. Indeed, the people's liberation movement—even after the 1986 Edsa Revolution or People Power One that toppled the twenty-year Marcos dictatorship—persists because the neoliberal agenda remains to be the dominant development ideology of the government. While these movements already carry a deglobalization agenda from below, the neoliberal Philippine nation-state has yet to transform to legitimize and incorporate such agenda.

## **Alliances within the Nation-State and International Solidarity Networks as a Relational Foundation for a Deglobalized World Society**

The process of building a deglobalized world society would require interacting social movement organizations that persist over a long period in pushing their change agenda. The global or international networks they create as they engage in international solidarity based on common goals form a relational foundation for a deglobalized world system that is humane. As monopoly capitalism globalizes based on its neoliberal pursuit, it also shapes global networks of corporate relationships that are resilient. But on the other hand, the networks that these movement organizations create within the nation-state and on the transnational scale can provide counter-frontiers to corporate power. The movement organizations previously discussed are not working in isolation; they are in fact alliances of various groups and organizations within the nation-state. If they can create international solidarity networks, it is because they are already formed into national alliances with local sectoral organizations. KATRIBU, KMU, Amihan, KMP, GABRIELA, Migrante International are all alliances of various organizations within their sector or class united under common goals. Then these sectoral national alliances are again networked under a broad national coalition called BAYAN (Bagong Alansyang Makabayan or New Patriotic Alliance) that has a progressive orientation that includes seeking alternative paths to the neoliberal project.<sup>10</sup>

Some contributors to this World Society Studies volume argue that the world society is not just a collection of nation-states. To that idea, I add that the paths

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9 Based on my knowledge of Malaya USA as one of its national convenors.

10 Based on my analysis of BAYAN's political statements on various issues posted on their website (<https://www.bagaongalansyangmakabayan.org>) and my personal knowledge of the organization.

to deglobalization are partly paved by grassroots movements that interconnect across national borders, forming people to people networks of international solidarity. While alternative policies are fundamental to deglobalizing the world, interacting agents of change will be needed in the reconstruction of new deglobalized nation-states that can muster counter-movements that will defend the status quo. The movement organizations mentioned in the preceding pages contribute to creating transnational structures that interconnect people and activists from different countries. For example, BAYAN (National Patriotic Alliance) was a founding member organization of the International League of People's Struggle (ILPS) that was formed on May 25, 2001, in Zutphen, the Netherlands in its First International Assembly where more than three hundred delegates representing more than two-hundred organizations from forty countries attended. The elected Founding chair, the late Professor Jose Maria Sison, a Filipino scholar activist then living in exile in the Netherlands, framed his speech during the founding assembly around the theme of internationalizing resistance to capitalist imperialism and neoliberal globalization—a theme that has been reiterated in his succeeding speeches in the assemblies of the League held every three years.<sup>11</sup> International formations, like the ILPS, contribute in shaping a global consciousness that is critical of neoliberalism which can form the conceptual base for an international solidarity as a counter-current to the corporate networks of global capitalism.

At the third ILPS Assembly in 2009, its Women's Commission resolved to form a global women's alliance that would address the gendered nature of neoliberal globalization. This led to the formation of the International Women's Alliance (IWA), a transnational alliance of women's organizations and individuals that oppose neoliberal globalization, imperialism, and wars. IWA recognizes that the gendered-classed oppression and exploitation of women is rooted in the intersections of capitalism, imperialism, and wars.<sup>12</sup> During its founding assembly in 2010 in Montreal, Canada (that I attended) it brought together women from Cuba, Canada, USA, Philippines, Africa, South America, and Europe. GABRIELA Philippines (mentioned earlier) in collaboration with Women of Diverse Origins in Canada led the formation of IWA. Liza Maza, the international representative of GABRIELA became IWA's first founding chairperson. International formations of women's organizations, such as IWA—with diverse nationalities and intentionally unite transnational forces against neoliberal globalization and imperial control of Third World nations—are important in conceptualizing/paving a deglobalized world society that will not reproduce the gendered nature of global capitalism and the subordination/exploitation of the Global South.

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11 From the ILPS website (<https://ilps.info/en/about-ilp/>) and from what I personally know about it.

12 Based on my analysis of IWA's organizational documents accessed through its website and from my personal knowledge of it.

## Conclusion

Examining the interlocking manifestations of the intensification of neoliberal globalization in the context of a nation-state in the Global South—through a critical look into its economic project of expanding capitalism globally and its contestation from different sectors—offers a good conceptual site for reimagining deglobalization. The social movement organizations' change agenda and their framing of issues as they struggle offer insights on theorizing about deglobalization and its policy implications. Struggles of people from below against neoliberal globalization that negatively affect their everyday lives must be given voice in the deglobalization discourse and policy if the top-down mistakes of the technocrats of neoliberalism can be corrected in re/shaping a deglobalized world system. The development process of deglobalization must be from the bottom-up if it wants to create alternative relations of ruling and national/global structures that will empower those made powerless by global capitalism.

This case study of the making and maintaining the Philippines as a neoliberal nation-state has revealed complex dynamics of the interaction of national/global structures in entrenching global capitalism. But the local-national-transnational contestations of social movements have already begun a deglobalization process towards non-capitalist paths. If neoliberal globalization created neoliberal nation-states to embody its ideology and practices, then the deglobalization process also needs interconnected deglobalized nation-states to sustain itself. Social movements interconnected nationally and internationally will play a crucial role in this deglobalization process—which begins from developing a critical consciousness that a more just and more equal world society is possible.

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# International Tourists as Guardians of National Democracies?

Georg P. Mueller

In recent years, public opinion about international (over-)tourism has become more and more negative. This chapter takes a different stance and discusses its potentially positive effects on the maintenance of democracy. Among others, it assumes that the increasing moralization of consumer behavior may also lead to boycotts of travel to countries, where authoritarian regimes curb democratic freedom. Consequently, the author analyzes by means of a special statistical regression technique how much the dependency on international tourism constrains the possibilities of authoritarian governments to restrict democratic freedom. The empirical analyses confirm the expected positive effects of international tourism on democracy. However, there are also competing constraints like e.g. the strength of civil society, which is able to use its political rights in order to defend them against anti-democratic governments. Quantitative comparisons between the two constraints show that international tourism mainly matters if civil society is weak. However, if civil society is endowed with sufficient democratic power, the entailing constraints are more important for maintaining democracy than those related to international tourism.

## Introduction and Overview<sup>1</sup>

Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, international tourism had increasingly problematic aspects. There were growing waiting lines in front of world class museums and monuments, which often hindered tourists from realizing the principal purpose of their journey. Moreover, the increasing long-distance travel by air raised ecological questions about the carbon footprint of this kind of tourism. The international travel restrictions by COVID-19 brought an unexpected (temporary)

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<sup>1</sup> This is a revised and substantially enlarged version of an earlier article by the author: see Mueller (2019).

end to these problems (Andriotis, 2021a). This pause is an opportunity to discuss also the positive aspects of international tourism, not only with regard to the economic but also the potential political returns.

The starting point for this discussion is the assumption that political repression by a national government has negative consequences for the international tourism of the concerned country. In particular, the reduction of political rights may lead to:

- *Political unrest* (Hibbs, 1973, 88–93) with negative consequences for tourism, ranging from insecurity by protest or terrorist movements to the destruction of touristic infrastructure by civil war. The Arab Spring e.g. temporarily deterred foreign visitors from classical holiday destinations like Tunisia or Egypt. Obviously, tourism is much more affected by political unrest than other forms of international exchange like the export of raw materials and manufactures.
- *Political shame* of potential visitors. NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, Amnesty International, and others often fuel this shame by calls for boycott, like in the case of Myanmar (Bianchi et al., 2014, 201 ff.). By the increasing moralization of (touristic) consumption (Seyfi et al., 2020, 92–97; Barnett et al., 2011, chap. 1.1; Butcher, 2003) and the spread of social media (Shaheer et al., 2018) this shame may deviate tourists to politically less “problematic” destinations.
- The *surveillance of touristic visitors* by authoritarian national security agencies, like in the former communist Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe. This intentionally hinders direct contacts between foreign visitors and suppressed nationals. However, it also deters tourists, who stick to the freedom of movement, especially during holiday time (Bianchi et al., 2014, chapter 4).
- The *bureaucratization of travel* by visa, immigration forms, or visiting bans, like in Russia after the outbreak of the Ukrainian war in 2022. This protects authoritarian regimes against the arrival of critical foreign journalists but hinders spontaneous and uncomplicated travel. Consequently, many tourists will go to “easier” destinations, which require less travel preparation and where they have a full “license to travel” (Bianchi et al., 2014, chap. 4).

In sum, individual refusals and organized boycotts of touristic destinations matter for the defense of the political rights in the concerned countries (Makarem et al., 2016). Consequently, *rational* political regimes which depend on income from international visitors have to consider the likely loss of tourism, resulting from the restriction of civil liberties and political rights: the higher the dependency on international tourism, the smaller the possibilities of rational regimes to reduce the political rights and civil liberties of their population. Consequently, the *description* of the resulting governmental *policy space* will be one of the research goals of this chapter. In order to tackle this goal, an iteratively reweighted least square procedure is used,

which attempts to capture the worst thinkable cases of anti-democratic policies that are possible for a given level of dependency on international tourism.

In many countries, civil society itself has the capabilities and institutional means to defend its democratic rights by parliamentary votes, decisions of supreme courts, or political protest (Gurr, 2010, chap. 2): the more political rights, the better the opportunities of civil society for self-defense and the smaller the possibilities of authoritarian regimes to restrict these rights. Thus there are *national* constraints, which interfere with the previously discussed *international* ones. Consequently, the present chapter tackles also the research questions of the *joint effects* and the *relative importance* of the two constraints: under which conditions is international tourism more important than the self-defense of civil society and how effective are the *joint effects* of the two constraints?

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, there are voices to permanently reduce international tourism below the level before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (Andriotis, 2021b; Hall et al., 2021). Consequently, another research question of this chapter is, what the *deglobalization* of travel would mean for the maintenance of democracy: lowering international tourism could imply a weakening of the respective constraints on authoritarian politics—at least if the alternative constraints by civil society are not very strong. In order to tackle this research question, the author presents some simulations, based on the assumption that international tourism would drop to 50% or even 0% of its level in 2011.

## The Constraints of the Restriction of Democracy: Theoretical Considerations<sup>2</sup>

If authoritarian regimes plan to restrict the political *freedom*  $F$  of their national population, they have to consider two factors:

a) The *power resources*  $R_{nat}$  and  $R_{int}$  of the national and international pressure groups, which oppose this kind of anti-democratic policy. In the previous section we related  $R_{nat}$  to the self-defense capacity of the national civil society and  $R_{int}$  to the economic dependency on international tourism. However,  $R_{int}$  may also depend on commercial trade (Mueller, 2019) or foreign aid like in the case of the EU-subsidies to Poland and Hungary (Steinvoth, 2020), which are not discussed in this chapter.


b) The *expectations*  $E_{nat}$  and  $E_{int}$  of the national and the international pressure groups with regard to the future freedom  $F_+$ . If freedom  $F$  is at the maximum level  $F_{max}$ , the international expectations cannot go beyond this level and consequently  $E_{int} = F_{max}$  (see Figure 1). If freedom  $F$  is at the minimum level  $F_{min}$ , there is room for

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<sup>2</sup> At the end of this chapter there is a glossary of the major mathematical terms and abbreviations.



Figure 1: The expectation  $E_{int}$  about future freedom in relation to the current freedom  $F$



Legend:  $\Delta_{int} = b_{int} * (F_{max} - F) / (F_{max} - F_{min})$

Source: Author.

improvements and according to Figure 1 the expectation  $E_{int} = F_{min} + b_{int}$ , where  $b_{int}$  is the *basic growth expectation* with regard to political freedom. Between these two extremes, we hypothesize in Figure 1 that

$$E_{int} = F + \Delta_{int} = F + b_{int} * (F_{max} - F) / (F_{max} - F_{min}) \quad (1a)$$

For the national expectations  $E_{nat}$  there are similar hypotheses and consequently an analogous formula

$$E_{nat} = F + \Delta_{nat} = F + b_{nat} * (F_{max} - F) / (F_{max} - F_{min}) \quad (1b)$$

Thus there are *relative performances* of political regimes

$$P_{int} = (F_+ - E_{int}) / E_{int} \quad (2a)$$

and

$$P_{nat} = (F_+ - E_{nat}) / E_{nat} \quad (2b)$$

with regard to the *national* and *international* expectations  $E_{nat}$  and  $E_{int}$ . They may be positive or negative. If performances are positive, the regime aims at a higher *future level of freedom*  $F_+$  than expected—if they are negative the regime is under-performing with regard to these expectations. As stated at the beginning of this section, the

amount of possible under-performance depends on the power resources  $R_{\text{nat}}$  and  $R_{\text{int}}$  of the national and international pressure groups. In particular, we postulate that

$$P_{\text{int}} \geq f_{\text{int}}(R_{\text{int}}) = C_{\text{int}} \quad (3a)$$

and


$$P_{\text{nat}} \geq f_{\text{nat}}(R_{\text{nat}}) = C_{\text{nat}} \quad (3b)$$

where  $f_{\text{nat}}$  and  $f_{\text{int}}$  are positive monotonic functions, which define the national and international *constraints*  $C_{\text{nat}}$  and  $C_{\text{int}}$  of the political regime. If these constraints and the related expectations are violated, the regime risks national protest (Gurr, 2010, chap. 2; Feierabend et al., 1972) and international boycotts and sanctions (Seyfi et al., 2020, Table 31).

## Measuring Constraints: Methodological Considerations

The equations (3a) and (3b) postulate monotonic positive relations between the *relative governmental performance*  $P$  and the *power resources*  $R$  of a pressure group. At first sight, this hypothesis suggests to estimate the related *constraints*  $C$  by conventional statistical regression. However, constraints describe *worst case* situations, whereas conventional OLS-regression is conceptualized for the description of “*average*” relations. Thus the author proposed in earlier publications (Mueller, 2012; Mueller, 2019) the use of iteratively reweighted least squares regression (Rubin, 1983; Andersen, 2008, 52ff.) instead of classical OLS. Since situations of governmental under-performance are of primary interest when estimating constraints, the regression analysis starts with cases, which have a *negative* relative performance  $P$ . The resulting regression line  $f_1(R)$  (see Figure 2) usually has positive and negative residuals. As a next step, cases with *positive* residuals are attributed the weight 0 and consequently eliminated, whereas the remaining ones keep their original weight 1 and thus constitute the sample of the next following regression no. 2. Again, cases with positive residuals from the resulting regression line  $f_2(R)$  are attributed the weight 0, whereas observations with *negative* ones keep the original weight 1 and define the sample of the next following regression no. 3. By continuing this process, a sequence of regression lines  $f_1(R), f_2(R), f_3(R), \dots, f_n(R)$  is created, which get closer and closer to the *lower margin* of the data cloud of Figure 2 that represents the searched constraint  $C$ . The process has to be stopped, if the sample with negative residuals becomes too small. In the present research this happened after 4 iterations, when the results of the final regression were based on ca.  $1/2^3 = 12.5\%$  of the initial cases. The final outcome had to be submitted to the usual statistical tests and should display a positive and significant effect of the power resources  $R$  on the relative performance  $P$ .

Figure 2: The measurement of the constraint C by iteratively reweighted regression



Note: Sample for  $f_1$ : all units with neg. values P; Sample for  $f_2$ : all units with *no pos.* residuals from  $f_1$ ; Sample for  $f_n$ : all units with *no pos.* residuals from  $f_{n-1}$ . Source: Author.

## Empirical Analyses

### Constraints by international tourism

The following equations summarize our previous theoretical assumptions about the international constraints  $C_{int}$  on the retreat of democracy:

$$E_{int} = F + b_{int} * (F_{max} - F) / (F_{max} - F_{min}) \tag{1a}$$

$$P_{int} = (F_+ - E_{int}) / E_{int} \tag{2a}$$

$$P_{int} \geq C_{int} = f_{int}(R_{int}) \tag{3a}$$

Thus we need operationalizations of the current and the future political freedom  $F$  and  $F_+$ , the maximum and minimum values  $F_{max}$  and  $F_{min}$  of this freedom, the basic growth expectation  $b_{int}$ , the constraint function  $f_{int}$ , and the power resources  $R_{int}$ . The remaining variables, i.e. the expectation  $E_{int}$ , the performance  $P_{int}$ , and the constraint  $C_{int}$  can be derived from these primary operationalizations (see eqns 1a, 2a, 3a).

Political freedom  $F$  is in the present context by far the most important variable to be operationalized. Due to its frequent use by international institutions (Giannone,

2010, 75f.) we rely in this work on the political rights index PR of Freedom House (2017). Its polarity<sup>3</sup>, however, had to be altered, such that

$$F = 8 - (\text{Political Rights PR in 2011}) \tag{4a}$$

Due to the rather slow changes of the PR-index we operationalized future freedom as

$$F_+ = 8 - (\text{Political Rights PR in 2016}) \tag{4b}$$

which refers to freedom *5 years later*. Thus we are covering in this study a historical period that started with an accelerated global decline of democracy and ended three years before the outbreak of COVID-19 that put a sudden end to international tourism. Due to the definitions 4a and 4b, the highest possible values of F and F<sub>+</sub> in this period were

$$F_{\max} = 7 \tag{5a}$$

and the lowest possible values

$$F_{\min} = 1 \tag{5b}$$

Of similar importance is the operationalization of the power resources R<sub>int</sub> of the international pressure groups. A possible indicator is the number of foreign visitors per year. However, this indicator does not grasp the importance of international tourism in relation to other economic activities. So we use in this paper the ratio of the returns from international tourism to the revenues from exports in 2011, which is in this chapter abbreviated as T<sub>2011</sub>. It is supplied by the World Bank (2021) and varies between zero and infinity.<sup>4</sup> The higher the value of this indicator, the more important is tourism for financing the often crucial imports of a country. Thus, any drop of the indicator T<sub>2011</sub> by individual or organized collective travel boycotts necessitates the respective country to increase its exports of physical goods or to decrease its imports in order to maintain in the long run its balance of payments.

The constraint function f<sub>int</sub> is not directly observable and thus has to be estimated by the iteratively reweighed least-squares procedure, described in the previous section. The related regression equation reads as

$$P_{\text{int}} = (F_+ - E_{\text{int}}) / E_{\text{int}} = k_{\text{int}} + c_{\text{int}} * T_{2011} + \epsilon \tag{6}$$

where (F<sub>+</sub> - E<sub>int</sub>) / E<sub>int</sub> is the dependent variable corresponding to the relative performance P<sub>int</sub>, T<sub>2011</sub> is the explanatory variable representing the power resource R<sub>int</sub>, k<sub>int</sub> is the regression constant, c<sub>int</sub> the regression coefficient, and ε the error-term. The left-hand side of eqn. 6 contains as a hidden unknown parameter the basic growth expectation b<sub>int</sub> (see eqn. 1a), which cannot be directly estimated by statistical regression techniques. So the author decided to vary this parameter systematically from b<sub>int</sub> = .10 to b<sub>int</sub> = .30 and to retain that value of b<sub>int</sub>, which yields the best fit for the regression equation 6. Results for b<sub>int</sub> and the regression parameters k<sub>int</sub> and c<sub>int</sub> are given in Table 1.

3 The worst level of the original PR-index is 7, the best 1.


4 The highest value in 2011 was observed for Palau and equaled 0.819.

**Table 1: Parameter estimation of the international constraint  $C_{int}$  on the relative performance**

Model no.	Growth exp. $b_{int}$	Coefficient $C_{int}$	Constant $k_{int}$	Adjusted r-sq.	Sample $N_{rel}$	Sample $N_{abs}$
A1	1.00	0.311***	-0.211***	.067	1.000	127
A2	1.00	0.618***	-0.455***	.384	0.394	50
A3	1.00	0.786***	-0.611***	.796	0.197	25
A4	1.00	0.830***	-0.684***	.936	0.102	13
B1	1.50	0.340***	-0.239***	.066	1.000	132
B2	1.50	0.648***	-0.509***	.392	0.386	51
B3	1.50	0.847***	-0.681***	.837	0.182	24
B4	1.50	0.877***	-0.737***	.949	0.091	12
C1	2.00	0.337**	-0.252***	.054	1.000	140
C2	2.00	0.750***	-0.553***	.455	0.400	56
C3	2.00	0.899***	-0.731***	.905	0.179	25
C4	<b>2.00</b>	<b>0.954***</b>	<b>-0.788***</b>	<b>.960</b>	<b>0.086</b>	<b>12</b>
D1	2.50	0.353**	-0.278***	.054	1.000	141
D2	2.50	0.768***	-0.588***	.455	0.404	57
D3	2.50	0.920***	-0.769***	.906	0.177	25
D4	2.50	0.873***	-0.808***	.844	0.085	12
E1	3.00	0.380***	-0.299***	.060	1.000	144
E2	3.00	0.751***	-0.602***	.411	0.417	60
E3	3.00	0.948***	-0.791***	.880	0.188	27
E4	3.00	0.775***	-0.820***	.823	0.090	13

*Legend:* Final model for given  $b_{int}$ : A4, B4, C4, D4, E4. Bold: best final model. One-tailed significances: \*\*\*:  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*:  $p \leq .01$ , \*:  $p \leq .05$ .  $N_{rel}$ : Relative sample size in comparison to the first model of a given  $b_{int}$ .  $N_{abs}$ : Absolute number of processed cases. Adj. r-sq.: Adjusted r-square = fit of the model.  
*Note:* All samples without Maldives and Ethiopia. *Source:* Author.

Figure 3: The international constraint  $C_{int}$  on the relative performance  $P_{int}$ , as a function of  $T_{2011} = \text{Tourism} / \text{Export}$



Legend: Diagonal line: International constraint  $C_{int}$ . Deviant cases: 57 = Ethiopia; 105 = Maldives.  
Sources: World Bank (2021) and author.

According to Table 1, C4 is the equation with the best fit, being as high as .960 (see adj. r-sq.). Thus we conclude from Table 1 that the constraint on the relative performance is

$$C_{int} = -.788 + .954 * T_{2011} \tag{7}$$

and the basic growth expectation  $b_{int} = 2.0$ . This confirms our hypothesis that an increasing dependency on international tourism increasingly constrains the possibilities of authoritarian regimes to reduce democracy. The diagonal constraint line in Figure 3 confirms this hypothesis also visually. However, as this figure shows, this constraint cannot prevent most of the political regimes from being under-performers with *negative* performances  $P_{int}$  in relation to the expectations  $E_{int}$ , which are quite tough: if e.g. freedom  $F=1$ ,  $b_{int} = 2.0$  implies an international expectation  $E_{int} = 1 + 2 = 3$ . Besides, Figure 3 also shows two *outliers*, which had to be excluded from the regressions of Table 1: Ethiopia and the Maldives. Ethiopia experienced in the recent past extremely high growth rates (ca. 10% p.a.) of its GDP (World Bank, 2022) and the Maldives have one of the highest dependencies on international tourism.

**Table 2: Parameter estimation of the national constraint  $C_{nat}$  on the relative performance**

Model no.	Growth exp. $b_{nat}$	Coefficient $C_{nat}$	Constant $k_{nat}$	Adjusted r-sq.	Sample $N_{rel}$	Sample $N_{abs}$
A1	1.00	0.083***	-0.578***	.710	1.000	171
A2	1.00	0.096***	-0.707***	.848	0.614	105
A3	1.00	0.101***	-0.839***	.785	0.199	34
A4	1.00	0.091***	-0.860***	.852	0.117	20
B1	1.50	0.093***	-0.647***	.725	1.000	176
B2	1.50	0.110***	-0.805***	.899	0.597	105
B3	1.50	0.109***	-0.903***	.826	0.193	34
B4	1.50	0.100***	-0.921***	.882	0.144	20
C1	2.00	0.100***	-0.694***	.718	1.000	184
C2	2.00	0.120***	-0.873***	.921	0.571	105
C3	2.00	0.116***	-0.953***	.854	0.185	34
<b>C4</b>	<b>2.00</b>	<b>0.107***</b>	<b>-0.969***</b>	<b>.899</b>	<b>0.109</b>	<b>20</b>
D1	2.50	0.108***	-0.753***	.761	1.000	185
D2	2.50	0.127***	-0.924***	.933	0.568	105
D3	2.50	0.121***	-0.993***	.874	0.184	34
D4	2.50	0.081***	-0.932***	.868	0.086	16
E1	3.00	0.114***	-0.794***	.774	1.000	190
E2	3.00	0.133***	-0.964***	.939	0.553	105
E3	3.00	0.125***	-1.026***	.889	0.179	34
E4	3.00	0.085***	-0.962***	.883	0.084	16

*Legend:* Final model for given  $b_{nat}$ : A4, B4, C4, D4, E4. Bold: Best final model. One-tailed significances: \*\*\*:  $p \leq .001$ , \*\*:  $p \leq .01$ , \*:  $p \leq .05$ .  $N_{rel}$ : Relative sample size in comparison to the first model of a given  $b_{nat}$ .  $N_{abs}$ : Absolute number of processed cases. Adj. r-sq.: Adjusted r-square = fit of the model.

*Source:* Author.

### Constraints by national civil society

Similar to the equations 1a, 2a, and 3a there are three other equations, which summarize our theoretical assumptions about the national constraints  $C_{nat}$  with regard to the relative democratic performance of political regimes:

$$E_{nat} = F + b_{nat} * (F_{max} - F) / (F_{max} - F_{min}) \tag{1b}$$

$$P_{nat} = (F_+ - E_{nat}) / E_{nat} \tag{2b}$$

$$P_{nat} \geq C_{nat} = f_{nat} (R_{nat}) \tag{3b}$$

In order to test these hypotheses, we had to operationalize the basic growth expectations  $b_{nat}$ , the constraint function  $f_{nat}$ , and the power resources  $R_{nat}$ . The operationalizations of the remaining variables have already been presented in the previous section.

For the operationalization of the power resources  $R_{nat}$  of the civil society we suggest to use the political rights variable  $F_{2011}$ . The higher this variable and the related liberties, the better the possibilities of civil society to control its government by democratic elections, protests, or decisions of the supreme court and the higher the governmental constraints on democratic performance deficits. Thus the iteratively reweighted least squares procedure used for estimating the constraint function  $f_{nat}$  is based on the following regression equation:

$$P_{nat} = (F_+ - E_{nat}) / E_{nat} = k_{nat} + C_{nat} * F_{2011} + \varepsilon \tag{8}$$

where  $(F_+ - E_{nat}) / E_{nat}$  is the dependent variable, corresponding to the relative performance  $P_{nat}$ ,  $F_{2011}$  is the explanatory variable,  $k_{nat}$  the regression constant,  $C_{nat}$  the regression coefficient, and  $\varepsilon$  the error-term. Analogous to the estimation of the international constraint function in the previous section, the basic growth expectation  $b_{nat}$  could only be determined by systematic variation of this parameter, until the best fit of eqn. 8 was retrieved.


As Table 2 shows, the best results are for equation C4, where the basic growth expectations  $b_{nat} = 2.0$ , the constant  $k_{nat} = -0.969$ , and the coefficient  $C_{nat} = 0.107$ . Thus we conclude that the constraint on the relative performance equals to

$$C_{nat} = -0.969 + 0.107 * F_{2011} \tag{9}$$

The fact that the coefficient 0.107 in eqn. 9 is positive and highly significant (see Table 2) confirms our hypothesis that political freedom is a constraint for authoritarian regimes. Nonetheless, the constraint function  $C_{nat}$  is always in the *negative* domain of Figure 4—even for the highest degrees of freedom  $F_{2011}$ . This means that the expectations  $E_{nat}$  of the national population can always be violated. They are by the way identical to the international expectations, since  $b_{nat} = b_{int} = 2.0$ . This points to the *globalization* of the respective standards, probably by media-related international exchange.



Figure 4: The national constraint  $C_{nat}$  on the relative performance  $P_{nat}$ , as a function of Freedom  $F_{2011}$



Legend: Diagonal line: National constraint  $C_{nat}$ . Note: Markers with fat circles represent *multiple* cases.  
 Sources: World Bank (2021) and author.

### The effects of both constraints together

By a few elementary mathematical operations<sup>5</sup> the international constraints  $C_{int}$  on the performance  $P_{int}$  can be transformed into international constraints

$$K_{int} = E_{int} + C_{int} * E_{int} \leq F_+ \tag{10a}$$


on the future freedom  $F_+$ . Analogous transformations turn the national constraints  $C_{nat}$  on the performance  $P_{nat}$  into national constraints

$$K_{nat} = E_{nat} + C_{nat} * E_{nat} \leq F_+ \tag{10b}$$

on the future freedom  $F_+$ . These transformations are in so far very useful, as they allow to compare the constraints of different pressure groups. Figure 5 displays such a

5 From eqns (2a) and (3a) follows  $P_{int} = (F_+ - E_{int}) / E_{int} \geq C_{int}$ . Consequently,  $F_+ - E_{int} \geq C_{int} * E_{int}$  and thus  $F_+ \geq E_{int} + C_{int} * E_{int}$ , where the right hand side  $E_{int} + C_{int} * E_{int}$  is defined as the constraint  $K_{int}$ .

Figure 5: National vs. international constraints on Freedom F\_2011




Legend: Outliers: 105 = Maldives; 132 = Palau; 190 = Vanuatu. Source: Author.

comparison between the effects of the national civil society and international tourism.

Above the main diagonal, the international constraints are more restrictive than the national ones, below this line the situation is just the reverse. All in all, there are more countries below the mentioned diagonal such that *civil society* is generally more important than international tourism. This is in so far not very surprising as the empirical literature attributes to external economic sanctions and boycotts only limited success (Hufbauer et al., 2009, 158ff.). In some cases, external pressure on threatened regimes may even worsen the situation with regard to political and civil rights (Wood, 2008). However, according to Figure 5, there are two exceptions to this regularity: First, in countries with a very weak civil society in terms of political freedom ( $F_{2011} \leq 2$ ), the regime is more restrained by international tourism than by national constraints. Mueller (2019) has shown a similar result for the dependency on international trade, which only matters as a constraint if civil society is weak. Second, in the three countries with the highest dependency on international tourism ( $T_{2011} \geq 0.71$ ), i.e. Palau, Maldives, and Vanuatu, the restriction by

Figure 6: The joint national and international constraints on Freedom F\_2016




*Legend:* Joint constraints =  $\max(K_{\text{int}}, K_{\text{nat}})$ . Diagonal line: Joint constraints required for maintaining the status-quo with regard to freedom F\_2011. Outlier: 105 = Maldives. *Sources:* World Bank (2021) and author.

tourism is more important than by political rights, although these rights are in all three cases relatively important ( $F_{2011} \geq 5$ ).

By focusing on the constraints  $K_{\text{int}}$  and  $K_{\text{nat}}$  instead of  $C_{\text{int}}$  and  $C_{\text{nat}}$  it is also possible to analyze the *joint constraints*  $\max(K_{\text{int}}, K_{\text{nat}})$  of the national and the international pressure groups with regard to the future freedom  $F_{2016}$ . The result is visualized in Fig. 6: with the exception of the highly touristic Maldives the joint constraints  $\max(K_{\text{int}}, K_{\text{nat}})$  are generally *lower* than the original level of freedom  $F_{2011}$ . This means that authoritarian regimes may in most cases restrict democratic rights, especially at *middle* level of freedom  $3 \leq F_{2011} \leq 5$  (see Fig. 6). Below this critical zone, reducing democracy is more difficult, because  $F_{2011}$  is already near the lower end of the scale. Above  $F_{2011} = 5$ , civil society is at least in some cases strong enough to defend the democratic status quo. Consequently, the joint constraints deviate at the middle level of freedom  $F_{2011}$  very visibly from the diagonal of Fig. 6, which represents the maintenance of the status quo.

Figure 7: The effects on the joint constraints if tourism is reduced from 100% to 50%




Legend: Outliers: 105 = Maldives; 132 = Palau; 190 = Vanuatu. Note: Markers with fat circles represent multiple cases. Source: Author.

## Consequences of the Deglobalization of Tourism for Democracy

We are now turning to our initial research question what deglobalization in terms of a permanent reduction of international tourism would mean for democracy. In order to tackle this question, we reduced in equation 7 for all countries the importance of tourism  $T_{2011}$  first to 50% and subsequently to 0% of its original value and recalculated the international constraints  $K_{int}$  and then the joint constraints  $\max(K_{int}, K_{nat})$ . The results of the two simulations can be mutually compared as well as with the joint constraints  $\max(K_{int}, K_{nat})$  calculated for the original values of tourism  $T_{2011}$ .

Figure 7 displays the effects of the reduction of tourism  $T_{2011}$  from the original 100% to 50%. For countries with high freedom  $F_{2011}$ , the alleviation of the joint constraints is rather limited, mainly due to the fact that the unchanged power resources of civil society are more important than the varied resources of the international pressure groups (see Fig. 5). Exceptions with a considerable reduction of

Figure 8: The effects on the joint constraints if tourism is reduced from 50% to 0%



Legend: Outliers: 105 = Maldives. Note: Many markers of this diagram represent *multiple* cases. Source: Author.

the related constraints are again the three countries with the highest dependency on tourism  $T_{2011}$ , i.e. Maldives, Palau, and Vanuatu. The reduction of tourism to 50% of its real value has also some effects for countries with low freedom  $F_{2011} \leq 2$ , since international tourism constitutes for these cases the only real constraint on political freedom (see previous section). However, as Figure 7 shows, the mentioned effects are in most cases rather *small*.

A further reduction of tourism  $T_{2011}$  from the 50% to 0% has for nearly all countries no effect on the joint constraints, as the simulation experiment of Figure 8 displays: the most important constraint after reducing the tourism to 50% is for the majority of countries the unchanged self-defense of the national civil society. Thus, effects of a further reduction of tourism from 50% to 0% of its original value exist only for countries with a weak civil society, where  $F_{2011} \leq 2$ . However, also in these cases the changes of the joint constraints are rather small, as Figure 8 shows.

## Summary and Conclusions

This chapter started with the question, whether foreign tourists are “guardians” of the national democracies of their hosting countries. In order to tackle this research problem, we analyzed the statistical effects of the revenues from tourism on the worst possible case of democratic under-performance of political regimes. According to Table 1, the respective regression coefficients are indeed statistically *highly significant*. However, there are also competing constraints from civil society. Democratic freedom as its main power resource has too a statistically significant effect on the protection of democracy, as shown in Table 2. Moreover, democratic freedom is for many countries a more important constraint against the reduction of democracy than the dependency on international tourism (see Figure 5). Mueller (2019) has shown a similar result concerning the limited importance of *trade dependency* on the maintenance of democracy. International tourism matters as a constraint only if *civil society* is weak and political freedom kept at bay. However, also in this situation, international tourism cannot prevent the reduction of democracy. It is just a substitute for the self-defense of civil society, which is too not a real protection against the loss of democracy (see diagonal line in Figure 6). Consequently, the reduction of international tourism to 50% or even 0% of its original value has generally only small effects on the loss of protection of democracy, as the related simulations show in Figures 7 and 8. Thus, international tourists are only in exceptional cases the “guardians” of democracy: as the outliers Maldives, Palau, and Vanuatu of Figure 7 demonstrate, substantial international effects on democracy can only be expected if the dependency on international tourism is *exceptionally high*.

## Glossary of the Major Mathematical Terms and Abbreviations

$b_{int}$	Basic growth expectation of the <i>international</i> pressure groups with regard to future political freedom $F_+$ .
$b_{nat}$	Basic growth expectation of the <i>national</i> pressure groups with regard to future political freedom $F_+$ .
$C_{int}$	<i>International</i> constraint of the polit. regime with regard to its democratic performance $P_{int}$ .
$C_{nat}$	<i>National</i> constraint of the polit. regime with regard to its democratic performance $P_{nat}$ .
$C_{int}$	Linear regression coefficient of the <i>international</i> constraint function $f_{int}$ .
$C_{nat}$	Linear regression coefficient of the <i>national</i> constraint function $f_{nat}$ .
$E_{int}$	Expectations of the <i>international</i> pressure groups with regard to future political freedom $F_+$ .

$E_{\text{nat}}$	Expectations of the <i>national</i> pressure groups with regard to future political freedom $F_+$ .
$\varepsilon$	Error term of statistical regressions.
$F$	<i>Current</i> political freedom.
$F_+$	<i>Future</i> political freedom.
$F_{\text{max}}$	Highest possible degree of political freedom, given by the definition of $F$ .
$F_{\text{min}}$	Lowest possible degree of political freedom, given by the definition of $F$ .
$F_{\text{2011}}$	Political rights (political freedom) in 2011.
$f_{\text{int}}$	Constraint function describing the relation between the <i>international</i> power resources $R_{\text{int}}$ and the constraint $C_{\text{int}}$ .
$f_{\text{nat}}$	Constraint function describing the relation between the <i>national</i> power resources $R_{\text{int}}$ and the constraint $C_{\text{int}}$ .
$K_{\text{int}}$	<i>International</i> constraint of the polit. regime with regard to future freedom $F_+$ .
$K_{\text{nat}}$	<i>National</i> constraint of the polit. regime with regard to future freedom $F_+$ .
$k_{\text{int}}$	Linear regression constant of the <i>international</i> constraint function $f_{\text{int}}$ .
$k_{\text{nat}}$	Linear regression constant of the <i>national</i> constraint function $f_{\text{nat}}$ .
$P$	Performance of the polit. regime with regard to a <i>general</i> expectation.
$P_{\text{int}}$	Performance of the polit. regime with regard to the expectations $E_{\text{int}}$ of the <i>international</i> pressure groups.
$P_{\text{nat}}$	Performance of the polit. regime with regard to the expectations $E_{\text{nat}}$ of the <i>national</i> pressure groups.
$R$	Power resources of a <i>general</i> pressure group.
$R_{\text{int}}$	Power resources of the <i>international</i> pressure groups.
$R_{\text{nat}}$	Power resources of the <i>national</i> pressure groups.
$T_{\text{2011}}$	Ratio of the returns from international tourism to the revenues from exports in 2011.

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## Globality and Particularity of Legal Norms in South Africa's Relation with World Society

Jürgen Schraten

The South African transition to democracy in the 1990s was globally celebrated as an example for the successful implementation of the universal norms of world society. However, three decades later the dismal social reality motivates some political and scientific actors to call for separating the country's development from global trajectories again. This chapter reviews the evolution of legal norms according to the concepts of "power" and "prestige" of Peter Heintz to explain the disappointing results of globalization in South Africa, but also the dangers of embarking on the paths of separate development again. It follows the transformation of values into legal norms through two periods of political transition, and interprets the current political conflict accordingly. It finally argues for the importance of the openness in the competition for values.

### Introduction

This chapter analyzes the historical development of the implementation of values as legal norms in South Africa in reference to the theoretical work on development and world society in the tradition of Peter Heintz.<sup>1</sup> It is motivated by debates about the desirability of a renewed separation of South Africa from world society that was initiated by a prominent politician, and which also resonates in some scientific debates about "decolonization" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013, 37–63).

By studying two periods of political transition it demonstrates the effects of attempts to congeal the competition for values as desired goods, and of strategies to re-open the competition. It then analyzes the value implementation concerning a main conflict of current South Africa, the question of land distribution and its protection by property rights. The study also shows how values can emerge from

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within society or being imported from world society. Following the effects of value implementation, and limitation or extension of access to them, will finally enable us to reveal a closedness of value distribution as the main problem of the current political crisis *and* as main danger of the calls for another separation of South Africa from world society.

South Africa is an interesting case for understanding the conflicting dynamics of globalization and the disentanglement of nation states from world society. In its historical trajectory the country seems to represent three different codes of world society as summarized by Peter Heintz (1982, 16–26). Initially, the eastern and northern territories of South Africa were included into the capitalist world market by the deliberate imperial and military conquest of Great Britain from the 1870s to 1902. It was motivated by the economic interests to exploit the mineral resources of the territory, especially diamonds and gold (Feinstein 2005, 22–46; Terreblanche, 2002, 239–250). Hence, it seems to confirm the concept of Wallerstein (1974; Heintz, 1982, 16f.), which is focused on the power of a center executed on a peripheral region.

From the foundation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 to the transition to a parliamentary democracy in 1994 the country followed a separate path by imposing a racist order on its population, which was radicalized into a bureaucratically organized and brutally enforced social engineering project by the apartheid regime from 1948 on. It centered around a nationalist ideology of an exceptional status of “Afrikanerdom” in world society (Moodie, 1975), and can thus be interpreted as the historical emergence of a culturally diverse societal system in the understanding of Lipset (1963; Heintz, 1982, 71–75). The South African government explicitly claimed to represent a different kind of “sociocultural evolution” (Stichweh 2020, 92f.). It meant that South Africa deliberately interrupted some of its links to the international system, and strove to retain only those the government deemed as beneficial, which was complemented by an active and increasing isolation of the country by international forces (Spence, 1971).

The combining effect of a “disintegration” (Wiederkehr, 1972) of the national subunit, caused by local protests against political oppression and poverty (Clark and Worger 2004: 64–83), and the fundamental power shift in the international system after the fall of the Berlin wall led to the negotiated re-integration of South Africa as an active participant into the world society and the dismantling of the apartheid system (Marais, 2011, 69–96; Van der Westhuizen, 2007, 211–246). South Africa was hailed as a role model of another wave of democratization and globalization.

However, there have been numerous skeptical statements about the continuance of a disintegrated societal system and problematic relations to the world society since the transition to democracy (Terreblanche, 2002, 371–415; Hart and Padayachee, 2010; Mbeki 2009; Marais, 2011; Hart 2014). These are supported by the evidence of the globally most extreme social inequality as recorded by the World

Bank (2022), enduring poverty of more than half of the population (World Factbook 2022), and a world record high in registered unemployment (Statistics South Africa 2022, 6). This culminated in scientific statements about a “new apartheid” that had only been “privatized” (Mpofu-Walsh 2021).

Referencing this development, the long-term serving minister and daughter of anti-apartheid heroes, Lindiwe Sisulu (2022) called the meaningfulness of transitioning to a parliamentary democracy into question:

What we have instead witnessed under a supreme Constitution and the rule of law since 1994 has been the co-option and invitation of political power brokers to the dinner table, whose job is to keep the masses quiet in their sufferance while they dine caviar with colonized capital.

With this, she directly addressed the distribution of power and prestige in the societal system and the interference with the according distribution of these values on the international level of nation states.

Power means the control or property of desired goods by some units of the system according to particularistic criteria. Prestige means the possession of desired goods which are accessible to all units of the system according to universalistic criteria. (Heintz, 1972a, 127)

Hence, the question at stake is that of value generation and value distribution.

Sisulu questioned the meaning of South Africa's deliberate orientation towards core values of the world system during the transition to democracy between 1992 and 1997. Also, she named the relationships local leaders cherished with multinational and transnational organizations to increase their individual wealth at the cost of the collective well-being of South Africans. Finally, she argued that the new *openness* of South Africa did not benefit its development as a national society. This in turn was interpreted as a plea for an anewed closure of the country by the acting Chief Justice of South Africa, Raymond Zondo (Ferreira, 2022), and the Minister in the Presidency, Montli Gungubele (Ferreira and Tandwa, 2022).

This political challenge makes the theoretical approach of development and world society a suitable starting point for a sociological analysis. To begin with, Peter Heintz (1972a, 1972b) created a theoretical framework for understanding the complex power-prestige distributions on the national, regional and world society level. Secondly, he explicitly addressed the role of multinational and transnational corporations as a factor of increasing importance beyond the nation state and independently from intergovernmental relations (Heintz, 1974; 1982, 62–66). Both elements benefited from the methodological elaborations on power by Levy and Obrecht (1972) and allow to describe the gradual changes and effects of openness and closure of a subsystemic unit.

Therefore the chapter will begin with an empirical analysis of the attempt of the apartheid regime to close the national subunit to the outside, and to fix the value distribution by linking it statically to specific groups of society. Then, the chapter will demonstrate how a new set of values appeared in the resistance against apartheid and was popularized by prominent political leaders like Tutu and Mandela. The political transition to democracy in South Africa still is a lesson for the peaceful transition of fragile societies. It shows an interesting interplay between local forces and the values and norms of world society. Finally, we return to a process of preliminary closure of the competition for values and their implementation in the conflict about property in South Africa. This compromise, like the conflict that arose from it, are both examples for the undesirable result of attempts to limit the openness of society.

## South Africa's Return to the World Society

Shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall, on 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1990, the then-President of the Republic of South Africa Frederik Willem de Klerk announced the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of some political organizations after these oppositional forces to the apartheid regime had been persecuted and prohibited since 1948.

In the following seven years, South Africa turned from the authoritarian apartheid regime into a constitutional democracy without slipping into a civil war despite high levels of violence, which documented the existing danger. The first crucial question arising from this is how the new and alternative values could arise in a racist regime that had been conceptualized to *separate* from world society and *congeal* its normative foundation.

This section starts with a review of the legal process that transformed political norms into imposed and generalized laws of society. It reveals that this act itself—the transformation of socially negotiable action orientations into rigid commands—generated the breaks in the edifice. Then, a view on the transitional period shows that a solution of the political crisis was tantamount with a re-integration of South Africa into the global trajectory of societal development. Actually, it was the political and legal looping of the prospective foundation of a constitutional court that made a peaceful transition possible. The preliminary constitution, basically just a contract, prospected the foundation of a court with the purpose to check the fulfillment of the contract by which this very institution was founded. This allowed to escape the totalitarian claim of the old regime.

However, it also reveals the main vulnerability of the new and flexible system. In order to appease the old elites, the crucial legal norm of property was mainly left untouched, generating the impression that the new political order legitimizes the violent colonial dispossession of land. Precisely read, the constitution indeed suggests

to initiate another transitional process for this norm. However, it also established a political order that allows elites to prevent another change by simple inaction.

Meanwhile, the missing next step of transformation endangers the democratic progress and South Africa's integration in world society.

### **The closed subsystem of apartheid**

This section analyzes how the leading party of the apartheid regime defined and justified *values*, and imposed them as guiding principles of politics in the form of laws. It shows that the fixation of values as legal norms itself is the process that generates tensions in society, because those norms contradicted the identities and modes of social intercourse of the people it tried to instruct. It inevitably led to the emergence of counter-values and therefore challenged the feasibility of enforcing values as norms by the state itself.

During and after World War II, the Reunited National Party of South Africa (HNP) developed the policy of "apartheid," which is the Afrikaans term for "separation." In a pamphlet called *Race Relations Policy of the National Party* from 1947 it defined this policy by "the task of preserving and safeguarding the racial identity of the White population of the country" by erecting "social, residential, industrial and political" barriers between different groups (Krüger, 1960, 402f.).

The division of groups was very complex from the start. The "Whites" were distinguished in collectivities following "two distinct guiding principles," one defined as "integration" and the other as "apartheid." The pursuit of the HNP was to enforce apartheid because it "derived from the experiences of the established White population in the country" and was "in harmony with such Christian principles as justice and equity" (Krüger, 1960, 402). Hence, separation was *politically* defined as the core value of the society because it would conform with experience and Christianity, i.e. with facts and norms.

Then, the "non-White" were split into "Coloureds," "Bantu" and "Indians," and they were ordered hierarchically. The "Coloureds" had to be strictly separated from the Whites, but should also "be protected against unfair competition by the Bantu." According to the pamphlet they should be provided with some political representation by "Whites" acting on behalf of them, only sufficient to influence their internal affairs.

"Bantu" referenced the Africans, and they were to be even stricter separated by moving them physically to the reserves as defined in the *Native Trust and Land Act No. 18* of 1936, which amounted to just 13 percent of the South African territory. These areas were intended to be built into "the national home of the Bantu ... instead of the present practice of providing them in urban locations" (Krüger, 1960, 403–406). This means that their expatriation, which finally began with the *Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No. 46* of 1959, was intended from the very beginning. The figures of a 1946 census had shown that 23.7 per cent of the seven to

eight million Africans lived in the towns, which gives an idea of the monstrosity of the projected relocation policy (Welsh, 1971, 173).

Finally the program distinguished “the Indians as a foreign element which cannot be assimilated in the South African set-up.” The goal was to “repatriate” them, but the politicians had realized that this would require “the co-operation of India and/or other countries,” and hence expected the ongoing presence of “Indians” (Krüger, 1960, 407). The second plan was to treat them similar to the “Coloureds” for the time being. All these groups were put into a system because the state was understood as a total institution (Goffman, 1961: 1–124). It was defined as the paramount frame of all people, with the HNP and its concepts at the head of the state.

After campaigning with this program, the HNP won government in the elections of 1948. They gained 70 seats due to the absolute majority principle in the constituencies, which had been created with the intention to appease the minority of Afrikaners after their defeat in the South African War 1899–1902. Therefore the HNP was able to build a coalition government together with the nine seats of the Afrikaner Party, although they had only won 41.63 percent of the votes, opposed to 51.75 percent of the collaborating United Party and Labour Party. It also meant that the new government had to act quickly to stabilize the basis of its electoral success. HNP and Afrikaner Party united into the National Party (NP) in 1951. This required a common plan.

In this new party program from 1952, the “Whites” were unitedly defined as “European races,” but distinguished into “English-speaking” and “Afrikaans-speaking” people. Hence, “race” meant language and a vague idea of culture attached to the mother tongue. Although these communities were said to have “a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation,” it was seen necessary to enforce the bilingualism “in every way in all spheres of South African national life” (Krüger, 1960, 97). The obvious reason was the localization of their seat-winning constituencies in the predominantly Afrikaans-speaking areas. Hence, there was a concealed identification of the political value “apartheid” with the qualification as “Afrikaans-speaking.”

The English-speaking individuals were nowhere criticized in the new program, but their share in public culture was intended to be statutorily reduced to the half, independently of other criteria like quantity of people, education, output in the arts or productivity. The tension between the political value and the criteria of the mother-tongue is obvious, and the uncertainty in the guidance of action orientation is palpable. A “spirit of trust and co-operation” is not compatible with government enforcement.

At this point of time, the government had already begun to restructure the national subunit by law. First it introduced the *Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act No. 12* of 1949, complemented by the *Immorality Act No. 21* of 1950, replacing the already existing *Immorality Act No. 51* of 1927. The latter had prohibited sexual intercourse between “Whites” and Africans, which represented a vague category, and which was now deliberately extended to all “non-Whites.”

In the same year the *Population Registration Act No. 30* of 1950 and the *Group Areas Act No. 41* of 1950 were put into force. These four laws were interconnected because the legal prohibition of relationships and marriages with persons conceptualized as being of *a different kind* in the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts required to define the criteria of these groups in the Population Registrations Act. An effective ban of these relationships also suggested to separate them physically by the Group Areas Act, as already intended in the pamphlet of 1947. This indicated the necessity to constantly extend the legislation, which kept the regime busy until the end.

Defining the groups was a very difficult task. Obviously, the terms "Coloureds," "Bantu" and "Indians" referenced different qualities. Their origin was explained by Professor HP Cruse (1947, 9–16) in a book primarily directed at a nation-wide student organization as the future elite of the country. The term "Coloureds" suggested a reference to the skin, but of course *color* is no proper definition as it could only be distinguished from non-color. Consequently, "Coloureds" were defined by their mixed descent from Khoikhoi, San, "slaves" and Europeans and their area of origin around the Cape of Good Hope. Former slaves was another blanket category because the referenced people had been abducted from such diverse areas as present-day Benin, Angola, Mozambique or Indonesia since 1658, or they were enslaved from neighboring peoples until the Ordinance 50 of 1828 had outlawed such a practice. The partial kinship of some of them with Europeans and their localization in the Cape justified for the regime to place the "Coloureds" above the "Bantu," but further affinity to the "European races" was meant to be prevented in the future.

Right to the opposite of this case, the term "Bantu" suggested language and culture as root of the definition, but it was actually based on the racist criteria of color of the skin. Cruse described the designated individuals as "strongly built" and "of dark complexion," and repeatedly defined them as "darker" than "Coloureds" and "Indians." They were also characterized as "living together" on "tribal land" as "cattle farmers." These rather economic and cultural features were mentioned to explain why they could not be assimilated to the urban life in towns, like the "Coloureds," and despite their increased presence among the workers especially of the mining industries. Most importantly, they could be subdivided into Zulu, Basotho, Swazi, Batswana, and Xhosa, which allowed to counteract their numerical majority, and this partitioning again was substantiated by political reasons due to their governance by a common chief.

Finally, referencing "Indians" one would expect a regional or national definition, but instead it was justified on economic terms. "Indians" were those indentured laborers who were initially contracted to work on the sugar plantations in Natal. Their, albeit involuntary, familiarity with capitalistic labor vindicated their defined superiority to the "Bantu" and similarity to the "Coloureds." Hence, they could also expect limited political representation according to the NP program of 1952.



Hence, the division of the population into different groups itself undermined the idea of *generalized values* fixed as legal norms because no clear criteria to perform such a division could be found. The very ability of humans to shape and adjust their modes of life contradicts every attempt of definition. Trials of fixation must capture deviations that they themselves generate. This can be politically enforced, but it does not create harmony between norms and values.

The ideological and pseudo-scientific classification of the apartheid regime was implemented by the *Population Registration Act*, which could be specified by the head of the state and had to be changed and amended in 1962, 1964 and 1967. In the course of time, some terms changed, for instance the initial term “Native” for Africans was replaced with “Bantu.” In 1961, the state president ordered to subdivide “Coloureds” into “Cape Malay,” “Cape Coloured,” “Griqua,” and “other Coloureds” (Horrell, 1971, 9f.).

The mentioned set of laws had to be complemented again as soon as 1952 by the *Native Laws Amendment Act No. 54* and the *Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act No. 67* in order to make the distinctions of individuals effective. So it went on. Keeping an overview of the numerous laws, regulations and bureaucratic requirements became a full-time task of organizations like the South African Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg.

With this political strategy of social division of society, complemented by political steps of physical separation and an ideology of racist splitting, the South African government intentionally departed from a global tendency of “inclusion revolutions” (Stichweh, 2020, 94–96). Instead of founding polities on the interaction of increasingly diverse populations, the South African government tried to engineer a set of homogeneous partitions of the people under its jurisdiction.

This provoked reactions on the level of world society. The political concepts of the government were incompatible with principles of transnational cooperation. Regarding the international system, the nationalist government took deliberate steps to withdraw from cross-border relations and to isolate itself. For example, intergovernmental negotiations for an South and East African defense treaty, which took place in Nairobi in 1951 with the participation of Ethiopia, were abandoned by South Africa because it refused to enter an alliance in which Africans would be equipped with military gear (Spence, 1971, 479).

The ideological focus on “Afrikanderdom” motivated the regime for a “counter-revolution” regarding the policies of previous governments, and to finally leave the Commonwealth of the British Empire and become an independent republic in 1961 (De Villiers, 1971, 390–395). After the violence against “non-White” people became more and more viral in the international public, its policies were condemned by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in December 1966, tightened by the implementation of an UN embargo on the trade of arms in 1977, and finally culminating in the two-thirds vote of the US Congress for the *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act*, overriding a veto of president Ronald Reagan in 1986. These political and eco-

conomic acts of isolation were complemented by many sporting and cultural boycotts of South Africa, which consequently had to build its societal system according to the name of its ideology: apart from the rest.

### **The openness of democracy**

This section first deals with the consequences of the failed attempt to embark on an isolated national developmental path that was based on a division of the population justified by an authoritarian set of institutionalized values. It then shows how organized economic actors achieved the maintenance of basic economic principles of the past in a new framework of norms. We reveal how an alternative set of values broke the ideological surface of the regime, and was counteracted again by another political project to stabilize competing values.

One of the core purposes of Afrikaner nationalism besides racist supremacy was the economic and social uplifting of Afrikaans-speaking people to overcome poverty, which was common among them due to a low educational level. Before the Second World War, they built a number of educational and economic organizations focused on their separate socioeconomic improvement (O'Meara, 1983).

Since the beginning of the industrialization, the South African economic growth had been based on the supply of cheap labor from the subjugated people. The *Mines and Works Act No. 12* of 1911 marked the nation-wide racist divide of the workforce known as the "colour bar" (Feinstein, 2005, 74–89). At first, it gave South Africa comparative advantages in export prices, but already before the beginning of apartheid there were warnings that such a developmental pathway would lower the overall productivity and damage South Africa's competitiveness (Kiewiet, 1946, 208–247). However, apartheid increased the benefits of cheap labor for another while by violently aggravating the impoverishment of the discriminated groups.

In the early 1970s, the isolated economic development model began to burst. The first wave of strikes almost immediately turned into political opposition because the economic dissatisfaction was inextricably linked to the racist political suppression. From 1973 on, a long series of protest and resistance acts, counter-attacks from the government, and increasing international pressure brought the country into a situation of a permanent state of emergency and near-civil war (Welsh, 2009, 142–343).

In this situation, a new and democratically open pattern of values emerged from the civil society, which became world famous as the utopia of the "rainbow nation." The metaphor had been introduced into the anti-apartheid struggle in a speech of archbishop Desmond Tutu during a protest march of the *Defiance Campaign* on 13 September 1989. On that day, thousands of people gathered in the streets of Cape Town to protest against the state violence committed upon those who had been classified as "Bantu" by the apartheid regime. These racially excluded people had protested against their disenfranchisement in the apartheid polls on 6 September

1989. On election day, the police killed more than 20 people in the townships of Cape Town.

Tutu reacted in a remarkable way. Instead of calling for a revolution as the overturn of existing power relations, and hence a continuity of struggles between social groups as they had been formed and defined during South Africa's colonial history, Tutu invoked a completely new framing of the South African society as such. He did this by, first, noting the already achieved establishment of a new South African people in the non-racialized protests against the regime and, second, deliberately inviting the perpetrators of apartheid like then-president de Klerk into this collective:

You wanted us to show you that we can be dignified. You wanted us to show you that we are disciplined. You wanted us to show you that we are determined. You wanted us to show you that we are peaceful. Right! Mr. de Klerk, please come here! We are inviting you. [...] Come and see what this country is going to become. This country is a rainbow country. [...] Mr. de Klerk, we have already won. Mr. de Klerk, if you really know what is good for you, join us! [...] Join us in this new South Africa! (Tutu, 1994, 187f.)

With these words, Tutu took the political legitimacy from the governing group and put it into the hands of the protesters, and then eradicated any substantial barrier between them by inviting the opposed party to join. In this move he overcame the power struggle of political camps by calling a new arena of political competition into existence. Pointing to the evidence of a non-racialized citizenry that demanded their agency in the streets of Cape Town, he disqualified the government as proper representative of its people. He revealed the breakup between the normative orientation of everyday actions of South African citizens, and the values as institutionalized by the government. From this moment on, the apartheid regime had to choose between opening constitutional negotiations to the public or to turn deliberately against its own people, be they franchised or not.

The rapid dismantling of the apartheid regime that followed was surely favored by concurrent international events like the fall of the Berlin wall with its weakening effect on the existing balance of power. But even without them a simple continuity of the reign of president de Klerk would not have been possible after the speech of Tutu, because the elections of 6 September 1989 as constituent foundation of the power of the government had lost a huge share of its legitimacy.

In his inauguration speech as first democratically elected president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela took the metaphor of Tutu up and turned into a globally recognized catchphrase: "We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity—a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world." (Clark and Worger, 2004, 154).

This political proclamation of a new framework of values was constitutionally implemented in a complex negotiation and legislation process. Even before the po-

litical reversal of president de Klerk, business leaders in concern about their isolation from the world market had begun to engage in talks with the possible new power of the African National Congress (Welsh, 2009, 382–420). They made their influence felt in the development of new economic policies for the post-apartheid state. In fact, they urged for the implementation of internationally established standards especially in regard to property. For this, they had to overcome ambitions among African National Congress (ANC) activists to partly dispossess their oppressors and redistribute it among the hitherto disadvantaged people (Marais, 2011, 69–122).

In this intention the ANC leadership met with the white elite of the apartheid regime that tried to secure at least the accumulated material wealth as they were losing political power. Van der Westhuizen (2007, 285) called this aptly the “globalization of the Afrikaner.” In order to win prestige on the national as well as international level, the companies began to appoint prominent figures of the anti-apartheid struggle in the managements. This means that they shared power and wealth with formerly discriminated individuals in order to demonstrate openly their new orientation towards liberal values. This policy was then implemented as “Black Economic Empowerment” into the new government strategies (Mbeki, 2009, 66–73).

The difficulty of the transitional process consisted in the necessity to avoid an authoritarian defense of power by the old elites, and a violent counter-revolution of the hitherto discriminated people alike. In 1993, the outgoing apartheid regime was still in possession of all means of state force and controlled economic resources, and the threat of an open civil war was imminent. A peaceful transition was finally achieved by a sophisticated institutionalized process. In negotiations between all organized actors that existed, which had no other legitimation than the simple fact of their ability to claim their participation, some basic principles of a new constitution and a free election were agreed upon in late 1993.

This preliminary constitution contained three core mechanisms. First of all, elections would generate a new and fair source of legitimation from the people of the country. Second, the new government would be one of *national unity* for at least five years to prevent that the winner would take it all, and negotiate a final constitution based on its newly gained legitimation. Finally, the preliminary constitution contained some principles and projected the foundation of a Constitutional Court in the moment of election, which was assigned with the task to examine the proper implementation of the agreed-upon principles in the new constitution (Klug, 2010, 29–58). Hence, the preliminary constitution was a contract that instituted a new constitutional body in the moment of election, which would then check the adherence to the contract exactly in the moment it expired.

This mechanism secured the transfer of some new values which were deliberately taken from established democratic countries in the world, as a kind of guarantee of “achieving an internationally acceptable framework” (Klug, 2010, 48). This means it projected the gradual opening of the closed national subunit. The most important elements were incorporated as the Bill of Rights in the sections 7 to 39 of

the new constitution, which transformed the separated and predominantly subjugated groups into a common and equal society of individuals on the territory of the Republic of South Africa. The basic means for doing this was granting freedoms and political rights to individuals, which could now choose their actions without being commanded in authoritarian ways. They had gained these rights by opposing and fighting against the institutionalized rules for decades.

One of the most contested values, however, was the property clause, especially in regard to land. The NP demanded a full and uncompromising protection of private property, which meant defining the status quo of wealth distribution at the end of 342 years of colonial, imperialist and racist exploitation of the autochthonous people as starting point for the future market society (Klug, 2010, 49).

In contrast, the ANC had agreed on the following demand in its *Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa* in 1988: "The state will give special help to people who have had taken away their land from them, for example by forced removals." The interim solution consisted in including a clause of property protection, but to single out the specific question of land reform for another bargain.

The negotiations "provide a window through which the making of the Constitution and its interaction with global and local imperatives may be viewed," as Klug (2010, 54) explained. The interesting move of the ANC in the conflict between its own demand for limited redistribution and the NP's claim of nearly unrestricted protection of property was to suggest that no property clause was necessary at all. Not institutionalizing a property norm would have meant to transfer the power of regulation to the soon freely interacting people of the country. Their protection of property rights of a minority was unlikely in the face of all the violence and injustice the majority had endured under their rule.

Before the elections of 1994, this conflict saw on one side the old elite, still in possession of massive state forces in the form of the police and the army, demanding the implementation of the principle of equal exchange after the fixation of the current wealth distribution. Hence, they called up the maximum power of the national subunit in reference to the international prestige of liberal market exchanges.

Opposing to this, the ANC mobilized a different societal power, that of the people, and referenced the international prestige of a normative rather than economic value by claiming a restoration of justice. It is easy to see how this could have ended in a civil war, which caused Mahmood Mamdani (2001, 185) to judge on the final outcome: "If Ruanda was the genocide that happened, then South Africa was the genocide that didn't."

In the further proceedings, the NP named the World Bank to justify its position, which is interesting because it referenced international prestige rather than the state power close at hand (Klug, 2010, 56). However, the ANC could mobilize the accumulated power of the international normative prestige on the one hand with the fundamental power of the people, which Tutu had addressed as the "rainbow people," on the other.

The *Constitution of South Africa* as adopted on 8 May 1996 and amended by the Constitutional Assembly on 11 October 1996 contained the protection of property in section 25 of the *Bill of Rights*, but excluded the dispossessions “after 19 June 1913” from it, which was the date of the *Natives Land Act No. 27* of 1913 that had distributed the land between settlers and autochthonous people in the ratio 93 to 7 percent. Beyond that, section 25(8) regulated that “[n]o provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past discrimination.” And this clause was again linked to section 36(1), which ruled that the *Bill of Rights* could only be touched “based on human dignity, equality and freedom.”

This chain of rights meant that every violent dispossession of land after 1913 could be reversed, but every legal acquisition was protected. Further, it allowed the political redistribution of land that was colonially dispossessed in 1913, but bound such measures to the procedures of the Constitution and the protection of universal human rights. This means that the world society insofar it represented states of law was established as the central value, even trumping the economic principles of market society, but under the condition that national political support could be mobilized.

The connection to the world society was explicitly confirmed in the *Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Case CCT 23/96*, as the procedure that had been agreed upon in the interim constitution of 1993. The Constitutional Court rejected the complaint that the new constitution would violate a universal property right in section 71 of the judgement with reference to three agreements of the United Nations: “Although article 17 of the UDHR [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to own property’ and that ‘no-one shall be arbitrarily deprived’ of property, neither the ICESCR [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] nor the ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] contains any general protection of property.” It also referenced “[s]everal recognized democracies” and “[o]ther constitutions” to justify the local decision (Section 72 of CCT 23/96).

By its Constitution of 1996 and this judgment, the democratic South Africa was formally incorporated to the world society.

### **The renewed questioning of the rule of law**

This brings us back to the starting point of this chapter, the questioning of the meaningfulness of the “rule of law” and the orientation of South Africa towards global values. To understand the new popularity of the plea for a deglobalization, two developments since the transition to democracy have to be taken into consideration.

The first is the evident and continuing failure to achieve a higher level of economic equality and welfare. With the beginning transition to democracy the accumulated capital of South Africa started to flee the country, between 1994 and

2000 on the average level of ten percent of the gross domestic product per year. At the same time, cheap manufacturing goods from all over the world were imported into the country, frustrating every hope for building up labor-intensive local production sites. Barely any sector of the economy boomed but finance (Marais, 2011, 123–237).

Although the government built an extensive and costly welfare system, it could not really help the poor. This can be illustrated by the Social Relief of Distress Grant, which was introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic. As it is paid to every person with a legal resident status and a lack of income, it causes massive expenses from the Treasury. However, the grant amounts to less than 25 US-Dollar per person per month and covers only a minimum of basic expenses. All would be worse without, but it is no solution either. This situation leads to the popular impression that apartheid did not really end (Mpfu-Walsh, 2021).

One attempt of the government to trigger economic improvements was to establish a consumer credit market, which granted the right to apply for a loan to every citizen. However, it sent more than ten of the 60 million South Africans into over-indebtedness, because they could not serve their instalments for three months or longer. To stimulate borrowing without a socially shared increase of income is not an economic strategy. As South Africa does not offer consumer bankruptcy or debt relief, it aggravated the crisis (Schraten, 2020).

The second crucial development is the emergence of a parallel economy. It all started with bribery around a huge military arms deal in 1999, in which politicians up to the presidency became willing to push the unaffordable investment through in return for illicit extra payments. Some of them were motivated because they had been ignored in the redistributive Black Economic Empowerment strategy, and they started to manipulate the democratic institutions (Feinstein, 2007). The most active of them became president in 2009: Jacob Zuma designed a sophisticated system, in which friends of him at the head of Ministries issued huge orders to other friends of him at the top of private or parastatal companies, often financed by a third group of friends. Nearly every deal was accompanied by the distribution of illicit surplus benefits and paid for with taxpayers' money. After the architecture of this "state capture" (Myburgh, 2017) was revealed, Zuma could be urged to step down and finally had to appear in court. Yet, it also fueled fundamental distrust in the hard-won democratic institutions.

Both developments can only be explained by referencing the *Natives Land Act No. 27* of 1913. It had put an end to a long history of colonial and imperialist conquest and violent dispossession of Africans (Ngcukaitobi, 2018, 11–38). It was based on the justification that the land was unused or uninhabited, which was only possible by depriving the autochthonous people of their human rights (Mellet, 2020, 95–216). It robbed the majority of the population of the means to survive in order to generate a cheap labor force and drove them into poverty, which lasts until today (Terreblanche, 2002, 241–251).

The solution of the 1996 Constitution, which envisaged a gradual redistribution of land as explained above, depended on the emergence of economically capable citizens that could afford to buy the land. The only alternative would be to present undisputable evidence of illegitimate dispossessions to a court, which is unrealistic as these dispossessions happened in colonial wars to mainly illiterate people of acephalous societies. As an effect, the debate of 1993 has revived afresh, because many activists claim that without “expropriation without compensation” no fundamental economic change could be achieved (Ngcukaitobi, 2019). The confrontation is exactly the same as during the transitional period.

The “state capture” of the legislature of Jacob Zuma is not without popular support, and Sisulu acts as a paradigmatic spokesperson. The failure of the democratic institutions to bring fundamental change serves as justification for suggesting vague alternatives as a remedy. However, the social fabric of the parallel economy rests on “declarations of dependence” (Ferguson, 2013) and “slaves in search of masters” (Achille Mbembe cited in Mpofo-Walsh, 2021, 25). It means that individuals are giving up some of their personal freedom and autonomy in return for some social provision. But conflicts in the parallel economy are not solved by law or political debate, but by violence. Actually, this is a form of returning to some kind of authoritarian rule.

## **The Desirability of Closing and Opening of Value Systems**

This chapter reviewed the transformation and generalization of values into legal norms in two transitional processes of the South African history. It then analyzed the circumstances that popularize new suggestions of a separation of South Africa from world society under the call for decolonization.

During this historical development we could follow the different states of openness and closedness in the competition for values, which finally allows us to judge on the desirability of another closing up of South Africa from the global competition for values.

The first stage showed the attempt of an authoritarian regime to close the competition for values in society. In favor of “separation” as alternative to “integration” it tried to reserve values by linking them to determinable characteristics of human beings and social intercourse. This obviously failed as it generated the constant necessity of re-adjustments and amendments. Yet, the regime was able to establish nearly complete political control over society and to enforce its closure of values violently.

It collapsed at the beginning of the second transitional period. The crisis began with a lack of economic values, which caused social unrest. But it almost immediately slipped into a conflict about political and social values, of which some were newly generated in the political protests. Archbishop Tutu was able to make these counter-values publicly visible, and to open the competition for them that way. This step undermined the legitimacy of the old regime.



For overcoming the old regime as well as for defending existing privileges, political actors deliberately addressed values of the world society. Whereas the democratic forces invoked political values of justice and equality, the powers of the ancient regime demanded the implementation of property clauses as legal values of the economic intercourse. This means that both competing forces followed a strategy of enriching the competition for values in order to mobilize support for their political goals.

The preliminary compromise implemented a constitutional property clause that is problematic as it transformed colonial land dispossessions into a legal value, as predation before 1913 became tolerated for the time being. Although the constitution made preparations for another change, it made such a move dependent on political mobilization. This represents another closure as it prohibits a conflict about the legitimacy and possible change of land distribution.

However, the political result of new political calls for another separation of the South African development from world society with the deliberate intention to prevent further competition for valued goods would once again create the necessity to stop global “integration” in favor of “separation,” albeit under reversed power distribution.

This historical analysis shows very clearly that the closure of value competition is dysfunctional, and unsustainable in the long run, because it requires to *define* value distribution to fixed groups and to prevent further debate, competition and development.

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# Social Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Non-Globalization of World Society

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World society research is surprisingly silent about social policies. Applying general world society theory to this topic, the economic variant suggests a correlation of social expenditures with economic development, whereas the cultural variant assumes the diffusion of policy models that emerge in international organizations and INGOs. Such models are discussed in the Global Social Policy approach. How successful are competing models for cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa? This chapter offers a comparative study of cash transfer programs in the six most populous sub-Saharan countries (Nigeria, Ethiopia, DR Congo, South Africa, Tanzania, and Kenya) based on the scientific process tracing literature. There is no dominant cash transfer model, but the fact that cash transfers played a role in all countries shows that the idea that individuals are responsible for their own well-being has become dominant in world society. With the exception of South Africa, there are examples of stalled pilot projects and thus decoupling between policy and practice in all countries. Cash transfers serve as a myth: they are believed to be rational organizational principles for social policies, and national and international policy makers receive recognition and legitimacy when they implement these scripts.

## Introduction

When the COVID-19 pandemic began to spread globally, scenarios of a looming health catastrophe in sub-Saharan Africa quickly emerged. They were later supplemented by media reports expressing astonishment that the expected health disaster had failed to materialize. These rather stereotypical reports drew attention away from the many measures taken. In his snapshot of social policy responses, Devereux (2021) reported on the responses in most sub-Saharan countries. Without wanting to idealize their effects and deny the manifold social problems that were created or exacerbated by the pandemic, a look at the social policy responses of sub-Saharan

Africa's six most populous countries based on this snapshot is revealing, though surely incomplete.

The most populous country, Nigeria, announced an expansion of its cash transfer program by enrolling more than a million households and adding an emergency relief to the regular social assistance provided. The school feeding program was replaced by food vouchers. In addition, food aid was distributed. In Ethiopia, both pillars of the existing social assistance program were part of the policy response. The rural public works program continued to transfer cash or food but waived the work requirement because movement was restricted. The urban pillar was expanded vertically (top-up of the cash transfer) and horizontally (new enrollments for temporarily unconditional cash transfers). In addition, as part of the response, the distribution of emergency food aid to fifteen million people was announced. The response of the third most populous country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was limited to tax exemptions on basic commodities and waivers for government utilities. In some ways, the response of South Africa was similar to that of Ethiopia: a waiver of the work requirement in the public works program, a top-up of the existing cash transfers that already covered one-third of the population prior to the pandemic, and the introduction of an additional temporary cash transfer. Food parcels were also distributed. In addition, the response in South Africa had a unique element targeting working adults who were paid unemployment benefits while temporarily laid off for training. Tanzania's late president Magufuli questionably declared the country COVID-free and thus could justify not to respond. Finally, the sixth-most populous country, Kenya, reacted with tax reliefs, a public works program for the youth, and the vertical and small horizontal expansion of the existing cash transfer program. These responses are a mixture, adapting existing and some new social policies. However, they were mostly announced as temporary responses to a global challenge in anticipation of a return to "normal." But what were the "normal" pre-pandemic social policies in sub-Saharan Africa?

As the following literature review will show, world society theory is surprisingly silent about social policies. The economic variant is quite skeptical about social policies in the periphery or semi-periphery. The cultural variant assumes the diffusion of policy models that emerge in international organizations and non-governmental organizations. The global social policy approach is informative about such models. Regarding cash transfers, there are competing models. This paper offers a comparative case study of cash transfer programs in the six most populous sub-Saharan countries based on the scientific process tracing literature. The comparative analysis shows that in the domain of cash transfers, the policy models of world society theory are remarkably non-globalized. There is decoupling in the form of stalled pilot projects, but also between means and ends.

## **Social Policies in the World Society: Literature Review and Empirical Strategy**

### **World society theory and social policies**

The examples in the introduction suggest that national social policies cannot be understood without taking the global level into consideration. World society theory is an appropriate starting point for a theoretical explanation of this global influence on national social policies because it assumes a realm of reality beyond the nation state that shapes the behavior of the lower levels from the individual to the nation state. The economic variant of world society theory is generally not much interested in social policies. Among the rare exceptions, Usui (1994) assumes that welfare states evolve as capitalist core countries develop from agricultural to industrial economies. In other words, social policies such as social insurance programs are strongly linked to economic development. This correlation is evident in a global sample, whereas regional samples point to differences among countries of similar economic strength. Remarkably, modernization theories assume a similar correlation (Künzler, 2004). However, in contrast to modernization theories, the economic variant of world society theory does not see the lack of social policies as a temporary phenomenon that disappears as economic growth sets in. The economic development of the core countries in the world system is only possible with the non-development of the periphery, and mobility in this world system is very rare. In this perspective, social policies in the core countries are palliatives to soften the effects of capitalism and divert attention from the exploitative nature of the capitalist system (see e.g. Jones, 1990).

Bornschieer and Trezzini (2001) offer a slightly different perspective on the question. They do not explicitly refer to social policies but focus on the social order that governments offer, with social policies implicitly included. If this social order realizes key values such as efficiency, equality, and security, it is more likely to be perceived as legitimate and thus has a competitive advantage on the world market. Such countries will be more economically successful in the long run. Peripheral societies such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, DRC, Tanzania or Kenya do not compete on an equal footing in the world system but are integrated into it as raw material producers. Raw material and other rents can be redistributed to generate legitimacy or used to finance a repressive apparatus. Neither infrastructure nor a healthy and educated population are needed to sustain the commodity economy. This kind of social order is expected to lead to low economic growth. This is somewhat less the case in the resource-rich semiperiphery, to which South Africa belongs. Beyond the commodity sector, there is also industrial production that depends to a certain degree on the provision of an infrastructure, but health care and education can be limited to a small group of the population that is relevant for the functioning of the system. Nevertheless, this kind of social order is expected to lead to higher economic growth. South Africa is thus

potentially an exception, but in the other countries discussed here, the economic variants of world society theories do not expect much in terms of social policies. However, they are unable to explain differences within this group.

Usui (1994) also tested a second variant of world society theory that is known as world polity theory. Contrary to what the name might suggest, this has a focus on a shared world culture and not on a political entity at global level. She found that shared global norms are also important predictors of the adoption of a first social security legislation and points to the importance of the International Labour Organization (ILO). World polity theory was developed by John W. Meyer and colleagues as a contribution to the debate on the sociology of education, with particular reference to the explanation of educational expansion (for overviews see Krücken and Drori, 2009). Opposing functionalist explanations, this theory emphasizes the effect of norms such as equity and rationality, codified in international treaties or in global goals and diffused through international (non-governmental) organizations since the end of the Second World War. Scientists and the relevant professions describe violations of these norms as social problems, refine and quantify them. Besides the assumed exogenous explanation for national policies, the theory also predicts that institutions and structures become increasingly similar (“isomorphism”) and converge towards global models. Resource-rich countries have more possibilities to deal with exogenous pressure and maintain their own solutions compared to poorer countries. The adoption of elements of global models by poorer countries is supported by monetary incentives such as loans or development aid. However, states formally adopt elements of global models to pose as legitimate actors, but cannot or do not necessarily intend to implement these elements. This is called decoupling. Furthermore, global norms and models are fuzzy and contradictory. World polity theory was later applied to various other areas, but with few exceptions not to social policies, an area where Meyer himself was skeptical about the diffusion of global models (Leisering, 2007, 186).

### **Global social policy**

While both variants of world society theory are surprisingly silent about social policies, there is another strand of literature that is not explicitly related to but quite compatible with it: Global social policy. The term became known through the work of Deacon et al. (1997) and was developed in two distinct directions (Deacon, 2010). The first one is interested in how social policy processes could be and are steered at the supranational level or, in other words, the emergence and functioning of global social governance. While this substrand goes beyond world polity theory, the second one is compatible as it looks at the social policy concepts of global actors and how they influence social policies at national level. However, in contrast to world polity theories, the focus is less on isomorphism and more on the disputes and conflicts between international actors and the models and concepts of social policy

they and their epistemic communities advocate. Diffusion is more complicated in this perspective, with pressure by international actors and choice on the side of national governments.

Based on this actor-centered approach, a number of social policy fields have been investigated. Regarding global health care policy, Kaasch (2013) did not find a clearly dominant international organization in the field, but several organizations that compete and try to position themselves as the dominant organization. At the same time, they also cooperate in some areas. The positions of these international organizations are complex and diverse, and there is no encompassing one-size-fits-all model. While all agree that health systems should have universal coverage, it is not clear how this should be organized and financed. The advantages and disadvantages of health care financing by means of social insurance and taxation are discussed. Three phases of dominant positions on user fees can be identified. Currently, no global health care actor clearly favors user fees (Künzler, 2016b).

In the field of global pension policy, Kaasch (2013) describes contestation between two policy models. The historically older model emerged from the 1940s and focused on a unified national pension insurance system. It is promoted by an epistemic community around the ILO. This model was challenged by a second model that emerged in an epistemic community around the World Bank after the pension reform in Chile (1981). Painting the specter of aging societies, it promoted a three-pillar pension system with a low-level public pension and a strong emphasis on privately funded and managed pension schemes in the occupational pension and personal savings pillars (World Bank, 1994). While this model was initially not meant to be a blue-print for low-income countries, it was actively disseminated and influenced a number of national pension reforms in Latin America and in Central and Eastern Europe (Orenstein, 2008). However, this model never became dominant in sub-Saharan Africa, where the age structure of the population is quite different and the ILO model was preferred (Kpessa and Béland, 2012). Furthermore, the position of the World Bank is not static; since 2005, the World Bank has advocated a five-pillar pension model, adding social pensions as the “zero pillar” and informal support as the last pillar to the previous three (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). Social pensions are also part of the Global Social Floor recommendations of the ILO; thus there has been a certain accommodation between the two global models since 2009.

The inclusion of non-contributory social pensions points to a broader development. As part of the so-called post-Washington Consensus, the individual with its capabilities gradually became the target of development policies and was conceived of as a key agent of development (von Gliszczynski, 2015). This shift legitimized social policies in general and cash transfers to poor people as a development instrument in particular. Besides social pensions, there are other variants of cash transfers, including general household assistance, non-contributory family allowances and conditional cash transfers. Although social pensions are part of the World Bank’s pension model, in practice (e.g. Fiszbein and Schady, 2009) the World Bank



actually prefers to support the fourth variant (conditional cash transfers) with loans and promotes it with research, advice, conferences and study trips for stakeholders. “Conditional” in this context means that cash benefits are paid only if the recipients meet conditions that are generally intended to promote the development of human capital (e.g. sending children to school or preventive healthcare visits). While public works programs follow a similar logic (transfer in the form of a low wage against work performed) and are also justified by the development of human capital, they are generally short-term and not discussed as a variant of cash transfer in the literature. However, there is a second model promoted by a variety of development actors including some UN organizations and NGOs who advocate unconditional cash transfers (Leisering and von Gliszczynski, 2019). Some actors (ILO, UNICEF, Great Britain<sup>1</sup>) cannot easily be associated with either of these two models.

According to older data, the financial support linked with these two models matters. Cash transfers in countries supported by the World Bank are clearly more likely to be conditional than cash transfers in countries supported by other donors (Simpson, 2018). However, donors have frequently supported pilot projects rather than systematic nation-wide programs. Donors try to convince national elites with evaluated pilot projects of the benefits of cash transfer programs with the idea that governments take ownership of the scientifically evaluated pilot projects and expand them with their own financial resources. The assumed diffusion of the model through knowledge-based interventions of international organizations is in line with world polity theory. But there might be decoupling between policy and practice. It is important to point to the fact that both models are not really global models so much as models for the Global South.

### **Empirical strategy**

While all of the social policy fields discussed above are far from static, the field of cash transfers is clearly the most dynamic. The following therefore focuses on this field, for two main reasons. First, this dynamism means that studies in the field soon become obsolete and miss significant new developments. One example is Simpson’s (2018) comparative study, which is based on data from 2011 and neither includes all programs nor covers expansions and contractions of existing programs. Second, this field is interesting both from the perspective of world polity and global social policy theory as it illustrates quite clearly not only which cash transfer models governments follow but also if there is decoupling between formal policy and practice. The initial research question about pre-pandemic social policies can thus be specified as follows: *How successful are these competing cash transfer models in sub-*

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1 To facilitate reading and avoid having to write out and explain the changing names of the institutions responsible for the development cooperation of countries, the names of the countries are used throughout this chapter.

*Saharan Africa? Are cash transfers implemented according to these models or is there decoupling between policy and practice?*

Sub-Saharan Africa is too vast an area to discuss in one chapter. As in the introduction, the rest of this chapter has a focus on sub-Saharan Africa's six most populous countries where more than half of the population lives: Nigeria, Ethiopia, DRC, South Africa, Tanzania, and Kenya. While this choice covers some countries that are frequently discussed in the literature, it also covers two remarkable gaps: the most populous country, Nigeria, and the francophone DRC. To answer the research questions, this chapter is based on the variant of process-tracing methods that aims to explain particular outcomes (Beach and Pedersen, 2013), in this case the introduction, expansion or contraction of cash transfer policies in a particular country. For the well-documented countries, it can draw on existing process-tracing literature. For Nigeria and the DRC, it traces the processes that lead to the outcomes through systematic research of the general literature on diverse forms of cash transfers. While there are country-specific non-systematic parts of these explanations that cannot be compared, there are also systematic parts that can be compared among countries. The research for this desk study was finished in early 2020 before the (temporary) social policies to cope with COVID-19 mentioned in the introduction were introduced.

## **Nigeria**

A draft *Social Protection Strategy* that mentioned cash transfers for the elderly was developed in 2004 (Holmes et al, 2012). In 2007, a pilot project for a conditional cash transfer started in twelve states with technical assistance from the World Bank. It was later expanded but reached only a few thousand households because federal government resources—to be matched by state funds—were very limited. Broader political support was lacking. This also became evident in 2009 when there was another social policy draft that supported cash transfers but petered out. Yet another attempt was started in 2012, when funds no longer used to subsidize petroleum were made available for a maternal health care program that included a conditional cash transfer in a sub-set of health care facilities. This endeavor was stopped by the new federal government in 2015.

In the run-up to the 2015 elections, several opposition parties merged to challenge the ruling party. In its electoral manifesto, the winning opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) promised, among other issues, a conditional monthly cash transfer to one million Nigerians. In 2017, government announced that payments had started in nine states. They were later expanded to twenty-six states and were supposed to benefit one million Nigerians as promised. The beneficiaries of this conditional cash transfer are selected from a Social Register developed with assistance from the World Bank. The World Bank also announced a credit of 500 million USD as contribution to the total costs of almost three billion USD for the

first three years. The number of beneficiaries was supposed to reach five million Nigerians in 2021, out of an estimated population of 206 million people.

However, on 4 December 2017, the Nigerian government signed a *Memorandum of Understanding* with the World Bank and Switzerland on the monitored repatriation of 321 million USD of funds looted by the late former President Sani Abacha and frozen by Switzerland. According to this memorandum, the funds should be spent on the poor and vulnerable through a cash transfer project. The monitoring mentioned was a reaction to earlier restitutions of looted money whose use could not subsequently be traced by the World Bank. From August 2018, the money was used for the payment of the cash transfer to almost 330,000 beneficiaries, matched by one dollar from the World Bank credit for every four dollars of restituted money distributed. The number of beneficiaries reached almost 750,000 at the end of research.

## Ethiopia

As the process-tracing literature (Lavers, 2016, 2020) shows, cash transfers are far more institutionalized and started earlier in Ethiopia than in Nigeria. In the 2000s, there was a growing admission that food insecurity was persistent. Proposals of predictable cash transfers instead of food aid had been around for a while, but a first pilot project launched by Save the Children in 2001 and funded by the USA still provided support in kind. Save the Children then also piloted cash transfers. From June 2003, a forum was started to discuss food security, bringing together donors, regional government and federal government whose representatives exchanged ideas with the Deputy and the Prime Minister. While government, the World Bank, the USA and the World Food Programme (WFP) supported a public works program, Great Britain, Ireland and the EU pushed for direct support of people unable to participate in such programs. The World Bank, Great Britain and the EU preferred cash transfers, while key stakeholders in government supported the idea after initial skepticism. The USA tried to flexibly interpret its mandate, which did not allow for cash transfers. The WFP however stuck to its mandate and continued to support food aid. Finally, Great Britain wanted the cash transfer included into the government budget; the World Bank, the USA and government did not. Government also refused to commit to a financial contribution.

Thus, a few months before the 2005 elections, government launched the *Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)* with an initial coverage of around five million people. It has a dominant public works and a small unconditional cash transfer component and uses food distribution only where cash transfers are not feasible. The basic orientation of this program was thus in line with the key principles of the ruling party: productive contributions in exchange for support and increased party legitimacy. In the following years, coverage was expanded to around ten million people out of a population of almost 110 million. Initially, government was not

financially committed to the PSNP, which was meant to be temporary. However, the program became *de facto* permanent and increasing donor pressure from 2012 onward made government participate in the financing. Whether this is a progressive movement towards full domestic financing, as some donors understood it, remains to be seen.

With its rural focus, the PSNP could not prevent low electoral support in 2005. Land shortages fueled urbanization and contributed to rising urban unemployment. Government introduced a number of social programs including food subsidies. Before the 2015 elections, government approached the World Bank and announced its own funding to supplement a loan for an additional urban PSNP. This was introduced in April 2016 with a similar design to the existing rural PSNP, combining public works and unconditional cash transfers. The World Bank unsuccessfully recommended a conditional cash transfer. The urban PSNP initially covered 600,000 people in eleven regional capitals; a considerable expansion to cover 4.7 million people in towns with over 2,000 inhabitants was proposed in reaction to widespread protests in the region around the capital. The World Bank and some government officials hope that this expansion will be financed with the removal of food subsidies, an old concern of the World Bank. As shown by the conflict between central government and regional forces, which had progressed to armed conflict by the time the research ended, central government can also react with violence when its legitimacy is fundamentally questioned.

## **Democratic Republic of Congo**

Since the end of civil war in 2003, there have been waves of small-scale rebellion and conflict (Künzler, 2022). In this context, in 2004 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) formulated a program and secured grant assistance from Japan to give one-time cash grants to 120,000 ex-combatants for their integration into society. In the same year, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Action contre la Faim (ACF) and a few other NGOs started to distribute vouchers that farmers could use to buy seeds. Two years later, CRS launched a pilot that provided cash instead of non-food item kits, but vouchers remained more important than cash. A pilot project of the CRS, Caritas and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) organized fairs where people could use vouchers to purchase household items. Overall, these smaller donors gave one-time vouchers for non-food items to close to 800,000 families as part of humanitarian aid to a total population of 103 million people.

The WFP also used food vouchers from 2010 but increasingly turned to cash. Great Britain financially supported the non-food item fairs mentioned above but also piloted cash transfers from 2011. These humanitarian cash transfers were delivered by UNICEF and other partner organizations. Great Britain continued to use both means in the following years, reaching several 100,000 people in eastern DRC in a context of limited financial infrastructure and insecurity.

This overview is far from exhaustive, but it covers the biggest cash transfer programs, which are very small by comparison to vouchers and other forms of humanitarian assistance. These cash transfers are donor-driven and limited to humanitarian aid. They are frequently one-off and reach beneficiaries in specific regions in a context where millions of Congolese need humanitarian aid. There are no signs that government is interested in endowing these programs with its own financial resources. Remarkably, in 2014 the World Bank started to support a public works project in Eastern Congo that, however, still did not include any cash transfer component at the end of research.

## South Africa

The process tracing literature on cash transfers for old age (Seekings, 2007, 2020), disability (Schnitzler, 2020) and child-caregiving (Schreiber, 2014; du Toit, 2018) reveals a remarkably distinct story in South Africa. The *Children's Protection Act* of 1913 was modeled on the British Act of 1908. An amendment in 1921 introduced child maintenance grants that, however, were not granted to people considered “native” or “Asian.” From the late 1920s, liberal members of the child welfare movements, linked to similar movements in Europe, as well as, later on, mission-educated “native” African women embedded in transatlantic networks campaigned for an extension of the grant to “native” African mothers. In 1928, a non-contributory tax-financed old age pension for “white” and “colored” workers was introduced by the ruling coalition, thus realizing an electoral pledge. The policy was based on the reports of two commissions that considered different pension systems in Europe and presented options for South Africa. A non-contributory pension modeled on the pensions introduced in Great Britain in 1908—and not on the contributory one introduced in 1925—was preferred as it enabled the elderly to be assisted quickly and without raising the relative costs of “white” workers.

The excluded population groups protested, but a shift towards universalism only started in the context of the Second World War, reaching child maintenance grants before old age pensions. The *Children's Protection Act* of 1937 included no racial classification, and grants were paid to non-“white” children after the intervention of the child welfare movement. This was stopped with a circular in 1939, but a new circular in 1940 reinstated the grants for urban-based “native” African children. Rural-based families remained excluded. Regarding the non-contributory social pension, the shift started after the introduction in 1942 of the pension for “native” African soldiers that was, however, lower than pensions for “colored” or “white” soldiers. This shift was influenced by debates about ideas from New Zealand and from Great Britain. Following the recommendation of a commission, an amendment extended the non-contributory old-age pension to “native” Africans and “Indians” in 1943, albeit with racially tiered benefits. After the formal introduction of apartheid, the pension was not abolished, but the gap between the different tiers widened. In 1946,

and thus also in the postwar context mentioned, South Africa introduced a disability grant that was inspired by the medical model of disability that advocated for support to those people with disabilities who could not be helped by medicine.

Equality and particularly deracialization became an important topic towards the very end of formal apartheid in 1994. Benefits of the unconditional old-age pension had already been deracialized by 1993. In the area of disabilities, the social model of disability that was advocated by self-help groups since the 1980s was adopted by the post-apartheid government. This meant that the prime goal is the promotion of employment opportunities for people with disabilities, thus making the disability grant subordinate. Consequently, the number of people benefiting from the grant started to decrease. Regarding the child maintenance grant, equality meant that government support had to be expanded to rural areas. To do this, the grant was replaced in 1998 with the unconditional Child Support Grant that was paid after a means test to caregivers of children aged below seven. This reform was largely driven by government officials. It was subsequently expanded step by step to children aged up to eighteen years. Furthermore, benefits were also expanded. Although government was not particularly ideologically inclined to these expansions, electoral pressure and path dependency made the South African system of cash transfers the most comprehensive in sub-Saharan Africa, covering a third of a population of roughly sixty million.

## Tanzania

Compared to South Africa, the introduction of cash transfers in Tanzania was tardy and had to be initiated by donors, as the process tracing literature shows (Künzler, 2020). In 2005, the World Bank funded a workshop and assisted officials with the design of a cash transfer system. The World Bank also organized study trips to Ethiopia, Kenya and Jamaica. While officials were more sympathetic to the Ethiopian cash transfer than the Kenyan, they initially attached less importance to the public works component than their Ethiopian colleagues. In 2008, a pilot project for a cash transfer conditional on regular school attendance or health care checks was introduced and supported by donors such as the World Bank, Japan, USA and Norway. Key domestic players and the World Bank supported the scaling up of conditional cash transfers. In 2012, the *Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN)* program was approved by government. It included a public work component and a conditional cash transfer based on the pilot and supported by the World Bank, Great Britain and Sweden. It reaches more than five million people out of an estimated population of nearly sixty million.

However, other parts of government and donors—including, remarkably, Great Britain—nevertheless also considered unconditional cash transfers in the form of a universal social pension. Announced before the 2015 election, this social pension has not (yet) been introduced. In parallel, government scaled up the PSSN and iden-

tified additional beneficiaries just before the 2015 elections. While this was surely politically advantageous, government lacks financial commitment to the cash transfer component of the PSSN that, contrary to donor preferences, seems to have become less important compared to the public works element after the election of the new president Magufuli in 2015. Another cash transfer pilot started in 2017. In two regions, adolescents living in households that benefit from the PSSN receive a separate cash transfer and training, mentoring, grants and health care services in addition. This pilot is supported by UNICEF.

## Kenya

As the process tracing literature on Kenya shows (Künzler, 2016a, 2020), UNICEF also advocated cash transfers in Kenya. After the 2002 elections, the responsible minister urged UNICEF to provide more resources for the support of AIDS orphans. UNICEF suggested a cash transfer program for orphans and vulnerable children (CT-OVC) and, with support from Sweden, started a pre-pilot project, followed by a pilot project in 2004. As part of the continuous lobbying by UNICEF, study trips to Colombia and Jamaica were financed. This generated support from some officials of key ministries that previously had been rather skeptical. Interestingly, a conditional cash transfer was considered initially, but conditionality was then dropped because it was considered difficult to implement. Thus, the study trip to Jamaica had different outcomes in Kenya and Tanzania. Great Britain and the World Bank became involved in the program, the latter despite the cash transfer being non-conditional. The CT-OVC was expanded rapidly in mid-2007, a few months before election time. Government support continued after the election when, after a period of post-electoral violence, opposition politicians were included in a Government of National Unity. The opposition leader and new Prime Minister became supportive of cash transfers after a study trip to India. In 2009 the World Bank started to contribute to the program with a loan.

After the aforementioned post-electoral violence, the Kenyan government was under pressure to reassure donors who were threatening to withdraw. As social protection became a focus area of Great Britain's development cooperation, money for a cash transfer became available. Government took the British money and in 2008 introduced a pilot project for the *Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP)*, an unconditional cash transfer for arid and semi-arid areas. While this prescribed policy solution was bound to the British cash offered, there were also domestic interests in this cash transfer program, not least possibilities of patronage and electoral promises to the population of these arid and semi-arid areas. Indeed, once the pilot phase had concluded, the program was expanded to roughly 300,000 households—far short the 1.5 million households intended. It is still mainly financed by Great Britain with some additional funding from Australia, the latter however at a lower level than Kenyan government's contribution.

In parallel to these two donor-initiated programs, there was another pilot project for a cash transfer program that is described as being initiated by government. This OP-CT targets the elderly and started with government funding in 2006. It was considerably expanded in 2009 with the goal of thin but national coverage, a goal that was reached by the electoral year 2013. The OP-CT is solely financed by government, which has allocated increasing amounts of money. The other cash transfer that has been fully financed by government from the outset is the cash transfer for people with severe disabilities (PWS-D-CT). Proposed by the then responsible ministry after consultation with stakeholders, it started in 2011 with a pilot phase. It was scaled up to nationwide coverage in 2014, but reaches fewer households than the other Kenyan cash transfer programs discussed. In the same year, the PWS-D-CT, OP-CT and CT-OVC—but not the HSNP—were consolidated under the name of *Inua Jamii Cash Programme*. Their further expansion was again supported by a World Bank loan.

In the electoral year 2017, government announced the introduction of a social pension for all persons aged 70 or older. This social pension was then introduced in 2018 under the name of *Inua Jamii Senior Citizens' Programme*. Beneficiaries of the OP-CT are automatically enrolled in this program, which is intended to gradually replace the OP-CT. Draft policy to expand the pension by lowering the age threshold to sixty-eight years and later to sixty-five years has not been implemented yet. Even without this expansion, this program reaches roughly 700,000 people. The other three programs under the Inua Jamii umbrella have roughly one million beneficiaries according to official figures that are, however, contested and difficult to crosscheck. Cash transfers thus reach 1.7 million Kenyans out of a total population of close to forty-eight million.

After the post-electoral violence mentioned, Cabinet recommended the creation of a task force to address to the urban food crisis. The responsible ministry was mandated to design a pilot program to respond to this crisis. However, Oxfam and Concern Worldwide, also members of the task force, started an emergency urban food subsidy program funded by Sweden. As donors intended, after this emergency cash transfer, government adopted a pilot project for the *Urban Food Subsidy Program* in 2012 with funding from Great Britain. However, this program was suspended in 2016.

## Comparative Discussion and Conclusion

As the literature review showed, cash transfers are among the social policy fields where there are competing models. Social pensions are part of the World Bank's pension model, but the literature shows that the Bank actually has a preference for conditional cash transfers. In contrast, according to the literature, other donors prefer unconditional cash transfers or have no clear position. How successful are these competing global models for cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa? In Nigeria, both



the conditional pilot cash transfer and the unconditional current cash transfer program were supported by the World Bank. In Ethiopia, too, the World Bank supports both conditional (public works) and unconditional cash transfers. In the DRC, there are no cash transfer programs beyond smaller humanitarian programs that are not (yet) supported by the World Bank. In South Africa, the unconditional cash transfers are not supported by the World Bank and predate global models. In Tanzania, the World Bank supports conditional cash transfers, while it supports unconditional cash transfers in Kenya. Finally, the World Bank has also supported public works programs that were more permanent than the literature assumes. Tanzania still sees them as temporary and wants beneficiaries to graduate out of the program. Ethiopia initially followed the same logic but then started to acknowledge that graduation is unlikely and the program *de facto* permanent. In Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, beneficiaries of cash transfers are not expected to graduate from support. As described in the literature, Great Britain also supports quite different kinds of cash transfers in four countries. Other donors support cash transfers in fewer countries without clear patterns of preference or only in one country.

There is no clear coalition that supports unconditional or conditional cash transfers, let alone any single cash transfer model in which all donors are involved and which all states are expected to follow. Thus, world society's cash transfer models are remarkably non-globalized. Strikingly, with the exception of the DRC, the World Bank—and not actors from the UN system or the ILO—was involved in all countries researched. However, it supports quite different cash transfers and not only the preferred conditional model. The question of the World Bank's motivation for this policy—whether it is getting a foothold in the social policies of the countries discussed, presenting itself as an actor concerned with the well-being of poor populations or other reasons—cannot be answered with the empirical approach followed. Remarkably, the World Bank is the key donor in all of the most comprehensive cash transfer programs in terms of beneficiaries. This does not mean that bilateral development cooperation and international NGOs have not been important for several cash transfers. The fact that cash transfers have played a role in all countries, albeit to varying degrees, is significant in itself. It shows the acceptance of the idea that individuals are responsible for their own well-being. This idea is dominant in world society, as opposed to concrete models of cash transfers with predefined target groups and modalities. It is not surprising that cash transfers for the urban able-bodied poor are still the exception and not meant to become permanent.

Taking the number of beneficiaries as a percentage of the total population as a very rough proxy for institutionalization, cash transfer programs are highly institutionalized in South Africa, Ethiopia and Tanzania. However, in Ethiopia and Tanzania, most of the beneficiaries participate in public works programs that enroll and pay people for a limited period. The percentage is lower in Kenya, but here benefits are paid throughout the year. This is also the case in Nigeria, where the percentage is again lower. Tanzania is the only one among the countries with a somewhat

institutionalized cash transfer program that didn't use it for emergency relief during the COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to other policies. Against the assumptions of Usui's (1994) economic variant of world society theory, cash transfer institutionalization is not concomitant with per capita income. The richest country (South Africa) covers the biggest share of the population and the poorest (DRC) the smallest, but in between, fewer people are covered by the richer countries (Nigeria and Kenya) than by the poorer ones (Tanzania and Ethiopia). However, the results fit Bornschier and Trezzini's (2001) approach insofar as South Africa, the only country from the resource-rich semi-periphery, clearly offers the most comprehensive social policies. The approach is not able to explain differences among the seven other countries.

However, the lack of a single model has made national actors somewhat powerful. Their domestic priorities have proved important for the adaptation of cash transfers and include ideas and electoral concerns. The political systems vary. Nigeria, the DRC and Kenya have fragmented party systems and varying levels of cash transfer institutionalization. South Africa was partly under colonial minority rule, but elections mattered for the old age pension. After the end of formal apartheid, the country had an elected dominant party but was far less authoritarian than Tanzania and especially Ethiopia. Cash transfers are more institutionalized in these elected dominant party systems, but this should not be generalized as they are elected dominant party systems where cash transfer programs are far less institutionalized, for example in Angola, Zimbabwe or Uganda. Furthermore, there are stable party systems with quite institutionalized cash transfers, such as the Seychelles or Mauritius. While cash transfers are thus sometimes in line with government priorities, they are not necessarily in line with the priorities of the population, which is rarely consulted. Evidence from Tanzania (Adesina, 2020) suggests that citizens prefer social services such as health care to cash transfers and from South Africa (Fouksman, 2020) that work is preferred to grants.

The second research question asked whether cash transfers are implemented according to the respective models or whether there is decoupling. As mentioned in the literature review, donors try to convince governments with pilot projects of the benefits of cash transfer programs, with the idea that governments take ownership and expand the programs with their own financial resources. In the world polity perspective, stalled pilot projects are thus examples of decoupling. In Nigeria, a donor-supported pilot stalled, and the current program was introduced without a pilot and is not (yet) financed by government. In Ethiopia, a donor-financed pilot project led to the current program, but government is still reluctant to move towards full domestic financing. A regional donor-financed pilot has not yet been scaled up nationwide. In the DRC, there are donor-financed pilot projects that have not been scaled up or financed by government. South Africa has introduced and financed cash transfers without pilot projects and initial or later donor support. In Tanzania, a donor-financed pilot project was scaled up, and government agreed

with donors on increasing domestic funding but failed to keep this promise. A related donor-financed pilot has not yet been scaled up nationwide, while a different donor-supported cash transfer pilot was announced but has not yet been introduced. In Kenya, two donor-financed pilot projects were scaled-up but are still largely donor-financed, another donor-financed pilot was suspended, and two cash transfers were introduced without pilot projects or donor support. With the exception of South Africa, there are examples of stalled pilot projects in all countries. It is difficult to assess the reasons for non-implementation.

There are other forms of gaps between policies and practices. To justify cash transfers, proponents generally refer to scientific research that shows beneficiary effects where payouts are frequent and regular. In practice, all countries researched having non-one-off cash transfers have payment delays, albeit to varying degrees. Some of them have very long payment cycles or expand payment cycles occasionally. These examples of decoupling clearly point to the limits of the influence of international organizations and NGOs in this policy field which lacks a single scripted model. This, however, should not be generalized for other policy fields related to social policies (see Künzler, 2020). Donors seemed to be most powerful when acting in coordination, such as when they pushed to increase government financial participation in Ethiopia. Furthermore, donors have the option to enforce compliance by withholding funds. One form of donor influence is the narrowing of policy space, as the policy solution is not developed in an open-ended government-led process but is suggested by donors.

Another form of decoupling that is less discussed in the literature is the gap between means and ends. Cash transfers are means to reach policy goals. These goals generally include the reduction of poverty. Do cash transfers actually reach these goals? Exchange rate fluctuations and inflation make it difficult to compare the purchasing power of different benefits that generally are only occasionally adjusted for inflation. To bring benefits into a rough order of purchasing power, they are highest and above the poverty line in South Africa (disability and old age grant), followed by Kenya and Nigeria where they are already below the poverty line. They are much lower still in Tanzania and Ethiopia. The DRC, where one-off transfers are most widespread, cannot be compared. As a result—especially in Tanzania and Ethiopia, but to a certain extent also in Kenya and Nigeria, cash transfers do not necessarily reach the goal of lifting people permanently out of poverty. This is not to say that cash transfers do not alleviate poverty—they certainly make a difference to people's lives. However, whether they are better able to alleviate poverty or even lift people permanently out of poverty than other policies such as investing in social services is rarely discussed. Similarly to education in world polity theory, cash transfers serve as a myth: they are believed to be rational organizational principles for social policies, and national and international policy makers receive recognition and legitimacy when they implement these scripts.

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## **PART IV:**

### **Global Rivalry and Geopolitics**

#### **“After Globalization”**





# After Globalization: The Political Economy of Mercantilism

Robert A. Denemark

I argue that deglobalization is a challenge to global society that is emerging given the decline of hegemony. We see this empirically with the rise global cooperation during hegemonic periods as evidenced by an increase in the number of multilateral treaties concluded, and the decline in multilateral treaties during periods of rivalry. Where hegemony seems to spawn globalization, hegemonic decline appears to generate deglobalization. In political economy we will see a return to elements of the system dominant in previous periods of rivalry: mercantilism. Mercantilism includes tension between smaller and larger polity structures; definitions of wealth that include infrastructural elements and patterns; concerns to avoid balance of trade and other forms of deficit; and a policy toolbox that is varied and contextual. In the realm of security, we see reduced obstacles to great power war that hegemony tends to dampen. Culturally, those changes will generate multiple competing, and sometimes purposely destructive belief systems that offer limited solidarity and very different ideas about what our global-level problems are, and what solutions we ought to adopt. Many of these new ideas will be antiglobal in nature. We should be concerned, but not demobilized by the current move away from global society. Key elements of deglobalization may prove to be as ephemeral as they had been in the past.

## Introduction

“After Globalization” or “Deglobalization” appears both baffling and threatening. For over 70 years the global system has enjoyed the absence of great power wars and a long period of relative economic openness. Albeit quite unequally, that openness facilitated an increase in wealth across much of the world. It made sense to speak about an explicitly peaceful world society through the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It is difficult to imagine why we would choose to abandon such a system, but it is breaking down, and we are right to be concerned.

While many explanations for the current entropy focus on state or individual-level incentives, I contend that deglobalization is fueled by a systemic-level phenomena. In the 1970s we saw the rise of the idea that a hegemonic power—capable of unilaterally making the rules of the global game—was necessary to create and sustain the systems that our peace and continued coordination depended upon. The US was said to have been hegemonic from the end of the Second World War. The vast majority of the literature on world politics has been generated during the period of hegemony or the initial phases of decline. We have come to think of the conditions that emerged in that long period as normal. The debates over hegemony raged for many years, while the actual decline of the US as hegemonic power has proceeded quite slowly. But now the decline is taking hold in more significant ways. The norms, rules, and incentive structures that kept the system together have degraded. The result is *deglobalization*. This chapter focuses on the political economy of this process, and I contend that we are familiar with the nature of such a system. In the historical literature it is referred to as mercantilism.

This chapter has two parts. First, I substantiate the argument that the decline of hegemony generates a decline in cooperative interaction by identifying the dates of the hegemonic life-cycle both during the last period of British hegemony and the current period of US hegemony. I then look at the best indicator of formal global cooperative interaction, multilateral treaties, to see whether they rise and decline synchronously with hegemony. They do. It appears that coordination and cooperation are the norm during periods of hegemony, but decline in its absence. Instead of looking at the traditional rules, the defenders of those rules, relatively fixed relationships among states, and well-worn patterns of economic and cultural interaction, we move to a period where those rules, defenders, relationships, and patterns are more immediately contested. This is the period of *rivalry*. The old system allowed global actors to focus on joint gains. The building of agreements and norms facilitated interaction and a focus on enhancing collective action and well-being. During periods of rivalry, individual states or alliances gain to the degree that others lose. Cooperation and joint benefits suffer setbacks.

It must be noted that while hegemony facilitates cooperation, it can also give rise to a system that imposes uniformity and oppresses outliers. Conflict is pushed toward smaller-scale actions like state and anti-state terror and radicalized social mobilizations. During periods of rivalry the great powers are free to generate significantly different ideas about the organization of global life. They also tend to mobilize to pose or deter military threats from other great powers. Neither the system generated under hegemony or rivalry is uniformly *better* than the other, but they are decidedly different.

In the second part of this chapter I will focus on the concept of mercantilism. Mercantilism is the contentious process that arises among political units of different scales, not just different sizes, as they seek dominance. Larger scaled units tend


to prevail (i.e. national states over local areas; then globalization or global society), albeit amid much conflict and periodic setbacks. Mercantilist ideas about the nature of wealth, specie inflow, and the relevant economic policy toolbox differ from those dominant in open market economies. Competition becomes more zero-sum in nature, cooperation is more difficult to achieve and sustain, older sets of established relationships, and the supply chains that underpin them, break down. There is competition to rebuild them in new ways that will benefit different parties. This is the essence of mercantilism, and will be reviewed in terms of 1) conflict over polity form; 2) the nature of wealth; 3) the role of revenue inflow; and 4) policy tools. The impact of each on global society will be suggested.

## Hegemony and Rivalry

Wallerstein (1983) identified hegemony as the relatively rare outcome of coterminous agricultural, industrial, and financial dominance. This condition allows a single state to acquire sufficient resources to unilaterally establish the rules of the global game. Periods of rivalry, by contrast, are defined by competition among actors to establish global rules or norms that serve their particular interests.

The rise and decline of hegemony are relatively well understood, but the logic of rivalry tends to be ignored. For Silver and Slater (1999), hegemony emerges when new solutions to problems of social disorder are successful. Systemic disorder arises when the dominance of trade and production in the hegemonic state, which tends to widen social and political opportunities as mass employment and growth increase, evolves into a system more characterized by financial interactions. Financial dominance is highly polarizing. Class tensions increase as opportunities dissolve. The virtuous cycle of expansion, increasing wealth, stability, peace, and further expansion, breaks down. In its place we find a vicious cycle of competition understood in zero-sum terms, intra- and inter-state conflict, well-orchestrated hypernationalism, and military tension. The fact that different orientations toward globalization are adopted during such periods is readily understandable.

Globalization and the growth of global society may be understood in many ways, but formal multilateral treaties are excellent indicators of such global interaction. They are carefully constructed official indicators of collective action. They are more important than bilateral treaties in that they are more transparent, coordinate more state activities, and serve as the foundation for international law. If hegemony and rivalry present alternative global environments regarding interaction, we should see some alteration in the pattern of multilateral treaty-making. Figure 1 below provides an empirical look at this hypothesis. It adopts the hegemonic cycle dates for the UK and US proposed by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1979) and amended marginally based on subsequent literature (Modelski and Thompson, 1996). The y-axis reports multilateral treaties signed during the relevant period. Data on multilateral treaties are drawn from the Multilateral Treaty and Agreements (MATRS) dataset

**Figure 1: Cooperative interactions by hegemonic period**

Source: Author.

that includes about 7,000 entries between 1596 and 1995 (for information on the dataset see Denmark and Hoffmann, 2008).

Figure 1 shows that as hegemony emerges, is established, and matures, global cooperation as measured by multilateral treaty-signings increases. As hegemony declines, so does treaty-making. The trend is clearer in the case of the US (with a 10% decline) than the UK (with a 4% decline), but the direction is consistent. Hegemonic periods generate greater coordination, while rivalry evidences less cooperative interaction.

## Rivalry and Mercantilism

Hegemonic systems tend to be more open economically. Hegemons are efficient, they organize the global system to their benefit, and they are advantaged by larger and more open markets. Even though the hegemon does not come out on top of every interaction, the structure of the system allows it to pay for the maintenance of various market-oriented regimes, and it profits in the medium and long-run from the system remaining free and peaceful. Economic openness becomes a more *taken*

for granted environment. As the global economic system enters a period of rivalry, we may expect relations between the economy and the state to play a closer role. The global economy is no longer viewed as a system apart from politics. Matters of wealth-generation and exchange, and matters of authority and power, are merged and re-politicized in the hope of providing advantages in a more competitive environment. During periods of rivalry, hegemonic regimes are challenged, markets begin to close, immediate policy outputs may be more short term in orientation, and organizations created during the hegemonic period degrade.

## Four Elements of Mercantilism

### Conflict over new polity forms

Crafting a modern nation-state was not easy in feudal Europe. Small sovereignties with cross-cutting structures of loyalty worked to keep their hard-earned rights and privileges. They were the dominant political form. New, larger political units like the early modern nation-state whose leaders were interested in growth had to break down traditionally separate local elements to make interaction more efficient (e.g. unifying systems of weights and measures, taxes and tolls, communication and transportation, language, and governance). And they had to do so before others, whether neighboring regions, states, or other macro-models, did so. If they did not, they feared they themselves would be overcome and relegated to secondary status by or within the systems of stronger neighbors. Gustav Schmoller, the most important mercantilist of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, famously wrote that “mercantilism was nothing but state-making” (1894/1896, 50).

Consolidation and growth are coterminous in mercantilist thought. Jean-Baptiste Colbert, best known as France’s First Minister and economic reformer from 1661 to 1683, is widely disparaged in modern economic thought (e.g. Smith, 1776/1937, 434). He sought to increase the quality of export goods to help secure markets and protect the French brand, facilitated the creation of larger and stronger firms, and organized French trade to secure resources and markets to the disadvantage of competitors like the English. But Schmoller argues that Colbert’s most important success was breaking down the municipal and provincial authority that hindered progress toward unity (Schmoller, 1884/1896, 55). Without these actions, *France* would be unable to do much else.

The effective marshalling of internal resources was also necessary to engage in imperialism and reap the benefits of the exploitation of overseas resources and markets. Schmoller concludes: “Those forces all converging impelled society to some large economic reorganization on a broader basis, and pointed to the creation of national states with a corresponding policy” (Schmoller, 1884/1896, 47). Various elements of this complex process are recognizable in the policies of the Italian and Swiss states, the Dutch, and the English. Victory over the power and control

of smaller units was not assured. These units used their traditional positions, the law, and their allies, to maintain their sovereignty and avoid subjugation. Schmoller laments that insufficient political organization (or put differently, the failure of the larger scale unit to overcome the power of the smaller units) doomed a state to internal disharmony and loss of opportunity, as he argued had been the fate of Germany (Schmoller, 1884/1896, 48).

Schmoller works to place mercantilism into an appropriate historical context. He notes that human social units “successively evolved of even wider scope” (Schmoller, 1884/1896, 3). In earlier work Schmoller begins with the development of family life and village consolidation. Creating the village allows for collective development, requires establishing boundaries, and the management of both internal and external networks. Successful development, often in competition with other villages or surrounding rural areas, allows for growth into towns. Town privileges often included rights to establish markets, charge tolls, mint coins, collect taxes, determine citizen liberties, and other important elements of self-government. Lack of successful consolidation may see a village remain small, become subordinate, or sublimate back into the rural environment—all to the disadvantage of the village population. “For centuries economic progress is bound up with the rise of towns and the formation of civic institutions” (Schmoller, 1884/1896, 6).

Unit scale and integrity allow advantages, but also generate contradictions that lead to “pulsations” of polity size (Chase-Dunn, Inoue, Welch, and Gao, 2019). Growth is pursued to accumulate wealth and maintain security, but generates conflict that tends to roll back polity boundaries. Large polities emerge, grow, then suffer from internal dissension that may emerge as ethnic irredentism or civil war. Externally, neighbors fear the growing unit and will oppose its further development or ally against it. The increasing unit scale is therefore difficult, highly contested, and suffers setbacks, but the tendency is pervasive over time.

Perhaps the most radical element in Schmoller’s late 19<sup>th</sup> century work was his suggestion that transnational elements were beginning to emerge that would attempt to wrestle power away from the nation-states that nation-states had only relatively recently captured from towns and regions. Schmoller saw this as inevitable, and not something to be opposed. Coherent states with significant power began to support moves toward freer trade to capitalize on their advantages. Arguments for freedom of the seas re-emerged. Schmoller was hopeful regarding the new age and the new trans-state scale. He writes about the advent of international law, the development of “humane cosmopolitanism,” an end to colonialism, and an increasing sense of community, variably described as “a network of international treaties” or a future in which “great institutions and interests of international traffic” would help craft “the ideas and tendencies of a world economy” (Schmoller, 1884/1896, 61–2). At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Schmoller was recognizing elements of possible consolidation of political units beyond those of the nation-state, and understood that the process would be contentious, but might provide a better system. It is clear

within the context of his work that these trans-state units would face both internal and external opposition and suffer setbacks.

From this perspective, the period “after globalization” is a reflection of the contentious process of consolidation by the next largest unit of political organization. The global society of nation-states will not easily give way to the global society that appears as a trans-state form. Globalization generates forces that tend to give rise to policies of deglobalization. Global society will appear to roll back. It would be difficult to find a clearer example of this process of conflict over the scale of the dominant unit of socio-political and economic interaction than in the voluminous literature on globalization, antiglobalization, and now deglobalization. A leading journal in the field uses the plural *Globalizations* to represent the range of experiences associated with the process. The major definitions of globalization focus on the compression of time and space, and the need to consider *others* in the thinking and planning of action. This increased interaction suited hegemonic interests, and economic institutions and practices were marshalled toward its management. But the penultimate *Washington Consensus* was hardly the first manifestation of the global economic system under US hegemony to generate losses at various local levels and spark a backlash. In an attempt to moderate the impact of globalization and take it out of the hands of those who controlled market interactions, there were attempts to foster a greater and more humane global governance (Boswell and Chase-Dunn, 2000). Poor areas facing further impoverishment rose up against integration and sought solidarity (e.g. the Global Social Forum). Regionalization emerged to allow areas to better protect themselves from global-level marketization (Mittelman, 2000). Traditional nationalism, along with racism and xenophobia, appeared as well (Friedman and Randeria, 2004). But the tendency is that ever-larger organizational forms will eventually consolidate their position. We see globalization, we see deglobalization, global society appears to fracture, but mercantilists suggest we will eventually see the victory of the larger scale unit.

### The nature of wealth

Mercantilism is characterized by particular ideas regarding the nature of wealth. Early liberals argued that mercantilists had a zero-sum concept of wealth, fixating on the acquisition of specie: gold and silver. Specie was not viewed as a commodity but as wealth itself. Adam Smith argued that instead of lusting after, mis-defining, and subsequently hoarding specie, mercantilists might have realized that an individual with gold could use it to obtain various resources to begin the process of generating a salable commodity. Following the purchase of land or ships or buildings or other means of production, having no specie remaining did not mean that the individual had lost their wealth. They had simply exchanged one commodity, specie, for others that might be used to generate even more wealth. This is the basis of Smith’s suggestion that mercantilists opposed the export of specie and therefore



stood in the way of increasing national wealth. Some mercantilists were wary of gold exports, as they feared that other states were manipulating the price of specie to attract it themselves or upend the economies of their opponents. While Smith believed that an equilibrium price for any commodity, including gold and silver, would be reestablished rapidly in a free market, it is also possible that periods of upheaval, loss of productive activity, and the inability to import key intermediate inputs for lack of acceptable payment, will emerge. These forms of instability are especially problematic in the early period of the development of capitalism when mercantilists were addressing these policy questions (Wennerlind, 2014).

The central difference between the mercantilists and both classical and neoclassical liberals rests with the operational definition of wealth. For liberals, wealth and value must be understood in terms of market prices for productive assets—whether for direct consumption or in the form of tools to create other goods. There is no place for *special commodities* that should be desired outside the bounds of immediate market incentives. Mercantilists, on the other hand, developed their ideas in the context of scarce capital, missing or insecure transit passageways, and unstable markets. For them, the logically prior and therefore most fundamental elements of wealth creation were infrastructural—and included specie to serve as money, secure routes to necessary resources, functional transportation networks, and access to labor and consumers. While liberals assume these things are in place, mercantilists wrote in an era when they were not, and so they did not confine concepts of wealth and value to narrow market definitions.

What the mercantilists of the time could not express, and the liberals of the time could not conceptualize, were *public goods* that are technically defined as those that are joint in supply (one's use does not diminish availability to others), and non-excludable (non-contributors cannot be denied access). Such goods are not provided by the market (Olson, 1965). Yet an economy cannot thrive without public goods like roads, security, a monetary structure, and a system of justice. States must provide public goods. Hegemons, when they exist, provide them globally. Hegemons benefit from the consistent functioning of the system, making the provision of global public goods rational. But as hegemony breaks down, the expense of maintaining public goods comes into question. They are costly to provide, and declining hegemons balk at continued support for institutions like global security structures, while other states may seek advantages in breaking down existing trade or monetary systems. Existing public goods degrade, while new ones prove especially difficult to create. What is lost in the quest for wealth are the vital infrastructural elements that could previously have been assumed.

In the current system we can see that process unfold with the reduction of security assurances to US allies in NATO, and the mobilization of counter-hegemonic actors like Russia that initiated the first invasion of a European country—Ukraine—in over half a century. We also see the undermining of organizations to assure free trade like the WTO. The monetary system evidences a move away from the hege-

monic US dollar, and efforts to control of its use through banking regulations, via the growth of alternative reserve currencies and the creation of cryptocurrency. The financial system suffered serious breakdowns several times through the 2000s and no state appears able to maintain regulations to keep it secure. These are not just changes in form but represent fundamental alterations in the kind of interaction actors expect. They may respond pre-emptively (Denemark, 2021). Withdrawal from cooperative interaction—deglobalization—becomes the norm.

### Specie inflow

If mercantilists mistake gold and silver for wealth, their arguments about the importance of specie inflow are likely to be spurious as well. Mercantilists are accused of a *fear of goods* as exports drain specie (making capital accumulation more difficult) and displace local employment. But as we noted above, such accusations assume a stable monetary system and sufficient liquidity to support economic growth, both of which were challenges that early mercantilist authors needed to address. No less than John Maynard Keynes considered mercantilist policies in *The General Theory* (1936, chapter 23), and argued that given low levels of ready capital, as existed in the subsistence agricultural societies of the early mercantilist era, the only way to increase investment was to reduce rates of interest by generating a positive flow of specie, and the only way to do that was for the state to take the lead. Keynes' reported that the wealth acquired by Francis Drake in the 1570s and 1580s, as he preyed upon Spanish shipping on behalf of England, allowed Queen Elizabeth I to satisfy the English debt and found the Levant Company, which became the British East India Company (EIC). Keynes calculates that the original sum Elizabeth invested in the EIC, increasing at the relevant average rates of return over time, would account for *the total value* of British overseas investment in 1930 (Keynes, 1930, 156–7). Britain's rise was not accomplished to the advantage of other actors. Specie inflow to generate significant growth and advantage was neither a natural nor a neutral process.

The direct corollary of the desire for specie inflow are policies designed to generate positive trade balances and related benefits. The simple argument is that a positive inflow of money that emerges from a greater net outflow of goods and services obviates the need to search for specie or other means of settling debts, and affords state and private actors more options. More capital means lower rates of interest, higher relative currency valuations, and the potential for more overall economic activity. Raw materials exports or agriculture are considered inferior to those of processed or manufactured goods as they are more vulnerable to competition and are often dependent on uncontrollable elements like the weather. Processed or manufactured goods afford greater levels of employment, support a more educated workforce, tend to provide more incentives for entrepreneurs, offer more options for taxation, produce efficiencies of scale, facilitate the support of more public goods,

and are useful to the military for the provision of security or aggression (Hamilton, 1791).

In the 1970s the *new trade theory* often associated with the work of Paul Krugman, is an excellent example of the way in which ideas about trade generally ascribed to mercantilists make their way back into the contemporary economic mainstream. *New trade theory* emerged in the wake of the end of the US-led Bretton Woods monetary system, and in the midst of concerns over the future of free trade. Arguments for the optimality of free trade rest upon assumptions that do not always hold in practice. Among them, the idea that there are no economies of scale, defined as advantages enjoyed by those who reduce individual unit costs by increasing the scale of production. In short, producing more units of a given good makes each unit less costly to construct. Larger producers therefore have an advantage. The securing of a large market becomes self-fulfilling: by selling more you become more productive, and this advantage allows you to sell more. This may appear to be a market phenomenon, but it is instead inconsistent with the existence of a free market. Market size may be dictated by control of borders that serve as barriers to other producers. Control of other areas (colonies) or alliance structures (regional economic zones) may be organized to take advantage of economies of scale. Economies of scale are particularly important in the context of goods that are very large and that evidence a limited market such that only a few producers will be able to enter and generate scale returns. (Such goods might include things like wide-bodied aircraft, with limited markets among airlines and potential dual-use applications for countries with especially large militaries.) The export of such goods, with its corollary ability to generate positive trade flows, is also important. Krugman (1986) shows that it would be rational for states to support such industries as they generate greater profits, and states themselves are advantaged by serving as the home base for those enterprises that dominate production.

Other aspects of the *new trade theory* concern employment and externalities. The production of some goods is more labor-intense, generating more employment. Other goods are produced with a minimum of externalities like pollution. (Once again, the production of wide-bodied aircraft is an excellent example as the industry employs a great many highly skilled workers and is relatively clean environmentally.) As a result, it becomes rational for states to intervene in the market to help support domestic *rent-earning* industries (Krugman, 1986; note that Krugman won the 2008 Riksbank Prize in Honor of Alfred Nobel for his work on economies of scale).

Another of the more recent efforts by large powerful states to assure positive trade balances concerns science and technology. Future economic well-being, security, and even hegemony are dependent on the generation of new ideas and their application to commercial and military concerns (Modelski and Thompson, 1996). For the last three or four decades states have increased efforts to safeguard scientific as well as artistic creations by broadening and strengthening their definition

of *intellectual property*. When national safeguards were insufficient, traditional nationally-based regimes (like the one created by the World Intellectual Property Organization) were supplanted by stronger global regimes sponsored by large countries (specifically the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights created as part of the WTO in 1994) to establish global protection. Hegemonic powers usually benefit from the creation of new technology wherever it emerges, but as hegemony declines the ability of others to gain on a leading economy by acquiring (via creation or appropriation) new ideas creates fear. Additional safeguards regarding *intellectual property*, *intellectual theft*, and various *secrets* or *proprietary processes* become increasingly important (May and Sell, 2005).

### The mercantilist policy toolbox

The final element of mercantilism is constituted by the policies its adherents adopt to accomplish proposed tasks. Policy tools are often closely related to desired policy outcomes, but mercantilism is a bit confounding in this regard. Mercantilists reject the idea that there is only one set of key policy tools that are necessary, as is the case with the liberal focus on free market reforms. They argue that the conditions in any given location are derived from their history, internal conditions, and external context, and these should dictate policy responses. The policy toolkit is therefore as varied as are the possible contexts (Balabkins, 1988). As early as the 13<sup>th</sup> century we begin to see prohibitions on the export of locally accepted money to avoid swings in value driven by changing market conditions or efforts at manipulation. Laws against profit repatriation emerge in 1550 (Wilson, 1967, 500). Navigation Acts emerge in the 1650s, closing ports to ships that are not built nationally. These are not designed to be policies relevant across all circumstances, but contextual responses that may or may not be relevant in various areas or eras. Mercantilism is not about any fixed set of policies with regard to trade (e.g. tariffs), production (e.g. state regulation), or finance (e.g. controls on currency or specie export). Instead, mercantilism was “state making” because socio-political and economic units increase their scale and coherence as a method of acquiring the wealth and power to survive and dominate. Any number of policies can serve in that regard. In important ways, free market policies and liberal ideology may be understood as mercantilist tools wielded by those who may be most efficient at a given time. Evidence of this may be found in the nature of policy prescriptions offered to other states that differ fundamentally from those that led to the rise of the lead state itself, and to the rapidity with which free market policies are repudiated once they cease to support lead states. Both are phenomenon we see in the current context that are identified as pathologies of globalization or emblems of deglobalization. Neither supports the continuation of a stable global society.

Optimizing internal market infrastructure and assuring national security are not the only paths to economic advantage. Early mercantilists argued that these

were necessary for building a state that could engage in imperialism and reap the benefits of transnational exploitation. At stake were foreign resources that could be acquired at sub-market prices to build the economy at home and compete with others abroad. Failure to take such actions meant falling behind. Andre Gunder Frank traced the elements of successful imperialist architectures, especially by the British (Frank, 2015). The British succeeded by controlling areas and crafting exchange patterns that placed them at the most profitable point for shipping, manufacturing, and finance between colonies or subject areas, and either captive or competing markets. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century one such system included the slave markets of Africa, the raw materials of the Americas, and at the apex, the ships and manufactured goods of England. At each step resources were marshalled, traded, and exploited, to provide value that flowed to the English. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, opium grown mostly in India anchored the huge trade with China that saw wealth from both India and China flow to England. The wealth allowed for hegemony (Frank, 2015, 120). Bergesen (2011) labeled these geo-economic architectures “Frankian Triangles.”

The various triangles Frank identified are important, but he does not study the process by which they were conceptualized or brought to life. I suggest there are three different and traditionally mercantilist processes to consider in the crafting of Frankian triangles: 1) opening new areas and routes; 2) consolidating these areas into profitable interactive units; and 3) defending these units against resistance, both local and global. These elements are especially difficult if they include the restructuring of pre-existing patterns established and still nominally defended by a declining hegemonic power.

The earliest mercantilist authors were concerned with opening trade relations or transport routes in areas that were as yet unknown and essentially unintegrated into the western economy. (e.g. da Gama, Columbus, Cook, and their immediate followers.) The domination of unfamiliar territory is predicated on the control of new transport routes. Land routes played a key role in “silk road” trade, while sea routes were both crucial and highly contested in Asia and among European states. Mercantilist concerns with security, access, money, and usable resources make far more sense in this context. The securing of trade routes or preferential access to goods must await *exploration* at this early date and is a haphazard process. European acquisitions were often peripheral nodes in existing local or trans-local routes. (Note, for example, Hong Kong, Acapulco, or Manilla. None were important in their domestic or regional contexts, but became prominent only later as hubs of Europe’s growing global reach.)

Once new areas are available for exploitation, crafting these Frankian triangles will depend upon decisions regarding which holdings are valuable enough to attempt to consolidate into a coherent commercial or political system. Individual efforts may create profitable enterprises, but only those that are tied to large trading companies or viewed as critical by states are likely to receive the support necessary to maintain themselves. Both indigenous sovereignty and competing imperialists

need to be rebuffed. Imperialist powers are not always thoughtful about what to engulf, nor was communication reliable, so officials generally sought to conquer first and ask questions later. The logic of any given set of holdings might be worked out in the future. The other side of this process is the need to avoid becoming too deeply entrenched in colonial holdings that might not provide value sufficient to cover costs, or that are unnecessary to stop others from being successful.<sup>1</sup> As this is a difficult process to predict, it is no surprise that the British over-imperialized. This process was especially disruptive for native populations that were enslaved or impressed into the building of forts, had their resources exploited, were forced to provide services to support military outposts, paid onerous taxes, suffered the theft of their property, and other oppressions.

An additional element of triangle-building, one that we will likely see develop in the near future, is conflict over the re-fashioning of a given economic geography crafted by a hegemonic power that is firmly in decline. Declining hegemony will clear the way for an alteration in the patterns of trade, production, and finance. Hegemonic powers like to foster system openness, but decline will drive new rivalries to dismantle, or constitute new preferential economic relations. Tariffs, quotas, contention over sea and land routes (e.g. actions in the South China Sea, the *Belt and Road* initiative, Russian Oil Pipelines, or the peculiar US request to *purchase* Greenland); new migration patterns or barriers (for refugees, the poor, the technically sophisticated), and the building up of (e.g. *Asia's Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership*), breaking down (e.g. Brexit), or marginal shifting (e.g. NAFTA to USMCA), of free trade areas, typify such efforts. They are the result of hegemonic decline and the search for a new global economic architecture that will offer new centers the extraordinary gains that hegemony both promises and depends upon.

These efforts will be joined by financial and monetary competition as states contend over reserve currency status, national industrial champions, sovereign wealth fund options, or via direct or indirect support for technology—5G, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum computing, big data and/or new sources of energy (Wong, 2011; Cohen, 2015, 2018, Thompson and Zakhirova, 2019).

In each case, economic geographies considered natural, but actually the result of power contestations in an earlier period, will be questioned, challenged, altered, or replaced by new configurations driven by attempts to acquire advantages in the context of the deconstruction of existing global patterns. Declining hegemonic powers will seek to bolster their advantageous positions by wringing greater returns from the free markets they originally created—often by making a palpable joke out of the idea that they are “free.” Older policy options, abandoned or replaced because they were destructive (e.g. politically driven tariffs and quotas) tend to re-emerge.

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1 Note the English historian J.R. Seeley's famous comment in an 1883 essay that “We seem to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind.” (Seeley, 1922, 10).

In the US, navigation laws (in the form of the Jones Act that restricts ships taking cargo or passengers between US ports to those built and registered in the US) still exist and are being newly enforced.

Poorer states will also be looking to usurp or reconfigure the economic architecture so that additional value flows toward them in the hope that they can sustain their positions relative to the declining hegemonic power, or each other. The economic system will appear less free, less fair, and more competitive in ways that they can only hope to cope with. Peripheral areas may benefit from becoming a part of a rising coalition, but should that coalition lose, or should its role become irrelevant, their positions will again deteriorate. *Development* will retrench as sunk capital and significant human inputs are lost. This was an important lesson dependency theorists drew from the history of Latin American industrialization, which increased during the Second World War, then was forced into decline. The point of the competition will be to assure the best position in an emerging global system—a system whose actors ignore the lessons, norms, and patterns of the immediate past. Mercantilism appears as the political economy of the rivalry phase of the hegemony/rivalry cycle.

## A Short Note on Global Violence and Geoculture

A move to the rivalry phase of the hegemony/rivalry cycle will also have significant implications in the area of global security in ways that add to the sense of deglobalization. Traditional great power mobilization and war are suppressed during periods of hegemony. Global violence presents at lower intensities under the banner of antisystemic movements for independence or autonomy—often in the form of revolutions, terrorism, irredentism, or the radicalization of global social movements (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2004; Tetreault and Denemark, 2004; Karastali, 2018;). Even traditional *balance of power* politics is replaced by softer diplomatic efforts (Paul, 2005; Denemark et al., 2019). During periods of rivalry there is a tendency for great powers to contend directly. We see alliance formation, mobilization, provocation, and great power war (Modelski and Thompson, 1996). Longer term analyses by Wallerstein (1989), Arrighi (1994), and Modelski and Thompson (1996) focus on an increased chance of great power war in the period between 2020 and 2050 (Pollins, 1996). Security concerns are likely to reinforce the elements of political economy that have been identified with mercantilism. More importantly, this will be the first time we experience a period of rivalry while armed with nuclear weapons. This provides reasons for serious concern (Denemark, 2018).

Geocultural interactions will also change. Geoculture is that set of dominant popular beliefs that help us live with “the contradictions, the ambiguities, the complexities” of the social order (Wallerstein, 1991, 166). Geocultural dialogue includes a set of proposed central problems we are said to face, suggested solutions, and purported methods for implementation. In hegemonic systems there is a dominant ide-

ology that provides for these things. Hegemonic culture does not go unchallenged, but is well positioned to meet rivals, or repress them. Those geocultural ideologies that cannot be easily coopted (e.g. Soviet-style communism or strong religion), generate *culture wars*. As hegemony declines, perceived global problems tend to overwhelm existing cultural understandings and the hegemonic order enters a phase of ideological delegitimization that clears a path for competing ideas (Silver and Slater, 1999). Radical ideologies flower, and their past repression affords them some legitimacy in the intensifying *culture wars*, and allows them to focus scorn on their traditional enemies and scapegoats.

The most interesting element of geocultural rivalry rests with ideas that generate state support. A large state apparatus is turned not just toward supporting its favored ideas, but to sponsoring (often at arm's length) newer and more radical ideologies designed to weaken their opponents. These ideas will not be constrained by the need to offer solutions to global problems, but may have a distinctly destructive purpose. Where past geocultural offerings had to contend with the contradictions, ambiguities, and complexities of an increasingly integrated world, these new ideas may be designed instead to undercut hegemonic efforts by capturing the hearts and minds of smaller units that might emerge from the delegitimation of hegemonic culture and deglobalization. Ideas of reform and moderation that can allow for the creation of a winning hegemonic bloc may be viewed as insufficient to attract adherents in the spicy ideological soup of rivalry, may be attacked in counter-hegemonic efforts, or may take years to evolve. Blame is usually aimed at the openness of the prior hegemonic order for the difficulties we face so as to exploit handy scapegoats, delegitimize past leaders, and current opponents. This is *antiglobalization*.

Such offerings may be unsuited to spread beyond local borders. The varieties of fascism that are now emerging stress the superiority of small national or racial groups. Xenophobic ideologies may serve as a foundation for *order* in a society but face inherent challenges with the formation of any broader solidarity. Chase-Dunn, Grimes, and Anderson conclude that "hypernationalism was [...] an obstacle to transnational and international cooperation and organization. The fascists did try to organize a fascist international during the late-1920s and the 1930s [...] but their own commitment to the myths of nationalism stood in the way" (2019, 544).

Global openness aids in the process of its own delegitimation by generating various contradictions. Boli, Gallo-Cruz, and Mathias (2011) offer insights from world-polity theory as to some of the possible drivers and contradictions of expanding global culture. Friedman and Randeria (2004) identified elements of an oncoming global elite culture, and Friedman's latest volume (2019) makes the highly controversial argument that the current elite cultural form of globalization is "political correctness" that tramples open discussion and generates an unsurprisingly fierce political backlash (as has Friedman's volume).



## Conclusions

Deglobalization is a challenge to global society that emerges from the decline of a hegemonic power. We see this empirically with the rise of multilateral treaties concluded during periods of hegemony, and their relative decline during periods of rivalry. Hegemonic periods are not better or worse than periods of rivalry, but are quite different in their economic, security, and cultural norms and patterns. Where hegemony seems to spawn globalization, hegemonic decline will generate counter-tendencies that we may understand as deglobalization and the fracturing of global society. In political economy we will see a return to the policies of previous periods of rivalry identified as mercantilism. Mercantilism includes tension between smaller (currently *national*) and larger (possible future *transnational*) polity structures; definitions of wealth that include infrastructural elements and patterns; concerns to avoid balance of trade and other forms of deficit, and a policy toolbox that is contextual and purpose-built instead of focusing on a narrow set of tools.

In the realm of security, we see reduced obstacles to great power war. Culturally, we see the multiplication of competing, and sometimes purposely destructive belief systems that offer limited solidarity and very different ideas about what our problems are, and what solutions we ought to adopt. Many of these ideas will be anti-global in nature.

Though the re-emergence of mercantilism, and the entire phenomenon of deglobalization may be considered a set-back for the development of a more peaceful trans-state socio-economic system, and certainly for any trans-state political system, this is not the end of the process. The evolution of the nation-state from a myriad of sub-state actors was also highly contested, suffered many setbacks, and was challenged by alternative organizational competitors over the course of several centuries. The current process is likely to be similar. The existing socio-economic system will not degrade entirely. Some of its elements will survive, and others will reassert themselves. Such a system is likely to be re-joined to a larger-scale political system over time, though not in any linear, uncontested, or necessarily peaceful manner.

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# From *The Belt & Road Initiative* to *A Community of Shared Future for Mankind*: Contesting China's Aspiration and Road Map for a Future World Society

Zhan Zhang

This chapter unpacks the role of the *Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)* and the *Community of Shared Future for Mankind (CSFM)* in the shift of China's foreign policy and Beijing's perception change of the world order. By analyzing sampled articles from *Xuexiqiangguo* (2019–2022) as the study platform for Communist Party members in China and accessing emerging research projects related to BRI and CSFM that were funded by the National Social Science Fund of China (2018–2020), this chapter tries to offer an evolving internal perspective to understand the logic of Beijing's policy making, the rhetoric preparation of its legitimacy, and the road map of its future development under BRI and CSFM. The chapter discusses: 1) to which extent the alternative future of the world society from the Chinese proposal is different from the West; 2) where does the ambiguity and disconnection of the Chinese set of values from the prevailing neoliberal values in shaping the global system come from; and 3) how to critically understand the Chinese approach in legitimizing China to uphold globalization and contribute to “coexistence of civilization” as a contrast to “clash of civilization” for the future of the world society.

## Introduction

Tracing back to what John Meyer and his colleagues at Stanford University developed in the late 1990s for the world society theory, nation-states adopt very similar organizational structures despite their different socioeconomic or sociocultural patterns (Meyer et al., 1997). The wave of globalization has fostered an integrative process of economic development, technology transformation, political homogenization, and cultural integration under the expansion of global markets. The traditional concepts of nation-states, especially the national boundaries, were under sig-

nificant changes as the growing array of 'intermestic' issues required governments to develop the right global strategies that connect their domestic policy with international policy (Jun and Wright, 1996, 15). Especially countries from the Global South, which have much less power in formulating the rules of game, must organize their domestic agendas to fit the global scope since globalization has built a monopoly dominated by the transnational corporations from countries in the Global North (Jotia, 2011).

Anti-globalization movements appeared in Europe during the 1980s and in America in the 1990s in the form of opposition to transnational corporations and international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). By observing the growing influence of the "ruling elites" from neoliberal societies that sought to utilize "globalization" to harness the expansion of world markets based on investor rights (Chomsky, 2002), these social movements raised attention to environmental protection, labor protection, and especially the inequality between the industrialized Global North and the exploited Global South. Ironically enough, countries from the Global South did not engage or support these claims during these decades. Rather, they have accepted and endorsed the concept of globalization by carrying out free-market reforms, opening doors to international investment and prioritizing economic development as their national agenda to engage with the world society.

China is one of the best examples. Following Deng Xiaoping's economic reform termed "Socialist Market Economy," Beijing has introduced privatization and market competition to the country and opened the massive domestic market to foreign investment since 1978. With the establishment of a systematic regulatory framework of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), FDI inflows to China reached \$1.8 billion annually between 1979 and 1991 and further increased over \$40 billion before China entered WTO in 2001 (Chen, 2018). Not only foreign capital, but also technology innovation, a focus on management skills, and the access to international markets through transnational corporations have contributed to the country's economic boom ever since. At the same time, China learned fast from the *Tiananmen* Square incident in 1989 that economic reforms may produce social resistance and political turmoil. Instead of simply following the logic of neoliberalism that weakens the role of government and strengthens the demand of private initiatives, China emphasized its organizational structure as "Socialism with Chinese characteristic" and consolidated its political power under the ruling Communist Party (CPC). As a result, the government did not compromise on its sovereignty and control over domestic political, economic, and social affairs, despite the private sectors becoming the country's main economic driver.

Intensive debates were taking place between different political ideologies (i.e. *Liberalism*, *Cultural Conservatism*, and the *New Left*) in China at that time, concerning the expansion of market competition, the pace of political reform, the loss of

socialist values due to material culture, emerging problems such as regional disparity, corruption, as well as growing concerns regarding environmental sustainability (Lu et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the majority was in favor of deepening the reform, and China marched further to embrace the world. 2008 marked as a year of great significance for China's internationalization progress, not only for its presence in international stories—like the Beijing Olympic—but more importantly, the downturn of the financial crisis in the West alerted Beijing to best avoid the devastation from the global recession. Through investigating the American regulatory failure, financial capitalism and the disadvantages of neoliberal globalization, Beijing realized that adjusting government measurement over the financial system and mobilizing state interventions through macroeconomic policies are necessary means to counter the crisis and keep stability in the society. CPC's ruling capacity was evidenced again with careful thinking of the long-term benefits of China's global engagement. Being one of the biggest recipients of international FDI inflow, China increased its FDI outflow significantly. Not only investing in developing markets in the Global South, but the Chinese capital also flew to developed markets like North America and Europe. Between 2008 and 2012, Chinese FDI increased from \$1.11 billion to \$7.08 billion in the United States (Statista, 2022), and from €0.7 billion to €10.2 billion in the twenty-eight member states of the European Union (Merics, 2020).

When Xi Jinping came into power in 2012, China was seen as a relatively stable country worldwide, as the country's engagement through financial investment and international cooperation was optimistically on the rise. One year later, the early concepts of the *Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)* and *A Community of Shared Future for Mankind (CSFM)* were put forward officially. During Xi Jinping's state visit to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, he initially announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and the "21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road" as pro-globalization projects that reconnect China with Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa through improved regional cooperation. During his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Xi proposed the idea of a community of common destiny in which "everyone has in themselves a little bit of others" (*China Today*, 2021). Since then, these two concepts began to develop, interact, and connect closely to China's foreign policy. In 2017, with the first BRI Forum convened in Beijing, BRI was incorporated into the country's Constitution. During the same year, CSFM was also written into CPC's constitution and then included in the preamble of China's Constitution in 2018. In contrast to the Trump administration who forged an "America-first" strategy and fanned an anti-globalization sentiment, the Chinese leadership strategically positioned China as a leading power for globalization and multilateralism, offering BRI and CSFM as China's answers to the challenges in the world society, ranging from climate change, increasing terrorism, economic downturn, and the rise of protectionism.

A growing body of research in international studies on BRI and its strategic impact on regional and interregional levels is found in recent years (Verlare and van

der Putten, 2015; van der Putten and Meijnders, 2015; Ciurtin, 2017; Zeng, 2017; De Vergeron, 2018). But there is a significant lack of analysis about CSFM in the background of the recent anti-globalization movement, which focuses on unfair competitions to the developed countries and criticizes international organizations like the WTO for their decisions that run adversely to the West (Stiglitz, 2018). With the BRI and CSFM in development, Beijing took the anti-globalization surge in the West as a historical opportunity for China to stage itself as upholding globalization and shoring up the rule-based global trading system. Beijing began to criticize openly the American unilateralism through its support of multilateralism governance. By shifting its foreign policy from a low and modest profile to a high and assertive profile, China envisions a future world in line with Beijing's economic bounty, cultural magnificence, and the Chinese concept of "harmony under heaven" (*tian xia da tong*, 天下大同).

Nevertheless, the world society seemed puzzled by these Chinese proposals. From 2013 to 2018, the global trends in favorable opinions of China declined despite the country's massive efforts to boost its pro-globalization appeals (Xie and Jin, 2022). Since the Trade War and especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, the general unfavorable views of China reached historic highs in many developed countries, and the overall confidence in Chinese leadership's handling of world affairs remained significantly low at 20% (Silver et al., 2021). With BRI and CSFM both emphasizing interconnection, interdependence and mutual benefits for the world, China seemed to be further isolated, alienized and differentiated.

Why is there such a big contrast between Beijing's optimistic outlook and the world society's pessimistic view of China? Where comes the disconnection of the Chinese approach from the prevailing neoliberal approach in shaping the global system? To which extent does the alternative future of the world society China proposed differ from the Western paradigm? This chapter tries to tackle these questions by offering an evolving internal Chinese perspective to understand the logic of Beijing's policy making, the rhetoric preparation of its legitimacy and the road map of its future development under BRI and CSFM. By understanding BRI as a pragmatic platform to implement CSFM for its further formulation, this chapter unpacks the role of both concepts in the shift of China's foreign policy and Beijing's conceptual change of the world.

## Data and Methods

Two sets of data were collected: First, a representative sample of all the articles explicitly referring to BRI and CSFM and published by the *Xuexiqiangguo* App as an internal study platform for CPC members in China (2019–2022); and second, the data of emerging research projects funded by the National Social Science Fund of China (NSSFC) about BRI and CSFM (2018–2020).

**Table 1: Designed two-week sample to retrieve articles on *Xuexiqiangguo***

	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
2019	04/02	11/04	20/02	31/01	19/06	15/08	13/12
	27/05	22/07	14/08	17/12	13/03	27/06	18/12
2020	13/01	09/03	06/05	23/01	23/04	09/05	17/05
	01/06	27/10	15/07	25/09	06/11	03/10	06/12
2021	18/01	18/05	03/03	28/01	17/09	24/04	02/05
	20/12	09/11	29/09	10/06	03/12	27/11	25/07
2022	11/04	19/04	05/01	24/02	29/04	12/03	30/01


*Note:* With consideration at the moment of writing in May 2022, the year of 2022 recorded samples only for one week. *Source:* Author.

The literary meaning of the Chinese term *Xuexiqiangguo* is “learning to make the country strong.”<sup>1</sup> The App was designed and published by Alibaba Group in 2019 under the direction of the publicity department of the CPC. It is one of the most downloaded Apps in China (over 100 million times) with monthly active users of over sixty-four million (*Sohu news*, 2021). Three subtle messages are behind the name of the App: 1) the logo of the App used the calligraphy of “learning (学习)” from Mao Zedong, the founder of the PRC; 2) once the App is activated, one classic saying from Confucius’ *Analects* about “learning” appears at the front page; and 3) the surname of Xi Jinping “Xi (习)” shares the same Chinese character “learning” (*xuexi*, 学习), so the ambiguity of the word itself implicitly implies “learning from Xi” as well.

The App is mandatory for all CPC members to download and follow its updates. The time duration the user spends on the app results in achieving credits on the App. Many government administrations, public institutions, state-owned companies, and universities would consider *Xuexiqiangguo* credits as part of the employee’s overall work performance, especially if the employee is a CPC member. In some cases, CPC members are requested to maintain a daily amount of thirty-five credits from the platform, and the prospect CPC member should reach a weekly amount

1 All quotes from Chinese sources in this chapter are translated by the author.



**Figure 1: No. of funded NSSFC projects about BRI and CSFM (2018–2020)**

Source: Author.

of 150 credits (*Regulations*, 2020).<sup>2</sup> This means that the *Xuexiqiangguo* App has become one of the essential educational sources for the ninety-five million Chinese Communist Party members as political elites of the country. Published content retrieved from this platform has a considerable potential to unpack the mainstream interpretation of Beijing's policy making and standpoint.

The keyword search of BRI and CSFM on *Xuexiqiangguo* resulted in 20'846 items associated with BRI and 11'944 items associated with CSFM. The author applied a two-designed-week model (Riffe et al., 1993) between 2019 and 2022, which resulted in 163 BRI items and 125 CSFM items for a detailed thematic analysis and discourse analysis (see Table 1). After the author discovered that most published articles on *Xuexiqiangguo* are periodical results from research projects within a wide range of Chinese universities, research institutions and think-tanks, another data set was added to give an overview of all the research projects funded by NSSFC between 2018 and 2020. Considering that research projects take an average of two to four years to be completed, an overlook at the NSSFC data helps to grasp a general understanding of the current articles and publications in progress on *Xuexiqiangguo*. The keyword search of BRI and CSFM was applied in accessing the NSSFC data, which resulted in 206 projects titled BRI and 156 projects titled CSFM (see Figure 1).

<sup>2</sup> An average reading time of 4 minutes on one article could help to gain 2 *Xuexiqiangguo* credits.

## Findings and Discussions

From the analysis of the collected data, the study discovered a discursive contradiction of China-centric theory and a philosophic interplay between Marxism and traditional Chinese epistemes. The fall of the Western paradigm was highlighted as an incentive for introducing BRI and CSFM. And together with a triangle sentimental mechanism, the Chinese narrative deliberately forged a patriotic public sphere in conceptualizing BRI and CSFM domestically.

### Discursive contradiction: China-centric or not?

Both BRI and CSFM were officially promoted as not primarily serving China's own interests (Liu and Fang, 2019). According to Zhong (2019), the fundamental value of CSFM is not to position China as a global leader through advancement, nor to extend "China-centric theory" to other societies. Instead, it aims at cultural (re)construction of international relations based on multi-civilization. Wang (2019) directly quoted Xi Jinping by saying that "BRI is not a sole-play of China, but a symphony of countries along the routes. It is not China's backyard, but the backyard of the world." Both concepts hope to abandon the zero-sum game thinking and to establish a new type of international relations aiming at positive-sum game thinking and win-win (Li, 2020; Wang, 2021). The role of China as the main endeavor of CSFM and BRI is rather a negotiator between developed and developing countries instead of a power grabber who wishes to replace one hegemony with another. According to such statement, any inclination of "China-centric theory" in viewing BRI and CSFM is a total misunderstanding.

Nevertheless, based on the word frequency test with all the research titles funded by NSSF, China is absolutely centered in BRI and CSFM research between 2018 and 2020 (see Figure 2). A few Asian countries were related to some research projects about BRI, such as Pakistan, Burma, Laos, Vietnam, India, Japan, South Korea and Mongolia. Even within these research projects, the research question still focuses on China, for example in, *Changes in Japan's China strategy under BRI and the response from China* (Meng, 2018) and *China's national image in mainstream media in ASEAN countries* (Li, 2019). It remains questionable why when the official discourse downplays "China-centric" logic behind BRI and CSFM, the growing body of the domestic research leaves a clear China-centric and Asia-centric trace. According to Chinese scholars, the previous globalization phase prioritized developed countries (like the US), which turned the regional integration into their exclusive control measures to restrict the development of emerging economies (Meng and Wang, 2019). Therefore, BRI and CSFM will not repeat the same mistake of limiting benefits within a specific regional framework but involving countries across different regions. However, much fewer research projects were found focusing on



nified China-centric logic, as “only with the precondition that China’s core interests are not infringed, and China’s domestic governance is strengthened, it then seeks to lead global governance through extensive participation and to cooperate with the world society to build a community with a shared future for humankind” (Wu and Wen, 2019). With such discursive contradiction and linguistic ambiguity, what the Chinese narrative did not clarify is that in case China’s domestic interests was not met or China’s national rejuvenation was compromised, how the country would further contribute to the global society through BRI and CSFM.

### Philosophic interplay: Marxism or traditional Chinese epistemes?

The research discipline named “Marxism Studies and Philosophy” led all funded NSSFC research projects related to CSFM with a percentage of 34% in 2018, 53% in 2019 and 17.5 % in 2020 (see Figures 3, 4 and 5). Among the total forty-three projects under this discipline, nine projects directly used “Marx,” “Marxism” or “*Das Kapital*” in the headline, focusing on a philosophical and political-economic approach to study CSFM. In contrast, the NSSFC data only retrieved two research projects related to Confucianism and one project related to Taoism under the BRI and CSFM search. A clear emerging research trend was given to Marxism studies.

Among the retrieved articles from *Xuexiqiangguo*, CSFM is viewed as both inheritance and innovation of Marxism developed by the CPC (Kang, 2019). Especially the concept of “genuine community” from Marx’s philosophy is highly emphasized as a contrast to the “false consciousness” and “illusory community” under capitalism. Xu (2022) directly quoted *A Critique of the German Ideology* (Marx/Engels Internet Archive, 2000):

In the previous substitutes for the community, in the State, etc. personal freedom has existed only for the individuals who developed within the relationships of the ruling class, and only insofar as they were individuals of this class. The illusory community, in which individuals have up till now combined, always took on an independent existence in relation to them, and was at the same time, since it was the combination of one class over against another, not only a completely illusory community, but a new fetter as well.

The “State” in the original text is omitted in the Chinese translation, as the Chinese development of the *genuine community* through CSFM openly combines individuals’ development (of absolute freedom) with national interests (of the country’s development agenda) (Xu, 2022). The interesting and contradicting aspect here is that the *genuine community* Marx tried to depict for the future of humankind is in the form of a *state-less community*. For Marx, the State is an absolute political organization divorced from both the civil society and the total power and instrument used by ruling elements within the civil society to control, enslave and regulate the lives of all (Megill, 1970). Instead of interpreting the *genuine community* as a state-

Figure 3: Disciplinary distribution of funded NSSFC project titled CSFM in 2018




Figure 4: Disciplinary distribution of funded NSSFC project titled CSFM in 2019





Figure 5: Disciplinary distribution of funded NSSFC project titled CSFM in 2020



Figures 3–5, source: Author.

less community for individuals with absolute freedom on a universal level, CSFM simply extended the primary component of the community from individuals to nation-states, international organizations, and transnational corporations (Ye, 2021).

Most of the scholarly discussion about Marxism in the Chinese language remained general and abstract. It enthusiastically emphasized the contribution CSFM provides to Marxism without addressing fundamental elements from the original Marxism thoughts to imply how CSFM would give alternative solutions to establish the new social order—the community. For example, CSFM drifted away from the preconditions of achieving the absolute individual freedom—namely, the abolishment of private property, wage system, and the capitalistic social order (according to Marx's *genuine community*)—without providing the know-how of the realization of the Chinese *genuine community*. Would the substantial existence of the State and the continued logic driven by productivity further suppress individual freedom? How to solve the conflict between individual freedom and organizational interests for the real development of human beings? Answers to these questions still wait to be given.

Although much less research projects were found, traditional Chinese thinking is often borrowed in explaining the imagined future of the world society through BRI and CSFM on *Xuexiqiangguo*. Two quotations were found with the highest frequency in the sampled data: “harmony in diversity” (*he er bu tong*, 和而不同), and “harmony with respect to each other’s beauty” (*mei mei yu gong, tian xia da tong*, 美美与共 · 天下大同). “Harmony in diversity” comes from Confucian Analects and the original text says that “the wise man aims at harmony instead of uniformity, whereas the ordinary man aims at uniformity instead of harmony.” “Harmony with respect to each other’s beauty” comes from the original text of one well-known Chinese anthropologist Fei Xiaotong (1910–2005), who draws a connection to the Confucius’ idea of “Great Harmony (*datong*, 大同)” and calls for a profound appreciation of other’s civilizations while developing one’s own. Both quotations suggest that only when countries and cultures learned to respect, tolerate, and admire each other mutually, we could expect peace and harmony for the world society.

“The rule of the nature (universe)” (*zi ran zhi dao*, 自然之道) from Taoism is used to suggest the importance of the balance between the nature and the human society as one promise of BRI on environment protection through its infrastructure projects (Zeng, 2019). And the fact that the Chinese civilization is an open system formed through mutual learning with other civilizations is emphasized by Ye (2021) when tracing back to the historical introduction of Buddhism to China. BRI and CSFM are seen as alternative worldviews against the Western belief in “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1993) since the Chinese civilization is rooted in inclusiveness. Therefore, BRI and CSFM carried on such inclusive nature, with the branded quest of “coexistence of civilization.”

### The focal point behind BRI and CSFM: The fall of the Western paradigm

Seen from the Chinese perspective, the sequence of world crises and the challenges of fragmentation, protectionism, and anti-globalization are embedded in the current international order, which was fabricated under America’s global interests through international financial institutions, regional security organizations, and neoliberal norms. And hence CSFM and BRI were proposed based on a critical understanding of the weakening Western paradigm—labeled as capitalism and democracy.

#### *The downside of capitalism*

From the sampled data, the Chinese reflection of capitalism has two folds: inequality and protectionism. First, *inequality* is rooted in the design of capitalism where the antagonistic relations between the capital and the labor cannot be solved. With the rise of neoliberal policies, what was seen as a worldwide economic boom in 1990s resulted in widening the gap between the rich and the poor (Zhu, 2022). Not only in periphery countries, the problem of income inequality also worsened within

developed countries. Zhu (2022) drew on statistics during the COVID-19 pandemic and observed that “when the wealth of American billionaires increased by 1.1 trillion US dollars from March to December 2020, eight million people in the country returned to poverty, twenty million people lost their jobs, and ten million people fell into hunger.” French President Macron was also quoted in the same article, stating that “capitalism and the market economy have provided the middle class with opportunities for progress, but the system is now broken.”

Second, the rise of *protectionism* provides additional evidence of the imbalanced capitalistic economic order and the unilateralism of the United States. According to the Chinese standpoint, globalization has been centered with the United States in the past. Therefore, “when America had its competitiveness through monopoly advantages, it advocated free-market competition so that other developing countries had basically no chance to compete,” however, “as soon as it lacks such advantages in those markets, it raises trade protectionism or imposes sanctions to guarantee its economic benefits” (Lin and Zheng, 2022). Chinese scholars did not point out any specific actors as transnational corporations during the neoliberal globalization but criticized the United States or the West as a whole entity. Neither did they feature China in these arguments, as a common ground is found for all the emerging economies in the same shadow under the dominance of the West. Without linking to any equivalent calls during the anti-globalization movements in the 1980s and 1990s in the West, the Chinese scholars viewed BRI and CSFM as unique wisdom and solution that are proposed to include more voices from the developing countries into “mutual negotiations” when empowering international organizations like WTO and IMF. This is to say, BRI and CSFM did not propose to abandon capitalism or the current international economic order, but to abandon “unilateralism,” “America-first,” and “Western-centric” scenarios so that more equality and fair play could arrive in developing countries as a whole—and China included. Nevertheless, as part of the global value chain, uneven development and disparity would remain within developing societies as well, and a non-America-first globalization would not solve these classic “capitalistic” defects automatically. How unique will BRI and CSFM turn out to be once China faces the same domestic problems as the West, including growing income inequality, the “hollowing out” of manufacturing jobs due to the automation, and the supply chains shift to neighboring countries like Vietnam?

### *Questioning Western democracy*

In response to the Western criticism on the Chinese political system due to the different control measures against the spread of coronavirus during the pandemic, Chinese scholars analyzed the conceptual difference in democracy, freedom, and human rights between China and the West. Chen Peiyong, a leading scholar in Marxism studies at Peking University, attributed four main problems to the Western democracy in a series of videos published on *Xuexiqiangguo* (2020):



1) the way to recognize only Western approach to democracy is not democratic. Western societies should also accept other approaches (like the Chinese one) to reach democracy instead of labeling China under the authoritarian framework.

2) Western democracy sets the government as permanently evil, therefore criticizing the government has become an absolute “political correctness.” This generates an overall mistrust from the public and impairs the government from allocating social resources to deal with crisis.

3) Western democracy values the democratic process (through engaging different voices) instead of the results and efficiency of problem-solving.

4) Western democracy highlights individual rights while the Chinese system values collective wisdom as many individual opinions may lack a general and long-term vision.

Like China’s “not abandoning capitalism” attitude, from the sampled arguments, China is also a supporter of democracy, and it just has “another set of understanding of democracy” (Chen, 2022). By emphasizing every country’s specific historical, cultural, and social background, the Chinese discourse repeatedly claimed that “China would not judge other countries’ choice of their democratic approach nor impose the Chinese approach on other countries” (Chen, 2022). It is the fault of the Western countries who demand “cultural homogeneity” and “universalization of the Western democratic values” along the process of globalization, whereas other nations demand “cultural heterogeneity” (Ding, 2020). But what is the Chinese approach to democracy then?

The recent White Paper *China: Democracy That Works* published by the State Council Information Office clearly stated that the whole-process democracy in China (*quan guo cheng minzhu*, 全过程民主) “gives full expression to the guidelines of the CPC, the will of the state, and the expectations of the people, uniting the Party, the government and the people behind shared goals, interests and aspirations” (SCIO, 2021). In contrast to the neoliberal democratic approach through which the government is no longer an advocate or essential dominant decider for the general interest but just one actor representing a competing interest with other legitimate actors (Ives, 2015), the Chinese approach faithfully reinforces the overall leading power of the party-government, as “for a country as big as China to fully represent and address the concerns of its 1.4 billion people, it must have a robust and centralized leadership” (SCIO, 2021).

Instead of interpreting the original meaning of democracy as “rule by the people,” the Chinese discourse highlighted the fact that “it is the (Communist) Party that led the people in realizing democracy in China” and the Party “has made continuous efforts to ensure the people’s status as masters of the country” (SCIO, 2021). Therefore, the original setting of democratic leadership with multiple parties and voices fostering deliberation and participating in the decision-making process is replaced by the Chinese “multiparty cooperation system” within which the eight other political parties “participate fully in the administration of state affairs under the

leadership of the CPC” (SCIO, 2021). From the official discourse, the “centralized leadership” of the CPC is probably the most distinguishing feature of the Chinese approach to democracy in contrast to the Western approach. One natural weakness of such a centralized and hierarchical structure under one political party is that “it relies (too much) on the goodwill of the CPC because of the party’s absolute power at every level” (Li, 2022). And knowing such divergence from the normative standards of democracy from its Athenian origin, people in the West may find Beijing’s own version of democracy “laughable” (Li, 2022).

Nevertheless, Beijing calls for the international recognition of the Chinese approach to democracy through BRI and CSFM, as the goal in dealing with global development problems is “for the democratization of international relations” (Xu, 2022). CSFM and BRI would not replace the democratic value system nor to extend any confrontation for international relations. Alternatively, it is the Chinese attempt to enrich democracy as “a constantly evolving process and diverse political structure” (SCIO, 2021). Chinese scholars suggested Beijing not to avoid talking about freedom, human rights, and democracy because of the Western criticism (Chen, 2020), but to deepen the understanding and get ready to “contribute China’s experience to the global political progress through cooperation and mutual learning” (SCIO, 2021).

### **A triangle sentimental mechanism: Anti-America, pro-China and the endorsement of Xi’s leadership**

The keyword of United States was registered with a very high frequency on *Xuexiqiangguo* platform, with a total of 549 items referring to BRI and 292 items referring to CSFM. Two general themes are identified from the sampled data: 1) to fight back against a few US politicians who deliberately smear BRI and CSFM and overtly spread conspiracy theories; 2) to find evidence of American voices that support the Chinese initiative. A clear tendency in selecting divided American opinions echoed the rise of the Chinese patriotic campaign mixed with an overall anti-America and pro-China stance.

*Xinhua* (2020) published a long list of American rumors following the Trump administration’s blame shift of calling the coronavirus “China Virus” during the pandemic. It pointed out that what American politicians framed as “repayment to China’s supporter” in viewing China’s international medical aids is “a total misunderstanding of China’s application of CSFM for global health.” Sun (2021) mentioned another example of Trump’s disrespectful attitude towards Xi’s CSFM proposal for the Asia-pacific region during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in 2020, commenting that Trump’s behavior left “an awful impression.” In contrast, one of the most favored American experts the Chinese media often interviews, William Jones, as the Washington Bureau Chief for *Executive Intelligence Review (EIR)* viewed BRI and CSFM as powerful concepts “complied with the global

trends” (China Central Television, 2019). However, Jones is also an official columnist for *China Focus*, which belongs to the Digital Media Center of China International Publishing Group and operates under the direct guidance of the CPC. To which extent his perspective reflects an authentic American angle remains questionable. Besides, the EIR magazine is an outlet for socialist activists founded during the LaRouche movement in the US in the 1970s. And the movement itself was called a “cult-like organization” by the *New York Times* (Severo, 2019). Purposefully presenting followers of the political movement who are viewed as a danger to democratic institutions in the United States (King, 1989) may not help the Chinese public to reach a neutral understanding of the mainstream American frame of reference.

The flame of Chinese nationalism is evidenced in almost all the collected articles about BRI and CSFM from *Xuexiqiangguo*. In his article, Wang (2019) proudly commented that the BRI integrates the Chinese dream and the dream of the world, and the CSFM “opens a new era for civilization dialogue 3.0 and transcends cosmopolitanism.” While it is not easy to grasp the true meaning of such vast and quixotic ideas, it is obvious how the Chinese scholars used such a hypernationalist narrative to justify BRI and CSFM as the country’s robust measure to legitimize its rightness on the world stage. Additionally, the rise of Chinese nationalism is mixed with a solid support for Xi Jinping. Nine NSSFC research projects were found with Xi’s name in the headline, all connecting to CSFM. Two specific search-result categories were found under Xi’s name on *Xuexiqiangguo*: Xi’s diary and Xi’s publications. The platform recorded 1799 results of Xi’s diary and 145 results of Xi’s publications under the search of BRI, as well as 1161 results of Xi’s diary and 137 results of Xi’s publications under the search of CSFM. Every activity of the Chinese leader and almost every word from him referring to BRI and CSFM are carefully recorded in detail on the platform. BRI and CSFM not only showcase China’s rising importance to the world but also “Xi’s global mindset, responsibility, and his Chinese wisdom” (Du, 2020).

## Conclusion

A recent survey IPSOS conducted with the World Economic Forum across twenty-five countries indicated a nose-dive of general favorability towards globalization, with 52% of participants disagreeing that globalization is a good thing for their countries (IPSOS, 2021). China is not included in the survey, but from the analysis of this study, the country is probably one of the very few with an affirmed commitment to globalization despite the hostile geopolitical environment. Even so, after ten years of promoting BRI and CSFM as China’s proposal to uphold globalization, the Chinese motive, vision, and proposition behind these initiatives remained largely suspicious or incomprehensible to the world society.

One of the obstacles probably lies in the discursive contradiction of the China-centric logic behind BRI and CSFM. On the one hand, the Chinese scholars offi-

cially oppose China-centric logic so as not to fall into the American unilateralism and hegemony scheme. On the other hand, their research effort and rhetorical preparation reveal China's enthusiasm for taking its center stage. BRI and CSFM are seen as strategic tools to affirm the historical inevitability of China's national rejuvenation. Another obstacle might relate to the obscure reference of Marxism as the philosophical foundation of CSFM. Instead of understanding Marx's *genuine community* as a state-less community, the Chinese interpretation blended nation-states into the original scope of the "community" without tackling the preconditions for its realization. Together with the interplay of Confucius's primary concept of *Great Harmony*, one pivotal message of BRI and CSFM, according to this study, is not to abandon capitalism, democracy, or the current international system, but to justify China as part of the international community, China's choice of its own development model and political path, and prominently the Chinese party-government as a major nation-state player and responsible stakeholder to contribute to the "harmony under heaven" for the world society. Such obstacles hindered the comprehension of Chinese alternative future of the world society, giving rise to the contrast between Beijing's optimistic outlook of its promise to the world and the world society's pessimistic acceptance. The dilemma here is that with such defensive emphasis on China as a nation-state, how could BRI and CSFM go beyond national interests for its global reach of humankind's prosperity?

More importantly, what disconnects China from the western paradigm is China's political-economic system and especially the Chinese approach to democracy, which stands apart from the US-led homogenous organizational structure during globalization (Meyer et al., 1997). In recent times, Western democracy itself is under challenge following the neoliberal triumph, as the rising socioeconomic inequality slowly transforms democracy into an "oligarchy," which disrupts "the core democratic principle of equality in participation, representation and governance" (Merkel, 2014). Nevertheless, under its affirmed centralized leadership of the CPC, the Chinese approach also finds underlying limits in balancing political unipolarity and diversifying society. What BRI and CSFM really tried to downplay is the US hegemony behind neoliberal globalization and the Western-centric, or better to say, America-centric worldview. And to do so, the Chinese discourse purposefully mingled China with other developing countries in advancing mutual respect and multilateralism governance, emphasizing that BRI and CSFM are not meant to overturn other countries toward the Chinese approach or to harness the world markets for Chinese gain. The vagueness in the Chinese language and a triangle sentimental mechanism are knitted to consolidate people's support of these claims and the overall CPC governance within the domestic public sphere. However, tensions may arise between China's internal necessity for uniformity and its external insistence on multiplicity. And fueling an anti-America and pro-China clash contradicts what BRI and CSFM promised in the first place for the "coexistence of civilization" as branded inclusiveness rooted in the Chinese tradition.

The proposition of BRI and CSFM will undoubtedly guide China's international policies and commitment to the world society—especially within its neighboring countries in Asia—in the long run. But the conceptualization of BRI and CSFM may need a profound self-examination before calling for international awareness and applause. What Beijing should question itself is that constantly legitimizing the importance of the party-government and Xi's undisputed authority may gain deterrence power and ascertain domestic stability within the Chinese border, but it also creates a natural barrier for BRI and CSFM to charm other societies which have devoted decades-long effort to counterbalance the government power and especially to scrutinize one-man rule polity. The insufficiency of private sectors in the Chinese context—like transnational corporations as frontier drivers of BRI—may further disengage the Chinese pro-globalization appeals with the current globalization progress and generate skepticism over unfair competition (as if Chinese enterprises were all state-backed). And without working on the transition from the nation-state to a world-state or stateless community, the realization of a shared future for humankind under BRI and CSFM may eventually lead to another “illusory community.” What the world society should be aware is that China is learning fast with constant perseverance and application to get strong, as the name of *Xuexiqiangguo* indicated. The choice of the country's development model, globalization path and the inauguration of BRI and CSFM are all based on its grounded experience and fast learning within the domestic society, the changing world economy and geopolitics. May it be Chinese harmony or Chinese aggression, the West, and the United States in particular, need to renew themselves from the habitual over-reliance on the neoliberal model's superiority and ideological certainty. A closer understanding of the original Chinese perspective is essential to foresee the future of the world society, as the country's long and steady rise following its non-Western style and its pragmatic and programmatic impact in the region is becoming indispensable.

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## **The Cold War 2.0 Fallacy: An Exploratory Study of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations Between China and the US**

Alexandre Abdal and Douglas Meira Ferreira

This chapter assesses the Cold War 2.0 concept as applied to US-China relations. Our main argument is that the Cold War analogy is a bad metaphor for analyzing current impasses in the capitalist world-economy. To demonstrate this, we undertook a historical reconstruction of Sino-American diplomatic patterns. Trade data were also used to characterize commercial relations between these countries and other regions. Despite the increasing political animosity that has been growing over the last decade, what mainly characterizes economic relations between China and the US is strong commercial integration with unequal trade patterns. This strong commercial integration is a different scenario from that of US-USSR relations during the Cold War era. Current Sino-American relations were built on 50 years of diplomatic approximation since the Mao-Nixon meeting, known as “Ping-pong” diplomacy, but went through difficult times after the Tiananmen Square incident, many crises involving the Taiwan Strait, and the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. After China became fully incorporated into the world economy and the new global order, which was consolidated by being accepted as a member of the WTO, China rose to economic superpower status with a subsequent trade surplus with the US and other Western regions.

I won't wait for the day  
On which all  
Men agree  
I only know several  
Beautiful harmonies  
Possible without reckoning  
It seems that something  
Has gone out of order  
Out of the new world  
Order  
Caetano Veloso (*Out of Order*)<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction<sup>2</sup>

In this chapter, we deal with the Cold War 2.0 as applied to Sino-American relations.<sup>3</sup> Arguing that the Cold War analogy is nothing more than a bad metaphor, we aim to reconstruct and analyze Sino-American diplomatic and commercial patterns. Our main argument is that, besides increasing diplomatic animosity over the last decade, what characterizes economic relations between China and the US is strong commercial integration. This strong commercial integration, incidentally, is a very different background from that of the Cold War era between the US and the USSR. During that period, both superpowers were economically autonomous, each leading a bloc of countries that had relatively parallel production systems.

If Cold War 2.0 is not valid in scientific or sociological terms, how can we describe and explain diplomatic and commercial relations between the world's current superpowers? How can we interpret the growing instability in the global order? One thing is both certain and our departure point: the perception of rivalry and hostility has been growing stronger between China and the US over the last decade. Since Obama's administration China is seen by the US as a threat: a competitive, scientifically, technological, diplomatic and security threat (Khong, 2020). Trump exerted more pressure by triggering a trade war with China that focused on the commercial and technological fields, and by spreading fake news about the sup-

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1 A free translation by Editora Aula de Português (<https://editorauladeportugues.wordpress.com/2014/07/07/out-of-order-fora-do-ordem/>). The original song (in Portuguese) is available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iQ4IBFC2YWk>.

2 Previous versions of this chapter were presented in Cebrap's 2022 International Postdoctoral Program seminar, held in December 2022, as part of Alexandre Abdal's postdoctoral work. It has also been presented at the World Society Foundation Conference, August 2022, and in the 5<sup>th</sup> Workshop on New-Developmentalism, held in July 2022.

3 In this chapter we are not analyzing Russian-American relations, although we recognize their importance to the structural change processes of the capitalist world-economy.

posed “Chinese virus” when referring to the COVID-19 pandemic. So far<sup>4</sup>, Biden has done nothing to change the situation other than by being more polite than Trump when referring to China. On the one hand he is maintaining and increasing the emphasis on industry incentives and repatriating manufacturing, mainly by way of his economic and infrastructure recovery plans.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand he is sharpening the security and military focus of the US on the Indo-Pacific region in an effort to contain China (Abubaker, 2021). This is exemplified by the revitalization of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)<sup>6</sup> and the growing importance of the Taiwanese question.

As a broader development in other pieces of work (Abdal, 2022; Abdal et al., 2021), the escalating rivalry in Sino-American relations and the current instability in the global order can only be adequately understood if it is situated within the crisis of the US globalization project, which was aggravated by the 2008 Financial Crisis, the 2020–21 COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war. This crisis is one of the most evident symptoms of an emerging geopolitical cycle (Bergesen et al., 2018), in which it is possible to identify a wave of nationalism on a global scale (Karatasli, 2018).

The crisis of the US globalization project is also a hegemonic crisis in which US has lost its capacity to legitimately lead<sup>7</sup> the global order (Arrighi, 2007; Thompson, 2018; Guillén, 2019; Manzi, 2019). Since the ‘War on Terror’, and through the 2008 Financial Crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic, US international action have become more about a destabilizing than a stabilizing one (Abdal et al., 2021). The insistence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on “marching” East, and the inability and unwillingness of the US to negotiate with Russia is just the latest example of its destabilizing activities.<sup>8</sup>

Behind this destabilizing action lies the fact that the US has become a net loser in the globalization process, while growing shares of world production have moved to East Asia and to China, in particular (Abdal et al., 2021; Arrighi, 2007; Palley, 2018). This output of the globalization process is unexpected, in the sense that no

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4 December, 2022.

5 The *Build Back Better Plan*, for example, has multiple ramifications in terms of the *American Jobs Plan*, *Families Plan*, and *Rescue Plan*, which were all aimed at ensuring economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.

6 An international military cooperation between the US, Australia, India, and Japan. This dialogue was initiated in 2007, led by Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe.

7 By ‘legitimately lead’ we mean lead the international community in a way that enhances cooperation in international institutions with the perception that it is oriented to the common good of the whole community. For a broader discussion, see Arrighi (1994).

8 Other examples are the US leaving the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) paralysis, the trade war itself, and the US refusal to sign up to a long-term commitment to any of the climate agreements.

one in the 1990s could have predicted a world in which the US was not the only superpower, and the single economic and political model for all other countries.

Moreover, the US globalization project is bankrupt (Abdal et al., 2021; Bresser-Pereira, 2020; Fraser, 2017; Rugitsky, 2020). While a project, it was oriented to reign over the globalization process in a way that would result in a new and integrated world, a world of free global markets and liberal democratic regimes, a kind of American *tiānxià* 天下 (Babones, 2018) in which the hierarchy comprises a central state and other small allied military forces. Its economic roots were in the 1980s, in the so-called 'monetary counterrevolution' (Arrighi, 1994) and 'strong dollar diplomacy' (Tavares, 2019; Tavares et al., 2019). Its political roots were in the 1990s, at the end of the bipolar world, and in the conversion of the US liberal democratic regime into a product to be exported. In that decade, the globalization process under the US globalization project was triumphant, with both neoliberalism and the liberal democratic regime seen as the sole options available.

When China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, at first sight this was confirmation of the US globalization project. It was, however, just a Pyrrhic victory, in the sense that it paved the way for China to become the main beneficiary of the globalization process, even though it fell under the realm of the US globalization project (Ferreira, 2021). On the one hand, China's membership of the WTO consolidated the global order, and the same set of international institutions now cover almost the whole world. From the US point of view it was just a matter of time before China converged politically (Ferreira, 2021). On the other hand, it made way for an illiberal and developmental mode of economic and societal coordination to flourish in the global economy (Bresser-Pereira, 2021, 2017). Only a few perceived the particular aspects of China's integration at the time, although today it is quite clear that China did not converge with US economic and political institutions, but had its own institutions.

At the beginning of 2022 China accounted for 19%<sup>9</sup> of the world's population, and was the biggest economy in the world, measured by gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity. Between 1980 and 2020, China doubled the size of its economy six times<sup>10</sup>, while the US could only double it twice. In 2020, China represented 18.3% of world's gross domestic production, 11.5% of its foreign trade<sup>11</sup>, and 16% of the world exports of manufactured goods.


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9 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: *World Population Prospects: The 2020 Revision*.

10 GDP of China measured in current US\$ in January 2022, according to World Bank.

11 Trade represented as imports plus the exports of goods and services, in current US\$ in January 2022, according to World Bank.

**Figure 1: Chinese emergence: the evolution of its share in production (GDP, PPP), foreign trade (exports+imports) and exports of manufactured goods**



Source: World Bank and WITS; prepared by the authors.

From the time it became a member of the WTO until today the world has witnessed China rising to become an economic and geopolitical superpower. The principal geopolitical consequence of such a rise, together with the crisis in the US globalization project, is that it is no longer possible anymore to gently accommodate the declining and emerging hegemony in the capitalist world-economy (Abdal et al., 2021; Allison, 2015; Barbosa, 2019). While US action points to unleashing deglobalization forces through economic protectionism and a limited anti-China multilateralism, China's foreign policy is becoming more and more assertive (Yan, 2014), and the country is designing its own globalization counterproject, as represented by its Belt and Road Initiative<sup>12</sup>, and the creation or strengthening of new institutions, in particular the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB), and BRICS (Barbosa et al., 2014).

12 The Belt and Road initiative started in 2013, consisting of a program of bilateral treaties with countries around the world aimed at developing infrastructure. By the beginning of 2021, 140 nations had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese government (Wang, 2021).



In the renewed structures of the capitalist world-economy (Arrighi, 1994; Wallerstein, 2004), in which the gently accommodation of hegemons is not possible anymore, the Cold War analogy has emerged to describe and explain Sino-American relations. Coming mainly by Western analysts, the metaphor suggests that the US and China tend to enjoy a kind of relationship that is typical of the Cold War era, in which the former superpowers competed in all spheres of existence, including the military and security dimensions. They were completely economically decoupled, and did not engage in direct conflict because it could easily provoke a nuclear war capable of annihilating humanity (Khong, 2020). Despite the mutual destruction outcome, the US and the USSR were interested in maintaining geopolitical stability (Gardner, 2019), something that the US is less interested in nowadays; see, for example, its unwillingness to avoid the Ukraine-Russia war by the use of diplomacy and the disposition to negotiate.

In this chapter, we recognize the potential of metaphors for helping us understand new phenomena. We argue, however, that the Cold War analogy is a bad metaphor for describing the current scenario, firstly because it does not address the essence of Sino-American relations, namely: economic dependence, with strong commercial, financial, and technological integration. In sociological and historical terms, the case of the US and China's relationship is a historically new one, and irreducible to recycled concepts. We accept that current structures of the capitalist world-economy are becoming polarized, and a systemic rivalry or competition is taking place in a multilateral world (Yin, 2020), but the output is not necessarily a "Cold War." A Cold War situation requires complete economic decoupling and a radical bipolarization of the world, something that is out of the question, at least in the short and medium terms.

This chapter is structured in three sections, besides the Introduction and Final Remarks. The next section reviews the debate about the Cold War analogy as it relates to Sino-American relations, focusing on the main mistakes around current uses of the Cold War analogy. The third section provides a strategic historical reconstruction of US-China diplomatic relations since the 1970s, when China started to dedicate efforts to joining Western political and economic institutions, such as the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which became the WTO in 1994, and maps out the hostilities since the beginning of Trump's administration. The fourth section analyzes Sino-American commercial patterns, and indicates their connections, complementarities, and specificities.

## **The Cold War Analogy**

The Cold War analogy is a powerful metaphor, mainly because memories of it is still alive in political, geopolitical, international relations, and national security thinking. But, as we argue here, it is nothing but a bad metaphor. In its simplest form, it describes a scenario of systemic rivalry in a bipolarized world in which the only

reason why the two superpowers, one the incumbent hegemon and the other the emerging hegemon, do not engage in direct military conflict is because it would quickly escalate into a nuclear conflict that would probably destroy both rivals, and the whole world with them. Despite this nuclear deterrence, both hegemonies have a long-standing economic, technological, diplomatic and ideological rivalry, and have formed and still maintain parallel geopolitical and economic blocs (Barreiros et al., 2021; Gardner, 2019; Khong, 2020; Yin, 2020). In this scenario, there is nothing resembling a global economy with integrated free markets.

Looking at current literature that deals with the Cold War analogy, we noticed some common traits and some peculiarities. First, it tends to be more Western, or more Western-oriented, at least. Muhammad Abubaker (2021) and Jiwu Yin (2020), for instance, describe a “Cold War mentality” in which the US is trying to convert China not only into an economic, technological, diplomatic and military competitor, but also into an ideological rival. This constitutes a Cold War mentality bias that affects not only American politicians and strategists, but also political and international analysts.

Second, Cold War 2.0 literature is more oriented to the international relations perspective than to the sociological, economic, or historical approaches. The result is a tendency to value structural aspects of a systemic rivalry in a bipolar and economically decoupled world, in which both rivals have nuclear weapons (Upchurch, 2018). In this frame, there is little room for other variables, like historical context or economic relations, although incorporating historical context and economic relations into the analysis of Sino-American relations reveals a different situation. In spite of a bipolar world in the image and likeness of the 1950’s world, the world today is much more multipolar with a single global order, and with at least three main hegemonic centers (the US, Europe, and China), plus a quite important semi-periphery comprising countries like Russia, Japan, India, Brazil, and South Africa (Barbosa, 2019; Gardner, 2019; Upchurch, 2018). In spite of the economic decoupling of the two superpowers, China and the US are amazingly interdependent in commercial, productive and technological terms (Abdal et al., 2021; Yin, 2020).

Third, there is confusion as to what reality is being describe when Cold War 2.0 is referred to: if it is Russian-American relations or Sino-American relations. One set of analyses<sup>13</sup> uses the Cold War analogy to characterize Russian-American relations since the 2014 Ukraine Euromaidan protests, which culminated in Russia annexing Crimea, leading to today’s Russia-Ukraine war. The problem here is that despite Russia being a huge military and nuclear power, it is no longer in a position to dispute the leadership of the world order. In this sense, Russia nowadays is just a mirage of what it was in the past; it is basically a semi-peripheral country with regional security concerns.

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13 See, for instance, Daniel Barreiros and Pável L. Grass (2021) or Hall Gardner (2019).

Summarizing, the problem with using the Cold War analogy involves: (i) a mentality bias that makes analysts see new historical situations that are based on former viewpoints; (ii) a disregard of the actual historical context and economic specificities; and (iii) non-definition and confusion with regard to the object of analysis. Our claim is that the Cold War analogy can only be converted into a valid scientific category if it can be adapted to fit new historical situations in a way that considers the historical and economic specificities of each situation and it is oriented toward a well-defined objective.

Regarding the Sino-American question, and despite the growing animosity in diplomatic relations and the constitution of a systemic rivalry, what we see are quite integrated economic systems. Incidentally, integrated economic systems were constructed during the 1970s and 1980s as an attempt by the US to have China integrated into international institutions in order to undermine the influence of the USSR. Those diplomatic and economic links paved the way for China's request to join GATT (and then the WTO). Without the economic decoupling of China and the US (Tchakarova, 2021), an action that would, indeed, put an end to the current global world order, the Cold War analogy remains an unlikely scenario among other possible scenarios (Yin, 2020).

## **China and the US in the Diplomatic Field**

It is possible to trace Sino-American diplomatic relations back in time to the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a period when both countries had very different internal configurations than nowadays.<sup>14</sup> For our present purposes, however, what is of main interest is the basis on which the recent bilateral interconnection was built. The resurgence of Sino-American relations occurred during the 1970s under the pretext of "Ping-pong" diplomacy. By the early 1970s, both countries were interested in improving the dialogue. On the part of the Chinese, it was clear that after the Sino-Soviet split and border conflicts with the USSR other international partners were needed. On the US side, Nixon saw that the proximity with the Chinese would provide important support in Asia when confronting the USSR and negotiating the war in Vietnam. Under the argument of confronting the USSR, the US developed initial diplomatic relations with China, which started with a table tennis match.

Since then, US and Chinese diplomatic relations can be classified in relation to three different moments, each one having specific meanings and motivations. They are: (i) from Ping-pong diplomacy to Tiananmen Square (1970–1989): geopolitical approximation and China's reinsertion in world institutions and trade; (ii) pragmatic reinsertion under new premises (1990–2008): economic approximation and China's incorporation into the new global order; and (iii) systemic rivalry (2008 –

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14 See, for instance, Gene T. Hsiao (1977).

present day): diplomatic animosities and the US engaging in activities to destabilize the world.

### **From Ping-pong diplomacy to Tiananmen Square (1970–1989): Geopolitical approximation and China’s reinsertion in world institutions and trade**

Ping-pong diplomacy is the embryo of both countries’ contemporary relations. It started with an encounter between table tennis players in 1971, leading to a group of American players traveling to China in that same year. After that, friendly public dialogue between the countries flourished and the US lifted its trade embargo. China was also recognized in the UN Security Council.

The 1972 historic meeting between Nixon and Mao changed the history of both countries and established new possibilities. At the end of the event, both leaders signed a joint communique known as the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), declaring that their aim was “the normalization of relations” between countries. This document addressed a series of issues: disputes over Taiwan, the Vietnam War, Korea, and the Indo-Pakistan conflict. The US side stated that it would withdraw its forces from Taiwan, and adopt the “One China” policy.

Relations between the countries slowly evolved during the 1970s. After Mao and Zhou Enlai’s death in 1976, leadership was renewed in China resulting in Deng Xiaoping consolidating his position. Deng was looking to implement a reform policy that would reshape the country, and modernize the main areas of the economy. The reforms aimed at the controlled use of trade by attracting foreign companies to operate via Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other regulation mechanisms.

In 1979, Deng travelled to US, and was the first Chinese authority to officially visit the country. After that, China received full diplomatic recognition from the US. Paradoxically, in that same year, Jimmy Carter, the former US president, signed the Taiwan Relations Act, which allowed the US to trade with Taiwan in ammunition and military equipment. This ambiguous position on Taiwan continued during the 1980s, with confrontation relating to Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, on the one hand, and continuous efforts by both countries to keep improving commercial relations, on the other.

During the late 1980s, cultural relations between countries saw the “golden years” with Zhao Ziyang, the first Chinese leader to wear Western clothes. This fast liberalization in Chinese culture reached international relations with a diplomatic approximation with Japan.

At the peak of China’s commercial, diplomatic, and cultural integration, the incidents in Tiananmen Square in 1989, combined with the break-up of the Soviet bloc, set back diplomatic relations between the Chinese and the rest of the western world. At the same time, Japan and western countries joined together to disapprove of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) response to the street protests and the argument of an anti-Soviet alliance with China was lost. As a result, the Sino-American dia-

logue turned essentially into a commercial one and China's increasing commercial and cultural integration stopped. For instance, the initiative to join GATT was denied by the Working Group, and arguing "human rights violations," funds from the World Bank and Japanese government for developing the Chinese economy were frozen (Mann, 1999).

### **Pragmatic reinsertion under new premises (1990–2008): Economic approximation and China's incorporation into the new global order**

After Tiananmen Square, the discussion centered on the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status granted to China, the same trade regime as other countries with good relations with the US enjoyed. Lobbying by multinational companies maintained the MFN status, but it was conditional on the "application of human rights" by the Chinese.

During the early 1990s, relations slowly started to improve when the Chinese government released political activists who had taken part in the Tiananmen Square protests. By 1994, Clinton, who had been recently elected, started changing his emphasis on human rights, claiming that the best decision was to keep the MFN status. Clinton shifted to a strategy of including China to changing it, therefore, advancing in WTO negotiations and delegating the human rights judgement to UN.

The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 led to widespread commotion among the Chinese. The operation, which was organized directly by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was part of NATO's attack on Yugoslavia. This gave the Chinese leverage in WTO negotiations that had been delayed several times due to the terms of the agreement. After approval, market integration between the US and China reached its maximum point with the US-China Relations Act of 2000. By 2006, China had become the second biggest trading partner of the US.

The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century saw the fast economic rise of the Chinese economy that was strongly linked to economic activities in Europe and the US. During the Bush administration (2001–2009), China was seen as a minor issue as the focus of US external policy rapidly turned to the so-called "War on Terror" after the 9/11 incidents. China itself had problems with terrorism between Muslim minority inhabitants living in the far west of the country and, in this aspect, the War on Terror was supported by the Chinese, and both countries became allies on the subject.

### **Systemic rivalry (2008–actual): Diplomatic animosities and a US destabilizing world action**

When Barack Obama came into office (2009–2017), the scenario of economic relations had changed. For a brief period after the financial crisis of 2008, China became the largest US creditor in the world, and exceeded Japan owning debt (or treasury

bonds) worth U\$600 billion. By 2010, China had also overtaken Japan as the second largest economy in the world, which opened the eyes of Western policy analysts. In 2011, the US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton wrote an essay (Clinton, 2011) on foreign policy in which she points out that “the future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq,” thus shifting the focus of international policy from the Middle East to Asia.

As trade deficits kept rising during the Obama administration, trade tensions were manifested in disputes over international trade rules in the WTO. During this period, the US used international organizations in the attempt to counterbalance the rise of China, thus reinforcing its globalization project. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), for example, was seen as a way to exclude China from trade agreements. Another measure taken was to increase US military presence in the Pacific as disputes between China and the Philippines arose in the South China Sea. In 2012, the US moved 60% of its navy and air force to the Asia-Pacific region.

China altered its foreign policy at the same time. Xi Jinping became president of the Chinese nation and proposed a new, more assertive policy approach (Yan, 2014). In the following years, Xi established open dialogue with the US, but disputes over cybersecurity and tensions in the South China Sea showed that the scenario of diplomatic relations had changed from that of harmony, which had been seen in previous years, to one that was new and more competitive.

In this chain of events that were leading to animosities in both sides, Trump was elected in 2016. At first, the “One China” policy was the subject of controversial declarations, and as time passed the rhetoric became stronger with regard to unilateral actions, which weakened international institutions. Not indicating panelists to sit in the WTO’s Arbitration Chamber is paradigmatic and of special interest to this chapter, because, in practice, this paralyzed the functioning of the organization, which is responsible for managing global trade. In 2018, a set of tariffs were issued on Chinese trade in an attempt to reduce current trade deficits. In fact, it would be the beginning of the so called “Trade War” that openly questioned US commercial relations, especially with China. Escalation of this conflict can be seen in Table 1, which summarizes it.

US officials met with their Chinese counterparts just a few times in subsequent years to negotiate the terms of bilateral trade. As a result, this led to instability in financial markets (He et al., 2022). Events of the trade war had various impacts on global value chains and affected companies on other continents, including Africa (An et al., 2020). According to UNCOMTRADE data, total US-China trade contracted by 15% in 2019 compared to 2018; trade in commodities reduced in value by 37%.

Even after the 2020 bilateral trade agreement the trade war was not completely over (Bown et al., 2022). Biden’s administration has not only increased diplomatic animosity with China—in the Anchorage meetings, for example—but kept some of the tariffs that were put in place during Trump’s government.

**Table 1: Escalation of the US-China trade war, 2016–2022**

<b>Date (mm/yyyy)</b>	<b>Action</b>
12/2016	Trump is elected in the US
01/2018	30% tariffs on solar pannels
01/2018	Rates of 20-50% on washing machines, especially for South Korean companies
03/2018	Tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum
03/2018	U.S. imposes 25% tax on imports of South Korean trucks
06/2018	<i>Outbreak of the trade war</i> : tariff of 25% for Chinese exports in an amount of USD 50 billion (alleged practices of illegal trade and disrespect of intellectual property)
06/2018	Tariffs in an amount of USD 3 billion in the import of Mexican products
06/2018	Announces the possibility of an extra tariff of 10% on Chinese exports of USD 200 billion; China retaliates with corresponding sanctions
08/2018	China complains to WTO over tariffs on solar panels
12/2018	Meng Wanzhou is arrested, based on allegations of Huawei-Iran negotiations;
12/2018	(G20): U.S.-China agreement to cool trade war with 90-day truce without new tariffs.
12/2018	China lowers tariffs on U.S. cars
01/2019	China-U.S. negotiations (until 04/2019)
05/2019	U.S. raises tariffs on Chinese products from 10% to 25%
05/2019	Huawei enters the U.S. "Entity List," banning U.S. companies from negotiating with the company
06/2019	China increases import tariffs
06/2019	US adds other Chinese entities to its list: Sugon, Wuxi Jiangnan Institute of Computing Technology, Higon, Chengdu Haiguang Integrated Circuit, and Chengdu Haiguang Microelectronics Technology
06/2019	China-US negotiations during the G20
07/2019	U.S. removes restrictions on Huawei and exempts 110 Chinese products
08/2019	U.S. declares China a foreign exchange manipulator
09/2019	New U.S. tariffs on Chinese products take effect
09/2019	China lodges WTO representation against new tariffs
10/2019	U.S. imposes \$7.5 billion tariff on EU as WTO win
11/2019	Phase 1 of an agreement signed between China and the U.S
01/2020	U.S. withdraws complaint about Chinese currency manipulation and both sign phase 1 of bilateral trade agreement
01/2020	U.S. increases fares in the aviation products area (Airbus) from 10% to 15% for the EU
07/2020	U.S. withdraws preferential trade agreement with Hong Kong
07/2020	U.S. announces visa restrictions on Huawei workers on human rights charges
09/2020	U.S. announces restrictions on semiconductor imports from the industry's largest Chinese company (SMIC)
11/2020	New restrictions on the purchase of U.S. shares of companies that have ties to the Chinese army
11/2020	Biden is elected in the U.S
01/2021	New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) removes China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom from the list of companies
01/2021	U.S. bans imports of tomatoes and cotton produced in Xinjiang
06/2021	Biden announces expanded list of 59 Chinese companies linked to the banned army of investment
02/2022	Biden Extends Trump-Era Solar Tariffs
02/2022	Biden reinstates duties on aluminum from the UAE

Sources: BBC, China-briefing, US Census Bureau, NY Times, SCMP, Bown et al., 2011. Own elaboration.

## China and the US in the Commercial Field

In this section we will explore trade relations between the US and China. Our main contention is that besides the soaring animosity in the diplomatic field, with China being identified as a threat, the trade war and the continuation of efforts to boost local manufacturing in the US, what best describes Sino-American trade relations is strong and increasing commercial interdependence. This commercial interdependence, with the US being heavily dependent on manufactured imports from China, especially because of their lower prices, represents a context of long-term income stagnation (Rugitsky, 2020).


To analyze Sino-American trade patterns, we used data on international trade taken from UN COMTRADE for the 1992–2020 period. Data were aggregated according to the OECD's technological level of manufactured products methodology: high, medium and low, plus commodities and natural resource-based industry (Lall, 2000): see all sectors in the appendix (Table 3). This is a sectoral classification, whose main advantage is the possibility of analyzing trends in the technological advance in bilateral trade. With regard to the geographic aspect, we are working with a sample of 38 countries that represented more than 80% of world trade in 2020. Regions have been aggregated into the following groups of countries: Africa, Asian Tigers, countries in the region surrounding China, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, countries in the region surrounding the US, and the World, plus five individual countries (China, India, Japan, Russia, and the US)—see all the countries in the appendix (Table 2).

Figures 2a and 2b show the main American and Chinese trade partners in 1992 and 2020. What is most striking in the US figure is the rise of China as the major US trade partner, representing almost one quarter of total US foreign exchange and revealing a growing American commercial dependence on China. In 1992, China was just the sixth-ranking partner, with less than 6% of all American trade. Following China, Mexico doubled its commercial flows with the US, jumping from 9.5% to 18.5%. China and Mexico together now occupy places that were formerly held by Canada and Japan in terms of American foreign exchange.

Other countries that are gaining ground in US trade flows are Asian, like South Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Together they represented almost 9% of all American trade in 2020, against less than 6.5% in 1992. If we sum up all Asian countries, including China, but without Japan, they account for almost a half of all American trade flows: in 1992 this figure was approximately 20%.




Figure 2a: The top ten US trade partners, 1992 and 2020




Source: UN COMTRADE; prepared by the authors.

Figure 2b: The top ten Chinese trade partners, 1992 and 2020



Source: UN COMTRADE; prepared by the authors.

**Figure 3: Chinese trade balance with the US (in billions of dollars) for all manufactured products, high-tech manufactured products, and commodities: 1992–2020**



Source: UN COMTRADE; prepared by the authors.

Changing the focus to the ranking of China's commercial partners, we observe a significant "dilution" and diversification in its partners: in 1992 the top two partners accounted for more than a half of all Chinese international trade, while the top ten accounted for 85.4%. By 2020 the top two and top ten partners represented a little less than one third and 67%, respectively. This "dilution" and diversification is based on shrinking commerce with Japan, whose participation in the Chinese trade agenda dropped from 29.8% in 1992 to 10% in 2020.

Those gaining ground in the wake of the Japanese retreat are mainly other Asian countries, particularly South Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Together, they accounted for 13.3% of all Chinese foreign trade in 1992, and forged ahead to almost 25% in 2020. The case of Vietnam is, in fact, paradigmatic with its participation having increased by 67 times between 1992 and 2020.


With regard to the US, it maintained its share in Chinese international trade at between a fifth and a quarter, and became the single most important Chinese trading partner. The main reason for this achievement, however, is not praiseworthy performance by the US, but underperformance by the Japanese. The trade picture in 2020 is that the US and China have become each other's most important commercial partner, suggesting a not insignificant trade dependence.

**Figure 4: US trade flows (in billions of dollars) with the world for all manufactured and high-tech products, and commodities, 1992–2020**



Source: UN COMTRADE; prepared by the authors.

**Figure 5: Chinese trade flows (in billions of dollars) with the world for all manufactured and high-tech products, and commodities, 1992–2020**



Source: UN COMTRADE; prepared by the authors.

Behind this strengthening in trade ties, however, there are different trading patterns (Figure 3), different patterns of insertion in the world's international trade (Figure 4), and different trade relations with major commercial partners (Figures 5 and 6).

The US trade balance with China is openly in deficit as regards manufactured products, especially high-tech products.<sup>15</sup> Although the US trade balance is in surplus in terms of commodities, the volume of trade in this sector is relatively small and insufficient to reverse the commercial deficit with China.

Observing the historical series, what is most relevant about Sino-American trade relations is that they grew during the 2000s. Before the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the total volume of trade and the US deficit (and, hence, the Chinese surplus) were not as relevant as they are today. Indeed, since China became a member of the WTO in 2001, not only did the volume of trade between both countries increase sharply between 2000 and 2016, but the US deficit in its manufactured products' trade balance also increased. Since it was not the fall of the Berlin Wall that consolidated globalization, but the setting up of the WTO, followed by China becoming a member of it (Abdal et al., 2021; Ferreira, 2021) our data suggest and underline the fact that because China became the main trading partner of the US, it also became the main beneficiary of globalization.


This diagnosis of China being the main beneficiary of globalization and the US incurring huge and structural deficits in manufacturing industry, with a particular emphasis on the high-tech sectors is confirmed when we analyze Sino-American commercial inclusion in the world economy (Figures 4 and 5). In short, the US manufactured products' trade deficit has grown since the early 1990s and the US high-tech manufactured products' trade deficit has grown since the early 2000s. At the same time, the Chinese surplus in its manufacturing industry and in high-tech manufactured products has been increasing, since 1992 and 2000, respectively. With regard to commodities, the historical trends are different. While the US deficit increased up until 2009, it was able to reverse the trend between 2010 and 2020. China, in turn, has incurred structural trade deficits in commodities since the early 2000s, which shows its significant dependence on natural resources.

Looking specifically at the US's commercial relations with its main trading partners (Figure 6), we see that the US is in a deficit situation in terms of manufactured products with Europe, Japan, the Asian Tigers, and, also with Latin America and India, which are not represented in the figures. There is only a surplus with Canada and Mexico, countries that are in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the former North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), plus the Middle East and Africa. The US manufacturing trade deficit in general, and in high-

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15 For reasons of conciseness, we only show data for manufactured products ("all manufactured products"), high-tech manufactured products, and commodities. Whenever relevant, we comment on the two other manufacturing sectors (medium and low tech), and natural resource-based manufactured products.

**Figure 6: US trade balance (in billions of dollars) with its main trading partners for all manufactured and high-tech products, and commodities, 1992–2020**




Source: UN COMTRADE; prepared by the authors.

tech manufactured products in particular, has been growing with Europe and Asian Tigers, especially from the late 1990s until today. At the same time, the manufacturing trade deficit with Japan is long lasting, and refers to a historical context that precedes our time series.

The picture that emerges is that the US is in a structural manufacturing deficit with all its main trade partners, with the exception of Canada and Mexico. The manufactured products surplus with these countries helps alleviate the enormous competitive disadvantage with China, East Asia, Japan, and Europe. Meanwhile, the US has a commodities surplus with Europe, Japan, and the Asian Tigers, but not with the USMCA countries.

China, in turn, has quite different commercial patterns (Figure 7). First, it is not in a structural manufactured products deficit. China is, instead, in a surplus condition in manufactured products with the US, Europe, Latin America, and surrounding region, plus Africa, Canada and Mexico, India, and other territories that are not represented in the figure. China also has a high-tech manufacturing surplus with the US, Europe and Latin America. It is noteworthy, however, that China is in a manufactured and high-tech products deficit with Japan and its surrounding region. This pattern is opposite to the US pattern and suggests that Chinese foreign

**Figure 7: China’s trade balance (in billions of dollars) with its main trade partners for all manufactured and high-tech products, and commodities, 1992–2020**



Source: UN COMTRADE; prepared by the authors.

trade plays an important role in activating regional dynamics, especially in high-tech products (Barbosa, 2019).

With regard to the dynamics of commodities, China is fully dependent on imports. It is in deficit with all its main trading partners, except Japan, whose trade volume in commodities is very small. Our data confirm the well-known dependence of Chinese growth on imported raw materials and natural resources.

## Final Remarks: Not a Cold War, but Systemic Competition in a Changing Capitalist World-Economy

As we have argued throughout this chapter, US-China relations have a very particular political economy dynamic. The current decline in US hegemony in economic terms was enabled by the rapid industrial development that took place in China. This was only possible after the US (and other Western countries) took the political decision to incorporate China into the Capitalist World-Economy following the start of ping-pong diplomacy.

The historical evolution of Sino-American diplomatic relations suggests that despite setbacks, especially after the Tiananmen Square incident, both countries took

a pragmatic approach with regard to trade relations. Sensitive questions raised by the US, such as “human rights,” “freedom of speech” and the “One China policy” have been left aside where trade is concerned. Under Trump’s administration, a new foreign trade policy was introduced leading to a trade war (Table 1). Even though both countries responded with tariffs for dealing with trade disputes, this had little impact on trading patterns, showing just how hard it is to change the interaction between countries structurally.

The result of 50 years of approximation is a significant economic integration with different patterns in each country. On the Chinese side, a structural trade surplus in manufactured products emerged, with deficits in commodities. The opposite happened on the US side: a structural manufacturing deficit. This strong commercial cooperation is very different from that seen in the Cold War era between the USSR and the US.

If we look closer at the last 30 years of commercial patterns in each country, it is clear that China has diversified its trading partners and laid greater emphasis on Asian economies, such as the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, and Malaysia, which grew to occupy the space that Japan had occupied in Chinese trade during the early 1990s. These countries show a trade pattern of a Chinese deficit in high-tech manufactured products, whereas in medium and low-tech products there is a trade surplus. With regions such as Europe and North America, there is a clear trade surplus in the manufacturing sector, but with some trade deficit in commodities and natural resource-based manufactured products. There are similar trade characteristics with Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Russia, and India, with a Chinese trade surplus in the manufacturing sector and a large trade deficit in commodities and natural resource-based manufactured products, which is characteristic of the classical international division of labor.

With regard to US trade patterns, China has grown largely to become its main trading partner. Other Asian countries have emerged, such as the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam. These countries have a large US trade deficit in manufactured products, especially products with a high level of technology, and a trade surplus in commodities and natural resource-based manufactured products. This same pattern is seen in trade with Japan, Europe and India. Africa, the Middle East, and North America have a US trade surplus in manufactured products, and a trade deficit in commodities and natural resource-based manufactured products. Latin America has a trade deficit with the US in manufactured products, commodities, and natural resource-based manufactured products.

To sum up, we can see that the Cold War analogy is not sufficient for dealing with US-China relations in either the economic or diplomatic fields. Economic integration between these two countries has been affected by growing animosity over the past few years, but has had little effect on the bilateral trade. In fact, the ongoing territorial dispute in Ukraine may suggest new arrangements in global value chains, but with regard to this point, not even the trade war that the Trump’s administration

promoted was able to alter economic integration to any significant degree. These events added to the old claims about human rights and “political liberalization” show how difficult it is to reverse the globalizing trends that were manifested during the early 21<sup>st</sup> century.

What does the above analysis and discussion suggest about the future of globalization? First of all, we remark on the need to differentiate between globalization as a process, and globalization as a project (Abdal et al., 2021). While economic and commercial integration between the incumbent and the emerging superpower continues to characterize the current phase in the Capitalist World-Economy, the US globalization project has broken up and seems to be abandoning its previous commitment to the world market. At the same time, China has become more and more interested in it and in a functional global order.

As we pointed out in the introduction of this work, the Belt and Road Initiative can be understood as a counter or a Chinese globalization project. If the US becomes strong enough in its emerging nationalism to block China’s rise, the Capitalist World-Economy may usher in a new era of “eternal chaos” (Arrighi, 1994), in which the destabilizing actions of the US become systemic. If China is successful in its globalization counterproject, then it may pave the way for a brand new global order with reformed institutions, in which Chinese hegemony may be established for the middle and long term. Whichever of these possible orders becomes established, economic and commercial decoupling would seem not to be looming on the horizon, at least in the short term.

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## Appendix

Table 2: Countries and regions

Region	Countries
Africa	Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco
North America	USA, Canada
Latin America	Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Venezuela, Chile, Mexico
Europe	United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Greece
East Asia	Mongolia, Rep. Of Korea, Japan, China
Middle East	Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq
South Asia	India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore
Asian Tigers	Taiwan, Rep. Of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Viet nam.

Source: UN COMTRADE; prepared by the authors.

Table 3: Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Rev. 3 and Classifications

Classification	Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Rev. 3
Commodities	1, 11, 22, 25, 34, 36, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 54, 57, 71, 72, 74, 75, 81, 91, 121, 211, 212, 222, 223, 231, 232, 244, 245, 246, 261, 263, 268, 271, 273, 274, 277, 278, 281, 286, 287, 289, 291, 292, 322, 325, 343, 344, 333, 283, 284, 285, 345, 321, 341, 971
Natural resource-based manufactures	272, 351, 421, 422, 12, 342, 16, 17, 14, 23, 24, 35, 37, 46, 47, 48, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 73, 98, 111, 112, 122, 233, 247, 248, 251, 264, 265, 269, 423, 424, 431, 621, 625, 628, 633, 634, 635, 641, 282, 288, 323, 334, 335, 411, 511, 514, 515, 516, 522, 523, 531, 532, 551, 592, 661, 662, 629, 663, 664, 667, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 961, 686, 687, 688, 689
- Low-technology manufactures	611, 581, 579, 748, 747, 746, 597, 735, 733, 731, 575, 574, 573, 571, 612, 613, 651, 652, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 831, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 851, 642, 665, 666, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 679, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 841, 699, 821, 813, 893, 896, 894, 892, 895, 883, 897, 898, 899
- Medium-technology manufactures	781, 782, 783, 811, 891, 784, 785, 266, 267, 512, 513, 525, 533, 553, 554, 562, 572, 593, 582, 583, 584, 585, 591, 598, 653, 671, 672, 678, 786, 791, 882, 711, 713, 714, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 736, 737, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 749, 762, 763, 772, 773, 775, 793, 812, 872, 873, 884, 885, 951
- High-technology manufactures	716, 542, 718, 751, 752, 759, 761, 764, 771, 774, 776, 778, 524, 541, 712, 792, 871, 874, 881

Source: UN COMTRADE and Lall (2000); prepared by the authors.



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## Rings of Geopolitical Power: The Emergence of the Space Ring

Albert J. Bergesen

Along with the world-system's political economy and world society/culture, it possesses a distinctly geopolitical side as well, which is not included in classic world-system/society theory. Along with the global economic, cultural, and societal the global geopolitical needs to be theorized as well (cf. Bergesen and Suter, 2018). In this regard, this chapter presents a model of distinctly global rings of geopolitical power—a sea ring of global naval power and the more recent emerging ring of orbital space power.

### The Equivalence Principle

We begin with the geopolitical equivalence principle:

Explanatory geographic facts must be at the same level of analysis as the political facts they are to explain.

In the case of a geopolitical explanation for the modern world-system, the geography in question must also be at the global level, matching the width of the world-system, the object to be explained. This principle raises the question: what geographic domains exist at a distinctly world level of analysis? Consider the surface of the earth; it is divided between land and water, or continents and oceans, with land covering 30% and oceans 70%. But, for geopolitics the important dimension is the fact that the world's interconnected oceans, or the world ocean, surround the world's continents. Therefore, considering land and sea at a world system level of analysis and following the geopolitical equivalence principle, the key geographic element becomes water, not land, which is chopped up into chunks, called continents, and most importantly, is surrounded by the world ocean.

## Backbone of the World-Economy

But it's not the world ocean alone, for land and sea are combined on earth, and as such yield an emergent property that doesn't exist when they are considered separately—geographic encirclement—as the world's oceans surround the world's land masses. Further, when this geographic relationship is pressed into political service it yields a distinctly global geopolitical structure, what we can call the Sea Ring. If states can master and command the world ocean, they then possess a geographic delivery vehicle for maritime encirclement of the world's continents and its residential polities, which is precisely what began to happen beginning in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, when Atlantic bordering European states explored and colonized much of the world's continents from their newly acquired command of the world's oceans. This command of the sea on a global level has remained intact right up to the present reign of the United States as the Sea Ring's hegemonic maritime state.

Over the past 500 years it has been the naval power of Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, France, Britain, and now the United States to control global shipping lanes, thereby constituting the capitalist world economy. It's no wonder then that maritime states have been both the global naval and global economic hegemons at the same time and continental powers have never been global naval or global economic hegemons. Neither Germany, Russia, Austria Hungary, or any other classic land power has ever held the twin naval/capitalist hegemonies.

## Sea Ring Resentment

While the Sea Ring generated power and wealth for its trans-Atlantic maritime states, it also created resentments and grievances for those polities who were surrounded. For the colonial Global South the result was national liberation movements and revolutions, but traditional Eurasian continental powers, such as China and Russia, were also deeply resentful.

Being encircled, and periodically penetrated by the surrounding powers of the Sea Ring, produced a culture of humiliation and resentment, such as China's "one hundred years of humiliation" (1840s–1949) of treaty ports and spheres of influence carved out by European states in a weakened Qing Dynasty. Or, more recently Russia's resentment at the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian anxiety and resentment at the West has existed for centuries, from Peter the Great to the Soviet charge of "capitalist encirclement" to Putin's encirclement charges against NATO.

Anti-colonial riots, revolts, and independence movements in the Global South have taken two forms of resistance from the Eurasian North of Germany, Russia, and China. Unable to directly confront the Sea Ring's surface fleets land powers

Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia turned to submarines. But neither the German U-Boats or Soviet nuclear subs could win the Battle of the Atlantic or the Cold War. Their second efforts, though, were in retrospect the first step by encircled Eurasian land powers to get up, out, and around, their 500-year encirclement by maritime states. In 1944 German V-2 rockets would mark not just the beginning of the Space Age, but that of the emerging Space Ring as well. Like Nazi Germany earlier, Soviet Russia during the Cold War, was a classic land power facing the Sea Ring and the hegemonic navy of the United States. Their direct encounter with the US surface fleet faced the same problem as the Germans earlier. Strength lay in nuclear submarines; not aircraft carriers, which was the principal vehicle for the US dominance of the world's oceans. Whether Russia's submarines would have been more successful in conflict versus those of the US remains unknown. Their parallel with Germany was more than just submarines vs. Sea Ring surface fleets, for in 1957 Soviet Russia launched the world's first satellite and in 1961 the world's first manned space travel (Y. Gagarin) and in 1971 the world's first space station (*Salyut*). China in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century is following in the leadership role pioneered by Germany and Russia in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

## China's Space Gambit

Having become the hub of world manufacturing, trade, and investment, as the world's second largest national economy, China is already a, if not the, national leader in international economic activity. In political economy terms though, China is vulnerable as the world's oceans, hence sea lanes, remain dominated by the US navy, and spaces between the islands of the First Island Chain provide choke points to intercept a Chinese navy coming and going to the mainland. Complicating this geographic fact, is the political fact that Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines all have security treaties with the US. Basically, China faces a regional Sea Ring naval encirclement by the US and its First Island Chain allies.

Like German and Russian earlier efforts to break the Sea Ring's grip, China's response to naval encirclement also took different forms. One was to increase security *vis-à-vis* oil imports from the middle east through financing ports along the coast of the Indian Ocean, the so called "String of Pearls," such as Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Gwadar in Pakistan, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. A second was to manufacture and arm South China Sea islets (largely in the Spratly and Paracel islands) and then claiming them to be sovereign Chinese territory. A third was adopting an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, by marshalling missiles and air power on their coast to deter US naval forces from approaching China's coast without suffering a withering attack from the Chinese military. And fourth, was China's Belt and Road Initiative. It is usually seen as a global infrastructure investments, which it is, but it is also involved the creation of a Neo-Silk Road of railroad connections between China and Europe, bypassing shipping lanes vul-



nerability to the United States Navy. The problem here, though, is that while trade with the EU has increased, 90 percent of that trade still goes by sea where the US still commands the world's oceans.

## **US Navy Doubles Down and Re-Encircles**

The Chinese push out into the Sea Ring generated push back, led by the United States. In response to Chinese financed ports in the Indo-Pacific, the US created a new fleet (1<sup>st</sup> Fleet) dedicated to only the Indo-Pacific, while the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet dedicated to the larger Pacific remains intact. In response to the manufactured islands in the Spratly's and Paracel's nearby waters claimed to be sovereign Chinese territory, the US initiated Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONO) of sailing by these islets without notifying Chinese authorities. In response to the A2/AD strategy, the US strengthened its ties to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Island Chain (Indonesia, Guam, Australia, New Zealand) and generated new encircling maritime alliances. These include the The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, or sometimes referred to as the "Asian NATO," representing an informal strategic forum between the US, Japan, Australia, and India that is maintained by semi-regular summits, information exchanges and naval drills between member countries. Naval vessels from the US, Japan, India, and Australia have also take part in multilateral exercises in the Bay of Bengal and other bodies of Indo-Pacific waters. The US and Britain have also agreed to help Australia build nuclear submarines, which when patrolling the western pacific become another sub-alignment within the pacific side of the global Sea Ring, known by the acronym, AUKUS, for Australia, UK, and US. Finally, linkages between the Atlantic and Pacific wings of the global Sea Ring are also being made, as the UK and Japan have agreed on a quasi-alliance allowing joint military exercises in the Indo-Pacific.

## **Command the Sea from Space**

China, then, faces a political economy conundrum. Economically, it is the world leader in manufacturing and trade, but politically the world's shipping lanes remain in the hands of the US navy. Even with building a world class navy the constraints of the First Island chain populated with US security allies makes breaking out of the Sea Ring's encirclement difficult. Therefore, it is understandable that China would seek to command the sea from space, as seen in the development of hypersonic glide vehicles and orbital bombardment systems that are combined with satellite anti-ship missile guidance systems. The capacity to target aircraft carriers, the center of gravity of the global reach of the United States Navy, whether from silo launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and their glide vehicle nose cones, or by orbiting bombs, moves the command of the sea from the sea itself to land (siloed missiles) and space (satellite GPS systems). The revolution of the emerging Space


Ring is command of the sea, yes, but from off the sea, a first in world history. The earlier revolution of mastering the high seas to create a geopolitical sea ring finds itself being revolutionized by an even wider encirclement of orbital space that surrounds both land and sea.

Again, we see another classic land power follow their 20<sup>th</sup> century German and Russian predecessors in seeking a wider, more encompassing geopolitical ring, above and beyond that of the world ocean. The development of space-based weapon systems and their potential capacity to target aircraft carriers moving at sea, raises the question of the vulnerability of naval forces that have dominated the world's oceans since the mid-15<sup>th</sup> century. Land powers, resentful with their sea power encirclement, push back at sea power and reach out into space, raising the question of the emergence of a new geopolitical ring, the Space Ring. It also signals the demise of geopolitics and the rise of astropolitics (cf. Bergesen, 2018, 2023).

## Space Ring Power

Water surrounds land, encircles land, and naturally pressing it into political service yields a Sea Ring of power over *vis-à-vis* non-maritime continental powers. But, orbital space surrounds both land and sea, as illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 1: Rings of geopolitical power



Source: Author.

The movement from continent bound political power to that of an encompassing global Sea Ring was profound and so will be the world historical shift once again to the Space Ring. The reliance on satellites and plans for lunar and Martian stations/settlements clearly points the way to space being a constituent domain in

any post-terrestrial world-system. In fact, world meaning all that is known and the planet Earth will have to be disengaged, for our global, earth wide, “world” system is already an earth/near earth, or earth/off planet, system. World as what is known, is now, objectively, post-Earth in nature. As a general trend we can speak of the move off planet into space, as one of de-Earthification, which can be seen in a number of historical trends, a couple of which can be identified.

## **De-Earthified Power**

First, if colonial/dependence international relations of power are examined over time, we see that less and less earthly ground is involved in establishing dominance relations and creating global hierarchies (Bergesen, 2013). Broadly speaking, European imperial relations were tied to huge chunks of land—British India, Spain in Mexico and the American Southwest, whereas American imperial relations today are comprised of ports of call, overseas bases, and alliances, and if domination of both land and sea will come from space, then, there will be no earthly grip at all. Newton spoke of “action at a distance” for the power of gravity of one celestial body upon another, and by analogy once country’s dominance of another will come from off planet sources of weapons, surveillance, and other space assets. In effect, core-periphery relations are being replaced by orbital-earth relations, the analysis of which foreshadows the rise of astrosociology over the presently earth-bound terrestrial sociology of world-system studies.

## **Cosmic Community**

Second the idea of the social community has been since its inception limited to the human community, all else relegated to nature. But over the 20<sup>th</sup> century the hermeneutic bubble of “society” has shown cracks and widened. A first step was to see humanity as part and parcel of an “ecological community” of all living things, that itself widened to consider earth itself, with talk of humanity being in essence not just global citizens, as in a world system, or global government, but more Earth Citizens. The human “country” is now planet Earth, to which we have global obligations and duties—preserve the environment, don’t pollute, reign in greenhouse gases, stop species extinctions, and so forth and so on and forth.

But upon a moments reflection it is clear that yes, humans are earthlings, but as they move out into space, their home and community is moving with them, such that we have gone from the all human community (sociology) to the all living things community (ecology) to the planet Earth community (Earth citizens) to the possibility of being cosmic being (Citizens of the cosmos). We enter here the realm of speculation and a constant danger in all space talk—the sci-fi temptation. On the other hand that fear cannot stop the inevitable shift from geo- to astro-politics, for

that is a reality that is at the center of 21<sup>st</sup> century social, political, and economic developments.

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After several decades of significantly increasing global economic, socio-cultural, and political integration, the globalization pendulum is swinging back. But what comes “After Globalization”? The 26 chapters of this volume, originally presented at the World Society Foundation’s 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration in 2022, address from different angles four core issues of “deglobalization”: First, the re-conceptualization of world society and globalization within the current context of deglobalization. Second, the dynamics that are (re)shaping the world-economy, including processes of fragmentation, regionalization, reshoring, and global and regional polarization. Third, the current dynamics of global social and cultural structures, including new globalization cleavages, political mobilization, popular protest and resistance, and political participation and democracy. Fourth, the increasing great power conflicts and global rivalries and their impact on processes of (de)globalization.

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